

THEOLOGICAL THESES.
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OF SEDAN,
AND
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FOR DISPUTATION.
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MINISTER OF THE DIVINE WORD,
AND
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To the Kind Reader.

These Theses which you see collected here, Kind Reader, were published at various times for the private use of the Academy of Sedan. But when some copies of them, flying here and there, had even crossed the sea, they fell into the hands of some eminent and learned men, with which this Island particularly abounds. And since they were approved by them, and sought after by many, they undertook this task of making them more publicly available, and collecting them into one body to be printed anew.

In the vast majority of them, as will be clear to the reader, the Author's main purpose was to elucidate and clearly explain the state of the Controversies, which for many years have been debated with such great contention of minds between the Roman Church and those who in the previous century separated from it, because of various superstitions and corruptions which had crept into it over time, and for which they could not obtain correction. In this work he still continues, and has proposed to spend what remains of his life and leisure.

However, this work will perhaps seem superfluous and useless to many. For what could be more well-known than those Controversies, which have been celebrated by the voice and pen of so many for so many years? And who has ever attempted to write about these Controversies without judging at the very threshold what is being questioned, and immediately expounding both his own opinion and that of his adversaries? Nevertheless, that most people stumble and err in this is evident even in the fact that there are perpetual complaints of the parties crying out that they suffer calumny: and that there is no more

frequent response to the arguments of the opposing party than that the arguments miss the mark and do not touch the opinion which the respondent defends.

And certainly it almost always happens in all disagreements, but especially in those concerning Religion, that neither party sufficiently grasps the mind of their adversaries, or at least does not present it sufficiently sincerely. And this is due to the hatred and contempt of the parties. Indeed, contempt causes both to be content with their own opinion and to neglect the doctrine of their adversaries, and not to labor to learn it accurately. Hatred, on the other hand, is the reason why everything the adversary puts forward is taken in a sinister way, and twisted into an inconvenient and absurd sense, which could bear either a convenient or at least less harsh interpretation. And yet all who are zealous for truth and charity should, while disputing, be careful of nothing more than not to falsely impute anything to their adversaries that is contrary to their mind, and should strive for nothing more than to clearly perceive their mind and opinion. For by what method can you move someone from their own opinion who is conscious that you do not perceive their mind? And how much prejudice does it bring to the truth, if those who defend it use calumnies and false accusations to, as it were, overwhelm their adversaries? Who also can suitably attack an opinion unknown to him? And how much bile does it stir up in a man when an adversary maliciously or ignorantly twists his words, and undeservedly attaches an absurd opinion to them, so that he can traduce him? Indeed, all men who are candid and lovers of truth shudder at and turn away from such a man, as one of bad faith. Nor is anything more alien to Christian charity than to bring a false charge against someone, especially in matters of Religion.

Moreover, for the state of any controversy to be rightly established, it is not enough for someone to properly hold his own opinion and that of his allies, content with only a confused and general notion of the opinion of his adversaries, and that still drawn only from rumor and the relation of others, which happens to not a few: But it is also necessary that he should distinctly know the Doctrine of the opposing party, and on what and what kind of foundations it rests. Therefore, the writings of both these and those must be diligently perused and examined by an accurate Disputant, and both sides must be heard with a calm and tranquil mind. But above all, attention must be paid to what is the use of Vocabulary and the meaning of Names among both. For it often happens that when the contending parties use the same words, they nevertheless take them in a different sense: which, when not noticed, makes many controversies vain, or rather logomachies, and disagreements about words, when there is agreement in the thing itself: many such are agitated in the Schools, and indeed, which is unworthy of good and serious men, with great bitterness.

Then when the opinion of those who contend with each other is to be sought, and it must be defined what each thinks, what someone has said in passing and as if doing something else, and by occasion, should not be immediately seized upon: but the places where they treat the matter in question professionally, and repeat and teach it from the foundations, should be consulted, and it should be seen what they pronounce and establish there when the whole

matter has been considered. For otherwise it happens even to good and learned men that they sometimes nod off, and while they are intent on something else, some things escape them that are harshly and inconveniently said, and which ought to be somewhat twisted, so that they might be reduced to a good sense. Especially while disputing when the mind is more excited, many things are said more vehemently and hyperbolically, and which are not approved by the one who uttered them, unless they are softened by a benign interpretation. Therefore if any such things occur in adversaries, they should not be dealt with rigidly, but equity and candor demand that we judge their mind and sense rather from those things which they teach professionally, than from those which may have escaped them in passing, and that we allow them to be interpreters of themselves, and to correct by a convenient interpretation, or at least to soften by a less inconvenient one, the things which have been badly and inconveniently said by them.

Moreover, while disputing, care must be taken not to attribute to adversaries, as if they were their own opinions and dogmas, those absurdities which follow or seem to follow from their hypotheses, even though both the consequence and the consequent are denied by them. As if someone, arguing against those who hold that the human soul is *ex traduce*, asserts that they teach that the soul is mortal: since that opinion about the generation of the soul seems to fight with its immortality. For it is far different to expressly assert and explicitly teach some false and impious dogma, and to posit something from which such a dogma follows: but against the mind of him who posits the Thesis, and with a consequence neither proved nor noticed by him. And indeed just as false follows from false, and one absurdity leads to another, there is scarcely any error in Religion so slight, which if consequence is linked to consequence, will not eventually overturn some article of Faith and some capital dogma of Religion. And yet not every error is therefore capital, and to be judged to overturn the foundation of Faith. Therefore it is indeed permissible to lead an adversary to absurdity, and from those absurdities which follow from his Theses, to show and correct their falsity: but nothing should be attributed to him as his own opinion, except what he himself expressly admits and defends.

But especially in controversies of Faith and Religion, what is held by some universal Church and communion must be accurately distinguished from what is the private opinion of some, and something about which it may be permitted to think thus with you. For what is held by some of its Doctors, while others oppose and contradict, should not be attributed to the whole Roman Church. Just as our Churches should not pay for what has been rashly asserted by some of their Theologians against the mind and opinion of others.

The author of these Theses diligently attends to all these things. For in each Question he observes the different uses of vocabulary, if there are any, in this and that School, and discerns the logomachies arising from there from real Controversies. Nor does he judge the sense of any Author from words uttered by them in passing, and while doing something else, but from those things which he teaches and affirms when treating and explaining the matter professionally. Nor does he attribute to anyone, as if they were his dogmas and opinions,

except what he himself acknowledges and defends as his own. And moreover he distinguishes private opinions of Doctors from the common and public opinion of both the Roman and Reformed Church. Nor does he attribute anything to the Roman Church, as its proper Doctrine, besides what its Councils and Popes have sanctioned, or what is taught in its Schools by common consent. And indeed that he proceeds faithfully and sincerely in this can be argued from the fact that the Doctors of the Roman Church indeed accuse him of glossing over and dissimulating the Doctrine of the Reformed, and substituting his own private one for it; and in turn some Reformed, that he softens too much the Doctrine of the Roman Church, and fashions a certain new face for it; but the same Doctors of the Roman Church bear witness to him, that he faithfully reports their own and their allies' opinion, and the Reformed that he truly and as it is expounds the Doctrine of the Protestants. For each is the best judge and interpreter of his own sense. And therefore if he satisfies the Reformed in expounding their Doctrine, and the Roman School in explaining its Doctrine, he has undoubtedly attained their sense.

Furthermore, some have wanted to render him suspect, as if he had proposed to himself to reduce all controversies which lie between the Reformed and the Roman Church to logomachies. But the mere reading of this Work abundantly frees him from such suspicion. For there occur in it not a few Questions, in which he shows that there is a most serious, and most real dissension between Protestants and the Roman Church; and many of this kind remain which he has not yet touched; and which he hopes to explain by the same method, if God prolongs his life. But what he thinks about that Union which many in various ways are contriving between the Roman Church and Protestants, you will find explained in a singular Disputation, which is inserted into the body of these Theses.

Meanwhile farewell kind Reader, and enjoy the present work.

Index of all Theses in this book.

**Theological Theses,
On Faith.
BY ORDER OF
THE ACADEMIC SENATE
OF SEDAN
Subjected to Public Disputation.
The AUTHOR Responding, on May 29, 1645.**

Thesis I.

Faith taken Theologically in general, is the assent which we give to God speaking, when we are certainly persuaded that something is true, moved to that by Divine Authority. And by this faith is distinguished from opinion, which is a timid and uncertain assent. Likewise from knowledge, which is indeed a certain assent; but one which rests on demonstration or some evident argument, not truly on anyone's testimony. Finally, from human faith, which acquiesces in the authority of men.

II. Therefore not every assent, even applied to those things which are contained in the Word of God, should be considered faith. For if someone certainly and firmly holds some dogma of religion, such as the creation of all things out of nothing: yet not impelled to that by divine revelation, but by some reason which seems necessary to him, to that extent he does not have faith. As does he who believes the history of the Israelite people from the account of Josephus the Historian, not truly giving faith to the sacred histories. Which can also be said about those who adhere to the true and orthodox religion, but only from custom, and moved to that by the authority of ancestors alone.

III. But it is permitted to assign from the Scriptures various either species or degrees of faith. For in some, faith remains in the theoretical intellect: and thus they give a bare and simple assent to those things which are proposed by the Word of God, so that they are not moved by it to act rightly, nor are they rendered better. Thus Simon Magus believed the preaching of Philip, yet his heart was not right, and he was placed in the most bitter gall and bond of iniquity, as is held in Acts 8. Thus also those had believed in the name of Christ, to whom nevertheless Christ did not entrust himself, because he thoroughly knew all, as we read in John 2. And the demons themselves share this faith in their own way, who are said by James to believe and tremble.

IV. This is the faith which is called historical by our people. It does not take its name from its object: as if it were only of those things which are narrated historically in the Scriptures. For those who are endowed with this faith truly believe whatever is contained in the sacred writings; no less promises, dogmas, and precepts than histories and narratives. For many of the impious do not doubt the truth of the Gospel promises, nor do the demons call them into

doubt. But that faith is called historical from the mode in which it concerns its object. Just as when we read histories not pertaining to us, we contemplate them nakedly, nor are we affected and moved inwardly by them, so those who have that faith speculatively gaze at the things which the Word of God teaches, nor do they refer them to practice.

V. But it is asked whether this faith should be called true. The Doctors of the Roman Church affirm it. And this can be conceded to them in some sense. For that faith believes only those things which are true, and truly believes them, not fictitiously and feignedly. But nevertheless that faith alone seems to us to be absolutely called true which is justifying and salvific, such as we deny that to be.

VI. From this faith another degree of faith does not differ much, which can be observed in Scripture. For there are those in whom faith not only illuminates the theoretical mind, but also somewhat affects the practical: so that they do not simply believe the Evangelical truth: but they are tickled by it with some joy, and in some way abstain from their vices and worldly desires. But truly their mind is only lightly imbued with that faith, nor has it penetrated deeply enough and taken root in the heart. Nor also do they truly and sincerely renounce their own vices and desires, and the love of the world and of earthly things always remains in their heart. Whence it happens that if a somewhat heavier cross must be borne and persecution assails, they suffer scandal and cast off faith. Which they also often do in obedience to their desires and weighed down by the cares of this life.

VII. These are those whom Christ notes in the parable, namely those who immediately receive the Word of God with joy, but do not have root in themselves and are temporary: and when affliction or persecution arises on account of the word, they are immediately offended. Such also are those about whom Peter speaks in his second epistle, chapter 2: "For if after they have escaped the pollutions of the world through the knowledge of the Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, they are again entangled in them and overcome, the latter end is worse for them than the beginning." And of this kind also are those whom the Apostle so severely threatens in Hebrews chapters 6 and 10. Our schools call this temporary faith: the name taken from the words of Christ which we just cited.

VIII. But there is also a certain faith which is numbered among the peculiar gifts of the Spirit in 1 Corinthians 12:9, and which does not fall to all who are in the Church: but to certain few, as it seemed good to the Holy Spirit. This is the faith by which miracles are performed, whence it has also taken its name. And it is found in him who, called by God to perform miracles and having a promise about this matter (just as the Apostles had from the mouth of Christ, and many others from the internal revelation of the Spirit), does not hesitate or distrust: but is certainly persuaded that God can and will effect those stupendous works through him. Christ speaks of this faith in Mark 11:22 when he says to the disciples, "Have faith in God. Truly I say to you, whoever says to this mountain, 'Be taken up and thrown into the sea,' and does not doubt in his heart, but believes that what he says will come to pass, it will be done for him." Christ also reproaches the disciples for their lack of this faith in Matthew 17:20, when he attributes the reason why they could not cast out the demon to their

unbelief. And the Apostle refers to this in 1 Corinthians 13: "If I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing."

IX. Finally, there is another faith to which Scripture attributes our righteousness and salvation, to which it vehemently and frequently exhorts us, and which it adorns with the highest praises and commendations. And this is what we call justifying, salvific, living, and true faith.

X. But here we have a dispute with the Doctors of the Roman Church: for they confuse justifying faith with that which we just called historical, and make no distinction between them: but plainly want them to be one and the same. Then they also teach that the faith of miracles is nothing other than a certain excellent degree of justifying faith.

XI. But it is not difficult to prove that justifying faith should be distinguished from historical faith. For if historical faith were the same as justifying faith, then whoever had historical faith would by that very fact have justifying faith: But hypocrites and many impious are endowed with historical faith who nevertheless lack justifying faith. For of this Scripture says, "Whoever believes has eternal life," and "Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes," and "the righteousness of God is revealed in the Gospel to all and upon all who believe." Whence it is evident that no one is endowed with such faith who is not a partaker of righteousness and salvation. And consequently another faith must be assigned to those who are in a state of perdition and remain in sin, if they are said to believe.

XII. And certainly what the Papists say about these passages helps our opinion. For they say that when Scripture says, "Whoever believes has eternal life," it must be understood about those who believe as they ought and with the whole heart: and that there are many who believe in the Son, yet do not have life; that is because they believe badly and not with the whole heart and as they ought: as can be seen in Bellarmine, On Justification, Book 1, Chapter 10, paragraph "Add that". But who can affirm with any reason that the faith by which someone believes well is the same as that by which someone believes badly: that by which someone believes as he ought, and that by which someone believes as he ought not? Or that the faith by which someone believes badly, and not with the whole heart and as he ought, is justifying faith, which the Apostle says is imputed for righteousness? Romans chapter 4.

XIII. Then it is also manifest that the faith of miracles is not an eminent degree of justifying faith, from the fact that some are endowed with that faith who nevertheless do not have justifying faith. For to many who will say to Christ, "Did we not prophesy in your name, and cast out demons in your name, and do many mighty works in your name?" Christ will respond, "I never knew you," as Christ himself testifies in Matthew 7:22. Add that the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 12:9 numbers faith of signs among the various charismata of the Spirit, which the Papists call Graces freely given. But an eminent degree of justifying faith pertains to grace making one pleasing [to God]. For it is given for the salvation of him who has it: not truly, as those free gifts of the Spirit, for the salvation of others. Then, if the faith of miracles were an excellent degree of justifying faith, Christ, reproaching the disciples for their lack of

that faith, would not say to them, "If you had faith like a grain of mustard seed, you could say to this mountain, 'Move from here to there,' and it would move, and nothing would be impossible for you." For a grain of mustard seed denotes something very small in the Scriptures, and it is as much as if Christ were saying, "If you had even a little bit of faith."

XIV. But justifying faith is that by which not only the theoretical intellect is illuminated, so that it certainly believes those things which are taught by the Word of God; but also the practical mind of man is so affected that it refers those things to practice and applies them to itself. If indeed the truly faithful so believes, for example, the promises of the Gospel concerning the remission of sins, concerning eternal happiness and glory, that he firmly and effectually judges that his highest good and blessedness, to which he must aspire with all his strength, is situated in those things: thus he gives faith to the mysteries of our redemption so that he plainly thinks that consolation and peace of conscience must be sought in them: finally, he so considers the divine commands that he certainly resolves with himself that his life must be spent according to them.

XV. Whence it can be clear that justifying faith is so different from historical and temporary faith that it includes all its power: and so is distinguished from it as the perfect from the imperfect: or by that distinction by which a higher degree differs from a lower. For justifying faith is related to the remaining species of faith as the rational soul is to the sensitive and vegetative; whose power and faculties, life, sense, and motion it eminently embraces, and adds the degree of reason. For thus also justifying faith makes us believe all things which are taught by the Word of God, which historical faith accomplishes. And if God promises something special and calls to the working of a miracle, then it also supplies the power of miraculous faith; nor does he who now believes the Word of God as is fitting, if a special promise is directed to him, need a new habit to give assent to it. Whence it is that the Apostle, commending the power and efficacy of salvific faith, attributes to it various miraculous works which holy men once performed or which were done by their grace: saying, "By faith the fathers passed through the Red Sea," and "By faith the walls of Jericho fell down," and "By faith some stopped the mouths of lions and quenched the violence of fire." Hebrews 11. But above the remaining species of faith, justifying faith has that it more clearly irradiates the theoretical mind and more fully imbues the practical, and penetrates more deeply, and engenders a keener sense of truth and firmer assent in our minds than historical or temporary faith. Then also it refers whatever it has drawn from the Word of God to action and the conducting of life: and applies it to itself in the way we have said.

XVI. Which application indeed must be rightly understood, and in what sense has now been explained. Not truly in such a way that the proper act of justifying faith, by which it is discerned from other species of faith, consists in this - that someone induces in his mind that his sins are remitted, and that he is a son of God predestined to life, and will certainly be a partaker of salvation. For this persuasion, if it is legitimate, necessarily presupposes faith and arises from it: and so cannot be its primary act. For since the remission of sins and eternal life are promised to no one absolutely in the Gospel, but under the condition of faith

and repentance: in order for us to be certain of the grace of God and our salvation, it is necessary that we first establish our faith and repentance. Whence it is manifest that that certainty is a consequence of faith, not truly faith itself: or if someone wants it to pertain to faith, at least it is not its primary act.

XVII. But in order for the nature of faith to be more fully understood, it is necessary to discuss its object and subject, cause and effects a little more widely. And indeed it is evident from what has been said that the object of faith is those things which have been revealed by God, and insofar as they have been revealed by God; So that the material object of faith are those things which are contained in the Word of God: but the formal object is the divine authority and truth itself.

XVIII. Therefore Bellarmine does not rightly dispute against our people, as if they entirely restricted the object of salvific faith to the promise of the remission of sins alone. For we establish as the object of that faith not only those things which are promised in the Gospel, but also whatever else is taught, narrated, and commanded in the Word of God. Which the Apostle teaches in Hebrews 11, where speaking of justifying faith, he says, "By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which are visible." And likewise that Noah by faith believed the divine warning about the coming flood, being moved with fear by which he constructed the ark to save his household.

XIX. But here it must be noted that all things which are set before our faith do not equally pertain to its object. For just as in the objects of human sciences, certain things are those whose cognition is chiefly intended, and those are called the principal object: as for example, in logic the syllogism and demonstration: but others which are only proposed for the elucidation of those former things, and so that they may be known more easily and fully: and these are the secondary and less principal object of the science; so also the matter holds in the doctrine of faith. For certain things are set before faith primarily and principally, but others secondarily and less principally. But that principal object are those things without which one cannot arrive at salvation, nor rightly institute life: such as those which are called the articles of faith, summarily embracing the mysteries of salvation, and likewise the divine precepts. But the Word of God contains many other things which pertain only to their confirmation and fuller knowledge, as are, for example, the various histories and miracles which are narrated in the Scriptures, and those are the secondary object of faith.

XX. Moreover, it is necessary that those things which pertain to the principal object of faith be believed distinctly; but the rest it is enough if they are believed confusedly. Those things are believed distinctly which faith apprehends separately and one by one. And this is the faith which is called explicit. Confusedly, those things which are not apprehended in particular, but only in some common principle in which they are contained: and this is the faith which they call implicit. For example, he who believes that the book of Judges is divinely inspired, yet has not read it nor heard anything recited about it: he indeed believes that the histories contained there are true, but implicitly and confusedly. But he who reads

those histories and knows one by one the things narrated in that book about Samson and Gideon and the rest of the leaders of the Israelite people, he has explicit and distinct faith of Them.

XXI. But since God did not manifest the whole doctrine of redemption and salvation to men at once and at one time, but in many ways and in many parts, and at first more obscurely, then more clearly; it follows from this that according to the various distinctions of times, faith had to be more or less explicit. For revelation is the measure of faith: and the more things are distinctly revealed, the more it is necessary that faith be extended to more things. And consequently from us, to whom the Gospel has been clearly made known, the explicit faith of many articles is required as necessary, of which under the Old Testament implicit faith once Sufficed.

XXII. But here it must also be noted that when we say that implicit faith of many things which are contained in the Word of God is sufficient, this should not be taken as if it were praiseworthy to acquiesce in any kind of knowledge of the principal heads of faith, nor should fuller knowledge be sought. For although the distinct faith of few articles is required as plainly necessary for salvation, nevertheless this is also certain - that each one is bound to apply all effort, according to the mode of his calling, to advance more and more in the doctrine of salvation and to be instructed more fully and copiously in the Word of God. To which the Apostle diligently exhorts the faithful in Colossians 2:2 and 3:16. And consequently those gravely err and sin who, under the pretext of implicit faith, foster the stupid and crass ignorance of the people.

XXIII. But in order to better know what the object of faith is, it must be considered what the Apostle teaches in Hebrews 11:1 - that faith is of those things which are not seen; which Paul also confirms by opposing faith to sight in 1 Corinthians 5:7. But here those things are said to be seen which fall under the senses: then, which through themselves move the intellect to the cognition of themselves and are so set before the mind that our intellect is compelled to assent to them by a certain innate splendor of truth, nor does it need the testimony of anyone for this: Such are the first principles known through themselves, and those things which are demonstrated by some evident reason in the sciences.

XXIV. Therefore we do not properly hold by faith those things which we perceive by sense, nor also those things which have been necessarily and evidently demonstrated to us. Hence also it is that faith is said to be abolished in the future age, in which sight will succeed faith, and we will see face to face. For those things which faith now proposes to be believed, such as that God is three and one, and that Christ is God and man, we will know those very things in the life to come, and we will assent to them; but this because we will openly discern and contemplate the truth in the things themselves. But now we see as through a mirror and in a riddle: and that we persuade ourselves that those mysteries are true, we do not do this sufficiently convinced by a certain light emanating from the object itself; but voluntarily submitting our intellect to the divine truth which testifies about them. This obscurity and inevidence is involved in the nature of faith: and therefore when it is removed by the clear

and evident manifestation of truth, faith is said to be abolished, not perfected. Whereas on the contrary love is said never to fail, although here it is imperfect and all imperfection is to be removed from it in the heavenly homeland. Because of course that imperfection is accidental to love, it does not pertain to its nature and essence, as obscurity and inevidence pertain to the nature of faith.

XXV. But here it must be noted that there is a twofold evidence, one external, the other internal. Internal evidence is that splendor of truth shining forth from the thing itself and necessarily drawing the mind to assent. But external evidence is when it is evidently established not from the light of the thing itself which is set forth, but from elsewhere that it must be believed. And thus nothing prohibits those things which are of faith from being evident. Thus from the miracles of the Apostles and Christ it was evident that faith should be given to their words. And to those who are illuminated by the light of faith it is evident that the divine mysteries must be believed, on account of the authority of God speaking and approving his word to them by illustrious marks and criteria. And they manifestly judge that whatever things are brought forth from the Word of God are worthy of belief: because they see that those things are confirmed by God, who is the first and highest truth.

XXVI. But although those things which are of faith are not so evident as those things which are taught in the human sciences, they are nevertheless no less certain for that reason. For the divine testimony is more certain than any demonstration. But here also a twofold certainty must be distinguished, one by reason of the object and in itself: the other by reason of the subject and as to us. For indeed those things which constitute the object of faith are in themselves no less certain, indeed more certain, than those things which are known demonstratively and through arguments. For nothing is more certain and firm than the divine truth, on whose authority they depend. But truly by reason of the subject and as to us, faith is not so certain as it ought to be, but is shaken and impelled by various temptations.

XXVII. As far as pertains to the subject of faith, a twofold subject can here be considered, one of inherence, the other of denomination: the former is the faculty in which faith inheres: the latter the person who is endowed with faith and is denominated from faith. But that faculty in which faith inheres is none other than the mind or intellect, not truly also the will, as it has seemed to some. Which is manifest from the object of faith: for the formal object of faith is divine truth. But truth according to its proper nature is set before the mind, not truly the will.

XXVIII. Then this very thing is evident from the act of faith: for the act of faith consists in two things, namely in the apprehension of those things which are revealed by the Word of God: and also in the judgment or assent which we give to them. But both of these pertain to the mind: For it belongs to it to apprehend or conceive things: and also to judge about them by assenting or dissenting.

XXIX. Certainly those who place faith also in the will are moved to that because they confuse trust with faith, and think trust is the principal act of faith and as it were its form. But in that they are deceived, or do not speak accurately enough. For trust is an effect of faith, not truly

an act and form of faith. And if we want to speak properly, trust pertains to hope, not to faith. For it is nothing other than hope strengthened and confirmed. And certainly the Apostle manifestly distinguishes trust from faith in Ephesians 3:12, "In Christ," he says, "we have boldness and access with confidence through faith in him." Where faith is placed as the cause of trust or confidence, since we are said to have trust or confidence through faith: which would be said absurdly if trust and faith were the same thing. For this being posited, the sense of the passage would be, "Through trust we have trust"; which is nugatory.

XXX. But those in whom true faith is found are all and only those who are predestined to eternal life. For that faith falls to them from the decree of divine election; and therefore it is called by Paul, "the faith of God's elect," Titus 1:1. Whence it happens that without it no one can be saved, nor does anyone have it who does not obtain salvation. For that assent which imitates true faith in some of the reprobate is temporary faith, about which we spoke above: and it must be distinguished from justifying and saving faith.

XXXI. But as to what is often asked here, whether elect and saved infants also have faith, it is plain indeed that they cannot have actual faith; but nothing prohibits a certain habitual faith, or rather the seed and root of faith, from being infused in them. And certainly it cannot happen that God would purge from every stain of original sin as many infants as he admits into his heavenly kingdom, which nothing defiled and contaminated enters. Since therefore original sin in infants includes a certain seed of unbelief, just as of all vices, while God cleanses them, he undoubtedly takes away that innate unbelief, and so infuses the principle and a certain seed of faith. For God does not purge his own from vices except by infusing the contrary habits of virtues.

XXXII. Moreover, whatever that may be, whether faith or the root of faith and disposition to faith which can be found in infants, it is beyond controversy that it must be attributed to God alone, and that the offices of man do not concur with it: nor can it be called into doubt by anyone: but Scripture also manifestly teaches that the same must be thought about the faith of adults, for it calls faith the gift of God, Eph. 2:8, "By grace you have been saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God." And to the Philippians the Apostle says that it was freely given to them to believe in Christ, Phil. 1:29.

XXXIII. But in order for it to be better known how much we owe to God in the matter of faith, it must be noted that the mysteries which are proposed to our faith to be believed are so hidden and sublime that the mind of men, indeed even of angels, could never have penetrated them and raised itself to them. For they are, as the Apostle says, "things which no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man." Therefore it was necessary for God to speak them forth and reveal them by his word, otherwise they would have remained completely unknown; nor would any man or Angel have ever thought anything about them.

XXXIV. But it is not enough for God to have revealed the mysteries of salvation and taken care that they be announced to men. For two things especially stand in the way of men receiving and acknowledging those things revealed and outwardly proposed. First, the

blindness of the human mind and the darkness with which it is covered by sin. Then, the insuperable perversity of the will turned away from God and immersed in earthly things. And therefore, in order to engender faith in us, it is necessary for God to heal and open the eyes of our mind and pour over our intellect a certain internal light, so that we may thus acknowledge God speaking. Then also it is necessary for him to prepare our will by his grace and move it and correct and tame its depravity and rebellion, lest it resist the illuminating Holy Spirit, as happens in unbelievers, but yield and submit to his admonitions and inspiration.

XXXV. Which indeed God accomplishes certainly and effectually. For he does not leave the will to its own choice, so that it may either follow or not follow the leading of the Holy Spirit: but he bends and inclines it with such great force that it necessarily follows. Nor does God only bring it about by grace that we believe if we want to, but that we want to believe and truly believe. For he himself is the one who works in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good pleasure, as the Apostle teaches in Phil. 2:13. Whence it is evident that the whole praise of our faith must be referred to God, nor is even the least part left to us, according to that saying of Paul, "What do you have that you did not receive?" Likewise, "Who makes you different from another?"

XXXVI. But it can hardly be said enough what effects it has and how excellent are the fruits borne by so precious a gift of God. For faith is what unites us to Christ, what receives the remission of sins, what brings justification, life, and salvation, and carries off the victory over the world and Satan. Then also it begets peace of conscience and fills the soul with confidence and joy unspeakable. And this, because the believer, feeling that he believes and taught from the Word of God that whoever believes does not perish nor come into condemnation but has passed from death to life, and that faith is the pledge of our adoption and election, is certain of the remission of sins and knows that he has eternal life and belongs to the number of the sons and elect of God. And thus he has the material for immense joy and the highest confidence and the greatest peace and tranquility of soul.

XXXVII. For although that certain persuasion of the remission of sins, the grace of God, and thus of salvation is not properly faith itself, as was said above, yet it is born from faith and accompanies it. And certainly it is legitimate and is found in the faithful, as the examples of the saints convince, who in the Scriptures speak as being entirely persuaded about their own salvation and the special love of God toward them, as the adversaries themselves confess about David and Paul. But when they say that they had that certainty from a peculiar revelation, Scripture gives no indication of that matter. For Paul, testifying to his confidence and certainty of salvation, does not bring forward other arguments than those which are common to all the faithful, as can be seen from the passages themselves.

XXXVIII. Add that even if the Apostle had had that certainty from a special revelation, yet his one example would suffice to show the vanity of the arguments by which the adversaries attack that persuasion which we attribute to the faithful about their salvation and God's mercy toward them. As if that persuasion would induce carnal security and take away the

use of prayers and the desire to live well. For it was not because Paul was certain of his salvation that he therefore abstained from prayers and ceased from doing good, but he always remained in that pious solicitude to work out his salvation.

XXXIX. But for engendering such a persuasion in us there is no need of any particular revelation: for the general promises made to believers suffice for this, then that each one may see and feel that he is endowed with that living and effectual faith which God requires. But that the faithful can see their faith and certainly recognize it, the Apostle shows sufficiently when he thus exhorts the Corinthians: "Examine yourselves to see whether you are in the faith, test yourselves. Or do you not recognize yourselves, that Jesus Christ is in you? - unless indeed you are disqualified," 2 Cor. 13:5. For that exhortation is in vain if true and sincere faith cannot be recognized and discerned by him who possesses it. And it is plain that the Apostle there puts forward as something amazing and stupendous that someone has Christ dwelling in him by faith, yet does not recognize it, not knowing himself.

XL. But what is especially to be noted here is that faith purifies hearts and works through love: which indeed no one dares to deny belongs to true faith, since they are the very words of Scripture. But it is asked whether faith necessarily accomplishes that and always has love joined to it. The Papists deny it and want true faith often to be without love: we on the contrary affirm it, moved to that by many testimonies of Scripture.

XLI. And first indeed, that faith and love are so conjoined that they are never separated is shown by those passages which teach about all who believe in general that they obtain remission of sins and righteousness through Christ and have the right of the sons of God and of eternal life. For since those things do not fit those who are devoid of love, it follows from this that those who have faith also have love. Furthermore, as John says in 1 John 5:1, "Everyone who believes that Jesus is the Christ is born of God." But whoever is born of God has both love and is zealous for good works. For "everyone who is born of God does not sin," that is, is not given over to sin, as is contained in the same epistle.

XLII. Then, to truly know God and to have true faith about God are in reality one and the same thing. But he who does not love God and remains in sins does not know God with true and saving knowledge. "For he who says, 'I know God,' and does not keep his commandments is a liar, and the truth is not in him," as the same John testifies in 1 John 2:4. Related to this is what he says in the same chapter, verse 11: "But he who hates his brother is in darkness and walks in darkness, and does not know where he is going, because the darkness has blinded his eyes." Whence it is manifest that no one can lack love and hate his brother and yet be endowed with true faith. For he who has true faith is not in darkness, nor does he have a blinded mind. Since indeed he has the eyes of his mind illuminated by the Spirit of wisdom and revelation: Indeed, faith is that very light by which the darkness is dispelled from our mind.

XLIII. Finally, Scripture takes the faithful and the holy for the same thing, as for example in 2 Thess. 1:10: "When he comes to be glorified in his saints and to be admired among all those who believe in that day." A manifest indication that faith cannot be separated from holiness.

**Theological Theses,
On Theology.
ÆGIDIUS WARNIER of Aachen Responding,
on August 13, 1646.**

Thesis I.

Theology, according to the etymology of the word, signifies discourse about God. And it is taken in general for every doctrine which treats of God and divine things. Therefore, since it is possible to treat of God in two ways, first from principles known by the natural light, then from principles which have been disclosed by God in a supernatural way, hence also a twofold Theology is usually distinguished: One, namely, Natural: The other Supernatural.

II. Natural theology is called that part of Philosophy which especially treats of immaterial being and God. Thus Aristotle himself calls Metaphysics in the first book of the Metaphysics. But supernatural theology is that doctrine about God which has its origin from divine revelation. And this Theology is said absolutely and autonomously. And henceforth we are to deal with this alone.

III. Furthermore, there is a twofold habit which rests on revelation, one by which we simply believe and embrace the things which are contained in the Word of God. And this habit is nothing other than faith itself. The other by which someone is fit to distinctly explain the things which faith believes, and to assert and vindicate them by various reasons, and to deduce legitimate consequences from them. And this habit is properly called Theology.

IV. But Theology thus taken is related to faith as science is to understanding. For faith is the habit of principles: but Theology the habit of conclusions. The primary and principal object of faith are certain truths immediately and expressly revealed by God. But those things are properly set before Theology which are only mediately and virtually revealed, that is, which are gathered by discourse from those first things immediately revealed. Therefore, although Theology is distinguished from faith, it nevertheless presupposes faith and in a certain way includes it. But faith does not necessarily bring Theology with it.

V. But many things are usually disputed about Theology in the Schools. But what we have now proposed to teach about this argument will be referred to these heads. 1. What is the necessity of Theology, and how great. 2. What is its nature, where its genus and difference must be inquired into. 3. Finally, what is the dignity and excellence of Theology above the remaining sciences.

VI. As far as the first is concerned, it is certain that Theology through itself is not necessary for the salvation of individuals, that is, it is not necessary that all who arrive at eternal life be endowed with theological knowledge: for in the Church not all are teachers, as the Apostle teaches in 1 Cor. 12, nor on that account are they deprived of salvation. Since indeed faith suffices for the salvation of individuals, but a fuller and more ample knowledge of the things of faith is not necessarily required.

VII. Nevertheless Theology, that is, such knowledge of divine things which can defend, explain, and persuade faith itself, is necessary in the Church, for this purpose - that the Church may stand and be able to be preserved, and thus that individuals may attain salvation. The Apostle teaches this in Ephesians 4, where besides other things he affirms that Christ instituted teachers in his Church "for the perfecting of the saints" and edification of the body of Christ, "so that we may no longer be children, tossed to and fro by the waves and carried about by every wind of doctrine." Whence it is evident that there is danger, if there are not teachers in the Church, of its structure being dissolved and edifice collapsing, and of individuals falling away from the faith, carried away by many and various errors. Furthermore, the same Apostle in Titus 1 requires as a necessary condition in a Bishop that he be able to exhort in sound doctrine and refute those who contradict - which he who is not educated in sacred matters beyond the common faithful cannot do.

VIII. And certainly the Church has never been without such men who surpassed the pious and faithful people in knowledge of divine things. For once teachers of this kind were the Patriarchs and Prophets, who had their own schools and disciples - who are called the sons of the Prophets in Scripture. Of this kind the hill of God which is mentioned in 1 Samuel 10 is thought to have been a school. And from there to have taken its name, because divine doctrine was taught on it. Similarly in 2 Chronicles 34 mention is made of "the Mishneh" in which Huldah the prophetess is said to have lived. Which word "Mishneh" is translated by many as school or college, which our French version has followed. Since from the usage of the Chaldaic and Rabbinic language שנה signifies to learn and teach. Whence the Talmudic text is called by the Hebrews משנה as if you were to say doctrine or discipline, through a certain antonomasia.

IX. After the times of the Prophets also, the Jewish Church had its own Theologians, who were called חכמים "Wise men", רבנים "Masters", and סופרים "Scribes". By which title Ezra himself is designated in the book which bears his name. And of this kind also were those who are called in the Gospel νομικοί and νομοδιδάσκαλοι, doctors and experts of the law. From whom Christ, taking away the key of knowledge, handed it over to the Apostles, Pastors, and Doctors, who are in their own way their successors.

X. But besides the Bishops and ordinary Pastors, from whom at least some knowledge of Theology is required, the Christian Church from the beginning had its own schools and Doctors professing sacred doctrine in them and expounding the divine writings. The Alexandrian school was especially famous, in which, if Jerome is to be believed in his book on Ecclesiastical Writers, there had been in continuous succession, from the times of Mark the Evangelist to his own times, Ecclesiastical Doctors. Of whom Pantaenus is especially remembered, and Clement of Alexandria who succeeded him.

XI. And certainly from the very necessity of faith the necessity of Theological knowledge is inferred. For faith cannot be propagated and endure unless there are those who teach, persuade and defend the faith. But it is not for every believer to accomplish this - but only for those who are skilled in Scripture and divine matters. Therefore for the preservation of faith

and the Church, and consequently for the salvation of men, Theology is necessary - that is, men skilled in divine matters are necessary in the Church to engender, foster and nourish faith in others - although it is not necessary that each individual be so learned and skilled.

XII. Thus it is clear concerning the necessity of Theology. But now in order for us to hold clearly and distinctly what it is, first its genus must be inquired into. It is asked therefore first whether our Theology is knowledge. On which matter we say that Theology is not knowledge, speaking accurately and according to the definition of knowledge posited by Aristotle. For knowledge according to Aristotle is evident assent: But Theological conclusions are not evident. And this because they are gathered from inevident principles. For faith is the habit of Theological principles. But faith is an inevident habit. For the Apostle opposes faith to sight: 2 Corinthians 5, "For we walk by faith, not by sight." And in Hebrews 11 he teaches that faith is of those things which are not seen, "Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen."

XIII. But those things are said to be evident which move the intellect through themselves to the cognition of themselves, that is, which persuade and commend themselves to the mind, and so strike and convince the mind by their light that it cannot not assent to them. Which it is plain does not belong to the mysteries of our faith. For they are not things known through themselves, whose truth reveals itself to our mind from itself. But that we assent to them, we do this on account of the authority and testimony of God who has revealed them by his Word and confirmed them.

XIV. But here a distinction must be made between the evidence of the consequent and of the consequence. For indeed Theological conclusions are not evident - but nevertheless the consequence by which they are deduced from their principles is evident. They are indeed gathered from inevident premises - but evidently gathered. For example, that Christ is true God and true man is a principle of faith which is not evident from itself but is believed on account of the testimony of God alone. But nevertheless from this it evidently follows that there are two wills in Christ, one divine and the other human. And therefore in this part nothing is lacking to Theology for the true nature of knowledge.

XV. But although Theology is not knowledge properly and strictly speaking, and according to all the conditions of knowledge posited by Aristotle, nevertheless there is no habit of the mind which it approaches more and to which it should rather be reduced. For it is certain cognition evidently deduced from certain principles which, although they are inevident, are nevertheless no less certain than if they were evident. And therefore it is rightly and fittingly called knowledge, nor can it be designated by any other more apt name.

XVI. Furthermore, Theology is one knowledge in species, not multiple. For although it treats of greatly diverse things, for example, of God, of Angels, of man, of virtues and vices, which seem to pertain to completely diverse sciences, nevertheless all those things agree in one common notion under which they appear to and are set before Theology. Which common notion is divine revelation. For those things which I have mentioned do not fall under the consideration of the Theologian in just any way - but insofar as they can be known through

divine revelation. For, for example, the Theologian does not teach whatever can be taught about the nature, powers and duty of man, but only those things which he has learned and gathered from the Word of God.

XVII. But here it must be noted that not whatever things God reveals in any way pertain to the object of Theology. For God can have revealed certain things privately to many, which do not fall under this science. But here by revelation we understand that which is common to the whole Church and has been made for its common usefulness, and which God has willed to be consigned to writings. Since indeed the Theologian ought to prove his assertions not from private revelations made to this or that person, but from sacred Scripture.

XVIII. Furthermore, Theology does not seem to be a merely speculative science, nor merely practical, but practical and speculative at the same time. And this because Theology treats of many things which pertain to science both practical and speculative. For it contemplates God and the divine mysteries which do not fall under action, and also it gives precepts of life and teaches what are the morals worthy of a Christian man.

XIX. Nevertheless, we judge Theology to be more practical than speculative. Since indeed all of Theology is occupied in the explication and defense of those things which are contained in the Scriptures. But the doctrine contained in the Scriptures, from the purpose of God himself teaching and revealing, is referred to action, namely to the love of God and neighbor. Nor has he attained the purpose of this doctrine who does not refer whatever he has learned from the Word of God to that end. For Christ affirms in Matthew 22 that the law and the Prophets hang on these two commandments, namely, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul," and "You shall love your neighbor as yourself." Then Paul says in Romans 15, "For whatever was written in former days was written for our instruction, that through endurance and through the encouragement of the Scriptures we might have hope." But especially the most to be weighed are his words in 2 Timothy 3, "All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness, that the man of God may be complete, equipped for every good work."

XX. To this pertains that the Gospel is called by the same Paul "the doctrine that accords with godliness," 1 Timothy 6. For this is from nothing else than that the principal purpose of the Gospel is to form us to piety. Indeed, those articles which seem to pertain most to contemplation, namely about the divinity and incarnation of the Son of God, are called by the Apostle specifically the mystery of godliness in chapter 3 of the same Epistle. Add that the habit of Theological principles is faith. But true faith is a practical habit. But of the same kind is the habit of principles and the habit of conclusions.

XXI. As far as pertains to the object of Theology, it must be noted that sometimes the object of a science is said to be whatever the science in any way considers. Thus the object of Theology is not one. For it considers many and greatly diverse things - God, the Church, Angels, Sacraments. All of which nevertheless agree in one common appellation, insofar as they fall under the consideration of the Theologian. For whatever things the Theologian

treats can be called divine things. For they are either God himself or other things which are in some way ordered to God. Nor is anything properly considered by the Theologian except with some respect to God. Therefore, if someone were to ask about the object of Theology, it could be answered not ineptly that that object is divine things.

XXII. But for the most part the object of any science is said to be that whose knowledge the science chiefly intends to give us, and on account of which it considers all other things - because, namely, they conduce to its fuller and more perfect notion. God is an object of Theology of this kind, which almost all confess, and the very word Theology teaches, which as was noted above signifies discourse about God - but it is not agreed whether that object is God simply, as God is, or under a certain respect. The former is defended by the more celebrated Scholastics following Thomas Aquinas, and they establish that the object of Theology is God as God is, and as they say, under the aspect of Deity. But this seems to us too lax and general. Nor is the purpose of Theology to lead us simply into the knowledge of God as God is, but it treats of God with some respect to men.

XXIII. Therefore it can be said more fittingly that the object of Theology is God as God is and the savior of men. For indeed all of Scripture proposes God to us under this respect. And it chiefly intends to teach us what are the benefits of God toward men, and what worship and obedience he in turn requires from them. But if it touches on any other things, it does this to declare and confirm those things more. For example, when it teaches that there are three Persons in God - the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit - its purpose is not simply to teach us this truth, but through this it wants to inform us more clearly and fully about the mode of our redemption and salvation which has been obtained for us through Christ and is applied and sealed to us through the Spirit. And similarly the attributes of God, such as justice and mercy, are recounted in the Scriptures in relation to men, namely so that they may know insofar as the justice of God is to be feared by them, and what refuge they ought to seek in his mercy.

XXIV. Furthermore, once the nature of Theology is known, it is readily to be gathered what is its dignity and excellence above the remaining sciences. And indeed first, the things which have now been said about the object of Theology show it sufficiently. For the dignity of the sciences is usually estimated from the dignity of the object. But the object of Theology, as has been said, is God the Best and Greatest who surpasses all other things in dignity to an infinite degree, since he is of infinite essence and perfection.

XXV. First Philosophy indeed treats of God, but about so great an object it hands down few and meager things in comparison with those which are handed down in this discipline. For Theology narrates the nature and attributes of God far more fully and clearly than Metaphysics. Then it reveals many mysteries about God completely unknown to the Philosophers - such as that there are three persons in God, although there is one essence, and that the Son of God was incarnate and died for us, and many similar things.

XXVI. Then also, although God is the principal object of Theology, because as we just taught it considers nothing except in order and respect to God, nevertheless Theology treats of

many things besides God, nor is there any science which extends to more things, whose object lies open so widely. For it elucidates very many excellent things about spiritual creatures, namely Angels, both good and evil, about which human reason can scarcely attain anything. There we have a perfect Ethics and rule of living well far more holy and sublime than any precepts of the wise men of this age. Nor are political and economic precepts lacking to Theology, many of which can be drawn from sacred Scripture.

XXVII. Add that through this discipline man is led into true knowledge of himself, and he learns those things about himself which he cannot be taught from elsewhere. Since indeed this alone reveals the origin of the human race and the various states of man. And since it is easy to notice in human nature great misery and disturbance, Theology alone teaches the cause and remedy of so great an evil, and reveals the magnitude of it. On which matter Philosophy once labored and panted in vain.

XXVIII. Indeed sacred doctrine embraces not a few geographical and historical things which shed great light on History and Geography. And without its light shining beforehand, the beginnings of the world and the origins of almost all nations would be unknown, nor would Chronology have any certain beginning, and the first and most venerable antiquity would lie completely hidden. Finally, sacred Scripture, the fount and first rule of our Theology, everywhere sprinkles certain physical things which aid natural science not a little. As for example that saying of Solomon in Ecclesiastes 1 about the origin of springs and rivers from the sea, and their return into the same sea through a perpetual cycle.

XXIX. But as much as this science is commended from its object, so much does its author commend it. For the remaining sciences boast of some illustrious man as their principal author. Aristotle is held to be the prince of Philosophers, and Hippocrates of Physicians. But the Mathematical disciplines acknowledge Euclid as their parent. But Theology claims God as its author, from whom this sacred doctrine emanated. For prophecy was not brought in former times by the will of man, as the Apostle Peter says, but holy men of God spoke as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit, who first consigned it to writings.

XXX. Not without the divine will indeed were the good arts and disciplines invented - and the very light of reason descends from the Father of lights, who is the mover and governor of nature. But the principles on which Theology rests are the express sayings and oracles of God, by which are manifested those things which could not become known except through a light higher than reason.

XXXI. Whence it happens that Theology surpasses all the remaining sciences in certainty. Since indeed they rest on human reason, which can be deceived and is liable to error. But Theology reclines on the truth of God, who can neither be deceived nor deceive. Many indeed doubt about Theological truths, and to them the principles and conclusions of Theology seem less certain than those things which are handed down in the human sciences. But that does not stand in the way of their being most certain in themselves - just as the Sun does not cease to be most splendid, although the blind and blear-eyed perceive its light either not at all or only obscurely.

XXXII. But here it must be noted that when we posit that Theology is more certain than other sciences, we do not so understand this as if that certainty were only on the part of the object. For indeed those things which God has revealed are not only most certain in themselves, but can also be known more certainly through the habit of faith and Theology than any truths known through the light of reason alone. So that he who is strengthened in faith and the knowledge of divine things is more certain and more persuaded of divine truths than he is of any other truth. And thus the habit of faith and Theology, in itself and from its own species, surpasses in certainty the habits of merely natural sciences, although all do not equally participate in that habit, and it is firmer in one, but less firm in another.

XXXIII. But in no thing does the dignity and excellence of Theology shine forth more than in the excellence of its end and use. For among the practical disciplines, the further and more universal the end of any discipline is, the more worthy and excellent is that discipline. Thus Politics surpasses military science, because the end of military science is victory, which is a means to attaining public peace and tranquility, which is the end of political science - and is some greater good. But the highest and ultimate end of all is the end of this science, namely the perfect happiness of man, to which the ends of all the other arts and disciplines are subordinated.

XXXIV. The remaining disciplines and arts take care of some particular good of man. Medicine, for example, the health of the body; Jurisprudence, property; Politics, public peace and tranquility. But none of these suffices to make man happy. But Theology takes care of the complete happiness of man, and supplies whatever things are desired for living well and happily.

XXXV. Philosophy also strives toward this indeed. But it attains its goal less, and whatever goods it endeavors to procure for man are contained within the scope of this life. But Theology offers eternal life and happiness, and furnishes it to those who follow its guidance. And thus it teaches to so arrange the present life that we may be happy not only for the state of this life, but in such a way that it may lead to everlasting happiness.

XXXVI. Therefore by the highest right this sacred discipline ought to be called wisdom. For according to Aristotle himself, Wisdom is the science of the most excellent things. But as is evident from what has been said, Theology treats of the most excellent things - namely of God and his wondrous works, both in our creation and in our redemption. Then also of things of the greatest importance with respect to us, and which it most interests us to know - namely of our highest happiness and of rightly ordering life according to God, which is the way to attaining that happiness. Nor does it only treat of the most excellent things, but also in the most excellent way - namely not from the inventions of human reason, but from divine revelation.

XXXVII. Besides, among the marks of wisdom it is usually reckoned that it is occupied with the most difficult things and those remote from sense. Then that it does not depend on another science. And finally that it directs and judges the other sciences, as their arbiter and mistress. All of which fit Theology exceedingly well.

XXXVIII. For first it reveals to us the most difficult mysteries, which are in themselves not only remote from the senses, but far surpass the capacity of the human mind. For they are, as the Apostle says, "things which eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor have entered into the heart of man - but God has revealed them to us through his Spirit, who searches all things, even the depths of God," 1 Corinthians 2.

XXXIX. Second, Theology does not depend on any other science. For one science is said to depend on another in two ways. 1. When a certain science takes its principles from another, which are the conclusions of that superior science. And thus the Art of fortifying cities depends on Geometry. For the conclusions of Geometry are the principles of that art. Then when the end of one science is referred to the end of another science. And thus military science depends on political science - since the end of military science is referred to the end of political science, and is a means to attaining it. But in both of these ways Theology is plainly independent. For since the end of Theology is the ultimate end of man, namely his eternal happiness, it can be referred to no end, but all things are necessarily referred to it. Then also there is no human science from which Theology takes its principles - but it has them immediately from the revelation of God, whose they are the pronouncements and declarations.

XL. But you will say, Theologians in their arguments often use propositions which are not revealed but known by the light of reason alone, and very many arguments are found in Theology in which only one of the premises is revealed, but the other is one of the conclusions of a certain natural science. I respond that when Theology takes certain things from other sciences, it does not do this out of necessity, but to illustrate the matter more, and to accommodate itself to weak men. For through itself it suffices for itself alone, and can prove all necessary conclusions from revealed principles. Therefore, when it borrows something from the natural sciences, it does not do this as an inferior which is compelled to have recourse to a superior - but as a mistress who freely makes use of the faculties of handmaids.

XLI. And in reality Theology is the arbiter and mistress of the other sciences, which directs them and judges about them, itself to be judged by no other science. For all the remaining disciplines must be applied to its rule, so that whatever they have that is not consonant with Theology may be rejected, nor may anything be admitted which does not agree with the principles of Theology.

XLII. And thus various errors have been detected in Philosophy, as for example about the origin of the world, which some of the Philosophers thought was eternal, others made from matter - but none created from nothing, as is really the case, except with Theology showing and leading by the hand. And in many other matters where the Philosophers were stuck and did not have the matter sufficiently investigated, Theology has placed it in the open and removed all doubt. As is evident in the matter of divine providence and the immortality of the Soul.

XLIII. Therefore by the highest right sacred doctrine is to be adorned with the title of

Wisdom, which is also often attributed to it in Scripture - as when the Apostle calls the Gospel "the wisdom which is in a mystery," and says that it is "foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling block to the Jews, but to those who believe, the power and wisdom of God," 1 Corinthians 1 and 2.

**Theological Theses,
On the Authority of Scripture:
Part One.
Which is about the Light of Sacred Scripture.
JOSEPH PITHOYS of Sedan Responding,
on November 18, 1652.**

Thesis I.

The authority of Scripture is hotly disputed between the Orthodox and the Papists. The question is, Whence does sacred Scripture have its authority? But by the authority of Scripture both understand the dignity according to which it deserves faith in all things which it says in any way, and the highest obedience in faith in those things which it commands and prohibits.

II. But here the Papists distinguish, and indeed confess that Scripture in itself has its authority from nowhere else than from God: But they contend that that authority, as far as we are concerned, depends on the testimony of the Church. This is certainly their opinion. That Scripture is worthy of all faith and reverence is because it has emanated from God, the fountain of all truth and the supreme Lord of all: But that it cannot be known certainly and indubitably from anywhere else that Scripture has proceeded from God than because the Church testifies to that. So that, that Scripture is of irrefragable truth and has the highest authority over consciences is because it has God as its author: but that it is now certainly acknowledged to have God as its author depends on the testimony of the Church.

III. But our people suspend the authority of sacred Scripture neither in itself nor as far as we are concerned on the testimony and authority of the Church. Since indeed they assert that it can be recognized from elsewhere that the sacred books have proceeded from God than from the voice of the Church testifying; nor do the faithful receive these books as divine on account of the authority of the Church but Scripture itself suffices to furnish knowledge of Itself.

IV. Therefore the parties agree whence its authority belongs to Scripture: but they do not agree whence it is known that such authority belongs to it. And thus the state of the controversy seems easy and unimpeded: But truly when it has come to the disputation, and each party explains its opinion more clearly and in particular, then great obscurity and confusion arises in this question; and it is hardly permitted to assign in what thing the parties properly disagree.

V. Therefore, in order to bring some light, as much as is in us, to this most celebrated

question, we will attempt to treat the whole matter more accurately. And indeed first we will investigate and expound the mode by which Scripture becomes known to us as divine. Then we will inquire into the opinion of the Papists, which to acknowledge and perceive is not so unimpeded and ready as it might seem. And finally, the state of the controversy having been drawn out from there, we will explain what is the error of the Papists in this part, and we will refute it.

VI. Furthermore, about the mode by which we come into knowledge of sacred Scripture, four things especially will have to be discussed. 1. Whether sacred Scripture has some light by which it offers itself to be recognized, and what and of what sort that light is. 2. What are the roles of the Holy Spirit in this business, and how far his work is necessary in order for someone to acknowledge the Word of God and Scripture. 3. What should be attributed to the Church in this matter, and how much its testimony is worth. 4. Finally, on what foundation especially rests that faith which we apply to Scripture as true and divine.

VII. As far as the first is concerned, in this question our people lay down as a foundation that sacred Scripture has a certain light in itself by which, all authority of the Church being set aside, it can become known through itself. And certainly Scripture compares itself to light in many places. But this having been noted thus only in general brings little light to this controversy. Therefore it is necessary to treat more distinctly what is that light and evidence of Scripture. Indeed by that light we understand nothing except a certain evidence of truth which the faithful perceive in Scripture and by which Scripture proves and persuades its divinity to their minds.

VIII. Furthermore, a twofold evidence can be distinguished: one which it is permitted to call Mathematical or Metaphysical; but the other which can be called moral. I call metaphysical evidence that which belongs to first principles known through themselves, and to conclusions demonstrated through principles of this kind. But moral evidence is that which is discerned in things which indeed cannot be demonstrated, but nevertheless are persuaded by such indications and arguments that a prudent and skilled man cannot doubt them and obtain dissent from himself. Thus that the Aeneid was written by Virgil, and that the orations against Verres, Catiline and Antony were once published by Cicero is indeed not a thing known through itself or which can be demonstrated: But nevertheless that has been attested by such constant and solemn report and confirmed by such great indications that no one who is of sound mind and who has some knowledge and experience of things and letters can doubt it.

IX. The evidence which belongs to Scripture is not of the former kind. For that Scripture is divinely inspired is not a thing known through itself, like these principles: The whole is greater than its part; The same thing cannot be and not be at the same time. Nor also can that be demonstrated logically or mathematically, as is clear by experience. For no one has ever been able to bring any demonstration of this truth. Add that, if the matter were so, the assent which we would apply to sacred Scripture would be knowledge, not faith, since the very definition of knowledge is that it is a demonstrative habit.

X. Therefore sacred Scripture does not have any other light or evidence besides that which we have called moral. For although it is not known through itself, nor also can it be properly demonstrated that sacred Scripture has proceeded from God: nevertheless this is persuaded by so many and so probable arguments. And Scripture has in itself so many and so remarkable marks and indications of its divinity that from there a pious and prudent man is efficaciously induced to believe that it is true and divine.

XI. And to bring forward here some specimens of those arguments, that that Scripture which we hold as sacred is truly such and divinely inspired is proved from the condition of those who first handed it down and commended it as divine. For if sacred Scripture is not true and divine, it is necessary that the sacred writers, who profess that they have written by the inspiration of God and testify that those things which they write either have been seen by them or revealed to them by God, were impostors whose purpose was to deceive men and impose on the world. But this suspicion cannot fall on the Prophets and Apostles by whose work Scripture has been consigned to us. For those who have the intention to deceive strive for that either by desire of gain, or for the sake of some pleasure, or by hope of attaining some glory and pleasure. Thus those who have been the authors of some superstition have certainly procured for themselves riches and dignities by their fictions: as for example, Muhammad who by deceiving the world with his fables arrogated the highest authority to himself and his own. But such a thing cannot be imputed to the Prophets and Apostles except very impudently and against all appearance of truth. For if the matter is estimated from the sense of men, almost all of them were most miserable and of an abject and despised condition; nor by their preaching did they obtain for themselves any riches in the world, or any authority and glory among men. But on the contrary, that doctrine which they asserted by word and writings stirred up against them the hatred of their fellow citizens and of foreign men, and rendered them liable to infinite reproaches and insults; indeed it cast them into certain danger of life, so that most of them sealed their writings with their own blood.

XII. Nor can it be said that they fell into such miseries through thoughtlessness. For they, undertaking their office, were foreknowing of these calamities and willingly gave themselves to be harassed and tormented by so many evils. Moses indeed was the leader and priest of the Israelite people: but nevertheless how little he strove for himself and his own is manifest from this - that he did not transmit the principate and priesthood to his posterity, but designated his servant Joshua as leader of the people after him, and inaugurated his brother Aaron as priest by the command of God. But how alien the sacred writers were from vainglory is evident from this - that if anything great or remarkable was done or said by them, they attribute it all to God; indeed in those very writings which they commend as divinely inspired, they candidly note their own blemishes and defects. And if there was anything lowly and inglorious in them, they do not dissemble that. Thus Moses noted his own diffidence and the punishment of diffidence which God imposed on him, and likewise the idolatry of his brother Aaron and the murmurings of his sister Miriam.

XIII. Then, that the doctrine and Scripture which we hold as divine is truly divine is rendered very credible by the faith which has been had for it in the world. For in a few years the Gospel of Christ pervaded almost the whole world; and as soon as it began to be preached to the Gentiles, it found innumerable followers everywhere of every age, sex and condition, so that one Paul, from Jerusalem even to Illyricum, in a very brief space of time, filled all things with the Gospel of Christ, as he himself writes to the Romans, chapter 15. But that could not have proceeded except from a certain divine power which accompanied that sacred doctrine, and as the same Paul notes in the cited place, from the power of the divine Spirit, inscribing it on the hearts of men and confirming it by various prodigies and signs.

XIV. For if the matter is considered in itself, all things seem to have had to stand in the way of men receiving that doctrine and Scripture which is its foundation. First, the character of the doctrine itself. For it proposes for belief very many mysteries which human sense judges to be foolishness; and it orders and requires those things which are most repugnant to human affections, namely that we should bear the cross of Christ, deny ourselves, and for the sake of the crucified Christ be prepared to relinquish riches and pleasures and pour out our life. Then, those who announced that doctrine to men did not use art and eloquence by which the minds of men are usually bent. Nor did they prevail among men by authority or by the fame of wisdom and doctrine. Nor were they powerful men who could terrify by threats and arms and compel to the acceptance of their doctrine - but they were for the most part unskilled men and unlearned, making a living by mechanical arts, from the nation of the Jews despised and hated by all others, held as barbarians and ignorant by those who were then esteemed wise and learned. Add that they preached to men nurtured in another religion and who were occupied by many and great prejudices. For the superstition from which they were turned away they had received from their ancestors, and they saw it confirmed by the consent of the peoples, the judgment of the wise, and the authority of the great. Finally, it can hardly be said how many and how fierce and powerful enemies the doctrine contained in our Scriptures had. For the teachers of the Jews and the Philosophers of the Gentiles opposed it with great effort. And indeed the former set against it their authority; but the latter exercised on it all the sharpness of their talent and unfolded their eloquence. And besides, the magistrates and princes of the world most atrociously persecuted those who had embraced it and raged against them with every kind of punishment. Since therefore nothing humanly assisted it, but on the contrary it had all things adverse, it is necessary that its increase and propagation be ascribed to the power of God alone. Whereas if any other sect and religion has crept widely and found many followers, that has been done by human means. For Islam was propagated from Greece in a short time through many provinces - but that was done by arms and open force. Then because that doctrine in many things flatters the flesh.

XV. Furthermore, something divine in Scripture is argued by the constancy, number and condition of the martyrs who sealed it with their blood. For since by nature nothing is dearer to man than life, whence did it happen that so many men gladly suffered death for the

defense of Scripture and the doctrine it teaches, if not from a certain divine power which had wholly settled in their minds? Sometimes indeed certain heretics and superstitious people have been raged against, and perhaps a few examples can be found of those who out of a certain fierceness and obstinacy of mind chose to die rather than allow themselves to be moved from an error once adopted. But there is no error, no superstition and human doctrine which has had many followers so obstinate that, when they could escape safe and unharmed by denying their impiety, they nevertheless did not refuse to bear punishments and torments. But when the Apostolic and prophetic doctrine and Scripture first began to be propagated through the world, and could not yet be considered confirmed by the tradition of ancestors and custom - by which roots human institutions usually adhere most to the minds of men - not a few were found, but infinite myriads of men of every age, every sex, every condition, men, women, boys, old men, the literate, the unlearned, who suffered the direst kinds of death rather than deny the doctrine of Scripture - although by the mere denial of it they could not only redeem their life but also enjoy their goods and honors with their fellow citizens by equal right. Nor can they be judged to have rushed into certain death out of ferocity or stupidity or some disease of mind - since they often extorted from the enemies themselves the testimony of a rightly composed mind and a blameless life, and in death itself they testified the greatest modesty, the greatest humanity and presence of mind. In which certainly, unless someone willingly shuts his eyes, the finger of God can easily be noted.

XVI. Furthermore, that the doctrine handed down in the Scriptures, and thus Scripture which is the foundation of it, is divine and has flowed from God is proved from the miracles which have been done for the confirmation of that doctrine. For since there are two principal parts of the Scriptures and heavenly doctrine, the Law and the Gospel - indeed the Law was confirmed by those wonders which happened in the desert, such as that the living voice of God speaking from the midst of fire was heard, that for forty years manna rained in the desert, that water was often brought forth from the rock, and that the garments of the Israelites were not worn out in all that time, and more of the same kind. But the Gospel received testimony from the almost infinite miracles of Christ, then from those visible and plainly stupendous gifts of the Holy Spirit which were poured out on the first believers, so that they suddenly spoke in various and foreign languages, healed any diseases, cast out demons, and did very many other wonders. For since such things are above the powers of nature, it is necessary that God exercised his power in them. But it is wrong to think that God wanted to use his omnipotence to make faith in Scripture and doctrine which was falsely and injuriously ascribed to him, as if he wanted to lie by agreement with men.

XVII. But you will say, those miracles are indeed said to have been done, but how can we know that they were really done? For it does not seem less uncertain whether those miracles are true than this - whether that Scripture is divine in confirmation of which they are said to have been done. I respond. That those things really happened can be efficaciously proved from our Scriptures themselves. For our writers wrote those things in such a way that it cannot happen that they lied in this matter. For I will ask him who denies or doubts that the

things which our writers Moses and Paul, for example, narrate about those miracles are true, whether he wants to call into doubt that there was a certain Moses who gave laws to the Israelite people and wrote certain volumes, and similarly that there was a certain Paul who preached the Christian doctrine and wrote certain epistles which are ascribed to him. About this matter certainly no one has doubted up to now, nor indeed have the Atheists themselves wanted or dared to deny this. And in reality this is attested by a report so constant, so perennial, so received by the consent of all, even of adversaries, that to doubt this would be plainly to be delirious. For frequent mention of Moses and his writings is made among the pagans. Nor do the Jews and Muslims, the most hostile enemies of the Christian religion, deny or doubt that our Apostles existed and wrote. But if anyone wanted to call that pertinaciously into doubt, he would have to be driven to this - to bring the cause of his doubt and some reason why he does not have faith in the agreeing testimony of the whole world. And why he believes rather that Pliny and Livy existed and wrote than that Moses and Paul did. And certainly we labor in vain in proving this, since the matter is in agreement. For those who reject the Word of God do not deny that those authors whom we hold as sacred existed or wrote, but they blaspheme that they did not write true things.

XVIII. Come then, let us see whether it can happen that those things which are narrated by Moses and Paul about those miracles are not true. Certainly, if they are not true, either they were deceived in writing, thinking that those things had happened which had not really happened - or they wrote with the intention of deceiving and endeavored to thrust false things for true. The former cannot be said. For they do not report those things as accepted from elsewhere, but testify that they were done or seen by themselves. It is necessary therefore that Moses wanted to deceive the Israelites, and Paul the Corinthians, Galatians and others. And profane men who accuse Moses and Paul of imposture think this. It must be seen therefore whether they were impostors who endeavored to persuade those to whom they wrote and into whose hands they delivered their writings that these and those prodigies and miracles had been done, when nevertheless none of those things had been done.

XIX. Certainly impostors and those who have the intention to deceive are accustomed so to produce their lies that they cannot easily be convicted of lying by those whom they want to be deceived. Thus Numa, who instituted most of the rites of Roman superstition, pretended that he had nightly conversations with the Nymph Egeria - but alone with her alone, and of which no one could be a witness. Also in the Quran of Muhammad certain portentous things are narrated, but not as done before the eyes of men, but whose credibility was up to him. But if someone were to narrate portents and dreams and yet appeal to the senses of those whom he was addressing concerning their truth, as if he were now commemorating that the waters had flowed backwards for Moses and that it had rained grain while we were watching, and wanted to persuade us of that very thing, this now would not be imposture but a certain kind of madness plainly unusual and incredible. Nor can this befall one who is not completely raging and agitated by black bile. But now those wonders which are contained in Moses, such as that the sea was parted, that the voice of God speaking was heard from Mount

Sinai, that it rained manna and quails in the desert, that torrents of water burst forth from the rock, and more of the same kind - those wonders, I say, Moses does not commemorate as having happened at other times or in distant places, but he narrates that they happened at that very time and in that very place in which he was writing, indeed with those watching and attending for whom he was writing and into whose hands he was delivering his writings. And concerning the truth of those miracles he appeals to the eyes and ears of the Israelites. "You have seen," he often says, "and you have heard," and on that account he seriously and often rebukes their ungrateful mind toward God.

XX. Similarly, when the Apostle Paul had certain rivals and envious persons among the Corinthians who were trying to call his Apostleship into doubt and render it suspect, he appeals concerning the truth of his Apostleship to the miracles and signs which had been done in their midst. "The signs of an apostle," he says, "were performed among you with utmost patience, with signs and wonders and mighty works." 2 Corinthians 12:12. And in chapters 12, 13, 14 of the first Epistle he discusses the miraculous gifts of the Holy Spirit, the gift of healing, the working of miracles, the gift of prophecy, and the gift of speaking and interpreting foreign languages by the sudden inspiration of the Spirit, as matters known and customary in their midst; he exhorts them to peace and warns them not to envy one another on account of such gifts; and he even rebukes them because they sometimes used such gifts ambitiously. And he orders that henceforth they do it for edification, and he prescribes the legitimate use of those gifts.

XXI. If therefore all these things are lies and fictions, certainly Moses and Paul were not, as the profane accuse, crafty men and men skilled in deceiving, whose purpose was to deceive men and impose on the world. For no one can be deceived in those matters concerning which appeal is made to his ears, eyes and experience. But it is necessary that they were, far be it from blasphemy to say, men plainly raging and insane. But their writings, even the Atheists being judges, argue enough that they were of sound mind. For they speak things consistent with themselves, and in which much prudence and wisdom is discerned.

XXII. Then, let us suppose that they were insane men who with the greatest madness or imprudence wrote and thrust forth as true those lies about which they could be openly convicted by all; whence then did it happen that the Israelites looked up to Moses, the Corinthians, Romans, Galatians and others to Paul as divine and holy men, and accepted their discipline with such great reverence - although in many things it is unpleasant to the flesh and burdensome and repugnant to human affections; nor did any advantage redound to those who so wanted to be deceived, if the matter is estimated from the sense of men? Certainly no miracle, nor any portent is more incredible than this - that the doctrine of insane men, and their crass and foul lies, without any help either divine or human, obtained so great faith among those very persons by whom it was impossible for their insanity and lies not to be recognized and noticed.

XXIII. And here that ancient dilemma has a place - the miracles which are narrated in the Scriptures are true, or not true; if true, the doctrine and Scripture for whose confirmation they

were used are also true. But if they are not true, it is more than a miracle that a doctrine so abhorrent to the sense of men, and full of so many lies which it was easy for anyone to convict, was nevertheless embraced with such ardor without any divine or human aid, and retained with such constancy through exiles, through crosses, through torments, with those who were eminent in the world for power and prudence raging and indignant.

XXIV. Since therefore the things which Moses and Paul relate about the miracles done for the confirmation of the Law and the Gospel are written in such a way that those to whom they wrote could immediately recognize whether they were saying truth or falsehood - since they are matters concerning which appeal is made to their experience and senses - and nevertheless such great faith was had in those writings by those who first accepted them, and thereafter up to the present day, it is plainly necessary that they wrote true things, and the miracles which they narrate are true, and consequently the Scripture and doctrine are true for whose confirmation God wanted those things to be done.

XXV. But furthermore, that the miracles which are reported to have been done by Moses are true, and similarly those which are attributed to Christ and his Apostles, is evident from the very confession of the adversaries. For as far as Christ is concerned, the Jews who are the most hostile enemies of the Christian name neither dared in the past nor dare even now to deny that Christ performed miracles - but they have invented I know not what to elude the force of the argument which we deduce from there; namely, that Christ did those things either by magic art which he had learned in Egypt, or by the power of that tetragrammaton name, the correct pronunciation and exposition of which he knew. For they fable that whoever knows how to pronounce that name correctly can by the power of that name do any wondrous works. The vanity of which fiction is evident through itself, nor is there need to refute it. We only note here that the truth of the miracles of Christ is not a little confirmed by this - since the Jews who most envy his glory do not dare, nor can they openly deny that they were done. And similarly very many of the pagans bore witness to Moses and acknowledged the truth of the Mosaic history, as can be seen in the books of Josephus against Apion, and of Eusebius on Gospel Preparation.

XXVI. But especially the truth of the Christian doctrine, and the divine origin of Scripture, are proved by the predictions of the Prophets. For it belongs to God alone to foreknow certainly and distinctly contingent futures, and finally things to come to pass after many centuries. And consequently no one can predict such things except by the inspiration of the divine Spirit. But the Prophets predicted many things of which no causes appeared in the nature of things, and which were fulfilled long after their death. Thus Isaiah named Cyrus, and predicted his empire and wondrous felicity, one hundred and fifty years before Cyrus was born. Thus Jeremiah the Prophet precisely numbered the seventy years of the Babylonian captivity, before the Jews were led to Babylon. Thus finally Daniel clearly prophesied about the Persian and Greek Monarchy, about the successors of Alexander the Great, and especially about Antiochus Epiphanes who profaned the temple of God.

XXVII. But what is principal, the things which the Gospel teaches us about the nativity, life, passion, death, burial of Jesus Christ, about his resurrection and ascension into heaven, likewise about the fruit of his death and passion, about the calling of the Gentiles, the desolation of the Jewish Nation, and the abrogation of the ceremonial worship with almost all the circumstances of these things, are found clearly and openly predicted in the Prophets. Among others, Isaiah chapter 53 is remarkable, where he speaks so expressly and clearly about the death and passion of Christ our redeemer, and his offering for the sins of the world, that he seems to narrate a thing done, not to predict a future thing: And Daniel chapter 9, where he expressly designates the time in which Christ was to come and soon be cut off and put an end to sacrifices, namely after seventy weeks of years, which a horrible destruction of the whole Jewish nation was to follow: so that to one comparing the oracles of Moses and the Prophets about the Messiah with the Evangelical history about Christ, a wondrous and plainly stupendous agreement immediately appears. Whence it is manifestly proved both that the books of the Prophets are divine, since they contain predictions of things which happened so long after: And also that the Evangelical history is true and divine, since God bore witness to it through the Prophets so many centuries before.

XXVIII. Furthermore, that these prophecies were not fabricated by the Christians is attested by the Jews, the enemies of the Christians, and yet the most fierce assertors and defenders of the prophetic books. And besides, that the greatest hatred of the Christian religion could not compel them to erase from their books those prophecies so greatly adverse to them - this very thing, I say, frees them from the charge with which some pagans wanted to render them suspect, as if they had inserted those prophecies about Cyrus and Alexander the Great into their books in order to court the favor of those kings. For if they thought so much was permitted to them, those prophecies by which they are so greatly pressed by the Christians would not have been left intact, especially that of Daniel about the time of the advent of Christ and his destruction. Nor will anyone ever suspect such a thing of the Jews, who has found with how great religion, not to say superstition, they conduct themselves toward the sacred books, even to the point that they have the syllables and points of each book numbered; and they proclaim a public fast if by chance a copy of Scripture has fallen to the ground through carelessness. Add that whoever will attentively read and consider the books of the Prophets Daniel and Isaiah will easily recognize that in them all things cohere, and are woven together by the same thread and genius, nor is anything found which anyone can justly suspect to have been added and inserted there contrary to the mind and sense of the author, and which can be torn away from there without the ruin and gap of the whole work.

XXIX. Besides these, many arguments can be taken from the antiquity of Scripture, from the care of God in preserving it, and from the world's hatred for it, and from the just judgment of God against its haters and despisers, to gain authority and veneration for Scripture. For the books of Moses, which are as it were the basis and foundation of all Scripture, are by far the most ancient of all that exist. Indeed there are no writings which equal the antiquity of Solomon and David. And yet almost the whole world long waged war against Scripture, and

tried to abolish it, as in Jewish times that Antiochus Epiphanes, but in Christian memory the Roman Emperors, whose power was so great and whose empire lay so wide. But as much as the world strove to abolish it, so much did the providence of God watch that it might remain safe and whole up to this point.

XXX. Nor is the consensus of the nations, indeed of the various sects, in this matter of little importance. Although today there flourish three principal sects, afterwards subdivided into many others - namely the Jewish, the Christian, and the Muslim which occupy the greatest part of the world - the Jews, Christians, and Muslims all acknowledge the authority of the Old Testament. Indeed the Jews reject the New Testament, but the Muslims hold it in esteem with us, and venerate Christ at least as the greatest Prophet of God. But what could compel so many peoples discrepant among themselves in morals and sects, and pursuing each other with the fiercest hatred, to approve these books as sacred and divine, if not the very force of truth and a certain divine efficacy?

XXXI. Although all these arguments perhaps are not equally valid if each is taken by itself, nevertheless taken together they have the greatest force to prove the excellence of Scripture and to gain authority for it. Indeed we judge the former arguments which we have explained more widely to be such that by them the authority of Scripture can be strongly asserted and proved even against Atheists and the profane, who can object and oppose nothing which has any force, whose vanity it is not easy to show.

XXXII. But besides those arguments by which the divinity of Scripture can be asserted against one denying it, Scripture in itself has very illustrious marks and indications of truth and divinity by which it proves and commends itself to a well-disposed mind whose eyes have not been blinded by prejudices and perverse affections - although from there suitable means for disputing cannot be taken, or certainly not so strong and efficacious. For just as in an extraordinary work of some art, as for example in a Virgilian poem or a painting of Apelles, there are certain things by which it betrays its author and vindicates itself to him - and these are certainly and clearly recognized by the skilled, although the unskilled do not attend to them, nor can arguments easily be drawn from there against one denying it - so the vestiges of the divine Spirit and the marks of heavenly origin are deeply impressed on sacred Scripture, which those discern whose mind is not darkened, and who are skilled in divine things, and from there they become certain of its divinity, even if ignorant and profane men make light of those things or do not notice them at all. And certainly, if there are any learned in human letters, when they peruse any human book, they easily note in it a certain genius and character by which they are led to the knowledge of its author. By which reason critics assert genuine writings to their authors, to Aristotle for example or Cicero, but expunge spurious and supposititious writings, although often what the sagacious critics note and recognize can scarcely be explained and demonstrated to another who is not versed in these things. Will we doubt that the Prophetic and Apostolic writings savor of the divine Spirit, and that there is in them something that the pious and learned man may perceive, and by which he may distinguish them from human and Apocryphal writings, although that could

not be demonstrated against one disputing and resisting?

XXXIII. Furthermore, such marks of divinity which we say to be in Scripture can be observed both in the things and in the words. And indeed first in the words, or manner of speaking, a certain divine character shines forth through all of Scripture. For when it narrates things done, it does it ingenuously, simply and nakedly, without any artifice, without any trappings. Human writers, when they recount great things, are accustomed to give signs of an anxious mind fearing that it will not be believed. For they try secretly to remove what could offend more, and to render the matter, as much as is in them, credible. But when something must be said by them about themselves, they either boast and show their own deeds, or are timid and fearful, and use certain excuses and prefaces - which certainly arises from a certain weakness, and betrays a mind distrustful of itself and not secure enough. But as far as pertains to the sacred writers, although they treat of the greatest and plainly stupendous things, and often done by their ministry, nevertheless in their narrations all things are direct and simple, nor is there anything which savors of an anxious and solicitous mind, lest faith be denied to it. But everywhere they speak as if secure about the judgments of men, relying on the dignity and truth of the matter - which argues a certain magnanimity and majesty worthy of God.

XXXIV. Also in the precepts, reproofs and exhortations of Scripture, it is easy to observe a certain divine majesty. For it addresses kings and commoners, the highest and lowest, magistrates and private persons with equal authority. It flatters no one, connives at no one, and its author plainly shows himself to be impartial, devoid of favor and hatred, hope and fear, and who is the same toward all of whatever state and condition they may be. Nor nevertheless is the speech fierce, swollen and proud. But in it indeed a certain wondrous gravity appears, but one which is tempered with the highest gentleness and pious affection toward men.

XXXV. But when it teaches, it uses a certain condescension by which it accommodates itself to the capacity of the unskilled. Nor does it seek ornaments for the things it teaches from art and eloquence, but commends them by their own weight and usefulness. The masters of human arts and sciences are accustomed to coin peculiar terms for each art, and to cover the things they hand down with the wrappings of grand words - so that they may thus procure dignity for their art, and affix something of a mystery which the common people may regard with awe and admiration. But Scripture explains divine things by human words and phrases sought from the common people. When it wants to illustrate something, it does not seek its similes and examples from afar, but uses examples ready to hand and as it were from the crossroads. Nor are its arguments such as can be perceived only by the learned, but for the most part of such a kind that any rustic and unlearned person may recognize their force.

XXXVI. Often indeed there is in the words and phrases of Scripture something foreign and at variance with common usage. But that is to be attributed to the genius of the Hebrew language, to which our ears are not accustomed. For the sacred writers either wrote in the

Hebrew language, as Moses and the Prophets, or used the phrases and idioms of the Hebrew language, even if they wrote in Greek, as the writers of the New Testament.

XXXVII. Finally, Scripture everywhere acts candidly and ingenuously. And although men are accustomed, in blaming or praising, in threatening or promising, to inflate and exalt small and lowly things with magnificent words and sublime metaphors, Scripture on the contrary expresses the greatest things for the most part in a style thin and common, and in words which fall below the magnitude of the matter. And when it threatens and promises, its promises are indeed magnificent and its threats terrifying - but nevertheless in such a way that the moment and gravity of the thing itself far surpasses the sound and emphasis of the words. And yet the highest simplicity of Scripture is never devoid of gravity and decorum. Indeed, often joined to it is a wondrous sublimity of speech - so that Longinus himself, a pagan rhetorician and most hostile enemy of the Christians, discussing περὶ ὕψους, that is, the sublime kind of speaking, cites an example of it from Moses: "As," he says, "the Lawgiver of the Hebrews said, 'And it was done.'"

XXXVIII. But now, if we attend to the things themselves of Scripture, in them the marks of divinity will appear still more illustrious and clear. But whatever things are contained in Scripture are either histories and narrations of past things, or prophecies and predictions of future things, or dogmas and precepts which denote no difference of time. Furthermore, history is especially commended by two things - the truth of the things, and then also their weight and importance - which two things sacred History claims for itself in an eminent way. And indeed first, sacred history has many and great indications of truth. For either reason and the very nature of things support it, as the history of the creation of the world, which is proved by the strongest arguments to have been made from nothing and in time. As the monuments of ancient and external historians bear witness to the truth of it, as for example in the history of the universal flood, of the building of the tower of Babylon, of the conflagration of Sodom and Gomorrah, of the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt - of which mention is made in approved and ancient historians whose fragments remain in Eusebius, Josephus and others, and some of whom are even in the hands of men.

XXXIX. Add that sacred History in many things proves itself by its ingenuousness and verisimilitude, and has those marks of truth which any honest historians have, as can be seen in the books of Samuel and Kings. Also the names of nations, cities and regions which were formerly, and remain today, create faith for those things which Scripture narrates about the posterity of Noah, from whom after the flood the world began to be inhabited anew and to be filled with inhabitants, as is plain to one comparing those names which Moses recites with the names of peoples and nations. But the things which seem to surpass faith, and are wondrous and plainly stupendous, are written in such a way that it is impossible for him who wrote to have lied - since he appeals to innumerable witnesses by whom he could be convicted, who nevertheless received his writings as divine and commended them to posterity as such, as was shown above concerning the miracles which are narrated by Moses, and of which there is mention in the Apostle Paul.

XL. Furthermore, the sincerity and candor of the sacred Historians, which is so great that they do not conceal their own vices, and often brand themselves and their own with many marks of ignominy, renders credible the history of Scripture. Indeed, the fables of the poets themselves render the history of Scripture credible. For if anyone diligently inspects the ancient fables of the poets and compares them with sacred history, he will find that those fables are certain shadows of things of which Scripture has the body, and to have taken their origin from the true histories which were disseminated through the whole world by the tradition of the sons of Noah, and at length corrupted and interpolated by the lapse of time - as could be made manifest by many examples, and learned men who have labored in this matter have rendered the thing easy.

XLI. But now if anyone wants to weigh the weight and importance of sacred history, what things of greater weight and importance can be either in reality or imagined than those which pertain not only to some nation and republic, but to the whole Church which God has selected for himself from the world, indeed to the whole world, to the angels the inhabitants of the Heavens, and to God himself who is the first cause of all things? But these are the things with which the history of sacred Scripture is occupied. For Scripture recites to us what were the beginnings and cradle of this universe, and how God once founded all things and ordered them to exist; whence the human race was born and propagated, how it diffused itself through the whole globe of the earth, and what were the divisions of the nations and languages in the beginning. It narrates the appearances of angelic spirits and their frequent conversations with men, and the wondrous deeds of God himself in ruling and protecting the Church and procuring the salvation of the human race. With which if anyone compares the histories of the Greeks or Romans, he will find nothing whose importance and gravity can be compared with these in any part.

XLII. Especially in the prophecies and oracles of the Prophets the greatest light of divinity shines forth, about which we have already spoken before, since it not only suffices to persuade the pious and faithful mind, but also has the greatest force to refute the enemies of the Word of God, and to prove its divinity even against the profane. For if you consider the matter of the sacred prophecies, they are not about things of no or little importance, but which pertain to the glory of God and the salvation of the whole human race. Nor are the predictions of the prophets perplexed and ambiguous, as once the oracles of the pagans, but so clear and perspicuous that in them the persons and place are often designated by their proper names, and the time of fulfillment is precisely defined. Nor also are they fallacious and uncertain, but such that most of them have already been proved by the very event.

XLIII. The precepts and dogmas of sacred Scripture also do not lack their own light, indeed they have the greatest light. Which, so that it may appear more clearly, it must be noted that they are of two kinds. For Scripture teaches and orders many things of which men by nature have some notion, but very confused and vacillating. But Scripture has made those things more clearly known, and taught them fully and accurately. Of this kind are the things which

Scripture hands down about the nature and attributes of God, namely about the eternal, immense and immutable essence of God, and about his infinite power, wisdom, goodness, and also justice; about the creation of the world and all things which are in it; about the providence of God by which he conserves, rules and administers all things.

Likewise about the duty of man both toward God and toward his neighbor, such as that God is to be loved above all things, all things are to be referred to his glory, he is to be diligently worshipped and invoked, he is to be trusted, and we must rest in his care. The neighbor also is to be loved, good is to be done to all, injuries are to be borne, one must think humbly of oneself, intimate thoughts and affections are to be kept pure, and in a word, all and each of the precepts of the Christian life, which ought to be pure in every part, and from which all filth and luxury ought to be absent. These certainly and similar things the sense of conscience approves, reason confirms, and certain rudiments of them are discerned in the books of the pagans. For they hand down some not contemptible things about God, about piety and the duty of man. But nevertheless obscurely, sparingly, coldly, doubtingly, and with the admixture of very many errors. But Scripture puts those things in a clear light, and teaches them fully and openly - so that after its light has shone on us, we wonder that things so certain and indubitable were perceived and handed down only thinly, doubtingly and obscurely by the most excellent talents. But when those most excellent talents handed down those things, whose truth we now discern by the benefit of Scripture, so jejunely and obscurely, but Scripture so fully and perspicuously - and nevertheless the sacred Writers did not excel above other men in erudition or gifts of nature, indeed on the contrary most of them were unskilled in human sciences and unlearned - it is necessary that they were led by another light than that of nature, and taught and inspired by God.

XLIV. But besides those things, of which men by nature have a certain thin and fleeting knowledge, sacred Scripture teaches many things which surpass reason, nor can the human mind grasp them, nor does it have certain arguments for them - but nevertheless they cohere so well with those things which the sense of conscience approves, and of which right reason is convinced, and are so agreeable and fittingly built upon those former things, that it appears enough that they are not human fictions, but mysteries of divine wisdom. Such is, for example, the doctrine about the expiation of our sins through the death and offering of Christ, God and man, made on the cross - which is seen to agree most with the justice and mercy of God. For in this way the justice of God is satisfied, while our sins are punished in Christ, and mercy, while they are forgiven to us. And with this doctrine coheres that dogma so sublime and lofty about the three divine persons in one essence. For unless the Son of God were God, and equal to the Father, his sacrifice would not have been of infinite value, such as was required, that by it our sins might be expiated, since they had merited an infinite punishment. And such also is the doctrine about the resurrection of the dead. For it seems to be agreeable to reason that man, who acts well or badly in the body, should also receive in the body the punishment or reward of things justly or unjustly done - which since it does not happen in this life, it is congruous to the justice of God that our bodies, which death has

reduced to dust, be again joined to their souls, so that it may be well or ill with the whole man, according as he has acted well or badly.

XLV. But besides, the greatest indication of divinity in sacred Scripture is its efficacy, by which it acts inwardly in man, partly indeed by terrifying consciences and affecting them with a sense of sin, partly by lifting up the contrite mind and consoling afflicted consciences - but especially by so changing man that he hates sin and pursues piety and true virtue from the heart - by which efficacy indeed nothing is more powerful in confirming the faithful; although it cannot compel the assent of those who have not yet felt that efficacy, and have hardened themselves against the Word of God. And nevertheless, a most profane man, even if he has not felt the efficacy of the Word of God, if nevertheless he considers it attentively, can easily recognize that this word is such that it generates the highest tranquility and joy in those who firmly believe it, and compels them to every good work and every virtue.

XLVI. And let it suffice to have touched upon these few things about this argument which can never be exhausted, and which is treated more fully and copiously by learned men, whose footsteps we follow, and who have carried the torch before us. But this seems necessary to be added, namely that these characters of divinity which we have said shine forth in Scripture are not to be sought in the individual parts of Scripture separated from the whole, but in the divine writings as they are considered conjointly and according to their whole selves. For it is not to be thought that any pericope of the Canonical books has a certain mark by which it can be discerned and distinguished from the Apocryphal.

XLVII. And besides it must be confessed that the marks and indications of divinity which we have said to be in Scripture are not equally conspicuous with the same brightness in the individual books of Scripture. For just as star differs from star in light, so certain books of Scripture emit richer and more splendid rays of the divine Spirit, but others far more meager and obscure ones. Thus for example, in the Old Testament the brightness of divinity is far unequal in the book of Esther or the book of Ruth than it is in the Pentateuch of Moses and the Prophecy of Isaiah. Nor are the vestiges of the Spirit of Christ so open in the epistle of James or Jude as in most of the epistles of Paul and the four Gospels.

**Theological Theses,
On the Authority of Scripture:
Part Two.**

In which it is taught what is the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit by which the faithful are certain of the divinity of Scripture, then what and how much is to be attributed to the Church in this matter, and also what is that in which our faith is ultimately resolved.

Thesis I

In the preceding disputation we expounded what light, that is, what arguments and indications of truth and divine origin sacred Scripture has; it follows that we inquire how that

light is perceived. And Whether and How far the work of the Holy Spirit is necessary in order for us to acknowledge Scripture as true and divine.

II. But here a distinction must be made between a certain fleeting and evanescent opinion, and true and salutary faith which is pleasing and acceptable to God. For someone can conceive a certain opinion about the divinity of Scripture, having been led to that by certain human incitements, without any internal operation of the Spirit - and this is what the Schools call human and acquired faith. Thus many most wicked and perverse heretics do not deny the authority of Scripture, and acknowledge it to be divinely inspired. Indeed, even the unbelieving Jews fiercely defend at least the authority of the Old Testament. But the Muslims are said to hold and revere the books of both Testaments as divine. Nor nevertheless is it necessary that we think the Holy Spirit to act in all those heretics and unbelievers, and to illuminate their minds inwardly.

III. But in order for us to conceive a certain and legitimate faith about Scripture, and one which is of some moment for salvation, it is altogether necessary that the Holy Spirit insinuate himself into our minds and work in them in a secret way. Whence it is that the Schools call such faith divine and infused. But Scripture itself teaches this in many places. For in John, Christ our Lord affirms that no one can come to him, that is, believe in him and embrace his doctrine, unless the Father draw him and he hear the Father teaching inwardly: "No one," he says, "can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. It is written in the Prophets, 'And they will all be taught by God.' Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me." John chapter 6. Furthermore, Paul, in 1 Corinthians 12, expressly asserts that no one can say that Jesus is Lord except by the Holy Spirit. And in chapter 2 of the same Epistle, speaking about the mysteries of the Gospel, "God," he says, "has revealed them to us through his Spirit, for the Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, that we might know the things freely given us by God." And a little later, "The natural man does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned." And hence it is that faith is called the gift of God, Ephesians 2: "By grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God."

IV. Furthermore, the depravity of human nature and the darkness which sin has brought upon it renders that operation of the Spirit of God in our minds necessary. For sacred Scripture contains many things which are repugnant to our depraved and distorted affections. Whence it happens that the carnal man abhors it and turns away from it, which impedes him from acknowledging its truth and forming a right judgment about it - since as each one is affected, so he judges. Then the mind of man is so obscured by sin in general that even in natural things it cannot but hallucinate and be very often deceived. And consequently it can much less certainly recognize and perceive the things which are above nature. For this, therefore, it is necessary that the Holy Spirit dispel the native darkness of the mind and those fumes by which depraved affections obscure the intellect and impede it

from being able to discern the truth.

V. Indeed, not only the depravity of our nature and the darkness arisen from sin, but the very genius of the doctrine handed down in Scripture necessarily requires this operation of the Spirit for engendering faith in our minds. Since indeed it contains many mysteries which not only surpass corrupt nature, but human nature in itself, even considered apart from sin - so that by it they can not only not be found out and devised, but not even understood and perceived. And therefore it is necessary that the Holy Spirit not only heal our minds blind by sin, but also raise our intellect not a little above the natural state, so that it may be able to rise to such great things.

VI. But what may be the mode of that operation is a very obscure matter and difficult to explain - which perhaps could seem strange to someone. For since that operation of the Holy Spirit happens in our minds, we seem to have to know it by sense itself and experience. But nevertheless there is nothing in this which we ought to marvel at. For we experience many things in ourselves, indeed we ourselves work many things, of which nevertheless we do not grasp the reason and mode, nor are we able to understand. Thus we experience daily that we see and understand, and nevertheless when it must be explained in what manner vision and understanding happen, even the most acute and most learned men are stuck, nor can they sufficiently extricate themselves. And there is still a dispute between Physicists and Mathematicians, Whether vision happens through the emission of rays, or through the reception of visible species. Therefore, although any faithful person experiences that he embraces the Word of God by a certain faith, and attributes a full and firm assent to sacred Scripture, it ought not to move wonder if Theologians are stuck in expounding how that faith is engendered in us, and in what manner the Spirit begets that assent in us. About which matter we will briefly set forth our opinion.

VII. First, therefore, it is certain and undoubted to us that the Holy Spirit so disposes and affects the mind of the man whom he leads to faith, which otherwise is dim-sighted and blind in these things, that it perceives and recognizes the light of the Word of God and Scripture - that is, seriously attends to those arguments, marks, and criteria by which the Word of God is proved to be true and divine, and judges rightly about them, and thence, as is fitting, is persuaded of its divine truth. Which while the Spirit inwardly does, he is said to give us new eyes. Of which Moses, Deuteronomy 29: "You have seen," he says, "all that the Lord did before your eyes in the land of Egypt, to Pharaoh and to all his servants and to all his land, the great trials that your eyes saw, the signs and those great wonders. But to this day the Lord has not given you a heart to understand or eyes to see or ears to hear." And David implored this help of God, Psalm 119, section Gimel: "Open," he says, "my eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of your law." For by the wondrous things of the law, he understands the teachings of divine wisdom which are scattered through the law of God - about which our carnal mind cannot judge rightly, our native dullness, depravity and ignorance standing in the way, which are like a certain veil spread before the eyes of our mind, which the Holy Spirit removes in the faithful.

VIII. But whether that operation of the Holy Spirit, by which he so affects our mind that it attends to the light shining in Scripture and perceives it, precisely and alone considered by itself, suffices to engender in us a full and certain enough faith about sacred Scripture can rightly be doubted. For that light of Scripture about which the question now is, is only a certain moral evidence, which does not so convince the mind as principles known through themselves, or logical or mathematical demonstrations, and consequently does not beget an equal certainty, but one of a certain inferior kind - as we taught in the preceding disputation. And therefore, either it must be said that the faith which we apply to sacred Scripture does not of itself and from its own kind admit so great a certainty as is found in the human sciences - which is contrary to the common opinion of Theologians - or the Spirit, in order to impress that faith on us, does something else than simply open the eyes to see and perceive the light of sacred Scripture. Especially if we consider the individual books of sacred Scripture, many will be found which, if we want to confess what the thing is, do not have so much light in themselves that it is rendered altogether certain and manifest from there, not only that they contain true doctrine, but also that they were written and inspired by God. As for example, in the Old Testament the book of Esther, the book of Ruth, and the Song of Songs; and in the New certain epistles, such as those of Jude and James. Wherefore, in order for someone to acknowledge and receive those books as divine by a certain and firm faith, it is not enough to discern that light which is in them - since that light is not so great that it can extort that assent which faith requires, to whose object they pertain, since they are a part of the rule of faith, and are numbered among the principles of faith.

IX. Therefore, in order for us to believe the whole of Scripture as divine, as it deserves, firmly and certainly, besides that action of the Holy Spirit opening the eyes of our mind to the light shining in sacred Scripture, there seems necessary a certain internal impulse and instinct, as I may say, by which he may move us to believe, by a certain force which is greater than every argument and reason. And that instinct is what we think ought to be properly understood by the intrinsic persuasion of the Spirit, and the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. For it is not to be thought that when the Holy Spirit is said to testify in the hearts of the faithful about the divine truth of Scripture, the faithful inwardly hear a certain voice which says expressly and explicitly, "This is true and the Word of God." But that is to be taken of a certain virtual testimony, as I may say - nor is anything else given to be understood by this than that the Holy Spirit in a secret way instigates us to believe, and imprints a certain persuasion of the divinity of Scripture on our minds. In which way that celebrated passage of Augustine is to be understood, which is usually cited from his Confessions. "Let me hear," he says, "and understand how in the beginning you made heaven and earth. Moses wrote this, he wrote and departed, he passed hence from you to you, nor indeed is he now before me. For if he were, I would hold him, and ask him, and through you I would beseech him to open these things to me, and I would lend the ears of my body to the sounds issuing from his mouth. And if he spoke in the Hebrew language, in vain would he strike my sense, nor would he touch my mind at all. But if in Latin, I would know what he was saying. But whence would

I know whether he was speaking the truth? And if I knew this too, would I know it from him? Inwardly indeed within me, in the dwelling place of thought, Truth, neither Hebrew nor Greek nor Latin nor barbarian, without the organs of mouth and tongue, without the sound of syllables, would say, 'He speaks the truth,' and I, immediately certain, would say confidently to that man of yours, 'You speak the truth.'"

X. But it is not to be feared lest, if that impulse and instinct of the Holy Spirit in the faithful is admitted, a place be given to enthusiasms. For such a force and action of the Spirit in us differs much from enthusiasm. For, to omit other things which could be brought forward here, in enthusiasm God so insinuates himself into the minds of men that he reveals to them those things which they have learned or heard from no man. But the Spirit does not instigate the faithful to believe, except those things which are outwardly proposed to be believed, in the Word of God handed down by the Apostles and Prophets. Nor also can the persuasion which that impulse of the Spirit generates be called blind, and ignorant of itself. For the Spirit of God does not impel to believe, except those things whose light he first made them so discern that the intellect judged them to be credible, and that they could rightly and with reason be believed, although the arguments of truth which it notes in them do not equal the certainty which the Holy Spirit imprints, nor are they its rule and measure.

XI. Furthermore, that Spirit of wisdom and revelation, by whose power and efficacy men are led into the knowledge of the Word of God and conceive a certain faith about it, is common to all and each one in the Church, nor is there any faithful person and member of the Church who is altogether devoid of it. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God. But if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ, he is not his, as the Apostle testifies in Romans 8. And also, since it was proved before that no one can believe the Word of God and receive it as divine who has not been illuminated by the Holy Spirit, from there it is manifest that any faithful person who believes the Word of God has been illuminated by the Holy Spirit.

XII. But that Spirit is given unequally, and not to all by the same measure. Whence it is that, although all and each of the faithful have the Spirit of God, in some degree at least, yet certain of them are called spiritual, in opposition to others who are called carnal, as can be seen in 1 Corinthians 3. "And I, brethren," says Paul, "could not speak to you as to spiritual people but as to carnal, as to babes in Christ." For Paul does not call any his brethren unless they are faithful. And nevertheless those whom he there addresses he says are carnal, that is, still rude and of weak mind, and who have not yet received that measure of the Spirit of Christ that they can bear and grasp the more abstruse and difficult mysteries of the Christian religion; and therefore, as he himself says, infants in Christ as it were. But by the spiritual he understands those whom the Holy Spirit has raised to a more perfect state.

XIII. Therefore not all who are in the Church receive the Spirit of God in that measure that any of them can recognize and discern whatever pertains to the Word of God and sacred Scripture. For among the faithful and those having the Spirit of God, there can be doubt about some book of Scripture, and about some dogma of the Christian religion. Thus

formerly in the ancient Church, not all good and holy teachers felt the same about the Canonical books, but some rejected those which others admitted. For, for example, the Epistle to the Hebrews was long rejected by the Latin Church, whose sacred and divine authority the Greek Church meanwhile acknowledged. Nor is he who errs in some point of Religion immediately to be expunged from the number of the faithful. For Paul, in Philippians 3, wants that those who are perfect bear with those who think otherwise, and cultivate communion with them as with brothers, in the meantime until God reveals to them that to which they have not yet attained.

XIV. But however unequally that Spirit of Wisdom and revelation may be distributed, it is certain that each and every one who has the Spirit of God can recognize the word of God presented to them, and discern true doctrine from false, as much as is necessary for each person's own salvation. For it should be noted that it is not necessary for the salvation of each individual to know every single book of sacred Scripture, and everything that God has revealed in his word. Since some of these things are necessary for the salvation of individuals, while others only pertain to the common good of the Church. Then, if a comparison is made between individual members of the Church, one is required to know more, another less in the word of God. Nor should it be thought that what suffices for the salvation of a private individual is sufficient for those who are called to teach in the Church. And for that reason, God, to whom it seemed good to variously dispense his gifts in the Church, does not bestow his Spirit on all in such abundance that they can attain to all things which are contained in the scope of his word. But at least he bestows on each believer that measure of the Spirit which is necessary for them to be able to recognize and perceive what is fitting for their calling, and what they need to know, according to their state and condition. And according to this limitation and suitable distribution, those passages of Scripture are to be understood which attribute to the faithful the ability to discern and judge the word of God. As is that saying of Christ in John 10, "My sheep hear my voice." And in John 7, "If anyone wants to do the will of the Father, he will know whether the teaching is from God, or if I speak on my own." Likewise, what Paul says in 1 Corinthians 2, "The spiritual person judges all things." And in 1 John 2, "You have an anointing from the Holy One, and you know all things." Again, "The anointing teaches you about all things." For in these and similar passages, Scripture does not mean to teach that each and every believer can immediately, by the help of the Spirit, recognize whatever pertains to God's word in any way. But only this: that the faithful, and those who are piously disposed towards God, can discern sacred doctrine from contrary error by the instigation and suggestion of the Spirit, as much as is expedient for the salvation of each individual.

XV. And so it is clear how necessarily, and in what way, and to what extent, the Holy Spirit works in us so that we may recognize God's word and sacred Scripture. It follows that we should briefly see what is to be attributed to the Church in this matter as well. Which was the third point of those things which, at the beginning of this disputation, we undertook to examine.

XVI. The question is asked, therefore, whether the voice and testimony of the Church is needed to attain this knowledge. We answer briefly that, speaking absolutely, no man's work is necessary for this. Since God can immediately, and without any external ministry, give someone knowledge of Scripture and his word, and impress a certain faith concerning it. Thus Paul had not received the Gospel from man, nor had he been taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ, as he himself testifies in Galatians 1. So the rest of the Apostles were led into all truth by the Spirit, the Paraclete, with no man going before them. So finally the Prophets of old learned what they spoke from the Holy Spirit alone, who inspired them.

XVII. But that was extraordinary. Nor did it seem good to God to use this way commonly in bringing men to faith and instructing them in heavenly doctrine. But he wanted men to be taught by men, and to receive faith, yet with the Spirit himself teaching and cooperating within. And so he instituted the sacred ministry in the Church, and commanded pastors and teachers to publicly proclaim, explain, and commend his word, and to testify concerning its truth. And what the Pastors do publicly and with authority, individual believers are also bound to do privately, according to their capacity, with those entrusted to their care, by divine ordinance.

XVIII. Therefore, according to the ordinary law, this ministry is necessary for someone to have knowledge of divine doctrine and Scripture, and to conceive faith. For the Holy Spirit does not lead us immediately into the knowledge of God's word. Nor do we embrace heavenly doctrine and revere the Scriptures by any immediate inspiration of the Spirit. But it is necessary that in this we have as guides the ministers of the Church, and those to whom our instruction is entrusted, who may set forth and expound that doctrine to us, and point out, explain and commend Scripture. And we are first moved by this testimony of the Church to think well of heavenly doctrine and sacred Scripture, and to have faith in it, otherwise we would remain in perpetual ignorance of it. According to that saying of the Apostle in Romans 10, "How will they believe in him of whom they have not heard? How will they hear without someone preaching?" Likewise, "Faith comes from hearing, and hearing through the word of God," that is, by God's command. To which pertains that oft-repeated saying of Augustine, "I would not believe the Gospel, unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me." For he speaks in the person of one who is being introduced to the faith, and begins to have some persuasion of the divine truth of the Gospel. For the common consent and testimony of the Church is ordinarily the first incentive by which we are induced to give some credence to Scripture. And even among the faithful themselves, when doubt arises about some book or divine dogma, we confess that the constant and uniform testimony of the Church is an argument of the greatest weight and importance, which it would be insolent and rash for a man to oppose with his own judgment. Especially when it is a matter of the rejection or admission of some sacred book, we recognize that the perpetual consent of the Jewish and Christian Church is an incontrovertible argument, to which everyone ought to yield.

XIX. Yet the consent and testimony of the Church is not the proper and principal basis of our faith, to which its certainty is to be reduced. For the Church indeed, as we have just taught,

is the one that proposes and explains to us what is to be believed through its ministers, and even private believers, according to God's ordinance, and by its testimony and authority we are first induced to give them some credence, but our faith does not rest in that, but relies on a far more solid foundation. But if it does not proceed further, it is not true and legitimate faith, but only a certain human persuasion. Namely, the Church performs the same service for us as the Samaritan woman once did for her fellow citizens. For the Church gives us access to knowing Christ and his doctrine. And we are first admonished by the testimony of the Church to believe in Christ. But after we have heard Christ himself speaking, both outwardly in the word and inwardly in our hearts, our faith no longer rests on the testimony of the Church, and we can say to it what the Samaritans said to the woman, "We no longer believe because of what you said, for we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this is truly the Savior of the world."

XX. But that the matter is so, and that the testimony and authority of the Church is not the proper reason for our faith, and the principal thing on which our certainty about the word of God rests, is proven by many arguments. For first, if our faith had such a foundation, it would be human, not divine: because, of course, it would rely not on divine truth and authority, but on the testimony of men. Then it would follow that the faithful believe God not for his own sake, but for the sake of men, and that with respect to the faithful themselves, the authority of men is greater than that of God, which is very absurd. The definition of faith would also have to be changed. For, by the consent of all Doctors, faith is that assent which we give to God speaking. But thus, by faith, we would believe not so much God speaking, as men. Nor would faith be an assent altogether firm and infallible. For no human veracity is so great that it can remove all fear of falsehood.

XXI. Moreover, there never was, or will be, any greater authority in the Church than that with which the Apostles were endowed. And yet the faith of those who believed the preaching of the Apostles did not rely on the authority of any Apostle. This is clear from Paul's words in Galatians 1: "Even if we, or an angel from heaven, should preach to you a gospel contrary to what we preached to you, let him be accursed." For if the authority of the Apostles had been the only or principal foundation on which the faithful relied, certainly with that foundation removed, it would also have been necessary for their faith to be taken away or waver. And yet if the Apostles, indeed, the Angels themselves, had taught contrary to what had first been preached, Paul wants the faith of the Gospel to stand firm and unshaken nonetheless.

XXII. Then the Prophets and Apostles, who first handed down sacred doctrine and Scripture, could not resolve the faith which they had in the word of God into the authority of the Church, since they were handing down that doctrine to the Church, not accepting it as commended by the Church. And it is possible, at least out of the ordinary way, for someone to believe the Gospel without being taught by any man, but perhaps coming upon some codex of the Gospel. In which case the faith of that man could not have the authority of the Church as its foundation, whose testimony he had never heard. And yet the faith of all is one. Nor does our faith differ in kind from the faith of the Prophets and Apostles, and of those who would be

taught immediately by God. But our faith would not be the same as their faith, if it had another foundation, and another formal reason for believing. For there is one proper and principal foundation of one faith in kind: nor are there, as the Scholastics say, diverse formal reasons for believing it.

XXIII. Add that, if some imagine our faith rests on the authority of the Church, by the Church they mean the universal Church. But individual believers do not hear that Church, but most are instructed by particular Churches, and their ministers, who can be deceived and err. And therefore their faith cannot rest on the testimony of the universal Church, which has never been heard by them.

XXIV. But with that view exploded, which reduces faith given to the word of God and sacred Scripture to the authority of the Church, it must be seen what then is that in which our faith finally rests, and what is its proper and principal foundation. In order to make this clear, it seems a distinction must be made between the Word of God itself, or divine revelation: And those things which are handed down and contained in the word of God, are made known through divine revelation. For our faith receives the mysteries which are handed down in the word of God in one way, and the voice of God itself, or divine revelation, in another way.

XXV. For as far as the things themselves which are handed down in the word of God are concerned, such as what are called the dogmas of faith, and other things which are contained in the Scriptures, we assent to them and receive them as true, because God, who is supremely truthful, and who can neither be deceived nor deceive, has revealed them to us through the Apostles and Prophets, and taught them in his word. The dogmas of faith do indeed have, besides divine revelation, many arguments by which they are proven and persuaded. Nor is God accustomed to lead us to faith in them, except by means of certain arguments, indications, and reasons, by which their truth is rendered credible to our mind, and is gently insinuated into our souls. Hence it is that Peter in 1 Peter chapter 3 wants the faithful to be able to make a defense and give an answer to anyone who asks for a reason for the hope that is in them. But one who would believe without any reason, and would have or could give no reason for his faith, that would not be true faith, but a slight and rash persuasion of some kind. And so it is not enough for those who proclaim the word of God simply to set forth the doctrine of faith, but there is need besides to apply certain persuasions, and to elicit arguments either from the things themselves, or from certain adjuncts, by which they may render the mysteries of the Christian religion credible and even powerfully prove them. Yet the principal foundation of our faith, and the proper reason, are not those reasons and arguments of whatever kind, but divine revelation, on which our faith especially rests.

XXVI. It has seemed to certain learned men, if we rightly perceive their mind, that the certainty of faith by which we embrace the dogmas of religion and believe the things revealed by God is founded on the light of the things revealed, and a certain inherent splendor of truth, by which our mind is convinced and as it were compelled to assent. Namely, when someone believes the Gospel, and persuades himself that the Son of God

was made man and came into the world, suffered and died for us, rose again, ascended into heaven, and the rest which pertain to our redemption, they are of the opinion that the proper and principal reason for that assent is the very majesty, holiness, sublimity, truth, and congruence with right reason of the doctrine, which seizes the mind into assent to itself, and makes it manifest that that doctrine is not only true, but proceeded immediately from God; since such great and wondrous things could neither be invented nor fabricated by human wit. From which it follows that the truth of heavenly doctrine is recognized by us by nature prior to our being certain that it has God as its author; and thus the ultimate and chief reason for believing it is not the veracity and authority of God speaking, and because God has so said and revealed; but, as we said, the very truth and evidence of the thing. But although we acknowledge that the dogmas of religion have their own light and arguments of truth, and even of divine origin: Yet it seems more in agreement with truth and Theological doctrine, if we say that the proper and principal reason for faith, by which we receive those dogmas, is the authority of God speaking and revealing, rather than the truth and light of the thing itself: which is proven by many arguments.

XXVII. For first, it has hitherto been accepted in the Schools that faith, although it does not exclude reasoning, nevertheless relies more on the authority of the one speaking. But faith does not rely especially on divine authority, if the principal reason why we believe the things of faith is a certain evidence of truth which is in them, not divine revelation. The definition of faith would also be absurd, namely, that it is the assent which we give to God speaking. For then through faith we would not believe God speaking, except materially, as they say in the Schools, that is, we would indeed believe those things which God would speak, but not because God had spoken them. But it is absurd for some habit of the mind to be defined only by its material object. For if someone, for example, skilled in Peripatetic doctrine comes upon some book of Aristotle, and carefully considering his doctrine, recognizes it to be true, and also from the sharpness of style and manner of disputing judges the book to be by Aristotle, the assent given to that doctrine could only absurdly be called faith held in Aristotle speaking. But certainly Theologians up to now by common consent have not only defined faith as the assent shown to God speaking, and have determined its object to be the word of God and the things revealed by God; but also teach that the formal reason of that object, under which faith apprehends it, and on account of which it receives and acknowledges it, is divine authority and revelation.

XXVIII. Then, if the proper and chief reason for faith were the very light of truth which is discerned in the things to be believed, and which necessarily determines the mind to assent, faith would be evident assent, and the dogmas of faith would be evident. Since that is evident which by its light convinces the mind, and compels assent. But it is like a certain axiom of the schools, founded in the Scriptures, that faith is an inevident habit of the mind; since Scripture opposes faith to sight: and teaches that faith is of things not seen.

XXIX. Moreover, although some things which the word of God teaches are demonstrable, and can be deduced from self-evident principles: yet many things are proposed for belief by faith, which, unless one wishes to be contentious, must be admitted to be neither self-evident, nor able to be proven by any necessary and convincing arguments. Let us take, for example, that principal article of faith, by which we are taught that in the one most simple essence of God there are three distinct persons. Who will dare to promise a demonstration of so great a mystery, and seriously affirm that in it there is a certain evidence of truth? when on the contrary our mind sees nothing there but mere darkness, being blinded by that inaccessible light, as the eyes of owls by the sun; and scarcely can even the most acute and subtle vindicate that article from apparent contradiction, much less demonstrate it. And the same can be said about the satisfaction rendered by the death of Christ, about the future conflagration of the whole world, and the resurrection of all the dead, of whose truth, if anyone seeks proofs besides the authority of sacred Scripture, he will find nothing very certain and firm, and which suffices to support our faith. We do not indeed disapprove of the pious attempt of those who labor to prove these and similar mysteries by reasons sought from every quarter, and to persuade. But if we wish to act candidly, it must be acknowledged that those arguments, whatever they may be, are only, as the schools say, certain congruities, which render the matter at most probable and likely, but do not necessarily conclude that it is so.

XXX. But when the Israelites in Egypt were taught that every male was to be circumcised on the eighth day, that they were to abstain from blood, that they were allowed to eat certain animals, not others, and many things of this kind, no one can deny that these things had to be embraced by them in faith, as things pleasing and acceptable to God. And yet who can sincerely and from the heart affirm that these things had in themselves a light by which they sufficiently produced faith in themselves, and from which the mind of the faithful was efficaciously compelled to believe that these things had been commanded and handed down by God. And the same can be said today with respect to us about that washing of water which is used in Baptism, and about the taking of bread and wine at the Lord's table. Since, therefore, many dogmas and precepts are to be received by faith, which do not have that light and evidence in themselves by which they sufficiently prove themselves to be certainly true and handed down by God, it is manifest that the reason and principal basis of faith, by which we receive the things handed down in the word of God and the dogmas of religion, is not the truth and evidence of the thing itself, but rather the truth and authority of God teaching and revealing.

XXXI. But, you will say, how do we perceive divine revelation: And on what does the certainty of faith depend by which we embrace the word of God itself? Certainly God is not accustomed to speak without his voice and word having certain marks and indications by which it can be distinguished and recognized from human or diabolical imposture and fraud. But especially that revelation on which our faith rests today, and which we have recorded in the sacred Scriptures, has very illustrious arguments by which it claims God for itself, as was

abundantly shown in the preceding theses. Nor is the faith by which we receive it a blind persuasion, and one which has no reason for itself. But one who believes the word of God as is fitting is induced to give assent to it by certain reasons and motives, which can persuade a prudent man that it is truly God who speaks, and that a fictitious and false revelation is not being passed off for a true one. And so, besides the arguments which can be sought from the thing itself, God often, in order to produce faith in his word, and to compel men to believe, employed many signs and miracles, to which the faith of those who believed is not infrequently ascribed. Thus Sergius Paulus, a prudent man, when he saw the blindness with which the Apostle Paul had struck Elymas the sorcerer, believed, being astonished at the teaching of the Lord, Acts 13. And the Centurion who stood by the dying Christ, seeing the wonders which happened at the death of Christ, glorified God, saying, "Truly this man was righteous," Luke 23. Similarly in John 4, when a certain Father recognized that his dying son had been healed and recovered by the word of Christ, at that very hour at which Jesus had said to him, "Your son lives," he himself believed, and his whole household. Hence the conversion to faith of those who, when asked for a reason for their conversion, have nothing to say, or bring forward frivolous things, is rightly suspect.

XXXII. Yet we do not think that those arguments and motives for believing, by which the word of God is persuaded, and by which the minds of men are gently bent to obedience to it, are that on which the certainty of faith chiefly depends, and its principal foundation. God does indeed use these arguments in generating faith, and faith already generated is also nourished and cherished by them; yet they do not seem to be the chief basis of faith and the measure of its certainty. And this because, as was already said in thesis 8, the Christian schools agree that the certainty of faith is supreme, and such that it either equals or even surpasses all certainty which is found in the human sciences, namely, if faith is estimated from its principles, and considered as it can and ought to be: but not as it actually is in many. But the faith by which we receive the word of God, which today is contained in Scripture, cannot have that certainty, if it relies only on the marks and arguments by which Scripture is proven divine. For they are not demonstrations which generate absolute certainty, but only moral arguments, which although they suffice for someone to be induced to believe prudently, nevertheless cannot by themselves, and from their nature, produce a certainty equal to that which, for example, the Mathematical disciplines have: such as or even greater than we suppose faith to acquire.

XXXIII. Especially if we consider the individual books of sacred Scripture, it must be confessed that there are many which do not have in themselves those marks of divinity by which their divine authority can necessarily and evidently be proven, and on which so great a certainty as faith requires can be founded. Such are, for example, the book of Judges, the book of Ruth, the book of Esther, the Song of Songs, which can scarcely be proven to be divinely inspired by any other arguments than those general ones which are sought from the testimony and consent of the Jewish and Christian Church. And yet those books are part of the divine word, and of that most certain rule of faith, to which all things pertaining to religion

are to be applied and examined; and thus pertain to the object of faith taken in its full extent: and the assent which we give to them, as is fitting, is referred to no other virtue than faith. And therefore, since certain parts of the word of God to be received by faith do not have those arguments of divinity which can of themselves found an assent as certain as faith demands, without doubt the arguments by which the word of God proves itself divine and to have flowed from God, are not the principal foundation of faith, and that ultimate thing to which the certainty of our faith must be resolved. Nor is it relevant that faith in such books is not necessary for the salvation of individuals. For here the question is not what is necessary for the salvation of individuals, or not. But we are considering in general the nature and foundation of faith to whose object pertain many things which are not necessary for individuals to know for salvation.

XXXIV. Therefore we establish that the ultimate thing to which our faith is finally resolved, and its principal support, is that impulse and instinct of the Holy Spirit which was described by us in thesis 9. By which name we designate the action and efficiency of the Holy Spirit by which he immediately moves us to accept divine revelation, and impresses a certain persuasion of it on our minds. For the illustration of which thing, a comparison can contribute something if a comparison is made between the assent of faith and the assent of the sciences. For what demonstrated conclusions are in the sciences, here are the dogmas of faith and other things which the word of God teaches and hands down. What is the means of demonstration with respect to the conclusion, that is the authority of God speaking and revealing with respect to those things which are proposed to be believed. But as we immediately perceive the means itself and the force of demonstration by the natural and innate light of reason: so we immediately believe and perceive divine revelation made to the Prophets and Apostles through the internal instinct and testimony of the Spirit of God, which the Scholastics call the light of faith. And as the light of reason is not that which we perceive and know by reasoning, but that by which we know and reason: So that testimony of the Holy Spirit is not something further which is believed, nor an argument which moves to belief, but only that by which it is believed, and the action by which faith is impressed on our mind: which it is not necessary for every believer who elicits the act of faith to know and understand by a reflexive cognition: No more than it is necessary for some peasant to think about intelligence and the power of reasoning when he understands and reasons.

XXXV. But what the testimony of the Holy Spirit contributes, and what weight the arguments have by which the divine authority of Scripture is persuaded, so that we may give it the faith which is fitting, we cannot better explain than in the words of that most celebrated man [John Calvin] who speaks thus on the matter: "Let this therefore remain fixed, that those whom the Spirit teaches within solidly acquiesce in Scripture, and that this is indeed *ἀυτόπιστον*, nor should it be subjected to demonstration and reasons: which certainty, however, it obtains among us by the testimony of the Spirit. For although it gains reverence for itself by its own majesty, yet it seriously affects us only when it has been sealed upon our hearts through the Spirit. Illumined, therefore, by his power, we now believe, neither by our own nor by anyone

else's judgment, that Scripture is from God; but above human judgment, we affirm with utter certainty that it has flowed to us from the very mouth of God by the ministry of men. We seek no arguments, no verisimilitudes on which to lean our judgment; but we subject our judgment and wit to it as to a thing placed beyond any guesswork. Not as some miserable men are wont to tether their minds captive to superstitions; but because we feel that the undoubted power of his divine majesty lives and breathes there, by which we are drawn and inflamed, knowingly and willingly, to obey, yet also more vitally and more effectively than by mere human willing or knowing. Such, then, is a persuasion that requires no reasons; such, a knowledge with which the best reason agrees -- in which the mind truly reposes more securely and constantly than in any reasons; such, finally, a feeling as can be born only of heavenly revelation." Institutes, Book 1, Chapter 7, Section 5.

**Theological Theses,
On the Authority of Scripture:
Part Three.**

**In which the opinion of the Papists is set forth, and the state of the controversy indicated,
and the true opinion confirmed by arguments.**

Thesis I

Thus far we have expounded, as distinctly and clearly as we could, our opinion on the authority of Scripture. And to draw the whole matter into a small compass, we have taught 1. That Scripture shines with its own peculiar splendor, and emits various rays of divinity by which it can strike and affect a mind rightly disposed: and thus prove itself. Yet that light is not evidence properly so called, such as is found in things which are self-evident or fall under demonstration, as is seen in things Mathematical and Metaphysical: but only a certain moral evidence, which consists entirely in this, that Scripture is persuaded by so many and so probable arguments, and has in itself so many and such remarkable marks of divinity, that from this a pious and prudent man is efficaciously induced to believe that it is true and divine: although its divine authority is not a thing self-evident, or even one which can be demonstrated.

II. We have proven that for someone to believe sacred Scripture, and to acknowledge it as divinely inspired, with a true and legitimate faith which is of some moment for salvation, there is need of the Holy Spirit warning and illuminating within. But that operation of the Holy Spirit is necessary for us, not only on account of the darkness brought in by sin, which is like a certain veil spread over the eyes of our mind, which hides from us the light of sacred Scripture, and hinders us from being able to behold it; but also on account of the genius and nature of the doctrine itself contained in Scripture: which, since it altogether surpasses our mind, even considered in itself apart from sin, it is necessary that our intellect be raised above itself, so that it can rise to it. And thus, so that we may acknowledge and receive Scripture and its individual books as true and divine, firmly and indubitably, and with a

certainty as great as faith requires, to whose object they pertain, there is need not only for the Holy Spirit to heal the native blindness of our mind and dispel the darkness brought on by sin, which hinder us from being able to perceive the light of Scripture: but also for him to compel us to believe by a certain secret instinct and impulse, or by a certain internal efficacy, which is greater than any argument and reason.

III. And this has been shown by us, that although, speaking absolutely, there is no need for the voice and testimony of the Church for us to have knowledge and faith in Scripture, yet according to the ordinary law, God uses the ministry of the Church in generating faith in Scripture in us; and the first incentive by which we are ordinarily moved to accept it as true and divine, is the common consent and testimony of the Church. Yet neither the voice nor authority of the Church is the principal foundation of our faith, and that to which the certainty of faith by which we embrace sacred Scripture is ultimately to be reduced.

IV. We have taught that although the dogmas of religion and other things which are handed down in the word of God may have many arguments for their truth, yet those arguments are not the proper and principal reason on which rests the faith by which we receive the things handed down in the word of God, but rather the authority and veracity of God teaching and revealing. But the word of God itself, or divine revelation, does indeed have marks and indications by which it can be recognized and distinguished from diabolical and human frauds, nevertheless our faith does not rely chiefly on marks and indications of this kind: but the certainty of it is resolved into the secret testimony of the Holy Spirit, and that internal efficiency by which he immediately renders believers certain that it is God who speaks, and impresses a firm persuasion of this matter on our minds.

V. It follows now that we should see what the Papists think about all these things, so that it may clearly appear in what the state of the question on the authority of Scripture, which is debated with such contention between us and them today, is situated. But here, before all things, it should be noted that among the Papists there are two kinds of men. For among them there are many shameless men, of no candor, scarcely any learning, who have proposed nothing else to themselves than to harass our people with importunate disputations. These often fight in the manner of the Andabatae [gladiators who fought blindfolded], not seeing what they strike, and where they direct their blows. And so, in the course of disputing, they not only attack our doctrine, but also overthrow their own positions, and contradict themselves. For it is enough for them, provided that with certain stinging sophisms and a certain captious subtlety they create trouble for us; not caring in the meantime whether the things which they bring forward against us can be retorted against themselves. When the question is about the authority of Scripture, they hiss at the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, and babble many things against our people which take away all authority from sacred Scripture, and suspend our faith solely from the testimony of men. And thus they expose the Christian religion to reproach and render it ridiculous, as if it rested on no other foundation than the authority of those who profess it.

VI. But besides these babblers and sophists of no authority even among their own, it must

be confessed that in the Papal school there are many learned men who speak more considerately and exactly, and have a greater selection of arguments. These certainly hold the opinion of the Roman Church more accurately, and explain it better, and defend it more cautiously. And so those former wranglers should indeed be restrained and repressed, and their foolishness and impiety is rightly reproved by our people and publicly whipped. Yet when the state of some controversy with the Roman Church is to be sought and determined, we do not think that the trifles of those men should be dwelt upon: but it should be inquired what the latter think and teach, who are strong in learning and authority among their own.

VII. Yet again those leaders and chief centurions of the Papal school are to be distinguished from themselves. For they do not always seem to be consistent with themselves. Indeed, they speak one way when they deal with their own people, and teach among their own with a calm and composed mind, but another way when they fight with us, and the ardor of disputing and contradicting has grown hot. Since in their contests with us, carried away by hatred of us and the heat of disputation, even those standard-bearers of the Roman school rashly blurt out many things, not only adverse to us, but to themselves, of which they themselves are ashamed. And so those very things are found elsewhere in their writings set forth far more mildly and more agreeably to the truth.

VIII. Moreover, although such things rashly blurted out, and brought forth more from hatred and blind passion than from a certain judgment of mind, are most justly noted and harped upon by our people: yet in determining the state of some controversy, we think that regard should rather be had to those places where they speak with a calm mind, and treat the matter in question expressly, and clearly and distinctly explicate the mind of their Church. For it happens not infrequently, not only to such men who plead a bad cause, but also to good men whose purpose is to defend the truth, that in the course of disputing they recede too much from the opposite opinion and are carried to contrary shores; and inadvertently bring forward against their adversary things which are harmful to themselves also, and do not altogether agree with the truth and their own positions. Which both our people and the Papists often note in the ancient Fathers of the Church, while they refute schismatics and heretics and inveigh against heresies. But fairness and candor require that things thus spoken harshly and unsuitably should be explained from other places where those authors speak more suitably and more agreeably to the truth. Nor do we deny that our Doctors also sometimes need this pardon and indulgence. And so, that we may deal kindly and candidly with our adversaries, we think that this also should be granted to them, that if they have anywhere spoken some things badly and falsely, but elsewhere well and congruently with the truth, those former things should be softened and understood from the latter.

IX. But to apply these things to the present matter, it is certain that not only those vain men, and of no value even among their own, but even those very ones who lead the family among the Papist Doctors, bring forward many things in the course of disputing, which seem plainly contrary to these things which we have hitherto taught, about the marks of the word of God and the arguments by which sacred Scripture is proven, and about that internal testimony of

the Spirit, to which our certainty about the word of God is to be referred. For they often speak as if sacred Scripture would merit no faith, nor have authority, except what it borrows from the Roman Church, and as if the whole certainty of our faith would rest on the Doctors of the Church today: so that, with that testimony set aside, Scripture would be of no more value among us than any profane book. Sayings and blasphemous statements of this kind our Doctors note and collect in their disputations on this argument. Yet when those Papist doctors bring forward such things injurious to Scripture, they seem to be forgetful of themselves, and in that to unseal their own positions. For almost the same things which we taught before, about the light of sacred Scripture and the word of God, about the secret testimony of the Holy Spirit, about the proper reason of faith and its principal foundation, and about that ultimate thing to which the certainty of faith is resolved, are handed down and taught by Papist Theologians in the schools. Which, so that we may show more clearly, those points about which we have previously dealt must be briefly run through by us, and what the Papists teach about each one must be indicated in a few words.

X. First, therefore, although the Papists do not want those things which pertain to faith per se and properly to be things self-evident, or which can be demonstrated, which we also confessed above, yet they do not deny that a certain external and moral evidence belongs to the things of faith: and besides the authority of their Church, they acknowledge that there are very many arguments by which Christian doctrine and sacred Scripture is proven, and, as they say, is rendered evidently credible. This is commonly taught by the commentators of Thomas Aquinas on the second part of the second part, question 1, article 4. Where Thomas discusses this, Whether the object of faith can be something seen. For in that article Thomas, who determines that the object of faith is not something seen or evident, objects to himself the passage of the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 13, "We see in a mirror dimly" [1 Cor. 13:12]. Where the Apostle speaks about the knowledge of faith: And yet he says that through it, we see as in a mirror. From which it follows that the object of faith is seen by the believer, and thus faith is of things which are seen. To which that Doctor responds, that the things which are of faith can be considered in one way in particular, and thus they cannot be at the same time seen and believed: in another way in general, namely, in the common notion of credibility, and thus they are seen by him who believes. For, he says, he would not believe, unless he saw that they were to be believed, either on account of the evidence of signs, or on account of something of this kind. From which words of Thomas the Scholastics gather this maxim, that the things which fall under faith are not evidently true: yet evidently credible and persuaded by many very weighty arguments and very strong reasons. Which arguments they then enumerate, each one, of course, those which seem to him most valid. As can be seen in Dominic Bañez, John Puteanus, Pesa, and others on the passage of Thomas mentioned above.

XI. But especially Gregory of Valentia, a learned and acute Jesuit, in that volume which he titled *On the Analysis of Faith*, spends the first book pursuing the arguments by which Christian doctrine and Scripture, which is its book, can be proven and persuaded: and he

enumerates arguments of this kind up to nineteen. In which he touches upon almost all those which our people call the marks of the word of God, that is, arguments by which sacred Scripture can be recognized and discerned from human writings. And even Bellarmine himself, in Book 1 On the Word of God, Chapter 1, omitting the testimony of his Church, which those with whom he deals reject, proves the divine authority of Scripture by many arguments and reasons. As, for example, from the miracles done in confirmation of Scripture, from the admirable agreement and harmony of the sacred Writers, and from the predictions of future things and the prophecies of the Prophets contained in Scripture, and proven by the event. Which and certain other things he brings forward and vindicates against the Libertines who despise Scripture. And so those of our Theologians who laboriously prove against them that sacred Scripture has certain marks and certain arguments by which it is proven divine do not seem to grasp the mind of the Papists well enough; as if the heat of the controversy about the authority of Scripture were placed in that, and the Papists simply denied that Scripture has any marks and notes of divinity, but could only be recognized by the testimony of the Church alone.

XII. Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church agree with us that there is need of a certain internal operation of the Holy Spirit for this, that we may acknowledge the word of God and sacred Scripture, and receive it with the faith which is fitting. Which operation of the Spirit of God in us they call, as we also do, the internal illumination of the Spirit, revelation and persuasion, and the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. And they speak about that testimony of the Spirit so clearly, so constantly and frequently, that it might seem superfluous to bring forward their testimonies on this matter. Yet lest any place be left for doubt, we will cite a few out of many. Thus, therefore, Melchior Cano in Theological Places, Book 2, Chapter 8, Response to Argument 4: "This must be determined," he says, "that human authority and all those incentives mentioned before, or any others whatsoever applied by him who proposes the faith, are not sufficient causes for believing as we are bound to believe, but besides there is need of an interior efficient cause, that is, of the special help of God moving to belief." And with a few things inserted, "All external, therefore, and human persuasions are not enough for believing, however competently those things which are of faith may be proposed by men. But there is need besides of an interior cause, that is, of a certain divine light inciting to belief, and certain internal eyes given by the benefit of God for seeing." Which in the same place he proves by the authority of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine, and by many passages of Scripture, which he cites and urges for this matter. The same is taught by Thomas Stapleton in his Relectio on the Principle of Controversies about the Power of the Church in Itself, Question 1, Article 2, Conclusion 4. And more fully On the Principles of Faith, Controversy 4, Book 8, Chapter 1, whose heading is, That it is impossible without special grace and the gift of faith divinely infused to produce an act of true faith, or to believe by faith truly so called. And in his disputations against Whitaker he perpetually complains that it is objected by calumny to the doctors of the Roman Church that they deny that the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit is necessary for generating faith. He especially

makes this reply against Whitaker in defense of the authority of the Church, Chapter 3: "This secret testimony of the divine Spirit," he says, "is absolutely necessary for someone to believe the testimony and judgment of the Church about the approbation of the Scriptures." With which Gregory of Valentia agrees in his *Analysis of Faith*, Book 1, Chapter 1: "God," he says, "is the one who in the first place, by the voice of his revelation and by a certain internal instinct and impulse, bears witness to human minds of, and persuades them of, the truth of Christian doctrine and thus of sacred Scripture, as is expressed in many places in Scripture itself." Finally, Bellarmine pursues this doctrine in an entire lecture, to which he has given the title *On the Light of Faith*.

XIII. But from these things it is manifest that those of our Theologians have not reached the scope of this controversy who so explicate the state of the question: Whether, namely, we believe Scripture on account of the testimony of the Church alone or rather principally on account of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit: as if the Roman Church utterly rejected and hissed at that internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. And conversely those Papists wrong us who harp upon our people as if they were boasting of a private Spirit and panting after certain enthusiasms. For we do not teach anything else about the secret testimony of the Spirit than what they themselves confess and teach. Nor by that testimony do we exclude, as they calumniously object to us, the necessity of the Ecclesiastical ministry in setting forth and expounding those things which pertain to faith, as we taught abundantly in the preceding disputation.

XIV. Nor do the Papists any less expressly teach that the authority of the Church is not the formal reason of our faith, that is, the principal foundation on which our faith rests. This is especially taught by Melchior Cano in *Theological Places*, Book 2, Chapter 8, Response to Argument 4: "This third thing," he says, "must be put down, that the formal reason of our faith is not the authority of the Church, that is, the ultimate resolution of faith is not made to the testimony of the Church." And below, "The authority of the Church is not the reason moving per se to believing." Again, "If it is asked generally whence it is certain to the believer that those things which he holds by faith have been revealed by God, he will not be able to adduce the authority of the Church." Some indeed there were among the old Scholastics, namely, Durandus and Gabriel Biel, who ultimately resolved Christian faith into the authority of the Church, as if the ultimate reason for believing for the faithful was the testimony of the Church. But this opinion was long ago exploded, and is rejected by common consent by the Scholastics today; it is expressly rejected by Melchior Cano in the place which we have now indicated. "Their error," he says, "I cannot dissemble, who assert that our faith is to be reduced to this as if to the ultimate cause of believing, that we believe the Church to be truthful." Later he adjoins many arguments by which he refutes that error: such as, that it would follow from it that the first formal reason of faith would not be uncreated but created truth: And thus our faith would not rest as on its foundation on divine truth, but on human truth. Moreover, since the assent of the conclusion is not more certain than the assent of the principles, he shows that it would follow from it that it would not be more certain or firm for us

that God is truer than that the Church is truthful, which we would believe through the incentives of human causes. Then he urges the passage of Paul, "But even if we or an angel from heaven should preach to you a gospel contrary to the one we preached to you, let him be accursed" [Gal. 1:8]. From which he gathers that assent of faith does not rest on human causes and incentives. "Wherefore," he says, "lest our mind waver, the authority of divine Scripture must be sought from a higher source than from either the reason or the authority of man." To which he adds that the Apostles and Prophets ultimately resolved their faith to divine authority and veracity: But now our faith is the same as the faith of the Prophets and Apostles, and thus is not resolved into the human authority of the Church, and many similar things.

XV. Thomas Stapleton teaches things agreeing with these in Controversy 4 on the Power of the Church in Itself, Question 3, Article 3, where this is his second conclusion, The voice of the Church is not the formal object of faith. Which he proves, First, because faith can exist without it. And second, because the voice and authority of the Church alone cannot induce faith truly so called. Later he objects to himself the arguments of certain old Scholastics, and among others that celebrated passage of Augustine, "I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me." To which he briefly responds in these words, "The Gospel is not believed except by the authority of the Church moving one to do so, namely, ordinarily, because it is the ordinary way by which the First Truth reveals all things." And in the same place he confesses that our faith does not depend on the testimony of the Church alone, nor principally on it. But on that saying of Augustine, Melchior Cano says these things in the place cited above, "It is not the case that if the Church provides us access to the knowledge of the sacred books, one must immediately acquiesce in that, but it behooves us to proceed further and to rely on the solid truth of God." Dominic Bañez, celebrated among his own, agrees in treating the second part of the second part, question 1, article 1, doubt 4, where this is his second conclusion, "The assent of our faith cannot be reduced to acquired faith, by which we believe the Church to be truthful, as if to the rule or formal reason for believing." And afterwards he adjoins, "This conclusion is so certain that its opposite seems to us to be not only rash, but even erroneous in faith." From which it is evident that neither is this the state of the question between us and the Papists: Whether, namely, the proper reason and principal foundation of the faith which we give to Scripture is the authority of the Church.

XVI. But what the proper reason of our faith is, the same Cano thus explains in the oft-cited place, "But to these three certain and stable opinions this is also conjoined, that the ultimate resolution of our faith is made to the interior efficient cause, that is, to God moving to belief, for instance, to this article, 'God is truer,' and to this, 'The Church cannot err,' and to all the other principles of Christian doctrine, I assent through infused faith, not because John said it, or anyone else, but because God revealed it: but to this, 'God revealed it,' I believe immediately, moved by God through a special instinct." And so, on the part of the object, the formal reason moving is divine truth revealed: but that, nevertheless, does not suffice to

move, unless the interior cause, that is, God also moving by a gratuitous and special concurrence, is present. The same is taught by Thomas Stapleton in that first question, article 2, where this is his third conclusion, "God revealing is properly and absolutely the formal object of faith." And he proves it by the example of the faith of the Prophets and Apostles, who had no other formal object of their faith: from which he concludes that the faith of all has the same object; since the faith of all is one. But in the same place, in response to the third argument, these are his words, "Absolutely and per se, the ultimate resolution of things to be believed is to God who is truthful, or to God revealing inwardly in the heart, according to that saying of John the Baptist, 'He whom God has sent utters the words of God,' and 'Whoever receives his testimony sets his seal to this, that God is truthful,' John 3[:33-34]." Finally, this is the common opinion of the Scholastics, that the assent of our faith is ultimately resolved into the interior motion of the Holy Spirit, as can be seen in the commentators on Thomas in the second part of the second part, question 1.

XVII. And so those Doctors want the voice and testimony of the Church to be a cause without which we would not believe, and, as they say, a certain condition of the object of our faith because the Church is the means through which God reveals and proposes things to be believed. Yet they do not want our faith to be reduced to the testimony of the Church as if to the supreme and ultimate reason for believing, but to God revealing and the Holy Spirit illuminating, as Bañez accurately teaches in the place which we have now cited. And similarly Stapleton, whose these words are in the article indicated by us more than once, "Faith which begins from the testimony of the Church, insofar as it proposes and induces to faith, ends in God revealing within, and teaching within what the Church preached without. For the preaching of the Church teaches outwardly, proposes, induces, assists: but he who teaches within has his chair in heaven, as Augustine teaches." By which internal teacher once approaching, the saying of the Samaritan woman has a place, "It is no longer because of what you said that we believe, for we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this is indeed the Savior of the world" [John 4:42].

XVIII. Nor do the Scholastic Doctors deny that the faith which we give to divine revelation is a prudent assent, that is, that he who believes the word of God is moved to it by certain arguments, which can persuade a prudent man that the word of God is truly what is proposed to him as such. Although the certainty of faith does not depend on those arguments, or properly rest on them: as can especially be seen in Gregory of Valentia, Analysis of Faith, Book 1, Chapter 1, where these are his words, "But because divine revelation is not evidently apparent to human reason, certain other arguments besides divine revelation are needed, by which men, having also been induced, may prudently persuade themselves that Christian doctrine is true. But such arguments are not required for that matter, so that on account of them men may properly, certainly and firmly believe (for the certainty and firmness of faith, and thus its assent, per se rests on divine revelation alone, as on a foundation). But that they may have certain clearer motives by which they may prudently induce their mind to will to believe certainly and firmly, with the help of God, on

account of divine revelation. For two motions of the mind should be accurately distinguished in those who embrace the faith. For they also, with prudence dictating, judge that the doctrine of Christ is worthy to be certainly and firmly believed, and finally they believe by the assent of faith, assisted by God, that it is true. As for what they believe by the certain and firm assent of faith, assisted by God, that the doctrine of Christ is true, that indeed ought to be referred to the divine testimony alone, which is contained in divine revelation, as if indeed to the cause and reason for believing. And likewise, to the proposition of the Church, as if to a certain condition, without which it would certainly not be believed by Christian faith. But as for what they in the first place prudently deliberate upon, and determine that that doctrine can be believed by them as divine and true with certainty and firmness, that is indeed a certain judgment of prudence, which properly rests on arguments other than divine revelation." To which Melchior Cano hands down things agreeing in Book 2, Chapter 8, Response to Argument 4: "It is necessary," he says, "not only that those things which are of faith should be simply proposed to him who is about to believe by a man, as if first principles to a disciple, but there is also need to apply a certain external persuasion, and human incentive." And he proves it by the examples of those who were moved to believe by miracles and other reasons. And afterwards he also adds, "With which things set forth, it can easily be understood, as I think, that those things are true which were said a little before, that is, that it behooves certain human and external aids to intervene for believing: yet that they are not suitable per se, nor is the resolution of our faith made to them, but to the interior divine cause, which excites and moves so that we may believe." And this is also the common opinion of the Roman school, with no one, as far as I know, dissenting: so that it is superfluous to accumulate more testimonies.

XIX. But, you will say, what then is finally the state of the controversy about the authority of Scripture? For in the points reviewed up to now there seems to be agreement between the Orthodox and the Papists. Or perhaps is there only here a dispute about a name? Certainly not. Here there is a great and very important disagreement between both sides. For the understanding of which it should be noted, 1. that there are certain revelations which are not made known to us except through another revelation, from which they borrow their authority with respect to us. Thus, for example, the revelation once made to Balaam became known to us through the revelation made to Moses. And I say the same about that fragment of the prophecy of Enoch, to which the Epistle of Jude grants authority. But since there cannot be an infinite regress in this matter, nor should a circle be admitted, by which one revelation would be proven through another, and this in turn through that other one: it is necessary that there be given a certain revelation which is first with respect to us, which obtains faith among us per se and on account of itself, but not by the benefit of a certain better known revelation.

XX. Moreover, it should be known that, speaking accurately, a distinction can be applied between the proper and, as the Schools say, formal reason of faith, if it is considered simply and absolutely; and between a certain external principle of faith, or external rule of things to be believed. The proper and formal reason of faith was, is, and will always be the same

among all the faithful, namely, the revelation of God, in whatever way that revelation may be made, whether by the immediate inspiration of God, or through men, or through Angels, or through Scripture, or apart from Scripture. For to all the faithful this is the perpetual formal reason for believing the things of faith and religion, namely, because God has revealed such things. But it did not seem good to God to reveal privately to individual believers what would be necessary for the salvation of each one, but for preserving unity and communion in the Church, and so that the wiles of Satan might be met, God always wanted there to be extant in the Church a certain common, external and public revelation, which would be the rule of faith, to which all dogmas of faith were to be applied, and from which every contention about matters of faith was to be decided and ended. Such a rule of faith before the Law was given were the voices of the Patriarchs, and the living oracles of God. But after the Law had been given through Moses and committed to writing, the rule of faith in the Church was the written Law of Moses itself, and the revelations made afterwards to the Prophets and also consigned to writing. But after the advent of Christ, this rule has been made larger and ampler by the addition of the New Testament. And so now the rule of our faith in the Christian Church is the Scripture of the Old and New Testament.

XXI. Thirdly, it should be noted that the resolution of our faith can be made in two ways, with respect to the object and with respect to the subject, or with respect to us and with respect to others. With respect to us, and with respect to the subject, faith is resolved when it is asked what is the internal principle of faith, and that in which the conscience of each one rests, and it is not permitted to proceed further. But with respect to the object, and with respect to others, our faith is resolved when it is asked what is the ultimate foundation of our faith, which we can put forward and indicate to another. But that ultimate foundation of our faith which we can indicate to another must necessarily be some external principle of faith, and a certain external rule of faith, in which one must stop, and than which no other further one is given.

XXII. Now to apply these things to the present matter, it is agreed between us and the Papists, as is clear from what has been said before, that the proper reason for our faith, simply and per se, is divine revelation, in whatever way that revelation may be made, nor is there any controversy between us on this matter. It is also agreed that that ultimate thing in which the conscience of each believer rests is the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. But it is not agreed what is that revelation today which is first and best known with respect to us, which must be received by us per se and on account of itself, but not on account of any other revelation which is better known to us and of greater authority; and thus what is the first and most common external principle of faith, through which all things must be proven, but which itself is proven by none prior. We assert that this revelation is contained in sacred Scripture: For the word of God, comprehended in the books of the Old and New Testament, is such that it ought to obtain faith among us per se; but not through some other word of God, and a certain divine revelation, which bears public and external testimony to it, which is better known and more certain to the faithful than Scripture itself. Nor is there any rule of faith, or any external principle of faith, which is

prior to sacred Scripture, and by which Scripture can be proven as if from something prior. But it is the first and most common rule of all things which pertain to faith, itself to be examined by no other rule. And so if someone asks why you believe this or that dogma, for example, that God is triune and one, and that the faithful are to be baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, we respond: because this is contained in Scripture divinely inspired, and we indicate the place. But if we are further asked why we believe that Scripture to be divine, we no longer put forward another principle of faith by which Scripture is proven: but we advise that one must stop at that principle. We do indeed adduce arguments by which we try to prove that Scripture is divine, and that it is rightly believed as divine. Yet those arguments are not the principles of our faith properly so called, and that foundation on which our faith chiefly rests: But we believe Scripture, that is, God speaking in the Scriptures, immediately, moved to that by the internal impulse of the Holy Spirit.

XXIII. But the Papists do not want sacred Scripture to immediately and per se merit and obtain faith among us; but they teach that there is another divine revelation through which Scripture must necessarily be proven, so that it may be publicly established concerning it in the Church. And this revelation for them is the voice and testimony of the Church, that is, the teaching of the leaders of the Church. For they want God himself to speak today through the pastors of the Church, as through infallible organs, as far as the doctrine of faith is concerned, just as he once spoke through the Prophets and Apostles. And so they admit indeed that Scripture is the rule of faith, but a subordinate and partial one, which needs to be proven by a superior and broader rule. Therefore, to prove the dogmas of faith, they do indeed bring forward the authority of sacred Scripture. But if they are asked why they give credence to sacred Scripture, they say they do it on account of the testimony of their Church, and in this testimony, as the supreme one among the external principles of faith, they must necessarily rest, if indeed they want to stand by their positions. We indeed also bring forward the constant testimony of the Church to prove the authority of some sacred book: but not like them, as if it were some principle of faith to which our faith must be subjected: but only as a certain argument from posteriority, valid indeed and good, but not entirely divine and infallible.

XXIV. And from that arises that celebrated question about the authority of Scripture. With us asserting that the authority of Scripture among us is supreme, and not borrowed from elsewhere: because Scripture has no revelation above itself, as some other principle of faith by which it can be proven. But the Papists contending that the authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the Church: because they think that the testimony of the Church is a certain principle of faith superior to Scripture, and by which Scripture needs to be proven so that it may be publicly established concerning it among the faithful.

XXV. But so that the difference between the Papist opinion and ours may appear more distinctly, and in what the hinge of the controversy is placed, it should be known that the Papists so compare sacred Scripture with the teaching of the Church, as we compare some particular dogma of faith with sacred Scripture. For just as some article of faith, as for

example, that the dead will one day rise again, has its truth and authority in itself from God alone, but not from the testimony of the Prophets and Apostles, who wrote the books of Scripture: so the Papists admit that sacred Scripture has its authority in itself from God alone, not from the testimony of the Church. Then, just as the principal reason for faith, by which we embrace that dogma, is not properly the authority of Peter, Paul, Isaiah, etc., but divine revelation transmitted to us by their pen, since before Scripture that dogma was believed, and can still be believed apart from Scripture. So the Papists confess that the testimony of the Church is not the proper and principal reason for our faith about Scripture, but simply and absolutely divine revelation. Yet again, as that dogma, and any other similar one, ought not to be publicly received in the Church, and proposed to be believed, except insofar as it is proven by the testimonies of Scripture from which alone it can be publicly established to the faithful that something pertains to faith, and thus the authority of any dogma with respect to us, and public and external certainty depends on the testimony of sacred Scripture: So the Papists want the authority of Scripture with respect to us to depend on the testimony of the Church, and for it not to be publicly established to the faithful concerning the divinity of any book, except from the approbation and testification of the Church. Finally, just as, notwithstanding that dependence of dogmas on Scripture, the dogmas of the Christian religion can be proven and persuaded by many arguments besides the testimonies of Scripture, which arguments nevertheless are not the reason and foundation of our faith, but only certain motives inducing to faith: So the Papists also do not deny that sacred Scripture, besides the testimony of the Church, has many arguments and marks of divinity, by which it can be proven and persuaded, but which nevertheless cannot found public faith in the Church concerning the divinity of Scripture.

XXVI. From which things we think it is sufficiently clear what controversy we have here with the Doctors of the Roman Church. Namely this, whether Scripture is the first rule of faith and the first external principle of faith which therefore cannot be proven by any other principle, nor borrows its authority from elsewhere. Or whether the teaching and testimony of the Church is the principle and rule of faith, better known and more evident to us than Scripture itself, and by which Scripture must necessarily be proven, so that it may be publicly established concerning it among the faithful: We assert the former: The Papists the latter, who by the Church, as was just said, understand the Pastors of the present Church, and especially the Roman Pontiff.

XXVII. But from that their error is refuted because Scripture is something better known among the faithful than the Church itself is. And this because it is agreed among all Christians what the true Scriptures are, at least as to the principal parts, as is clear by induction. For the Greeks, Armenians, Ethiopians, Papists, Protestants, and if there are still any sects of Christians today, by common consent acknowledge that the books, which our Churches hold as Canonical, are truly Canonical. The Papists indeed add certain other books to the Canon of the Old Testament: but concerning those which we deem Canonical they agree with us. But if any have denied or despised the Scriptures altogether, which in the

memory of our fathers the Libertines are thought to have done, they were very few, and of no name, and quickly passed away. But it is not agreed what is the true Church: but each sect claims to be the true Church. Nor do the Greek, Armenian and Ethiopian Churches hold the Roman Church to be the true Church of God, or think themselves bound by its authority in any way.

XXVIII. Add that no Pope, no Council, no Assembly of Pastors has so many and such illustrious marks and arguments of its authority as sacred Scripture has of its divinity. For sacred Scripture is commended by very many things enumerated by us in the preceding Theses; The predictions of future things which are contained in it, the holiness, sublimity and efficacy of the doctrine which it hands down, the majesty and simplicity of its style, the agreement of the Old and New Testament, the miracles done in confirmation of it, the kind of life of those who first handed it down, the perpetual care of God in preserving it, the constancy of the martyrs in defending its truth, the consent of the peoples, and the testimony of the enemies themselves. But what Council or what multitude of Pastors impresses its authority with so many and such remarkable arguments? And here the conscience of our adversaries must be appealed to, whether it is not, namely, better known that the writings of Moses and Paul are divine and authentic than that the Council of Florence, Trent, or the Lateran are legitimate Councils, and which had the infallible guidance of the Holy Spirit.

XXIX. Moreover, Scripture is more certain to the faithful than the testimony of those who are in charge of the Church, and therefore does not borrow its authority from them. For the authority of the Pastors of the Church is not more certain today to the faithful than the authority of the Apostles was to the first Christians. But when the Apostles were formerly living and preaching, their testimony was less certain to the faithful than the testimony of Scripture, as is clear from the words of Peter, 2 Peter, chapter 1, where, speaking to those who had already received the faith, after he testified that he had heard the voice from heaven saying to Christ, "This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased," he adds that the faithful have another testimony about Christ that is firmer, namely, that of the Prophets in the holy Scriptures, "For," he says, "we did not follow cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty. For when he received honor and glory from God the Father, and the voice was borne to him by the Majestic Glory, 'This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased,' we ourselves heard this very voice borne from heaven, for we were with him on the holy mountain. And we have the prophetic word more fully confirmed, to which you will do well to pay attention as to a lamp shining in a dark place" [2 Peter 1:16-19].

XXX. Add that sacred Scripture has greater authority in every respect among the faithful than the testimony of the Pastors of the Church. For the testimony of the Pastors of the Church is not greater today than the testimony of John the Baptist was formerly. But the testimony of Scripture was greater than the testimony of John the Baptist: as our Lord Christ manifestly teaches in John, chapter 5, where he places that testimony which the sacred Scriptures bore to him before the testimony of John the Baptist. "You sent to John," he says,

"and he has borne witness to the truth. Not that the testimony that I receive is from man, but I say these things so that you may be saved. He was a burning and shining lamp, and you were willing to rejoice for a while in his light. But the testimony that I have is greater than that of John" [John 5:33-36]. And afterwards he brings forward a threefold testimony greater than the testimony of John: and indeed first, the miraculous works which he was doing. "For the works," he says, "that the Father has given me to accomplish, the very works that I am doing, bear witness about me that the Father has sent me" [John 5:36]. Then the voice of the Father from heaven bearing witness, "And the Father who sent me has himself borne witness about me" [John 5:37]. And finally the testimony of sacred Scripture. For he adjoins, "You search the Scriptures because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it is they that bear witness about me" [John 5:39].

XXXI. Moreover, according to the adversaries, there is no testimony of the Church more illustrious and solemn than that which is given in the Councils and Decrees of the Popes. But the common sense of the faithful dictates that no Councils have so great authority as sacred Scripture has: For no one would dare to equate any Council, whether Nicene, Chalcedonian, Tridentine, or any other, in authority with the writings of Moses and the books of the Prophets. Nor have even those who are most devoted to the Popes yet so hardened their forehead as to dare to equate the Papal Epistles with the Epistles of Paul and the four Gospels. Which the practice of the Romanist doctors teaches. For when they arrange the places from which Theological arguments are drawn, they always assign the first place to Scripture, but the later place to the Councils and the Decrees of the Fathers. And indeed they so venerate Scripture, as is fitting, that they acknowledge that no error, even the smallest, can be found in it. But, although they want the Councils to be infallible as far as the dogmas of faith are concerned, yet they acknowledge that in many other things they are liable to error, and that their conclusions are indeed *de fide*, but that the Councils can use arguments that are not good: And although they do not err in the question of law, yet they often are deceived in the question of fact. Add that the Pastors and Doctors of the Church use the testimonies of sacred Scripture to gain authority for their teaching: and their teaching can and ought to be brought back to the examination of sacred Scripture. Hence it is that the faithful Bereans are praised who, having heard Paul's preaching, consulted the Scriptures to see if these things were so. Acts 17. Since, therefore, sacred Scripture has greater authority among the faithful than the Pastors of the Church, without doubt it does not receive its authority from their testimony, since what has greater authority cannot receive authority from what has less. For nothing can confer authority greater than that which it has itself.

XXXII. But how could the authority of Scripture with respect to us depend on the authority of the Church, when on the contrary the authority of the Church with respect to us depends on the authority of Scripture. For from Scripture we learn what is the true Church, and what and how great is its authority. Nor can that authority be certainly proven from elsewhere. And so the fathers of old referred the heretics who did not acknowledge the true Church of Christ to the Scriptures, and thought that the true Church should be demonstrated from them. For

thus Augustine deals with the Donatists: "Whether they hold the Church," he says, "let them show only from the Canonical books of the divine Scriptures." And the Papists themselves today try to prove their Church, and its infallible authority, against us from sacred Scripture, and think that they fulfill that duty excellently while they bring forward to us those passages of Scripture. "I am with you always, to the end of the age" [Matt. 28:20], "I have prayed for you, Peter, that your faith may not fail" [Luke 22:32], "The Spirit will guide you into all the truth" [John 16:13], "Tell it to the church" [Matt. 18:17], and certain similar ones which they bring forward as the foundations of that authority which they attribute to the Church. Since, therefore, by their own admission, the authority of the Church becomes known to us from Scripture, and no more certain proof of it can be brought forward, it is plain that conversely the certainty of our faith about Scripture does not rest on the testimony of the Church, as its principal foundation. Otherwise a circle will be admitted here. For the authority of Scripture will be proven through the Church, and in turn the authority of the Church through Scripture; And again there will be a return from Scripture to the Church, and so on to infinity.

XXXIII. To this it is added that the Papists teach that Scripture in the hands of the Church is like letters which they call credentials, that is, by which credence is given to someone who is sent by a superior, and by which we are referred to him, so that we may be more fully informed about the mind and will of the sender: For so they want the Church to exhibit Scripture to us, as a diploma by which its divine calling and authority is confirmed, and sealed to us. And by which we are referred to it, so that we may be more fully taught about the will of God. But the authority of those letters, which they call credentials, does not depend on him who exhibits them: but on the contrary his authority becomes known to us and is confirmed through those letters. And he who brings the letters is not the reason why we believe the letters: but we believe him on account of those letters by which credence is given to him.

XXXIV. It is amazing how the Papists respond to this Argument. For Stapleton, who seems to have treated this controversy most accurately of all, concedes that the authority of the Church with respect to us depends on the authority of Scripture. But he denies that it follows from this that the authority of Scripture does not in turn depend on the authority of the Church. And he tries to prove it by certain instances adduced as the reason for his denial. For, he says, the authority of Christ with respect to us depended on the authority of John the Baptist. For John was sent to bear witness to Christ, and that all might believe in Christ through him. And yet in turn the authority of the Baptist with respect to us depended on the testimony of Christ. For Christ bore testimony to the Baptist, and confirmed his calling. But this Instance, and similar ones which he brings forward, do nothing for the matter. For by this it is only shown that two certain things can bear witness to each other mutually, and prove each other. But not that two things are so related that the authority of the first depends on the authority of the second, and in turn the authority of the second on the authority of the first, at least with respect to the same people. For it is indeed true that the Baptist bore witness to Christ, and pointed him out, and led men to Christ. But yet the authority of Christ

did not depend on the authority of the Baptist, nor did those who had been led to Christ and had acknowledged Christ by the Baptist's indication believe in Christ on account of the testimony of the Baptist, as the principal foundation of their faith. Nor was the authority of John the Baptist greater and more certain with respect to them than the authority of Christ. And so we grant indeed that the authority of John the Baptist depended on the authority of Christ, but we utterly deny that the authority of Christ in turn depended on the authority of John the Baptist. And certainly it is impossible for two things to be so related that the authority of one depends on the authority of the other, and vice versa, at least with respect to the same people, and at the same time. For that whose authority depends on another is less certain and known with respect to us than that on which it depends. Thus, if the authority of the Church with respect to us depends on the authority of Scripture, then the authority of Scripture is more certain and better known with respect to us. But if in turn the authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the Church, then Scripture will be less certain and known with respect to us. And thus the authority of Scripture will at the same time be more certain and less certain, better known and less known with respect to us than the authority of the Church, which implies a contradiction. But here the question is not simply whether Scripture can be proven through the Church, and the Church in turn through Scripture. But whether the authority of Scripture, properly speaking, depends on the authority of the Church, as on some principle of faith which is more certain and better known with respect to us.

XXXV. Secondly, Stapleton responds that the authority of the Church indeed depends on the authority of Scripture with respect to us, yet not in such a way that the Church cannot become known from elsewhere than through sacred Scripture. For, he says, apart from Scripture the faithful learn from the Creed that the Church exists and that it must be believed. But certainly the Creed does not have authority per se, but takes its authority from sacred Scripture, from which it is entirely derived. Nor is the Creed anything other than a declaration of those things which the faithful, according to sacred Scripture, profess to believe. Moreover, it follows from this that the authority of the Creed with respect to us is better known than the authority of the Church itself, which greatly goes against the adversaries, who contend that the authority of the Creed, as of all other things to be believed, depends on the authority of the Church, as on a certain principle of faith better known and a more evident argument. For the Church, according to the adversaries, is itself that which composes the Creeds, and grants them that authority. Add that in the Creed we profess to believe in one holy Catholic Church. But the Creed does not teach what is that holy and Catholic Church, whether, namely, the Roman, rather than the Greek or Ethiopian. Nor can that be elicited from the Creed by any proofs. But so that the authority of Scripture may be confirmed for us through the authority of the Church, in the way the Papists want, it is not enough for us to know in general that there is a Church on earth, but it is necessary for us to know determinately what is the true Church, namely, endowed with divine and infallible authority.

XXXVI. Moreover, that the certainty of faith, by which the faithful embrace sacred Scripture as the rule of faith, does not depend on some public and solemn judgment of the Church, by which the divine authority of Scripture is confirmed as if by a divine oracle, is evident from the fact that, apart from any such judgment, Scripture was publicly known and received as the Canon of faith for many centuries. For through some centuries from the time of the Apostles, no Council, nor any Pope, fixed a certain Canon of Scripture, and drew up a catalog of the sacred books. For the first Council in which the number of the Canonical books was reviewed was that of Laodicea, which was not held before the three hundredth year after the birth of Christ, and was still particular, not general. But before that Council the Canon of Scripture was certain, and the authority of Scripture certain to the faithful. Nor was the scope of the Synod of Laodicea, as of the subsequent Councils which reviewed the number of the sacred books, to acquire some new authority for those books, but only to indicate and declare which ones were already Canonical.

XXXVII. Nor can recourse be had here to some tradition of the Church, as if before the Councils which defined the number of the sacred books, the tradition of the Church was the foundation of faith about Scripture. For the Papists want tradition to be indeed the means which the Church uses in judging those things which are of faith, yet they want tradition to be doubtful, no less than the books of Scripture, and not to be a certain foundation of faith, before it has been approved by the public judgment of the Church.

XXXVIII. Nor is the fiction of Stapleton any more to the point, who distinguishes a twofold testimony of the Church. One solemn and express; which, namely, the Church gives in universal Councils and the Decrees of the Fathers. The other tacit and interpretive, by which the Church is thought to approve those things which it allows to be taught by its ministers, and to be held by the faithful people: as if the Church before the determination of the Councils had already pronounced judgment concerning the Canonical books, and had borne witness, not indeed that solemn and express one; but that other tacit and interpretive one: insofar, namely, as it allowed the Pastors to hand down the books of Scripture to the faithful as Canonical, and did not disapprove of the faith of the faithful accepting them. For that judgment, or testimony, which he calls interpretive, could not found the faith of the faithful, nor did the faith of Christians depend on it, since that judgment follows the faith of the faithful, it does not precede it. For what the Church allows to be done is understood to be and to be done, before the Church allows and suffers it to be done. And so I ask the Papists what foundation that faith of the ancient Christians had, which the Church tolerated, and which it is thought to have approved by its tolerance. For certainly that faith which is conceived as something prior to that tolerance could not rest on the tolerance of the Church, and tacit consent.

XXXIX. Then, whatever may be the case concerning that tacit testimony of the Church, at least as far as certain Canonical books are concerned, the Papists teach that for some time the Church did not pronounce its opinion on them; for they say that some of the books of the New Testament were formerly doubted, because the Church had not sufficiently testified its

mind about them. But although some doubted about them, yet among most Churches those books were publicly received even then, and held as divine and authentic. From which it is clear that the public testimony of the Church is not necessary so that the divinity of any book can be publicly established, and the faithful may be certain about it. Since before the determination of the Church about those books, about which some doubted, the authority of them was certain and publicly acknowledged in the greatest part of the Christian world. For although the Epistles of Jude and James seemed to some to be spurious, as Eusebius says: yet, by the testimony of the same, among others they were genuine, and publicly received. And similarly, although some rejected the Apocalypse of John, yet the Churches founded by John, as Tertullian says, defended its authority. And the matter stands the same way concerning the Epistle to the Hebrews. For although it was doubted about for some time in the Latin Church, yet Jerome teaches in his Epistle to Dardanus that the Churches of the East venerated it as divine and Apostolic.

XL. But if it pleases to go back to the times of the Old Testament, when the Prophets were publishing their books, those books had authority both *de jure* and *de facto* among the faithful of the Israelite people, before the priests placed over the Church at that time had approved those books, and declared them to be divine. Indeed, since most of them had been sent by God for that purpose especially, to reprove the vices and sloth of the Priests, they had them for the most part as adversaries; and yet notwithstanding that repugnance of the Priests, the books of the Prophets were held and acknowledged as divine and authentic. Which is especially clear from the example of Jeremiah. For in chapter 8 of his book he thus rebukes those who were then in charge of the Jewish people. "How can you say, 'We are wise, and the law of the Lord is with us'? But behold, the lying pen of the scribes has made it into a lie. The wise men shall be put to shame; they shall be dismayed and taken; behold, they have rejected the word of the Lord, so what wisdom is in them? From prophet to priest, everyone deals falsely" [Jer. 8:8-10]. And so in chapter 18 we see that those leaders of the Church rose up against Jeremiah, saying, "Come, let us make plots against Jeremiah, for the law shall not perish from the priest, nor counsel from the wise, nor the word from the prophet. Come, let us strike him with the tongue, and let us not pay attention to any of his words" [Jer. 18:18]. And yet although the leaders of the Jewish Church thus opposed Jeremiah, far from approving his prophecies, yet, I say, Jehoiakim is most severely rebuked, because he had rejected the authority of his prophecies copied by Baruch, and had cut them with a scribe's knife and burned them, as is contained in Jeremiah chapter 36. But according to the positions of the Papists, what great crime was that king committing, in not holding as divine a writing which had not yet been approved by the judgment of the Church, indeed was then being opposed by the leaders of the Church?

XLI. Finally, since by the Church on whose authority the authority of Scripture with respect to us depends, the Papists understand the Pastors and Bishops who govern the Church, we ask them on what the authority of Scripture depends with respect to the Pastors themselves, and whence it is established for them that these books are divine, and inspired by God.

Certainly here they cannot have recourse to the judgment of the Church, by which the faith of the Pastors about Scripture may be founded. For the Pastors and Bishops are the very Church whose testimony and judgment is in question: and thus those Pastors would learn from themselves what are the true Scriptures, and their faith would be founded on its own testimony: for lest there be any place for exception, we will take as an example those who first pronounced some such judgment, and could not rest on the judgment of other pastors. And yet the adversaries do not want the Pastors of the Church to be driven by enthusiasms, and to have knowledge of Scripture from the immediate revelation of God. Since enthusiasms and immediate revelations no longer have a place in the Church of God. But they determine that the Bishops and Doctors of the Church come to that knowledge, indeed by the Holy Spirit teaching and leading, but yet also by means of their own study and diligence, and accurate consideration of the books themselves, and diligent examination of the many arguments which the Holy Spirit uses to generate faith about Scripture in them. But what is absurd, if we say that the faithful are led by the Holy Spirit into the knowledge of sacred Scripture in that way? At least it manifestly follows from this that it can be established for us concerning sacred Scripture apart from enthusiasm, and immediate revelation, and yet also apart from some authentic and infallible judgment of the Church.

**Theological Theses,
On the Authority of Scripture:
Part Four.**

In which the objections of Adversaries are solved.

Thesis I

In the immediately preceding disputation we explained the state of this question, and confirmed the true opinion with those arguments which seemed to us most suitable. It remains for us to examine the arguments of the adversaries, and to show their vanity, as briefly and clearly as can be done by us.

II. First, therefore, they try to prove that the authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the Church in this way. Scripture, they say, cannot be proven by Scripture. Therefore, so that Scripture may be established among the faithful, it is necessary that there be some divine and infallible testimony by which Scripture is proven. But this testimony can be no other than the testimony of the Church, than which there is none more certain and august on earth. But if you say that Scripture in many places asserts itself to be divine, they retort that for us to believe Scripture asserting itself to be divine, it is necessary that we are already persuaded of its divinity from elsewhere. For it is not enough for a writing to be held as divine that it asserts itself to be divine: which most of the Apocryphal books did, which were nevertheless rightly rejected. And certainly it seems manifest that Scripture cannot be proven by Scripture itself from the fact that every proof is from things better known. But the same thing is not better and less well known than itself. Nor is anything proven from Scripture to one ignorant

of the authority of Scripture, or doubting about Scripture.

III. I respond that this argument is a mere fallacy by which the Papists can be urged just as much as we can. For thus it can be retorted against them. The voice and testimony of the Church is not the supreme rule of faith, but its authority depends on some other principle of faith better known and more certain to us. For it is necessary that there be another divine testimony, better known and more certain than the testimony of the Church, through which the testimony of the Church may be established. And this because the authority and testimony of the Church cannot be proven through the testimony of the Church itself. Since the same thing is not better and less well known than itself, nor can anything be proven from the testimony of the Church to one ignorant of the authority of the Church, or doubting about the authority of the Church. And so, if this argument is worth anything, it overthrows all faith whatsoever: since no rule of faith can be brought forward, as first and supreme, against which it is not permitted to use a similar argument.

IV. But so that the fraud and vice of this argument may be detected, it must be reduced to form. Therefore, they must argue in this way: What is not evident of itself, nor can prove itself, that is not the first principle of faith, and the supreme rule of faith, whose authority does not depend on something else, but it is necessary that it be proven through something else. But Scripture is not something evident, nor can it prove itself. Therefore, etc. But now the major of this argument is manifestly false. For it is plainly necessary, on the contrary, that what is the first principle of faith neither prove itself, nor be proven by something else; and yet not be something evident. For just as in the human disciplines there are certain first principles, on which the rest depend, and through which the rest are proven, yet they themselves depend neither on themselves, nor on others in this genus, otherwise they would not be first, but obtain credence and assent per se: so also the matter stands in the doctrine of faith. For either a circle must be admitted here, or an infinite regress be granted, both of which are absurd: so that it is necessary to stop at some principle, on which the rest which pertain to faith may depend, and through which they may be proven, yet it itself is proven by no prior thing, of course, nor even by itself, since the same thing cannot be proven by itself: but obtains faith and assent per se, and to which we believe and assent immediately.

V. In this indeed the principles of faith differ from the principles of the sciences, that the principles of the sciences are known per se and are evident, and compel the intellect to assent by their own light: but the principles of faith, although they have some moral evidence, yet, speaking logically and properly, are inevident, nor do they obtain assent, such as faith requires, by their own light. Yet in this they agree that just as we assent to natural principles immediately, through the natural light of the intellect: So also we believe the principles of faith immediately, through the illumination and impulse of the Holy Spirit. But as nothing hinders natural principles from sometimes being proven a posteriori: so also the principles of faith can indeed be proven; but a posteriori, and only to the man.

VI. From that, therefore, it is plain that in the business of faith we must come to some principle, which is neither evident of itself, nor can be proven by itself, and yet does not

depend on any prior principle, but merits authority and faith per se. Although, therefore, Scripture is neither evident of itself, nor can prove itself, yet it cannot be concluded from that that it is not that first principle of faith which does not borrow its authority from elsewhere.

VII. And certainly, wherever the Papists may turn, they will be altogether compelled to confess that the testimony of the Church, which they put forward as the first and supreme principle of faith, is not a thing evident per se, nor can it be suitably proven through the voice and testimony of the Church itself. When, therefore, they nevertheless want the testimony of the Church to depend on no other prior authority; but to obtain its authority among the faithful per se, they openly fight against themselves, when from the fact that Scripture cannot be proven by Scripture, they conclude that its authority does not depend on something else, and ought to be proven to us by the authority of the Church, as by a certain principle of faith prior and superior to Scripture itself: since Scripture, as the first principle of faith, obtains faith and assent among the faithful, not by the intervention of such proof, but immediately through the internal efficacy of the Spirit impressing a certain persuasion of it on our minds.

VIII. These things, however, must be rightly accepted. For first, when we concede that sacred Scripture cannot be proven by Scripture itself, we only mean this: that those testimonies by which Scripture preaches that it is divinely inspired are not suitable arguments by which he who denies the authority of sacred Scripture may be convinced and persuaded. But this does not hinder Scripture from being able to be said to prove itself in another sense, insofar as, as was shown in the preceding theses, there are many signs and arguments of divinity in sacred Scripture, by which it asserts itself to be true and divine. Just as heaven and earth preach and show their author to be God, not by some simple voice and testimony, but from the very excellence of their nature, and the vestiges of divine power and wisdom, which can be noted in them. Or, as some book claims Aristotle and Euclid for itself, not from the title alone, but from the very genius of the doctrine, sharpness of style, and manner of disputing, which is such that it cannot be attributed except to those outstanding minds.

IX. Then, when we say that we believe Scripture immediately, through the internal efficacy of the Holy Spirit, but not by the intervention of some proof, our opinion is not that our faith about sacred Scripture is a blind persuasion, and one which has no reason for itself. Nor by that do we deny that he who believes Scripture, as is fitting, is led to it by certain arguments, which can persuade a prudent man that Scripture is true, and has proceeded from God. For by that word immediately we do not exclude proofs of whatever kind, but only proofs which the schools call *de fide*, that is, which are sought from some principle of faith, and make the thing to be *de fide*, and can found an article of faith per se. But of this kind are not the proofs by which the divinity of sacred Scripture is persuaded. For they are not sought from any principle of faith, and from some rule of faith; but only from various marks and signs: and they consist entirely of certain moral arguments, which cannot per se beget that certainty which is required in faith: since the certainty which is owed to faith, of itself and from its genus, equals, if it does not surpass, all certainty which can be born from demonstration.

And therefore, although those proofs are aids of faith and motives for believing, yet the full certainty of faith, by which we ought to embrace the sacred books, is not to be referred to them, as to its proper and principal foundation, but rather to the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit.

X. But when we say that the certainty of our faith about the divinity of Scripture is to be referred immediately to the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit, the adversaries urge that those things which are of faith, such as that this and that book was written by divine inspiration, are no longer had through immediate revelations, but according to God's ordinance ought to be learned and received from the teaching Church: otherwise a window would be opened to fanatics and Enthusiasts. Resp. When it is said that something is believed immediately, through the illumination and impulse of the Holy Spirit, that can be understood in two ways. First indeed so that the work and ministry of men explaining and commending those things which are to be believed may be excluded; in which way the Apostle Paul had not received the Gospel from man, nor through man, but had been taught it immediately by the Holy Spirit. A revelation of the Spirit of this kind no longer has a place in the Church of God. Nor does the Holy Spirit, commonly and according to the ordinary way, thus reveal to the faithful that these and those books were written by divine inspiration. But faith about Scripture is generated in us through the work and ministry of the Church handing down and commending the sacred books. But in another sense it can be said that Scripture is believed immediately through the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit; namely, so that any extraneous authority may be excluded, whether of some word not written, or of the teaching Church, which is properly called the argument of our faith, by which the Spirit is understood to found our faith. And thus we believe Scripture immediately, since that faith which we give to Scripture, and which the Spirit of God impresses on us, does not properly rest on any external argument and means, nor is founded on some word which is in the mouth of the Church. Just as, from the mind of the Doctors of the Roman Church, that faith which is given to the teaching Church, and proposing the word of God, which they believe to be in its mouth, does not rest on some other authority, which is diverse from the authority of that word: nor does it have for its argument the testimony and voice of the Church, since the same thing would be the argument of itself, but is immediately from the illumination and instinct of the Holy Spirit. Who nevertheless also, from their mind, uses certain motives by which he may dispose men to give faith to the Church: such as are what they themselves call the marks of the Church. And so by that word immediately we exclude the authority of the Church as the foundation of our faith, but not simply the work and ministry of the teaching Church.

XI. But the adversaries continue to urge us. For, they say, if the faithful immediately received Scripture through the internal illumination and persuasion of the Spirit, but not on account of the teaching and testimony of the Church, as the rule of their faith, it would happen that the faithful, who have the Spirit of God, could infallibly and certainly distinguish the divine

books proposed to them from those which are not divine, without the authority and testimony of the Church. But experience is to the contrary. Since, before the judgment and determination of the Church, it was doubted about many books which are truly divine: as for example, about the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Apocalypse of John, and about many other books of the New Testament. But others which were not Canonical and divine were ignorantly held to be such even by pious men. And so that they may urge us more, they say, You Protestants, who boast that you have that Spirit of God by which the sacred and divine books are distinguished from the apocryphal, are not in agreement among yourselves about these books, since the Lutherans doubt about the Epistle of James, and certain others, which the Calvinists admit. And so that they may bring the matter as it were before our eyes, and refute our opinion among our people by experience itself, they read to someone from among our common people a chapter of an Apocryphal book, and likewise a chapter of a Canonical book, with the name of the author and book concealed. Then they ask whether he can discern by the help of the Spirit which is divine, which is not.

XII. Resp. It is indeed true that God bestows his Spirit on all the faithful who leads them into the knowledge of his word: and that they, as John says, have an anointing from the Holy One which teaches them about all things. But not all equally partake of that spirit of faith and wisdom: Nor does God dispense it to all and each in an equal measure: but imparts a greater supply of that spirit to some, but a lesser to others. Nor does that unction teach all the faithful about all things simply, but at least about all things which are congruent to the calling of each one, and which are necessary for the salvation and knowledge of each one, according to his state and condition, and the place which he holds in the Church of God. From which it happens that he who is endowed with faith, and with the knowledge of divine things, as much as suffices for salvation, can nevertheless err in some chapter of faith, and not acknowledge some part of the word of God. And so Paul in Philippians chapter 3, wants those who are perfect to bear with those who think otherwise, and to maintain communion with them as with brothers, meanwhile until God reveals to them that to which they have not yet attained. "Let those of us who are mature think this way, and if in anything you think otherwise, God will reveal that also to you. Only let us hold true to what we have attained."

XIII. But now for the salvation of each individual it is not necessary that he receive and acknowledge each individual book of Scripture, and each individual part of them. And so it is no wonder if all who have received the spirit of faith and revelation, at least in some degree, nevertheless are ignorant of certain parts of Scripture, and are deceived in this, that they think that some book, which is truly divine, is human: And conversely they consider some book, which is only the offspring of human wit, to have been written by divine inspiration. Indeed it is plainly unjust, and against reason to require from any simple believer that he be able to distinguish by himself immediately any particle of a Canonical book from a small portion of an Apocryphal book. For this is not required for his salvation. Yet it does not follow from that that those who embrace those books rejected or unknown by certain ones, and receive them by faith, I say that they do not do this immediately through the testimony and

internal illumination of the Holy Spirit, by which they have been endowed in greater abundance in this part, but by means of the testimony and authority of the Church, as the foundation of their faith.

XIV. And certainly many, whom the Roman Church holds to be truly faithful, can no more distinguish by themselves the genuine testimony of their Church from a supposititious one, and a true and legitimate Council from an illegitimate one, and true Canons from adulterated ones, than believers from among our common people can distinguish a particle of a Canonical book from a particle of an Apocryphal one. And even learned men in that Church dispute about the authority of certain of their Councils, and do not sufficiently agree among themselves whether they are legitimate or otherwise. And yet they maintain that the teaching and testimony of their Church is the supreme rule of faith, whose authority does not depend on any superior authority, and to which the faithful ought to subject themselves immediately, moved and impelled by the Holy Spirit.

XV. Moreover, the Papists strive to prove that the authority of Scripture with respect to us depends on the authority of the Church in this way. Without the authority and testimony of the Church, Scripture is doubtful and uncertain to us. Therefore it is necessary that it be confirmed by some superior authority. But they prove that Scripture is doubtful and uncertain of itself, unless the authority and testimony of the Church is added, from the fact that without that authority it cannot be known with certainty which are the sacred and divine books, which are not. And this because very many writings, fabricated by heretics and vain men, have been attributed and foisted upon the Prophets and Apostles. Nor have whatever things the Prophets and Apostles wrote merited divine authority. For many things are read to have been written by Solomon, and other Prophets, which are not held in the number of the sacred writings. Then also there is scarcely any book of sacred Scripture whose authority has not been called into doubt, or entirely denied, by those who professed to be Christians. For example, the Manicheans denied the authority of the Old Testament, the Ptolemaites of the books of Moses, the Marcionites of the Gospels, except the Gospel of Luke alone, and so on concerning the rest. And even today there is a dispute between us and the Papists about the divine authority of certain books. Since they want many books which we deem Apocryphal to pertain to the Canon of the Old Testament. And also about many books of the New Testament it was formerly doubted among the orthodox themselves, and even today it is doubted among those who seceded from the Roman Church in these last centuries. As for example, about the Epistle of Jude and James, and certain Epistles of John and Peter. Add that the sacred books have been corrupted, depraved and interpolated by heretics, and many things have been added to or detracted from them. And to certain ones the first part of the eighth chapter of the Gospel according to John is still suspect, where the story about the adulterous woman is had. In such a variety and confusion of opinions, therefore, they say, about the sacred books and their parts, by what certain reason will the truth be able to be found without the authority and judgment of the Church? From where do you know that the books which are attributed to the Prophets and Apostles are truly theirs: And supposing that

those books truly have certain ones of the Prophets and Apostles as authors, from where will you know with certainty that they were not written by human diligence, but by divine inspiration, and have come down to us intact, but were not corrupted in various ways by heretics. And from that they conclude that, so that our faith about Scripture may have a firm foundation, it is necessary to have recourse to the authority of the Church, which, namely, by its certain and infallible judgment discerns the divine books from the Apocryphal and supposititious ones, and on which judgment it is permitted for the faithful to securely rely.

XVI. Moreover, they indeed urge and exaggerate these things speciously, but nevertheless, if someone examines that argument, and accurately weighs it, he will easily recognize that it is a mere sophism, which rests on a false presupposition. And so that we may make this clear to the adversaries themselves, we can argue against them plainly in a similar way, and overturn the foundation which they lay under their faith. The authority of the Church is doubtful and uncertain. Therefore the teaching of the Church is not the supreme rule of faith nor does the Church have the first authority with respect to us. But that the authority of the Church is doubtful and uncertain is clear because it is doubted what authority should be attributed to the Church. Whether, namely, an infallible and certain divine authority, as the Papists want: Or, as we think, a great one indeed, but nevertheless human, and liable to error. Then also it is not certain among Christians what is the true Church; but since Christianity is divided into many parts and sects, each one claims to be the true Church. Here therefore we can also ask them: In such a diversity of sects among Christians, by what argument can you demonstrate that the true Church is among you, and that its authority is infallible? For now they cannot have recourse to sacred Scripture whose authority is also called into doubt, and which they want to depend on the authority of the Church as better known and superior. Much less can they put forward the testimony of their own Church itself, about whose authority the question is here asked and disputed. Either, therefore, they will be compelled to be silent here, or they will necessarily have recourse to those indications and marks which they call of the true Church, that is, certain arguments by which they think it can be rendered probable that the Roman Church is the true Church. But here arguments are not sought which only render the matter probable and credible, but by which our faith may rest as on its legitimate foundation, and which certainly prove the matter to be *de fide*. Then Scripture has far clearer and more illustrious marks of its divinity than the Church, nor are arguments lacking by which it can be strongly persuaded, even if not demonstrated: of which kind many arguments were brought forward and indicated in the first part of these Theses.

XVII. But since the Doctors of the Roman Church want that Ecclesiastical authority to reside especially in the Councils and Pontiffs, their argument can also be strongly retorted in this part. For I will also prove from this that the authority of the Pontiffs and Councils is not first and supreme, because their authority is doubtful and uncertain. For certain Pontiffs were intruded and created by vice. And there were often many Antipopes who mutually excommunicated each other and declared each other Antichrists. Many Councils also which said they were Ecumenical, and gathered in the name of Christ, favored heretics, and were

not legitimate, such as the Council of Ariminum which favored the Arians, and the second of Ephesus in which the Eutychians were superior. But the second of Nicaea, and that of Frankfurt under Charlemagne cannot both be legitimate at the same time, but it is necessary that one or the other erred. Since one forbade and prohibited the adoration and worship of images, but the other commanded it under penalty of Anathema. Indeed in the recent Roman Church, such as it is for some centuries now, there were many Councils which each call themselves Ecumenical, of which nevertheless certain ones were reprobated, but others approved, others approved in part and rejected in part. And there is bitter dispute about the authority of certain ones among the Pontifical Doctors. Thus Bellarmine subscribes to the Lateran Council under Leo X, but the Gallican Church does not admit the decisions of that Council. Since it defined that the Roman Pontiff is above the whole Church, and the universal Council. And conversely, the Council of Constance, which many in France receive in its entirety, is rejected by Bellarmine and others as to its first Canons: since it defined that the Council is above the Pontiff. Thus also some among the Papists have venerated the Council of Basel, but others defame it as a Conciliabulum.

XVIII. We therefore can also justly ask the Papists, From where do you know that this or that Council is legitimate, and that Pontiff is not intruded, and created by vice, just as many others, whose successors rescinded their acts, and defamed their memory? By what certain argument can you prove that the Council of Trent was truly gathered in the name of Christ? Is it because it itself says this? But it cannot make credence for itself, and prove itself: and there are many other impious Councils which likewise boast that they are led by the Holy Spirit. Is it because the Roman Pope approved that Council? But he also approved the Lateran one, by whose authority nevertheless not all Papists want to be bound. Then by what certain argument of faith can it be proven that those Pontiffs who approved the Councils were legitimate, and did not occupy their see by force and simoniacally? At least no greater certainty can be had about this matter than historical and moral certainty which does not suffice for faith. Moreover, how will credence be given to anyone that the copies of the Councils and Pontifical Decrees have not been corrupted, and nothing has been added to or detracted from them; when it is certain that many decrees were attributed to the Pontiffs, and the acts of very many Councils were corrupted and depraved? Nor will a new declaration of the Pontiff or of some Council remove this doubt. For the same difficulties will be moved against this last Council as against the former, and so on to infinity. And so, if the reasoning of the Papists against the certainty and authority of sacred Scripture has a place, the authority of the Church and of the Councils and Pontiffs will also be overturned: nor will any foundation of faith remain.

XIX. Indeed I dare to say that no foundation of faith can even be imagined in the mind against which it is not permitted to use similar cavils. For whatever will be brought forward as the first rule of faith, it is necessary that it be something logically inevident, and which cannot be properly demonstrated. For the principles of faith, from the common consent of Theologians and Scholastics, are inevident and indemonstrable. And besides it is necessary

that it cannot be proven from other principles of faith as prior and better known, otherwise it would not be the first rule, but some prior one would be granted. From which it necessarily follows that the first rule of faith, whose authority is supreme with respect to us, is something which cannot be proven by arguments *de fide a priori*, and about which also the questions of profane men cannot be satisfied through demonstrations, and utterly necessary and evident reasons.

XX. But so that the vanity of that sophism may appear more clearly, it should be noted that many things are presupposed in it which are altogether false. And indeed first it supposes that everything is doubtful and uncertain to us which is denied by many, and about which there are many who doubt. But if this is admitted, nothing at all certain will remain. For there is scarcely anything so certain and evident about which it has not been doubted by many; indeed which has not been denied by many. Thus it will not be certain to us from the aspect of heaven and earth that God exists, since the Epicureans and Atheists deny this. Nor will the first principles of the sciences be certain and indubitable to us, since the Pyrrhonists, who took away all assent, doubted about those also. Nor will the authority of their Church be certain to the Papists, as we have said, since it is denied by the rest of Christians. And so it must be said that that about which it is undeservedly doubted, and which is denied without reason, does not cease to be certain to those who think rightly. For the error and doubt of badly disposed, perverse and foolish men about things certain in themselves does not at all detract from the certainty of men of sound judgment, and whose mind is rightly disposed.

XXI. Then it is supposed in that argument, what cannot be demonstrated, and proven by necessary and evident arguments, cannot be certain and ascertained to faith, and a certain rule and foundation of faith among the faithful. But this is most false. For the first rule of faith, whatever it may finally be determined to be, must necessarily be something which cannot be proven by evident, and, if we speak logically, utterly necessary arguments. Since those arguments would either be sought from its own testimony, or from other principles of faith, or from human reason. But now they cannot be sought from its own testimony; because in this way nothing proves itself; nor from other principles of faith; because what is posited to be the first rule of faith is by this very fact supposed to be the best known principle of faith, to the proof of which, therefore, other less well known things would be employed in vain; unless perhaps to the man; finally not from human reason; because, since the rule of faith is something inevident, properly speaking, it cannot be demonstrated by necessary reasons, but only persuaded by moral arguments.

XXII. Thirdly, that argument supposes that those doubts which human reason can move against Scripture are removed by the authority of the Church. But this also is false. For to one asking from where we know that the books which are circulated are of the Apostles and Prophets, or that there were any Apostles and Prophets at all, it is not sufficient to say that the Church says and teaches this. Since by equal right he will ask from where we know that the Church speaks the truth and is led by the Holy Spirit. But since there are so many sects among Christians, from where do we know that this one rather than that one is the true

Church, or that there is any Church of God at all on earth. Certainly then nothing will remain for them by which they may defend themselves against a questioner of this kind, except those marks and prejudices by which the authority of the Roman Church is rendered credible in their judgment. But here arguments of this kind are not sought, but those which certainly prove the matter to be *de fide*, and on which faith can rest as on its foundation. And besides, if it should come to that, it is ready for us to show that the authority of Scripture is commended by far more and more certain arguments and marks than the authority of any Church among Christians.

XXIII. But, so that we may now deal more closely, these things are to be applied to the argument proposed. The argument was of this kind. What is doubtful and uncertain to us of itself cannot be apprehended by us with firm faith, unless it is confirmed by some superior authority. But Scripture is doubtful and uncertain to us of itself. Therefore it is necessary that it be confirmed by some superior authority. Which can be no other than the authority of the Church. I respond that something can be said to be doubtful and uncertain to us in a twofold respect. Namely with respect to faith: then with respect to human reason. With respect to faith, that is uncertain which is not revealed and inspired by God. But with respect to human reason, that is uncertain which cannot be demonstrated by necessary and evident arguments. And so the minor must be distinguished, Scripture is doubtful and uncertain to us of itself. For if that is said to us with respect to human reason, it can be conceded, but if with respect to faith, it must be denied. For although Scripture can be persuaded and commended to human reason also by many good and valid arguments: Yet because those arguments are not logically and mathematically demonstrative, to that extent we allow Scripture to be called uncertain to human reason. But it is false that what is uncertain to reason, and cannot be demonstrated, cannot be certain to faith, and be a certain rule of faith.

XXIV. But to the major, What is doubtful and uncertain to us of itself cannot be apprehended by firm faith, and be a certain rule of faith, unless it is confirmed by a superior authority. Resp. it is most false, if by that which is uncertain to us is understood that which cannot be demonstrated, and confirmed by utterly necessary and evident arguments. For what cannot be proven by arguments, philosophically and properly speaking, necessary and evident, can nevertheless be apprehended by firm faith, and be a certain rule of faith, although it is not confirmed by a superior authority prior and superior to us. Indeed, as we have just now proven, it is altogether necessary that the first rule of faith be something inevident, which cannot be demonstrated, and yet also cannot or ought not to be confirmed by a superior authority. Since in this way it would not be, as is supposed, the first and supreme rule of faith, but only a subalternate and inferior one.

XXV. But to the confirmation of the minor, by which it was proven that the books of sacred Scripture are doubtful apart from the authority of the Church, because many books were foisted upon the Apostles, and it was doubted about their true writings. Resp. that what is

doubtful to ignorant, perverse or insufficiently instructed men can nevertheless be certain to the faithful and pious, who are abundantly instructed, and illuminated by the Holy Spirit. For the rash and unjust doubt of certain ones does not at all detract from the certainty of men of sound judgment.

XXVI. But as far as those importunate interrogations are concerned, From where do you prove that the Apostles existed and wrote books by divine instinct, and that those which are circulated are truly theirs. Resp. that something unjust is required of us, namely that we demonstrate what is indemonstrable. And so we freely confess that those things cannot be demonstrated by us, and proven mathematically or logically. But from that we deny that it follows that those books cannot be a certain and first rule of faith; since this is proper to the principles of faith that they are inevident, and cannot be proven by arguments philosophically necessary and evident. Which nevertheless are not to be so accepted, as has already been often observed, as if we have nothing which we can throw back at profane men, and oppose to their impious questions. For we do not lack arguments which can be enough for a prudent man, and persuade him that the Apostles and Prophets wrote by divine instinct, and that we have their genuine books in our hands; of which kind of arguments we proposed and explicated many in the first part of these theses, nor is there need to repeat them here. This alone we confess, that those arguments do not have logical, or mathematical evidence, and to that extent leave the matter uncertain, if it pleases to call uncertain what is inevident, and ἀναποδείκτον. But this also we add, that if those arguments leave any uncertainty, it can by no means be removed by a certain judgment and determination of the Church, as has just now been proven.

XXVII. And these things are now enough about that argument. We must proceed to another. Therefore, the Papists also strive to prove that the authority of Scripture with respect to us depends on the authority of the Church from the usage and practice of the Church. For they say that the Apocryphal books, which various impostors published under the name of the Prophets and Apostles, and tried to foist off as sacred and divine, were rejected and exploded by the faithful, was done by the authority and judgment of the Church, which by its wisdom discerned those supposititious books from the divine ones, and expunged them from the Canon: or at least never judged that they were to be received. And for this matter they bring forward many testimonies from the Fathers. As what the author of the synopsis which is attributed to Athanasius, bringing a reason why those Gospels of Thomas, Peter, according to the Hebrews, etc. are not approved, says, "The sacred Canons of the holy Catholic Church have sanctioned for us four books of the Gospels, besides these there is not another one." And similarly Augustine rejects a certain Gospel of Thomas, which the Manicheans brought forward, with these words, "It is permitted for us not to believe this Scripture, because it is not in the Catholic Canon:" And again, "The Ecclesiastical Canon rejects these Scriptures." To which they add Eusebius, who in his Ecclesiastical History often pronounces writings of this kind to be Apocryphal, because there is no mention of them among the ancients. And because no Ecclesiastical Writer has used testimonies drawn from

those books: or has anywhere deigned to bring them to remembrance in his writings.

XXVIII. But since it was sometimes doubted even among the orthodox themselves about certain truly divine and Apostolic books, as for example, about the Epistle to the Hebrews, about the Epistle of James, about the Epistle of Jude, and the second Epistle of Peter, and about the second and third of John and his Apocalypse, they assert and contend that this happened because the Church had not yet pronounced its judgment and opinion on these books: But that doubt was at last removed through the determination and judgment of the Church. Namely in the Synod of Laodicea, and the third of Carthage, and the decrees of Popes Innocent and Gelasius, by which not only the aforementioned books of the New Testament, but also those about which there is still today a dispute between us and the Papists, Whether they pertain to the Canon of the Old Testament, were received into the Canon of Scripture, as indeed they want. And in confirmation of this matter they also bring forward what Jerome writes about the Epistle of James, "Although it was asserted to have been written by someone else under his name, yet gradually with the progress of time it obtained authority." And what he similarly says about the Epistle of Jude, "Although it was rejected by most, yet it merited authority by antiquity and usage." With which are agreeable the things which Jerome also writes about the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse of John in his epistle to Dardanus, "We," he says, "receive both, following by no means the custom of this time, but the authority of ancient writers, who for the most part use the testimonies of both, not as they are sometimes accustomed to do from the Apocrypha, but as if from the Canonical and Ecclesiastical."

XXIX. Finally, since many books whose authority was always certain among the Orthodox were rejected or called into doubt by heretics, the Papists are busy in this, to show that the Fathers refuted those heretics from the authority, consent, and testimony of the Church, by which they vindicated and asserted the divinity and authority of those books. For thus, for example, Augustine speaks about the Acts of the Apostles, whose authority the Manicheans denied, "It is necessary for me to believe this book, if I believe the Gospel: since the Catholic authority similarly commends both Scriptures to me." And against the same Manicheans he says, "The authority of our books, strengthened by the consent of so many nations, through the successions of Apostles, Bishops, and Councils, is adverse to you: But there is none of yours, which is brought forward by so few," etc. From which and similar things the Papists conclude that our faith about sacred Scripture depends on the judgment of the Church: and that its authority, testimony and consent is the rule and standard, to which all Scripture must be proven and examined, so that it can be certainly established for us: according to that celebrated saying of Augustine, "But I would not believe the Gospel unless the authority of the Catholic Church moved me." And what the same holy man says elsewhere. "A faithful soul will hold this manner in the Canonical Scriptures, that it may prefer those which are accepted by all Catholic Churches to those which certain ones do not accept. But in those which are not accepted by all, it may prefer those which more and weightier Churches accept, to those which fewer Churches of less authority hold."

XXX. So that all these things may be satisfied, here first of all it must be called to mind what the adversaries understand by the name of the Church. For that is especially necessary for rightly understanding the state of the question, and for removing here all homonymy. Therefore, it should be known that the Church is not taken here collectively for the whole multitude of the faithful, who are and hitherto have been. For the question is not properly about the authority of the Church taken in this way. And although the authority of sacred Scripture does not depend even on the authority of the Church so taken, it is nevertheless certain that an argument for the authority of Scripture can be drawn from its testimony and consent, divine and infallible, and which obliges our faith: since in that Church is comprehended the Apostolic and primitive Church, to which it belonged to confirm the Canon of Scripture in a certain and divine way, and to hand it down to the faithful, as what was henceforth to be the unique rule of faith.

XXXI. But the Papists understand by the Church the present Church of each age. Nor yet by that present Church do they understand the community of the faithful living in one and the same age: but they restrict the name of Church to the leaders and Pastors of the Church. And so, when they contend that the authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the Church, their mind is that the faith by which the faithful people embrace the books of Scripture as true and divine, rests on the testimony of the Pastors who are then in charge of the Church; and acquiesces in that testimony. And this because in the Pastors and prelates of the Church there perpetually resides an infallible and certain divine authority, from which they can pronounce concerning the truth and divinity of any book: so that their opinion and judgment obliges our faith. Indeed they are endowed with that power, that a book, which hitherto was of doubtful authority, and about which it was permitted to opine on either side, through their determination becomes authentic, and afterwards ought to be held in the same number as the other sacred and canonical books.

XXXII. There were indeed some among the old Scholastics who restricted that authority of infallibly and certainly determining about Scripture to the Apostolic Church, and taught that it was not to be attributed to the present Church in any other sense than because it is considered one body with the Apostolic Church. And the old man indeed did what he did when he was a boy, although now as an old man he can no longer do those things. Which was the opinion of Durandus, and Thomas Waldensis, and even in the previous century of Driedo. But this opinion is commonly deemed erroneous today. And the Doctors of the Pontifical School today concede to the former opinion. And so it must be seen, whether from the usage and practice of the Church, and those argumentations of the ancient Fathers, which were adduced above, it can be concluded that the authority of the Pastors who govern the Church in each age is so great, that it is the rule of our faith about Scripture, more certain and better known to us than Scripture itself, and on which our faith about sacred Scripture rests, as on its principal foundation. That is what we deny: nor do those proofs which were brought forward above do anything for this.

XXXIII. We indeed freely concede that the Doctors of the ancient Church rejected the

Apocryphal books, which the heretics had fabricated, and were foisting off as divine, on the grounds that those books had never been in the Canon of the Church, nor acknowledged by the Doctors of the Church, and held and cited as divine. And we approve their argumentation as legitimate, and in a plainly similar way we impugn the authority of those books which the Roman Church adds to the Old Testament above the Canon of the Jewish Church: namely, because these books were never acknowledged by the Jewish Church, even then when it was the true and only Church of God. Indeed not even by the primitive Christian Church, whose Doctors by common consent, with perhaps a very few exceptions, expunge those books from the Canon, although they admit their reading in the Churches, as useful for the edification of the people. And although most of the Apocryphal books have certain marks of vanity in themselves, and vestiges of human infirmity, by which it can be detected that they were not inspired by God: yet speaking absolutely and in general we do not think that there is any more suitable argument, by which the authority of the Apocryphal books can be impugned, than that the true Church of God never held them as divine.

XXXIV. But so that that argument may stand, and have its force, it is not necessary that the Pastors of the present Church have a divine and infallible authority, more known and superior to Scripture itself with respect to us. Nor does that argument simply rest on their authority: but the force of the argument consists in this, that if those Apocryphal books were truly divine, and written by the Prophets and Apostles for that purpose, so that they might be a perpetual rule of faith in the Church, without doubt they would have been handed down and commended to the faithful by the Prophets and Apostles themselves as such, as the other Canonical books were, and consigned with the rest of the Canon of Scripture. But if this had been done, the Apostolic men and the Church immediately succeeding the Apostles, which received their other books with such great reverence, would without any doubt also have received these, and, if not by all, at least by the greatest, or a notable part of the faithful they would have been admitted. And so the fact that the ancient Doctors of the Church do not even mention them, is a manifest sign that the Apostles, when they fixed the Canon of Scripture, did not admit such books but rejected and repudiated them. Nor is it in any way likely that God by his singular providence inspired a Prophet or Apostle to write, for the purpose that his book might be a rule of faith in the Church of God and serve for the instruction and consolation of the faithful, and yet would have allowed that book to be neither received nor acknowledged by his Church.

XXXV. But to that second proof taken from the books about which it was formerly doubted, as if the authority of certain divine books was formerly doubtful, because the Church had not yet pronounced its opinion on them: but afterwards all doubt was removed through the judgment and definition of the Church: I say first that the authority of the books which are truly divine and Canonical was never so doubtful, that it was once permitted to doubt about them, but now it is no longer permitted, as the Papists want. For those who doubted about the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Apocalypse of John, and other books of the New Testament, did so rashly, and without just reason. And just as today he would not lack blame

who would deny or call into doubt the authority of those books, so also those who formerly took away authority from those books, or wanted to render them doubtful, were worthy of reprehension. But as far as those other books are concerned, which the Papists want to pertain to the Canon of the Old Testament, and about which nevertheless they acknowledge that it was formerly permitted to doubt, just as it was rightly doubted about them, so also we contend that it can be doubted about them today by right.

XXXVI. But secondly I say that the authority of no books which are truly divine was ever so doubtful that all and everywhere doubted about them. But that doubt was only of certain ones: but among the rest their authority was certain. Thus it is indeed true that the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistle of James, and the Apocalypse of John, were suspect to some, and held by some to be supposititious: yet among most Churches they always obtained their authority. Nor can any time be assigned when they were not received, and held as divine and authentic, in a great part of the Christian world. Which is indicated by the very places which the adversaries refer to as favoring their cause. Thus Theodoret responds to the Arians denying the authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "It was necessary for them, if nothing else, certainly to revere the long duration of time, in which the alumni of the truth had perpetually read this Epistle in the Churches." And thus Tertullian defends the Apocalypse against Marcion, "We also have the Churches founded by John, for although Marcion rejects his Apocalypse, yet the order of Bishops traced back to its origin will stand on John as the author." But as far as the Epistle of James is concerned, the same Eusebius who says that it seemed to some to be spurious, testifies that it was publicly received in very many Churches.

XXXVII. I say thirdly that those who doubted about those books did not have as the cause of their doubt that they did not see them received by the Churches, and commended by the tradition of the ancient Fathers referring them to the Apostles as authors: but because, the matter not being sufficiently weighed, they thought that in these books there were certain things which did not savor of the divine Spirit; nor sufficiently cohered with the doctrine of faith contained in the other books. Thus it was doubted in the Latin Church about the Epistle to the Hebrews, because in chapters six and ten it seemed to favor the Novatians, who took away all hope of pardon from the lapsed after baptism. The Apocalypse also was suspect on account of the Millenarians, who abused certain places in it, which in appearance favor them. But the Epistle of Jude was rejected by some, because it seems to cite a certain Apocryphal book, which was formerly circulated under the name of Enoch the Patriarch.

XXXVIII. Finally, as for the fact that those books were afterwards received by common consent, the cause was not some new decree of the Church by which their authority was sanctioned; but those things which moved scruple in certain ones about those books gradually receiving light, and being rightly understood, at last there ceased to be those who doubted, and all conceded to the opinion of the ancient Fathers, who being next to the Apostles, commended these books to posterity as accepted by them: and approved them by frequent usage and reading. And certainly that this is not to be attributed to the Synod of

Laodicea, or the third of Carthage, is clear, because those Synods were provincial, nor could they, from the very opinion of the adversaries, properly oblige faith. And in truth it was still doubted about those books after the Synod of Laodicea. For in the time of Jerome, who was more recent than it, there were still those who doubted. But it is especially manifest that neither the Synod of Carthage, nor the Decrees of Popes Gelasius and Innocent, removed the doubt about the books of the Old Testament, which they think Canonical, we Apocryphal: since up to the times of the Council of Trent, there were very many, in the Roman Church itself, who rejected the authority of those books.

XXXIX. But to that confirmation of the argument, which is taken from the fact that the Doctors of the Church, to refute various heretics, who repudiated certain books of Scripture, perpetually used the testimony and consent of the Church, by which they proved the authority of those books: I respond that from that it can by no means be concluded what the Papists want and what is in question, namely that the authority of the Pastors, who govern the Church in each age, is greater with respect to us and better known than the authority of Scripture, and that our faith about Scripture rests on the testimony and judgment of the Pastors who are now in charge of the Church as divine and infallible, and as its principal and proper foundation. Nor do those Doctors simply argue from the authority of the Bishops of their time, as if it were the rule of faith, and the faith of each individual member of the Church was bound by it, but, when those heretics, whom they were impugning, rejected the authority of certain sacred books, as if they were falsely attributed to the Apostles or Apostolic men, and had been fabricated by the Catholic Doctors, the Fathers opposed to them the perpetual consent of the Bishops and faithful, who ever since the times of the Apostles had venerated those books as handed down and commended by the Apostles as true and divine: to which consent faith cannot be derogated, except by a wanton and obstinate man. For if he who today would deny that the books of Aristotle, Demosthenes and Cicero are by those to whom they are attributed could be convicted from the consent of the Doctors, who in all ages attributed those books to those great and excellent men, and would be held insane who would deny credence to a report so constant and celebrated: Would not he by equal, indeed by far greater right be held insane, who dares to oppose himself to the tradition, and the report more constant and celebrated, and still more continuous, which refers those books, which we hold as sacred, to the Apostles as authors and approvers?

XL. And certainly that the ancient Doctors of the Church chiefly put force in this, when from the authority of the Church they defended the authority of the Canonical books, is clear from Augustine, who in Book 32 and 33 against Faustus the Manichean, to Faustus asking whence he knew that those were the letters of the Apostles, responds that he knew it from the same place whence Faustus knew that those other letters were by Manichaeus, and whence all knew that certain books were by Varro, Plato and Aristotle, and whence posterity would know that the books which Augustine was then writing, were by Augustine. And after he had explained and accumulated more examples of this kind, he at last concludes in these words, "Since these things are so, who finally is so blinded by madness, unless he is

subverted by consenting to the malice and fallacy of lying demons, who would say that this could not have merited the Church of the Apostles, so faithful, so numerous a concord of brothers, that they transmitted their writings faithfully to posterity, when they preserved their chairs by a most certain succession up to the present Bishops, when this happens so felicitously to the writings of any men whatsoever, whether outside the Church, or in the Church itself."

XLI. And so when some book of Scripture is called into controversy, and it is doubted whether it is truly Prophetic and Apostolic, and consigned with the rest of the Canon by the Apostles or Apostolic men, we acknowledge that the best argument of this matter can be drawn from the perpetual and constant consent and testimony of the Church, by which that book was always referred to the Apostles as authors or approvers, to which testimony faith cannot be derogated, without great impudence and obstinacy. Nor do we think that there is any argument more suitable by which a sectarian man, or a heretic, can be refuted. Yet nevertheless that argument is not divine, but human, nor does its force consist in this, that in the leaders of the Church there resides an infallible and certain divine authority. For that is not necessary for the argument to stand, and have its force. For in those who treat of literary matters no such infallible authority of judging can be imagined. And yet the perpetual consent of the learned who ascribe certain books to Aristotle, Plato, and Galen, suffices to make full credence; and if anyone would want to strive against it, he would by right be held wanton and insane. How much more therefore will the consent of the Church, which it is not doubtful is ruled by the peculiar providence of God, and the assistance of the Holy Spirit, make credence that this or that book was written by an Apostle or Prophet, and commended as divine.

XLII. But however good and valid an argument can be taken from the consent and testimony of the Church for proving the divinity of some sacred book, we deny that it follows from that that the authority of Scripture depends on the authority of the Church as better known and superior. Which we can extort from the adversaries themselves even most unwillingly. For just as the Fathers refuted the heretics who denied Scripture from the authority and testimony of the Church; so also they referred the Schismatics not acknowledging the true Church of Christ to the Scriptures, and contended that the true Church was to be demonstrated from them. For thus Augustine deals with the Donatists, "Whether they hold the Church let them show only from the Canonical books of the divine Scriptures." And today the Papists try to prove their Church, and its authority from the Scriptures: And they think that they excellently fulfill that duty. And yet they by no means want the authority of the Church to be less known and certain to us than the authority of Scripture: which is the very thing about which the question is here, and which we affirm, but they deny. Therefore, from the fact that some book of Scripture called into doubt cannot be defended by a more apt and certain argument against heretics, than from the consent and testimony of the Church, the Papists cannot conclude that the authority of the Church is more certain to us and better known than the authority of Scripture: since they are compelled to confess that a heretic,

who does not acknowledge the true Church, cannot be refuted by a more certain and firm argument than by the authority of Scripture. And yet they utterly abhor saying that the authority of sacred Scripture is prior and better known to us than the authority of the Church.

XLIII. And so it must be said that not all proofs are taken from what is simply better known and more certain. For in the course of disputing we are compelled to accommodate ourselves to those with whom we have to do: And against those who deny the principles, and those things which are most certain in themselves, to use less certain proofs, and arguments which are called a posteriori, that is, by which what is prior in knowledge simply speaking, is proven through that which is posterior in knowledge. Thus against the Pagans who deny the Christian religion, we often argue from the opinions of wise men, philosophical axioms, and the consent of nations. And yet all those things do not have certainty with respect to us, more than the Christian religion. And the very first principles, than which absolutely nothing is better known and more certain, we prove by examples and inductions, on which nevertheless the certainty and authority of those principles does not depend.

XLIV. In sum, therefore, we confess that the authority of the sacred books is rightly and validly proven through the consent and testimony of the Church. But we nevertheless deny that it follows from that what the adversaries want, namely that the testimony of the Church is a rule of faith better known to us than Scripture itself. For not every good proof is taken from some rule and principle of faith, nor even from what is simply better known and more certain: but often we are compelled to prove things to the man, and a posteriori.

**Theological Theses,
On the Plentitude and
Sufficiency of Scripture Against the Necessity of
Some Unwritten Word: Part One.
In which the opinion of the Orthodox is set forth.**

Thesis I

It is the constant opinion of the Churches, which made secession from the Roman Church in the previous century, that sacred Scripture sufficiently contains all things which pertain to faith and salvation: so that there is no need of another word of God, from which those things which are lacking to Scripture may be supplied. But the Doctors and defenders of the Roman Church most bitterly oppose that opinion, and there is a serious controversy about that matter, which we undertake to treat in these and the following theses. But so that it may be done more distinctly and clearly, we will set forth the opinion of our Churches as clearly and distinctly as can be done by us. Then we will inquire into the opinion of the adversaries, and comparing it with ours, we will make manifest what properly is that which is in question. And finally we will confirm the truth in a few words, and undermine the foundations of the opposite opinion.

II. As far as the first is concerned, before all things our Theologians distinguish between

those things which are necessary for salvation, and those which are not necessary for salvation. And indeed they assert that those things which are necessary for salvation are contained in sacred Scripture. But those things which are not necessary for salvation, from their mind it is not at all necessary that Scripture contain.

III. But here it should be observed that something can be said to be necessary for salvation in two ways. And indeed first because it is such that no one can be ignorant of it without the loss of salvation, nor can anyone be saved without express knowledge of it. Then also because no one can reject it, and the Church teach the contrary of it, without sinning against his own salvation.

IV. And similarly something is said to be necessary for faith, either because it is necessary for the faith of each individual, nor ought anyone to be deemed faithful without explicit faith in it: or it pertains in general to the object of faith, and obliges the public faith of the Church.

V. But when our Churches determine that those things which are necessary for faith and salvation are all contained in the Scriptures, they understand necessary not only in the first way, but also in the second way. For we do not only want that nothing is without the explicit faith and knowledge of which no one can come to salvation: but also this that no one ought to be deemed to sin against the Christian faith, and his own salvation, by rejecting and impugning something which sacred Scripture does not teach. From which it follows that our opinion is not sufficiently proven, by making an induction of those things the explicit faith and knowledge of which can suffice for someone for salvation. For faith in general comprehends more in its scope than those things the knowledge of which is necessary for salvation. But we deem that nothing pertains to faith which is not found in Scripture.

VI. And so that all ambiguity may be avoided, some of our Theologians use here a distinction clearer and more suitable. For they observe that a distinction must be made between those things in which is the substance, and as it were the body of the Christian religion, and which from the force of divine institution are necessary not only for faith, but also for forming morals, and containing the polity of the Church: and other things which are only as it were appendices of this substance, and ornaments of this body, and which neither from their nature, nor from divine institution, are necessary, but indifferent, and received into usage only for the sake of order and decorum: such as are many parts of discipline sanctioned by various Canons, also rites and ceremonies various, both universal and particular, observations indeed free, but so far that no one by his private authority can or ought to despise or reject them.

VII. We assert that things of the former kind are contained in sacred Scripture, but not in like manner those other things, which are as it were accidental to the faith, morals and discipline of the Church. For we confess that many things which pertain to the various circumstances of divine worship and Ecclesiastical polity are not delivered one by one in Scripture; but left to the prudence of the leaders of the Church, under this general precept, that all things be done in order and decently in the Church of God. From which it is evident that in this

controversy various instances are brought forward in vain against us by the Doctors of the Roman Church from the rites, statutes and certain ceremonies, which were formerly observed in the ancient Church, whether Jewish or Christian, and are even now preserved among us both in divine worship and in Ecclesiastical polity, even if nothing has been determined about them in Scripture.

VIII. Therefore, what are those things, which we say are contained in sacred Scripture, is manifest from what has been said. Next it must be seen, in what way and manner they are contained in Scripture from our opinion. Moreover, certain dogmas and precepts can be contained in some book in two ways. Indeed first word for word and in the same words. Secondly in substance, and in equivalent words. But our opinion is not that all the dogmas of faith, and precepts of life which are handed down by the orthodox, are found in sacred Scripture in so many words and syllables. Indeed certain wranglers of today impute that to us, who from the fact that we profess to accept nothing outside of Scripture in the matter of religion, require that whatever we write and teach, we show in sacred Scripture in so many words and syllables. But it suffices for us to believe some dogma, that sacred Scripture contain it in substance. Thus sacred Scripture nowhere has these words. God is one and triune. And yet we believe that by certain faith, indeed because Scripture says the equivalent that there are three in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Spirit, and these three are one. And in many places it testifies that God is one, and yet the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God.

IX. But to that former distinction is related another. For it is one thing to contain expressly and immediately, another mediately and by consequence. And indeed Scripture, from the mind of our people, does not contain all the dogmas of faith immediately and expressly. But there is nothing necessarily pertaining to faith and religion, which cannot be deduced from Scripture through a good and clear consequence. Thus Scripture does not say expressly that Christ has two natures, and that in him there are two wills. Yet both pertain to the truth of faith because it clearly follows from what Scripture teaches in many places, namely, that Christ is true God, and true man.

X. From which it is again evident that today's Sophists unjustly vex us, when we draw out some dogma of ours by a good consequence from Scripture. As if in that we were unsealing the law posited by us, by which we determine that Scripture is the unique rule of faith and religion, to which nothing is to be added, nothing detracted. For to deduce something from Scripture is not to add something to it, or to substitute another rule of faith: but to unfold the very things which it contains, and to explicate its hidden treasures. Thus in the Acts the Prophets are said to testify to Christ, that it will be that whoever believes in him will receive remission of sins through his name. Yet that is found posited expressly nowhere among the Prophets; But the Prophets are said to testify what is deduced from their testimonies.

XI. Moreover, certain dogmas can be deduced from some principle in two ways. First individually, distinctly and per se. Then generally confusedly, and through another. Thus all the dogmas and institutions of the Christian religion cannot be proven from the Scripture of

the old Testament per se and one by one. As, for example, that the faithful are to be baptized in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit could not be sufficiently proven from the old Testament, if no other principle of faith was available besides that old Scripture. And yet all things which pertain to Evangelical doctrine can be proven from the old Testament in general, insofar as it can be efficaciously demonstrated from there that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah, and the Son of God promised by the Prophets, and thus his doctrine is true and divine, and his institutions are to be embraced by us as divine. Those things which can only be gathered and deduced from some principle generally and confusedly, are contained in it virtually and in seed. But those which are proven from it distinctly and one by one can be said in some way to be contained in it expressly: although in a stricter sense expressly signifies the same as explicitly and immediately.

XII. But in this disputation our opinion is not that all the institutions of the Christian religion, and dogmas of faith can be proven from Scripture only confusedly and generally, but distinctly and one by one, and thus indeed in this sense, they can be said to be contained in Scripture expressly not only virtually, and in seed.

XIII. But since all things which pertain to faith are contained in sacred Scripture, in the way now explained, it is gathered from that that Scripture is the perfect and sufficient rule of faith. Which sufficiency nevertheless does not exclude the necessity of the Ecclesiastical ministry, by which, according to the order constituted by God, heavenly doctrine is drawn from Scripture, and handed down to the faithful people by their pastors and doctors: then also of the internal teaching of the Spirit, by which the faithful are led into the knowledge of the doctrine drawn from Scripture and proposed, and without which they will not discern it, and salutarily embrace it. But that perfection and sufficiency of sacred Scripture only excludes the necessity of another rule, which must necessarily be joined to sacred Scripture, so that we may have the whole doctrine of faith. From which it is evident that the Doctors of the Roman Church do nothing, who try to prove to us that Scripture does not suffice for salvation from the fact that otherwise the Ecclesiastical ministry would be in vain, the necessity of which is nevertheless commended in sacred Scripture itself.

XIV. But for a fuller understanding of this question, here also it must be noted that those things which are usually treated in our schools, and set forth and expounded in the public confessions of our people, either consist in the admission of true principles of faith and religion, and the rejection of those which are undeservedly and falsely obtruded as such principles: or are the doctrine itself drawn and deduced from true principles. And indeed we say that the principles of faith are contained in sacred Scripture, since they are sacred Scripture itself. For our Churches do not admit any principles of faith, besides the books divinely inspired of which the body of Scripture consists.

XV. But the plenitude and sufficiency which we attribute to sacred Scripture, in no way requires that the principles of faith can be proven and demonstrated from it, for example, that this or that book is divine and Canonical. For the perfection of any rule consists in this, that it is the measure of all the rest which are of the same genus, but by no means that it is the rule

of itself. Nor in any discipline is it required in the principles, that they prove and demonstrate themselves, which is absurd and impossible; but in their genus they are held sufficiently perfect, if from them all things which pertain to such a science and discipline can be proven and demonstrated.

XVI. Therefore, just as in all human disciplines there are certain principles, proper to each art and science, from which are deduced and proven all the conclusions and propositions, which pertain to the art and science of which they are the principles, but they themselves in that genus are certain per se nor can they be demonstrated and thus they can be said to be as it were the rule on which depend, and through which are proven all things, which pertain to such an art or science, although they themselves can neither prove themselves, nor ought they: so also the matter stands in divine and heavenly doctrine. For when its Theorems and propositions are called to examination, and it is asked what is their foundation, it is necessarily to be arrived at certain principles, beyond which in that genus at least, it cannot be proceeded: And consequently, which cannot be proven through other principles of faith, as prior and better known: and from which also it ought not to be required, that they prove themselves, since nothing can prove itself: And which nevertheless ought to be held for a sufficient and perfect rule of faith, since all other things, which pertain to faith, are proven and demonstrated through them.

XVII. From the common sense of Theologians indeed, in this there is a difference between the principles of faith, and the principles of the sciences, that the principles of the sciences are known per se, and are evident, and extort assent from the natural light of reason by their own light: but the principles of faith do not have equal evidence; and so, as is fitting, they cannot be believed and accepted, except through the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit. Yet in this they would agree, that just as we assent to natural principles immediately through the natural light of the intellect, but not through certain other better known principles, through which they may have been demonstrated: so also we believe the principles of faith immediately, through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, but not by the intervention of some proof, which is drawn from other better known principles in this genus.

XVIII. Indeed the first principles of faith ought to have marks and characters of their divinity and truth, and arguments by which they are proven and persuaded: but they cannot properly and directly prove themselves: nor do they depend on other principles of faith, from which they borrow authority and credence. But now those first principles of religion, and of the Christian faith for us are the divine Scriptures consisting of a certain number of divinely inspired books. And therefore the authority of sacred Scripture, according to our opinion, ought not to be proven from Scripture itself, but to be accepted immediately and for its own sake by all Christians.

XIX. But just as, if the first principles of some science are denied by a contentious man, they are not proven from themselves, but it is necessary to leap over the boundaries of that science, and seek their proofs from elsewhere: or even to have recourse to certain less known things by which they are proven a posteriori, and to that man; nor does this at all

detract from the perfection and sufficiency of those principles: So if the divinity of the sacred Scriptures is called into doubt, as it is by Pagans and profane men, it will indeed have to be proven, yet not from their own testimony, or from some other principle of faith, nor are there any more proofs available which they call *de fide*, that is, which are sought from the principles of faith properly so called, but other proofs will have to be applied, which are sought from various marks, both intrinsic and extrinsic, by which the divinity of sacred Scripture can become known, and be confirmed. Nor does this hinder Scripture from being a most full and most perfect rule of religion and faith, with respect to the faithful.

XX. And hence it is clear how the argument, by which the Papists greatly vaunt themselves, is to be met, while, namely, they think they demonstrate that Scripture is not a full and sufficient rule of faith, because Scripture itself cannot be proven by Scripture. For it is not necessary for the perfection and sufficiency of a rule, as is clear from what has been said, that it be able to prove itself. But it is enough that through it all things besides itself which are of the same genus can be examined and proven. And besides in the analysis of faith, unless one wants to admit a circle, or an infinite regress, both of which are absurd, it is necessary to come to some principle in which one must stop, and which cannot be proven through another better known in that genus, nor prove itself, since, as has been said, nothing proves itself.

XXI. But just as it is not required for the perfection, which we attribute to sacred Scripture, that it prove itself, so also there is no need at all, that what are falsely put forward as principles of faith can be directly and expressly rejected by Scripture, and that the testimonies of Scripture be required for this. But just as we immediately believe the true principles of faith, through the illumination and internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit, who gently leads men to this, not through some other principle of faith, but only by certain motives and marks by which their divinity becomes known: so to reject and not admit what are falsely thought to be principles of faith it suffices that they are destitute of the true marks of true principles, and that in them can be noted vestiges of ignorance and human weakness.

XXII. And therefore it is no objection to the perfection of Scripture, if it cannot be demonstrated through it that this or that book, which is falsely presumed to be Canonical, is in fact Apocryphal. And, even if it were altogether silent about unwritten traditions, it ought to suffice to reject them, that their authority cannot be persuaded and proven by suitable arguments just as divine Scripture can. Nor is it for us to prove that they are not divine, but it is incumbent on those who urge and defend them to prove that they are divine.

XXIII. But as far as the doctrine which is drawn from Scripture, and is usually set forth in the schools, either it consists in those things which are found set forth explicitly and expressly in sacred Scripture, or at least in those which are deduced from them by proximate and evident consequences: of which kind ought to be those things, which are proposed to the Christian people to be believed as articles, and heads of faith, with the mark of heresy on those who teach the contrary. Or in those things which are indeed rightly and well deduced from

Scripture, but yet not so clearly, and evidently, and by more subtle and remote consequences: which kind are not properly articles of faith, but only Theological truths, or opinions, the contrary of which ought not to be called more gravely than an error; but not marked with the name of heresy. Just as the Doctors of the Roman Church determine that only those things are *de fide*, which are perspicuously and expressly defined by their Councils, but not whatever they think they can rightly gather from them by stringing consequences from consequences. And so they distinguish between the dogmas of faith, and the opinions and views of their Theologians, opposing heresy to the former, error to the latter.

XXIV. But from this it can be gathered what is to be responded to the adversaries, while impugning the sufficiency, which we attribute to sacred Scripture, they object that certain things are held, and taught in our Churches, which however are not deduced from Scripture by such open and necessary consequences, that they can oblige the faith of the Christian people, unless they are supported from elsewhere by some divine authority; for example, that those who once received baptism among heretics are not to be baptized anew. For that dogma, and some others are indeed held, and taught in our Churches, as agreeable to Scripture, and besides proven by long usage and the common suffrage of the faithful, which it is therefore rash to condemn and reject: yet we do not attribute to them such necessity, that they necessarily oblige the faith of Christians: so that he who thinks otherwise is to be expunged from the number of the faithful, and reckoned among the heretics, to whom we would by no means want numbered Cyprian a holy man and martyr of Christ, who did not think the same about the baptism of heretics as our Churches.

XXV. Moreover, from those things which have now been set forth, it is sufficiently manifest, in what sense we commend the plenitude, and sufficiency of Scripture, and inculcate that it contains all things which are necessary for faith and salvation. But we attribute that perfection not only to the Scripture of the Old and New Testament, as it was consigned to us by the Apostles, and Apostolic men, but, from the time it seemed good to God to hand down his word in writing, we deem that Scripture always contained all things which were necessary for the people of God and the Church to rightly worship God, and obtain salvation, nor was there need to have recourse elsewhere to draw the doctrine of faith and salvation.

XXVI. Nor does it make against this that Scripture, as it now is, contains not a few things necessary for salvation, which are wanting in the five books of Moses, of which alone the body of sacred Scripture once consisted for some time. For it should be known that not the same things were necessary for salvation in all ages. For very many things now under the new Testament necessarily pertain to faith and religion, which did not always have the same necessity. Since God did not reveal all the mysteries of heavenly wisdom at once and once for all: but as the Apostle says in Hebrews 4, "in many parts and in many ways." And, from the time heavenly doctrine first began to be consigned to writing, the light of divine revelation gradually grew, until in the last times Christ brought the fullness of heavenly doctrine, and announced to us the whole counsel about our salvation.

XXVII. But with the clarity, and amplitude of heavenly doctrine growing, the body of the Scriptures also grew. For as God, according to the various courses of his Church, revealed something anew to the Prophets and Apostles, they handed that down summarily in writing. From which with the progress of time the Canon of Scripture was increased.

XXVIII. But the more things God revealed, and the more distinctly, the fuller and more distinct faith he also required from men. But when revelation was more sparing and obscure, faith also extended to fewer things. For the measure of faith is divine revelation, nor is it necessary for salvation to know and believe more things, than are those which God has Revealed.

XXIX. And so although Scripture, when it was first given through Moses, did not contain all

things which are now necessary for us, yet it sufficiently contained those things which were then necessary for the Israelite people. And divine Scripture always had that perfection, that it embraced all things, which it was necessary for the Church to do and know.

XXX. Yet that seems to be understood with this caution, namely with the divinely inspired men being taken away through whom the light of divine revelation grew, and their writings being published. So that the time may be excepted when their living voice resounded in the Church, and they had not yet consigned to writing what it pleased God to reveal anew to them. For, for example, when the Apostles began to preach, and had not yet written anything, the Scripture of the old Testament did not contain all things necessary for salvation, except confusedly and implicitly, insofar as it sent us to the true Messiah, by whom we would be more fully taught about the will of God.

XXXI. But after those were taken from the earth, and translated into heaven, whose mouth and pen it seemed good to God to use to hand down his mysteries to the Church, nothing is to be deemed to pertain to faith and salvation, which is not found in the writings which they left, and commended to the faithful, that they might be the norm and rule of faith in the Church. Nor can their doctrine be safely and certainly sought and found elsewhere than in their writings.

XXXII. We indeed freely confess that the Prophets and Apostles and other men inspired by God, said and taught very many things by the living voice, which are not found expressed word for word in the sacred writings. Nor do we even deny that it could have happened that the Apostles and divinely inspired men once ordained many things in the Church, about the form of divine worship, and the various circumstances of Ecclesiastical polity, which are not written down in the sacred writings. And also that some historical things received from them could have been preserved among the faithful and transmitted to posterity.

XXXIII. But we strictly hold this, that the sum of those things, which holy men, driven by the divine Spirit, taught and spoke, as much as suffices for salvation and faith, is contained in sacred Scripture, nor did they teach anything, which is of any moment for religion, which is not abundantly handed down in the sacred writings.

XXXIV. Moreover we also assert, that those things, which were instituted by the Apostles

about the rites of divine worship, and the circumstances of Ecclesiastical government, and about which nevertheless the sacred Scriptures are silent, are left to the power of the Church, that it might variously change them, according to the nature of times and places; under only this general rule and caution, that all things be done in order and decently in the Church of God.

XXXV. Finally, what is chief, and from which the rest follow, we constantly affirm that of those things which the Apostles taught, or instituted, we hold nothing as altogether certain and ascertained, except those things which are handed down and consigned in the sacred writings. And this because after the Apostles, and Apostolic men, there were no longer any men in the Church divinely inspired placed beyond all danger of error. And so whatever has come down to us about the sayings and deeds of the Apostles, besides the Canonical writings, we do not have except from the faith of infirm men, who could both be deceived and deceive.

XXXVI. From which it is evident that there is no unwritten tradition, which ought to be compared in authority with the divine and Apostolic writings: and thus that Scripture is the unique rule of faith, to which another cannot be joined which has the same force of obliging the conscience, and binding faith. And therefore, if it were not sufficient, and did not contain all things, which pertain to faith, it would follow that the church would lack such a sufficient rule, nor would its salvation have been sufficiently provided for.

XXXVII. And hence it is that we argue negatively from the authority of sacred Scripture. For since of those things which God revealed through the Prophets and Apostles, nothing at all certain has come down to us, besides those things which they themselves divinely committed to writing, so that we may reject something as not pertaining to faith, it is enough that it does not have a foundation in Scripture, nor can be proven and deduced from it.

XXXVIII. And so we do not altogether condemn, and reject unwritten traditions about historical matters, and the rites, order, and polity of the Churches: but nevertheless we admit none about the dogmas of faith, and those things which pertain to morals. Nor do we think that those things which the Spirit did not judge necessary to be committed to writing by his amanuenses the Apostles and Evangelists, can be known by us with such certainty, or have the same authority in the Church, as those which he willed to be consigned to writings, that they might have the force of an eternal law in the Church.

**Theological Theses,
On the Authority of the
Vulgate Latin Version: Part One.
In which is set forth who is its author. And also what is
its authority according to the Doctors of the Roman Church.**

Thesis I

By the Vulgate Version is understood that which the Roman Church commonly uses. About which version two things are called into question. Who is its author, and what is its authority. As far as the former is concerned, the Doctors of the Roman Church do not agree on who is the author of the vulgate version, but their opinions vary on this matter. For the understanding of which, it should be known that formerly, before the times of Jerome and Augustine, there existed very many Latin translations, which were all expressed not from the Hebrew text, but from the interpretation of the Seventy Elders. But among all those Latin editions one certain one was eminent, and was most in use, and it was called the old and vulgate edition. And this is what Augustine calls the Itala, and prefers to all the other Latin versions. Book 2 on Christian Doctrine, Chapter 15.

II. Moreover since Jerome in his time saw so many discordant interpretations of scripture, in each of which were found not a few errors of the interpreters, and faults of the scribes, he himself also undertook to translate scripture into Latin. And indeed he translated the Old Testament twice. First from the Greek text of the Seventy interpreters. Then from the Hebrew text, on which version he labored with the greatest care, so that the doubts, which arose from the discrepancy and contrariety of the various versions, might be removed by comparing them to that one, which was conformed to the Hebrew truth. But the New Testament he did not so much translate anew, as purge and emend the old version, conforming it to the Greek context, where it seemed to have wandered from it.

III. But the version of Jerome from the Hebrew, although by its novelty it offended some, and among others Augustine himself, was nevertheless received with great applause by many, and soon began to be received and publicly read in certain Churches. And the offense, which the novelty brought in the beginning, being gradually removed, it was at last commonly received in the Latin Church; although the former one was not despised, nor did its use altogether cease.

IV. Which obtained in the time of Gregory the Great Bishop of Rome, about the six hundredth year after the birth of Christ. For then, as he himself testifies in his Epistle to Leander, the Roman Church used a double translation, namely, the New and the Old. Where by the new version he understands the Hieronymian, but by the old that which was in public use before Jerome, and which Augustine calls the Itala.

V. But after Gregory all the other versions gradually vanished, and only one remained, which is in use today, and which is called the vulgate and old edition, about which we must now treat, and about whose origin and author we have said that the Doctors of the Roman Church do not agree.

VI. Some from whose number is Thomas Stapleton, think that the Latin vulgate edition is that most ancient one, which the Roman Church first used, and which is celebrated by Augustine under the name of the Itala version. But there is no doubt but that they are deceived in that. For that ancient version, by the testimony of Augustine, was expressed from the text of the Seventy elders. But today's vulgate, in most books at least, recedes very far from the Greek

version of the Seventy interpreters, and approaches more closely to the Hebrew text. Add that Jerome in the ancient version notes and reproves many errors in many places, which no longer appear in that version, which the Roman Church now uses, a manifest indication that it is different from that former one.

VII. And so others from the Doctors of the Roman School determine that the Latin vulgate, which is in use today, is the interpretation of Jerome. But neither is this approved by their most learned men. And this because Jerome in his version accurately followed the Hebrew text, as he himself professes, and the ancient Doctors of the Church, who saw his pure version, acknowledge. But today's vulgate, although it approaches more closely to the Hebrew text than to the translation of the Seventy interpreters, yet often recedes much from the Hebrew text, and has not a few things which do not appear in the Hebrew, especially in the books of Kings. Besides that Jerome in his commentaries teaches that many things should be translated and expounded otherwise than they are found translated and expounded today in the Latin version whether of the Old or New Testament. From which it can be certainly gathered that that version is not altogether the same, with that which Jerome made, or at least emended, whom it is not credible to have translated or emended scripture against his own opinion.

VIII. And therefore a third opinion obtains in the Roman School, which determines that the vulgate which is in use today, is neither simply the version of Jerome, nor even that old one, which the Latin Church used before Jerome, but is mixed and composed from both. So think John Driedo, Sixtus Senensis, Baronius, and Bellarmine himself, and very many other men eminent in learning and authority in the Roman Church; And this is also the commonly received opinion among Protestants, which seems to us also agreeable to the truth. Book 2, Chapter 1. Sacred Library Book 8. To the year 251, number 41. Book 2 on the Word of God. Chapter 9.

IX. Therefore we think that today's vulgate is not of one author; but is mixed and interpolated, both from the ancient version, which obtained before Jerome, and from the Hieronymian version itself. And indeed first, as Bellarmine rightly warns and proves, the whole Psalter of the Latin Vulgate edition is not that which Jerome translated from the Hebrew, but the ancient translation of the Psalms itself, which was used in public worship in the first times, and was accustomed to be sung. For it was never possible to substitute any new version for the old edition in this part. And this on account of the too great offense of the people, who from all time were accustomed to this version, and therefore tenaciously retained it. For no part of scripture is more known and familiar to the people, and of which there is more frequent and constant use in sacred worship. But that the matter stands thus is clear from this, that what Jerome, and others cite, as from the ancient edition of the Psalms, are found in entirely the same way in today's Psalter. And besides it is certain, Bellarmine himself confessing, that the Books of Maccabees, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus are in no way from the version of Jerome, who never translated these books, but from that ancient translation, whose author is unknown.

X. But as far as the New Testament, and the remaining books of the Old Testament are concerned, they seem for the most part to be from Jerome's version, or emendation, to which nevertheless very many things are admixed from that older edition. And this perhaps by a certain design, lest when the Hieronymian version was substituted in place of that older one, it should offend the people by too much novelty.

XI. Nor is it altogether improbable what Baronius thinks, that both versions, as well the old, as that of Jerome remained unmixed up to Gregory the Great, but afterwards one was conflated from the two, which alone the Latin Church would henceforth use: lest the use of two versions should beget some division and contention. Yet it is more likely that that admixture was not made at once and once for all, but gradually and slowly by scribes adding and changing certain things at will.

XII. And let these things be said briefly about the origin and author of the vulgate edition. There now follows a more serious question to be explicated about the authority of this edition. The Council of Trent attributes the highest authority to it, whose these words are in the fourth Session. "The sacred Synod considering that no small utility can accrue to the Church of God, if from all the Latin editions of the sacred books which are circulated, it becomes known which is to be held as authentic, determines and declares that this same old and vulgate edition, which has been approved in the Church itself by the long usage of so many centuries, is to be held as authentic in public lectures, disputations, preachings, and expositions, so that no one may dare or presume to reject it under any pretext."

XIII. By which words the highest and absolute authority seems openly to be attributed to the vulgate edition, and without any ambiguities. But nevertheless the Doctors of the Roman Church do not agree on how much is to be attributed to the vulgate edition. And there is much doubt and disputation on both sides about the sense of the Tridentine Decree.

XIV. But before all things it should be noted that the Tridentine Fathers themselves did not dare to sanction this definition with an anathema, and to reckon among the heretics those, by whom the vulgate edition was not approved in every part. And therefore they did not place this definition among the Canons of the Council, to each of which an anathema is subjoined, but they included it in the decree of Reformation, by which they do not think the faithful to be obliged with such rigor, as the history of the Council of Trent warns in the second book. Wherefore it is less a wonder, if the highest authority of this version is not everywhere agreed upon among the Doctors of the Roman School themselves.

XV. But so that it may be clearer what they think about the authority of this edition, and how far they consent, or dissent among themselves on this article, it should be known that there are none in the Roman Church who do not acknowledge that many errors have crept into this edition by the fault of Scribes, and that it has happened by their carelessness and negligence, that it has been corrupted and vitiated in many places; especially when the Council of Trent declared it authentic.

XVI. And therefore that same Council, in which it was determined that it was to be rejected under no pretext, that same Council, I say, sanctioned that it should be printed as

emendatedly as possible, and mandated that work to learned men, that they diligently apply themselves to its emendation and correction. And Salmero and Andradius, each of whom was present at the Council of Trent, warn that the Synod willed to constrain all to embrace the Latin edition, not simply, but provided that it was expurgated from the vices which had crept into it, and cleansed from all blemishes; and to so commend that old edition, that it very much wants the errors which have been brought into it either by the carelessness of Scribes, or perhaps by the audacity of others, to be purged. Volume 1, Prologue 3.

XVII. Therefore before and after the Council of Trent many learned men of the Roman communion undertook to correct and emend this edition. And indeed before the Council Isidore Clarius Abbot, who afterwards was part of that Council, noted and emended up to eight thousand errors in the Vulgate version, in the edition which he had printed at Venice in the year 1542, as he himself testifies in the preface which is prefixed to that edition. Indeed Santes Pagninus Lucensis Dominican Monk acknowledged such a great depravation in the Vulgate version, that he thought it would be a matter to undertake a new version of the whole scripture: which he himself undertook, Pope Leo the Tenth exhorting, and providing the expenses necessary for the work, as Sixtus Senensis writes in Sacred Library Book 4. And the same Pope Leo approved the Lucubrations of Erasmus on the New Testament, in which he notes and reproves the errors of the Vulgate version with the greatest liberty.

XVIII. But after the Council of Trent the Theologians of Louvain, so that they might satisfy the desire of that Council, attempted to emend the vulgate version, and published a certain edition of it, emended as it seemed good to them. And at last the Roman Pontiffs themselves labored on that emendation, and selected a peculiar assembly of Cardinals, and other men, who should continually apply themselves to that work. And indeed Pius IV and Pius V, who immediately succeeded him, first undertook this care, but each died with the matter unfinished.

XIX. But a few years later Sixtus V keenly pursued the work undertaken by his predecessors, but not completed. And so he summoned learned men and those skilled in languages from all quarters, and with their help recognized and emended the Latin edition in very many places: and thus emended he had it printed in the Vatican Library constructed by himself. And so that the matter might be accomplished more solemnly and incorruptly, he corrected with his own hand, if any errors had crept in by the fault of the press. Not only that, but he prefixed to this his edition a solemn Bull, in which, after he set forth with how great care and diligence he had it emended, he determines and decrees that the old edition, which was received as authentic by the Tridentine Synod, is to be deemed the very same, which he then published emended as best could be done, and printed in the Vatican Typography. And he wants it to be held as true, legitimate, authentic, and indubitable in all public and private disputations, preachings, explanations.

XX. Yet nevertheless the Roman School did not rest in this edition of Sixtus as expurgated from all blemishes. For with however great authority Sixtus fortified it, and however much he exaggerates its purity, immediately after the death of Sixtus, Gregory XIV undertook to

emend this edition again. But Clement VIII perfected the emendation. Which contradiction of the Popes Thomas James an Englishman criticizes in a little book to which he gave the title *Bellum Papale*, or the discordant Concord of Sixtus V and Clement VIII, where comparing these editions, he shows that the former differs from the latter so much, that you would not know it to be the same: for Sixtus followed Hentenius and the Louvain doctors for the most part, but Clement adhered more to the Hebrew, Chaldaic, and Greek truth. From which it follows that that edition, whose purity and integrity Sixtus had so greatly commended, was nevertheless in the judgment of Clement defiled with many errors, since he judged that it needed a new emendation.

XXI. But however much labor either Sixtus or Clement applied to correcting the errors of the old edition, the Doctors of the Roman Church do not therefore think that they have an edition purged from absolutely all blemishes and errors. Indeed not even Clement VIII himself presumed so much about his edition, as the preface prefixed to the Clementine Bibles testifies. "Receive," it says, "the Old and Vulgate Edition of Sacred Scripture corrected with as much diligence as could be done, which just as it is difficult to affirm to be absolute in all respects, on account of human weakness, so it should be doubted not in the least that it is more emended and purer than all others, which have been published up to this day." Indeed, as the same preface subjoins, in that edition certain things were left deliberately unchanged, to avoid the offense of the peoples.

XXII. Which Bellarmine also confesses in a certain Epistle to Luke of Bruges. "I want you to know," he says, "that the Vulgate Bibles have not been most accurately corrected by us: for we deliberately passed over many things, for just causes, which seemed to need correction." And so this Luke of Bruges not only compiled a correctorium index, in which he diligently notes those things which have been emended in the Pontifical Bibles, lest henceforth there should be a relapse into the removed vices: but he also included in another little book other varieties of readings, by which, as he says, the begun correction of the Latin Bibles can be rendered more perfect.

XXIII. And so it is certain that all the Theologians of the Roman Church, however great authority they attribute to the Latin Vulgate, nevertheless acknowledge that it was depraved by the fault and carelessness of scribes and typographers, and that from that many blemishes remain in it up to this day, however much zeal many learned men, indeed even the Pontiffs themselves, have applied in correcting it. Nor by those errors which they attribute to the scribes and copyists do they understand only those by which certain particular codices have been corrupted, and which can be easily detected by anyone from the collation of other copies, but certain solemn, so to speak, and inveterate errors, which have pervaded either all the codices, or the greatest part of them, and which have been as it were confirmed by usage.

XXIV. But besides those errors which the fault and negligence of the scribes brought into the Vulgate, and also often the audacity and ignorance of the emendators themselves, there are scarcely any in the Roman School who do not acknowledge other defects in this Version,

which are refunded to the interpreter himself. And certainly he must purposely blind his eyes, indeed be more than blind, who does not acknowledge in it frequent solecisms and barbarisms, and very many things translated ambiguously, obscurely, unsuitably, and improperly. And therefore even those who attribute the most to this version in the Roman Church, yield on this part, and confess that this interpreter speaks less suitably, and uses words scarcely congruous and accommodated. And thus far the Theologians of the Roman School seem to agree among themselves.

XXV. But henceforth they begin to disagree from one another. For those among them who have some candor acknowledge that the Vulgate interpreter, not only failed in the choice of words and forms of speaking, but now and then lapsed in the things themselves, and neither attained nor expressed the sense of the text in his version: And therefore, setting aside even the errors of the copyists, they do not want it to be authentic and immune from error simply and in all things, but only in those things which pertain to faith and morals.

XXVI. Bañez reports and explains this opinion of his own at length in the first part of Thomas Aquinas, question 1, article 8. "This opinion asserts," he says, "that the interpreter of the Vulgate Latin edition, in certain things which pertained neither to faith, nor to morals, was mistaken." And so they understand the Decree of the sacred Synod about the Vulgate edition, which namely is to be held as authentic in things pertaining to faith and morals.

XXVII. But he attributes that opinion to many Theologians whom he calls pious and Catholic, such as Lindanus, Sixtus Senensis, Melchior Cano, Bartolomeo Medina, Andradius and Vega, who assert that the old interpreter did not attain perfect knowledge of all things which he undertook to interpret, and that in his lucubrations there remain vestiges of human weakness, and that he was not immune from all error. And therefore they think that the old edition is to be deemed authentic only, because it exists defaced by no error from which some pernicious dogma in faith and morals can be gathered.

XXVIII. And certainly Sixtus Senensis especially openly accedes to this opinion, and prolixly and ingenuously sets forth his mind about that matter. "We ingenuously confess," he says, "that in this our edition some blemishes are found, Solecisms and Barbarisms, hyperbata, and many things unsuitably translated, and less Latinely expressed, obscurely and ambiguously interpreted, also some things superadded, some omitted, some transposed, changed, and depraved by the fault of scribes, which Sanctes Pagninus, Thomas Cajetan, Francis Forerius, and Jerome Oleaster, most erudite men from the Dominican order indicated in their interpretations and explanations. Yet it does not follow from these that the Church up to this day has not had a true, sincere, integral and faithful edition of the New Testament, because, although such errors are found in it, it is nevertheless certain that neither in the Old, nor in the New edition has anything ever been found which was either deviant from the truth of the Christian faith, false or mendacious, or contrary to orthodox dogmas and rules, or added beyond the truth, or changed against the truth, or omitted to the prejudice of the truth, or so depraved, that it brought occasion of perniciously erring, or furnished matter and fuel for heresies and depraved dogmas, or so obscurely and

ambiguously translated, that it concealed the mysteries of our faith, or did not explain them sufficiently, and as much as is enough for salvation. Which errors, blemishes, and depravations nevertheless Saint Jerome testified that he deliberately left in the Old edition of the New Testament, and the Church similarly left in the new edition on purpose: not because so many most erudite and holy Fathers of the Church either did not recognize those errors, or approved them: but because they saw themselves impelled to dissemble them for just causes. First because they noticed that no danger in faith and morals threatened from these so slight errors. Then lest the faithful should be offended importunately, and by too exacting a novelty of correction, etc. Finally that they might venerate that ancient edition, which had educated the faith of the nascent Church, and strengthened it as it grew, and had gotten the upper hand." Sacred Library Book 8.

XXIX. Moreover those who are of this opinion, or at least most of them, do not admit that the Council of Trent prefers this edition to the Greek or Hebrew text, but only that out of the many Latin versions which exist it puts this one before the others, so that it may be authentic only in the genus of a Version, not in opposition to the original text, to which it must be subjected, at least not preferred. Bellarmine interprets the words of the Council of Trent clearly enough in this opinion. "The Fathers," he says, "made no mention of the sources; but only out of so many Latin versions which are circulated they chose one which they might put before the others." Book 2 On the Word of God, Chapter 10.

XXX. And thus also Alphonsus Salmeron, who was present at the Council, softens the Tridentine Canon, Volume 1, Prolegomenon 3, where he teaches that the old edition was not so approved, that on that account the Greek or Hebrew Volumes were rejected. "For nothing there," he says, "was done concerning the Greek or Hebrew copies. Only among so many Latin editions, it pronounced this one vulgate to be truer, purer, more lucid, and more agreeing with its sources whence it arose, than the rest." And he adds that it is permitted, with the authority of the Council of Trent safe, to produce the various reading of the Greek or Hebrew copy, and to weigh it as the text of the Bibles, and not only to edify good morals through it, but also to prove the dogmas of faith; and thus to take from it an efficacious argument, as from the mind of the Holy Spirit.

XXXI. Moreover the Theologians of the Roman School who are of that opinion, and who diminish and restrict the authority of the vulgate edition in the way now declared, or at least most of them, do not think it necessary that its author had the Prophetic Spirit, or some other peculiar and extraordinary guidance of the Holy Spirit, for without this it could happen that he faithfully translated, and at least in those things which pertain to faith did not err. Bellarmine manifestly concedes to this opinion in Book 2 On the Word of God, Chapter 11. "We admit," he says, "that the interpreter is not a Prophet, and could have erred. We only say that he did not err in that version which the Church approved."

XXXII. And similarly Andradius in the fourth book of his Defense of the Tridentine Faith, teaches that the power of the Holy Spirit did not so pour itself out on the old interpreter, that he can be compared with the most holy heroes, who committed the sacred mysteries to

writing, or attained perfect knowledge of all things which he undertook to interpret. Indeed he notes that by a certain wondrous providence the Holy Spirit willed that some vestiges of human weakness remain in the lucubrations of the old interpreter, which sufficiently betrayed that not all things were instilled into his mind, as into the Prophets and Apostles. And therefore he denies that he was immune from error. Indeed after many things of this kind, he breaks out into these words, "It would be infinite to enumerate each error by numbering them."

XXXIII. But there are others among the Doctors of the Roman School who extol the authority of the Vulgate version much more. For first they do not admit that the Vulgate interpreter erred in any thing, and deviated from the sense and scope of the Holy Spirit. And so they want him not only in those things which pertain to faith, but also in all other things of whatever kind everywhere to have attained the sense of the sacred text, so that whatever is found in him it is impious to call into doubt.

XXXIV. Then so that they may defend that infallibility of the old interpreter, they imagine that he had the Prophetic Spirit, or at least some Spirit similar to the Prophetic, which perpetually assisted him in interpreting, and rendered his version immune from error. Which among others Gretser, Titelmans, and Gregory of Valence boldly affirm.

XXXV. Finally they so extol the authority of the Latin edition, that they put it before the Greek and Hebrew text, as of more certain and ascertained authority, indeed as alone properly authentic. For these are the words of Stapleton, "To have recourse to the Greek and Hebrew is both permitted, and often expedient, but to elucidate that which is obscure, not to condemn the vulgar text of any falsity. And in this sense the Council of Trent determined that the old Latin edition alone is to be held as authentic." In the Relectio of the Principles of Faith, Controversy 5, Question 3, Article 3.

XXXVI. And so wherever it dissents from the Hebrew text they do not want it to be corrected from it; but rather they think that the Hebrew text itself is to be corrected from the Latin version. This can be seen in Gregory of Valentia's Analysis of Faith, Book 8, Chapter 5, where he contends that those are not to be heard, who even after the Council of Trent, want to emend the old edition in some places, as far as the sense is concerned: when rather the Greek and Hebrew codices, if they differ from the Old version anywhere, are to be emended by it: since the Church approved this edition by a special definition, but not those codices: which it does not indeed reject, unless perhaps where they would contradict the old version, yet it has not so precisely declared them authentic.

XXXVII. But Huntley proceeds so far, that he says that those who, rejecting the Old edition, take refuge in the Hebrew text, elicit nothing certain from there, but rather render faith doubtful, infirm, and uncertain. And similarly he who rejecting the ancient Latin version, takes refuge in the Greek text which exists today, without doubt recurs from things certain to things uncertain, doubtful, and depraved. Controversy 1 on the Word of God, Chapters 10 and 14.

XXXVIII. But the latter opinion, seems more conformable to the words of the Tridentine Synod. For that Synod determines that the Vulgate Version is to be rejected under no pretext

in public lectures, disputations, and preachings. But if some errors are admitted in it, at least in lighter matters, now it is permitted to reject it under some pretext; especially in public disputations, in which often the matter is not about graver things, and which pertain to faith and morals. And in the same way, if it is permitted to correct it in certain places from the Hebrew or Greek text, it is also lawful to reject it under that pretext, that it dissents from the Hebrew or Greek: and thus it is false that it is to be rejected under no pretext. From which it is that this opinion, although more abhorrent from the common sense, and from the truth, is nevertheless more common in the Roman Church, and is proposed more boldly by its defenders, while others set forth the feelings of their mind only timidly.

XXXIX. Yet for the former opinion it makes that those who were present at the Council of Trent, such as Salmeron, Vega, and Andradius, seem to favor it more. Indeed after Andradius taught and affirmed that the old edition is to be deemed authentic only, because it exists defaced by no error from which some pernicious dogma in faith and morals can be gathered, lest anyone doubt that this was the mind of the Council, he cites as a witness about that matter Cardinal Sancta Cruce who then, as the Pope's Legate presided over the Council, from whom Vega had heard it, the day before this decree was asked, and whom he heard confirming and protesting the same thing more than once. Which the History of the Council of Trent also testifies.

**Theological Theses,
On the Authority of the
Vulgate Latin Version: Part Two.
In which the opinion of the Protestants on that matter is set forth and confirmed.**

Thesis I

The Protestants by common consent determine this first, that no Version of scripture is properly speaking authentic. But they say that authentic which has plainly divine and irrefragable authority, and which it is impious to contradict. And of their assertion this is the foundation, that so that a writing may be so authentic, it is necessary that it was made by divine inspiration; but all versions have been made by human industry and study, but not by divine afflatus. For as Jerome warns in his preface to the Pentateuch, "It is one thing to be a Prophet, another to be an interpreter. There the spirit predicted future things, here erudition and copiousness of words translates those things which it understands."

II. But especially that the Latin Vulgate was made by human study, not divine inspiration, is not difficult to prove. For, according to the principal Theologians of the Roman School, for the most part, it is either of Jerome, or corrected and revised by Jerome, or at least mixed from the version of Jerome and another older one. But Jerome was not a Prophet: nor in translating or correcting the Bibles did he have a peculiar and extraordinary guidance of the Holy Spirit. For Jerome never attributes so much to himself, but everywhere professes that he labored on his version with human study, and in that he acknowledges that he was liable

to error, indeed and sometimes erred. He also often freely leaves it to the readers to interpret many things in this or that way, because he doubted whether they had been rightly understood and translated by him. But Augustine in his epistle to Jerome 11, takes it for granted that Jerome could err, indeed and modestly complains that he actually erred somewhere. Indeed Jerome altogether freely leaves his version either to be admitted or repudiated. "Let those who want," he says, "read: let those who do not want reject." And he orders him who with venomous tongue carped at his work, either to accept it, if it pleased, or to despise it, if it displeased. Preface to Joshua. But would he speak so submissively and contemptuously about his work, if indeed he had published it with the divine Spirit inspiring, and would he not, if it had been so, have ordered his version to be admitted, all others being repudiated?

III. It is especially worthy to hear in what way Jerome translated the book of Tobit, which is held Canonical in the Roman Church, and which the Doctors of it think they have translated by Jerome. Jerome relates it in his preface to Tobit. "Because," he says, "the Chaldean language is near to the Hebrew speech, finding a loquacious Jew most skilled in both languages, I took up the labor of one day, and whatever he expressed to me in Hebrew words, this I, with a notary summoned, set forth in Latin speech." From which it is evident that Jerome, since he did not know Chaldean, used the work of a certain Jew, who by a certain extemporaneous paraphrase expounded the Chaldean text of Tobit to him; but Jerome, also extemporaneously, dictated the sense of it, as much as he grasped, in Latin speech. But is there anything there which savors of divine inspiration? And who will be able to believe that text to be authentic which is expressed from a paraphrase of I know not what loquacious Jew, and that by one who ignorant of the language, dictated in Latin speech whatever that loquacious Jew had expounded in Hebrew.

IV. It is therefore clear enough that the vulgate version, at least as far as those things which it has from Jerome, does not have divine authority, since Jerome was not a divinely inspired man, nor did he write anything with God peculiarly inspiring, but labored on his version with human study only. But so that such authority might be established for it, it would be necessary not only that Jerome was divinely inspired, but also the author of that older version, from which also, as we taught before, it is mixed. Which came into the mind of no one before the Council of Trent, not even in a dream.

V. Indeed since the vulgate version, Jerome teaching in his preface to Daniel, and Bellarmine acknowledging in the second book On the Word of God, chapter eleven, has certain things translated from the version of Theodotion, such as those chapters about Bel and Susanna added to Daniel, who would believe either that the version of Theodotion the heretic and Apostate was made by Divine inspiration, or that a version expressed from a non-authentic edition is authentic?

VI. But if anyone should say that there is no need at all, that the individual writers, from whose patchworks the vulgate is made, had divine authority, provided it is established that nothing was taken from them which was not rightly and according to the mind of the Holy

Spirit translated; for thus the authority of the Vulgate is sufficiently established: this being posited; I say that at least it will be necessary, that that selection was made with God inspiring, and that the interpolator of this version was a Prophet and a divinely inspired man. Otherwise it cannot have divine and irrefragable authority. But there is not one author of this commingling, nor was it made at once and once for all, and by a certain design; but gradually and little by little, and rather randomly, than from a certain deliberation. For neither the author nor the time of this correction or interpolation can be indicated. Which without doubt could be done, if the matter had been done solemnly, and for a certain end.

VII. From all which it becomes clear and evident, that neither the Latin vulgate version, nor any other is such, that its authority must necessarily be acquiesced in, nor is it permitted to recede from the sense which it indicates, and to introduce a better sense, if the matter bears it. But from that it follows, which also the Protestants determine by common consent, that no version is to be equated in authority, much less preferred, to the original text of scripture, whether Greek or Hebrew. And therefore every version, and thus the Latin Vulgate, is to be examined and corrected from the Greek and Hebrew text, if anywhere it differs from it.

VIII. But that is manifestly proven from this, that the Hebrew and Greek codices were immediately written by the Prophets and Apostles, with the Holy Spirit dictating, and therefore have not only as to the things, but also as to the individual words, plainly divine authority and immune from all error: since all versions, as has now been said, have been elaborated only by human work and industry, by those who could be deceived, both in grasping the sense of the sacred text, and in rightly and with suitable words expounding it.

IX. There are indeed some in the Roman School, who want the author also of the Vulgate version to have written with the Holy Spirit assisting, lest he err from the true sense. But this is not certain among the doctors of that School. For some affirm, but others deny. And those very ones who affirm timidly affirm that, but not as a certain and ascertained matter; nor do they want the individual words of the Vulgate version to be from the Holy Spirit, since they admit that it sometimes uses words less proper, congruous, and accommodated, which is alien to the Holy Spirit. But now who does not see that the authority of that edition is greater, of which it is indubitable that the individual words are from the Holy Spirit, than of that about which at least it is permitted to doubt whether it is so, nor is it so ascertained and explored?

X. Then the Hebrew and Greek text holds itself in the manner of a fountain, but all versions hold themselves in the manner of streams, which have been drawn from it. But the wave of the fountain must be believed to flow purer and more sincerely than that of the stream. Then that text is as it were the exemplar, from which all versions have been expressed as images. But certainly the exemplar is always the rule and norm of those images, which have been expressed from it; and if any are less congruent with it, without doubt they are to be corrected and reformed from it.

XI. Which the ancient Doctors of the Church acknowledged. For they were accustomed to referring all translations to the original text of scripture, and to estimate them from it: so that those which approached it more closely, and expressed it more happily, were to be held in

greater esteem, and made more of. This is especially openly the opinion of Jerome, whose authority here ought to be great among others, on account of his erudition, and skill in languages. For thus he says against Helvidius, "The wave of the fountain must be believed to flow much purer than that of the stream." And in his epistle to Sunia and Fretella, "Just as in the New Testament, if ever a question arises among the Latins, and there is a variety among the copies, we have recourse to the fountain of the Greek speech, in which the New Testament is written; so in the Old Testament, if ever there is a diversity between the Greeks and Latins, we have recourse to the Hebrew truth, so that whatever proceeds from the fountain, this we may seek in the streams." And in his epistle to Marcella speaking about the New Testament, "I wanted," he says, "to recall the faultiness of the Latin codices, which is proven from the diversity of all the books, to the Greek origin, from which they do not deny that they themselves have been translated, to whom if the wave of the most pure fountain displeases, let them drink the muddy streams." But in his Commentaries on Zechariah speaking about the Old Testament he says thus, "We are compelled to have recourse to the Hebrews, and to seek the truth of knowledge from the fountain rather than from the streams."

XII. Augustine teaches similar things in Book 15 of the City of God, Chapter 13. "I would in no way doubt that it is rightly done, that when something diverse is found in both codices, credence should rather be given to that language, from which the translation was made into another by interpreters." But in Book 2 of Christian Doctrine, Chapter 11, he says, "Men of the Latin language have need of two others for the knowledge of the divine scriptures, namely, Hebrew and Greek, so that recourse may be had to the preceding exemplars, if the infinite variety of the Latin interpreters has brought any doubt."

XIII. With which Ambrose hands down agreeable things in On the Holy Spirit, Book 2, Chapter 6. "If anyone," he says, "contends from the variety of the Latin codices, some of which the perfidious have falsified, let him inspect the Greek codices." And in the Book on the Sacrament of the Lord's Incarnation, Chapter 8, "Thus," he says, "we find in the Greek codices, namely, of the New Testament, whose authority is greater." But the Doctors of the Roman School in this matter ought to be especially urged by the authority of the Canon Law itself, and its testimony. For thus it is had in the Decree of Gratian, Distinction 9, Canon Ut Veterum. "As the reliability of the Old Books is to be examined from the Hebrew volumes, so the truth of the new ones requires the norm of the Greek speech." Which words are taken from Jerome's epistle to Lucinius.

XIV. To this the Doctors of the Roman Church who are of the contrary opinion Respond, that by these arguments it is indeed evinced that the Greek and Hebrew text would be to be put before any versions whatsoever, if it were established that it is whole and uncorrupted: but since that text has been corrupted and vitiated, it no longer obtains that pristine dignity, nor is it safe to correct the Vulgate version from it. For to this amounts the response of Bellarmine in Book 2 On the Word of God, Chapter 11. "I respond," he says, "that it cannot be denied, that the fountains of the scriptures are to be put before the streams of the versions, when it

is established that the fountains are not disturbed: but now we have already shown that the fountains flow muddied in many places."

XV. But how Bellarmine has shown that it is worth the trouble to hear. The place to which he refers is the second chapter of the second book On the Word of God. But there he brings forward five places in all from the Old Testament, which he contends have been corrupted: but with how unhappy an attempt, is evident from the mere inspection of the places. The first place is Isaiah 9, where he contends that Tikkare "he shall be called" is to be read, "his name shall be called Wonderful;" although nevertheless in the Hebrew codices it is constantly read Likra "one shall call." But besides that Bellarmine conjectures, but does not prove by any solid reason that the Hebrew text here has been vitiated, what does it matter for the sense whether you read, Tikkare, "he shall be called," or likra "one shall call" impersonally, as is the custom of the Hebrew language? The second place is Jeremiah 23, where the Hebrew text has, "this is the name by which likreo 'one shall call' him, The Lord our righteousness." But Bellarmine wants it to be read likreubu "they shall call him." But it is the same whether you read likreo, or read likreubu. For the verb is always to be taken impersonally, as the usage of the Hebrew language bears, which on a similar occasion uses the verb indiscriminately now in the plural now in the singular.

XVI. The third place is Psalm 22, where the Hebrew text has Caari, that is, "like a Lion my hands and my feet," which have no sense: but it is to be read Caaru "they pierced." But although in the Hebrew text it is Caari, the Masoretic notes themselves which are placed in the margin warn that Caaru is to be read. And that word is from the number of those which the Masters of the Jews note are to be written one way, and read another. The fourth place is had in Psalm 19, where the Hebrew Codices have "into all the earth exivit Kavam 'their delineation' has gone out," although nevertheless it is to be read Kolam "their voice," as it is in the version of the Seventy interpreters, which Paul uses in Romans 10. But neither from that is any error convinced in the Hebrew text. For the Seventy who translated φθόγγος αὐτῶν, refer the sense not the words. Since that delineation of the heavens about which the Psalmist speaks, that is, their elegant and as it were to the line polished structure, is a certain voice everywhere preaching the infinite power and wisdom of the artificer. The fifth and final place is Exodus chapter 2, where these things are read about Moses in the Vulgate version, "He begot another also, and called his name Eliezer, saying, The God of my Father has helped me, and delivered me from the hand of Pharaoh." Which words are lacking in the Hebrew text, and Bellarmine wants them to have been erased from it, but gratuitously and without reason. Nor is there reason why we should give credence to him more in this matter than to Cardinal Cajetan, who rather acknowledges that these words are redundant in the Vulgate edition, in his commentaries on this place.

XVII. Nor does Bellarmine attempt to shake the integrity of the Greek text in the New Testament with stronger indications. For he brings forward, for example, that in 1 Corinthians 15, where the Greek text has: δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος Κύριος ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. "The second man the Lord from heaven." But in the Vulgate Edition it is "the second man from heaven, heavenly."

But of how great moment is it, and what does it do for the sense, whether we read "the second man the Lord from heaven," or "the second man from heaven, heavenly"? Moreover he notes that in Romans 12, in the Greek text it is καιρῷ δουλεύοντες "serving the time:" when it is to be read Κυρίῳ δουλεύοντες "serving the Lord." But most Greek Codices have Κυρίῳ not καιρῷ, which is found only in a certain few: and therefore corruption is here brought forward in vain. Which also on that account is not to be attributed to the Greek codices in general, because certain codices, and those few, are truncated in part, and mutilated by some chapters, or verses perhaps: just as Bellarmine there contends in vain.

XVIII. We report these things individually, so that it may be apparent with how much faith and reason Bellarmine dares to say that the fountains of the scriptures flow muddily, and therefore are not to be preferred to the streams of the versions. For although we would grant that in those places noted by Bellarmine there was some error by the fault of the Librarians, which however, as we have shown, it is not necessary to concede, how small are those things and of how little importance, that from them their authority should be detracted from the Greek and Hebrew codices? Here we appeal to Bellarmine himself, who after he had labored much in vain, to show that certain things in the Hebrew text were corrupted, concludes in these words, "However, errors of this kind are not of such great importance, that in those things which pertain to faith and good morals, the integrity of sacred scripture should be desired." For the whole discrepancy of the various Readings is usually placed in certain words, which change the sense either little or not at all. Will the authority and excellence of the original text immediately dictated by God therefore perish on account of some slight and unimportant errors of this kind? And should it not for that reason be preferred to the Latin version, which was not prepared by men inspired by God, and which, by the admission of the Roman School itself, has its own faults, and has been greatly corrupted by the lapse of time and the fault of the scribes?

XIX. And certainly here it is fitting to wonder at the thoughtlessness and stupor of those with whom we have to do. They acknowledge that the Greek and Hebrew text of scripture was immediately written by the Apostles and Prophets, with the Holy Spirit dictating; and yet they dare to detract from its authority, and to assert that it is uncertain. Why? Because, they say, that text has lost its purity, and has been corrupted and depraved. We ask where, and how far? They bring forth certain places, and those very few, in which they contend there was error by the fault of the Librarians, but in such a way, however, that those errors make little or nothing for the sense. While they use this argument, it is necessary that they presuppose that that text cannot be certain and authentic, into which even the slightest blemishes have crept, by the fault and negligence of men.

XX. Now let us apply these things to the Vulgate edition. Certainly they are not so iron-hearted, but that even the most obstinate of them freely grant that many errors have crept into this edition by the lapse of time, some things added, others removed, and others indeed changed, and that its codices vary greatly among themselves, so that it is difficult to judge which reading is true, and according to the mind of the interpreter. So that Lucas

Brugensis noted more than six hundred errors in it to be corrected, and Isidore Clarius observed up to eight thousand errors in it. And yet, notwithstanding so many blemishes and errors, they want this Latin edition to be certain and authentic, indeed the only certain and authentic one; and that rightly and justly defined by the Council of Trent, even before that edition had been emended: although it was not ignorant that it was in the greatest need of emendation.

XXI. Recognize therefore the Spirit of vertigo. Perhaps some errors, and those not of great importance, which have slipped into the original text of scripture, will render it uncertain, and will abrogate its authority; but far more and graver errors by which the Vulgate edition is corrupted, will not prevent it from being certain and authentic. But let us grant that the corruption is equal in both, and that no less of errors has been introduced by the lapse of time into the Greek or Hebrew text itself, than into the Vulgate edition, should not the original text always be preferred, other things being equal, for the reasons which we have just now brought forward? Certainly if they wanted to cast down the original text below their Latin edition with any color, on this pretext that that text is corrupted and vitiated, they ought to have rendered their Vulgate edition immune from all errors and faults, with which however, even in their own judgment, it is no less filled than the Hebrew text.

XXII. But that the truth and force of that argument, by which we assert the first and chief authority to the Greek and Hebrew edition, above all other editions whatsoever, may be more clear, it must be known that the Theologians of the Roman School do not think the same thing about its integrity or corruption. For there are some among them, like Lindanus and Melchior Canus, who, in contempt of it, in which they hold the Original text of Scripture, allege its corruption, and assert that the Hebrew text was greatly depraved and corrupted by the malice of the Jews, in hatred of the Christian religion; and that the Greek text of the New Testament suffered similar things by the craft and frauds of heretics. But this opinion is not of so many whom zeal for the cause has altogether blinded. But others more learned and in great number oppose it, like Bellarmine, Sixtus of Siena, Dominicus Bannes, who excellently refute that opinion.

XXIII. But that we also may stop up that evasion, if the Latin version is to be preferred to the Hebrew text, because that text has been depraved by the Jews, we ask when that depravation took place, Whether before that version was made, or indeed after it was made. If they say that the Hebrew codices were already depraved, when the Latin version was made, certainly they cut their own throats. For how could a pure and authentic version be expressed from an impure and non-authentic text? And how will that stream be pure, if it is drawn from a fountain already muddy? It is necessary therefore that the Hebrew codices remained whole up to Jerome, who is considered the author of the greatest part at least, of the Vulgate edition. And indeed, Jerome and Augustine absolve the Jews from that crime, which had begun to be leveled against them by some, and they call them faithful librarians of the Christians. They not only praise their faith in this regard but also confirm it with many arguments.

XXIV. Now, moreover, that the Jews have not violated the Sacred text from the time of Jerome out of hatred for the Christian religion, is manifest from this, that if there are any places that favor the Christian religion, they are no less whole in the Hebrew text than in the Latin edition. Indeed, the testimonies concerning Christ are often more illustrious in the Hebrew text than in the Vulgate version. An example may be that of the second Psalm, "Nashchku Bar," "Kiss the Son," where Kings are ordered to adore the Son of God. But in the Vulgate it is held corruptly and dilutedly, "apprehendite disciplinam" [embrace discipline].

XXV. Add that the Jews after Jerome had less cause for corrupting the sacred text than before Jerome. For the more remote the times were from Christ, the rarer were the colloquies and disputations of the Jews with the Christians about religion. Nor was the hatred of the Jews against the Christian religion greater after Jerome than before him. And also they could more easily be accused and convicted of that depravation after Jerome, by the translation recently made by him from the Hebrew, with one and another Jew striving and lending their work to him, who taught Jerome the Hebrew letters. Then also no one will hold the Jews suspected of so great a crime, who knows with how great religion, not to say superstition, they deal with the letter of scripture: so that they have all its letters and points in number, and if any few and slight blemishes have long been recognized in the sacred text, yet they have not dared to correct them for many centuries back, but have only noted in the margin how it should be read.

XXVI. But what is especially to be noted, since those with whom we have to do, on that account contend that the Hebrew text has been corrupted, that they may defend the authority of the Vulgate edition, which differs not a little from it, it is necessary that they say that the books are more corrupt in which the Vulgate version departs further from the Hebrew text. And so no book will be more depraved than the Hebrew Psalter, from which the Latin differs very much. And yet that nothing was changed in the Hebrew Psalter from the time of Jerome, Jerome's version expressed from the Hebrew text of the Psalter makes manifest. For this version, which has remained whole up to this point, is altogether conformable to the Hebrew text, which exists even today: nor does it depart less than it does from the Vulgate version.

XXVII. But especially the vanity of that calumny, by which the Original text of Scripture is assailed in the person of the Jews, is openly convicted from this, that those who cry out that the Hebrew text has been so corrupted, when it comes to the thing itself, and they are ordered to bring forth those places which the Jews have corrupted with evil intent, can scarcely indicate one or another place, in which even a slight suspicion of that corruption occurs. For besides those things which we have reported above from Bellarmine, they contend, for example, that in the Hebrew Psalter eight verses are missing, which are cited by the Apostle in chapter 3 of the epistle to the Romans, and are inserted in the Vulgate version in Psalm 13. Namely, "Their throat is an open sepulchre, with their tongues they have used deceit," and what follows in the Apostle: But these verses are not missing in the Hebrew text, but have been rashly inserted into the Vulgate version, as the most Learned Theologians of

the Roman School acknowledge, and among others Bellarmine himself. For these verses are not cited by our Apostle, as if they existed in some place of Scripture in a continuous series, but are taken from various places of scripture, as Jerome testifies in the preface to book 16 on Isaiah.

XXVIII. They object moreover that in Genesis chapter eight in the Hebrew text it is "The raven went out, and returned"; when yet it should be read, "and did not return"; as the Vulgate version has it. But what did it concern the Jews to remove the negative particle in this place? And what does it make for their case, if the raven returned into the ark, or not? And how will they prove that in this place we must not stand by the faith of the Hebrew codex, but rather follow the Latin codices, which here also vary among themselves, and do not all read in the same way? From which it is clear how futile are the things which are wont to be objected against the Hebrew text, and with what slight arguments its authority is impugned.

XXIX. Nor are the things which are brought against the Greek text of the New Testament more valid. For although it is true that the heretics often tried to corrupt the Greek codices, yet it is also true that the Orthodox always resisted such an impious attempt, and did not suffer their codices to be depraved, whatever the heretics dared in theirs. Of which thing it makes faith, that those places of the New Testament which are apt to confute the various heretics, who have vexed the Christian Church, are no less whole in the Greek text than in the Latin codices. Nor can, or dare, those with whom we deal individually designate what places of the New Testament remain corrupted by heretics in the Greek Codices, which the Christian Church uses today.

XXX. But experience confutes what Bellarmine imputes to the Greeks: namely that they were not as faithful and careful in preserving their codices, as the Latin Church was. For, omitting the faults of the interpreter himself, more depraved and various readings can be shown in the Latin codices themselves than in the Greek. If, therefore, any errors have crept into the Hebrew and Greek codex by the fault and negligence of men, they are few and very slight, and of no importance, as to the sense, as we have heard Bellarmine himself confessing, with the sounder Doctors of the Roman Church. And therefore nothing is taken away from the authority of the Original text, which does not for that reason cease to be certain and authentic, and to be preferred to any versions whatsoever: and even to the Latin edition itself, into which, by the acknowledgment of the Roman School itself, many errors have slipped, by the fault and unskilfulness of the scribes; and which nevertheless they do not want for that reason to have lost that authority; which they wrongly attribute to it.

XXXI. But that it may more clearly appear how without reason that sacrilege, by which its authority above all other editions is detracted from the Greek and Hebrew text of scripture, is covered by the corruption of that text, will those, whose opinion we impugn, say that from the time when the Canon Law was collected by Gratian, and confirmed and sanctioned by the Roman Pontiffs, such corruption invaded that text, as took away from it the authority which it had hitherto had? Certainly they will be compelled to say that? if they want to stand by their

right. For whatever the Greek and Hebrew codices were, when the Canon Law was composed, in that law there stands a Canon, by which it is sanctioned that the faith of the old books is to be examined from the Hebrew volumes, but the truth of the new ones to desire the norm of the Greek speech, as was observed above. And therefore it is necessary, that that corruption happened only a very few centuries ago. For it is not many centuries since Gratian lived. But what need is there to recur all the way to Gratian, since in the century immediately preceding, the Decree of Gratian was recognized, and newly sanctioned by the Roman Pontiffs, who by no means abrogated that Canon, on the pretext of any corruption, which had happened after that Canon was first composed.

XXXII. But Bellarmine and other Doctors of the Roman School try to elude this Canon and similar opinions of the Fathers in another way. For they concede that it is often useful to recur to the Greek and Hebrew fountain, and that for various reasons. And first indeed, when there seems to be an error of the Librarians in the Latin codices. Secondly, when the Latin codices vary, so that it cannot be certainly established what is the true reading of the Vulgate. Thirdly, when the words or sentence in Latin is ambiguous. Fourthly, to understand the energy and propriety of the words. And in this sense they draw what is contained in the Canon Law, and in Jerome, Augustine, and other Fathers, about all versions being emended and examined from the Hebrew and Greek text. But they do not want it to be lawful to correct the Vulgate edition from the Original text, as if something in it was erred by the interpreter, and alien to the mind of the Holy Spirit. But surely the aforealleged Canon sanctions that very thing. For when it says that the truth of the books of the New Testament desires the norm of the Greek speech, does it not manifestly declare that whatever in those books does not agree with that norm should not be held for the true word of God? And similarly when it says that the faith of the old Books is to be examined from the Hebrew volumes, does it not openly sanction that faith is not to be had in those books, except insofar as they are found to agree with the Hebrew text; and therefore that faith is to be abrogated from the Vulgate edition, where it dissents from the Hebrew text?

XXXIII. Let this therefore be concluded, that the Latin version is neither properly authentic, nor in any way to be equated in authority to the Greek and Hebrew text, much less to be preferred to it. For the rest, if anyone asks how much it is to be esteemed, and what place it ought to hold among the versions, this is the opinion of the Protestants about it, That there are many Latin versions better than it and more accurate; indeed, that there is scarcely any extant today which is more imperfect, and which has more defects.

XXXIV. For first it bristles with wondrous barbarity and is full of dissonant and absurd words. Of this kind are Psalm 76, "Scopebam spiritum meum," for that which is in Hebrew "Vajechappe's Kouchi," "my spirit searched." Psalm 67, "Benedictus Dominus die Quotidie." Psalm 125, "In convertendo Dominus captivitatem Sion facti sumus sicut Consolati." Also in Joel chapter 2, it is said of God that he is "praestabilis super malitia." Which is explained by Bellarmine with a wondrous enough gloss, "excellent in pitying." When in Hebrew it is "Nicham hal haraha," "Whom it repents of the evil," namely, which he was otherwise about to

send upon the obstinate. And of the same vein are those in the New Testament, "Nonne vos magis pluris estis illis." Matt. 6. "Omnis populus manicabat ad eum," for "mane veniebat" [came in the morning]. Luk. 21. Also, "Deus intentator est malorum." Jam. 1. for that which is in Greek "ἀπειράστος κακῶν," that is, "who cannot be tempted by evils." Which things we bring forth only in appearance. For Myriads of such barbarous Locutions could be noted.

XXXV. Then not only do many barbarous words occur in that version, but also many places which have no sense, especially in the Psalms, whose version is most depraved. It would be infinite to pursue each one. But we will give only a certain specimen of this thing in two Psalms. And first indeed in Psalm 67, according to the Vulgate version. Which is almost entirely so depraved, that the reader can scarcely sculpt any sense from it; or certainly if the words bear any sense, it departs very far from the Hebrew truth. But especially who could divine the sentence of these words, "The Lord will give the word to them that preach good tidings with great power. The king of hosts, of the beloved, and to the beauty of the house to divide the spoils. If ye sleep among the midst of the lots, ye shall be as the wings of a dove covered with silver, and the hinder parts of her back with the paleness of gold." Also of those which follow, "When he that is in heaven appointeth kings over her, they shall be white as snow in Salmon. The mountain of God is a rich mountain, a mountain curdled as cheese, a rich mountain, why suspect ye curdled mountains?"

XXXVI. Nor did the Vulgate interpreter less infelicitously translate Psalm 89, which in Hebrew is 90. Which that it may be more clearly apparent we will compare some of its verses with the Hebrew text. For what do those things mean in the third verse, "Lest thou turn man to destruction; and thou hast said, Return, ye children of men." When according to the Hebrew codex the sentence is plain, this namely, "Thou turnest man to dust, and sayest, Return, ye children of men:" Namely, into the dust whence ye were taken. In the fifth verse the Vulgate has, "Their years shall be. They are accounted as nothing." But the Hebrew words in Latin sound, "With a flood thou carriest them away, and they are a sleep." But especially how absurd is the version of the tenth verse and those following, where it is read in the Vulgate, "As a spider our years shall be spent in thought. The days of our years in them are 70 years. But if in strength, 80 years: and what is more of them is labour and sorrow, for mildness comes upon us, and we shall be chastised." But in the Hebrew text it is, "We spend our years like a tale [or meditation]. The days of our years are 70 years: and if any be strong, 80 years. But their strength is labour and sorrow: for it is soon cut off, and we fly away." Which words have a sense not so difficult, and which one may easily understand: But who would understand that, "our years like a spider shall be spent in thought"? and what do those words void of good sense have in common with the Hebrew text? To which many similar things could easily be observed in almost every Psalm.

XXXVII. Moreover it is manifest that the Vulgate interpreter, whether deluded by the ambiguity of the Greek or Hebrew word, or by a depraved reading, has translated many things absurdly, and in a sense most alien to the mind of the sacred author. Thus Exodus 34, it is said of Moses by the Vulgate interpreter, "He knew not that his face was horned."

Whence was born the common error of painters and sculptors, who represent Moses as some other Bacchus with a horned forehead. But the interpreter was deceived by the ambiguity of the word "Keren," which properly indeed signifies a horn, but metaphorically is said of rays, which are as it were certain horns of light. Whence comes the verb "Karan" to shine. Which the Hebrew text uses in this place. For there it is said of Moses that "Karan," the skin of his face shone. The interpreter made a similar error in the third chapter of the Prophet Habakkuk, where the Majesty of God is thus described, according to the Hebrew truth, "his brightness was as the light, he had rays from his hands." But in the Vulgate it reads "He had horns in his hands." Here pertains what is in the first Book of Chronicles, chapter 4, where the same interpreter turns many proper names into appellatives: Whence arises a fabulous and absurd sense. For among the posterity of Selah the son of Judah these are reckoned in the Hebrew text, "Jokim, and the men of Chozeba, and Joash, and Saraph, who had the dominion in Moab, and Jashubi-lehem." But the Vulgate version has, "And he that made the sun to stand, and the men of Lying, and Secure, and Burning, who were princes in Moab, and who returned into Lehem." Where it is absurdly feigned that another besides Joshua made the sun stand still.

XXXVIII. Similarly in Psalm 34 among the Hebrews, the Hebrew text has, "Choneh," that is, "The angel of the Lord encampeth round about them that fear him." Which the LXX not badly turned "παρεμβάλει." For "παρεμβολή" signifies a camp. But the Latin interpreter who turned the Psalms from the Greek not reaching the force of the Greek word turned it, "The angel of the Lord shall send in the circuit of them that fear him." In no sense, or little congruous. In Psalm 131 in the Vulgate version, the Hebrew text has "Tjedah barek abarek," that is, "her victuals [or provision] I will bless with blessing." Which the LXX turned "τὴν θήραν αὐτῆς εὐλογῶν εὐλογήσω," "Blessing I will bless her venison." And indeed "tsaid" properly signifies venison. But by the fault of the copyists "θήραν" was changed into "χήραν," that is, "Widow." Which error the Vulgate version followed, for it has "Blessing I will bless her widow."

XXXIX. Finally, in the ninth chapter of Proverbs, Solomon speaking of him whom the immodest woman allures and seduces with her blandishments, thus says, "And he knoweth not that the dead are there, and that her guests are in the depths of hell." But the Vulgate version has "He was ignorant that giants are there." Namely, the interpreter was deceived by the Homonymy of the word "Rephaim," which is found in the Hebrew text. For this word sometimes indeed signifies Giants, but as for the most part it signifies the dead. Which ambiguity also deceived him in Job chapter 26, where the Hebrew text has, "Harephaim," that is, "The dead things are formed under the waters, and the inhabitants thereof." Where by dead things are understood bodies void of soul, like metals and gems, which are formed under the very waters, in the lowest bowels of the earth. But in the Vulgate it Reads, "Behold the giants groan under the waters, and they that dwell with them."

XL. It would be allowed to collect more of this kind, but let these things said for an example suffice. More serious is that the vulgar interpreter often not only departs from the Hebrew text, but induces a plainly contrary sense; thus in Genesis chapter eight, in the place

already noted above, according to the Hebrew truth it is said of the Raven, that it went out of the ark and returned. But the Vulgate has "and did not return." Which error, as Augustine Bishop of Chisamo observes in Sixtus of Siena, made it so that the expositors invented most fabulous questions, inquiring in what place the raven was absent. Thus 1 Cor. 15, according to the Greek text is, "We shall not all indeed sleep, but we shall all be changed." But in a contrary sense the Vulgate interpreter has, "We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed." So also in the second chapter of the first Epistle of Peter, it is said of Christ in the Vulgate version, "When he suffered, he threatened not, but delivered himself to him that judged him unjustly." But in the Greek it is, "To him that judged righteously."

XLI. Moreover, although we do not think that the Vulgate interpreter acted in bad faith, and purposely corrupted the text of scripture to foster some errors, which some of the Protestants less prudently attribute to him, yet it is certain that many from his faulty version took occasion of erring, or at least of confirming themselves in their errors. Thus Bellarmine to prove the religious cult of relics brings forth that of Isaiah ch. 11, "His sepulchre shall be glorious." But in Hebrew it is simply, "His rest or dwelling shall be glorious." Similarly in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said of Jacob, according to the Vulgate version, "He adored the top of his staff." Which some bring forth to prove the religious adoration of images. As if, forsooth, by these words it were signified, that Jacob adored some image carved on the top of the staff of Joseph. But in the Greek it is "he adored upon the top of his staff," or "his own," that is, leaning on his staff because of infirmity. So also to prove the invocation of saints those words of Peter are wont to be adduced, ch. 1 of the second Epistle, where in the Vulgate it is read, "I will endeavour that you may be able after my decease to have these things always in remembrance," as if Peter were promising to the faithful his endeavour and care after his decease. But the Greek truth has, "I will endeavour that ἐκάστοτε ἔχειν ὑμῶς," "that ye may be able to have these things always in remembrance after my decease." For ἔχειν there signifies to be able, from the frequent use of the Greek tongue. And in that place the Apostle renders a reason why he wrote to them, namely, that after his death, they might be able continually to call to remembrance what he being present had taught them.

XLII. But those who attribute more than is fitting to the free will of man in those things which pertain to piety and eternal salvation, abuse the words of the Apostle 1 Cor. 15 in the Vulgate interpreter, "I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, but the grace of God with me." When in the Greek text it is "yet not I, but the grace of God which is with me." Where the Apostle attributes the fruit of his labour in solidum to the grace of God, but not, as they want, divides it between himself and the grace of God. And the same also think that they have found something which favours their opinion in Luke ch. 2, where the Vulgate edition has "on earth peace to men of good will," as if some good will of men preceded the grace of God. But in the Greek it is far otherwise, Namely "among men," or "towards men, good pleasure" or "good will." Where the good will of men is not celebrated, but the good will of God towards men. Finally, to prove the perpetual splendour of the Christian Church very

many twist that of the Vulgate version, Psalm 18 in it, "He hath set his tabernacle in the sun." When the Hebrew truth has "He hath set a tabernacle for the sun in them." That is, in the heavens of which the Psalmist treats.

XLIII. Moreover, although many and various defects can be noted in the Latin Vulgate edition, yet it should not for that reason be despised, but its antiquity merits some veneration, and its use celebrated through so many ages in the Church. Nor is it so corrupted and depraved, that those things which pertain to faith and good morals cannot be sufficiently sought and drawn from it. But if either by the fault of the interpreter, or of the Librarians, it has been gravely erred somewhere in it, that can easily be corrected and supplied from other places. And certainly we are of the opinion that it should have departed from it as little as could be done, saving the truth, and that it should rather have been emended, than that new and entirely other versions should have been freshly coined for the common use of the Church. Although versions expressed verbatim and more closely from the Greek and Hebrew text have their use also among the learned, and conduce not a little to elucidating the text of scripture.

XLIV. But that we may so think, we are moved by the example of the Apostles and Evangelists, who did not despise the Greek edition of the Old Testament, Vulgate in their time, although laboring also itself with many defects: but they used it for the most part in citing the testimonies of the Old scripture; although also in those things it did not exactly agree with the Hebrew text. Nor did they rarely change anything in it, and cite it otherwise than it is read in it, Having regard to those to whom they wrote, and for whose sake they wrote; because, namely, they were accustomed to that edition; and taking care lest they should trouble them with unnecessary novelty, and cast unnecessary scruples upon them.

XLV. Although also we would not want any version to be properly authentic, yet we do not deny that it would be advisable, if all the Orthodox would agree on some version, which once diligently castigated and corrected they might all commonly use, and adhere to it as much as could be done. In which sense the Protestant Theologians in Germany are said to have once declared Luther's version authentic.

**Theological Theses,
On Vulgar and Vernacular
Versions of Scripture.
In which the use and necessity of those Versions is treated.
About which matter the Doctrine of the Roman School is expounded, and compared with
the
Doctrine of the Protestants: And the true opinion is confirmed by some reasons.**

Thesis I

The Doctors of the Roman Church do not think the same thing about the use and necessity of translating Scripture into Vulgar and Vernacular languages. For first there are among them some rigid and harsh ones, who absolutely condemn the translation of scripture into vernacular languages, and want the use and reading of them to be altogether forbidden to the laity, as too dangerous, and from which little fruit can redound to them. Which is the opinion of many in Spain and in Italy. But by others they are accused as rude Masters, and who so think more out of zeal than out of knowledge. With which censure Thomas Stapleton the Englishman notes them, in *Relectione principiorum fidei* Contr. 5. quæst. 3. art. 4.

II. On the other hand there are some more lenient ones who judge, at least per se and commonly, that it is expedient, as simply more agreeable to the divine honour, and the salvation of the faithful, that the scriptures should be delivered to the faithful in the vulgar tongue, although secundum quid, and in case, their reading can be noxious. For on account of either many, or few, either unlearned, or unstable, who deprave the scriptures to their own and others' destruction, not a few good and pious faithful, who would receive the greatest edification and consolation from it, are to be defrauded of that most wholesome Reading. So in France and England not a few Theologians of the Roman School think everywhere, who have some commerce with the Protestants in those kingdoms.

III. Especially that Veron formerly a Jesuit, and afterwards famous for his little books and disputations against the Reformed of France, in the third prologue, which he prefixed to the French version of the New Testament, which he himself prepared, professedly affirms and proves by many arguments that the reading of the Bibles turned into the French language is prohibited to none. Nor do artisans, idiots, women, and any others of the simple Christian people, need for such reading any permission and permission of their Bishop, Parish priest, or confessor. Indeed, that individual faithful are to be exhorted and invited to such reading, by the example of Timothy. Which opinion of Veron those Learned men from the Disciples of Jansenius approve, commend and adopt, who wrote against the Mandate of the Archbishop of Paris, by which the reading of the French version of the New Testament was prohibited, printed at Mons in Hainault, some years ago.

IV. But this opinion also is disapproved by the greatest part of the Theologians of the Roman Church. The more common doctrine of them therefore is, that vernacular translations are neither to be simply approved, nor simply prohibited. And indeed that it is not expedient, that their reading should be permitted everywhere and to anyone, but yet that it can be usefully conceded to some.

V. But Stapleton thus explains the whole matter in that Controversy 5, question 3, article 3. Namely that in the peace of the Church the reading of the whole Sacred Scripture in the vulgar tongue is not to be permitted, but only of certain parts, namely, of those which are Moral and historical. But when heresies are raging, the reading of the whole scripture can indeed be conceded, in vernacular languages; and that on account of the corrupt translations of the heretics. But yet that reading is not to be conceded promiscuously to all, but to some only, namely to those to whom the ordinary Pastors will judge it expedient.

VI. And this is the opinion of the Council of Trent, in the index of prohibited books, rule four. When, it says, it is manifest by experience, that if the sacred Bibles are permitted everywhere without discrimination in the Vulgar language, more detriment than utility arises from it on account of the temerity of men, let it stand in this part by the judgment of the Bishop, or Inquisitor, that with the Counsel of the Parish Priest, or Confessor, they may concede the reading of the Bibles turned by Catholic authors in the Vulgar language to those, whom they will have understood to be able to take from such reading, not harm, but an increase of faith and piety. Which faculty let them have in writing. But whoever will have presumed to have them, or read them without such a faculty, unless the Bibles have first been returned to the ordinary, he may not receive absolution of sins. Indeed afterwards the Regulars themselves are forbidden to read or buy Vulgar Bibles, unless a faculty has first been had from the prelates.

VII. But what the Council indefinitely decides, namely that vernacular Bibles can be conceded to those to whom the Ordinaries will have judged that to be expedient, this, I say, the same Stapleton acknowledging, in the place just now cited, the practice of the Roman Church restricts to places where, as they say, the battle line of the Church is disturbed, that is, where those who adhere to the Roman Church are mixed with those whom they consider heretics, and can have Vernacular Bibles from them. For then lest their own use corrupt editions, as they contend, they sometimes concede to them the use of Bibles turned by Doctors of the Roman School. But where, in their judgment, the battle line of the Church is ordered, that is, where the Pope reigns absolutely, and without contradiction, then they think it safer to prohibit Vulgar editions altogether, as is done in Spain and in Italy. For there the use of any vulgar translation is conceded to no one. And long ago by an edict of Kings Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain it was forbidden under the greatest penalties, lest anyone translate the Bible into the Spanish language, or import, buy, or retain those translated elsewhere.

VIII. But the Protestants by common consent teach that the scriptures ought to be common to the whole people of the faithful, and the use of them to be permitted indiscriminately to all: and therefore that it is plainly expedient, and agreeable to the divine will, that the sacred scripture should be translated into the languages vernacular to Christian peoples, that so all may be able to use it, and from it perceive instruction and consolation. And therefore that those are injurious to the Christian people, who prohibit, as much as is in them, lest versions of the scriptures should be published in vulgar languages, or at least lest it should be allowed to all to use them: nor should the Christian people obey such superiors in this matter: but rather, according to the exhortations of the scripture itself, and the liberty granted by God, they should handle the sacred books with nocturnal and daily hand, and not suffer them to be snatched from them by the Prelates.

IX. But that they may so think they are induced by many arguments. And first indeed by the example of the sacred writers themselves, or rather of God himself who wrote and spoke through them. For when God first delivered his Word in writing, he did it in a language known

and vulgar to the Israelitish people, of which the Church then consisted. For Moses and the Prophets wrote in the Hebrew language, which was vernacular and familiar to that people. A manifest indication that they wanted their writings to be read and understood by the people.

X. Similarly our Apostles and Evangelists, who having rejected the Jews, wrote chiefly for the sake of the Gentiles, published their writings in the Greek language, which then was vernacular to many Gentiles, but to very many, if not vernacular, yet commonly understood, and not unknown to the common people. Thus the Corinthians, Philippians, Thessalonians, Ephesians, to whom the Apostle wrote in Greek, also spoke Greek in common. But the Galatians, and other peoples of Asia Minor, although each had their own language, yet they commonly understood the Greek language: so that if any public speech had to be made, whether before they became Christians, or after they had embraced the Christian Doctrine, it would be made in Greek: as is evident from the homilies and demegories of the Fathers, which were made in Greek among those peoples. Indeed, the Romans themselves, to whom the Apostle wrote in Greek, knew the Greek language for the most part: so that even the women spoke and understood Greek: as may be seen in Juvenal, who therefore Satirically calls Rome a Greek city. "I cannot bear the Greeks, O Quirites, a Greek city." Since therefore God wanted his oracles first to be written in a language known not only to the rulers of the Church, but also to the common people themselves, to whom it was delivered, is it not agreeable, that they should also be proposed to each faithful people, in a language likewise vulgar and known? At least it is manifest from this that those who blame editions of scripture in the vulgar tongue, as dangerous to the faithful common people, accuse the divine wisdom, as if too improvident, as which delivered the sacred scripture in a language known and familiar to the people of God, as we have said.

XI. Then the example of the Prophets and Apostles was followed by the practice of the Church of the Old and New Testament. For under the Old Testament, after the Hebrew language began to become obsolete, but the empire of the Greeks rendered the Greek language common through a great part of the East, and understood by the common people, the Old Testament was converted into the Greek language by those seventy-two interpreters, sent for by Ptolemy, and sent from Jerusalem by the high Priest. But the scripture once so translated, the Jews dispersed through the various Provinces of the Greek empire, who having forgotten the language of their country, commonly used the Greek language, and for that reason were called Hellenists, the Jews, I say, those, having omitted henceforth the Hebrew text, began to read the scripture in Greek, not only at home but also publicly in the Synagogues on each Sabbath, in which not the Hebrew text, but the version of the Seventy elders was read. But our Apostles approved this custom, and gave that honour to the Greek version of the Seventy interpreters, that they commonly use it in their writings, while they cite the Sacred Scripture.

XII. But as for the Jews of the other dispersion, who to the distinction of the Hellenist Jews are called Hebrews, they certainly used the Hebrew text in the Synagogues, which they understood in some way. But yet because the Hebrew language had already greatly

degenerated, and about the time of Christ pure Hebraism had begun to be less understood by the common people, therefore the Old Testament was expounded by the Chaldaic Paraphrase of Onkelos and Jonathan, that the Jews then living in Babylon, and Jerusalem, and all Judea, who commonly used the Chaldaic, or Syriac idiom, might be able to use it more familiarly and easily.

XIII. But after the New Testament was written, and very many nations were converted to Christ, the whole scripture of the Old and New Testament was immediately turned from Greek into Latin, and that not by one, but by many interpreters, for the use of the Latin Church, namely, of Italy, and the adjacent Provinces, in which the Romans with their empire had propagated their language, and rendered it commonly known.

XIV. And yet, which is especially to be noted; in those Provinces the Greek language was known to the learned and many others, and the learned wrote in it, and the Disciplines were delivered; according to that of Cicero for Archias the Poet, "Greek is read through the whole world." So that even in the other century after Christ, the Bishops of Gaul published their books in Greek; as is evident by the example of Irenæus Bishop of Lyons, who wrote in Greek against the heresies of his time. But this did not seem enough to those first Christians, if scripture was had in a language known to the learned, and therefore they turned it into Latin, that it might also be able to be read and understood by the common people. But if in those first times of the faith, the Greek Church thought it equitable to have scripture in Greek, but the Latin in Latin, is it not also equitable and agreeable, that the Churches of other Languages, to which either the Greek and Latin language was never, or is no longer known, should also have the sacred scripture in a language known to them, and understood by the common people, and procure versions of it into their own languages?

XV. And certainly Ecclesiastical history teaches that other Churches used the same right, and followed the example of the Greek and Latin Church, and translated the sacred scripture into their own idioms. For Socrates testifies in book 4, ch. 27 of Ecclesiastical history, that a certain Ulphilas Bishop of the Goths, who flourished in the time of Emperor Valentinian, about the year of Christ 370, translated the sacred scripture into the Gothic language. For thus he has it in the place already cited, "Having interpreted the divine scriptures in the language of the Goths, he prepared the barbarians to learn the divine oracles."

XVI. But Jerome openly enough teaches that he translated the scripture into Dalmatian. For when he was a Dalmatian born in Stridon, thus he writes of himself to Sophronius, "I do not say this that I may bite my predecessors, or that I may think anything should be detracted from them, whose translation most diligently emended I once gave to the men of my language." Where he speaks of the Version of the LXX interpreters, from which he prepared a version for the men of his language, that is, the Dalmatians, as it seems. Bellarmine indeed doubts about this matter, but Marianus Victorinus denies it in his Scholia on this place, where he contends that Jerome understands the Latins by the men of his language. But other Doctors of the Roman School agree with us about that Version of Sacred Scripture into the Dalmatian language made by Jerome. For thus has Cardinal Hosius the Pole, in his

book on the vernacular reading of the sacred, "It is clear that Jerome translated the sacred books into the Dalmatian language." And similarly Alphonsus de Castro lib. 1, de haeresibus ch. 13, "We confess," he says, "that once the sacred books were translated into the vulgar tongue." And for an example of this thing he cites Erasmus who writes that Jerome translated the scripture into the Dalmatian language.

XVII. Similarly Chrysostom, when he was an exile in Armenia, is said to have translated the Psalms and other books of Sacred Scripture into the Armenian language, George the Patriarch relating in his life, as Sixtus of Siena acknowledges, Bibliotheca lib. 6. But Chrysostom himself Homily one on John testifies that his Gospel, and therefore the rest of scripture was translated into the various languages of even barbarous peoples. "But," he says, "the doctrine did not vanish away to unlearned and illiterate men. But the Syrians, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Ethiopians, and innumerable other nations having transferred the dogmas introduced by this one into their own language, barbarian men learned to Philosophize."

XVIII. Agreeing is Theodoret in his book on curing the affections of the Greeks. "The Hebrew books," he says, "have been converted not only into the Greek speech, but also into the Roman language, Egyptian, Persian, Indian, and Armenian, and Scythian, and even Sarmatian: once, so to speak, into all the languages which nations use to this day." To which similar things Augustine teaches, lib. 2, de Doctrina Christiana ch. 5. "From which," he says, "it is made, that the divine scripture proceeding from one language, which could opportunely be disseminated through the world, being diffused far and wide through the various languages of interpreters, became known to the nations for salvation."

XIX. But the Ethiopian Churches have always used, and even now use, the Ethiopian version, but the Syriac the Syriac version, which is doubtless very ancient, as to the New Testament at least: which the Syrians think they have turned into the Syriac language by the Evangelist Mark. And similarly the Egyptian Churches, from the time the Saracens abolished the Greek language in Egypt, and introduced the Arabic, use the Arabic version of scripture.

XX. Moreover, that it is not only lawful and expedient to translate scripture into vulgar languages, but also that this is necessary by divine ordination, is proved by scripture itself.

XXI. From this it is possible to argue thus. If as long as the Jewish Church stood the divine law had to be solemnly read to the people of God in perpetual courses of ages, and for that end that all, men and women, little ones and strangers might learn that law from that reading, and observe it, certainly that reading had to be done in a language vulgar and known to the women and little ones themselves: otherwise they could not have learned the law from that reading, which yet was the end of this precept. Then if all were bound, from the divine precept, to hear the public reading of the law that from it they might learn the law, it follows that they also could and should read the law privately. For of that of which it is necessary to hear the reading, it is also good to read it, and the reason and end of the precept looks not only to the public reading, but also to the private. For from both can men learn the law of the Lord, and be formed to his fear.

XXII. Finally it is to be noted, that although in this precept there are certain circumstances of place and time peculiar to the ancient people, yet the end of the precept and its substance, no less today looks to Christians, than of old to the Jews. For today we are no less bound to hear and learn the law of Christ written by the Evangelists and Apostles, than they the ancient law consigned in writing by Moses. For if God of old wanted his law to be read to his people, that from that reading it might be rendered familiar to that people, and from it the women and little ones themselves might learn the will of God, who would doubt that the Christian common people ought to be instructed by a similar reading, that it also might learn the will of God, and in the knowledge and fear of him more and more profit?

XXIII. Moreover the Lord in the law not only commends the public reading, but also the private, and that not only to the Persons whom they call Ecclesiastical, as the Levites and Priests, but also to the Laity themselves. For Deuteronomy ch. 17 it is nominally commanded to the king, that he should take care to have transcribed for himself a copy of the divine law, and preserve and read it all the days of his life, that he might learn to fear the Lord his God. But when the reason of this precept is not peculiar to the king, but pertains to any faithful one from the people of God, it is plain that the precept itself pertains to any other from the King. But it is separately commanded to the King, lest anyone think himself excused from the study of the divine law by the magnitude and multitude of the business by which he is detained. For if anyone could with color pretend such an excuse, certainly the King would be most able, as to whom pertains the care of the whole Republic, and to whom all business is referred.

XXIV. Add that in the sixth chapter of Deuteronomy, this command is proposed to the whole of Israel, and also vehemently urged, that namely, the words of the divine law may be engraved on their hearts, that they may tell them to their sons, that they may speak of them sitting in their house, and walking by the way, lying down and rising up, that they may have them bound as signs to their hands, that they may be always before their eyes, finally that they may inscribe them on the posts of their houses, and on their gates. But how could they have rendered the words of the divine law so familiar to themselves, unless it had been allowed to them to have the law of God with themselves, and to read in it daily? Or who will be able to dream that it ought not to have been read everywhere and by anyone, which individuals are ordered to inscribe on their gates, and on the posts of their houses, and to have bound to their hands and forehead? And that they could have had so great a knowledge of the law, and daily meditated on it with themselves, and discoursed of it among their domestics, unless the law had been handled in their hands in a known and vulgar language? But now who would believe that a lesser knowledge of the Evangelical law is required from Christians, than of old of the Mosaic law from the Jews? Especially when the Apostle writing to the Colossians wants the Word of Christ to dwell in the faithful *πλουσίως* copiously, with all wisdom, and wishes for them all the riches of the fullness of understanding in the knowledge of the mystery of God the Father and of Christ? Ch. 2 and 3.

XXV. Moreover the example is praised and proposed for imitation in the New Testament; of Lois the grandmother of Timothy, and Eunice his mother, who had instructed him from infancy in the scriptures. For the Apostle testifies 2 Tim. 3 that he had known the sacred letters from childhood in which he had not been instructed by his father, since he was a Gentile, as we learn from the sixteenth chapter of Acts, but by his mother and grandmother, whose unfeigned faith the Apostle commends in the first chapter of the same epistle. But how will faithful matrons be able, to the example of those pious women, to instruct their children in the sacred letters, if it is not allowed to them to have and read the sacred letters in a language which they understand? Or who ought to be barred from the reading of sacred scripture if it is commended in children themselves?

XXVI. Similarly the Jewish Beroeans are praised Acts ch. 17, who having heard the preaching of Paul, indeed received the Word with all readiness, but yet daily searching the scriptures ἀνακρίνοντες whether these things were so. But how could they so ἀνακρίνειν the scriptures to compare and confer among themselves, if the reading of scripture was not familiar to them, and indeed in a language which they well understood? And will the rest of the faithful people be able to imitate so laudable an example, if the reading of Sacred Scripture is not conceded to them in a known and vulgar language?

XXVII. Nor ought that to be omitted which Peter ch. 1 of the latter Epistle, addressing the faithful from the circumcision, says that they do well that they take heed to the Prophetic Word, as to a lamp shining in a dark place. For how could they take heed to the writings of the Prophets, unless they read them, and so that they understood them? Stapleton responds that it is taken heed to Sacred Scripture when it is read, but much more and safely, when it is expounded by the voice of the preaching Church. But certainly it is new and unusual to call the preaching of the Ministers of the Gospel the Prophetic Word. Nor is one ever said from the Style of scripture, or of anyone else, sanely and agreeably to the Word of God speaking, to take heed to the Prophetic Word who listens to those things which preachers say, while they expound some text of Scripture. Add that Peter in that place expressly opposes the Prophetic Word to the testimony of the Apostles, and to the living voice of those who preached the Gospel. For before he said, "For we have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eyewitnesses of his majesty." But afterward he subjoins, "We have also a more sure prophetic word, to which ye do well that ye take heed, as to a lamp shining in a dark place."

XXVIII. It is also worthy of great consideration that in ch. 1 of the book of Revelation John thus speaks of it, "Blessed is he who reads, and Blessed are those who hear the words of this Prophecy, and keep those things which are written in it." For if John could declare him Blessed who reads that book, which is doubtless the most obscure of the books of the New Testament, how much more is it allowed to declare them blessed who read the other writings of the Prophets and Apostles? But will this blessedness pertain to the learned only and the rulers of the Church, but will the Christian people be barred from it as unworthy of it? And is it not rather the duty of Pastors to call the people committed to them to the participation of

that blessedness with themselves? For who does not see that John, while he declares him blessed who reads the words of that Prophecy, invites any faithful to the reading of it with the hope of enjoying that blessedness.

XXIX. Finally what Christ says in John chapter five, addressing the crowd of the Jews, "Search the scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are they which testify of me." Stapleton responds that those words are not said to the crowds and people, but to the Pharisees and princes of the people. But in the whole chapter there is no special mention of the Pharisees, but John relates these things as simply said to the Jews, as can be seen by reading. Moreover he Responds that these words do not constitute a general and perpetual precept, but this is said to them by way of permission and indulgence, that namely, because they did not want to believe the Words of Christ, at least they should inspect the old scriptures. Therefore those words do not contain a precept, but partly a permissive indulgence, partly a tacit reprehension, that they believed the Mosaic letters more than the Words of Christ. But these Words of Christ are too clear, that they can be eluded by such Quibbles. For what need was there for Christ to grant the Jews permission to search the Scripture, when they neither sought nor expected that permission from Christ? But since Stapleton wants Christ there to address not the people, but the princes of the people, Do the rulers of the Church also need some permission and indulgence, that they may search the scriptures? And is this not rather their duty prescribed to them by God, to diligently unfold and search the scriptures?

XXX. But how can Stapleton feign that by those Words Christ tacitly reprehends the Jews, that they believed the Mosaic writings more than Christ, when in this chapter he reprehends them on this account, that they did not sufficiently believe Moses? "For if," he says, "ye believed Moses, ye would believe me also: for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?" By which words Christ acknowledges that it was just that they should believe the Mosaic letters more than then his simple testimony. And therefore he perpetually sends the Jews back to Moses and the Prophets, "They have," he says, "Moses and the Prophets, let them hear them." And he often proves and confirms his vocation by the testimony of Moses and the Prophets. Not that in reality the authority of Moses and the Prophets was greater than the authority of Christ, but because it was more known and confirmed to the Jews, at least before the Gospel was solemnly preached and confirmed. Whence it is that Peter, in the place just now cited, opposing the Prophetic Word to the preaching of the Apostles, dares to call it more sure, "We have," he says, "a more sure prophetic word."

XXXI. Therefore, the hiding places into which Stapleton tries to induce himself being omitted, it is plain that Christ both addresses the Jews, and simply exhorts them to search the scriptures. But to search the scriptures is not simply to read the scriptures, and much less to mutter in an unknown tongue, but to investigate their mysteries and hidden senses, as Chrysostom notes in his homily on this place. But how will the faithful be able to obey this command of Christ, unless they read the scripture assiduously, and have it in a language

known to them?

**Theological Theses,
On the Perspicuity of Sacred
Scripture.**

**In which the Doctrine of the Protestants is expounded and compared with the Doctrine of
the
Roman School, and confirmed by some arguments.**

Thesis One.

Most doctors of the Roman Church so dispute with the Theologians of the Protestants, as if they simply said that in the scriptures all things are so plain and perspicuous, that they can be understood by anyone without labor, nor does anything obscure occur in them which needs explication and the help of an interpreter. But this is not their opinion. For they freely admit, that what Peter says of the Epistles of Paul, is true of the rest of the parts of scripture, namely that in them are some things hard to be understood; nor do they so assert that scripture is clear and perspicuous, that it lacks all difficulty and obscurity whatsoever.

II. But that it may be understood what and what kind of perspicuity is attributed to scripture by the Protestants, it is to be noted first that they distinguish between those things which are necessary to salvation and those which are not necessary to salvation. And indeed they contend that those things which are necessary to salvation are clearly contained in the scriptures. But as for those things which are not necessary to salvation, they confess that scripture is often obscure in them and very difficult, as can be seen in many prophecies, and certain hidden mysteries.

III. Again, to remove all ambiguity here, it must be known that by those things which are necessary to salvation can be understood, either those without whose knowledge and explicit faith no one can attain to salvation. Such are the precepts of life, and the articles of faith contained in the creed. Or those which no one can reject, and teach the contrary in the Church without the loss of salvation. Which latter things are far more extensive than the former. For many things one can be ignorant of, or only know generally and confusedly, without the loss of salvation, which nevertheless no one can reject and impugn, but that he incurs the mark of heresy, and deserves to be expelled from the communion of the Church, and thus but that he sins against his own salvation. Moreover, when the Protestants assert that scripture is clear in those things which are necessary to salvation, they understand necessary not only in the first way, but also in the second way. For they do not think that heresy can otherwise be incurred, than by pertinaciously asserting and defending that, the opposite of which sacred scripture perspicuously teaches.

IV. Moreover it must be known, that when the Protestants say that all things which are necessary to salvation are clearly contained in the scriptures, they understand this of the whole body of scripture taken indefinitely and generally, but not of the individual places,

where something necessary to salvation is proposed. For it can happen that a thing necessary to salvation is obscurely proposed in some place, when yet it is clearly contained in others. Thus, for example, the incarnation of the Son of God, and his death for us is obscurely hinted at in many prophecies of the Prophets, but in the Gospel it is so clearly expounded, that the infidels themselves, namely the Mahometans and Jews acknowledge this, although they do not give faith to the Gospel.

V. Then those things which are necessary to salvation are indeed so clearly and perspicuously proposed in the scriptures, that the conscience may be satisfied, and in that a pious mind can acquiesce. But this does not hinder but that curious and itching wits perhaps may not think themselves satisfied, and may be able to raise some dust, by which they hide the truth from themselves: just as in natural and human things, many things are proved by evident reason, and so that a man of sound judgment is sufficiently convinced by it, and fully persuaded, which nevertheless some from petulance deny, and about which by stubbornness, and zeal of contending their mind is so clouded, that they do not discern nor perceive a thing however clear in itself.

VI. And that the opinion of the Protestants about this matter may be made plainer, it is to be noted that they acknowledge three degrees of things in scripture, as far as it looks to its perspicuity, or obscurity. For first in the scriptures some things are so openly and evidently put, that they are obtruded even upon the unwilling, nor is there any endued with common sense, who cannot acknowledge them. As for example, that the world was created by God, and is ruled and administered by his providence, that Jesus is the Christ and the Son of God, and other things of this kind, which are absolutely necessary to anyone for salvation.

VII. The second degree is of those things to understand which there is need of labor and exercise, frequent reading, meditation and sedulous collation of the scriptures. By which things is comprehended a more distinct and accurate knowledge of the mysteries of faith, and of those things which fight with them, or are agreeable to them. In which knowledge the faithful more or less profit, as they apply greater or less study to that thing, or are endowed with a greater, or lesser grace of God.

VIII. Finally the third degree is of those things which in scripture are so sublime or recondite, that they surpass the capacity of man, as long as he lives here on earth, at least if we regard the ordinary measure of grace: nor are they to be manifested fully unless when we shall enjoy the presence of God in heaven. For now, as the Apostle says, we see in a riddle, and as through a glass: but then we shall see face to face, 1 Cor. 13.

IX. Moreover, that God has so tempered the scriptures, that some things in them are obscurely, some things clearly put, and those very things which are clearly explained somewhere, are obscurely hinted at in other places, he has done this by his supreme wisdom. And first indeed that he might repress human pride, and that even the most Learned might be compelled to acknowledge their infancy, and ignorance in divine things, and presume nothing of themselves; but cast away all swelling of mind.

X. Then by this God wanted to excite in the faithful a desire of that happy and perfect state, which we expect in the world to come: where we shall no longer, as was said, see obscurely and in a riddle, but we shall see face to face. For just as the faithful under the law, by the great obscurity of the divine mysteries; and the veil of shadows and figures, were compelled to pant after the coming of the Messiah, who was to teach them all things, and bring much light to the divine mysteries: so also now under the New Testament, while we live on earth, what we acknowledge to be hidden from us in the mysteries of scripture, forces us to long for the second coming of Christ, and that perfect state of the Church, where we shall know all things clearly and perfectly, seeing God as he is.

XI. Moreover also God wanted to excite us to labor by those difficult places and mysteries with which he sprinkled the scriptures, and to the study of searching the scriptures, which would languish by too much facility. For plain and easy things we immediately neglect and disdain. Therefore God took care lest perpetual facility in reading the scriptures should beget disgust, and lest continual and too much difficulty should deter from the reading of them. Which wisdom of God Augustine notes and excellently describes, "Magnificently," he says, "and wholesomely the Holy Spirit has so modified the holy scriptures, that in the more open places he might meet with hunger, but in the more obscure he might wipe away disgusts. For scarcely anything is dug out of those obscurities, which is not found said most plainly elsewhere." Book 2, de Doctr. Christ. ch. 6.

XII. It is also to be carefully observed that the Protestants do not teach that scripture is so clear and perspicuous in all things which are of any moment to faith and salvation, that to attain its scope, and dig out sacred doctrine from it, there is no need of labor, study and diligence, but that any faithful person, immediately and without any help, can sufficiently understand it. For the sense of those places of scripture which can be called perspicuous is indeed sometimes so ready at hand, that it does not need proof, and forces itself even upon the unwilling, which can be seen in those things which are simply and absolutely necessary for anyone to know for salvation. Yet sometimes also, that the sense of scripture may be dug out, and shine forth, the words must be diligently weighed, the things preceding and following must be accurately considered, parallel places must be compared, and the sentence must be not drowsily examined to the analogy of faith, prejudices being set aside, and the affections of the mind being calmed.

XIII. In which thing there is need, that Pastors go before the people committed to their care, as much by private discourses, as by public sermons, and also, when the thing requires, by commentaries published on sacred scripture. For to this, among other things, God gave Pastors and Doctors to the Church, that they might expound the word of God contained in scripture, open the sense of scripture, and as it were lead the faithful people by the hand into the understanding of it.

XIV. Which sense of scripture however shown by their Pastors the faithful people do not embrace by a certain blind obedience, and on account of their authority alone; but it is led to it by the light of truth itself, when it has once been indicated and shown to them. Just as

novices who give their work to the more humane letters, cannot by themselves understand the classic authors, as Tacitus, Suetonius, Persius, Horace, and in many things penetrate their sense, unless a skilled Master indicates and expounds it. But led by the hand and taught by such a Master, they see by themselves that this is the true sense of the author, and remain persuaded by the evidence of the thing itself, not simply on account of the authority of their Master.

XV. For it is more difficult to find and detect the sense of some place, than to acknowledge and discern by the evidence of truth alone what has been detected by another and demonstrated. To the former, when it is a question of the scriptures, that the faithful might be invited, Christ gave Pastors and Doctors to the Church. To the latter, in necessary and momentous things, besides the internal illumination of the Holy Spirit, without which no one can be faithful, nothing further seems to be required.

XVI. For it is still to be observed that the Protestants do not teach, that the true sense of scripture once proposed to anyone, so proves itself by its own light and evidence, that it can be perceived, understood and discerned by anyone, without the help of the divine spirit. For the mind of men, whom the Spirit of God has not yet breathed upon, is from birth so blinded by prejudices, and depraved affections by which they are variously carried away cast such great darkness upon it, that there is plainly need of divine grace, and the internal operation of the Holy Spirit, to this, that we may be able to acknowledge scripture itself for divine, as it is in reality, and perceive and discern the true and salutary sense of it in many things.

XVII. In the scriptures indeed many things are so clearly put, that a man endued with common sense, without any supernatural light, can perceive how and acknowledge that scripture teaches this and that, although he does not adhibit to it the faith which is fitting. But no one can understand scripture to salvation, and in all things which look to salvation, discern its true sense from the false, without the light of the Holy Spirit, and the special help of God.

XVIII. Nor also do the Protestants attribute that perspicuity to scripture, that any faithful person, who is imbued with some light of the Holy Spirit, understands plainly all things in it, nor finds anything difficult in it, even about those things which look to the precepts of life, and the articles of faith, in respect of which there are given many and various degrees of knowledge. And the very mysteries of our Redemption, the knowledge and faith of which is required from all, have certain sublimities and profundities, which surpass the capacity even of those who are most illuminated, and most versed in sacred doctrine. Therefore there is always given place here for progress, and fuller knowledge, even in those who are most perfect among the faithful. Whence it is that the Prophets themselves, and holy men through whom scripture was delivered, frequently implore divine grace, and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, that they may be able to rightly perceive and understand the law of God, and penetrate its wonders and profundities. As especially can be seen in Psalm 119, as when David says, "Give me understanding, and I shall keep thy law." Also, "Open thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law."

XIX. In sum therefore the Protestants do not teach that scripture is everywhere and always clear and perspicuous, but they confess that in it many difficult and obscure places are found, and also some mysteries and prophecies into which we scarcely penetrate, or are able to attain anything. They only want this that those things which are necessary to faith and salvation, in the way which was explained above, are clearly contained in scripture, or can be evidently drawn out from it.

XX. And yet not in respect of all things which pertain to faith and religion do they attribute that evidence to scripture, which excludes either the work of Pastors teaching, and explaining the scriptures, either by living voice, or by writings and published commentaries: or the care and attention of the faithful learning and reading the scriptures, as the adversaries commonly impute to them. As if, namely, they simply wanted the scriptures to be so open and obvious to each one, that even the common people and most unlearned anyone should not have need of one teaching and going before in understanding the sacred letters, but by themselves and without labor they could follow and perceive the sense of them everywhere.

XXI. For on the contrary they teach and inculcate that to perceive the true sense of scripture, and to attain the understanding of it, there is altogether required the sedulous study of those reading, and serious attention, and the imploration of divine help, without which we can profit not even a little in the true and salutary understanding of scripture: and moreover the hearing of the living voice of Pastors, which is never to be neglected by the faithful, as which is a means instituted by God, by which he ordinarily calls us to faith, and once called confirms us in the faith, and daily more and more instructs and teaches us about those things which pertain to faith and salvation.

XXII. As for the Doctors of the Roman Church, they do not deny, nor can they deny, that many things in scripture are perspicuous. Nor also do they much labor, whether those things which are necessary to be known for salvation to all and each one, and which no one can be ignorant of without the danger of salvation, are openly put in scripture: and many of them not unwillingly concede that. Bellarmine especially who responding to that of Augustine, which is often wont to be cited by the Protestants, "In those things which are openly put in scripture are found all those things which contain faith and the manners of living:" says that Augustine speaks of those dogmas which are necessary to all simply, such as are contained in the Apostolic creed and in the Decalogue. And afterwards he proves that of the same Augustine, "I believe that even hence would be the most clear authority of the divine eloquences, if a man could not be ignorant of it without the loss of promised salvation." Of the word of God, book 4, ch. 11, paragr. "Lastly they bring forth." Nor is the mind of Coster the Jesuit other. "We do not deny," he says, "that those principal heads of faith, which are necessary to be known by all Christians for salvation, are perspicuously enough comprehended in the Apostolic writings." In Enchiridio, ch. 1.

XXIII. Therefore the whole dispute which intervenes between the Roman School and the Protestants about the perspicuity of scripture, can be reduced to this, whether all

controversies of faith and Religion, which are of any moment to salvation, and about which it is not lawful to opine thus or otherwise, without heresy, can be clearly and openly decided from scripture? which the Protestants affirm, but the Doctors of the Roman Church deny.

XXIV. But that it may more clearly appear how far and to what extent the Theologians of the Roman School want sacred scripture to be obscure, attention must be paid to the occasion of this controversy. For from that it was born, that when the Protestants brought forth various testimonies of scripture, by which they argued many things in the worship and Doctrine of the Roman Church; and very many of the Christian people moved by them seceded from the Roman Church, and adjoined themselves to the communion of the Protestants; the Doctors of the Roman Church obtended that scripture was ambiguous, perplexed, and obscure, and could be drawn into various senses, and admit diverse and opposite interpretations: and therefore they compared it to a two-edged sword, a waxen nose, and a leaden rule, which can be variously twisted and bent to the will of anyone. Whence they concluded that the disputes which arise in the Church about matters of faith, cannot be safely and certainly decided from it. Indeed such great darkneses are cast upon scripture, that what is its opinion about the controverted heads of the Christian Religion, cannot be clear to the faithful without the authority of unwritten tradition. Therefore the Christian common people should not be struck by the places of scripture by which the Protestants impugned the doctrine and practice of the Roman Church: Nor should the faithful stand by their own judgment in this matter, but by the interpretation of the Church, that is, of the prelates of today, they should acquiesce with the greatest lowliness of mind. For nothing is more prone, than that those who want to use their own light and judgment in choosing and discerning the true sense of scripture, should fall into heresies, on account of the obscurity and ambiguity of Sacred Scripture, which ought to be taken away and removed by the determination and authority of the Church, that we may establish something certain about the sense of Scripture.

XXV. Wherefore between the Protestants and the Doctors of the Roman Church it is not asked, Whether Sacred Scripture is in some way perspicuous or obscure. For the Protestants freely confess that in the sacred letters there are certain obscure places: nor do the Doctors of the Roman School deny that there are some perspicuous ones, as was shown before. But the whole contention is about the degree or magnitude of the obscurity and perspicuity. Whether, namely, sacred scripture is to that degree obscure, that what is its opinion about the controversies of faith and Religion, which are of any moment to salvation, cannot ordinarily be certainly clear to the faithful, except from unwritten tradition, and the judgment and testimony of the Church of the present age; however much sedulous and diligence they apply, as much in imploring divine help, as in weighing and comparing among themselves the places of scripture, as in hearing and consulting the expositions of pious doctors? The Protestants deny that there is so great obscurity in scripture, that to perceive and discern its true sense it is necessary to flee to unwritten tradition, and the judgment of the present Church as of a certain infallible interpreter, without whose authority and determination, the true interpretation of scripture, and the true opinion about matters of faith,

cannot prove and persuade itself to the faithful by its own light, and to those to whom the Holy Spirit has been granted according to the ordinary measure of grace, and has opened the eyes of the mind. But the Theologians of the Roman School affirm that: who not only require the skill of the Doctors and Pastors of the Church, to open and show the true sense of scripture, about controverted dogmas, but moreover their authority to determine it, without which it would remain ambiguous and uncertain.

XXVI. And that I may more briefly conceive the state of this question, here it is chiefly and properly asked, Whether the style and manner of treating of scripture is to that degree perplexed and obscure, that in things which look to faith, the salutary sense cannot ordinarily be discerned from the pernicious, without the authority of unwritten tradition, and the judgment of the present Church, as of a certain infallible interpreter. Which the Protestants deny, but the School of the Roman Church affirms.

XXVII. But it can easily be shown that that obscurity which the Doctors of the Roman School attribute to Sacred Scripture, openly fights with the counsel of God in procuring scripture. For first it cannot be denied but that it was the counsel of God, when he wanted sacred doctrine to be consigned to writing, that by that reason it might be able to be more easily conserved and propagated, and vindicated from the corruptions and oblivion of men. For such is the perversity, carelessness, and negligence of men, that those things which are simply committed to their care and memory are easily given over to oblivion, or at least are corrupted and adulterated in various ways, and are obnoxious to many and great changes. And therefore God that he might take care for the heavenly Doctrine once delivered to men, and perpetually conserve it among men, judged it to be of the thing to consign it to authentic tables, and to deliver it to sacred books as to faithful custodians to be preserved, that from it it might always be able to be drawn pure. But in vain did God intend that end and enter upon this reason of conserving the heavenly Doctrine, if Sacred Scripture is so obscure, that without the help of unwritten tradition the faithful cannot be clear about its sense. For if the thing so has itself, since sacred Doctrine is not so much to be sought in the letter of scripture, as in the sense, certainly it ought not to be thought committed so much to scripture, as left to the care and memory of men; nor will it be less obnoxious to the frauds and oblivion of men, than if it were not written. Indeed men will be able to pervert the doctrine of faith at will, and change the sense of scripture, nor yet will they be able to be argued from scripture, if scripture is to that degree perplexed and ambiguous, that in those things which pertain to faith and the manners of living, it admits opposite and contrary senses.

XXVIII. Then to this end God delivered scripture to men, that from the reading of it all might be able to learn the will of God, and be instructed in heavenly doctrine. For, as Paul says, "Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning, that we through patience and comfort of the scriptures might have hope," Rom. 15. And Deuteronomy chapter 31 God orders that the book of the law should be read before the whole people, the women also, little ones, and strangers standing by; and that to this end, that all may hear

and learn to fear the Lord their God. And of the same book chapter seventeen it is separately commanded to the King, that he should have the volume of the law with him, and read it all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, and to keep the words and ceremonies of it which are commanded in the law. Similarly the Apostle commands his epistles to be read with adjuration to all the faithful, 1 Thess. 5 as also he professes to write not only to the rulers and Pastors of the Church, but to all the faithful: as can be seen in the beginnings of most of his epistles. But now if God wanted his word to be committed to writings to this end, that from the reading of it all the faithful promiscuously might be able to be instructed in the doctrine of salvation, without doubt he took care that it should be so perspicuously written, that all also by reading it, or hearing, might be able to learn and draw from it those things which pertain to salvation and faith. But they would not be able if scripture were so obscure and ambiguous, that those who read and hear it were unable to discern the salutary sense from the pernicious, but as a waxen nose it could be turned, bent, and twisted to whatever part. For what else can such a writing do, than leave its reader, or hearer perplexed and uncertain about what is to be believed and done by him? Nor is it of a wise man to propose for reading what cannot be understood, and from which no, or little fruit can redound to the reader.

XXIX. Moreover the Doctors of the Roman Church do not deny, nor can they deny, that scripture is the rule of faith, at least, as they want, partial, and to this end was given by God. To which makes the very title of Canonical, which Christians by common consent attribute to scripture. But if the sense of scripture is of itself obscure, vague, and uncertain, and there is need of the determination and authority of the Church, that anyone can be certain of it, certainly scripture in no way deserves the name of rule, since a rule ought to be something certain and determinate, and per se known in its kind. Indeed the living voice of Pastors will be the rule of scripture, if the words of scripture do not determine it, but it is to be defined and determined from the voice and testimony of Pastors; since scripture is not to be esteemed from the letter, but from the sense. But the words of scripture, and their coherence, do not determine its sense, if they leave the reader ambiguous and suspended, until the authority of the Pastors of the Church accedes. And yet the Doctrine of the Pastors of the Church, ought to be proved from scripture, and so to speak, measured: as can be taught by the example of the Bereans, who having heard the preaching of Paul, consulted the scriptures whether the thing was so, as Paul had said, Acts 17.

XXX. And certainly the Theologians of the Roman School openly contradict themselves, while on one hand they admit that scripture is the rule of faith, or makes part of that rule; and on the other however, when it is a question of the perspicuity or obscurity of Sacred Scripture, in those things which pertain to faith, they cry out that it is like a waxen nose, and they call it a Lesbian, or leaden rule. For a leaden rule, which is bent to the will of the user, is in no way a rule, nor worthy of that name. And whoever calls something a leaden rule, denies that about which it is a question to be a rule.

XXXI. Moreover it is the perpetual use of the Church, and was from the beginning, to argue and convict heretics and heterodox openly despising the authority of the Orthodox Church, from Sacred Scripture itself, by bringing forth testimonies, by which their errors are damned and rejected, or the contrary truth is asserted, either expressly, or by a good and valid consequence. Thus in the beginning of the nascent Christian Church, Apollos mightily convinced the Jews publicly, showing by the scriptures that Jesus was Christ, Acts 18. And Paul similarly by the scriptures convinces in his Epistles to the Romans and Galatians the errors of the Jews or Judaizers, about the justification of man, and the use and necessity of the Legal Ceremonies. And the ancient Doctors of the Church also, as Augustine, and Athanasius, thought that the errors of the Arians and Pelagians, even putting aside the authority of the Catholic Church and its Councils, could be strongly and evidently impugned and overturned by very many testimonies of Sacred Scripture. Indeed the Doctors of the Roman Church themselves, when they dispute against those who have seceded from the Roman Church, urge various places of scripture against them, and glory that they can be evidently convinced from them. But if scripture is so perplexed and ambiguous, about the dogmas of faith, that it admits opposite senses, and for that reason deserves to be compared to a two-edged sword, and a waxen nose, the errors of the heterodox cannot be convicted from it, and putting aside the authority of the Church, to dispute from it against heretics, is to mock, and lose work. For how can you ever convince an adversary from places which can admit as much his, as your sense?

XXXII. But Sacred Scripture itself openly enough removes from itself such obscurity and ambiguity. For thus Moses speaks of the law which he delivered in writing to the Israelitish people, "This commandment which I command thee, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far off. It is not in heaven, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go up for us to heaven, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? Neither is it beyond the sea, that thou shouldest say, Who shall go over the sea for us, and bring it unto us, that we may hear it, and do it? But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart, that thou mayest do it," Deut. 30. For who does not acknowledge that by so many accumulated words it is signified, that Moses had clearly proposed to the Israelites what was the will of God, and what God ordered to be done and believed by them, that they might avoid death, and obtain life? That henceforth they could pretend no ignorance, if they did not perform their duty towards God. For to what else do those things look which Moses exaggerates that that word is not above them nor far put, but is very near in their mouth, and in their heart, nor is there need of one who should bring it to them that they may hear it? And how could he truly and with reason thus speak of Doctrine proposed in words so ambiguous and obscure, that its sense should remain ambiguous and uncertain, until an interpreter should accede who by his authority should determine it, and not only by some skill of his own should perish it?

XXXIII. To this with other Doctors of the Roman School Bellarmine responds two things. One is that the place is to be understood of the facility of fulfilling the law, but not of the

facility of knowing the law. But elsewhere Bellarmine himself says, that the exposition is most literal and proper, if the place is so accepted, not of the facility of the law to be fulfilled, but to be known. "For since," he says, "before the giving of the law the Jews could have pretended ignorance, if they had not done, what God wanted to be done by them: therefore Moses, after he expounded the whole law to them, admonishes them to fulfill the law, and in no way to obtend ignorance: therefore he says, This commandment is not above thee, nor far put, that is, not in a high place, or distant, that thou canst not know it." Book 5, de grat. & lib. Arbitr. ch. 6. Then those words, "that we may hear it," make manifest that there it is a question of knowledge. To omit that the law cannot be fulfilled unless it is understood, and it is much easier to understand the law, than to fulfill it.

XXXIV. The other which the Theologians of the Roman School respond, is that there it is not a question of the whole scripture, but of the precepts of the decalogue, which they concede to be easy to know. But first the series of the place openly makes, that Moses by the Word and Commandment of God designates all the precepts and documents, which God had delivered to the Israelitish people, and commanded to be written by Moses. For in the verse next preceding he exhorted the Israelites to the keeping of the precepts of God and ceremonies, as the vulgar interpreter has it, which, he says, "are written in this law." And afterwards he subjoins the words above alleged, as the reason of his saying, "The commandment which I command thee," &c. Then we take, what the Doctors of the Roman Church here freely concede, that the Decalogue at least is clear and perspicuous, and can be easily understood. Although its precepts are wont to be expounded in so many sermons, and have been illustrated by so many and so great commentaries; indeed so grave controversies exist among Christians, now for many ages about the sense of those Words, by which in the Decalogue the worship of images is prohibited. Whence it is apparent that from the controversies which are among men of the Christian name about the sense of scripture, and the commentaries and sermons by which it is the custom to expound it, it cannot be collected that it is in itself obscure and ambiguous, nor to a sound mind, and rightly disposed, clear and perspicuous in those things which pertain to faith.

XXXV. Finally, if there is any difficulty and obscurity in sacred scripture, it especially occurs in the prophetic books. And yet Peter does not fear to compare the prophecy of scripture to a lamp shining in a dark place: and that in respect of those among whom the authority of the Apostles was not yet firm and ascertained, but who had a more firm prophetic word, and to whom the day of the Gospel illustrating the prophecies of the prophets had not yet shone. For after he brought forth his own testimony concerning Christ, he adds, "We have also a more sure word of prophecy; whereunto ye do well that ye take heed, as unto a light that shineth in a dark place, until the day dawn, and the day star arise in your hearts," 2 Pet. ch. 1. But how can a writing be compared to a lamp so obscure and doubtful, that its sense about matters of faith, remains ambiguous and suspended, until it is determined by another's authority. For such a writing has no light in itself, or can of itself bring it to the mind, but what it has of light it borrows from elsewhere. Therefore that prophetic scripture can with reason

be called light, and compared with a lamp shining in a dark place; it is necessary that it should pour forth some light from itself, and its true sense should prove itself to the mind rightly affected by certain proper rays, and convince it. But if prophetic scripture affects the mind in that way, and illuminates it in the knowledge of heavenly and salutary truth, how much more does this belong to the scripture of the New Testament? which shines round about with far greater light, and by the judgment of the Apostle Peter, so much surpasses the prophetic word in this part, as the morning star surpasses a lamp in splendor, or even the day itself.

**Theological Theses,
On The Plentitude And
Sufficiency of Scripture Against the Necessity of
Some Unwritten Word: Part Two.**

In which the opinion of the Pontificians is expounded, and the state of the controversy is indicated, and the true opinion is confirmed by arguments.

Thesis One.

In the preceding theses the opinion of our Churches concerning the plenitude and sufficiency of Scripture was expounded as distinctly and clearly as could be by us. But that we may contract the whole matter into a few things, it seems to come to this, namely, that from the time God wanted his word to be consigned to writings, the Church had in the sacred books all things which for the individual ages, and the varied dispensation of God were so necessary to salvation, that no one could teach, defend and hold the contrary without the loss of salvation: or what comes to the same thing, that sacred Scripture always contained all things, which pertained to the body and substance of religion, and from the institution of God were necessary, although the determination of many circumstances which pertain to the exercise of divine worship, and Ecclesiastical discipline, was permitted to the power of the Church, but was not prescribed one by one in Scripture.

II. However, we do not affirm that all those things which we say are necessary are found in Scripture word for word, but, either in equivalent words, or at least so that the individual things can be deduced from Scripture by a necessary and evident consequence, without the help of another principle of faith, to which Scripture remits us, that from it we may draw a fuller knowledge.

III. And moreover that the principles of faith are indeed contained in Scripture, since they are Scripture itself, not something outside of Scripture; not that sacred Scripture ought to or can be proved. But all other things which pertain to religion and sacred doctrine, are either proved by express texts, or deduced from the Scriptures by open and proximate consequences, such are those things which properly ought to be called dogmas of faith: or are only as it were drawn out by more remote and less evident consequences from the more

recondite store of Scripture, of which kind are many Theological truths wont to be proposed and taught in the Orthodox Schools.

IV. To which it must be added that our Churches strictly hold this, that the things which are necessary to salvation, cannot be sought certainly and infallibly from elsewhere, than from Scripture, nor is there any word of God besides Scripture, by which those things which are of faith can be confirmed, and therefore that sacred Scripture is the only rule of faith, to which another which is of equal authority cannot be adjoined.

V. It now follows that we should inquire what is the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church about this question, Therefore first they teach, that Scripture was not given to the Church to this end, that it should be the only rule of faith, and that from it alone the institutions of religion and dogmas of faith ought to be sought and drawn out. Therefore that it is not necessary, that all things which pertain to faith and morals, should be proved from sacred Scripture. However they do not deny that those things, which are simply necessary to all for salvation, are found in sacred Scripture, as can be seen in Bellarmine, *De verbo Dei* book 4, ch. 11, par. ultimò proferunt. Where responding to that of Augustine which is wont to be brought forth by our side for their opinion, "In those things which are openly put in Scripture are found all those things which contain faith and the manners of living." "He speaks," he says, "of those dogmas which are necessary to all simply, such as are contained in the Apostolic Creed and in the Decalogue." And in the following he proves that of the same Augustine, "I believe that even hence would be the most clear authority of the divine eloquences, if a man could not be ignorant of it without the loss of promised salvation."

VI. Indeed also the Doctors of the Roman Church do not deny that the whole doctrine, whether of faith, or of morals, necessary, not indeed simply to individuals, but to the whole Church in some way is contained in Scripture: but they only assert that it is not expressly contained, as can be seen in Bellarmine book 4, *de verbo Dei* ch. 3, par. 2. And similarly Stapleton treating of the doctrinal principles of faith, *Controv. 5. quæst. 5. art. 1.* while he explains this question; He proposes various ways in which the whole doctrine of salvation is contained in the Scriptures. And first indeed this that sacred Scripture indicating the true Church, and sending us to it, through it teaches us all necessary things. Then also this, that from those many dogmas which are openly put in the Scriptures: the rest can be firmly deduced, as the dogma of the two natures in Jesus Christ from the incarnation of the Son of God. "For," he says, "it is also true in this sense that all things necessary to faith are comprehended in the Scriptures and the Fathers teach."

VII. And although in this question all the Doctors of the Roman Church do not speak in the same way, but some seem to attribute more, and some less to Scripture in this matter; yet in this they all agree, that all things which are the necessary requisites to eternal salvation, are contained in sacred Scripture explicitly, or implicitly, expressly or virtually, and as it were in seed, if the Scriptures are understood to that sense which the Holy Spirit intends.

VIII. But they all deny that those things which are necessary to the doctrine of faith and morals in the Church are so contained all in the Scriptures, that they can be sufficiently

sought and drawn from there, without the help of tradition, and of some unwritten word, which is deposited in the heart of the Church.

IX. For the Doctors of the Roman Church by common consent teach, that Christ our Lord, and his Apostles, taught and instituted many things pertaining to faith and divine worship, which are not found expressed in the sacred letters, nor can be sufficiently drawn out from them and therefore that Christian and Apostolic doctrine is contained partly in Scripture, and partly in some unwritten word, and handed down orally.

X. But they want that unwritten word commended to the rectors and rulers of the Churches, and committed to their faith, to have been afterwards handed down from hand to hand, and to have come down to us sincere and uncorrupted by the perpetual succession of Bishops and Pastors.

XI. And these are what they call unwritten traditions, by which name they understand dogmas and institutions pertaining to faith and religion, which were not consigned to the canonical Scriptures. About which, that, what is their opinion, may be more distinctly understood, it must be known, the Pontificians themselves confessing, that the name of tradition is of itself general, and signifies all doctrine which is handed down and communicated by one to another, whether through writing, or outside of Scripture. And so to hand down is the same as to teach, and tradition the same as a document. But yet the use of Ecclesiastical Writers for the most part restricts the word tradition to doctrine not written, but handed down by voice: and so the Pontifician Schools take this word. Nor yet by doctrine not written, do they understand that which is written nowhere, but, which is not written by the first author, or rather, as some of them more accurately say, which is not found written in the Canonical books of the Prophets and Apostles.

XII. Moreover they variously divide traditions. But the partition which is here most to be considered, is that which is taken from the authors to whom they are to be referred. For they say that traditions, "are some Divine, others Apostolic, and others Ecclesiastical." They call Divine traditions those things, which, as they think, Christ himself immediately taught and instituted: and yet are not found anywhere in the sacred letters. Of this kind of tradition to them is that anointing from oil and balm which is done in confirmation, which they number among the Sacraments of the new law. For they acknowledge that all the Sacraments of the new law had to be immediately instituted by Christ.

XIII. But those things are properly called Apostolic traditions by them, which they think were commanded and instituted by the Apostles, although no mention is made of them in the Apostolic writings. To which traditions they refer the fast which they call of Lent, which they reckon to have been instituted by the Apostles. And yet they often confound these words, calling those things Divine traditions, which not Christ himself, but only the Apostles are thought to have instituted: since what things were instituted by them they did not institute without the afflatus of the divine Spirit. And again what things they refer to Christ, they also call Apostolic traditions, since nothing of those things which Christ taught has come down to us, except through the writings and preaching of the Apostles. But those things are called by

them Ecclesiastical traditions which are certain ancient customs, either begun by the Prelates, or by the peoples, which gradually by the tacit consent of the peoples obtained the force of law.

XIV. But they do not attribute altogether the same authority to all those traditions. And indeed they want those traditions which they call divine, to have the same force, as the divine precepts and dogmas which are written in the Gospels. And similarly they decide that the same authority is to be attributed to the traditions, which they call Apostolic, as to the Apostolic writings. But to the Ecclesiastical traditions they defer a somewhat lesser authority, namely that, which the written Canons and Laws of the Church have.

XV. Therefore they restrict to only the first two kinds of traditions the Decree of the Council of Trent, which is contained in Session four: where it is commanded that the unwritten traditions should be received with equal piety of affection as the books themselves of Canonical Scripture. The words of the Council are, "The Synod perceiving the truth of the Gospel and discipline to be contained in the written books, and the unwritten traditions, which having been received by the Apostles from the mouth of Christ himself, or from the Apostles themselves the Holy Spirit dictating, have come down even to us, as it were handed down by hands, following the examples of the Orthodox Fathers, receives and venerates with equal piety of affection and reverence all the books both of the Old and of the New Testament, since one God is the author of both, and also the traditions themselves pertaining both to faith and to morals, as having been dictated either orally by Christ, or by the Holy Spirit, and preserved in the Catholic Church by continuous succession."

XVI. Moreover the Doctors of the Roman Church hand down many rules, by which the traditions truly divine and Apostolic can be discerned from others, which could be falsely obtruded for such. Which however can all be reduced to three. The first is that whatever the Roman Church believes as of faith, and yet is not found clearly handed down in Scripture, by this very thing is to be considered to be a divine, or Apostolic tradition. And that rests on two foundations which they suppose. One is that the Roman Church cannot err: The other that yet that Church today is not ruled by new revelations: but whatever it knows in matters of faith it learned the whole of that from the Apostles and Prophets.

XVII. The second rule resting on the same foundations is this, That those things which the Roman Church observes which are of such a kind, that no one except God could legitimately institute them, and yet are not found instituted by God in the Scriptures, must have been handed down by the Apostles.

XVIII. Finally the third rule of them is, That that, which the Doctors of the Roman Church teach by common consent, truly ought to be held for an Apostolic tradition to descend from Apostolic tradition although it be such that it could have been instituted by the Church. Of which kind they want that fast to be which they call Quadragesimal.

XIX. But again these three rules can be contracted into one, this namely, That whatever the Roman Church proposes as a divine or Apostolic tradition; is undoubtedly to be held for such a tradition. For as the Doctors of the Roman Church suspend the authority of books long

known as to us from the testimony of the present Church, so also they want the true traditions to be certainly and infallibly discerned and distinguished from the false by none except its judgment.

XX. Moreover from those things which have been said, it can easily be collected how far our Churches agree with the Roman Church in this question, and how far they dissent from it: and therefore what is the state of this controversy. And first indeed we concede to the Roman Church that the individual things which pertain to the polity of the Church, and the ceremonies of public and external worship, cannot be sought from Scripture; but are permitted to the power of the Church, and left to the prudence of the rulers of the Church.

XXI. We also freely confess that those very things which pertain to the substance and body of faith and religion are not contained verbatim and expressly in Scripture, or immediately, but many dogmas of faith are only deduced from Scripture by a good and legitimate consequence.

XXII. But the Doctors of the Roman Church in turn concede to us, that all things which are simply necessary to all for salvation; and the explicit faith of which is required from the individual faithful, are clearly and openly contained in Scripture. And moreover they grant us that all things which are necessary to the doctrine of faith and morals are contained at least virtually and implicitly in Scripture, and can be deduced from it by a good consequence.

XXIII. But the difference is in this, that we contend that all things which are necessary to faith and religion, can be so sought and proved from Scripture, that there is no need of another principle of faith, to which Scripture remits us to be more fully instructed. Nor also do we acknowledge any principle and rule of faith outside of Scripture. But the Doctors of the Roman Church contend that all the dogmas of faith, and institutions of religion cannot be sufficiently proved from Scripture, unless by the intervention of the doctrine and tradition of the Church, which they teach is to be received as another part of the divine word of equal authority with sacred Scripture.

XXIV. And therefore this whole question turns on two things. One is, whether the Apostles taught or instituted certain necessary things, which are not sufficiently contained in the sacred letters. The other, whether the documents and institutions of the Apostles can be certainly and infallibly sought and had from elsewhere, than from sacred Scripture, namely from the tradition of the Doctors of the Church who followed the Apostles, to which an equal obedience of faith ought to be given as to sacred Scripture itself. The Doctors of the Roman Church affirm both; but all Orthodox Theologians deny both.

XXV. Therefore we affirm two things. And first indeed that all things which pertain to the substance of faith and religion are fully and sufficiently contained in sacred Scripture. Then that besides Scripture there does not exist any word of God which is the principle and rule of our faith, and therefore that no unwritten traditions are of equal authority with sacred Scripture. But that honor is to be attributed least of all to those traditions which the Roman Church commends as Apostolic and divine. But the former of these follows from the latter. For if there is no word of God besides Scripture, it is necessary that it contain all things

necessary to faith and salvation, or that we now lack some necessary things. And what follows from that, that no certain way to salvation remains to us. Therefore omitting those testimonies by which Scripture commends its own plenitude and perfection, we will chiefly contend to prove this that there is no word of God handed down only by living voice which with sacred Scripture is a certain rule of faith.

XXVI. Therefore first we argue thus. In the Jewish Church, when sacred Scripture consisted of the books of the Old Testament alone, the whole doctrine of salvation was contained in Scripture, nor were there any unwritten traditions of equal authority with sacred Scripture. Therefore much more is it to be believed that the whole doctrine of salvation is contained today in sacred Scripture, when Scripture has now been increased by the books of the New Testament, in which is expounded the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles. But that in the Jewish Church there did not exist any unwritten traditions, of the same authority with sacred Scripture, is collected from this, that, if any such were to be held, they would doubtless be those which the masters of the Jews commended and the observance of which they urged upon the people. But that those were vain and the fictions of men Christ teaches in Matthew ch. 15 and in Mark ch. 7. For when the Scribes and Pharisees, who then were the Doctors of the Jewish Church, accused the disciples of Christ, saying, "Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition of the elders? For they wash not their hands when they eat bread." Christ in turn rebukes them, saying, "Why do ye also transgress the commandment of God by your tradition?" Also "Ye have made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition." Nor does he only argue their hypocrisy, that they urged the observance of human commands, while they themselves neglected the commands of God, and corrupted them by depraved dogmas: but in general he declares that their traditions as vain are to be rejected, nor does he distinguish any traditions as true and legitimate from the false and spurious. "Well," he says, "did Esaias prophesy of you, as it is written, This people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me. Howbeit in vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men. For laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men, as the washing of pots and cups: and many other such like things ye do." And therefore Paul Col. 2 admonishes the faithful that they should beware of the traditions of men. "Beware," he says, "lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men." And Gal. 4 he imputes it to himself as a fault that before his conversion to Christ, "he was beyond measure zealous of the traditions of his fathers." When therefore Christ and the Apostles condemn, and hold for doctrines of men the traditions of the Jews outside of sacred Scripture, by equal reason it follows that the traditions of the Pontificians are to be rejected and condemned, since those are not commended to us with greater authority than of old the traditions of the Jews.

XXVII. The adversaries respond, that Christ and the Apostles do not reprehend the traditions, which the Jews had received from Moses and the Prophets, but traditions received from some more recent ones, which traditions indeed were partly vain, partly repugnant with the Scriptures: But that the reason of the traditions of the Roman Church is

other, which they namely received from Christ and the Apostles. But on the contrary it must be known, that those traditions, which Christ exagitates as doctrines of men, were sold as traditions of Moses and the Prophets. For the Rabbis of the Jews, following in this the footsteps of their elders, call their traditions "therahfcebbaheh," as if you should say, the oral law, namely because they want those to have been received orally by Moses, who had them on mount Sinai from God himself, no less than the written law, to which therefore they want those to be equal in authority. But now in the time of Christ the Doctors of the Jews were the Doctors and Masters of the Church; since then there was no true Church of God except among the Jews. When therefore nevertheless Christ openly rejects, and holds for doctrines of men the traditions which they brought forth outside of Scripture; although they had received them from the ancients, and therefore boasted that they were handed down by Moses himself, what faith will the Doctors of the Pontificians of today make that those traditions, which they boast to have received from Christ himself and his Apostles through the hands of their fathers, are truly the institutions of Christ and the Apostles, but not human inventions? And certainly when thence it is apparent that the masters of the Church can be deceived in that, and obtrude for divine dogmas and precepts which are merely human, Thence also it follows that no certain word of God is found outside of sacred Scripture. For, if any such word of God existed, it would have to be received from the rulers of the Church; nor would it be commended to us with greater authority.

XXVIII. Finally what the Doctors of the Church hand down and teach cannot be rejected as human tradition, except because it is outside of Scripture. For, if the word of God were not determined by sacred Scripture, but besides there existed an unwritten word of God, the Doctors of the Church could justly obtend that their documents are that very word of God. And really, if recourse had to be had by us to some unwritten word of God, whence should it rather be received than from them themselves? When therefore nevertheless it happens, Christ being witness, that the Doctors of the Church propose for the word of God what is nothing other than a human fiction; thence it is manifest that whatever can be proposed outside of the substance of Scripture is to be held for the doctrine of men, and that Scripture is the rule to which all things are to be examined: otherwise, as we have said, the precepts and documents of the Masters of the Church, could not be rejected as human traditions.

XXIX. Moreover it is very much to be noted what the adversaries concede in their response, namely that Christ there reprehends certain traditions accepted by some more recent than Moses and the Prophets. For thence it follows that by at least equal right are to be condemned, and rejected those traditions which the Pontificians call Ecclesiastical, that is, many things by which God is thought to be worshipped, and which yet neither Christ, nor his Apostles instituted, but the Pastors and Doctors of later ages: which traditions certainly constitute a great part of the institutions of the Roman Church. For those traditions are no less the commands and precepts of men than what were formerly instituted by the elders of the Jews. And therefore no less do the words of Isaiah brought forth by Christ, and confirmed, agree with them, "In vain they do worship me, teaching for doctrines the

commandments of men."

XXX. But to that which the adversaries say that the traditions of the Jews were contrary to sacred Scripture, but theirs not so: it is to be observed that many traditions of the Jews were not directly, and by their nature contrary to the divine law, but only insofar as they were additions to the law, since the divine law prohibits anything to be added to it. Thus that custom of washing hands with a certain religion before taking food seems of itself to have nothing evil, and which is directly contrary to Scripture. And yet this is that very tradition which Christ carps at specially. But if the Pontificians say at least that it is vain, they will indeed say truly. But it squares no less with their traditions, For they are no less vain and empty. But if the thing is estimated from the judgment of human reason, that custom of the Jews will be found to have no less an appearance of wisdom, than most of the institutions of the Pontificians. But Christ does not simply condemn the traditions of the Jews, either because they were vain, or because they were contrary to Scripture: but moreover in general, since they were the commands and doctrines of men. Which is no less true of the traditions of the Pontificians.

XXXI. Add that of most of the traditions of the Pontificians it is easy to prove that they are not only besides Scripture, and added to Scripture, which itself is in some way contrary to Scripture, but also directly fight with Scripture. For, for example, according to the tradition of the Roman Church, it is both lawful, and expedient to administer the sacrament of the Eucharist to the faithful under the sole species of bread. And yet Christ in the Gospel instituting this sacrament expressly said of the chalice, "Drink ye all of it." Similarly God in the second precept of the Decalogue forbids any image to be religiously worshipped. And in many places he specially prohibits lest anyone presume to fashion any likeness of God. But the tradition of the Roman Church teaches that it is lawful and useful to place images of God and of Angels, and of men deceased in temples, and to fall down before them, and to venerate them and worship them with religious rites. Finally the same tradition alleges that Christ in the Mass is daily offered in a true and properly so called sacrifice, although in it he suffers nothing. But the Epistle of Paul to the Hebrews preaches that there is only one oblation of Christ, and that Christ does not offer himself more often, because he cannot suffer more often. Whence it is rendered manifest that the traditions which the Roman Church commends as Apostolic and divine are not the word of God and a certain rule of faith. For the word of God cannot be contrary to itself. And therefore what is contrary to Scripture, which is received without controversy by all Christians as the word of God, ought not to be held for the word of God.

XXXII. Moreover that Scripture alone is the certain rule of faith, but traditions which are proposed outside of it are doubtful and uncertain, is evident from this that if any part of Christian doctrine had been handed down by the Apostles only by living voice, and committed to the memory of men, but not also consigned to writings, certainly either it would not have come down to us, or at least not without many corruptions and depravations: so that the pure could scarcely be discerned and separated from the impure, and genuine and

sincere truth from human fictions and additional comments. For so great is the perversity, ignorance and negligence of men, that those things which are simply committed to their care and memory, are easily consigned to oblivion, and completely obliterated, or at least corrupted and adulterated in various ways. And therefore the use of Scripture is plainly necessary for preserving a certain and accurate memory of things. But those things which are not consigned to writings, in a short time are erased from the memory of men, or are so entangled with fables that the true cannot be distinguished from the false. Which could be rendered manifest by many experiences. For the placits of Philosophers, and the institutes of Republics which are not handed down in letters, but only committed to the memory of men have utterly perished, nor is anything further known about them, except perhaps something incidentally committed to letters by someone. Finally about all those things which in past times have been either done, or said, we have nothing certain except those things which are given to books as to faithful custodians to be preserved. But if the use of Scripture is anywhere necessary, certainly it is especially in those things which pertain to religion and divine worship, about which men are by nature most forgetful, and prone to lie and to feign. And in faith of this thing we can ask the Pontificians, where now are those traditions of the Jews which they want them to have received from Moses and the Prophets. Certainly not even the Pontificians themselves dare or can explain what was contained in those traditions. Nor do we have anything certain today about the religion and worship of the Jews from elsewhere than from the writings of Moses and the Prophets.

XXXIII. But, say, the adversaries, from the creation of the world to Moses the heavenly doctrine was conserved by tradition alone without writing. Why therefore could Apostolic traditions not similarly be preserved from the times of the Apostles to our own times for a thousand and six hundred years? But to that I say that indeed before Moses sacred doctrine was preserved without writing for some time. But within very few indeed. For among very many it was immediately corrupted, and involved in most absurd fables: so that the covenant of God, and the doctrine of salvation, remained in almost one family of Abraham alone, but all the remaining human race turned aside to idolatry and feigned worships. Add that then of times the defect of Scripture was supplied by frequent appearances of God, and familiar colloquies with the Patriarchs, by which he often restored and renewed the doctrine handed down by living voice among them, and recalled it, not so incorruptly preserved even by the pious, to its purity and integrity. But those divine appearances, and extraordinary colloquies of God with men have long not had place in the Church.

XXXIV. And, that we may more constrain the adversaries here, we ask them why God at last wanted his law to be committed to writing, and the remaining body of sacred Scripture to be made. Certainly they cannot deny, but that God wanted this to be done, both that it might succor human infirmity, and that it might meet the frauds of the impious: and but that it was the counsel of God, to vindicate the sacred doctrine contained in those books, from the oblivion and corruptions of men, and to render it safe against the negligence indeed of some, but the frauds and impostures of others. But since the thing so has itself, let the adversaries

say why God did not so consult for the whole sacred doctrine; But indeed wanted one part to be written, but the other to remain not written. For, whether is that part not written less opportune for diabolical frauds, and less obnoxious to oblivion, than that part which is committed to writing? And does not experience testify in the whole world, where Scripture has been wanting, that indeed some vestiges have remained of the divine doctrine handed down by the Fathers, but that they have been contaminated in a miserable manner with fables, and that foreign rites of sacrifices have been introduced, and distorted into horrible, as we have said, idolatry? Add that the adversaries among the causes, by which they want divine providence to be used in conserving traditions, number the writings of the Doctors of men, in which they are consigned. If therefore there was need for traditions to be written that they might be able to be more easily conserved, why would God have wanted this to be done rather by common men and obnoxious to error, than by the Prophets and Apostles, to whom he commanded the other heads of the doctrine of salvation to be written? And why, if those things which they want to be sought from tradition are of the same moment with those which are contained in sacred Scripture, did he want these to be consigned to authentic tables, but those to be required in the writings of common men.

XXXV. The Pontificians add that their traditions have been conserved, and have come down whole to our times by the continual use in which they have been among the Christian people; just as, they say, vulgar languages are conserved, although sometimes no grammars exist on account of their continual use in some nation. But experience is against this. For as men are by nature inconstant and very changeable, so whatever things are in their use, unless something else hinders, by this very thing are continually changed and altered; although for the most part sensibly and without sense. Which is manifest by the very example which they bring. For vulgar languages perpetually receive some change, which after some ages is so notable that they seem to have passed into another dialect. And so also in any people the ancient customs, and customs differ very much from those of today, the lapse of ages always bringing some change to human things. And the same can easily be observed in the Christian Church itself. For if anyone skilled in Ecclesiastical history, should put before his eyes the face of the Church, as it was in the second and third century after Christ, as it is allowed to collect it from the writers of that age, he will immediately acknowledge that the Roman Church today differs much from it in rites and discipline: nor is there anyone who can deny but that a great change has been made in those things. Whence more appears the necessity of some firm and stable rule, and not simply hanging from the memory and good faith of men, to which the abuses and errors gradually growing up in the Church can be corrected: which rule is sacred Scripture alone, but by no means unwritten tradition.

XXXVI. And certainly how undeservedly unwritten traditions are equaled in authority with Scripture, is manifest from this, that in the sacred Scriptures that Christ the Lord taught this and that, and instituted, Writers divinely inspired, and put outside of all danger of error testify to us. But about the sayings and deeds of Christ and the Apostles outside of sacred

Scripture nothing could come down to us, except from the testimony of those men, who flourished in the Church in the first ages after Christ, and succeeded the Apostles and Apostolic men: such are those whom today we name the ancient Fathers, and whose monuments remain among Christians. But all those were obnoxious to error, and such they confess themselves, and desire that their writings should be examined to the norm of Scripture, but not received ἀβασανίστως and without examination. Indeed the Doctors of the Roman Church themselves have noted not a few errors and blemishes in them: and that not only when some one of them speaks solitary, so to speak, with others, being silent, or speaking against: But also when more of them consent in the same thing, which can be made manifest by many examples. Thus ex. gr. most of the Fathers taught that the souls of the saints before the resurrection cannot enjoy the glory of the divine vision, as Sixtus of Siena notes, Bibliotheca sancta lib. 6. annotation 365. where he proluxly cites for this thing the testimonies of Justin, Tertullian, Clement, Origen, Lactantius, Victorinus, Ambrose, Prudentius, Augustine, Theodoret, and many more recent ones. Of the same book also annot. 35. he observes that the Ancients thought that no creature was incorporeal, and that this dogma so pleased them, that it was received among the Catholic rules and synodical sanctions. But in annotation 26, he adduces many places of Chrysostom, Origen, Athanasius, Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome, Chromatius Bishop of Aquileia, Oecumenius, Euthymius, whence he proves that they believed that all swearing was simply unlawful, and interdicted to Christians. Moreover the error was very solemn among the most ancient Fathers, that Christ was sometime to reign for a while on earth with the saints in the flesh: which Papias Bishop of Hierapolis, Irenaeus, Apollinaris, Tertullian, Lactantius, Severus and Victorinus are witness to have once thought, Hieronym. lib de viris illustribus in Papias, and book Eleventh on the Prophet Ezekiel. Nor do Hieron. himself and Augustine dare to openly condemn that opinion, as the same Sixtus acknowledges lib. 5. annot. 233. Finally in the same lib. annot. 171. he refers the testimonies of Origen, Ambrose, Hilary, Basil, Lactantius, Jerome, whence it is clear that they thought that all men who are who were and who will be, with Christ alone excepted, are to be examined, proved, and in some way burned by the fire of the conflagration of the world on the day of judgment. When therefore those ancient Doctors of the Church were so obnoxious to error, that they could embrace a false and erroneous dogma as divine truth, how can the Churches of later ages be so certain of those traditions which it learned from no other than their faith and testimony, and learned from elsewhere that they had origin from the Apostles, as of that which it sees consigned in the divine books themselves of the Prophets and Apostles? And is it not altogether abhorrent from right reason that that, which men testify who could deceive and be deceived, ought to obtain equal authority with the Church with that which God himself testifies through the Apostles and Prophets?

XXXVII. But that it may appear more clearly, how fallacious are the traditions, which are brought forth outside of Scripture as Apostolic, here it is very much to be considered, that, if ever those traditions had any certainty, that especially ought to have place in the first times

of the Christian Church, when the memory of the Apostles was still recent. But now in the first ages after Christ unwritten traditions were so uncertain and various, that the Doctors of the Church contended among themselves about them, and many men otherwise good were deceived by the name of traditions, and embraced many vain and false things as Apostolic traditions. Thus Eusebius testifies Ecclesiastical History lib. 3. cap. ult. that Papias that Bishop of Hierapolis, who lived next after the Apostles, attributed much to traditions, and among other things wrote five books about the sermons of the Lord from unwritten tradition, but that they were filled with fables. So also when some time after there was contention with great contention between the Churches of the East and West about the celebration of Easter, Whether namely it was to be celebrated precisely on the fourteenth of the moon, or on the Lord's day after the fourteenth; Polycrates, and other Bishops of Asia, who defended the former, obtended the tradition of John and Philip: but Victor the Roman, and other Westerners asserted that they followed Peter and Paul, as can be seen in Eusebius hist. Ecclesiast. lib. 5. cap. 23. and following and in Socrates lib. 5. cap. 22. Thus not a few of the ancients thought that the Apostles instituted certain stated and certain fasts, these indeed in one, but those in another way. But Augustine epist. 86. to Casulanus, and Socrates lib. 5. cap. 22. deny that the Apostles determined anything about fasts; but left it free to the Churches when and how it was to be fasted. And when Augustine in that epistle treats that question, Whether it is to be fasted on the Sabbath, which the Romans did, and a few Westerners, obtending the tradition of the Apostle Peter, but all the rest of the Churches either neglected, or even thought unlawful, relying on the tradition of the other Apostles, from whom they had received the doctrine of the Gospel, he judges that this contention is interminable generating contentions, not finishing questions, and therefore that nothing certain can be had from unwritten tradition about the reason and mode of fasts. So also Tertullian in his book on the soldier's crown, and Basil in his book on the Holy Spirit, recount various traditions which they want to be Apostolic, as ex. gr. that it is wrong to fast on the Lord's days, and that on the same Days it is necessary to pray standing, as also on all the days from Easter to Pentecost, which the Nicene Synod also sanctioned. And yet those things were not observed in later ages, and held for Apostolic traditions.

XXXVIII. Indeed once among Christians, especially in the Roman and African Church, and indeed for many ages, the custom obtained of offering the sacred Eucharist to infants as soon as they were baptized: and that was thought necessary to their salvation, as is evident from Cyprian in his book on the lapsed num. 20 from Innocent the first Bishop of Rome in his epistle to the Council of Milevis. Also from Gelasius also a Bishop of Rome, in his epistle to all the Bishops through Picenum, and from Augustine in many places. Who do not simply approve that opinion about the necessity of the sacred Eucharist in respect of infants, but bring it forth as common to the whole Church of their time, and therefore, descending from Apostolic tradition, and thence as from a known and conceded thing they draw arguments against the Pelagians, as can be seen especially in Augustine book 1. on the merit and remission of sin ch. 24. and lib. 1. against Julian ch. 2. Nor is there any writer of that age

who reclaims. And the Pontifician Doctors themselves acknowledge that, as Vasquez tom. 3. in. 3. Thom. disp. 212. ch. 2. and Maldonat. in John 6. num. 116. where he says that that opinion of Augustine and Innocent flourished in the Church for about six hundred years. And yet this custom has long been abrogated in the Roman Church, and condemned by the Council of Trent. If therefore now of old in the first times after Christ unwritten traditions were so uncertain and various among the faithful themselves and the Doctors of the Church, who often were deceived by the pretext of traditions, what now after sixteen ages will we think can be had more certain from traditions? And how unsafe and dangerous will it be to assume them for the rule of faith, and to equal them in authority to the sacred Scriptures themselves.

XXXIX. But, say, the adversaries, many things also of old were falsely supposed to the Apostles in writing, and about certain true writings of the Apostles it was doubted among the faithful themselves. Therefore, if this argument takes away the authority of unwritten tradition, its own authority will not stand to Scripture itself. But this instance neither overturns the authority of Scripture with us, nor can it diminish the force of our argument against Pontifician traditions. For we do not want the authority of sacred Scripture as to us to hang from the testimony of the doctors of the Church, but we state that Scripture is to be received by the faithful immediately and for its own sake, as which has in itself the arguments and notes of its divinity implanted: and therefore the doubt of some once about certain books of Scripture can prejudice nothing to its authority with us. Nor also do we simply reject traditions, because some once doubted about them, but because they are adverse to Scripture, nor have anything in themselves by which divine authority can be conciliated to them. But the Pontificians state that the authority of the word of God as much written, as not written as to us hangs from the testimony of the doctors of the Church. And therefore, if the ancient Doctors of the Church, from whose relation and testimony the Church of later ages received its traditions, and learned from nowhere else that they had origin from the Apostles, if, I say, those ancient Doctors of the Church were so uncertain and various about those traditions, and most of them were deceived and deceived in discerning them, according to the placits of the Pontificians no certain authority can stand to them.

XL. But the adversaries retort, if we hesitate, whether something is an Apostolic tradition, and the thing seems uncertain on account of the dissenting opinions of the ancients, in the Church there is a certain authority which can take away the doubt, and by whose judgment the true traditions will be discerned from the false, and will be certainly and infallibly known to the faithful. But if we ask who is endowed with so great authority, when there are no longer in the Church men inspired by God, as the Prophets and Apostles, not all the Adversaries respond in the same way. For most of them say that that authority resides in the Roman Pontiff, whom, namely, they want to be an infallible judge constituted by Christ in matters of faith. But this authority is not certain in the Roman Church itself. For not even those who flatter the Roman Pontiff most, dare to assert that this is a dogma ascertained and manifest of faith. Since there are not a few whom the Roman Church holds for

Catholics, and who remain in its communion, who do not acknowledge such an authority in the Pope. But others contend that that prerogative of infallibility in judging about matters of faith is found in a Council, that is, in a general assembly of the rulers of the Church. But again this is even less certain with the Roman Church. For very many Pontificians reclaim, and especially the Roman Pontiffs themselves. Nor is he who denies this held by anyone in the Roman Church as a heretic. But, you will say, at least all the Pontificians consent that general Councils which the Pope has approved and confirmed cannot err in faith, and can be safely believed. But, if Councils however general are not outside of all danger of error before the confirmation of the Pope, and the Pope himself is not infallible, how will he infallibly judge whether the proposed Council has erred, or not?

XLI. And certainly neither the Pope, nor a Council, can bring forth any legitimate document of so great an authority, which they arrogate to themselves. Nor can they with any appearance obtend anything else, than certain places of Scripture plainly distorted into an alien sense. Thus for example, the Pontiff tries to prove his infallibility by that saying of Christ to Peter, "I have prayed for thee, Peter, that thy faith fail not," where Christ promises to Peter about to be subjected immediately to the greatest temptation, and about to deny Christ himself with his mouth, that faith would not be utterly extinguished in his heart, but that he would rise from that fall, and persevere in faith, which pertain nothing at all to the Bishop of Rome, and that infallibility which he attributes to himself. But Roman Councils to claim for themselves a similar authority, especially abuse that promise of Christ, "where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." But Christ there promises nothing absolutely to a general Council of Pastors, but to all councils whether general, or particular, he promises the assistance of his Spirit, provided they use the means instituted by him, and propose to themselves solely the glory of God and Christ, and the edification of the Church, nor allow themselves to be carried away by their own affections. But there is no assembly of Pastors of which we can be infallibly certain, whether it has fulfilled that condition.

XLII. Add that, if we are rendered certain about the true Scriptures, and traditions by a certain infallible authority which is in the present Church, without which they cannot be certainly and infallibly discerned from the false and apocryphal, it is necessary that we are first clear about that infallible authority, than about Scripture itself and tradition, and with the authority and testimony of Scripture and tradition set aside it can be known to us. And therefore we can justly ask the Pontificians, that they prove to us that authority, which they attribute to the Pontiff or Council, from elsewhere, than from Scripture itself and tradition, since they profess that they are moved by the authority of the Pontiff or Council, to defer so much to traditions and Scripture, and to embrace as much the Scriptures as traditions as divine. What therefore at last will be that on account of which they believe their Church to be infallible while it judges about traditions and the Scriptures?

XLIII. But however great authority is attributed either to a Council, or to the Pope, the most learned and most approved of the Pontificians acknowledge, that the Church today is not

ruled by new revelations, nor the Pope, nor a Council immediately from God learn what the Apostles handed down. Whence therefore can they certainly learn that? Certainly nothing here remains to be said by them, except, what they also really say, namely, that the Pope, or Council has this from the voice and testimony of the Doctors of the Church, who from hand to hand received this or that from those ancient Doctors who were the hearers of the Apostles. But now by many instances, and from the confession itself of the adversaries we have made manifest that the most ancient Doctors of the Church were often deceived, and hallucinated in receiving and commending traditions, and that more of them by common consent admitted as a dogma and Apostolic institution, what the Roman Church today rejects and condemns. How therefore could their testimonies make a certain faith to the Councils and Pontiffs of later ages? And how can traditions received from the Fathers in respect of the Pontiffs and Councils themselves be held for a certain rule from which they judge the proposed controversies, no less than from Scripture itself: And now this very thing is asked, by what reason that uncertainty can be taken away which is born from the various testimonies and opinions of the Fathers and those ancient Doctors of the Church fighting among themselves, when it is a question of those things which the Apostles handed down. Wherefore Augustine rightly says in the place cited, th. 37. That when recourse is had to the tradition of the Apostles and it is fought about it, "This contention is interminable, generating contentions, not finishing questions."

XLIV. Finally, if any tradition is to be held for true, it is that which the perpetual and constant consent of Christians commends. But this least of all agrees with the traditions of the Roman Church, because they are not only outside of Scripture, and in most things are adverse to Scripture, but also most of them are unheard of in the ancient Church and contrary to its faith and practice. Of which kind are indulgences, such as are conceded by the Pope, the canonization of saints, the celebration of public worship in a language not commonly understood by the people, the prohibition lest sacred Scripture be translated into vulgar languages, and be read by the common people without special permission: but especially the custom of administering the sacred Eucharist under only one symbol, also of fashioning and pursuing with religious worship the images of God himself and of the saints, and more of this kind which it is easy to show did not have place in the primitive Church, and that the contrary was plainly observed. Whence it is manifestly apparent that those are the fictions of men, nor can they without impiety be compared in authority with the writings of the Apostles and Prophets

**Theological Theses,
On The Plentitude And
Sufficiency of Scripture Against the Necessity of
Some Unwritten Word: Part Three.
In which the arguments are solved by which the Doctors of the Roman Church try to
impugn**

the sufficiency of Scripture.

Thesis One.

This whole controversy can be referred to two things, which, although they are very connected, yet ought to be distinguished. One is whether all things which are necessary to faith and religion are fully and sufficiently contained in Scripture. The other is whether besides Scripture there is in the Church some other word of God of equal authority with sacred Scripture, which has been derived to us by unwritten tradition. The Doctors of the Roman Church deny the former, affirm the latter, and try to confirm their opinion, about both, by many arguments.

II. Therefore first that they may prove that the Scriptures do not contain all things which are necessary to faith and salvation, they argue in this way. If the Scriptures sufficiently contained all things necessary to faith and salvation, that would have to be understood, either of the whole Canon of Scripture, which taken together would be sufficient; or of the individual parts of Scripture, which would each suffice by themselves. But neither can be said. And indeed of the individual books it is manifest that they taken separately, and without the remaining body of Scripture do not contain all things necessary to salvation. For no prophecy of the Old Testament, or any Epistle of the New Testament embraces all the dogmas of faith. It remains therefore, that that perfection and sufficiency is to be attributed to the whole sacred Scripture, Canon. Therefore that the whole doctrine of salvation may be had, it is necessary that the whole Canon of Scripture be had. But if something is lacking in the Canon of Scripture, in doctrine also something must necessarily be lacking. But now the whole Canon of Scripture is not had. Therefore from Scripture, as we have it today, the doctrine of salvation cannot be sufficiently drawn. But that now the whole Canon of Scripture is not had they prove from this that many sacred books have perished, as much from the Old, as from the New Testament. And indeed from the Old Testament the books of Nathan and Gad the Seer, of which mention is made in the last ch. of book 1. of Chronicles. And also the books of Ahijah the Shilonite and Iddo the Seer, of which mention is made 2. Chron. 9. today no longer exist. As neither do the five thousand Songs of Solomon, and three thousand parables which he is said to have spoken 1 Kings 4. But from the New Testament they say that the Epistle to the Laodiceans has perished, of which mention is made, as they think, in the last ch. of the Epistle to the Colossians. And perhaps some other Epistle to the Corinthians, of which mention seems to be made 1 Cor. 5.

III. I respond, when we say that Scripture sufficiently contains all things necessary, we do not understand this of the individual books of Scripture, as if there were no little book of Scripture in which all the dogmas of faith were not handed down. But that this is true of the body of Scripture taken indefinitely, and according to the principal parts at least. But I say notably of the body of Scripture taken indefinitely, and according to the principal parts, because it is not our mind, that the necessary doctrine is so contained in the whole body of Scripture, that if thence some part, and some book be taken away, immediately something is

lacking to the integrity of doctrine, which the adversaries suppose in the argument. For in the body of Scripture, as we have it today, the doctrine of salvation is contained not only sufficiently, but also abundantly. And there are more books of Scripture in which new dogmas are not handed down, and diverse from those which are taught elsewhere, but only certain more lucid explications and applications of the same dogmas, either to refute contrary errors, or to form and institute the morals of men. Therefore without the loss of the doctrine of salvation we could lack certain books of sacred Scripture, and which were given to the Church not precisely to necessity, but to abundance and greater utility. Although therefore we should grant that certain divine and authentic writings have perished, yet it would not follow from that that the whole doctrine of salvation can no longer be found in Scripture. For it could happen that certain other divine writings existed and yet in them there was no dogma, or precept, which does not exist today in the parts of Scripture which remain.

IV. However it is not probable to us that any writing properly divine and authentic has perished. For that does not seem to be able to be stated without great injury to divine providence. For to what end would God have taken care that some divine and authentic book be written, that yet it would be of no use to the Church, but God would immediately allow it to perish? And since among those books of sacred Scripture, which divine providence has hitherto miraculously conserved, certain very small ones are found, and of which a great necessity cannot seem to be, who will be able to induce in his mind that God would have been about to allow, that so many books of no less authority should perish; and which are feigned to be such that they surpassed those in magnitude, moment, number and use? Add that the Pontificians who attribute infallibility to the Church, and extol its authority beyond measure, yet make no slight reproach to it in this matter, and brand it with ignominy. For who could excuse so great a fault and negligence in the Church, that it allowed divine books written, and given to it, that through them it might be instructed in the doctrine of salvation, and use them as the norm and rule of faith and truth, that such, I say, books, and those many, should perish, nor guarded them, with that care, which was fitting.

V. But now as for those books, by the example of which, the adversaries contend to prove, that certain divine and authentic books have perished, I Say, that either it is false that they have perished, or that they were never Canonical, and immediately inspired by God. And indeed we think that the books of Gad the Seer, and Nathan the Prophet, which in the last ch. of book 1. of Chronicles are joined to the books of Samuel, and in which are said to have been written the acts of King David, as much the first as the last, were prophetic, and pertained to the Canon: but we deny that they have perished, and contend that they still exist. For they are the very books which today are called the books of Samuel, or, as the vulgate version has it, the first and second of Kings. For that Samuel alone is not the author of them, is manifest from this, that in the middle of the first book the death of Samuel is described. Samuel therefore could not have written beyond about sixteen chapters of this book. But the rest of the book, and also the other book, which from the use of the Jews is also called of Samuel, who could have written rather, than Gad and Nathan the Prophets,

who lived in that time, and were themselves no small part of that history? Certainly that place itself which the adversaries cite openly enough indicates this: For there Gad and Nathan are joined to Samuel, as writers and continuators of the same history of David.

VI. The same also we say of the books of Iddo the Seer, and Ahijah the Shilonite, which are mentioned 2 Chron. 9. where the acts of Solomon are said to have been written in the books of Nathan the Prophet, and in the Prophecy of Ahijah the Shilonite, and in the visions of Iddo the Seer. For they seem to have written the first book of Kings, which is called the third of Kings in the vulgate version. For it indeed bears the name of no writer, but cannot be more commodiously attributed to others, than to the Prophets of those times.

VII. But as for the books of Solomon, of which it is clear that very many have perished, it must be known that not all things, which the Prophets and other men inspired by God wrote, had divine authority: For, as Augustine rightly admonishes de Civit. Dei lib. 18. the Prophets could write some things as men, with historical diligence, and other things as Prophets, with divine inspiration. Which were so distinguished, that the former indeed were to be attributed to them, the latter to God speaking through them. Thus therefore Solomon indeed wrote some things inspired by God, in which kind are those books of Solomon which make part of Scripture, and are related in the Canon, as Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs. But the same wrote very many things by his own industry, and not as a Prophet, but as the most learned man of his time in all things. In which kind were many physiological things, as what he wrote about plants from the cedar to the hyssop. Also many ethical things, to which pertain those parables which are not contained in the book of proverbs. Finally many poetical things, as those five thousand songs, of which mention is made in the place cited.

VIII. Similarly our Apostles, besides those Epistles, which merited to have Canonical authority in the Church, could have written many others, pious indeed and holy, yet not of the same authority with the former ones, as which were not inspired by God, as those, immediately, and extraordinarily. Of this kind could have been that Epistle of Paul of which mention seems to be made 1 Corinth. 5. where thus says the Apostle, "I wrote unto you in an epistle not to keep company with fornicators." For these things seem not to be able to be commodiously referred except to some other epistle to the Corinthians, which preceded that former one. Although there are many learned men, as much from ours, as from the Pontificians, who do not want there Paul to designate some epistle which was diverse from that very one which he then wrote. But they so interpret his words, "I wrote unto you in this epistle:" That Paul does not look to some other epistle, but to those very things which he had written above, about purging out the old leaven, and taking away from the midst of them that fornicator, who had his father's wife.

IX. But what some of the Pontificians contend that a certain epistle of Paul to the Laodiceans has perished, has no foundation: but was born from the ambiguity, which is found in the words of the old interpreter in the last ch. of the Ep. to the Colossians. For thus it is read there in the old interpreter, "When this epistle is read among you, cause that it be read also in the church of the Laodiceans; and that ye likewise read the epistle from Laodicea." But by

that epistle, which there is called of the Laodiceans, they understand an epistle written to the Laodiceans, when in reality there it is a question of an epistle written from the Laodiceans, as is manifest from the Greek context, which thus has, "καὶ τὴν ἐκ Λαοδικείας ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς ἀναγνῶτε," "and the epistle from Laodicea that ye also read." For certainly there is no one so little understanding Greek who can be ignorant that "τὴν ἐκ Λαοδικείας," signifies an epistle written from Laodicea, but not to the Laodiceans.

X. Moreover the Doctors of the Roman Church, that they may prove that the word of God necessary to the Church extends more widely than sacred Scripture, thus reason. If it had been the purpose of Christ and the Apostles to confine and restrict the word of God to sacred Scripture, Christ would have openly commanded a thing of so great moment. And the Apostles would testify that they wrote from the command of the Lord, just as from the command of the Lord they taught in the whole world: But this we nowhere read.

XI. I respond, it is true that the Apostles, would not have attempted to embrace the sum of Evangelical doctrine in writing, and to deliver their writings to the Church, as the norm and rule of faith, except from divine command; But that they had no such command is false. The adversaries could have learned this from Augustine. For the words of Augustine are book 1. on the consent of the Evangelists ch. ult. "Whatever Christ wanted us to read about his sayings and deeds, he commanded the Apostles as if with his own hands to write this." It could indeed happen, that Christ did not command this by living voice and express words: But it cannot be doubted nor do the Pontificians themselves dare to deny, but that to this they were inspired by God, and moved by the Holy Spirit extraordinarily. For what Peter says about the prophetic writings, that prophecy did not come in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit, is no less true of the writings of the New Testament. And, as the Apostle teaches 1. Tim. 3. "All Scripture," whether of the Old, or New Testament, "is given by inspiration of God." Therefore the Apostles perhaps did not have an external and vocal command of writing: But certainly they had an internal command, and by it were led by an extraordinary impulse of the divine Spirit, which is stronger than any command. Nor do I see, where it is clear about divine inspiration, why moreover an external command should be required.

XII. Nor yet was an external command lacking at least to John; for he himself in the Apocalypse testifies in many places that it was enjoined to him from heaven that he should write those things which the Lord had revealed to him, and especially those Epistles which, in the name of Christ, he inscribes to the seven Churches of Asia. But Bellarmine does not rightly oppose the command of teaching, which the Apostles had from Christ, to the command of writing: For he teaches not only who institutes by living voice, but also who delivers doctrine in writing: And therefore what Christ enjoins to his disciples Matt. ch. ult. "Teach all nations," ought not to be restricted to preaching alone made by living voice, but can be extended to writing itself, which is one of the modes of teaching. For there Christ orders that they should imbue the nations with the knowledge of the Gospel by the best modes whatsoever, whether by speech and tongue, or also by pen.

XIII. Bellarmine also notes in vain the various occasions by which the Apostles and Evangelists were invited to write. Matthew, for example, wrote the Gospel that he might leave to the Hebrews, whom he was leaving to go to the Gentiles, some memorial of his doctrine and preaching. But John published his Gospel at the asking of the Bishops of Asia, on account of the heresy of the Ebionites then arising. But Luke undertook to write the Evangelical history, that he might draw us away from the uncertain narrations of others. Whence Bellarmine collects that the Apostles and Evangelists wrote only incidentally, and by occasion, but not as if from their proper office and divine command. But although various occasions of writing were offered to the sacred writers, yet they did not for that reason write without divine command. For they were inspired by God, which is the strongest kind of command, that they should seize those occasions of consigning sacred doctrine to writing for the perpetual use of the Church, but not simply that they might remedy some singular inconvenience.

XIV. But, says Bellarmine, if they had wanted to consign sacred doctrine to letters on purpose, certainly they would have made a catechism or similar book. But they themselves, either wrote history, as the Evangelists: or epistles, as Paul and others, in which they treat of dogmas only incidentally. I respond that the sacred writers wrote not so much, as God through their hands: But God in writing is not bound to human and scholastic method; Indeed those laws of the school do not sufficiently become the majesty and simplicity of divine writing. But in whatever way the sacred books were written, whence the doctrine of faith, and the precepts of life can be collected easily and clearly enough by attentive and pious readers. Certainly it cannot be denied that Moses at least from the open and express command of God committed to letters the law received from God. Nor yet did he write books more methodical, than the Apostles and Evangelists. But in the Mosaic books the precepts of God are scattered without any certain order, and inserted in various histories.

XV. Finally what Bellarmine urges is not of greater weight and moment, namely, if it had been God's purpose to consign the doctrine of the Gospel to letters through the Apostles, it would have been that, either the individual Apostles would have written the body of Evangelical doctrine for the use of those provinces to which they preached, or certainly all having been gathered together before they departed into their provinces, they would have published some common book: For that this purpose of God might be ratified, and committed to execution, it sufficed that some of the Apostles and Evangelists undertook the care of writing with God inspiring. For the writings published by a few could have been for the use of the whole Church, and serve the faithful of all provinces. Nor was there need for the Apostles to consult in common about this matter, since God no less inspired the individuals separately, than all gathered together. Add that the divine writings had to be made not from the counsel of men, but from the immediate and extraordinary inspiration of God.

XVI. The Pontificians take a third argument against the sufficiency of Scripture from many things, which, as they say, ought not to be unknown, and yet are not contained in sacred

Scripture. And first, they say, in the time of the Old Testament without doubt the women no less than the men had some remedy by which they were purged from original sin. And yet indeed for the males circumcision was instituted, but what was for the females Scripture nowhere has. Then in the same time it is in no way credible that there was no remedy for the males dying before the eighth day, on which alone they could be circumcised, and yet nothing stands out about this matter in Scripture.

XVII. I respond by that argument, if it has any force, it can be proved not only that Scripture does not contain all things necessary to be known, but that the whole doctrine of faith cannot be sufficiently drawn from sacred Scripture and unwritten tradition taken together. For here tradition and the unwritten word are no less silent than sacred Scripture. Otherwise let the Pontificians draw out for us from their tradition what was that remedy of original sin under the Old Testament in women and males dying before the eighth day. But if they say that that tradition has perished, this argument will be retorted against them by which they try to prove that sacred Scripture is not a sufficient rule of faith, since, as they think, certain books of Scripture have perished. And with equal facility it could be said that this was contained in some one of those prophetic books which they contend have perished.

XVIII. As for the thing itself I say, the whole force of that argument rests on a certain false hypothesis of the adversaries, namely, that the grace of God necessarily depends on certain external signs, and that the external act of the Sacraments has the force of producing grace in us. For this having been put, it seems wonderful to them how the women could be saved under the Old Testament without circumcision, or some similar external sacrament: And yet in this very thing they forget themselves. For when they treat of the Sacraments, they attribute that efficacy and necessity to the Sacraments of the New Testament alone, but not to the Sacraments which were under the old law, which according to their mind were only shadows and figures of ours, nor had in themselves any force of working grace. And therefore if they want to stand by their own placits, neither circumcision, nor any other rite under the Old Testament could be a remedy of original sin.

XIX. But whatever the adversaries may say, or think about this matter, we with the Apostle say that circumcision was, not some remedy by the external application of which original sin was immediately taken away and abolished, but, as the Apostle speaks, "a seal of the righteousness of faith," Rom. 4. Therefore the true means of righteousness, and the remedy of original sin in all adults, as much men as women, was faith applied to the divine promises. But that promise which faith received, and on which grace and salvation depended, was this made to Abraham, "I will be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee," under which seed not only males, but also females were comprehended. By the virtue of this promise, not however of some external sign, God forgave original sin to all infants who died in the covenant before the use of reason, whether they had received circumcision, or on account of the female sex, or immature age, had not received it. But that the sign of circumcision was impressed on the males of each family, this sealed the promise to the whole family, and in the males the women were consecrated to God. And certainly that without an external

sacrament received in their own body the women could be saved of old under the Old Testament, and also the males before the eighth day, Bellarmine could have learned from Lombard. For he in book 4. dist. 1 letter, G. teaches that women of old obtained salvation and righteousness through faith and good works, either their own, if they were adults, or of their parents, if they were little ones. And similarly that little ones before circumcision were saved in the faith of their parents, and confirms that by the testimony of Pope Gregory.

XX. And Bellarmine indeed, whose footsteps we especially follow, brings forth that, as an example of a thing necessary under the Old Testament, about which yet nothing is found in sacred Scripture. But that today under the New Testament many things pertain to faith about which we cannot be taught through Scripture, he tries to prove by many instances. And first indeed, he says, it must be believed that the Blessed Mary was always a virgin against the error of Helvidius, as the whole Church always believed. And yet there is no testimony about this matter in Scripture.

XXI. I respond that faith indeed requires that we believe that Mary was a virgin, when she bore Christ our savior. "τὸ καὶ ἐξῆς," as Basil says, "ἀπολυπραγμόνητον τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ μυστηρίου" that is, what follows does not pertain to the reason of the mystery, and to inquire about it is curious. We indeed piously believe that Mary remained perpetually a Virgin, and think that Helvidius who dared to assert the contrary, was deservedly condemned as a rash man: Yet we do not think that that is to be numbered among the articles of faith, and to be urged as a thing necessary to salvation.

XXII. Nor does the other instance, which Bellarmine brings about Easter, have greater force, which, he says, must be believed to be celebrated in the New Testament on the Lord's day not the fourteenth of the Moon, on whatever day it may fall, although about that nothing stands out in sacred Scripture. For we indeed confess that in Scripture nothing is had about that matter, but we also say that the thing is of itself indifferent, which only pertains to the external rites of the Church, but not to those things on which salvation depends. Indeed once about this matter in the other century after Christ, a great controversy was excited between the Roman Church and the Asiatic Churches, so that for that reason they excommunicated each other. But although the custom of the Roman Church, which at last obtained everywhere, seems more agreeable to reason, yet in this matter there was sin on both sides. And therefore Irenaeus Bishop of Lyons about those times gravely reprehended Victor Bishop of Rome, because he contended with so great ardor about a matter of no great moment, and too much broke the bond of charity with the Oriental Churches for a slight cause. Indeed in the catalogues of heretics, which the fathers wrote, the Quartodecimans are reckoned. But whoever will diligently inspect those catalogues, will see that those fathers number among heresies any opinions disapproved by them, although about slight matters and least necessary.

XXIII. They object moreover, Bellarmine and others, infant baptism as a necessary thing, and yet not handed down in sacred Scripture: or at least which is not sufficiently proved from sacred Scripture. But we deny that the legitimacy of infant baptism cannot be proved from

sacred Scripture. Certainly our Theologians confirm this by many and valid arguments deduced from sacred Scripture against the Anabaptists. To relate and vindicate which arguments would not be of this place, and requires a more prolix work. But, what is very strange, the Pontificians themselves excellently confute the Anabaptists from the Scriptures. But among others Bellarmine so disputes about this controversy from the Scriptures, that he glories and trusts that his arguments can be solved by no reason, eluded by no art, book 1. on the sacram. of Bapt. ch. 9. And yet the same forgetting himself, while he tries to impugn the sufficiency of Scripture, asserts that paedobaptism cannot be sufficiently proved from Scripture. But here we appeal from Bellarmine carried away by zeal for the cause, to Bellarmine elsewhere convicted by the evidence of the truth.

XXIV. But the adversaries especially make force in the dogma about not iterating baptism in those who have been baptized by heretics as if we cannot deny that that dogma necessarily pertains to faith, and that those who deny it are heretics, and yet also cannot prove it from sacred Scripture. But certainly whether that is necessary to salvation, if there were nothing else, could be made ambiguous by Cyprian the Martyr of Christ, who after death merited the name of saint in the Church. For it is not doubtful that he departed from the living retaining that opinion which the Church afterwards commonly repudiated. And yet who would dare to pronounce that a man most excellent in doctrine, piety, and constant faith in Christ had fallen from salvation? Nor does the difficulty expedite what the adversaries are wont to except that about that matter in the time of Cyprian nothing had yet been defined by the Church: For if, what the Pontificians want, the Church received that dogma from Apostolic tradition, what could be added to the authority of the Apostolic sanction from the decree of the Church? Surely if it was not necessary from the authority of the Apostles, it could not be necessary from the authority of Councils. Add that Cyprian himself living the opinion of him was publicly condemned and reprobated by Stephen Bishop of Rome, by whose mouth they want the Church to speak, and his rescripts to be so many oracles obliging the faith of Christians. And yet Cyprian did not acquiesce in his judgment, but thought it free for himself to remain in his own opinion, and to refute the writings of Stephen. Therefore, although we may go into that opinion, which was sanctioned by the common judgment of the Church, namely that baptism received among heretics is not to be iterated, yet we would not want to urge it, as what is simply necessary to salvation. But that we follow and defend it, we do not do this because we think it to be supported by the authority of some unwritten word, but because, if it cannot be demonstrated from Scripture, yet it can be most probably collected from it, as the arguments make manifest which Augustine has sedulously collected from sacred Scripture for this thing. And moreover it would be petulant and shameless to reject an opinion now received by the universal Church, and contrary to it in no thing to Scripture to follow by a certain wantonness of mind a diverse practice from that which has been approved by the long use of the faithful, Scripture in no way repugnant.

XXV. Some of the Pontificians also urge the dogma about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, about which there is contention between the Greek and Roman Church: As if also that dogma could not be shown, and proved from the Scriptures. But first it seems to us very hard to number that dogma among those which cannot be denied without the loss of salvation. And although in this question we follow the opinion of the Roman Church as more true, if however the Churches of Greece had no other error, we would not for that reason think their salvation to be done, nor would we refuse communion with them. Then, although that procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son is a thing plainly arduous, and far above our capacity, yet we deny that it cannot be proved from the scriptures. Indeed we persuade ourselves of it by no other arguments, than which can be drawn from sacred Scripture, as that the Holy Spirit is said to be no less the Spirit of the Son, than of the Father, that he is sent from the Son as from the Father, and other things of this kind, which our Theologians deduce and explain from various places of Scripture. Indeed the Pontificians themselves, while they try to refute the dissenting Greeks, use almost no other arguments than those drawn from Scripture, which they collect very many, as can be seen, not only in Peter Lombard, but in Bessarion and Bellarmine Cardinals. Thus that the adversaries here are compelled to confess, either that the procession of the Spirit from the Son can be proved through Scripture, or that they argue perversely and sophistically against the Greeks.

XXVI. But the adversaries think that they can prove something more grave by which Scripture, as long at least as it consisted of the Mosaic books alone, did not contain all things necessary to salvation. For nothing can be feigned more necessary to faith and salvation, than the dogma about the immortality of souls and the resurrection of bodies. But, they say, about those dogmas of so great moment nothing is found in Moses. As for the first, namely the immortality of souls, I say it is a thing which all religion presupposes. For if we differ from the brutes to that extent, and our souls no otherwise than of cattle, perish with our bodies, and nothing of man remains after death, piety is in vain, and religion in vain: nor does anything else remain, than that we say with the profane, Let us eat, drink, for tomorrow we die. Therefore, since the books of Moses are wholly occupied in handing down religion and prescribing the worship of God, the immortality of the soul is presupposed by Moses, and is something which is undoubtedly and openly deduced from the general scope of his books and the doctrine contained in them. But moreover there are many singular places in Moses whence not only the immortality of the soul, but the resurrection of bodies can be proved and collected. For Christ confirms both against the Sadducees from those words of God, "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," since, as he says, "God is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living." And thus Christ arguing the error of the Sadducees in this part recalls them to Scripture, and reproaches them with ignorance of the Scriptures. "Ye do err," he says, "not knowing the Scriptures." Whence it is manifest, that that doctrine ought to have been known to them from Scripture. Add that, if we suppose that the doctrine of the resurrection was only obscurely insinuated in the Mosaic books, it will not be able to be proved that a clear and distinct faith of it was even then necessary to

salvation.

XXVII. Moreover they contend, that under the whole course of the Old Testament it was necessary to be known in the Church, that the legal sacrifices foreshadowed the future sacrifice of Christ. But that could not have been known from the Mosaic writings, indeed not even from the prophetic. I respond that the real sacrifice of Christ, that is, his death and the relation which the typical sacrifices had to it, is a mystery which the Gospel alone revealed, and which was silent in the preceding ages, as the Apostle speaks in many places. Those things indeed our Apostles, after the light of the Gospel had acceded, and the event of things itself, the best interpreter of prophecies, deduced from sacred Scripture. But truly before they lay hidden in the shadows of the law and the obscurity of the prophecies: nor could they be perceived at least by the common people of the faithful. And certainly that now after the advent of Christ himself on earth, nothing had yet become known among the Jews about his oblation and death, so far is it that they knew anything about it from the beginning, is manifest from this, that nothing so alienated their minds from Christ, as that bloody oblation which was accomplished on the cross. Nor is that true only of the unbelieving Jews, but also of the pious and faithful: For the Apostles themselves a little before the passion of Christ did not yet understand that he was to die for us. Whence it is that, when he first began to speak openly to them about his death, this was rejected by Peter with great aversion: Wherefore also Christ rebuked him saying, "Get thee behind me, Satan," as can be seen Matt. 16. Nor yet did anything necessary to salvation fail the ancient faithful: For divine revelation is the measure of our faith, nor does God require from us a fuller faith, than can be had from the revelation hitherto made. As long therefore as the mystery of the oblation to be accomplished by Christ was only confusedly obscurely and indistinctly revealed, it sufficed that the faithful had only an obscure and confused faith of it. But a clear and distinct faith of that mystery was necessary only after the promulgation of the Gospel.

XXVIII. There follows an instance which has more of difficulty, and through which the Pontificians think that they demonstrate that Scripture cannot be a sufficient rule of faith. For, they say, it is necessary to know that there is some Scripture divinely inspired, and that it consists in those books which we have today before our hands, which bear, the name of the Prophets and Apostles, and are held for divine by Christians. But this dogma so necessary cannot be sufficiently had from Scripture, For, even if Scripture says that the books of the Prophets and Apostles are divine, no one will certainly believe it, unless he first believes that the Scripture which says this, is divine: therefore it is necessary that besides Scripture there be some word of God by which we may be taught that Scripture itself is the word of God; otherwise we would have no faith about it, since faith rests on the word of God.

XXIX. I respond that that argument however specious it may be, is a mere sophism, which can easily be shown. For although the Pontificians deny that the whole word of God is contained in sacred Scripture, yet they cannot deny but that God at least could have delivered his whole word in writing, and commanded the Apostles that they should commit to writings all things which had been revealed to them, and which it was necessary for the

Church to know: And but that, this case having been put, our thesis would be true, namely, that sacred Scripture is a sufficient and perfect rule of faith, and that nothing can be urged as necessary to faith and salvation, which it does not contain. And yet, this hypothesis having been made, it would be allowed to argue in the same way, and to prove that all things pertaining to faith cannot be sufficiently had from sacred Scripture, because this very thing, that such Scripture was divinely inspired, and consisted of these and those books, would be a thing most pertaining to faith: And yet that could not be proved from Scripture: since, namely, nothing proves itself, nor can anyone believe the testimony of some Scripture asserting itself divine, but that he is first persuaded that it is divine Whence it would be concluded that an unwritten word is necessary besides that Scripture, which would bear testimony to it and by which our faith about such Scripture would rest. Which conclusion however, from the hypothesis made, would be manifestly false, and therefore it is necessary that the argument brought is false and sophistical since from it the false can be concluded.

XXX. But that it may be more evident, we ask the Pontificians, if Scripture is not the whole and sufficient rule of faith, let them tell us what at last that is. They will respond that that rule consists as much of the written word, as of the unwritten, which is in the mouth of the Roman Church: And that that word as much written, as unwritten is the sufficient and total rule of faith, outside of which there is no other word of God, and from which alone those things which are necessary to faith and salvation can be sought. But now I retort their own argument against them. That word partly consisting of sacred Scripture, partly without writing of traditions to which the Roman Church bears testimony, is not a sufficient rule of faith. For not all things which are necessary to faith can be proved from it. For of all things most necessary it is that we believe that there is some word truly divine, and that that word consists partly of certain Scriptures, partly of unwritten traditions, and that those divine Scriptures and traditions are the very ones to which the Roman Church bears testimony; and that we can and ought to believe its testimony in this part, as altogether certain and infallible. But that dogma so necessary, and which is brought forth as the foundation of the whole religion, cannot be sufficiently had from the word, either written, or unwritten, which is in the mouth of the Roman Church. For although Scripture affirms itself to be divinely inspired, and the Roman Church glories that its traditions are divine, and that the word of God is to be sought from it as from an infallible witness. Yet I will not certainly believe the Scriptures, nor the traditions, nor the Roman Church, but that I first believe that God speaks through the Roman Church, and that as much Scripture as traditions draw their origin from God. Therefore it is necessary, besides Scripture and traditions, and the very testimony of the Roman Church, that there be some word of God whence I may learn that all those things are divine, and oblige my faith: otherwise my faith about the authority of the word as much written, as unwritten which the Roman Church has in its mouth, will rest on no word of God, and so will not be faith. Finally no rule of faith can be feigned against which someone cannot use a similar argument.

XXXI. But that the fallacy of that sophistical argument may be detected, it is to be noted that it supposes as a manifest thing that which is most false, namely, that that is not a sufficient rule of faith by whose testimony all things which pertain to faith cannot be proved, not even excepting that very rule itself. For, whatever at last the rule of faith may be stated, it cannot be proved by its own testimony. For nothing can prove itself in this way, since all proof is from things more known, but the same is not more known and more unknown than itself. And yet it is a thing most pertaining to faith, and necessary, that we embrace the very rule of faith itself, and give certain assent to it. Therefore that is a perfect and sufficient rule of faith, not which proves itself, but from which having been supposed all things can be proved, besides itself, which pertain to faith. And therefore although Scripture cannot be sufficiently proved by its own testimony, yet this does not argue that it is not a perfect and sufficient rule of faith. And to say that Scripture does not suffice to prove all things which are of faith, because it cannot make faith for itself by its own testimony, is to sophisticate in plainly the same way as if someone should prove that the sky does not cover all things because the sky does not cover the sky itself: or that the principles of some science are not as it were the norm and rule, through which all things are proved which look to that science: because the principles themselves are not proved through the principles; And yet it pertains to some science to know its principles.

XXXII. Moreover that argument supposes that we embrace nothing by faith, except what can be proved by some divine word and testimony: which, although at first sight it seems to be most true and undoubted, yet is not true on all sides. For our faith receives the things revealed in the word of God otherwise, and the word of God itself, or divine revelation otherwise. Since indeed we believe and receive the things themselves revealed by God on account of the divine revelation, and because God bears testimony to them in his word. But about the word of God itself, or divine revelation there is another reason. For one part of the divine word can indeed bear testimony to another, and one revelation be received on account of another revelation by which it is confirmed to us; But here a progress cannot be given into infinity. But at last it must be stood in some word of God, which our faith receives on account of itself, and which does not borrow its authority from some other word of God outside of itself, by whose testimony we are rendered certain about it. Therefore it is necessary that there be some word of God which is known to us through itself, that is, from implanted signs and notes, and other arguments and incitements, by which our mind illuminated by the Holy Spirit is moved that it may believe that such a word is really divine, and refers its origin to God. Although therefore there is not another word of God, which bears testimony to the divinity of Scripture, nevertheless Scripture will be the legitimate object of our faith, if indeed faith is the assent by which we embrace the word of God, and on account of it whatever things are confirmed by its testimony. Nor can the adversaries escape but that their faith is at last resolved into some word of God to which they adhibit faith induced only by certain arguments and motives, but not on account of another word of God, by whose testimony its authority is sanctioned.

XXXIII. Moreover here it is to be observed, that the testimonies, by which sacred Scripture asserts itself divine, are not indeed suitable and efficacious arguments to convince those who call into doubt the authority of Scripture; And to that extent it is true that Scripture cannot be proved through Scripture. But yet in another sense Scripture can be proved through Scripture itself, insofar as there are in Scripture many arguments and notes of divinity by which, it indicates and asserts itself true and divine. Not otherwise than the sky and earth prove and show their author to be God, not by some simple voice and testimony, but from the very excellence of their nature, and the vestiges of divine power and wisdom which can be noted in them: or as some book vindicates itself to Aristotle and Cicero, not from the title alone, but from the very genius of the doctrine, the acumen of style and manner of arguing, which is such that it cannot, be attributed except to those most excellent wits. For so the books of Scripture, whether you regard the style, or the things themselves, have the vestiges of divine wisdom so deeply impressed, that it appears enough that they were divinely inspired, and have God for their author.

XXXIV. Therefore the sum of our response comes to this, that in the analysis of faith neither a circle can be given, nor a progress into infinity, but our mind is necessarily fixed in some word of God which is not confirmed by another word of God, but which our faith receives immediately and on account of itself, and into the knowledge and faith of which we are led by implanted arguments and signs, and other things, as the schools say, motives of believing, not taken from the testimony of some other divine word. But that that word of God, in which our faith is fixed, is sacred Scripture, consisting of a certain number of books, and therefore that it is not received by us on account of some other word of God, which bears testimony to it, nor also that it proves itself to us by its simple and bare testimony, but is known to us from implanted signs and notes, and other arguments and incitements. But from that it does not at all follow that it is not a perfect and sufficient rule of faith: because in such a rule it is not required, that it prove itself otherwise, but it is enough that, that excepted, all things which pertain to faith can be confirmed by its testimony. Indeed it is impossible to give such a rule of faith, which can prove itself, as the rest, by its simple testimony: but it is altogether necessary that the first rule of faith among Christians be supposed as a principle, nor be proved by other principles of faith except perhaps to man, and a posteriori, as they say in the schools.

XXXV. The adversaries add, It is necessary that we know not only that the books of Scripture are of themselves divine, dictated by the Holy Spirit, but also that they are found sincere and uncorrupted today, and have come to our hands such. But that we cannot learn from Scripture itself: and on that account there is need of another word of God, through which we may be rendered certain of the sincerity and integrity of Scripture itself. Therefore Scripture alone is not a sufficient rule of faith.

XXXVI. But they can be urged by a similar difficulty. For I will say in the same way, It is not only necessary, that we know that the Apostles handed down the doctrine received from Christ to the Pastors and Rectors of the Church without writing for the most part, and simply

committed it to their faith, but also that we be certain that those Apostolic traditions have come down to us through so many ages whole and uncorrupted. But that we cannot learn from Apostolic tradition itself. Therefore it is necessary that besides that word which the Apostles partly in writing, partly by living voice handed down, there stand out in the Church another word of God, through which the Church of today may be rendered certain that as much the Scriptures as the traditions have come down to it whole and uncorrupted. And therefore what Bellarmine asserts with the most learned and approved of the Pontificians is false, that the Church now is not ruled by new revelations, but remains in those things which were handed down by those who were ministers of the word: And that all those things which the Church holds by faith, were handed down by the Apostles, or Prophets, either in writing, or in word. Of the unwritten word of God book 4. ch. 9. But if anyone should say that the faithful are rendered certain of the sincerity and integrity as much of Scripture, as of traditions through the testimony of the Church which cannot err, he will not at all take away this difficulty. For it is asked whence the Church itself says this, and on what foundation the faith of the Church itself rests in this part.

XXXVII. Then I will thus urge, that my faith may have a certain foundation, it is not only necessary that I know that the Church bears infallible testimony, either through a Council, or through the supreme Pontiff: but moreover that I be certain that that Pontiff is legitimate whose testimony I hear, and also that that Council is legitimate whose decrees are objected to me. But about this I cannot be rendered certain through the testimony either of the Pontiff, or of the Council itself. For nothing can be sufficiently proved by its own testimony. And moreover it having been put that such a Pontiff was legitimate, and legitimate such a Council, it is necessary that I be certain that the decree of the Pontiff has come to my hands sincere and uncorrupted, and similarly sincere and uncorrupted the Canons of the Council. Therefore it is necessary that not only besides Scripture and traditions, but also besides the very decrees of the Pontiffs, and the statutes of the Councils of the Canons, there be in the Church some word of God, by which it may render certain that that Pontiff is legitimate, and that Council, and that the decrees of the Pontiffs and Councils, which are handed to me, are sincere and uncorrupted, otherwise my faith does not rest on a certain foundation, nor ought it to be called faith, since faith rests on the word of God.

XXXVIII. Here certainly the Pontificians are constrained by their own snares, nor can they expedite themselves but that they furnish a response to their own objection. But I respond that just as there is no need of another word of God, by whose testimony it may be proved that sacred Scripture is divine, because sacred Scripture is the first rule of faith, in which our faith is fixed: But it can be known through itself from implanted signs and notes, and other arguments and motives of believing, by which the faithful can be sufficiently moved that they embrace it as true and divine so also there is no need of another word of God whence we may learn that Scripture is uncorrupted and whole. For whence we learn that it is divine, thence we learn that it is whole and sincere, in things at least momentous and essential.

XXXIX. For that I may inculcate this which cannot be noted enough, in the proofs of faith, neither a circle can be given, nor a progress into infinity, both of which are vehemently absurd: and therefore our faith is necessarily reduced to some authority, whose testimony as divine, and therefore as sincere and uncorrupted we receive, on account of itself and immediately, through the internal illumination of the Spirit, who leads us to it, no longer by some external, testimony of another divine word, but by motives and incitements of another kind.

XL. Again the adversaries urge, it is not enough to have Scripture in our hands, but it is necessary that we hold its true sense. For the words of Scripture are not properly the rule of faith, but rather the sense of Scripture intended by the Holy Spirit. But the true sense of Scripture cannot be had from Scripture alone, For Scripture is very often ambiguous and perplexed, so that, unless it be explained by someone who cannot err, it cannot be understood nor can we be certain of the true sense of Scripture, unless tradition accedes. Therefore Scripture alone does not suffice.

XLI. I respond that in the Scriptures there are indeed certain places very difficult, and upon the understanding of which the mind hesitates: Nor can even the most learned perspicuously enough discern, what may be their true sense. But from that it does not follow that some tradition is necessary whence the understanding of those places may be sought. For it is not necessary to faith and salvation to penetrate into the true sense of such places. But if it were necessary, the Church would lack certain necessary things. For, from the confession of the adversaries themselves, in those most obscure and perplexed places of Scripture tradition does not teach, and put out of doubt what is their genuine sense: and the Pontifical Doctors are no less uncertain about it than ours.

XLII. Of whatever kind therefore the obscurity of Scripture may be, we deny that it is so obscure, but that the whole doctrine necessary to faith and morals can be undoubtedly and certainly collected from it by an attentive and skilful reader. For we do not assert that Scripture is so clear in all things which are of any moment to faith and salvation, that to attain its scope, and to dig out sacred doctrine from it, there is no need of labor, study and diligence: but that any faithful person by himself immediately and without any help can sufficiently understand it. For although the sense of Scripture is often so ready at hand, that it does not need proof, and forces itself even upon the unwilling, yet sometimes, that the sense of Scripture may be dug out, and shine forth, the words must be diligently weighed, the things preceding and following must be accurately considered, and parallel places must be compared, prejudices having been set aside, and the affections of the mind having been composed. In which thing there is need that Pastors go before the people committed to their care, as much by private discourses, as by public sermons, and also, when the thing requires, by published writings of diverse kind, in which they may explain Scripture and apply it to the various uses of the Christian people. For to this among other things God gave Pastors and Doctors to the Church, that they might expound the word of God contained in Scripture, open the sense of Scripture, and as it were lead the faithful people by the hand

into the understanding of it.

XLIII. Nevertheless the faithful people do not embrace the sense of Scripture shown by their Pastors by a certain blind obedience, and on account of their authority alone, but are led to it by the light of truth itself, when it has once been indicated and shown to them. For it is more difficult to find and detect the sense of some place, than to acknowledge and discern by the evidence of truth alone what has been detected by another and demonstrated. Just as there are many who cannot by themselves read some epistle Written in letters growing obsolete or not aptly enough formed. And yet after it has been read to them, they begin to acknowledge, and distinguish the strokes of the letters, and see with their own eyes what is contained in it.

XLIV. Therefore that the faithful may attain the true sense of Scripture in many things, and take abundant fruit from it, they have need indeed of an interpreter but not of an interpreter who cannot err, as the Pontificians say, but of an interpreter sagacious and skilful. But, after such an interpreter has gone before them, they hold the sense of Scripture, and are certain of it, not on account of the authority, either of the interpreter, or of the tradition, which they have learned from their interpreter: but on account of the force and light of truth, which they now acknowledge and observe in the things themselves, if indeed they have a mind, as is fitting, purged by the virtue of the Holy Spirit, and illuminated. Just as those who study Philosophy and the more human letters immediately by themselves cannot understand the text of Aristotle, and the Satires of Horace or Juvenal, but for this need the work of a preceptor and master. And yet after the true sense, either of the Poet, or of the Philosopher has been indicated and expounded to them; they now discern it by their own judgment and see it in the author himself: Nor are they persuaded of it on account of the authority of their master alone. For as the sense of the Poems of Horace and of the Aristotelian text is not of itself uncertain and doubtful, until some external authority accedes, which may pronounce upon it; but can be certainly detected from the very words of the authors and the context of the works, provided they be duly considered: so also the true sense of sacred Scripture has in the text itself its own light, and arguments and proofs of itself by which it can be known, nor is it of itself vague and undetermined until the authority of unwritten tradition accedes, or of Ecclesiastical judgment, which may limit and coarct it in a certain way.

XLV. Therefore although Scripture is in some way obscure, and among the faithful needs explication, in which way it has now been expounded, nothing can be concluded from that against the sufficiency which we attribute to sacred Scripture. For, when we say that Scripture alone suffices to faith and salvation, we do not understand that it needs no interpretation, that from it the individual faithful may draw the whole doctrine of faith, but only that for this there is by no means need of another word of God besides Scripture, and another rule of faith, or of some infallible interpreter, who may determine the sense of Scripture otherwise doubtful and uncertain, and render us certain of it.

XLVI. But against that the adversaries urge, that there are not a few things which are of great moment to faith, which are indeed in some way deduced from Scripture But not so certainly and evidently, that the mind can firmly acquiesce in it, and all doubt be taken away,

until the authority of tradition is adhibited, which may confirm the true sense of sacred Scripture, and put it out of doubt. And for example they bring the doctrine of the equality of persons in divinity, of the procession of the Spirit from the Son, of original sin, and of the necessity of some internal grace, that someone may be able to work well, and usefully to salvation. For that those things cannot be deduced clearly enough from the Scriptures, that without the authority of tradition they can be had for dogmas of faith, they prove from this that heretics, as today the Greeks, and of old the Arians and Pelagians, disputably dispute against those things from the Scriptures, and not only respond to the arguments, by which those articles are confirmed from sacred Scripture, but in turn object not a few places from the Scriptures for their opinion with appearance. Therefore controversies can never be finished with forward men, unless there be besides Scripture another word of God which may more clearly confirm those dogmas, and whence the true sense of sacred Scripture about controverted places may be sought certainly and infallibly.

XLVII. I respond that the sophistry and perversity of men who deny the truth, and clamor against it, and give some paint to lies and errors which can deceive light and incautious men, does not hinder but that the truth may be clear and certain in respect of those who duly consider the thing, and with a purged eye, without prejudices and perverse affections. Otherwise nothing at all clear, and certain will remain. And it will have to be said that it cannot be proved from the natural light of right reason that God is, and that he is one, because many Atheists and sophists have denied those things, and abused reason that they might assert the contrary: nor will its own certitude and evidence stand to the Mathematical disciplines themselves, because the Sceptics have tried to overturn their certitude: and by many sophisms and fallacious arguments to render their principles and axioms doubtful. And what can more urge the Pontificians, I will similarly prove that from tradition and the unwritten word, those very dogmas, which were brought for an example, are not clearly and certainly enough deduced, and therefore that besides the word handed down partly in writing partly by living voice by the Apostles, another word of God is necessary in the Church, whence they can be had more clearly and more certainly. For the Arians and Pelagians did not only dispute from the Scriptures against the Orthodox, but also claimed the tradition of the Church for themselves, and gloried that their opinion was confirmed by the testimonies of the ancient Doctors of the Church: as is manifest from the disputations of the ancients against those heretics. Indeed not even, will the thing be able to be defined by the authority of their Councils themselves. For the Arians opposed their own Councils also to the Councils of the Orthodox, as the Ariminian to the Nicene. But especially the Greeks contending with the Roman Church about the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone, about the Monarchy of the Pope, and other articles, fight not only from the Scriptures, but also from the ancient tradition of the Church, from the testimonies of the Fathers, and the decrees of Councils, and oppose their own Church to the Roman Church, their tradition to its tradition, and their Councils to its Councils.

XLVIII. Therefore if some truth is rendered doubtful, and some proof is weakened, because there are many who do not see and acknowledge the light of that truth, and the force of the proof but dispute against from the same principles, and in whatever way solve the arguments brought from them for the truth, no word of God at all will remain, whence heretics can be solidly enough confuted, and the dogmas of faith be proved certainly and evidently enough. But truly although men led and blinded by prejudices and perverse affections do not see the salutary doctrine contained in sacred Scripture, and try to cast darkness upon it by cavils and vain sophisms, that does not hinder, but that they evidently collect it from the Scriptures, and are certain that they have firm and undoubted arguments of it in them who with a sincere mind, and a mind free from prejudices and perverse affections, and with the Holy Spirit as leader, and holding forth a torch, weigh, and compare the testimonies of Scripture that they may find the truth in them.

XLIX. It remains that we may solve one Argument yet. For we profess to believe, and studiously assert that sacred Scripture contains all things which are necessary to faith and salvation, and that there is no unwritten word of God, But, they say, this very thing cannot be proved from Scripture. For those places of Scripture which are brought forth for this thing do not convince that, and the arguments deduced from them can easily be solved. I respond that the truth which we here defend can be solidly proved from Scripture itself, and in the preceding theses arguments have been dug out and vindicated from the Scriptures by which the authority of unwritten tradition is weakened, and the perfection and sufficiency of Scripture is asserted, and many other things are brought forth by our Theologians, and vindicated from the exceptions of the adversaries.

L. But although sacred Scripture made no mention of traditions, nor anywhere commended its own perfection and sufficiency, nevertheless we would truly and not without reason affirm, that there is no unwritten word of God: because no such appears, and the tradition which is proposed as divine has in itself notes by which it is acknowledged to be human, and arguments which convince that it is not a safe enough foundation of faith, as has been shown by us in the former disputation. For just as the true word of God, and the legitimate principles of faith do not need to be proved by another word of God, and deduced from other principles of faith, but are known to the faithful from implanted signs and notes, and other arguments and motives of believing, so also, that we may justly reject that, which is falsely proposed as the word of God, and a legitimate principle of faith, there is no need of some express testimony, which is taken from the true word of God, but it is enough that it has in itself indications and notes of human weakness, and motives and arguments are wanting by which the faithful can be sufficiently moved and persuaded, that they receive it as divine. But from that that besides Scripture no other word of God stands out and appears, it is evidently deduced that it contains all necessary things. For it is known through itself, that men are not bound to know and believe more things about divine and supernatural things, than it pleased God to reveal and manifest to them.

**Theological Theses,
On The Plentitude And
Sufficiency of Scripture Against the Necessity of
Some Unwritten Word: Part Four.**

In which the arguments are resolved by which the Papists endeavor to reconcile unwritten traditions with equal authority to sacred Scripture.

Thesis I

In the newest theses we have resolved the arguments by which the Papists think they show that Scripture is not a full and sufficient rule of faith. It follows that we should resolve those by which they attempt to prove that unwritten traditions have equal authority with sacred Scripture, and should be embraced with equal piety and affection.

II. Therefore, first, in order to prove that there are many dogmas and institutions of Christ and the Apostles which are not contained in the sacred writings, and yet should obtain the same authority among the faithful as those which are written, they bring forward the words of Christ in John 16, where addressing his disciples, he says, "I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now." To which passage they join those which are read in the last chapter of that Gospel, "And there are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written." Therefore it is certain, they say, that the Lord did and said many things which are not written. For one hand can hold those books which are extant, but John says that the whole world could not contain the books which should be written. And besides, those things which the Lord promised he would say in the cited passage, he undoubtedly said after his resurrection, as can be gathered from the first chapter of Acts, where Luke testifies that after his resurrection the Lord appeared to his disciples for forty days and spoke to them of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God. But the Evangelists wrote very few of the deeds and words of the Lord after the resurrection. Moreover, it is not at all credible that the Apostles, who had seen or heard those things, did not pass them on to the churches. For they were neither envious nor forgetful, so that they would not or could not say those things.

III. I respond that by those many things which Christ testifies he had to say to his disciples, and which the disciples could not yet bear before Christ's death, is understood the accurate and distinct explanation of the mysteries of the Gospel, such as concerning the efficacy and fruit of Christ's death, his resurrection, ascension into heaven, and sitting at the right hand of the Father, the calling of the Gentiles and the abrogation of legal worship, the state of the Church under the New Testament, and other such things, about which Christ spoke to his disciples briefly and generally even before his death, but which they could not then understand, nor bear their accurate explanation, on account of the various prejudices with which their mind was occupied, and the greatest sorrow by which their spirit was cast down,

and because they had not yet received that Spirit of truth who was to enlighten the eyes of their mind, so that they could bear and behold the light of the Gospel.

IV. And certainly it is manifest that the disciples did not then understand those things from the fact that even after they saw Christ raised from the dead, they still did not know what the nature of his kingdom would be; which ignorance of theirs they reveal by that question to Christ which is related by Luke in the first chapter of Acts, "Lord, will you at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" Indeed, even after Christ's ascension, the calling of the Gentiles and their gathering together with the people of God into one body was not sufficiently understood by Peter, until he was more fully instructed concerning that mystery by a special vision, as can be seen in the 10th chapter of Acts. But Christ undoubtedly taught the Apostles those many things, both by word of mouth after the resurrection, and through the Holy Spirit abundantly poured out upon them after sitting at the right hand of the Father. But from where do the Papists prove or conjecture that those things were not written, when those mysteries which we have briefly recounted, and far more, are found written in the writings of the Evangelists, which they undoubtedly drew from their Master? Therefore, it is true indeed that before his death Christ had many things to say to his disciples which they could not bear, and it is also true that Christ said and revealed those things to his disciples after the resurrection. But it is false that those things were not written by the Apostles and Evangelists, at least as to the sum and substance, and as much as is sufficient for our salvation. For they are the very mysteries which are scattered throughout the whole New Testament. Nor can the adversaries prove the contrary by any argument.

V. But they can much less make us believe that those many things which Christ had to say to his disciples are those traditions which they today thrust upon us, concerning the sacrifice of the Mass, the invocation of Saints, the worship of images, and other such things. Certainly they do not affirm this with greater reason about their traditions than the ancient heretics did about their own fictions and dreams, which with similar audacity they endeavored to reconcile with authority and faith. For Augustine testifies in Tractate 97 on John that the ancient heretics abused these words of Christ in order to commend their fictions to the people, as if they were the very things which Christ had to say to his disciples. "All the most foolish heretics," he says, "who want to be called Christians, attempt to color the audacity of their fictions by this occasion of the Gospel sentence, where the Lord says, 'I still have many things to say to you.'" From which it is clear that the Papists openly imitate the ancient heretics, while from the same words of Christ they argue for their unwritten traditions.

VI. As for the other passage, where John affirms that not all things were written which Christ did, and that the world could not contain the books which could be written about them, I respond that neither do we say that all the deeds of Christ were written, but only his entire doctrine, as much as suffices for salvation. But of the deeds of Christ so much has been written as is enough that we may know Christ, and through the knowledge of him come to eternal life, as the same John teaches in Chapter 20: "Many other signs," he says, "Jesus also performed in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book. But these

have been written so that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, you may have life in his name."

VII. Moreover, what kind of consequence is this? Christ did many signs which were not written, therefore there are many dogmas necessary for salvation which are not contained in sacred Scripture? Should we not rather conclude from this that, just as Christ indeed did many signs which are not recorded in sacred Scripture, yet nothing certain about his signs and miracles can be had from tradition, but only from sacred Scripture? So also we have nothing certain and ascertained about the words and doctrine of Christ, except from the same Scripture. And besides, just as Christ wanted only so much to be written about his deeds as is enough for a saving knowledge of him, so also he took care that only so much should be committed to writing about his words and doctrine as seemed to him to suffice for our faith and salvation.

VIII. A third place of Scripture from which the Papists argue for unwritten traditions is found in 1 Corinthians 11, where Paul addresses the Corinthians as follows: "Now I praise you, brethren, that you remember me in all things and keep the traditions just as I delivered them to you." For they say that by "traditions" are meant certain precepts about the manner of praying in the church, which are nowhere found written. But this needed not only to be said, but also proven. But we say that by "traditions" in that place is meant the whole doctrine of the Gospel, and all the precepts which they had received from Paul. For the word "tradition," as was observed before, is general, and signifies any teachings delivered in any way, whether by word of mouth or also in writing. Moreover, of those documents and institutions which were first delivered to the Corinthians by Paul, most had already been written down then, while others had not yet been written, but were afterwards written in Paul's very Epistles, and other books of the New Testament which were composed later. Some perhaps were never written, in which category there may be certain rites and ceremonies which were accommodated to those times, and other things which pertained to the polity and order of the Church of that time. For we do not contend that all such things were committed to writing. But from this it cannot be proven that all things which are necessary for faith and the worship of God either were not written then, or were not afterwards committed to writing. For what kind of consequence is this? Paul praises the Corinthians because they held to all the documents and precepts which they had received from him. Therefore Paul handed down certain necessary dogmas and institutions which were neither written then, nor afterwards.

IX. Nor does the other testimony, which the adversaries take from the same chapter, have greater force. For the Apostle, about to set forth the manner of celebrating the Lord's Supper, begins his discourse as follows: "For I received from the Lord that which I also delivered to you." And finally he concludes with these words: "And the rest I will set in order when I come." Where first Bellarmine presses the word "delivered," as if it made something for unwritten traditions. Then he adds that nowhere is it found written what Paul set in order. But rightly do Catholics think that he not only set in order the things that pertained to rites and ceremonies, but also handed down other weightier matters, such as about the ordination of

ministers, the sacrifice of the altar, the matter and form of the other sacraments - nor can heretics show the contrary.

X. But as for the first point, it is a wonder that Bellarmine insists on the word "delivered," when he himself acknowledges that the word "deliver" is general, and does not pertain only to unwritten doctrine, but also to doctrine delivered in writing. And certainly the things which Paul there delivers about the institution of the Lord's Supper are not only written by him in that place, but are also found written by three Evangelists - namely, by Matthew, Mark, and Luke. But the rest which Paul promises he will set in order when he comes, our side rightly refers (whatever the Doctors of the Roman Church may think to the contrary) to rites and ceremonies, and other things which look to decorum and order, and which are therefore matters indifferent in themselves, and do not bind the Church everywhere and always, nor are observed in the same way among all. And for that reason it was not necessary that those arrangements of Paul should be written down one by one, since in this matter the general rule of Scripture suffices - namely, that in the Church all things should be done decently and in order. But the particular disposition of order, and of that which looks to decorum, is left to the judgment and decision of the Pastors and the Churches themselves.

XI. But it is unjust, and against the rules of disputation, for Bellarmine to demand of us - namely, to show that those other things which Paul promises he will set in order are not certain weightier matters concerning the sacrifice of the altar and the matter and form of the sacraments of the Roman Church. For since Bellarmine here argues, but we respond, it is for Bellarmine to prove what he says, but for us it suffices to deny his propositions and to assert our own. Therefore he ought not simply to have said, but to have demonstrated that Paul ordained something about the sacrifice of the Mass, and those sacraments of the Roman Church which we judge to be adulterated and spurious.

XII. Therefore we do not at all heed Bellarmine's conjectures and suspicions. And yet we can easily show (which Bellarmine affirms we cannot show) - namely, that Paul there intimates nothing about the sacrifice of the Mass, and the matter and form of the sacraments, and other weightier matters. For the very manner of speaking which the Apostle uses sufficiently indicates that he is dealing with things which are not of such great moment. For after he briefly set forth the institution of the Lord's Supper, and rebuked certain graver abuses which obtained among the Corinthians in the celebration of it, he subjoins those words about which the question is: "And the rest I will set in order when I come." Where anyone who carefully considers the text will easily acknowledge that by that "rest" Paul intimates certain things of less moment than those which preceded, and which there was no need to write, and the ordering of which could be remitted to another time without danger, and seemed to require the presence of the Apostle, who being present should consider the state of the Corinthian Church, and all circumstances having been weighed, should determine what needed to be done, and what discipline and order should be followed in that Church.

XIII. But what has greater force, and can stop the mouth of the adversary - whether by those "other things" the ordering of which Paul defers to another time, are understood those

things which the Doctors of the Roman Church make so much of (namely, the sacrifice of the altar, the ordination of ministers, and the rest about the matter and form of the sacraments) - then certain necessary things had not yet been delivered to the Corinthians when the Apostle wrote this epistle. For the Papists say these things of theirs are necessary above all. But all necessary things had been abundantly delivered to the Corinthians by the Apostle before he sent this epistle to them, as is clear from the first chapter of this epistle, where Paul says that the Corinthians had been enriched in everything in Christ - in all utterance and all knowledge. And in the fifteenth chapter he affirms that the Gospel which he had preached to the Corinthians, which they had received, and in which they stood, was of such a kind that through it they were saved, if indeed they held it fast in the way he had preached it to them. From which it is manifest that the Apostle had previously delivered to them the whole and perfect doctrine, and had not concealed from them anything which he judged necessary for salvation and faith. Therefore the Papists must either concede that those traditions of theirs about the sacrifice of the altar and the matter and form of their sacraments are not necessary, or acknowledge that they do not pertain to those things which Paul, when he wrote to the Corinthians, had not yet delivered, but promised he would set in order among them afterwards.

XIV. But even if Paul did not expressly signify that he had already delivered all necessary things to the Corinthians, who could induce in his mind that Paul, when he preached the Gospel to the Corinthians and established a Church among them, delivered nothing to them about that sacrifice in which the sum of the Christian religion is to be constituted, and by far its most important part? And how preposterous would be that diligence, to write to the Corinthians about the attire in which men and women ought to be present in the public assemblies, but to defer to another time instruction about the Sacraments, and that which is thought the chief part in divine worship?

XV. The Papists take a third argument for traditions from those words of Paul which are found in 2 Thessalonians 2: "Therefore, brethren, stand fast and hold the traditions which you were taught, whether by word or our epistle." For, they say, Paul there opposes certain traditions to written doctrine, and sets forth two kinds of documents which the Thessalonians had received from him: some, namely, which he had committed to writing and inserted in his epistles; but others which he had commended to them only by word of mouth. And yet he wants both to be held equally.

XVI. I respond, it is indeed true that the Apostle, when he wrote these things, had not delivered in writing to the Thessalonians all things that pertain to the doctrine of the Gospel, but some things only by word of mouth, and some also in writing; and both ought to have been received by the Thessalonians with equal reverence - seeing that no less faith was to be given to the Apostle preaching than writing. We also freely confess that it could happen that then the whole doctrine of the Gospel had been committed to writing neither by the Apostle, nor by others, since the Canon of the New Testament was not yet constituted and completed. But it does not follow from this that afterwards the whole substance of the

Apostolic preaching was not committed to writing, both by Paul himself and by the rest of the Evangelists and Apostles; or that now anything certain about the Apostolic preaching can be had otherwise than from sacred Scripture. The Thessalonians indeed, who had seen and heard the Apostle in person, could be certain of the true doctrine of the Gospel not only from the books of Scripture which then existed, but from the living voice of the Apostle which they themselves had perceived. But from the time the Apostles departed this life, we cannot be certain of their doctrine otherwise than from their writings, by which the Holy Spirit willed to be sealed whatever is necessary for the perpetual use of the Church. The things, therefore, which the Apostle had delivered to the Thessalonians, partly by speech, partly by epistle, were afterwards included in the Apostles' epistles and Gospels, so that, the Apostles no longer teaching by the living voice, the doctrine of salvation should be drawn from there. Therefore it in no way follows from these words of the Apostle that even now there exist certain traditions, from which must be sought certain precepts of the Apostle which are not contained in the sacred Scriptures.

XVII. But Bellarmine insists that not all things which the Apostle taught were afterwards included in the writings. "For," he says, "the Apostle in this very chapter indicates that he taught the Thessalonians when Antichrist would come, and what was delaying his coming. 'And now,' he says, 'you know what is restraining.' And, 'for you know what I told you when I was still with you.' But this is nowhere written - namely, when Antichrist is to come. Wherefore the blessed Augustine, in Book 20 of The City of God, says that they knew what the Apostle taught by the living voice, but we cannot know it who have not heard the Apostle. Therefore not all things are written which the Apostle said."

XVIII. I respond first, we do not say that all and each of the things which the Apostle said have been committed to writing, but only all things which are necessary for faith and salvation. Of this kind, nothing was delivered and preached by the Apostle by the living voice which is not found written in the sacred writings. But we are unwilling to say that the Apostle did not communicate to certain ones particular revelations which do not pertain to the common salvation of the whole Church - which revelations were not afterwards written. But if Paul had from a special revelation when Antichrist was to come, and taught this to the Thessalonians, certainly this belongs not to the former category, but to the latter. For I do not think the Papists themselves will say it is a thing necessary for salvation to know the time and hour of the coming of Antichrist.

XIX. But what is especially to be noted, I ask the Papists whether the whole doctrine of the Apostle cannot be had from Scripture and tradition together. Undoubtedly they will not deny this. Let them therefore teach us from tradition when the Apostle told the Thessalonians that Antichrist was to come. Certainly here tradition is no less silent than sacred Scripture. Therefore, if there is any defect in this matter, tradition can be blamed for it no less than sacred Scripture. But if this does not prevent the whole doctrine of the Apostle from being able to be had from tradition, neither will it prevent it from being able to be had from Scripture.

XX. But as to the matter itself, the Apostle does not intimate that he taught the Thessalonians when Antichrist would come, but simply that he would come before the second advent of the Lord; and besides, what was delaying the coming of Antichrist. For he does not say, "You know at what time the man of sin is to come," but simply, "And now you know what is restraining." But what that was, the Apostle had not only taught before by word of mouth, but afterwards repeats and confirms in this very epistle. "For the mystery of lawlessness," he says, "is already at work; only he who now restrains will do so until he is taken out of the way. And then the lawless one will be revealed." Those things indeed which perhaps the Apostle had explained more clearly and fully by word of mouth; but whatever the tradition may be, it adds nothing here to Scripture, nor do we have anything more from it about those things which the Apostle intimates by these words.

XXI. But the passage of Augustine which Bellarmine brings forward for himself works marvelously for us. For there Augustine says that when this was not written, we cannot know it, since we have not heard the Apostle himself teaching. From which it is manifest that Augustine did not think anything certain could be had about the preaching of the Apostles from tradition alone, but only from sacred Scripture, which certainly is what we maintain.

XXII. But besides the testimonies of sacred Scripture, by which the Doctors of the Roman Church strive to prop up the authority of unwritten tradition, they bring forward for the same purpose certain arguments drawn from reason. And indeed they say the first argument is from the consent of heretics in despising traditions. For, they say, the heretics of all ages have rejected traditions. And therefore the contempt and rejection of traditions is, as it were, a mark and indication of heresy. But that heretics have always rejected traditions, they prove by induction and the example of the Valentinians, Marcionites, Donatists, Arians, Eunomians, Nestorians, Eutychians, Arians, and certain others.

XXIII. I respond, whatever heretics think, yet what they think is not forthwith heretical. For heretics can embrace many true things along with false dogmas. Therefore, although those heretics whom the adversaries enumerate rejected traditions by common consent, yet it would not follow from this that it is heresy to reject traditions. For they were indeed heretics, but not in that they did not attribute enough to traditions, but in that they defended perverse and impious dogmas against the authority of Scripture. Otherwise, if whatever they thought must be condemned, it must not be believed that Jesus is the Christ, and that we must suffer for Christ, which they also admitted.

XXIV. Moreover, it is false what Bellarmine assumes - namely, that all heretics have rejected traditions. For there were indeed some heretics who despised unwritten traditions and professed to adhere only to Scripture, although they corrupted it in various ways; but there were also many heretics who peddled certain unwritten traditions, and used that pretense and coloring in order to commend their fictions and dreams to the people. This is taught by Irenaeus, book 3, chapter 2: "The heretics," he says, "resist and fight against their own salvation. For when they are refuted from the Scriptures, they turn to accusing the Scriptures themselves, as if they were not correct, nor of authority, and because they are variously

expressed, and because the truth cannot be discovered from them by those who are ignorant of tradition. For that tradition was not delivered through writings, but through the living voice." Indeed, those very heretics whom Irenaeus censures in this place are the Marcionites themselves, and the Valentinians, and others like them, whom Bellarmine brings forward as enemies of traditions. Consonant with this, Jerome teaches in his commentary on Haggai, speaking of heretics: "The things," he says, "which, without the authority and testimonies of the Scriptures, they discover and devise of their own accord, as if by apostolic tradition, the sword of God strikes down." And above we referred to the words of Augustine, by which he testifies that the ancient heretics abused, in order to confirm their traditions, those very words of Christ which the Doctors of the Roman Church similarly abuse today - namely, "I still have many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now."

XXV. But Epiphanius, in Heresy 33, specifically teaches the same thing about a certain heretic Ptolemy, where he reports his words from an epistle to Flora, in which he promises that she would learn the truth of the things he taught, after she was deemed worthy of the apostolic tradition, "which," he says, "we also have received through succession." But in Heresy 73, he reports an epistle of the Semi-Arians, in which they boast that they embrace the faith handed down by the fathers, and that they preserve that faith as a kind of inheritance, which they had received from apostolic times, through the fathers who were in between up to them. The Papists, therefore, have no reason to reproach us with our agreement with the heretics in rejecting traditions, since even the worst heretics have boasted of certain unwritten traditions, and wanted to cover their pernicious fictions with that pretense, as the Papists do today.

XXVI. Besides, the Papists prove that unwritten traditions are necessary from the custom of all nations. For first, they say, the Jews had, and still have, some traditions apart from Scripture. Then all profane Commonwealths are ruled in great part by unwritten laws, as formerly the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, and also the ancient Gauls, as Caesar, Thucydides, and Plutarch testify. And besides, the most noble and celebrated philosophers, Pythagoras and Socrates, although they taught very much, nevertheless wrote nothing. From which Bellarmine concludes that nature itself in a certain way proclaims that unwritten traditions are necessary, or at least most useful.

XXVII. I respond, as far as the Jews are concerned, they indeed long ago had unwritten traditions. But what kind they were and how much they should be valued, Christ teaches, when he reproaches the Jews that by their traditions they abrogated and rejected the law of God and his commandments, and when he applies to them the words of God in Isaiah, "In vain do they worship me, teaching as doctrines the commandments of men." Therefore they indeed had their traditions, but with God disapproving, and Christ rebuking, so far is it from being the case that their example should be imitated by us and held as a rule. But how great the force of unwritten tradition is, and how apt a means it is for propagating and preserving the truth, the Jews' traditions of today can make manifest, which they boast of having from the mouth of Moses, although they are nothing but mere trifles, and impious, most

foul-smelling, and often blasphemous dreams.

XXVIII. Moreover, we do not heed at all the examples of profane Commonwealths. They indeed can best use unwritten laws in those things which pertain to civil government, and which therefore depend on the judgment of human reason. But it does not follow from this that the same reasoning holds for those things which pertain to faith and divine worship. For since those things are had from divine revelation, nor does reason perceive anything in them, they could not be entrusted safely enough to the care and memory of men; and therefore it seemed good to divine wisdom that they should be committed to writing by men divinely inspired, by which they could more easily be preserved uncorrupted in the Church.

XXIX. The Papists take a third argument from the dignity of the Church. For, they say, as formerly the Jews excelled all nations, because the oracles of God were entrusted to them, as Paul says in Romans 3, so now the Church of Christ surpasses all sects, because it alone knows all the mysteries of true religion, and is privy to the secrets of the bridegroom. But if all things were written, the Church would have no privilege. For the heretics, Jews, and Pagans would know no less about the mysteries of our faith than we ourselves and our prelates.

XXX. I respond, as formerly it was the privilege of the Jews that the oracles of God were entrusted to them, so also it is the privilege of the Christian Church that the same oracles have been committed to it. But as the Jews had those oracles consigned to writing, so also they have been delivered in writing to the Christian Church. The Church, therefore, is the guardian and depositary of sacred Scripture and the heavenly doctrine contained in it. But if unbelievers have any knowledge of it, they borrow it from the Church. Moreover, a twofold knowledge of the divine mysteries must be distinguished. For it is one thing to know what Scripture teaches, and what are the mysteries of the Christian religion; and another to believe those mysteries, and embrace them with sure faith. For someone can be most practiced and most learned in Christian doctrine, who nevertheless does not believe Christian doctrine, but conceals an occult infidelity in his heart. But the privilege of the Christian Church does not properly consist in the former knowledge, which is nothing other than a simple apprehension of what is said, but in that knowledge which also includes faith and sure persuasion of what is apprehended by our mind. For as they can read and learn the Koran, and yet not believe Muhammad and his Koran, so also a Muslim, and anyone else who is an unbeliever, can read Scripture, and learn the whole body of the Christian Religion, and yet he will not on that account give credence to the Christian religion, and enjoy the privilege of the faithful, who truly know and embrace Christ and his Gospel.

XXXI. But if account is taken of the former knowledge, which is wholly situated in a certain simple apprehension, certainly in order for that also to remain proper to the Church, and for no unbelievers to be partakers of it, Christian doctrine ought never to have been committed to writing by anyone, and entrusted to paper, but only always handed down in the Church by the living voice. But although the Papists contend that not all the mysteries of the faith were written by the Apostles and the divinely inspired men, they nevertheless confess that those

mysteries are found written in very many books of their Doctors, and that specifically, clearly, and plainly, so that they can be perceived by any reader. And consequently, although unbelievers could not draw the whole Christian doctrine from the writings of the Prophets and Apostles, they can nevertheless easily learn it from the books of Christian Theologians. And thus that imaginary privilege of the Church falls to pieces no less than if all things were written in the books of the Prophets and Apostles, as we contend.

XXXII. Finally, the Doctors of the Roman Church take an argument for unwritten tradition from the dignity of the mysteries of the Christian religion. For, they say, there are many mysteries which require silence, nor is it fitting that they should be explained in the Scriptures, which are read by the whole world. For if it is not permitted to admit any unbaptized persons to see the tremendous mysteries of the Mass, how will it be permitted to deliver the same to them in writing?

XXXIII. I respond that it is characteristic of superstition to hide its mysteries, and to keep the common people away from them, as the Pagans did of old. But the Christian religion is not ashamed of itself; and, as Tertullian says, the truth of Christ blushes at nothing except being hidden. Therefore the Christian religion begrudges the knowledge of itself to no one, but invites even unbelievers to it. I confess indeed that some prudence is needed in this matter. For Christ warns that what is holy is not to be given to dogs, nor pearls to be thrown before swine. One must also deal differently with little ones in Christ than with the perfect. And to the former, indeed, milk is to be offered; to the latter, solid food is to be reserved. It is therefore the part of Pastors and Doctors to have regard for their hearers in this matter, and to set forth the doctrine of the Gospel, which they draw from the Scriptures, skillfully and in a way suited to the understanding of those who hear, and not rashly to expose the mysteries of the Christian religion to be laughed at by the profane and impious. But our Evangelists and Apostles did not sin against that prudence, prescribed by Christ himself, when they consigned the whole Gospel, briefly and summarily, to their writings. For those very writings can be set forth and expounded to some in the manner of milk, but to others in the manner of more solid food. Nor should whatever is written be forthwith deemed to have been thrown to the swine, and exposed to the hisses and guffaws of the profane. Otherwise the Doctors of the Roman Church themselves would daily give what is holy to dogs, and throw pearls before swine, seeing that they daily publish Theological Summae and Catechisms, and teach and explain in writing any mysteries whatsoever of the Christian religion, as clearly and openly as they can. Which certainly if it is permitted to them, with the dignity of the mysteries of the Gospel remaining inviolate, why was the same not permitted to the Apostles and Evangelists? But if it was not permitted, and was not fitting for the Apostles to explain all the mysteries of the faith in writing, why today is the same thing more permitted to the Scholastics and Pontifical Theologians, who teach in writing all the dogmas of Pontifical Theology, and those very things which Bellarmine calls the tremendous mysteries of the Mass, of which there is absolutely none which is not found written in the books of the Papists?

XXXIV. Moreover, let the Papists tell us what are those mysteries, whose dignity and majesty is so great that they ought not to have been explained in the sacred Scriptures. For certainly the mystery of the creation of the world, and its destruction, of the resurrection of the bodies, of the incarnation of the Son of God, of the two natures in Christ, of the three persons in one divine essence, and many others of this kind, are set forth in the Scriptures. But can the Papists bring forward mysteries more august and sublime than these? And are the dogmas of the worship of images, of the invocation of the Saints, and of the succession of the Pope in the place of the Apostle Peter, something loftier and more worthy of veneration than the trinity of persons in God, the redemption of the human race through the death of God incarnate for us - so that these indeed could be written, but those ought not to have been written? Finally, what is that madness, to think that it was not in keeping with the dignity of the traditions for them to be written by the Apostles, but that their dignity is not violated when they are committed to writing a hundred times by common Doctors, and inculcated to all?

**Theological Theses,
By Which It Is Demonstrated
That There Is a God.**

Thesis I

As God gave his name to Theology, so he is its principal object. Therefore, one who is undertaking to treat of Theological matters must take his beginning from God himself.

II. But the things which are handed down about God can be reduced to two heads. For they either regard the existence of God, and the question AN SIT (WHETHER HE IS); or the nature and essence of God, and the question QUID SIT (WHAT HE IS). Reason demands that we begin from the former.

III. Therefore, the first theorem of all Theology, on which all religion is built, is this: "That there is a God," that is, an eternal Mind, best, most powerful, and most wise, who is the cause of all things, and on whom all things depend and are governed. According to which the Apostle says, Hebrews 11:6, "He who comes to God must believe that he is."

IV. Moreover, this principle is not of the kind which are had from revelation alone, and the word of God; but it is a matter which all nature inculcates, and almost forces upon our senses. For as the Apostle says, Romans 1:20, "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." To which pertains also Job 12:7-9, "But ask the beasts, and they will teach you; the birds of the heavens, and they will tell you; or the bushes of the earth, and they will teach you; and the fish of the sea will declare to you. Who among all these does not know that the hand of the Lord has done this?"

V. From which it has come about that even apart from revelation, by which God made himself known in his word, some knowledge of God has emanated to almost all men. Since indeed there is no nation, or hardly any, which does not have some form of religion, and

some worship of divinity. Nor do the terrors and stings of conscience, which draw out even the most wicked and abandoned, who endeavor to shake off all fear of God, unwillingly to his tribunal, and strike them with the horror of divine vengeance, arise from any other source.

VI. It is indeed not to be denied that true and saving knowledge of God is found among very few men; and that the true God was, and still is, unknown to most nations, on which account they are said by the Apostle to be "without God in the world," Ephesians 2:12. But this does not prevent some sense of deity from remaining even among those very nations whom Paul in a certain way charges with Atheism, although involved in many foul errors. An argument of this matter is that very idolatry by which the profane nations polluted themselves, and forsaking the creator, worshipped various creatures, and the very fictions of their own mind. For that sense of divinity must be deeply impressed on men, since man, too prone to pride and puffed up with arrogance, preferred to abase himself below the beasts, and to worship stones and wood, than to acknowledge no God at all.

VII. It is therefore altogether certain that from the contemplation of the world, and of the things which are seen in it, men can come to the knowledge of God; nor did the darkness poured over the human mind by sin prevent the greatest part of men from attaining, by this way, and with nature as guide, some knowledge of deity. But it is asked, of what kind are those reasons by which, from the consideration of the works of nature, it is shown that there is a God? Whether, namely, they are necessary, or only probable? And whether the existence of God is demonstrable to human reason, or whether it can attain to it only by certain conjectures and probable arguments? But we are of this opinion, with almost all Theologians, both ours and the Papists, that the existence of God is a matter which can be demonstrated, and established by necessary arguments.

VIII. But since there is a twofold demonstration among Logicians, one which shows the effect from the causes, but the other which, on the contrary, shows the cause from the effects, it is manifest that in the former mode of demonstration it cannot be taught that there is a God, since neither for God, nor for his existence, can a cause be adduced in any genus; but it can be demonstrated in the latter mode, namely from effects. For it must not be thought that the arguments by which it is proved that there is a God in some degree leave the matter doubtful, and only persuade, but do not convince.

IX. But this cannot be better shown than by bringing forward examples of arguments of this kind, which of themselves reveal their own evidence and necessity. Therefore, in the way by which we think this can more suitably be done, we will endeavor to deduce from those things which in this visible world are presented to our eyes, by a necessary and evident consequence, that there is a God who produced those things. And we will be content with that as if it were a single demonstration. For to pursue the individual arguments by which it is proved that there is some supreme deity would be a work of infinite labor, and beyond the scope of our undertaking.

X. But that we may gradually make a level road for ourselves to our purpose, and leave nothing to the highest evidence, such indeed as can be demanded in Physical and

Metaphysical matters, certain principles must be established, on which the rest may be built as on foundations, and which must often be used in the whole course of our discourse.

XI. First, therefore, it is certain that nothing is made by itself, and that nothing is the cause of itself. For if something made itself, it would plainly be necessary for it to have been before it was, which involves a contradiction. For what is made does not yet exist; for what is made passes from non-being to being. But what makes something already exists, since acting presupposes being.

XII. It is also beyond doubt that nothing depends on itself, but whatever depends, depends on something else. The reason is manifest: for if something depended on itself, it would be both prior and posterior to itself. For what depends is posterior to that on which it depends.

XIII. A third principle no less manifest than the previous ones is that in the order of efficient causes, of which one depends on another, there cannot be an infinite progression; but at last we must come to some first and highest cause. For if an infinite progression were granted in causes, and there were no first cause, all and each of the intermediate causes would be such, and thus would have some cause before them; indeed, there would be no cause which did not have infinite causes superior to itself. But this is impossible: for if before all and each of the causes there were infinite causes, before the whole multitude and collection of causes there would be infinite causes. For what is before all and each is before the whole multitude of individuals. But it involves a manifest contradiction for there to be infinite causes superior to the whole multitude of causes. For certainly outside the whole multitude of causes, no cause can be found. Otherwise, that multitude would not be whole. Moreover, if by ascending from effects to causes, the first cause could not be reached, by equal reason, by descending from causes to effects, the last effect could never be reached. For the distance is as great from the highest to the lowest as it is from the lowest to the highest. And what is infinite can no more be passed through by ascending than by descending.

XIV. To these principles we add a fourth, which will be of great use to us: namely, that whatever exists either exists of itself and by its own essence, or exists by participation in, and dependence on, something else. The former manner of existing belongs to God alone; the latter, to all creatures. This distinction seems to have been not unknown to the ancient philosophers. For Plato, or whoever was the author of the dialogue entitled Parmenides, brings in Parmenides philosophizing about the One (by which he certainly understands the supreme deity) in this manner: "It seems to me that the One has a most honorable condition. For thus it is: if the One is not, nothing is. This is apparent on many accounts. But this is the principal one. For, whenever anything else exists, it exists as participating in the One and on account of the One." Similar things are found in other places in Plato, and in other philosophers, by which they plainly recognize some supreme nature, which exists of itself, and is the cause of existence to all other things.

XV. These things having been established, let us suppose, if you please, that this whole visible world, and all things which it contains, exist. I ask whether they exist of themselves and by their own essence, or depend on some superior cause as the origin of their being? If

you say the former, you say what is manifestly absurd and impossible. For besides the fact that it has already been shown that nothing is or can be the efficient cause of itself, who can persuade himself that this whole machine of the world, and all things which are seen in it, in which so much order, beauty, power, and wisdom shine forth, arose from itself, and depends on no external principle? And if, of the things which are seen in this universe, some are living, others lifeless, and some are endowed with sense, intellect, and reason, but others lack sense and reason, who would be so insane as to affirm that the former, which are more perfect, depend on no external cause, when he dare not affirm it of the latter, which are more imperfect? Certainly if dull and lifeless matter has not the power of existing from itself, much less will life, sense and reason be able to exist, without being produced by some external cause.

XVI. It remains therefore that we affirm the latter - namely, that this whole visible world, and all the things which exist in it, exist not of themselves, but by participation, and depend on some superior cause, which we call God. For either we must admit some eternal and immutable being on which all other things depend, or we will be forced to say that all things which we see have arisen out of nothing without any cause, which is not only absurd, but clearly impossible.

XVII. Thus far we have proceeded by arguments abstract and metaphysical, which greatly exercise the intellect. Let us now, if you please, use arguments more concrete and physical, drawn from this visible fabric of the world. I ask therefore, whence such beauty and splendor in the heavenly bodies, such constancy and regularity in their motions, such variety and glory in the things of the earth, unless we confess that the most beautiful and perfect mind was the creator and architect of these things? The heavens surely declare the glory of God, and the firmament proclaims the work of his hands. Nor can the wonderful order of the seasons of the year - the unfailing changes of days and nights, the continual and uninterrupted succession of generations, and innumerable other things, be attributed to any other cause than to some most wise and powerful governor of all things.

XVIII. For in contemplating this whole visible world, one cannot but easily observe innumerable marks of the highest wisdom, not only in the structure of the entire universe, but also of every animal, which are so wondrous and stupendous, and in which all proportions are so accurately and exactly observed, and so diligently provided for in all things, that the human mind cannot sufficiently grasp and marvel at such great wisdom. Who therefore, unless entirely stupid and foolish, could ascribe works made with such art and industry, and arranged with such order and harmony, to a cause which is altogether brute and devoid of all wisdom and knowledge?

XIX. Thirdly, that the bodies of which this world consists are not self-existent and unproduced, is manifest from the fact that each has a certain end, and is not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else. For certainly that which is from itself is also for itself, not for the sake of something else; nor can it be referred to an end. For whatever is referred to an end is referred to it by something else on which it depends. But that which is

from itself does not depend on anything else, by which it could be referred to an end. Add that every end is prior in intention to the thing of which it is the end, but that which is from itself, as was already said, has nothing prior to it, by which that end could have been intended. But that the individual bodies of the world are not for their own sake, but are referred to an end, is clear even from the fact that they are parts of a certain whole, harmoniously and orderly arranged, namely of the world itself, to whose common good they are referred. For the good of the whole is the end of the individual parts. Nor can anyone deny that this or that body, for example, the earth, the sun, or some planet, is of this or that magnitude, in this or that state, endowed with this or that quality, figure and motion - that, I say, all these things have a certain end, and are thus or not, because the adornment, beauty and advantage of the universe requires it. And therefore it is necessary that the whole harmony and idea of the universe was conceived and intended by someone, by whom all things were constituted and ordered according to it.

XX. Fourthly, that those bodies which constitute this whole universe are not self-existent, but have arisen and been produced by another, is proven by the fact that each has a certain and determinate perfection, and a nature diverse from one another. For that distinction of theirs, and that determination, must by all means be referred to an efficient cause, which bestowed such a nature on each, and that perfection and not another. For if all were from themselves, they would be one and the same. For whence would it be that they have a diverse nature, and moreover lack every bound and limit of perfection? For what has a determinate and limited essence must necessarily have been thus limited by some cause; but what is from itself has no cause which could have set limits and bounds to it, but drew its being at the very fountain, or rather is the very fountain of being - it must necessarily contain in itself all entity and perfection.

XXI. But now if the bodies of which this universe consists are produced beings, and have a cause and origin of themselves, the universe itself also must necessarily be produced. For what consists of produced parts cannot be unproduced.

XXII. And certainly if this world, and the parts of which it consists, were something from itself, and which did not have a cause of itself, it would also be eternal, and lack a beginning of duration. For what is, and yet was never produced, must necessarily have always been. For what is, and at some time was not, must necessarily have been produced. For what passes from non-being to being is certainly said to be produced; but it cannot happen that this corporeal and visible world was from eternity. For this world is in perpetual motion, and its duration is measured by time. But motion and time, which follows motion, cannot be from eternity, which can be demonstrated in many ways.

XXIII. For first, if the motion which appears, for example, in the sun, is said to be from eternity, it will be necessary for the sun to have been from eternity, either in some sign of the Zodiac, or in all the signs of the Zodiac. But neither can be said without manifest contradiction. For if the sun was from eternity in some sign of the Zodiac, say in Aries, but not likewise in the others, it follows from this that the sun only arrived at Taurus and Gemini

in time. And thus, when motion is supposed to have been from eternity, through all eternity it will have traversed only one or another sign, that is, a finite space in infinite time. For a motion which is from eternity precedes by an infinite time whatever is done in time. And accordingly, the sun, by that same motion by which it traverses one sign within a month, could not in infinite time traverse more than one or another sign. But if it is said that the sun was from eternity in all the signs of the Zodiac, it will be necessary for the sun to have been simultaneously in all the signs of the Zodiac. For if it was from eternity both in Aries and in Cancer, and in Libra and in Capricorn, it was not in Aries before Cancer, and in Libra before Capricorn. For what is from eternity has nothing before it. And accordingly, since it was not in one before another, it must necessarily have been in all simultaneously. But it involves a contradiction for the sun to move through the Zodiac, and yet to be simultaneously in all the signs of the Zodiac. For for the sun to move through the Zodiac is to leave one sign and proceed to another; besides the fact that thus the sun would have been opposite to and distant from itself.

XXIV. Moreover, if the motions which are observed in the world were from eternity, and have no beginning of themselves, it is necessary that hitherto there have been infinite generations of men and other animals, and that in those generations there be given a progression to infinity. But this is impossible. For if in the generations of men a progression to infinity were granted, there would be no first man from whom the rest were begotten, but absolutely all men, none excepted, would be begotten by man. But it cannot happen that absolutely all men, none excepted, are begotten by man. For thus the whole and complete multitude of men would have been begotten by man, which cannot be said without contradiction. For if the whole multitude of men was begotten by man, it is necessary that he by whom it is said to have been begotten is either outside the multitude, or contained in that multitude. The former cannot be said. For it cannot happen that the entire multitude of men, not even one excepted, was begotten by some man who is not included in it, since outside the whole multitude of men, no man is found. Nor can it be said either that the whole multitude of men was begotten by someone who is part of that multitude. For if it were so, that man who would be said to have begotten the rest would also have begotten himself. For he who begot the whole multitude of men begot each individual contained in it, of whom he is one. But nothing begets itself, nor is the cause of itself.

XXV. Moreover, there is no man begotten by man before whom another man did not exist. Therefore, if absolutely all men were begotten by men, before all men whatsoever certain men existed, and thus before there was any man, there was a man, which is manifestly contradictory. Indeed, if all men are begotten by men to infinity, there was never any man who was not posterior to infinite other preexisting men, and thus there were infinite men before there were any men. Add that if before us there had been infinite generations, the order of generation could not have come down to us; for the infinite cannot be passed through.

XXVI. But just as those motions which are observed in the world cannot be from eternity, so neither can time be eternal. For if time is eternal, from eternity there is an alternation of day and night. But it is impossible for the alternation of day and night to have been from eternity. For if the alternation of day and night was from eternity, both night and day were from eternity. For if either night or day was not from eternity, that alternation only began in time. But it is repugnant for both, namely day and night, to have been from eternity. For of those things which are from eternity, one is not before another. For what has something before it is not from eternity. And accordingly, things which are from eternity are simultaneous. But it is clearly necessary that either night preceded day, or day preceded night, nor is it possible for day and night to be simultaneous, since night is the privation of day. But for a disposition and privation to be in the same subject simultaneously involves a contradiction. In a word, if day and night are supposed to have been from eternity, it is necessary that either day and night existed simultaneously, that is, simultaneously and in the same respect it was day and not-day, or that in those things which are said to be eternal, one precedes the other - both of which involve an open contradiction.

XXVII. Moreover, if time is eternal, there was no first day. For if there is some first day, time has a beginning, and thus is not eternal. But it is necessary that there be some first day. For if there was no first day, every day was preceded by a day, and before all and each day, some day existed; and thus there was a day before there was a day. Moreover, if time is from eternity, it is necessary that hitherto there have been infinite hours, infinite days, infinite centuries, indeed also infinite myriads of centuries. I ask therefore, is the number of days hitherto elapsed equal to the number of hours, or less than it? If it is said to be equal, it will follow from this that the part is equal to the whole, and the whole is not greater than its part. For since in each day there are twenty-four hours, the number of days is only a twenty-fourth part of the number of hours, and necessarily twenty-four times more hours than days have elapsed. But if it is said that the number of days is less than the number of hours, first this absurdity will follow, that there is given an infinite number which yet is only a twenty-fourth part of a greater number, and which is contained in another number twenty-four times, indeed more than a hundred thousand times, and a thousand times, and yet more times, if one wishes to compare not the number of days with the number of hours, but the number of centuries with the number of minutes, and myriads of centuries with tenths of minutes. Certainly it cannot be conceived how that number is infinite, which is contained so many times in a greater number, and which is such a small part of it. For a number which is contained in another is bounded and limited by that greater containing number, and thus is not infinite, since it does not lack every bound and limit.

XXVIII. Moreover, since the number of days is twenty-four times less than the number of hours, I ask again, does the number of hours equaling and not exceeding the number of days constitute a finite or an infinite time? It cannot be said to constitute a finite time; for since the number of days is supposed to be infinite, the number of hours equal to it is also infinite. But infinite hours cannot constitute a finite time. Nor can it be said either that that

number of hours, which equals and does not exceed the number of days, makes an infinite and eternal time. For it is bounded on both sides, namely by today, and on the other side, by a time twenty-three times longer, which preceded. And certainly since that time, which the number of hours equal to the number of days constitutes, is only a twenty-fourth part of the whole time past, it cannot be called infinite and eternal without manifest contradiction. For beginning from today, no part of past time is infinite, since any such part of past time is terminated by the preceding and subsequent time. But the infinite is what lacks limits; but what has limits cannot be infinite. Nor is the notion of eternity less incompatible with what is only a certain part of past time. For the eternal is not what has another time before it; but a part of past time of this kind has another time before it, namely all that which is outside that part. Since therefore any assigned part of time, such as a twentieth, hundredth or thousandth, cannot be eternal and infinite, the whole time cannot be eternal and infinite. For what consists of finite and determinate parts cannot be infinite.

XXIX. To these add that all past time was once future, and was as much future as it is past. Therefore, if now past time is infinite, once there was an infinite future. But the end of an infinite future time can never be reached. Therefore the end of past time could never have been reached. And if hereafter so much time will never pass away, that it can be said that an infinite time has already passed, certainly neither could so much have passed before, that there is an infinite past, infinity being equally opposed in both cases. But if up to today an infinite time has passed, today was once infinitely distant. How then could it be reached? Nor does this argument of a most learned man carry little weight - namely, either no day is from eternity, or every day is from eternity, or some day is from eternity and some is not from eternity. For a fourth cannot be imagined. But if the first is true, time is not from eternity; for that is not from eternity of which no part existed from eternity. The second cannot be true, experience being opposed to it. Nor also the third. For if some day was from eternity, its duration was infinite, nor does it have a beginning; but the duration of any day whatsoever is limited to twenty-four hours. From which it is clear that time could not flow from eternity, but as Scripture says, it is God "who made the ages," Hebrews 1.

XXX. Since therefore neither motion nor time could be from eternity, but necessarily have some beginning of themselves, it is manifest that the world also, which as we have said is in perpetual motion, and whose duration is measured by time, could not be from eternity either, but has some beginning of itself; and accordingly it was made and produced by another. But who can be thought the author of so great a work, except a cause which is not only most powerful, but also best and most wise, and thus except some supreme and eternal mind, which is signified by all with the name of God?

XXXI. But that the matter may be made still more manifest, and all occasion for doubting may be removed, since we have shown that the world was made, and has a cause of its existence, we ask, what is that cause to which the world owes its origin? Certainly, as far as we can conceive, three causes of it can be imagined and assigned in all. For either it must be said that it arose by chance, and from some fortuitous concourse of the particles of

matter; or that it indeed has a necessary cause, but one which is brute and ignorant of itself, which is called by the name of nature; or finally, as we have said, that the world is the work of some intelligent cause, at once best and most powerful.

XXXII. The first is attributed to Democritus and the Epicureans, who are said to have thought that the world arose from some fortuitous and rash concourse of atoms. But this opinion approaches madness. For constancy, order, and harmony cannot be from chance; but things which happen and arise by chance are uncertain and disordered, and have nothing constant and always like themselves. But nothing can be imagined more ordered and composed than this frame of the universe. And in the individual works of nature also the highest order and constancy can easily be observed.

XXXIII. And certainly who is there who, while contemplating some palace splendidly and artfully constructed, or some clock skillfully made, which by various wheels and motions composed among themselves marks and measures the hours, days, and phases of the moon, would induce himself to think that those things were made by chance, and arose from pieces of wood and stone and particles of brass and steel rashly heaped together? But what palace can be devised constructed with greater art and symmetry, and where all proportions are better observed, than this very universe which is presented to our eyes? Or what machine is there in which more motions, and more wonderful ones, and more constant ones in the highest variety, can be observed?

XXXIV. Nor can so great a work be ascribed to a brute cause, and one which acts from necessity, without reason and intelligence. For first, among the things which are seen in the world, there are many which are not only endowed with sense and knowledge, such as the beasts, but also with reason and intellect, such as men; but that which knows and understands necessarily has some knowing and understanding cause. For an effect cannot be more perfect than its first and principal cause; nor can there be anything of perfection in the effect which is not in the cause, if not formally, at least in some more eminent way, as was demonstrated before. But now to know is simply and absolutely more perfect than not to know, to understand than not to understand. Therefore it is necessary that what is the first and principal cause of an intelligent thing should not be devoid of intelligence; otherwise the cause would be less perfect than the effect. And this is the demonstration which the Psalmist uses in Psalm 94, when he refutes atheistic and profane men: "Understand, you stupid among the people! Fools, when will you be wise? Does he who fashioned the ear not hear? Does he who formed the eye not see? Does he who disciplines nations not punish? Does he who teaches mankind lack knowledge?"

XXXV. Moreover, we see that nothing in the world was made rashly, and that nature in all things acts for a certain end, and in the way that is fitting to attain that which is best. Thus there is none of those who investigate the works of nature who does not easily acknowledge that the daily and annual motion of the sun is so moderated as it is, so that by means of the alternation of days and nights, and of the various seasons of the year, the different species of things in nature can be generated and preserved. But on earth all things are arranged for

the use and advantage of animals, and especially in animals those so many and so various organs are made for certain uses, and each has its own end, one to serve for nutrition, another for generation, another for the functions of the senses - and so on for the rest, which are almost innumerable. But now it is necessary that what acts for an end, and tends to some end, either knows that end, or, if it does not know the end, is directed by another to whom that end was proposed, as an arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Therefore that nature which is supposed to be the cause of things necessarily either is something intelligent, and thus God himself, or is directed by some supreme intelligence, which will certainly be God.

XXXVI. Moreover, if anyone considers both the whole system of this world and the arrangement of those bodies of which it consists, and their various motions and flexures, and the individual things which are observed in it - the plants, I say, and animals and other things which we can see and handle - he will not be able to deny that in all these things shine forth infinite marks of the highest wisdom, and that not only the structure of the whole universe, but of any animal is so wondrous and stupendous, and in it all proportions are so accurately and exactly observed, and all things are so diligently provided for, that the human mind cannot sufficiently grasp and marvel at such great wisdom. Who therefore, unless entirely stupid and foolish, could refer works made with such art and industry, and arranged with such order and harmony, to a cause which is altogether brute and devoid of all wisdom and knowledge?

XXXVII. But to press still more those impious ones who are unwilling to acknowledge any other cause of things than some brute nature, we ask them what they understand by the name of nature. For commonly by nature, which is opposed to chance and to those things which act from counsel and deliberation, is understood the order and series of causes of which this universe consists, according to which order we see various generations taking place on earth, and other changes in the elementary region. For thus, when a plant generates another plant, and an animal another similar animal, we say it is the work of nature; and similarly, when the snows cover the earth in winter, but in summer the earth gapes with heat, we refer those things to nature. But here recourse is had in vain to that nature. For that nature, as is clear from what has been said, is nothing other than the order of agents and patients of which this universe consists. But here the author of this order is sought, and what is it that produced the heaven, the sun and the earth, and disposed them in the order we see. What therefore is the nature which is the cause of this nature which now operates?

XXXVIII. Some impious men think that this nature, which is nothing other than the system of the world, arose from the various situation, figure and arrangement of the parts of matter, which being agitated by a certain measure of motion, spontaneously disposed themselves into this order which is now observed in the world, and that no other cause of things or other principle beyond this is to be sought. But by the same arguments by which we proved that the principal parts of the world, namely the earth, sun and planets, do not exist of

themselves, but have some cause and origin of themselves, we can also prove that those particles of matter do not exist of themselves either, but have their being from another. For that which is from itself cannot have any limits of perfection, as was shown before; but matter and its particles are most imperfect beings. Moreover, what is from itself is also for itself; but the parts of matter are not for themselves, but for something else, namely for the bodies which they compose and of which they are parts.

XXXIX. Moreover, whence is that division of matter, and the various magnitudes and figures in its parts? It is altogether necessary that there be some agent which so divided matter, and impressed various figures on its parts. For if all had their quantity and figure from themselves, there would be no reason for diversity among them. Nor could their figure be varied and changed. And accordingly matter would not be, as nevertheless it is, divisible to infinity.

XL. But especially, since we have demonstrated that motion and time cannot be from eternity, whatever may be the case concerning matter itself, it is necessary that that motion of the parts of matter, from which the whole disposition of things is supposed to have arisen, has some beginning of itself; and accordingly matter cannot have that motion from itself, but that motion necessarily is from an extrinsic principle. For not granting that, matter would be eternal and exist from itself, the contrary of which was proved before; nevertheless after eternal rest it could not be moved, unless some external mover impressed that motion on it. But who is that mover who first began to move and agitate sluggish matter, and so aptly measured its motion that from it would arise the system of the world? Here certainly it will be necessary to have recourse to some supreme mind, that is, to God.

XLI. To these add that it cannot fall into the mind of a sane man that certain corpuscles variously tossed about, without any proposed end, and without any directing mover, could have composed so admirable a structure of the universe, where such great order, such great wisdom, such great agreement and harmony of all the parts, which remains constant and invariable through so many ages, can be perceived by anyone not entirely blind. Indeed, if we consider the human body alone, I do not think there is anyone so stupid or mad who could persuade himself that so wondrous a fabric, in which so many organs can be counted, so artfully and elegantly made, so aptly disposed, serving for such various and multiple uses - a fabric, I say, of this kind has no other cause than the blind tossing of the particles of matter.

XLII. Therefore we conclude that this whole universe, and the individual things which are observed in it, do not exist of themselves but have some cause of themselves; but that cause cannot be chance and fortune, nor even some blind and self-ignorant nature, but necessarily is an eternal mind, best, most powerful, and most wise, which we call God. And thus we think that we have evidently demonstrated what we proposed - namely, that God exists.

Theological Theses,

On the Simplicity of God.

(This thesis was translated by Scholastic_X on twitter except for XVIII which Onku retranslated for the Greek)

Thesis I

We have already shown that God exists beyond any doubt. Next, we must consider the other question, namely, what God is, and with what modesty and sobriety we should inquire into the nature of God itself.

II. Here, above all, we must confess our weakness and ignorance. For it should not be thought that the human mind, as long as it dwells in this mortal body, can comprehend what God is in Himself. The Apostle teaches this in 1 Corinthians 13 when he says, "Now we see through a glass, darkly." And in 1 John 3, presenting as a privilege of future life that we shall then see God as He is. It is clear evidence that God, as He truly is, is no longer known to us. And certainly, if even the essences of flies and ants cannot be perceived by us, as the more modest philosophers acknowledge, how much less can we estimate by our knowledge what the nature and essence of God are.

III. Nevertheless, it should not be denied that we can form certain concepts that represent the divine nature to some extent, according to the measure of our understanding: and many things are attributed to God by us, and many things are enunciated concerning God which truly apply to Him, although they do not at all reach His immense perfection. And these are what are called divine attributes, by which the essence of God is somewhat shadowed, although very imperfectly and obscurely.

IV. Furthermore, these attributes are of two kinds. For something is either affirmed of God through them, or something is denied of God. Indeed, we can strive for knowledge of the divine nature in two ways. First, by attributing to Him all the perfections that are seen in created things. For since He is the first being and the first cause of all, it is necessary that whatever perfection is found in creatures should be found in Him in a more eminent manner. Secondly, by denying of God whatever is imperfect or entails any imperfection in creatures. For whatever is imperfect in created things must be removed from God.

V. It is easier, therefore, to say what God is not than to explain and grasp what He is. Therefore, as we investigate the divine nature, we must briefly run through and consider such divine attributes—not all and each, but certain principal ones that are more difficult or have greater use in theology.

VI. The first attribute by which the divine nature is in some way declared is God's Simplicity. By simplicity here, we do not mean a moral sense, but a physical and metaphysical one, as opposed to what is mixed and composite. For when simplicity is attributed to God, all composition is thereby removed from Him.

VII. Moreover, various kinds of composition are observed in created things. The first and most perceptible of these is that which is seen in every body, consisting of extended parts,

one of which is outside the other, and therefore can be divided and separated from each other. The second kind of composition to be considered here is that of subject and accident; just as whiteness consists in a body that sustains whiteness. And as in man, besides human nature, there are various accidents, such as virtue and vice, knowledge and ignorance, from which man is variously designated as learned or ignorant, vicious or virtuous.

VIII. Furthermore, there are certain more abstract and metaphysical kinds of composition that should be considered here. For in all created things, essence can be distinguished from existence—there is one thing that is essence and another that is existence. For by essence we mean that without which a thing cannot be conceived, and by which each thing is defined. Thus, the rational animal is the essence of man, because you cannot conceive of a man without conceiving of a rational animal; and this is the definition of man. By existence, however, we mean that by which a thing actually exists in nature. Now these two are entirely distinct in created things. For existence is not of their essence. For they can exist and not exist. And you can conceive of their essence even if you do not think of their existence; indeed, even if you think and make them not exist. For example, in winter, when there is no rose, the nature of the rose is contemplated. And so all created things can be said to be composed of essence and existence.

IX. There is also another kind of composition common to all created things. For in their essence there are certain gradations. For there are some things that agree with each other, and some that differ from each other. That by which they agree is called genus, and that by which they differ is called difference. Therefore, all created and finite things can be said to be composed of genus and difference.

X. Having explained these things, the question arises whether such simplicity as excludes all such compositions belongs to God. And on this point there is common agreement among Christian scholars. But each of these must be distinctly shown. First, it is asked whether that composition mentioned in the first place applies to God—whether God is extended in the manner of bodies and has parts outside parts, which is the same as asking whether God is corporeal or not. Many ancient philosophers, such as Anaximenes, Diogenes Apollinaris, who thought God to be airy, and Xenocrates, who imagined God with a celestial body, and Epicurus, who attributed to God a body similar to human, considered God to be corporeal.

XI. However, among the Jews, the Sadducees, believing there is no spirit, yet not denying God, seem altogether to have thought that God is not a spirit but a body. Nor have heretics been lacking among Christians who thought God to be corporeal. Such were the Anthropomorphites, who attributed human-like members to God, and once greatly troubled the Church. Indeed, Tertullian himself expressly affirms in his work *Against Praxeas* that God is corporeal, so it is not surprising that he also considered the soul to be a body. Nevertheless, Augustine, in his work *against heresies* (Book 86), excuses Tertullian somewhat in this regard, as if he intended to affirm simply that God is something real and subsisting.

XII. But whatever he and others may have thought, it is certain both from Scripture and from right reason that God is entirely incorporeal. First, for Scripture distinctly calls God a spirit (John 4). For Christ says, "God is spirit." Now, spirit and body are opposed to each other. Secondly, Scripture teaches that God is everywhere and fills all things (Psalm 139). "Where shall I go from your Spirit? Or where shall I flee from your presence?" (Jeremiah 23). But if God were a body and extended, He could not be everywhere and fill all things without there being two bodies together, and there would be penetration of dimensions, which is absurd and impossible. And finally, Scripture clearly indicates that God is not a body, by denying that any likeness of a body can be made that is similar to God (Isaiah 40). "To whom then will you liken God, or what likeness compare with him?" (Acts 17). "We ought not to think that the divine being is like gold or silver or stone, an image formed by the art and imagination of man."

XIII. The Anthropomorphites indeed based their error on the authority of Scripture, which says that man was made in the image and likeness of God, from which they inferred that God has members similar to humans. However, the image of God in man does not consist in the arrangement and conformation of limbs, but rather in the spiritual faculties of the soul—namely, intellect and will—and furthermore in the various gifts with which the soul is adorned by the grace of God. The fact that Scripture attributes human members to God in various places, such as ears, eyes, hands, and feet, is to be understood metaphorically. Ears and eyes, for example, are attributed to God to signify that nothing is hidden from Him, and all our words and deeds are thoroughly known and seen by Him. For ears and eyes are instruments of sight and hearing, by which we perceive what is done and said. Similarly, because hands are instruments of our actions, the hand of God signifies His power and that strength by which He accomplishes things. And so it is with the rest.

XIV. Besides the testimonies of Sacred Scripture, there are also arguments from philosophers to prove that God is incorporeal. First, as Aristotle demonstrates, God is the prime mover who moves all things while Himself remaining immovable. But no body moves unless it is moved by something else, as is clear by induction. Therefore, God cannot be a body. Furthermore, among things produced by God are immaterial substances, such as angels and the human soul, which are far superior to bodies. But God is something far more excellent and noble than any things produced by Him. Therefore, He must be incorporeal and immaterial to a much greater extent. Lastly, what is corporeal contains within itself something that is not completely perfect—namely, its individual parts from which it is composed, each of which is something less and less perfect than the whole itself. But since God is everywhere the first being and from Himself, nothing can be in Him that is not entirely perfect. For no reason can be given why something perfect would be lacking in that which exists from itself. Therefore, God cannot be a body.

XV. The second composition we mentioned is that of subject and accident, concerning which the question is whether there are certain accidents in God distinct from His essence. This, theologians unanimously deny, and not without the highest reason. For since God is the first

being and the first cause, it is necessary that He is entirely independent. Therefore, in Him there is nothing that depends on another. But every accident depends on another, namely, on its subject. Therefore, there is no accident in God. Moreover, whatever has an accident besides its essence thereby shows that its essence is not completely perfect. For if the perfection of the essence of something were complete, it could receive no additional perfection outside of its essence. If indeed it has from itself all perfection, no perfection can be added to it. But God has His essence completely perfect. Therefore, He is incapable of any accident. And, to put it briefly, every composition of subject and accident indicates imperfection, both of the subject, which borrows additional perfection from the accident, and of the accident itself, which is always shown to be imperfect because its existence always depends on the subject. But in God there is nothing imperfect, and therefore He is free from such composition.

XVI. But you may ask, are not many accidents attributed to God, such as wisdom, justice, goodness, mercy, and similar attributes, from which He is called wise, just, merciful, and good? I respond that all these are not said of God in the same way as they are of us. For those names signify certain accidents in created things, but in God they denote His very essence, which due to its all-encompassing perfection and various operations, assumes various names. Because such perfection cannot be signified by a single name, nor grasped by a single concept.

XVII. The third composition that we noted is that of essence and existence. For these two, as we have said, are entirely distinct in created things. In them, there is one notion of essence and another of existence. Indeed, the whole essence of created things can be conceived without existence, and existence does not enter into their definition. This is because they can both be and not be, and there is no created thing for which non-existence is repugnant. Therefore, concerning them, existence is something contingent, not necessary, and something accidental, not essential. But in God, it is otherwise. For His essence cannot be conceived without existence, and it is plainly contradictory to conceive of God as not existing. Nor can the essence of God be mentally abstracted and separated from His existence any more than the essence of a human can be separated from its being an animal or rational. For although in God there is no before and after in the way we conceive it, yet, according to our way of understanding, the first and most essential attribute of God is that He is the first being and necessary—that is, that He first and necessarily exists. And it is entirely of God's essence to be and to exist.

XVIII. Therefore, God is called by Plato αὐτὸ ὄν (being itself), which today's philosophers call "being through essence," that is, that which exists by the power of its own essence, and whose essence and nature it is to exist perpetually. And God Himself teaches this in the third chapter of Exodus, when He calls Himself "He who is," saying to Moses, "I am who I am." By this name, He signifies that being belongs to Him in a far different way than to the things created by Him. For to exist, as I have said, is something contingent with respect to creatures, but necessary with respect to God. For creatures, it is accidental, but for God, it is

essential. The being of creatures is participated and borrowed, but for God, being is proper to Him, and belongs to Him primarily and through Himself. And this is also the force of that name Jehovah, which is most proper to God. For it comes from "havah," to be, as if to say "He Himself is," that which is, and τὸ ὑπάρχον (that which exists). John in the Apocalypse explains this by that periphrasis ὁ ὢν καὶ ὁ ἦν καὶ ὁ ἐρχόμενος, "who is, who was, and who is to come." And so, since God's existence is of the nature of His essence, and one cannot be distinguished from the other as if it were something else, but the concept of one enters into the concept of the other, God cannot be said in any way to be composed of essence and existence, and He is entirely free from this composition.

XIX. Nor does the fourth composition that we mentioned, namely, of nature and subsistence, or that which constitutes a person and a suppositum, apply to God Himself. We have shown that these two are distinct in created things. For in them, nature and essence are one thing, and that which has a nature is another. Just as Peter and humanity which is in Peter are distinct. And this is because in addition to humanity, there is in Peter something that constitutes the person of Peter, namely, subsistence, which (as has been proven above) is really distinct from nature. And in Peter there is also a singular difference, which restricts and confines human nature in Peter to Peter, which otherwise is common to many. Therefore, in concrete and abstract nouns for created things, not the same thing is meant at all. For Peter is not his humanity. Nor is the humanity of Peter Peter himself. Just as Gabriel is not the nature of an angel, nor is the nature Gabriel himself.

XX. But that distinction has no place in God. For in God's divine nature, nothing is added which is different from it. For the divine nature is something singular, which cannot be multiplied. Therefore, it has no need of any difference that would make it proper to God, just as Peter's humanity is made proper by a certain singular difference. Nor is there in God any subsistence really distinct from His essence. But the divine persons and the divine essence are the same. Otherwise, it would not be a trinity but a kind of quaternity in God, namely, the divine nature and three persons, or subsistences. And this also demands divine perfection. For since nothing is lacking in the divine essence, but it is simply and absolutely perfect, and includes all perfection in its concept, nothing else is needed to subsist in it, nor can anything be added to it.

XXI. Therefore, with abstract and concrete nouns, one and the same thing is plainly signified in God. For God is His essence, and the essence of God is God Himself. A man is not humanity, nor is humanity the man himself. But deity is God, and God is deity. Similarly, any divine attribute can rightly and truly be affirmed of God, whether in the abstract or concrete. Indeed, God is not only good, but He is goodness itself; not only just, but He is justice itself. This manner of speaking is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For the Son of God is frequently called Wisdom in the Scriptures. And He is not only called the true God, but He is truth itself; not only the living God, but He is life itself, as in John 14:6 where He says, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life." Therefore, the sentiment of Gilbert of Poitiers, Bishop of Poitiers in Bernard's time, has been rightly embraced in schools, who taught that abstract

and concrete nouns do not signify the same thing in God, such as the words "God" and "deity," "Person" and "nature." And thus, in this respect also, God is altogether simple and devoid of composition.

XXII. Nor can the composition we spoke of earlier, namely, that of genus and difference, be attributed to God. For God is above every genus and is not included within any category of things. Genus is said to be what is common to many things and is predicated in the same way of many things. But nothing is properly common to creatures and God, nor is predicated in the same way of creatures and God. For if something were common to God and creatures, it would be nothing other than substance. And yet, the nature of God is more distinct from created substances than created substance is from accidents. Now, created substance is not in the same genus as accident. Therefore, much less is God in the same genus as created substances.

XXIII. Furthermore, since God does not have a genus, He cannot properly have a difference either. For difference is said to be that which contracts a genus common to several things to a particular species. And thus, in the divine nature, certain grades cannot be distinguished, nor is it composed of various grades. Instead, it is a single simple essence that differs from all others in itself.

XXIV. There remains one more type of metaphysical composition, namely, that of actuality and potentiality. Act here is said to be whatever perfects, determines, and constitutes a thing, and in one word, any perfection is an act. But potentiality is said to be that according to which a thing is capable of being perfected and determined, and in itself capable of receiving or undergoing something. Therefore, all created things can be said to be composed of act and potentiality. For in all of them, there is something that perfects and something that is perfected. And besides the perfections that are in them in act, there is nothing that they cannot receive something else, nor are they capable of any change.

XXV. But God is also immune from this composition. For in God, there is no potentiality, namely, passive potentiality as we understand it. Indeed, God is whatever He can be: nor can anything happen to Him or be received from Him, nor can anything be taken away from Him, since He is the first being entirely independent, and He has no cause that can act on Him. And this is what schools mean when they say that God is pure act, that is, He has no mixed potentiality. For in God, there is nothing that needs to be perfected by another or receives perfection from another. Indeed, God is wholly perfect, to whom nothing can ever be added, and from whom nothing can be taken away.

XXVI. Furthermore, from these considerations, it is clear that God is the most simple, and there is absolutely no composition in Him, since we have removed every type of composition. And it is confirmed by the fact that God is the first being, and therefore the first one. For being and unity are convertible. But perfect unity excludes composition. For what is composite is in some way not one but many, since it consists of many things. Moreover, the first being has nothing prior to itself. But whatever is composite is posterior to its composing parts and depends on them. And finally, things that are different do not agree in one unless

they are united by some cause. But God has no cause.

XXVII. Hence, it is also clear how true that axiom is, which is common in schools, namely, whatever is in God is God Himself. For this follows from the absolute simplicity of God. For if something were in God that God is not, then necessarily the divine nature would not be altogether simple, but there would be certain distinctions within it, one of which would not be another, and therefore God would be in some way composite.

XXVIII. From this, it also follows that all the attributes of God are one among themselves and with the divine essence, and they are distinguished not in reality but only according to our way of understanding. For since the divine essence is infinite and infinitely perfect, its entire perfection cannot be grasped all at once by us and exhausted in one concept. Therefore, we are forced to divide it into various concepts, each of which corresponds to the same thing, which, according to various respects and operations by which one thing suffices in itself, is considered in different ways.

Theological Theses, On the Perfection and Infinity of God.

Thesis I

In the latest theses we treated of the divine simplicity, which has a necessary connection with the supreme and absolute perfection of God. For indeed in corporeal things, those which are simpler are more imperfect. Thus the elements are more imperfect than compounds, and animals are more perfect than plants. Nor is there any created thing which for its perfection does not require some composition, and which at least does not need to be perfected by certain accidents. But supreme perfection requires absolute simplicity. God is most simple, because most perfect. Therefore, after having treated of the simplicity of God, reason demands that we now treat of his perfection.

II. That is called perfect to which nothing is lacking. But perfection often designates any excellence whatsoever. But something is called perfect in two ways: either absolutely, or in a certain respect.

III. In a certain respect, that is perfect to which nothing is lacking, not simply, but in its own genus, that is, which has all the perfection congruent and due to its nature. Thus a perfect horse is one to which nothing is lacking which pertains to the equine nature, and a perfect plant which has all the perfection fitting for a plant, although, speaking absolutely, there are many perfections which a horse or plant said to be perfect does not have.

IV. But simply perfect is that to which nothing at all is lacking, and which has every possible excellence. Such perfection belongs to no creature, but is the proper attribute of the divine nature. For every creature has a certain and determinate perfection - this one has one, that one has another; but God contains in himself whatever perfection can be had, nor can any excellence be conceived of which the divine nature is devoid.

V. But this supreme perfection of the divine nature is gathered from two things: 1. From the fact that God is the cause of all things. 2. From the fact that God has no cause, but is through himself and from himself.

VI. For it is most certain that in an effect there can be no perfection which is not somehow in the cause. Since therefore God is the first cause of all things, there can be nothing of perfection in anything which is not found in God. And Scripture indicates this, when noting some perfection in things made by God, it argues from this that God has such perfection much more. As in Psalm 94, the Prophet says, "He who planted the ear, does he not hear? He who formed the eye, does he not see?" And in Isaiah 66, "Shall I who cause others to give birth not give birth myself, says the Lord? Shall I who grant procreation to others be barren?"

VII. Therefore it must be held tightly, and as a firm and certain axiom, that absolutely no excellence and perfection is found in any creature which is not in God in at least some way. But for a fuller understanding of this matter, it should be noted that there are two kinds of perfections. For there are certain perfections which are simply such, that is, which, speaking absolutely, it is better to have than not to have, and which exclude no greater perfection. These the Scholastics call perfections simply simple. And perfections of this kind are life, intellect, freedom of will. For speaking absolutely, it is better to live than not to live, to understand than not to understand, and to be endowed with free will than not to be endowed. Nor is there any perfection, however great, which cannot consist with life, intellect and free will.

VIII. But besides, there are certain other perfections called not simply, but in a certain respect. But these are those which indeed in their genus express some perfection, but which nevertheless is necessarily conjoined with imperfection, nor can be separated from it as long as it retains its own nature. And therefore there are certain greater perfections which cannot consist with a perfection of that kind. And accordingly, speaking simply and absolutely, it is better not to have such a perfection than to have it. Of this kind is the sensitive and vegetative soul. For although in its genus it is a certain perfection to be vegetative and sensitive, nevertheless those perfections connote a certain imperfection, and there is a certain greater perfection which cannot consist with them, as for example, the perfection of an angelic nature. And therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it is better not to be sensitive than to be sensitive, not to be vegetative than to be vegetative.

IX. Secondly, it should be noted that a perfection can be in something and be contained in two ways: namely, as the schools teach, either formally and properly, or virtually or eminently. That has a perfection formally to which that perfection belongs according to its whole nature and essence, so that it can be denominated from it. Thus fire has heat formally, water has cold formally, because heat and cold properly and according to their whole nature inhere in water and fire, so that fire can properly and without any figure be denominated hot, and water cold.

X. But to have a perfection eminently and virtually is to have in oneself something more

perfect, and which contains the whole power of that perfection which is said to be had eminently - and this, either because it can produce that perfection, or because without it, it can accomplish whatever that accomplishes, excluding all imperfection. Thus, according to the mind of the Peripatetics, the Sun does not have heat formally, and is not properly hot; but nevertheless it has heat virtually or eminently, because it can produce heat, and accomplish whatever fire, which has heat, accomplishes. Thus sight and hearing are not formally in angels, for they do not have a sensitive nature; but nevertheless they have those senses virtually and eminently, because they have through their intellect in a more noble way the knowledge which man has by means of those senses.

XI. These things having been thus noted, we say that those perfections of creatures which we have called in a certain respect are indeed not properly and formally in God; nevertheless, God has all of them virtually and eminently.

XII. That they are not properly and formally in God is manifest per se. For, as has been said, they note and carry with them a certain imperfection. But in God there is no imperfection. Moreover, those perfections cannot co-exist in all the same subject. For one and the same thing cannot simultaneously have a human, equine, and bovine nature - and be simultaneously dry and humid, hot and cold. But those things necessarily constitute diverse things, and require diverse subjects. And finally, if all those things were formally in God, they could be said and affirmed of him. Which nevertheless no one does not see to be false.

XIII. But although those perfections are not in God according to their proper notion, nevertheless they are in God, as was said, virtually and eminently, since God has in himself the power of producing them, and without them he can effect whatever they can effect. Thus God does not have formally in himself the nature of a plant or animal; but he has something more perfect in himself which contains those virtually, for they are from God whatever they are, and it is God who produced them and can produce them. He does not have ears and eyes, nor is he properly endowed with sight and hearing; but he is the one who planted the ear, and who formed the eye, and thus who without ears and eyes perceives all things which are done and said.

XIV. But those perfections which are simply such, and which, speaking absolutely, it is better to have than to lack, are found formally and properly in God. For in God they are according to their proper form and essence - life, intellect, will, wisdom, goodness, justice, and other things of this kind; and thus God can truly and properly be called living, intelligent, free, wise, just and good.

XV. But, you will say, those names properly signify certain accidents, for intellect and will are natural powers, but wisdom and justice are certain habits adorning the intellect and will. But in God there are no accidents. And therefore the perfections which are signified by those names cannot be properly and formally in God, but only eminently, like those perfections which are called in a certain respect. I respond, intellect, will, wisdom, justice, and the like can be considered in two ways. Either according to the mode in which they inhere in creatures. And

thus they are accidents which have something of imperfection mixed in. Or precisely, as a certain general concept is formed of them which abstracts from all imperfection, and is common to God and creatures by analogy. In the former way those perfections do not properly belong to God. But in the latter way they formally inhere in God, and can be truly and properly enunciated of God. For when we hear those words - intellect, will, wisdom, justice - we can conceive a certain absolute perfection, and one which does not include any notion of an accident. And thus they can be rightly and fittingly attributed to God. For those perfections considered in this way are truly within the divine essence.

XVI. From these things, therefore, it is manifest that there is no perfection in anything which is not somehow in God - namely, formally, as those perfections which are called simply simple; or eminently and virtually, as the others which are called perfections in a certain respect. And this because God is the first and principal cause of all things. From which it follows that whatever perfection there is in things emanates from him, and thus pre-exists in him, so to speak; nor can any excellence at all be given which is not derived from him, and thus which does not reside in him as in a fountain. For what is derived and flows from another cannot but be in some way in that from which it flows and is derived.

XVII. But besides, that in God is all perfection which can be and be had, is also manifestly proven from this, as was already said, that God who is the first cause of all things himself has no cause, but is the first being altogether independent, who is from himself, not from any other. For that the nature and perfection of created things is certain and determinate, so that this one has one perfection, but that one has another - this comes about because they received their being from another. For that distinction of theirs, and that determination, must by all means be referred to the efficient cause, which granted to each such a nature, and that degree of perfection, not another. And thus the first being, which did not receive its being from another, but exists through itself, and by the force of its essence, cannot have a certain measure of perfection, and be something determined to this and that; but is itself the fountain and first origin of all being, which contains in itself all entity and perfection.

XVIII. And certainly if any perfection is absent from God, it is necessary that that perfection either is something possible, or not. If it is not something possible, but something which involves repugnance, certainly it is not a perfection, but a mere nothing; nor can God, because he does not have it, be said to lack any perfection. But if it is something possible which is, or can be, since God is the first being, and the first cause, on which all the rest depend, it neither is, nor can be, except by the power of God, and consequently it is not absent from him, but is contained in him at least virtually and eminently.

XIX. God therefore is a most perfect being, which not only surpasses individual beings in perfection, but also has in itself all the perfection of every being, nor does it lack any excellence which is or can be. And this is the supreme perfection of God, which the Hebrew word Shaddai expresses, which is one of the divine names. For Dai in Hebrew is sufficiency. And therefore Shaddai properly signifies him to whom nothing is lacking, and who needs nothing, but in himself, and from himself has all-sufficient sufficiency. In Greek you may say

αὐτάρκης, who suffices for himself and can alone accomplish all things, whence it is not badly translated "almighty."

XX. And this is the name which God assumed when making a covenant with Abraham: "I am," he says, "El Shaddai," God strong and almighty, or rather, all-sufficient. By which title God intimated that that covenant was entered into not for his own sake, but for Abraham's; nor was anything lacking of those things which he promised him. No created thing is such that it suffices for itself; some need others, nor is there any which at least does not need the continual help of God. But it is proper to God to have all things from himself, and not to need anything. And therefore creatures are capable of progress, and can always receive something; but to God nothing can harm, nothing can benefit. Nor does any good or evil ever reach him.

XXI. Moreover, from that supreme perfection and sufficiency of God it follows that he is infinite, and has an infinite essence. For since God has all perfection which can be and be had, it is certain that nothing is better and more perfect than him, or can be conceived; and thus it is necessary that he be infinite. For infinite good is better than finite good.

XXII. Moreover, the essences of created things are said to be finite for this reason, because the perfection of each one has a certain term and limit, beyond which it does not extend. Namely, this one has one perfection, but that one has another. And each is contained within its own boundaries, nor do they have the perfections of others. Thus there is a certain essential perfection in an ox, a certain one in a horse, a certain one in a man; but a horse does not have the perfection of an ox, nor does a man have the perfection of a horse, but each of those has its own. And in sum, there is no creature, however perfect, from which some perfection is not absent. Since therefore in God the matter is otherwise, and he contains all the perfection of every being, in a most noble and most eminent way, his essence cannot be called finite, but must be infinite.

XXIII. Add that the perfections which inhere in created things are included in certain terms beyond which they do not extend. And all their power and activity has a certain sphere which it cannot transgress. But the divine perfections lack any limit at all. Nor does God only have every perfection, but every degree of all perfection without any limitation.

XXIV. And certainly what is finite and limited must necessarily have been thus limited by some cause, which attributed such a nature to it, and assigned a certain degree of perfection. But God, as was already said, has no cause above him which could have limited him, and set certain terms for him, since he himself is the first cause of all things. And therefore it is necessary that God have a nature plainly unlimited, and lacking any end and term - which is to be infinite.

XXV. Nor does only reason and sound philosophy teach this infinity of the divine essence, but also the very text of sacred Scripture. For in Psalm 145 it is expressly said of God, "Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised, and of his greatness there is no end," or, as the Hebrew has it, En cheker, "there is no investigation," which comes to the same thing. For what has an end is not utterly uninvestigable.

XXVI. And certainly that infinity of the divine essence is sufficiently proven from this, that Scripture attributes to God infinite power, and also infinite wisdom. For the essence of God and the divine attributes are plainly one and the same, as is clear from the supreme simplicity of God, which was proved and demonstrated before. And therefore, if the attributes of God are infinite, it is also necessary that the essence be infinite. Besides the fact that a finite subject would not be capable of infinite power and wisdom. For between a subject, and what is in the subject, a certain proportion is required. But that, according to Scripture, the power of God is fully infinite is manifest from this, that Scripture expressly teaches that God can do all things, and absolutely nothing is impossible for him. For that power alone can finally be called finite which can extend thus far and no further, and thus for which something is impossible. But he who simply and absolutely can do all things - his power has no term beyond which it cannot extend, but lacks any end and term. And similarly it is often said of the intelligence and wisdom of God that it has no number or investigation - by which words, as is clear, an infinite thing is described.

**Theological Theses,
On the Immensity and
Omnipresence of God.**

Thesis I

Since the perfection of the divine essence lacks any limit at all, it follows that God, in whatever way he is considered, is infinite. For to be infinite is to lack terms, and not to be concluded within certain limits.

II. But although the infinity of God is equally diffused through all his attributes, nor is there anything in God which is not infinite, nevertheless it is usually considered especially in two things - namely, in the fact that he is circumscribed by no limits either of place or of time, but is far above all time and place, so that his magnitude has no term, nor his duration beginning or end. Of which the former infinity is called immensity, but the latter eternity - about each of which we must treat separately, and indeed now about the former.

III. God therefore is immense, because no term of his magnitude is given, and thus he is circumscribed or defined by no place. Which singular excellence of the divine nature is better perceived if one compares God in this respect with created things. Therefore all created things each have their own particular place. Just as their essence is finite, so they are in a certain and finite place. And indeed we see bodies concluded, contained, and circumscribed by a certain space of place, so that their parts correspond to the parts of space and place - a greater to a greater, and a lesser to a lesser. Which the Philosophers call being in place circumscriptively. Which mode belongs only to bodies, but is plainly alien to incorporeal substances, such as angels and the human soul. For since spiritual substances are not extended in the manner of bodies, nor do they have parts outside of parts, they cannot have parts corresponding to the parts of place, and be commensurate with place. Nevertheless

they are defined by certain places. Thus they are here so that they are not elsewhere. Hence they depart, and go elsewhere. And therefore by the Philosophers they are said to be in place definitively.

IV. But it is proper to God to be everywhere, and not to be defined by any certain place. For his infinite substance penetrates all things, and is present to all. Nowhere is he so that he is not elsewhere. He is excluded from no place, and yet is included by none. He is wholly everywhere, and wholly outside any place.

V. Wherefore it was wisely and acutely said that God is a circle whose center is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere. Nor also without reason did the Hebrew Masters call God Makom, that is, place - since God is not contained by place, but he himself is the one who made and contains all places, so that rather all things are in him than that he is in all things.

VI. But for a more accurate knowledge of this divine immensity, note that God is present to things in three ways - namely, by power, by presence, and by essence, as the Scholastics commonly say. Which you may more clearly and fittingly call by operation, by knowledge, and by substance.

VII. For God is said to be in all things by power, since he produces, conserves and governs all things, and "works all in all," according to that of the Apostle: Acts 17, "God is not far from each one of us, for in him we live, and move, and are."

VIII. But God is said to be in all things by presence, since he sees and beholds all things which are, become, or are done everywhere, as placed before him, according to that of the Apostle, Heb. 4, "Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight, but all things are naked and open unto the eyes of him." But this mode by which God is present to things is called by the Scholastics "by presence" for a special reason, since presence seems to be referred to knowledge. For according to etymology, present is that which is "before the senses." In which way we are said to be present to some place when we survey it with our eyes; and in which way the sun, although it is placed in the sky, is said to be present to us, and we to it, while we look at it.

IX. Finally, God is said to be in things by essence, because his substance is nowhere lacking, nor can be lacking; but, as we have said, it penetrates all things, and is diffused through all things, and inheres wholly through itself most intimately in each and every thing - so that there are given no recesses in any creature at all in which the whole divine essence is not found.

X. Although we say these things, we nevertheless acknowledge that the mode by which the divine essence inheres in things cannot be sufficiently understood by us, so that it cannot be expressed in words. Nor do we want to assert anything else by the aforesaid words than that the divine essence is absent from no thing at all, nor does it inhere in things by parts, since it is most simple and indivisible, as has been abundantly proved in other theses. And although that mode by which God exists in things is proper to him, and plainly singular, nevertheless a certain vestige of it seems to be given in the human soul, which is so diffused through the whole body that it is wholly in the whole, and wholly in any part, as the Philosophical schools

commonly teach.

XI. In these three ways God is everywhere present in the world, according to the common opinion of the Orthodox. And indeed there is no doubt about the first two. Nor is there anyone among Christians, as far as I know, indeed not even among the infidels themselves who acknowledge some God, who denies that God is everywhere present by his knowledge and power - so that there is nothing which escapes his knowledge, and to which his power cannot reach.

XII. But about the third mode, namely about presence according to substance, there has been found one or another who denied that God is thus everywhere. For among the Papists, Augustine Eugubinus, writing on Psalm 138 according to the Vulgate version, which according to the Hebrews is 139, contends that God according to substance is not outside heaven, and dwells only in heaven. But from the Reformed, Vorstius fell into a similar error at the beginning of this century, a Professor in the Academy of Leiden, who affirmed that God by reason of his substance is only in heaven, although he is present to us on earth by his power and wisdom.

XIII. Therefore, to assert for God the praise of his immensity, against that man and any who think with him, we will now prove two things, God himself favoring. First, that in the whole universe there is no place in which God is not present according to his substance; second, that God is not contained by the whole world, and surpasses it by his immense magnitude.

XIV. As for the first, sacred Scripture teaches most openly that there is no place in the whole world in which God is not present, and indeed by a real and substantial presence. This is especially gathered from the words of God himself, in Jeremiah chapter twenty-three, where he asserts that he fills the earth and heaven. Which cannot be conveniently taken of any presence other than a substantial one. For arguing against the false prophets, who pretended to be sent by God, and did not fear to ascribe their lies to him, not thinking that God was present as a witness and avenger, he rouses their stupor by these questions. "Am I a God at hand, says the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? says the Lord. Do not I fill heaven and earth? says the Lord." Where he proves that no one can be hidden from his eyes, since in the whole world no place is empty of him. And certainly, if God were present to the earth only for this reason, because from heaven he sees and rules the things which are done on earth, he could not rightly be said to fill the earth. For a king who rules France by his authority cannot be said to fill France. Nor does one who, stationed in a certain tower, beholds a field from afar, fill that field.

XV. Nor do the words of the Prophet in Psalm 139 less prove that omnipresence of the divine nature: "Where shall I go from your Spirit? Or where shall I flee from your presence? If I ascend to heaven, you are there! If I make my bed in Sheol, you are there! If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there your hand shall lead me, and your right hand shall hold me." Which words teach that God is as much on earth as in heaven, and in sum that there is absolutely no place where he is not present. Nor can

those words be twisted to God's power and knowledge alone without departing from the scope of the Prophet. For since there are two ways in which someone can be so hidden that he is not seen by another - one, if he is in a place where the other is not; the other, if he is indeed in the same place, but the darkness impedes vision - the Psalmist affirms that neither avails him. And indeed he removes the former by the cited words, where he teaches that God is absent from no place. But the latter by the following words, where he affirms that to God darkness and light are alike. Nor do the words of the Prophet permit that interpretation. For when the Prophet says of the highest place, *sham attah*, "you are there," both the propriety of the words and the truth of the matter require that we understand the presence of the divine substance. But it is manifest that when he then adds about the lowest place, *hinneka*, "behold, you are there," he is speaking of the same presence, and wants to say that God is thus present on earth as in heaven, and thus that he is there also according to his substance.

XVI. To this also can be referred what is read in Isaiah chapter 66: "Thus says the Lord: Heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool; what is the house that you would build for me, and what is the place of my rest? All these things my hand has made." Where God proves that he cannot be included in man-made temples, not by an argument drawn from the distance of the place in which is his proper seat and dwelling, as Vorstius seems to have dreamed, but from the magnitude of his substance, by which he fills the whole world. And certainly he who sits on a throne touches the footstool no less with his substance than the throne itself. And thus God, saying that heaven is his throne and earth the footstool of his feet, signifies that he is present to the earth with his substance no less than to heaven itself.

XVII. But besides, that God is on earth according to substance no less than in heaven is clear from the fact that he operates immediately on earth. For it is no less impossible for someone to immediately effect something where he is not, than when he is not. But that God acts immediately on earth is manifest from the creation and conservation of the earth, and then from the miracles produced on earth. For creation and conservation, and also the working of miracles, are immediate actions of God, in which God uses no instruments, but acts immediately through himself. And therefore the Apostle in Acts 17, from that perpetual conservation and sustentation of things, by reason of which we are said to live, move, and be in God, gathers that God is not far from each one of us, and thus that he does not dwell far from us in heaven, as in a habitation outside of which he is not.

XVIII. And to this also the analogy of faith leads us. For from faith it is certain that the divine nature in Christ is personally united to the human nature. And thus all the fullness of divinity dwells in Christ bodily and substantially, as the Apostle teaches in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Colossians. But Christ according to the human nature long dwelt on earth. And therefore it is necessary that the divine substance also be present on earth, unless someone wishes to dissolve the union of the two natures in Christ, or to say that the human nature of Christ was personally united with the divine nature even then when it was distant from it according to place.

XIX. Therefore there is no place in the universe where God is not present, not only by his power and virtue, but also through his essence which penetrates all things and is diffused through all things. But besides, what we undertook to prove in the second place, the magnitude of God is so great that, filling the whole universe, it is nevertheless not contained by it, but far surpasses it. Solomon teaches this in the first book of Kings, chapter eight. For after he said about the temple which he had recently built, "I have built a house for you to dwell in, a place for you to abide in forever," lest anyone think that God was henceforth to be included in that magnificent house, like the idols of the nations in their temples, he removes an absurd thought of that kind. "Behold," he says, "heaven and the highest heaven cannot contain you; how much less this house that I have built!" Where by "heaven of heavens" he understands the outermost heavens, which contain the whole world, which he asserts cannot contain, that is, hold and include God. Which words cannot be taken except of the substance of God, but not of the power of God and the exercise of his providence. For to whom so stupid and inept could it come into mind that the power and providence of God is concluded in a single house? Nor was it necessary for Solomon to meet such a thought.

XX. Moreover, that God is not included in the world, but is greater and higher than the whole world, Zophar manifestly teaches in Job chapter eleven: "It is higher than heaven, deeper than Sheol, longer than the earth, and broader than the sea." For certainly if God were concluded by the outermost heaven, he could not be said to be higher than heaven.

XXI. And to this also pertains what God, in Isaiah chapter forty, is said to have "measured the waters in the hollow of his hand and marked off the heavens with a span," and finally to be so great that before him the nations are like a drop from a bucket, like the dust on the scales; indeed, they are as nothing, and less than nothing and emptiness. By which words so great a magnitude is attributed to God that, in respect to it, this whole universe is a small thing and as if nothing. And certainly if God were concluded by the universe, and were not superior to it, his magnitude would have an end, since the world is something finite. But the Psalmist expressly affirms that there is no end of the magnitude of God: Psalm 145, "Great is the Lord, and greatly to be praised, and En cheker, there is no searching out of his greatness," that is, as the Vulgate rightly translates, "there is no end." For why is there no searching out of the magnitude of God, except because it has neither measure nor end?

XXII. And certainly, since God by his will created this world out of nothing, it cannot be denied that he could by equal faculty, if he so desired, create more other worlds to infinity, and without a fixed number - from none of which, however, would he be thought to be absent. Nor would there be any reason why he would be in this one, but not in another. Besides the fact that if God is included in this world, and is not outside this world, how could he work outside this world and create another world, since immediate action is required for production from nothing? From this, therefore, it follows that the magnitude of God has no end or limit, much less that it is confined to heaven.

XXIII. But, you will say, how is God outside the world when outside the world there is nothing? Is God in nothing? I respond that God is outside the world in the way that before

the world was founded he was where the world is. Namely, God does not need a place, but is himself his own place. According to that of Tertullian in his book against Praxeas: "Before all things God was alone, himself to himself, both place, and world, and all things." Which others mean when they say that God outside the world is in himself, just as before he was in himself. And this after Augustine on Psalm 122: "Before God made the saints, where did he dwell? He dwelt in himself." To which also pertains that of Bernard: "There is no need to ask further where he was; besides himself there was nothing." And this is the sense of those verses which are read in Dionysius the Carthusian:

"Say where he was then, when besides him there was nothing?

Then, where now, in himself, since he suffices for himself."

To which it must be added that indeed outside this world there is no real and actual place, but nevertheless there is a possible place. Certainly God can there create bodies and places where he will be without any motion and change of place for himself.

XXIV. But what moved Vorstius and a few others to limit the magnitude of the divine essence, and to think that the substance of God is included in heaven, are many places of Scripture where heaven, opposed to earth, is described as the dwelling place of God and the place in which he resides. As what is read in Psalm 115: "The heavens are the Lord's heavens, but the earth he has given to the sons of man." And Psalm 123: "To you I lift up my eyes, you who are enthroned in the heavens." But if for this reason it must be thought that the substance of God is contained in heaven, and is not outside heaven, since God is said to dwell peculiarly in heaven, by equal reason it will have to be concluded that God was once included in the temple of Jerusalem, since God is often also said to have chosen that temple as a house and seat in which he would dwell. And besides, both the whole Church conjointly, and each of the faithful separately, are called in Sacred Scripture the temple of God, in which God is also said to dwell. And yet who from this would gather that God is present by substance nowhere else than in the Church and its members?

XXV. Therefore it must be known that although God, as has now been shown, is said to be in certain things and persons in a singular way, for certain reasons indicated by us, this does not prevent him from existing in all things, in the way also explained above. Indeed, so great is he that, although he is certainly present in the world, yet he is not contained by the world, but by his immensity infinitely surpasses the world.

XXVI. Nor should it be feared that God will be defiled by the filth of places. And lest, if his essence is diffused through these lower and earthly things, where so many polluted and sordid things occur, he thereby contract some pollution and uncleanness. For since God is a spirit he cannot be touched by a body. And since by an infinite interval of nature he surpasses every creature, he cannot receive or suffer anything from a creature. Moreover, it is indeed true that certain things are corporally unclean and sordid with respect to us, or another creature, whose nature they offend, corrupt, or vitiate. But with respect to God no thing is sordid or polluted. But only sin, which is not a thing, but a defect and vitiation of a thing, and which God neither makes nor touches, is spiritual uncleanness and an

abomination before God.

XXXI. Moreover, from that immensity of God, who fills all places both actual and possible, it follows that he is immobile, and cannot change place. For what changes place and is moved from place necessarily must leave one place and acquire another. But what is already everywhere, and fills all places, can acquire no place, nor leave any place. And certainly the power of moving oneself from place is indeed a great perfection in a finite substance, which, since it cannot be in many places at once, can by the benefit of that faculty successively be present in innumerable places, and thus in a certain way compensate for its finitude and smallness, so to speak. But the infinity and immensity of God makes it so that he does not need that help, since through his immensity he has in the most perfect way whatever can be supplied and acquired through local motion in a far more imperfect way.

XXXII. Wherefore when God is said in Scripture to ascend or descend, to approach or recede, to go here and there, these things must be taken figuratively, not of some change of place in God, but of the various operations which God begins or ceases to produce here or there.

Theological Theses, On The Eternity of God and His Immutability.

Thesis I

Eternal is frequently said in Scripture of that which indeed has a beginning of duration, but will not have an end: thus that blessed life which God promises to those who believe in Christ is often called eternal, and eternal also is said to be that punishment which by the just judgment of God is one day to be inflicted on the impious and impenitent - as when the end both of the pious and of the impious is described with these words in Matthew, chapter 25, verse 46: "And these will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life."

II. Eternal is also sometimes said of that which will indeed at some time have an end, but yet on account of its long duration seems to imitate eternity - thus, although heaven and earth ought one day to pass away, yet in Ecclesiastes 1 it is said that the earth stands forever; and in the same sense in Deuteronomy, chapter 33, mention is made by Moses of the eternal hills; and to this also can be referred what in the seventeenth chapter of Genesis God promises to Abraham that he will give to him and to his seed all the land of Canaan for an eternal possession.

III. Besides, that which during a certain course ought to continuously take place is said to be done eternally. In which way that of Exodus 12 must be taken: "You shall celebrate this day with an everlasting rite," where the Passover feast is treated of, since the legal rites and Mosaic worship had to obtain until the time of emendation and the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ.

IV. Indeed, although the life of men is most brief, sometimes what is never to be finished

through the whole life of a man, but ought to take place up to death, is said to be done forever - as when it is said of a Hebrew servant who in the seventh year was unwilling to use the freedom offered through the law, "He shall be a servant to his master, le-olam, forever," Exodus, chapter 21. To which pertains that of Horace: "He will serve forever who will not know how to use a little."

V. But eternal is properly said of that which simply and absolutely lacks beginning and end of duration; and this is that eternity which is usually predicated of God, and considered among his attributes. For the essence of God is altogether devoid of beginning and end. God neither began to be, nor will ever cease to be. And as the magnitude of God is so great that it cannot be contained or defined by any place, so the duration of God is not limited by any time, but precedes and surpasses all times.

VI. But Scripture teaches this openly in many places, but especially in Psalm 102, where the Prophet, comparing things which among visible things are most permanent, namely heaven and earth, teaches that those once had a beginning, since they are the work of the hands of God, and will one day have an end; but that God always remains, and perpetually both was and will be the same. "Of old," he says, "you laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands. They will perish, but you remain; they will all wear out like a garment. You will change them like a robe, and they will pass away, but you are the same, and your years have no end." Which perpetual permanence of God David also celebrates, Psalm 92: "But you, O Lord, are on high forever." And Moses the man of God, Psalm 90: "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever you had formed the earth and the world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God." To which also looks what he adds: "For a thousand years in your sight are but as yesterday when it is past" - because, namely, to the immense and unlimited duration of God, neither a thousand years, nor any designated time has any proportion.

VII. Therefore God in Isaiah chapter 9 is called the Father of eternity; likewise the first and the last, chapter 41 and chapter 57, the high and lofty One who inhabits eternity. To which pertains also that description by which God designates himself in chapter 1 of the Apocalypse: "I am the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, says the Lord God, who is and who was and who is to come." By which we are taught that the duration of God encompasses all times - past, present, and future - and that God can most rightly be called the beginning without beginning, and the end without end, because, namely, since he is the beginning of all things, he himself lacks beginning, nor can he have any end, since he is the end to which all things are referred.

VIII. But in this matter, reason manifestly agrees with Scripture. For whatever arguments demonstrate that there is one first Being on which all others depend, and from which they have their origin, arguments of which kind were brought forward and set forth by us in those Theses in which we demonstrated that God exists - those arguments, I say, necessarily prove that that first Being, namely God, is also eternal, and did not have any beginning of duration. For a Being which is first, and the cause of others, cannot have been made -

indeed it was not made by another, otherwise it would not be first, but there would be given another Being prior to it; nor also by itself, since in order to be made it would have had not to be, in order to make, it would have had to be - which things are manifestly contradictory. But what is and was not made never began to be, and thus is eternal. Wherefore that august name of God, יהוה, which signifies that God is through himself and from himself, and he who makes it so that all the rest are, and thus the first and independent Being, includes and connotes the eternity of God. And therefore by the authors of our vernacular version it is not badly translated l'Eternel.

IX. Moreover, as the essence of God does not simply lack a beginning of duration, but it is impossible for it not always to have been, so also it is simply and absolutely necessary that it endure perpetually and never have an end. For as God is from no one, nor received his being from another, so he can be destroyed by no one, nor lose his being. Wherefore by the Apostle he is called ἀφθαρτος, incorruptible or immortal, 1 Timothy 1:17.

X. From which it is clear that that eternity which belongs to God is a proper attribute of the divine nature, which can be communicated to no creature. For since creation is the production of a thing from nothing, every creature necessarily began, and at some time was not, since it passes from non-being to being. And although some of the Philosophers think that some creature can exist from eternity, nevertheless, since God is a most free agent who acts without any necessity, if any creature were from eternity, at least it could have not been from eternity, and have had a beginning of its duration, nor would it be necessary that it had always been; and similarly, although certain creatures will never have an end, like the Angels and human spirits, nevertheless there is no creature which cannot have an end, if indeed it had so seemed good to God; for just as he created all things from nothing, so all things at his nod can fall back into nothing - and this is the reason why in 1 Timothy 6:16 God alone is said to have immortality, namely because although certain things cannot be destroyed by any creature, yet there is nothing besides God which, speaking absolutely, cannot perish and fail.

XI. But the excellence of the divine nature shines forth not only in its perpetual and altogether necessary duration, but besides in this, that it always remains the same, nor do the gliding by ages add or detract anything to it. Since God is not only eternal, but also immutable. Most things not only have a duration circumscribed by rather brief terms, but also, as long as they endure, are in perpetual flux; for from their substance something continually flows out, and something is again added to it, until at last they entirely perish and are dissolved, as is seen in plants and animals. But if some substance is so firm that it always remains the same, at least it can receive new acts and new accidents, and to that extent is subject to various mutations. But God is devoid of all mutation whatsoever; he loses no perfection with time, nor does any accrue to him anew, but whatever perfection was ever in him, that now actually perseveres and will incessantly persevere, and whatever will ever be in him, that is now actually and was never not.

XII. Wherefore God is deservedly called pure act, because he is now actually whatever he

was or will be; nor is there in him any potency by which he could put off something which he has, or take up something which he does not have.

XIII. Also by the best right the life of God is said by Theologians to be not only interminable, but also all at once, because from his life, as from ours, nothing flows away with time, but God at any moment has at once whatever is in the whole of time at once, since the progress of time adds or takes away nothing for him, as for other things which are subject to change - to which Plutarch looks in his treatise on the saying inscribed in the vestibule of the Delphic temple. "God," he says, "being one, has filled eternity with the unique now" - because, namely, in the whole amplitude of time no moment can be taken in which he has something which he did not have before, or will not have hereafter, or does not have something which he had before, or will at some time have. Whence time is deservedly compared to a river perpetually gliding by, but we to a small branch of a tree which, floating on the river, is carried away by it, but God to a tree planted in the channel by deep roots, which that river, the image of time, in constant flux glides by unmoved and constantly remaining in the same state.

XIV. Besides, from this it is that Plato, and others after him, Philosophers, pronounced that of God neither past nor future, or "was" or "will be," but only present or "is" can properly be said - because, namely, the eternal duration of God indeed encompasses all times, past, present and future; but in the nature of God there is nothing past or future; for nothing of it has passed away, as also nothing has not yet come to it, but the same and unchanged it perpetually perseveres. But now the words of past and future time were invented to signify the changes of things which pass away with time, and are measured by time; for properly and strictly speaking, what is said to have been is what is no longer, as when in the Poet it is said "Troy was," and what is said to be future is what is not yet, as "There will then be another Tiphys." But although the words of past and future time in this sense are not congruent with God, this nevertheless does not prevent us from being able to truly say of God "was," provided we understand that he now perseveres altogether the same as he was before; likewise "will be," provided we understand that he is so from eternity and even now as he is going to be perpetually - which is to affirm the future of him, but without negation of past and present, and to affirm the past, but without negation of present and future, as when God is described in the place cited above, "who is and who was and who is to come" - which Augustine best explains in Tractate 99 on John: "Although," he says, "that immutable and ineffable nature does not admit 'was' and 'will be,' but only 'is,' yet on account of the mutability of the times in which our mortality and mutability is involved, we say not mendaciously, 'is,' 'was,' and 'will be'; he was in ages past, is in the present, will be in the future; he was because he was never lacking, he will be because he will never be lacking, he is because he always is."

XV. Moreover, God himself attributes to himself this immutability described by us, Malachi 3: "I am," he says, "יהוה the Lord, and I do not change"; and the Psalmist describes it excellently by opposition to created things which are subject to change, Psalm 102, which

we just now cited, where after he said that the heavens themselves, which had a beginning of their duration, are to be changed, and also at last to perish, of God he says, וְאַתָּה תִּהְיֶה, וְיָמֶיךָ לֹא יִסְּמוּךָ "You are the same, and your years will have no end"; and to this James also looks, 1:17, when he calls God the Father of lights, "with whom there is no variation or shadow of turning."

XVI. Nor does reason less evidently prove that God is devoid of all mutation whatsoever. For this is necessarily gathered from his absolute simplicity, which was before demonstrated by us in the Theses published on this argument; for whatever is changed, according to something remains, and according to something passes away - namely, the subject remains, but the form or some act departs from it; and accordingly it is necessary that what is changed falls short of the highest simplicity, and is in some way composed of diverse things. Therefore, since God is most simple, and in him there is not one thing and another, it is plain that no mutation falls upon him.

XVII. The same is also evinced from the infinite perfection of God, for if God were changed, that change would be made either for the better or for the worse - both of which are repugnant to the divine perfection. For what is changed for the better necessarily lacked some perfection which it acquires through that change; and what is changed for the worse, through that change loses some perfection, and thus cannot be supremely perfect. Add that no thing is subject to change, except either from its own impotence, or from the greater power of another; but to God, who is the first and independent Being, nothing is more powerful, nor can any impotence be attributed to him, since he lacks no perfection.

XVIII. And besides, if someone wishes to run through the individual species of mutation, it will be manifest that none can happen to God. For he does not begin or cease to be who is eternal by nature. He is not changed according to qualities and accidents, he in whom there are no accidents, but whatever is in him is his mere essence. He is not increased or diminished who is incorporeal and indivisible; and finally, he cannot be moved in place who is wholly everywhere.

XIX. But this attribute is so proper to God that it cannot be communicated to any creature. For nothing can be imagined which does not depend on God as on a first cause creating and conserving, and accordingly which does not so lie under his power that it could also be reduced to nothing, God so willing, and withdrawing his concurrence

Theological Theses, On the Life of God.

Thesis I

In the most common and general notion, and in common usage of speech, those things are said to live which in any way appear to move themselves to us; thus we say living water and living fire, because the flame seems to be stirred by many motions of its own accord, and also water gushing from a spring, to which the dead waters of ponds are opposed.

II. But properly and Philosophically, only that is said to move itself, and thus to live, which can move itself when placed in its natural place and state, and so that after it has naturally ceased from motion, and stopped working, it can again begin motion from itself. But when I say that what lives ceases from motion, I do not mean simply from all motion. For indeed in every living thing there is a certain continuous vigor and unceasing motion which does not cease except in death. But we do not say that it lives unless it can by nature cease from some motion, and again begin the same motion from an internal principle.

III. But in this definition of life, motion is not taken strictly, and as it is defined by Philosophers - the Act of a being in potency insofar as it is in potency - which motion in the subject necessarily supposes some imperfection, and for that reason is said in the schools to be the act of the imperfect; but in a general sense, by motion is understood any operation, and even that which is the act of the perfect.

IV. Moreover, the perfection of life, as can be easily gathered from the definition, consists especially in two things: first, namely, in the excellence and variety of motions and operations; then in the αὐτονομία of the agent, so to speak - that is, its independence from an external mover in acting, and its indetermination. And accordingly, those things live more perfectly which can exercise more and more excellent motions, and which are less dependent on and determined by another in acting.

V. But that we may gradually and as if by degrees rise to that life which belongs to God Most High, and about which we must treat here, it should be noted that God created and constituted many orders of living things in corporeal and visible creatures. For just as the industry and skill of men shines forth especially in fabricating various machines, which seem to move of their own accord, and serve for many uses in human life, so also the manifold wisdom of God manifested itself when, in this sensible world, he devised various automata, so to speak, and fabricated them with incomprehensible and utterly stupendous art, which we call living bodies. And certainly the works of nature are nothing else to one rightly considering them than works of divine art, just as conversely the works of human art are nothing else than works of nature insofar as it is directed by the human mind.

VI. First, therefore, many bodies adhering to and clinging to the earth can be discerned which are furnished with those organs, and endowed with that internal principle of moving which we call the soul, so that when the earth is opened by the heat of the sun, and the spirits contained in it are excited, they draw out and attract various juices from the earth, by the benefit of which they are not only nourished and grow, but produce leaves, flowers and fruits of different kinds, and also bring forth seeds, from which afterwards similar bodies spontaneously germinate and grow. And these are what we call plants, which are said by Philosophers to live a vegetative life, of which they enumerate three principal faculties: nutritive, augmentative, and generative.

VII. But besides that first and lowest genus of living things, on the surface of the earth, in the waters, in the air itself, there are very many bodies far more distinctly furnished with many and more admirable organs, and which are also endowed with nobler faculties, and can

exercise far more and more diverse motions. For not only do they have the power of nourishing themselves with nourishment received within, and of taking increase, and of procreating something similar to themselves; but besides they are not, like the former, fixed to one certain place, but are able to transfer themselves from place to place, nor are they, like plants, so determined by nature to one certain and simple kind of operations that they cannot be moved and act except always in the same way; but they often act in one way and another, and variously temper their motions, according to the diverse impressions which they receive within from various objects, by means of organs which Philosophers call the senses. And these are what are called animals, which of their own accord are stirred by various motions on the surface of the earth, in the air and in the waters, and perceive external objects through the senses; and thus above plants they possess the sensitive and locomotive faculty.

VIII. But men still much more eminent than all living bodies; in them we see a body similar to the body of brutes, except that it is furnished with more perfect organs; nor is there anything in brutes, which regards animal life, which is not found in them. But in them besides there lies hidden a certain principle of acting of a nature altogether different from that which is in brutes, from which proceed motions and actions which can in no way follow from the mere fabric of the organs, and any merely corporeal form; but must necessarily be attributed to a certain spiritual and immaterial principle - such as understanding and reasoning, knowing God and purely immaterial things, reflecting on oneself and one's own operations, and inquiring into the causes of things, and finally using liberty, and being master of one's own actions. Which argue that in men there lies hidden a soul of a kind altogether different than the sensitive and vegetative, namely, intelligent and reasoning, and therefore spiritual and immaterial.

IX. Wherefore man lives a far more perfect life than brute animals - not only because he exercises far more and more excellent actions, but because he moves himself, and acts from himself in a far more excellent way. For brutes, which lack reason and intelligence, neither set an end for themselves, nor direct themselves to an end, but are simply driven to an end by the author of nature, and are necessarily led there by impressions received through the senses from material objects. And so their operations are not in their power, nor do they properly have dominion over them. But man, using reason, himself sets an end for himself, and by choice rejects or chooses means leading to the end; nor in his actions does he necessarily depend on material objects and impressions of the senses; but directs his operations to an end deliberately and from his own judgment, and thus is ἀντεξούσιος, and master of his own actions.

X. And yet it must be admitted that among creatures some are found whose life is more perfect than human, namely, purely immaterial substances, such as Angelic spirits. For not only is their intelligence more noble, and their knowledge and power extend to far more things; but since they are not bound to matter, they depend less on the extrinsic in acting than men, who with respect to many motions which are exercised by them or in them

depend on and are determined by matter, and do not act otherwise, or rather are acted upon, than brutes.

XI. But now, if one rightly considers from the things which have been said in what life and its perfection consists, and institutes a comparison of creatures which are said to live with God, he will easily acknowledge that life belongs more properly to God than to any creature, and in a far more eminent way.

XII. For the most noble and excellent of living creatures indeed act and are moved by themselves, but in a certain respect, not simply. For not only do they have their essence and power of operating from God, and subsist and are conserved by him continually, but none of them act except acted by God the first agent, nor are any of them moved except by the power of God the first mover, in whom we live, move, and are, as the Apostle testifies, Acts 17, and who "works all in all," according to the doctrine of the same Apostle, 1 Corinthians 12. But God acts from himself simply and absolutely. For he depends on no one in acting. And since he is the first mover, he so moves himself that he is moved by no other.

XIII. Then, those which are most excellent among creatures indeed have in a certain respect power over their own acts, and are mistresses of their own actions, and therefore are called free, and ἀντεξούσιον is attributed to them; but that whole power depends on the supreme power of God, and is bent as it pleases him; and that dominion is not simple and absolute, but in a certain way precarious, and subject to the supreme dominion of God. And therefore God alone is absolutely ἀντεξούσιος, and Master of his own actions; and he alone enjoys absolute and utterly independent liberty in acting.

XIV. Besides, since the excellence of life is also estimated, as was said above, from the variety of motions and operations which are exercised by the living thing, indeed many creatures are found which move themselves by altogether various motions, and exercise manifold actions, and operate many and plainly diverse things; but nevertheless the faculties of all of them obtain a certain degree of perfection, and are limited and determined to certain kinds of actions, beyond which they can do nothing, nor are they able to accomplish anything. But God Most High can do not many things, but all things; and his power is utterly infinite and unlimited, nor is his power of operating defined and circumscribed by any terms.

XV. Add that just as creatures, even the most excellent, do not have life from themselves, but from God the first cause of all things, so also, speaking simply and absolutely, they can all be deprived of life, and cease from acting and existing, if indeed it seems good to God. But as God is from no one, so also his life can be taken away and abolished by no one. And so although certain creatures are called immortal with respect to others, because, namely, by the benefit of God they are going to live perpetually, and there is no second cause which can destroy and annihilate them; nevertheless, if creatures are compared with God, they all live a mortal and defectible life, but God alone is simply and absolutely immortal and incorruptible, and for that reason is said by the Apostle to alone have immortality, 1 Timothy 6.

XVI. Therefore, since God alone acts simply from himself, and is moved by no one, and has absolute dominion over his own operations, nor can ever be impeded by any in acting, much less be deprived of all motion and action, and also his power is plainly unlimited and undetermined, he alone also must be said to live simply and absolutely; but life belongs to creatures only in a certain respect, and by participation and dependence on God. And accordingly life is not said univocally of God and creatures, but equivocally and analogically.

XVII. For this reason nothing is more frequent in Scripture than to call God living, by which title it wants to oppose the true God whom we worship to false Gods, and to distinguish him from dead idols, which are destitute of all knowledge and power of acting.

XVIII. From this also arose the custom approved in Scripture of swearing by the life of God. For pious men in their oaths often use this formula, "The Lord lives." And God himself, when, to accommodate himself to us, he is introduced as swearing, uses these words, "As I live."

XIX. Nor is God in Scripture simply said to live, but is also called absolutely the living one, and the title of the living one is attributed to him as a certain proper name, as in Genesis 17, where that well by which God had appeared to Hagar the handmaid of Abraham is called in the person of that woman "the well of the living one who sees me." And Revelation 4, where the twenty-four elders are said to have worshipped "him who lives forever and ever."

XX. Hence also the Pagans called that supreme God whom they proclaimed the father of men and Gods Ζῆννα, as if you would say the living one, namely, from τοῦ ζῆν, which among the Greeks signifies to live.

XXI. Nor is God only called living, but life itself, as when the Son of God says in John chapter 14, "I am the way, the truth, and the life," and in chapter eleven, "I am the resurrection and the life." And certainly the supreme simplicity of God requires that he can be called life, since in him the matter is not as in creatures, in which to live and to be are distinguished as essential grades; but the life of God is his very being, nor must there be distinguished in him, as in us, a certain principle of living. Nevertheless, when Scripture says that God and Christ are life, it does not properly look to that; but rather by this it signifies that God not only lives in himself, but besides is a perennial fountain from which whatever of life, especially spiritual, is in creatures necessarily flows; and with whom we cannot have communion without becoming partakers of blessed and eternal life, according to that of Psalm 36, "For with you is the fountain of life; in your light do we see light." Nor does Christ our Lord look to anything else when he says in John chapter 5 that the Father has life in himself, and has granted the Son also to have life in himself, namely, that by this he may prove that the dead will hear the voice of the Son of God, and those who hear will live.

XXII. Moreover, here the scholastics are accustomed to ask, and attempt to explain, after Thomas, when all things are life in God; but that question is utterly frivolous and born only from a bad distinction, and little understanding of the text of the old Vulgate at the beginning of the first chapter of the Gospel according to John, where it joins those words as one sentence, "What was made, in him was life." Although however those words, "what was made," pertain to the preceding clause, "All things were made through him, and without him

was not any thing made that was made." But the following sentence begins from those words, "In him was life."

**Theological Theses,
On the Knowledge of God
Concerning the knowledge of things which is in
God.
In which is treated of the object of divine knowledge.**

Thesis I

The arguments which demonstrate that God exists, also prove that he is endowed with intellect and knowledge; for by them it is established that there must necessarily be given a first cause, not only most powerful, but also best and most wise, which sets the best ends for individual things, and most suitably and fittingly leads and directs each to its end, nor does anything shine forth more clearly in the works of God than his manifold wisdom, by which he fabricated the mundane bodies and various creatures in them with a certain stupendous art, and also disposed them among themselves in an altogether admirable order; and thus it is necessary that there be in him the highest and most excellent power of knowing and understanding.

II. And certainly, since among visible creatures themselves many are found which are endowed with sense, reason and intelligence, who can doubt that their author and maker knows and perceives things in a far more excellent and sublime way? According to that of Psalm 94, "He who planted the ear, does he not hear? He who formed the eye, does he not see?" For a cause cannot be less perfect than its effect; but now it is evident that what knows and understands is simply more perfect than what is deprived of all sense and knowledge; and speaking absolutely, it is better and more desirable to understand than not to understand.

III. And indeed there is no one who, having heard the name of God, does not immediately form the notion of an intelligent nature, which is endowed with the highest wisdom and power, not even excepting the Epicureans themselves, who, although they denied that God is the author and ruler of this universe, nevertheless confessed that God exists, and did not take away from him the knowledge and contemplation of things.

IV. But Scripture especially often proclaims the intelligence and knowledge of God. Thus in 1 Samuel 2:3, the Lord is called the God of knowledge, that is, God endowed with all knowledge. With respect to which David says, Psalm 147, "His understanding is beyond measure"; but in Psalm 139 he thus addresses God, "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high; I cannot attain it." From which it is that Paul exclaims, Romans 11, "Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God!"

V. But that we may have a full and distinct knowledge, as far as the weakness of our mind allows, of this wonderful knowledge which is in God, it must be considered first what its

object is, and to what it extends; second, what kind it is, and what is its nature; finally, of how many kinds it is, and what are its common divisions in the schools.

VI. As for the first, the object of divine knowledge in general is whatever can be known and perceived. For God knows all things, as John teaches, 1 John 3:20. And so, just as he is called omnipotent, so also he can be called omniscient. Which his infinity and supreme perfection, demonstrated by us elsewhere, plainly requires. For if God did not know all things, but certain things escaped him and were unknown by him, there would be absent from him some perfection, and his knowledge would have some terms and limits beyond which it would not extend, and thus would not be utterly infinite.

VII. But for a fuller and more distinct notion of divine omniscience, it is necessary to run through its various objects, and consider them separately. But the first and principal object of divine knowledge is God himself. For if intelligent creatures know themselves, how much more must this be thought of God? This the wisdom of God itself requires; for it is no small part of wisdom to know oneself. Nor can the most noble object, which is God, lie hidden from the divine intellect, which is the most noble of all. And indeed, if God did not know himself, he could not have taken counsel of creating things; for this it was necessary that he thoroughly know and have perceived his own immense forces and his wisdom, by which he could found, arrange and govern all things.

VIII. Moreover, God so knows himself that he comprehends himself. Which is not to be so taken as if the divine intellect concluded the divine essence with certain limits, as it were. For to comprehend a thing is nothing other than to know it as much as it is knowable, and so that nothing of it lies hidden from the knower, as Thomas Aquinas says; or in the divine essence, however infinite it may be, nothing can lie hidden from the divine intellect, which is similarly infinite. But such knowledge of God is proper to God himself, nor does it belong to any creature. For since all creatures are finite, they cannot grasp and comprehend an infinite thing. And to this can be referred that of the Apostle, "The Spirit searches everything, even the depths of God. For who knows a person's thoughts except the spirit of that person, which is in him? So also no one comprehends the thoughts of God except the Spirit of God," 1 Corinthians 2:11.

IX. But no less perfectly than himself, God knows all other things besides himself. For, as the Apostle says, Hebrews 4:13, "No creature is hidden from his sight, but all are naked and exposed to the eyes of him to whom we must give account." To which also pertains that of Job, chapter 28, "He looks to the ends of the earth and sees everything under the heavens."

X. But God knows things not only in general, and under some common notion, as they are considered in human sciences. Some Philosophers thought this, among whom Averroes is particularly remembered. For it is attributed to him that he taught that God only knows universals, but singulars do not fall under the divine intellect. But this is a manifest error, to which both the light of reason and Sacred Scripture openly oppose.

XI. For since God created individual things, and conferred being on each one of them by a proper and immediate efficiency, and that not rashly, nor by some natural necessity, but by a

certain counsel, and from the decree of his own will, he cannot be ignorant of them. For will a free cause, and one acting from judgment, not understand its own proper work, and not be able to perceive what it itself is able to effect?

XII. Nor did God once create and produce things, but he perpetually rules and moderates them, and most wisely directs each one to its end. But he cannot do this unless things are well known and perceived by him, not only in common, but one by one.

XIII. And indeed, since God is going to render to each one according to his works - liberally rewarding, namely, those which are well done, but punishing and avenging evil deeds according to their desert - it is necessary that God know each one, and have thoroughly perceived and known all the words, deeds, and thoughts of all.

XIV. Add that since God is immense, and his essence fills all places in an ineffable way, he is present and intimately present to individual things. But would God be ignorant of, and not perceive, those things which are nearest and present to him - indeed, in which he is, or which rather are in him - when not even a man, unless sleeping or not attending, cannot but perceive those things which he touches, and which are placed before him in the light? By which argument God, in Jeremiah chapter 23, rebukes the stupor of those who think that their frauds and hidden crimes can lie hidden from God. "Am I a God at hand," he says, "declares the Lord, and not a God far away? Can a man hide himself in secret places so that I cannot see him? declares the Lord. Do I not fill heaven and earth? declares the Lord."

XV. But since men themselves know and perceive singulars, who can with reason take away from God the knowledge of the rest? For will a man know anything which God will be ignorant of? Since whatever knowledge is found in man is as it were a certain drop drawn from the immense Ocean of divine wisdom.

XVI. Besides, a power which is most perfect of all necessarily extends itself to all things which can pertain to the object of that power. And accordingly, since the divine intellect is most perfect of all, nothing escapes it of those things which are intelligible. But everything which is, is intelligible, and thus singulars are also such, to which, according to the Philosophers, the notion of being especially belongs, and so it is necessary that they fall under the divine intellect no less, indeed more, than universals.

XVII. And certainly Scripture testifies that God knows the individual stars, and calls each one of them by its own name. Psalm 147, "He determines the number of the stars; he gives to all of them their names." An evident argument that he not only knows the nature of the stars in general, but that this and that individual star is well known and perceived by him.

XVIII. Nor should it be thought that God indeed knows individually things which are great and of some moment, like the stars, but the multitude and number of small and vile things escape his knowledge, as if it were not fitting for the divine intellect to advert separately to each one of them. Jerome seems to have thought this, writing on the first chapter of the Prophecy of Habakkuk, "It is absurd," he says, "to reduce the majesty of God to this, that he knows how many gnats are born or die each moment, what is the multitude of bugs and fleas and flies on the earth, how many fish swim in the water, and which of the smaller ought

to yield as prey to the greater."

XIX. But the arguments which we just now brought forward prove that God knows no less small and vile things than great and weighty ones. For God created no less small things than great ones. He is no less present and intimately present to small things than to great ones. And thus he also takes care of the smallest things. For not even one sparrow falls to the ground without our Father, that is, without his knowledge and permission. And even the hairs of our head are all numbered, as Christ teaches, Matthew 10:29-30.

XX. Nor for this reason is the divine intellect debased, because it knows small and vile things; just as the sun is not defiled because its rays often strike and illumine dung and filth.

XXI. Indeed with respect to men it is better to be ignorant of certain things than to know them; and it is a blameworthy thing and unworthy of a great and excellent intellect, if someone adverts to small and vile things. But this happens because the human intellect, since it is finite and not capable of many things, cannot suffice for knowing all things. And therefore if it seeks the knowledge of vile and minute things, and attends to them too much, by this very fact it must necessarily neglect those things which are of greater moment, and which it is harmful and shameful for it to be ignorant of. But in God the matter is otherwise. For the divine intellect, on account of its infinity, is not averted from the knowledge of great things by the knowledge of small things, or in any way impeded in it. Nor also is there fear that while it contemplates small and vile things, it will forget those which are weighty and momentous.

XXII. Add that with respect to God nothing can properly be called great or precious. For he needs none of them, nor can he derive any fruit from any thing which redounds to him, since he is αὐταρκής, and self-sufficient. Nor also is anything added to his magnitude. For he surpasses by his immensity things which seem however great to us to infinity. Nor are those things which seem greatest to us less distant from him than those which seem least, since between God and any creature whatsoever the distance is infinite, than which no greater can be given. And so, if God ought to know nothing which is not great and momentous before him, it is necessary to take away from him the knowledge of all things, because all things are to him as nothing, as Isaiah teaches in magnificent words, chapter 40, "Behold, the nations are like a drop from a bucket, and are accounted as the dust on the scales; behold, he takes up the coastlands like fine dust. All the nations are as nothing before him, they are accounted by him as less than nothing and emptiness."

XXIII. But again, in another respect it can be said that before God no creature is small and vile. For God saw everything that he had made, and it seemed to him very good, since in the least things also his power, goodness and wisdom shine forth; indeed especially in those little animals which we tread upon and hold as most vile, in which it pleased God to give specimens of his virtues, and as it were miracles, which can throw one rightly contemplating them into admiration and stupor, and illustrate the glory of God not a little.

XXIV. But that Sacred Scripture may render us more certain of the divine omniscience, it especially urges that God sees and beholds things which are most hidden to men, such as

the thoughts of hearts and counsels latent in the minds of men. "Sheol and Abaddon lie open before the Lord; how much more the hearts of the children of man!" says the wise man, Proverbs 15:11. And God often glories in this knowledge as proper to himself, asserting that he is the one who searches the heart and tests the minds, as is especially seen in Jeremiah chapter 17, "The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately sick; who can understand it? I the Lord search the heart and test the mind, to give every man according to his ways, according to the fruit of his deeds." Which Solomon, acknowledging in 2 Chronicles 6:30, attributes this glory to God, "For you, you only, know the hearts of the children of mankind."

XXV. But now, if one wishes to go through the distinctions of times, and from them distinguish the kinds of things, from there also it will be manifest that no kind of thing is unknown by God. For not only are present things known to God, however hidden, but nothing of past things escapes him, and he also foresees future things from afar.

XXVI. And certainly that the knowledge of past things must be attributed to God is clear even from the fact that God in Scripture recounts many things which happened many centuries before, and repeats the first origin of things from the beginning through Moses. This also makes it so that Scripture attributes memory to God, as when he is said to remember his covenant or oath. For although God is said to especially remember things because he takes account of them, or does something on account of them, nevertheless this very thing supposes that God well knows and holds them. Nor should those books be referred to anything else, in which God is said to write the things which happen and occur, Psalm 56:9 and Psalm 139:19. For by this Scripture intimates that God does not consign past things to oblivion, but that they remain known to God as certainly and distinctly as if they had been committed to writing by him, and were continuously read. But especially the exact knowledge of past things in God is argued by that universal judgment, in which he will one day render to each one for his past deeds, words and thoughts, whether good or evil, according to those last words of Ecclesiastes, "For God will bring every deed into judgment, with every secret thing, whether good or evil."

XXVII. But that God foreknows future things is proved by the innumerable predictions of future things scattered through the whole body of Sacred Scripture, and with which especially the books of the Prophets abound, like the book of the Apocalypse among the writings of the New Testament. And therefore Tertullian cleverly said that the prescience of God has as many witnesses as Prophets. And God claims this foreknowledge of future things as proper to himself, and wants to be discerned by it from the false Gods of the Gentiles, and to be acknowledged as the only true and living God, because namely he alone can announce future things, and actually announces them, as can often be seen in Isaiah, especially in chapter 41, where God through the Prophet thus addresses the fictitious deities of the Gentiles, "Declare the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that you are gods."

XXVIII. Moreover, God knows not only those things which are, were, or will be, but also

whatever can be, although they will never actually be. For since men themselves know that many things are possible, which nevertheless will never actually be posited, and will never exist in the nature of things, who will with reason take away from God the knowledge of things of this kind? Add that God cannot be ignorant of his own power; nor can he know his own power without knowing to what it extends. But God, besides those things which he made, or is going to make, can make and produce infinite things; and so it is necessary that he distinctly know that infinite things can be and become, which nevertheless will never be.

XXIX. But now, just as God best knows whatever is possible, so also he is not ignorant of what is impossible and cannot become. He knows that he cannot die, and deny himself, and that it is impossible for God to lie, which God himself asserts in his word. And certainly, since men themselves certainly and distinctly know that this or that cannot become, how much more must this be attributed to God? And since it pertains to the intellect to judge what is repugnant to become, and what is not, what is of this kind which can lie hidden from and escape the divine intellect, since whatever is in no way intelligible necessarily falls under the infinite intellect?

XXX. Therefore let it be concluded that God perfectly and distinctly knows all things which can be known and understood in any way whatsoever - singulars and universals, greatest and least, open and hidden, good and evil, past, present and future, finally, possible and impossible; of all which since the human mind perceives something, none of them can not be thoroughly known and perceived by the divine and infinite mind.

**Theological Theses,
On the Cause of Predestination.**

**In which it is expounded whether there is given in man any cause or reason of his
Predestination,
And on that matter the Doctrine of the Roman School is brought forward, and of those who
among Protestants are called by the singular name Reformed.**

Thesis I

In the preceding theses we observed that Predestination is taken in many ways in the Roman School. And indeed first, some restrict the word Predestination to that decree by which God from eternity absolutely determined to confer heavenly glory on certain men. But according to others, predestination only includes that decree by which God prepared for certain men means conducive to infallibly attaining heavenly glory. But today among most Theologians of the Roman School, both of those decrees are included under the name of predestination. And in this sense that word is commonly taken in this disputation.

II. Moreover, predestination taken under this notion can be considered in three ways, according to the Theologians of the Roman School. And indeed first, by reason of the act itself of the divine will, by which God destines men to salvation; secondly, by reason of the effects of that act, which are conferred on man in time, and which are all referred back to

grace and glory; finally, according to the termination and relation which the divine will had from eternity to those future effects. In the former way, all the Doctors of the Roman School confess, without any hesitation, that no cause of divine predestination can be given or thought of on the part of man, just as neither can the divine will, which since it is itself the cause of all things, can have no cause.

III. But here the question is about predestination considered in the second and third way, namely, according to the effects which God, as predestining and electing men, works in men or concerning men. And also according to the extrinsic respect which the will of God predestinating has to those effects to which it is freely terminated from eternity. Namely, it is asked whether there is any cause of all the effects of predestination in us, which is not to be numbered among those effects. Or what amounts to the same, whether God in electing and predestinating these and those considered and foresaw in them something which is the reason or motive of their predestination and election, to which, namely, whatever goods befall them by force of his predestination and election can be referred, as to a cause in some way moving and meritorious - and thus whether there is in man any cause or reason why he was predestined by God, and why this one was elected rather than another.

IV. This question regards only adults. For as far as little ones departing from this life before the use of reason are concerned, it is certain among all in the Roman School that there is nothing in them which can be the cause or condition of their election. And thus the whole controversy is whether in those predestined who depart from this life in adult age, there can be assigned any cause in any way meritorious, or any reason of their predestination and election, as to all its effects - and indeed such a cause or condition which always has a certain connection with predestination.

V. On which matter there are and were various opinions in the Roman School. For first, there were found some Scholastics who thought that the meritorious cause of predestination, as to all its effects, is moral good works antecedent to the grace of justification. Namely, that God from eternity elected to grace and eternal salvation those whom he foresaw, apart from any supernatural grace, would act well morally from the powers of free will, and thus in a certain way prepare themselves for grace, and invite God to give it out of a certain congruity. Gregory of Valencia attributes this opinion to Thomas of Argentina, Gabriel, and Ockham, old Scholastics - and likewise to Chrysostom Javelli the Dominican, who was writing in the preceding century.

VI. Others thought that the cause of predestination is merits, not indeed antecedent to grace, but subsequent to it. For they said that God from eternity decreed to confer grace on that man, and the remaining subsequent effects of predestination, whom he foresaw would rightly use accepted grace, and would have merits from God through divine grace. Which thing they explained by the example of some King who would want to give a horse to that soldier whom he thought would use the horse well, and thus on account of the future good use of the horse, would give the horse. As Thomas refers, question 23, article 5. And Durandus in Distinction 41, book 1 of the Sentences.

VII. To this opinion approaches and almost coincides with it the opinion of a certain Henry of Ghent, an old Scholastic. For he teaches that those actions, by which predestined man cooperates with the divine call and acquires justifying grace, and constantly perseveres in it once acquired, observing God's commandments, can be considered in two ways: in one way, as they are from free will; in another way, as they are from the help of Grace. And in the former way he says they are not effects of predestination, but in the latter way. And thus he thinks that those actions, as they are from Free will, are the cause of predestination referred to its effects, and thus also to those very actions, as they are from grace. But he adds that such actions are the cause not on account of which man is predestined, as if on account of condign merit, but without which he would not be predestined, and with the intervention of which he is predestined, by a certain congruity - because, namely, it is fitting and just that God predestine him whom he sees will cooperate in that way with Divine grace. Which opinion, as Gregory of Valencia testifies, was followed in the preceding century by John Eck, in the book which is inscribed by him Chrysopassus.

VIII. Finally, some of the Scholastics judged that there is some cause of predestination on the part of the one predestined, yet not positive, but negative. For they thought that God predestines those whom he predestines, because he foreknew that they would not finally place an obstacle to divine grace through mortal sin. Which various opinions are referred to and explained by the same Gregory of Valencia, Disputation one, question 23 on Predestination, point 4.

IX. But all those opinions are commonly rejected and condemned today by the Doctors of the Roman Church. For they think, at least by far most of them, that the decree of divine predestination referred to all its effects is absolute and merely gratuitous, and does not depend on any condition or cause which God predestinating foresaw and considered in man. For this opinion Gregory of Valencia, already often mentioned, proposes and defends as the common one of Theologians. Namely, that there is no reason or cause in any way meritorious, on the part of the one predestined, of predestination as to all its effects. And that if predestination is referred to all its effects, there is no reason or cause in any way meritorious of it in the one predestined, neither on account of which, nor without which not, but it ought to be referred to the merely gratuitous will of God alone. As can be seen in the place cited above. Where he also attributes the same opinion to many old Scholastics, such as Thomas Aquinas, Alexander of Hales, Cardinal Bonaventure, John Scotus, Giles of Rome, Gregory of Rimini, Richard Herveaus, and the Master of the Sentences himself, Peter Lombard.

X. In the same opinion is also Gabriel Vasquez, who lengthily proves and defends it in the first tome on the first part of Thomas, Disputation ninety-one. Where he explains his mind on that matter in these words: "The Catholic opinion therefore is that no cause, no beginning, or occasion can be devised on the part of the one predestined, on account of which God either in time gave his grace to him, or decreed to give it in foreknowledge. But first, this doctrine is to be understood not only of the beginning of faith, prayer, or the will of attaining salvation, or

of other works which in some way are concerned with God, such as are of religion; but also of any work of moral virtue, which is referred to honest good itself alone, so that in no way can any such thing be the occasion or beginning of the donation or predestination of grace. Besides, we exclude not only a beginning which is condign merit, but also congruous or impetratory merit, or disposition; finally, any cause and occasion on account of which God gave grace to this one rather than to another, or predetermined to give it, so that the whole reason for preparing grace for this one rather than for that was the good pleasure of the divine will, but nothing even the least on the part of the one predestined." Chapter eleven of the already mentioned Disputation.

XI. The same is also taught by Peter of St. Joseph in his Idea of Speculative Theology. Where in book one, chapter nineteen, this is his fourth Resolution: "On the part of the one predestined, no cause of predestination to first grace is given." Which he proves from that of Paul, "Who makes you different from another?" From which he gathers that man is not the cause of that distinction by which the predestined is distinguished from the non-predestined, but the mere mercy of God constituting such a distinction between both - which would be false if man naturally provided God with a motive or reason for predestinating him rather than another to the aids of grace by which salvation is obtained. And the same opinion among the more recent ones is held by Dominic Bañez, Estius, Puteanus, Eustachius of St. Paul, and very many others, to refer the individual testimonies of each of whom would be too tedious and superfluous.

XII. Indeed, this is the opinion of Molina himself. For he affirms that of predestination, as to its entire effect, no cause is given on the part of the one predestined. And he proves this because whatever is in man by which he is directed to eternal life is included in the entire effect of predestination, even the very preparation for grace, which is not made except through the particular aid of God. Therefore in no way can it happen that of the entire effect of predestination some cause on our part is found. Predestination therefore considered in this way on the part of the effect has for its reason the divine will, to which the whole effect of predestination is ordered as to an end, and from which, as from a moving principle, it proceeds. From which it is that he afterwards assents to Thomas saying that on the part of predestined and reprobate men there is no cause or reason why indeed some of them are predestined by God, but others are reprobated; but the reason must be taken and rendered on the part of God. Question 23, articles 5 and 6, Disputation 1, Member 6.

XIII. Moreover, although the Doctors of the Roman Church commonly think that all the effects of predestination taken together and collectively have absolutely no cause in man, nor depend on any merit or work of man, but are conferred on man from a certain will of God altogether gratuitous and absolute, and thus no cause of divine predestination referred to all its effects is given or found on the part of man, nevertheless it is their common opinion that one effect of predestination is not only the reason but truly the cause of another effect of the same predestination, and thus one effect can be the reason and cause, at least improperly so called, of predestination, as it is referred to another effect. Which having been posited,

they ask whether predestination or election of man to glory, as it is considered distinctly from the decree of conferring grace on man, has any cause in man, and was made from foreseen faith and merits, or whether it is altogether gratuitous and absolute, and according to our mode of conceiving, ought to be considered made before the prevision of faith and good works, and thus has no reason or cause on the part of man.

XIV. On which matter there are various opinions of the Doctors in the Roman Church. For although they agree that glory is given to man from merits, and that God decreed to give glory to man from merits, nevertheless many of them, and indeed the most Learned and celebrated, teach that the election of man to glory is in every way gratuitous, and depends on the good pleasure of God alone. Namely, they want God from eternity to have gratuitously destined and prepared heavenly glory for certain men, but nevertheless to have wanted them to arrive at it through merits, and for that reason to have decreed to give them grace by which they can merit the glory destined for them, so that the donation of glory falls under merit, and is not altogether gratuitous; but the decree of giving glory does not fall under merit, but is simply and absolutely gratuitous.

XV. This is, among others, the opinion of Bellarmine. For in the second book on Grace and Free Will, chapter 13, responding to the fifth testimony, he says: "The reason for predestination is one thing, the reason for execution another. For God determined in predestination to give the kingdom of heaven to certain men whom he loved without any prevision of works; yet at the same time he determined that as to execution, the way of arriving at the kingdom would be through good works. And so that proposition, 'God from eternity predestined to give the kingdom to men through foreseen good works,' can be both true and false. For if that 'through foreseen works' is referred to the word 'predestined,' it will be false, for it will signify that God predestined men because he foresaw their good works; if it is referred to the word 'give,' it will be true, because it will signify that the execution is going to be through good works, or, what is the same, that glorification is the effect of justification and good works, just as justification itself is the effect of calling, and calling of predestination."

XVI. But in chapter fifteen of the same book he expressly proves, as is clear from the very title of the chapter, "That not only to efficacious grace, but also to glory, men are elected gratuitously." And at the beginning of the chapter he proposes to refute those who distinguish predestination from election, and say that by predestination indeed infallible means to salvation are prepared for certain men, but by election they are prepared for glory. Finally, that predestination is plainly gratuitous, but election depends on the prevision of good works.

XVII. Bellarmine is seconded in this part by Peter of St. Joseph, whose Resolution is this: "The opinion which teaches that the efficacious election to glory was made antecedently to the absolute prevision of merits, and thus is merely gratuitous, is more probable." In the Idea of Speculative Theology, book 1, chapter 20, Resolution 1.

XVIII. Finally, the same thing is taught on that matter by Eustachius of St. Paul, Dominic

Bañez, William Estius, and others who are called more recent Thomists, but most of all by Jansen and his Disciples, who vigorously maintain that the predestination and election of man to Glory and eternal beatitude is no less gratuitous, and according to our mode of conceiving, precedes the prevision of good works in God, than the predestination of man to grace.

XIX. But their foundation is that glory is the end, but the merits of man the means to attaining that end; but the intention of the end is prior to the election of the means. From which it follows that the destination of man to glory, by which God intends the end, precedes the decree of conferring merits through grace, as means necessary to that end; and accordingly, the prevision of the merits of man follows his election to glory, which thus cannot rest on that prevision, condition, or cause.

XX. Nevertheless, very many Theologians of the Roman School are of the opinion that not only is glory given from merits in time, but the eternal predestination or election of man to glory itself was made from foreseen merits, so that, according to them, that very decree by which God from eternity destined glory to certain men is not simply and merely gratuitous, but was made not only after the foreseen merits of man, but even on account of those foreseen merits.

XXI. This is the opinion of Martin Becanus, who after he said that many of the Scholastics think that predestination, or efficacious election to glory, was made from foreseen merits, subjoins the following words: "Moreover, this opinion, which is much more probable, can be explained in two ways. First, of conditional foreknowledge, so that the sense is that God, before he efficaciously elected some to glory, foresaw through conditional knowledge who would use the grace of God well, if it were given to them. Second, of absolute foreknowledge, in this sense: God absolutely foresaw that some would work well before he efficaciously elected them to glory. Again, each can be understood in two ways. First, God efficaciously elected some to glory from foreseen merits, that is, after foreseen merits. Second, from foreseen merits, that is, on account of foreseen merits. We say that in all ways this opinion is true." In the Summa of Theology, tome 1, chapter 14, question 2, section 3.

XXII. But in this part Becanus, as in many others, follows Gabriel Vasquez, who in the first tome on the first part of Thomas, disputation 89, establishes these two things and contends to prove them with many arguments. The former is: "No efficacious election to glory was from the will of God alone, before merits were foreseen from grace, but each one was elected to glory from foreseen merits, which he was going to do by the grace of God." The latter is: "Before foreseen merits of grace, God had no peculiar affection of giving glory towards the predestined, but had a common simple or antecedent will towards all, even the reprobate, by which he equally proposed and desired eternal life for all, as a reward and common prize." Chapter 2. But in the same opinion as Vasquez, and as Becanus, are very many others, whom Becanus names in the place cited above, such as Pighius, Molina, Lessius, Ruardus, Driedo, Eckius, Turrianus, Stapleton, Gregory of Valencia. And from the Ancients, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Thomas of Argentina, Henry of

Ghent, Ockham, Gabriel, John Major - all of whom the already mentioned Martin Becanus affirms think the same as himself in this question.

XXIII. But as regards the Doctors of the Reformed School, all by unanimous consent establish that of predestination to grace and glory taken together and collectively, no cause, condition, or reason can be found in man, but it is merely and absolutely gratuitous, and depends on the free will of God alone. For when God elected and predestined these and those before others to grace and salvation, he regarded nothing in them by which he could in any way be moved to pursue them with such great benevolence and favor before others; nor can any reason for this be brought forward, except his sole good pleasure.

XXIV. But if someone wishes to consider separately election to glory, and to distinguish it from the decree of conferring various gifts of grace necessary for the attainment of that heavenly glory, by far most of the Reformed Theologians also assert that it is by no means conditional, but merely gratuitous and absolute, and that God elected certain men to glory by an absolute decree, before he foresaw in them any future good motions, or any good work or beginning of faith. Since God could not foresee anything of this kind in them before he decreed to give them grace plainly necessary for every good work and every act of faith. Which decree, according to our mode of conceiving, they think is posterior to election to glory, or at least not prior to it, but coherent with it, and if not subordinate, at least coordinate to it.

XXV. Nevertheless, there are some who want the decree of giving glory, according to our mode of conceiving, to be posterior to the election to faith and efficacious grace, and thus establish that God by reason first foresees the faith and good works of man, before he predestines him to heavenly glory. From which it follows that predestination to eternal life and glory is from faith, as a condition foreseen by God from eternity in the one who is elected.

XXVI. Which is the opinion of Paulus Testardus in the *Irenicon*, Thesis 289. "No one," he says, "will certainly deny that election to justification and glorification, if it is considered distinctly, is from foreseen faith, and its object is man believing, insofar as he is believing. For as God justifies and glorifies in time, such he decreed to justify and glorify from eternity. And what is the subordinate cause and condition of justification and glorification in time, that is the subordinate cause and condition of justification in the decree from eternity, since the execution responds very well to the decree."

XXVII. And Ludovicus Capellus also teaches things agreeable to these in the theses on Election and Reprobation, which are inserted in the *System of Theses of Saumur*. For there in Thesis thirty and thirty-one these are his words: "The decree of giving faith is prior, not indeed in time, for all the decrees of God are in him together from eternity, but by the nature of the thing to the decree of justifying and sanctifying, and thus also of glorifying him who believes, and is to be distinguished from them. For as it is one thing to believe, another to be justified, another to be sanctified, another to be glorified, so also the decree of God by which he determined to give faith to man is one thing, another by which he purposed to justify,

sanctify, and at last glorify the believer, according to our mode of conceiving, I say. Nor is the first separation among men made through the decree of glorifying, but through the decree of giving faith, because in reality through true faith, and in the very act, men are first separated from each other, who up to that point were equal. Nor does God first decree to glorify man absolutely, then to give faith to him, but on the contrary decrees to give faith, then to glorify. Because just as he glorifies in act only the believer, so also he decreed to glorify only the believer."

XXVIII. But from what has been said it appears that concerning the cause of election and predestination, as they regard all their effects, there is no controversy between the Reformed Doctors and most of the Doctors of the Roman Church. For both agree in this, that all the effects of predestination, taken together and collectively, have absolutely no cause in man, but are to be referred entirely to the grace and benignity of God alone. From which it follows that no reason on the part of man can be given why this one rather than that was predestined by God from eternity to glory and the various aids of grace, but it must all be referred to the mere and sole good pleasure of God, which is to be considered to depend on no condition on the part of man. But if any question remains on that matter, it is only with some of the older Scholastic Theologians, and perhaps a few of the more recent ones, with the common opinion of the School of today protesting against it.

XXIX. But whether election to eternal life and heavenly glory considered separately, and distinctly from the decree of conferring grace, is from foreseen faith and works, is doubted, as is clear from what has been said before, both in the Reformed School and in the Roman School. For in the former, as in the latter, there are found some who think that election to living and active faith, according to our mode of conceiving, precedes the absolute election to glory, and some reason can be given why this one rather than that was predestined to eternal life and glory - namely, because God from eternity foresaw that this one by the benefit of grace would believe in Christ, and would do penance, and would persevere in faith, but he foresaw nothing of the kind concerning the other.

XXX. But in the Roman School the opinion which suspends the decree of election to eternal glory on the foreseen condition of faith and works is more common and prevalent than in the Reformed School. And in the latter there are quite few compared to the others who want the prevision of living faith working through love to precede, in God, according to our mode of conceiving, the efficacious election of certain ones to glory; while the same is maintained and taught by very many in the Roman School.

XXXI. Moreover, the former question about the cause of predestination considered according to all its effects, namely, whether it is given on the part of man, is not of small moment, and regards the foundations of the Christian faith. For it cannot be affirmed that a cause is given on the part of man of all the effects of predestination, insofar as it is referred both to the aids of grace and to heavenly glory, without falling into Pelagianism, and denying that the salvation of man is gratuitous, and depends entirely on the mercy and benignity of God alone, not on any works of ours - which the Gospel so clearly and constantly affirms; and

thus without teaching that grace is given from merits, and that man through the powers of nature begins to distinguish himself from another, and to prepare and dispose himself in some way at least to salutary grace - which pious antiquity shuddered at and condemned as Pelagian and adverse to Christian grace.

XXXII. But it seems otherwise concerning that other question, Whether, namely, Election to eternal glory, as it is distinguished from Election to grace, is from foreseen faith and works - that is, Whether by nature, or by reason God first foresees that man will believe in Christ, and will embrace him with living faith working through love, before he absolutely decrees to confer on him eternal life and glory; provided it is agreed that men are elected to salutary grace altogether gratuitously, and there is nothing in them by which God is provoked to destine and bestow the aids of that grace on them rather than on others. And besides, that God by one and simple act of his will decreed from eternity at once and together whatever he ever decreed, and executes in time. Nor are there really in God many decrees succeeding each other, or really distinct from each other, as if distinct acts of the divine mind and will elicited separately and apart.

XXXIII. For if those things about which there is now agreement between the Roman School and the Reformed School are acknowledged and conceded, whatever controversy remains will not be about the thing itself, namely, how the matter stands in God, but only about the Method of arranging certain concepts of our mind. Namely, all now agree that the decree of giving glory and the decree of conferring grace are not two decrees really distinct in God, and between which there can be some real order of prior and posterior; but that God by one act of will constituted those two things. But our mind, not being able, on account of its weakness, to exhaust in one concept, and at the same time to comprehend all those respects which the one act of the Divine will has to various objects, is compelled to conceive it separately, according as it regards now this object, now that, and thus variously names it, and now imposes on it the name of one decree, now of another. And afterwards among those various concepts, which it designates with the names now of one decree, now of another, it devises some order by which they may be conveniently disposed among themselves - which order seems almost arbitrary, and can be assigned diversely without fault and reprehension, while some digest their concepts about divine decrees according to the very execution of things, but others, if there is any relation of means and end among the things decreed by God, prefer to follow the order of intention, and to conceive as prior the decree about the thing which is the end, but as posterior that which holds itself as a means to it.

XXXIV. And so I do not see what evil or danger there is, if someone conceives the decree of giving glory to someone as prior to the decree of conferring the aids of grace, because glory holds itself as the end, but the aids of grace as the means which are necessary for attaining that end; or on the contrary, if someone conceives the decree of furnishing the aids of grace as prior to the decree of conferring glory, because in reality God first communicates grace, and afterwards glory, and thus according to the order of the efficient cause, grace precedes

glory - although the former order, as it is far more received in the Reformed Schools, so also seems to us more fitting. For it belongs to the wise to intend some end, but afterwards to determine with himself about the means which are conducive to obtaining that end. Perhaps, however, it would be more prudent neither to move nor to determine questions of this kind, which do nothing for the fruit of piety, and nevertheless often excite very serious contentions.

**Theological Theses,
On the Eternal Election and
Predestination of Humans.**

**In which the use of these terms in the Roman and Protestant Churches is explained; and
how in the same Schools the effects and object of Predestination are variously assigned.**

*(The following theses are translated by Lynch on his substack with the title retranslated and
numbers edited by Onkuu)*

Thesis I

The word “predestination” is variously used in the Roman school. For according to some of their doctors, predestination only covers that decree by which God absolutely established from eternity to confer heavenly glory to certain human beings. But for other Romanists, predestination is more limited to the decree of conferring the means conducive to infallibly bring certain human beings to heavenly glory. Finally, others argue that both these decrees pertain to predestination. This is what Eustachius a Sancto Pauli observes in Summa Theologiae, de Praedestinatione, Q. 3.

II. The first meaning is rarer [among the scholastics]. Nevertheless, some of the older scholastics, like Gabriel Biel and Ockham, seem to understand the word “predestination” in such a way that it appears to be nothing other than that eternal council of God by which he decreed to give glory to certain people. This is clear from those things which Gregory of Valencia notes, Tom. 1. Disp. 1, Quest. 23, which is about predestination, point 3.

III. But the greatest part of the scholastics take predestination in the second way, namely for the preparation of grace, so that it is distinguished from election to glory. You can find this in Martinus Becanus, In Summa Theologiae, Tom. 1, Cap 14, Q. 2., Concl. 2.

IV. But many of the doctors of the Roman Church define predestination as not only the preparation of grace, but also the preparation of glory to which that grace pertains. According to these doctors, predestination is an eternal decree or purpose of God, by which God ordains and directs certain people to supernatural blessedness, by those supernatural means fit to the obtaining of it. The recently mentioned Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Peter a Sancto Joseph, Gregory of Valencia, Estius, and many others hold to this view.

V. But Jansen and his disciples, following Augustine on this point, understand predestination in a sense still more general. For they think that predestination covers not only the

good but the wicked, though not of sin, but of punishment. Hence, reprobates are no less able to be said to be predestined to eternal suffering by God as the elect are predestined to glory and blessedness. From this they make predestination to be twofold—one to life, and the other to death. One can see this with Jansen De Gratia Christi Salvatoris, lib. 9., Cap. 3.

VI. Election is similarly restricted by many scholastics to the decree by which God decreed to give glory to some human beings instead of others. And so, they distinguish this from what predestination means to them, that is, a decree with respect to the conferring of means fit to obtaining glory. Alphonsus Mendoza, professor at Salamanca, makes this observation in the scholastic question concerning predestination, the second section. But many others refer election, as with predestination, no less to grace than to glory. And, they want election to cover that decree regarding the giving of grace as well as a decree of conferring glory.

VII. But just as predestination in the Roman schools is received and defined variously by various theologians, so they do not all in the same way assign its effects. For those who understand the word predestination as only denoting that decree by which God prepared from eternity heavenly glory for certain people, they do not assign any other effect than the imparting of glory itself. Nor do they wish that the gifts of grace be numbered as among the effects of predestination. This is the view of both William Ockham and Gabriel Biel, as can be seen in Gregory of Valencia, Tom. 1, Q. 23., Point 3.

VIII. But others insist the contrary, that only the means [fit] for eternal blessedness are the effects of predestination, but not the acquisition of blessedness itself. They do this because they limit the word predestination to the decree of communicating grace, and consequently they do not want the word to include the decree of granting glory. This is the opinion of Durandus, as the same Gregory of Valencia testifies in the recently cited place.

IX. Today, however, the more common belief of the doctors of the Roman Church is that the effects of predestination are not only the supernatural blessedness itself, but also those particular means by which each predestinated person supernaturally obtains this blessedness. And therefore, they enumerate three general effects of predestination which the Apostle notes in Romans 8: Vocation, and certainly, justification and glorification. Indeed, by the word predestination they understand both the decree of conferring heavenly blessedness to certain human beings, and the decree concerning the means by which they are led to the enjoyment of that blessedness.

X. But there are some theologians of the Roman School who enumerate far more effects of predestination: And among other effects they include the permission of those sins into which the elect fall, and therefore the permission of the very first sin. Indeed, they even assign to the effects of predestination the very creation and preservation of those who are predestined. This is what Estius especially does in 1 Sent., Dist. 40., Paragraph 7.

XI. In fact, Alphonsus Mendoza of the Augustinians (already cited above), professor at Salamanca, goes even further. For he expressly holds that the first act of all divine acts was predestination, from which all the other decrees concerning the founding of the world, creation of human beings, the permitting of sin, etc., follow. Therefore, he wants the creation

and preservation of this whole world—indeed the very reprobation of the demons and of the impious, and their just damnation—to be numbered among the effects of the predestination of Christ and the elect. And, in a word, he continually insists that nothing whatsoever of any kind, whether something small, or big is brought about by God, or permitted, which is not an effect of predestination and a means ordained to bringing it about.

XII. For in his [Mendoza's] Theological Controversies (cf. the already cited first scholastic question about predestination, section six), this is his second conclusion. "The mind of God presupposes the foreknowledge of nothing future for predestination, but everything follows from it. And therefore, God decrees from eternity to do absolutely nothing, nor in time does he make or permit anything, either natural or supernatural, whether it is a thing of great importance or of little importance. And practically everything which comes into existence is an effect and means of the predestination of the elect and Christ. And, so, everything is subordinate to divine predestination as means ordained for the glory of Christ and the saints."

XIII. So, this is his third conclusion. "There is not any other providence of God antecedent to predestination, from which natural and some other supernatural effects come into being. But providence is no less unique and is itself a predestination, from which everything in the universe must follow with absolutely no exception. And therefore, according to this conclusion, the whole world—including the natural and supernatural, good and evil, substances and accidents, and all modes of being and acting in the world, not only in general, but specifically, and individually—should be considered as one complete object of divine predestination. Thus, just as absolutely nothing evades the extent of that object, so there is nothing which does not fall under that act of predestination."

XV. But from this it is possible to deduce in what way those two doctors think that a person is the object of predestination by God, namely, in the divine foreknowledge, neither as fallen nor created, but rather simply as possible or creatable. For given that the permission of the fall of the first man, and even the creation of man himself is enumerated by them as among the effects of predestination, it is necessary that, from their perspective, foreknowledge of the fall and creation did not precede the decree of predestination in God, according to our mode of understanding, but rather followed it. And so, God was not able in predestinating mankind to consider them as fallen or created, but only as creatable by him. Which Estius with Mendoza acknowledges: "We thus do not call it 'the predestination of fallen man' as if the foreknowledge of the fall of the first man and in him the whole human race preceded in God (according to our mode of understanding) the predestination of some from the whole race of mankind to eternal life." (Distinction 40 of book 1 of the Sentences, paragraph 6).

XVI. But Alphonsus Mendoza shows that not a few of the scholastics—both the older and more recent scholastics—think the same thing as he does regarding this point. Cf. the already mentioned question, section four. There, he cites for himself Jacob Naclantus, Bishop of Clugium, Albert Pighius, Peter Galatinus, Ambrosius Catharinus, and the man whom he prefers above all the others, Duns Scotus, whom he quotes many times, from

which quotes it is clear that according to the subtle doctor, God predestined the elect, and willed the gifts of grace for them before he had willed this sensible world, which God willed from eternity for the sake of predestined man, on account of whom he established to create all of visible nature.

XVII. But the more common opinion in the Roman Schools is that when God predestined from eternity certain people, he considered them as fallen in Adam, and corrupt in their sin. For commonly, their theologians believe that that decree by which God predestined certain people to salvation, according to our mode of conception, followed the foreknowledge of the fall of the first man, and from that, the attendant original sin, by which the whole race of mankind has been infected.

XVIII. But when one turns to look at those who are called with the singular name “Reformed” among the Protestants, many of them define the word predestination as that whole part of divine providence, by which God decreed and established with himself before the foundation of the world that which has in view either the eternal salvation or the death and destruction of every human being. And hence, they distinguish the eternal predestination of God between that which is to life and salvation, and that which is to death and destruction. And the former they commonly call election; the latter is commonly called reprobation in the schools. This is how Zanchi, Beza, Ursinus, Perkins, Polanus, Bucanus, and many others, and even the Synod of Dordt, use the term predestination.

XIX. Nevertheless, not a few of the Reformed doctors think that the term predestination, according to its use in Scripture, should only denote the pleasant side. And hence, by predestination they mean only those acts of the divine will and mind, by which God has immutably established with himself to lead certain human beings to heavenly life and glory, and those means afforded to them which are necessary to achieve this end. For they do not restrict predestination only to the preparation of grace, as many of the scholastics do. Instead, they understand the word predestination to include both the decree about the end, as well as the decree about the means; that is, a decree about giving glory to certain people as well as a decree about the grace which is to be communicated to them.

XX. And they use the word election in the same sense. Since by election they understand that decree by which God from eternity selects some people from among others in order that he might make them participants of the grace of Christ in the life, and crown them with glory in the life to come, therefore both election and predestination are understood by them to be synonyms.

XXI. Yet, some [Reformed] seem properly to mean by the term election: the decree concerning some certain people to be effectually called to Christ and given true and living faith. So, election, according to them, has more to do with the communication of grace than the giving of glory. This is how the term election is commonly used by Testard in his *Irenicum*, Louis Cappell in his theses on election and reprobation, Moses Amyraut everywhere, and others who follow the doctrine and method of [John] Cameron.

XXII. There is also some difference of opinion among the theologians in the Reformed

schools around the question of in what regard and condition is mankind the object of divine predestination. First, some in their assigning an object of predestination and election ascend beyond the fall of man and even the creation of man himself. And indeed, they want the decree of predestinating certain people to salvation in God, according to our mode of conceiving it, to be prior not only to the foresight of the fall of man into sin, but even the decree regarding the creation of man. And accordingly, the object of predestination itself is man neither created nor fallen in the foreknowledge of God, but instead man creatable. This is why they are called “supralapsarians” by other theologians. Of which number are Zanchi, Beza, Piscator, Perkins, Ursinus, Gomarus, Polanus, Voetius, Twisse, and not a few more!

XXIII. But the greatest part of the doctors of the Reformed schools have considered, in the act of God predestinating, its object to have been a mass of humanity corrupted by sin, and they do not think that the decree about creating mankind and the permission of the first fall of man ought to enter into the whole decree of predestination nor do they wish to make those former decrees a part of that latter decree. But in their view, the foresight of the fall of man exists prior in God, according to our mode of conceiving it, to the decree regarding the granting and manifesting of mercy in the salvation of some people, which, by these theologians, is called election or predestination. And hence, according to them, the object of election and predestination is fallen man, having been corrupted by sin. And we ought not to extend that description and definition [of predestination and election to] before the fall of man and creation. And this view most conforms to the Canons of the Synod of Dordt. And a very great number of Reformed theologians follow that position, whose names, were we to enumerate them, would be too lengthy and unnecessary.

XXIV. But among the Reformed are found some who make the object of election to be not simply fallen man, having been corrupted by sin, but additionally those called by an external call to the participation and communion in the grace of Christ. For they do not want to make the decree of Christ being sent as a redeemer, nor [that decree] about that grace offered to people through the preaching of the word to be a part of the decree of predestination, and instead they wish to subordinate the aforementioned decrees to that decree about the giving of eternal salvation to this or that person.

XV. This was the opinion of George Sohnius once a professor of theology at Heidelberg Academy. For in the second volume of his Opera, he defines the predestination of man in this way: “It is a decree of God by which he preordained from eternity all human beings foreknown by him as fallen and called to Christ by the gospel to either life or death in order to eternally make known his glory.” But in explaining this definition he adds this: “That predestination was made in accordance with the prescience of God, that is, God preordained human beings foreknown to him, and therefore as corrupted by sin, and called through the gospel of Christ. For from eternity in his predestinating of them, he considered them not simply as people foreknown to him, but as people having fallen into sin and to be called again by Christ in the gospel.” To which he adds afterwards: “The object or matter of predestination is fallen mankind, and called again by the gospel. For this call is universal.”

This is in his Exposition of the Chief Articles of the Augsburg Confession, the tract about eternal predestination, pg. 1000. Testard approved of and followed Sohnius's position in his book *On Nature and Grace*, in the chapter on the will and decree of grace, section 9. And to his name, it is also necessary to add all those who follow the method and doctrine of Cameron in the doctrine of the redemption of man and the doctrine of election, since (?) they wish to stand on their own opinions.[1]

XVI. But just as various theologians think variously about the object of predestination and election, so also it is necessary that they think different things about the effects of predestination and election. For those who hold that the object of predestination is mankind neither created nor fallen, but simply mankind creatable and able to be produced by God, place the creation and the permission of the fall among the means by which God acquires his intended end in predestination. Therefore, the creation and permission of the fall are, in their judgment, effects of predestination—indeed for some to life, but for others to death and destruction. You can see this position in Beza, Perkins, Bucanus, Polanus, and others of the same mind.

XVII. But those who deem the object of predestination and election to be man as he is considered by God fallen and corrupt by sin, and who do not subordinate the decree of creation and the permission of the fall to the decree about the demonstration of God's justice and mercy among mankind, even for salvation, but among others his just punishment, do not think the creation of man nor the permission of the fall should be numbered among the effects of predestination. But they only want the effects of election to be those various means by which God frees human beings from sin, and leads them to blessedness and eternal life. Among these means they place the first and principal as the giving itself of the mediator, Christ, and his being sent into the world.

XVIII. Finally, those for whom the object of election and predestination is not simply man as fallen, but additionally, called to the grace and communion of Christ, are not able to number the sending of Christ into the world and the redemption completed by his death to be among the effects of election. This follows because, according to them, the decree concerning the sending of Christ and concerning the redemption of the human race through Christ precedes the decree of election, and is presupposed by it. But the chief and proper effect of election is, according to them, the giving of true faith in time. And it follows that the conferment of the rest of Christ's benefits by which one is led to eternal life is an effect of that same election.

XIX. Additionally, it is plain from what has been said that the words predestination and election both in the Roman and Reformed communions are not used in the same way and sense. And both schools of theology understand the terms in various ways. However, there are certain uses of those words abundantly accepted in the Roman school which the Reformed school does not grant, and, by the same token, those words are used by many Reformed theologians in a sense which cannot be found in the Roman School.

XXX. Hence, many of the scholastics, as we have seen, are accustomed to understand by the word "predestination" only the preparation of grace and to distinguish it from the decree

of election by which glory is destined to certain people while passing over others. Thus, election is a decree about the end, but predestination is a decree about the means. But the Reformed never restrict the word of predestination in this way. Instead, they regularly mean by it, both the decree of the giving of glory as an end, and the decree of the conferring of the helps and gifts of grace so that by these efficacious and necessary means one might be led to that end. And you hardly even see among them the word election restricted to the decree concerning the communication of glory. But not a few of them seem to restrict predestination to the decree about the giving of faith, and they think the term better fits with grace than glory, which meaning is unusual among the Roman Schools. Among the latter—if you omit Jansen and his disciples—very rarely is the word predestination taken to denote anything other than the positive side [i.e., not reprobation]. And hardly ever is it made to include the decree concerning the destruction of certain people. On the other hand, predestination is a middle term among many of the Reformed Doctors, by which the decree of God is in general designated, a decree by which human beings are ordained either to life or death. Concerning this decree, thus, they constitute two species [of predestination], namely, election and reprobation.

XXXI. Additionally, it is clear from what was said above that neither the doctors of the Roman church, nor of the Reformed church agree among themselves about the effects of election or predestination when it is understood as the “positive/good side.” And indeed, just as it was noted by us before, there is a variety and discrepancy of opinion over this issue both in the Roman and Reformed schools. Likewise, or nearly likewise, one will find on both sides a diversity of judgments and opinions on this subject. For just as not a few doctors of the Reformed schools number creation itself and the permission of the fall among the effects of predestination for those [predestined] to salvation, so some theologians in the Catholic church also do the same as Estius noted before, Alphonsus Mendoza, and others mentioned above. See Domingo Báñez in *primam Thom.* Q. 23 on the second article, second doubt. And just as many doctors in the Roman school deny and reject that aforementioned view, so also a great part of the doctors of the Reformed school deny and reject the same.

XXXII. Just as theologians in both the Roman church and Reformed church variously philosophize about the effects of election and predestination, so among both groups their judgments vary—there being not a small difference of opinion concerning the object of predestination and election, that is, as it is asked for what reason and in what respect is man the object of God’s predestination. And nearly the same distinction of views which is found in the Reformed schools can be found also in the Roman Catholic schools. This is able to be gleaned from what has been previously mentioned above.

XXXIII. Indeed, it is important to observe that just as there are some among the Reformed who think that the object of predestination is simply man creatable, but not man considered as already created and fallen, and think that there is no antecedent prevision of the creation and fall of the person who is chosen by the decree of predestination, so not a few in the Roman church also hold that same view—all those, namely, who think that the creation of

the predestined and the permission of their fall into sin have a place among the effects of predestination, and who insist that the creation itself advanced the decree of predestination, and is a means subordinate to that end in God's predestination in order to attain that end. Concerning which number, beyond Scotus, Phigius, Naclantus, Catharinum, as we taught above, there is William Estius, Alphonsus Mendoza, and the Dominican Báñez, from whose doctrine, in the place cited above, man as a mere possibility is the object in God's predestination. And just as there are many in the Roman school who back away from this view, so also a great part of the doctors in the Reformed school also disapprove of and condemn that view. And finally, just as there are many among the Reformed who make the object of predestination fallen mankind, so also there are many in the Roman schools who commonly hold to this view.

XXXIV. But now, if anyone looks for the importance of that question about the object and effects of predestination, I respond that there is a lot of logomachy. For those who disagree on these things do not define predestination the same way. Some want, by the term, it to embrace many divine decrees, but others only want it to embrace a few. Indeed, the former deny this and want the act of divine providence to be included in predestination, but the latter affirm it. For, those who make creatable or possible man the object of predestination so enlarge the definition of election and predestination that that divine decree about the creation of man and the permission his fall is brought into it. Indeed some, like Alphonsus Mendoza, introduce in a certain way all of providence back into predestination. Given this, it is necessary that creation be its effect, and man, as he is at this point considered "to be created" by God, is not rightly made its object.[2]

XXXV. But those who think that fallen and sinful man is in the divine foreknowledge the object of predestination, and consequently deny that the creation of man and permission of sin ought to be numbered among the effects of predestination, define the term in such a way that it does not embrace the divine decree about the creation of man, the permission of his fall, but that decree is presupposed by it, as something prior, according to our mode of conceiving things. But wherever there is no agreement about the definition of a thing, there is bound to be much logomachy and contention over words.

XXXVI. But in this matter and in many others, this rule ought to be followed, namely that when we give some meaning of expressions, we follow, if it can be done, the scripture use, or at least we should accept no other uses than those which are accustomed to be commonly accepted in the Christian schools. Therefore, seeing that predestination is accustomed to be distinguished from common providence in the schools, and commonly the gifts of grace are assigned to the former, but the gifts of nature to the latter, creation seems less suitably to be placed among the effects of predestination, and consequently man not-yet-made by God is established as its object, but simply creatable. They enlarge the word "predestination" too much who bring in to it the decree itself of creating man, and of permitting his fall.

XXXVII. But if anyone searches deeper, asking whence it is that some theologians thus

restrict the word of predestination while others extend its meaning, I respond: it stems from the fact that some attribute more, and some less, acts and effects of divine providence to the end intended by God in the predestination of certain people, which end is the illumination of the divine mercy in their salvation. For, on this point, theologians seem to agree that all the acts and effects of God's providence have been brought back to the predestination and reprobation of men, which acts and effects as such are assigned for both the manifestation of divine mercy and of justice among certain people, either in their eternal salvation or just punishment. But some deny that to be the end intended by God in the creation of man, others, however, affirm it. For the latter, the eternal decree of God concerning the creation of man begins the decree of predestination, and makes up a part of it. But this is not so with the former group with whom we more probably agree. Indeed, the creation of man does not seem to be assigned as such and directly to the manifestation of divine mercy or justice, but rather to the illustration of the divine power, goodness, and wisdom.

(Notes by Lynch, changed [1] to [2] on Mendoza.)

[1] This last clause is tricky. Not sure what is trying to be said.

[2] If I understand this correctly, because Mendoza brings all which would (ordinarily) fall under providence into "predestination," then creation itself is a part of predestination. And if creation itself is a part of predestination, then it is an effect of predestination. And if it is an effect, then the creation of man is likewise an effect. And if man is an effect of predestination, he can't, as such, also be the object of predestination.

Theological Theses, On Reprobation and It's Object, Causes & Effects.

In which the Doctrine of the Roman School is expounded.

Thesis I

From the common usage of the Schools, Reprobation has long signified a certain part of divine Providence, which is concerned with those who fall away from the highest end of the rational creature, namely, eternal and celestial blessedness, and are adjudged by God to eternal punishments, for the demonstration of his justice. However, the Theologians of the Roman School do not all take this word in the same way. For under reprobation some include more, others fewer acts of divine providence: and so some use the word reprobation in a stricter sense, but others in a broader sense.

II. For many seem to restrict reprobation to that eternal ordination, by which certain ones are excluded from the heavenly kingdom, and subjected to everlasting punishments. To which pertains the definition which is in Peter Lombard, in the first book of the Sentences, Distinction fortieth. Reprobation is the foreknowledge of the iniquity of certain ones, and the preparation of the damnation of the same. To which the definition of Durandus is related in

the same distinction, question two. Reprobation is the prevision of the ineptitude of someone for eternal life, and the purpose of excluding from it. And similarly Molina defines Reprobation, The eternal judgment by which a rational creature is judged by God unworthy of eternal life, and worthy of eternal punishment, with the purpose of perpetually excluding them from the celestial kingdom, or at the same time also of punishing with eternal torments, as their sin will have been.

III. But others think that reprobation includes not only rejection from celestial glory, but also the permission of the sin of the reprobate, and rejection from divine grace, at least congruous and efficacious. In which sense Thomas Aquinas takes Reprobation in the first part of the Summa, Question 23, Article 3. Where these are his words, Reprobation includes the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt, and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for guilt. And in this sense also Gregory of Valentia defines Reprobation, The act of the divine intellect, by which formally God decrees to permit the sins of the reprobate, by not giving them the singular grace by which they would be freed from them, and on account of them to exclude them from the celestial kingdom, and to punish them eternally. With which operation of the divine intellect he adds is joined the operation of the divine will, by the force of which is mandated to execution what has been decreed from eternity concerning the reprobate.

IV. But there are those who think that not every act of divine providence, by which the sins of the reprobate are permitted, and are allowed to happen, pertains to their reprobation. For from thence at least they exempt that act by which God permits them to be infected with original sin, and that also by which they think God permits that some of them fall from the state of grace and justice into sin, which acts they think pertain only to common providence, but not to the decree of reprobation: to which they only refer the abandonment of man in sin, and the hardening, by which God, in punishment of preceding sins, permits that some fall into graver sins.

V. But others think that the permission of any sin in the reprobate must be referred back to the decree of reprobation. Indeed they think that reprobation includes every act of providence which is concerned with those who fall away from the highest end. For they do not think that there is any act of providence concerning rational creatures, which does not pertain to their predestination, or reprobation. And so reprobation is described by them, The Providence of God concerning those who fall away from eternal salvation, ordaining them to a certain end, which is the demonstration of his justice. As can be seen in Estius, and other more recent Thomists.

VI. Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church contend among themselves about the nature of the acts of the divine will and Providence, of which the total decree of reprobation consists. Namely, whether they are positive, or negative? Or, Whether they ought to be explained negatively, or affirmatively?

VII. And first indeed it is agreed among them, with respect to the damnation and punishment of the reprobate, that a positive act is found in the divine will, by which God wills to punish the reprobate perpetually, on account of their sins foreseen by God himself. But there are those who think that a positive act of the divine will is found besides concerning the permission of the sin of the reprobate, and concerning the withdrawal of efficacious aid or congruous grace, which being posited they would not sin, or would do penance. For they contend that that act ought to be explained affirmatively, and not only negatively. So that, according to their opinion, God had this act from eternity, I will to permit these sins. I will not to give to these and those the aids, which if they received, they would not sin. Which is the opinion of Gregory of Valentia on Reprobation point one. But especially of Domingo Bañez on the first of Thomas question 23, article 2, doubt 2, conclusion 3. And of William Estius on the first book of the Sentences, Distinction 40, paragraph 16, and of others among the more recent Thomists.

VIII. Indeed, the same more recent Thomists hold that God, in the same instant in which he elects and predestines some to eternal life, by a positive act does not will to admit others into his kingdom, and excludes them from celestial glory, before he has foreseen any of their sins, and has decreed to permit them. Which is the doctrine of Diego Alvarez in book 12 on the Aids of Divine Grace, Disputation 109, section 5, where this is his first conclusion. The eternal reprobation of God includes a positive act, by which he willed not to admit certain ones to eternal life. But in the third conclusion he affirms that the positive act, by which God from eternity willed not to admit certain ones into his kingdom, was not conditional, but absolute, antecedent in the order of reason the foreknowledge of the evil use of free will, future by hypothesis, which would be constituted in such an order of things. And consequently those Doctors do not recognize in eternal reprobation any act of the divine intellect, or of the divine will, other than positive and properly so called.

IX. But others, on the contrary, constitute the entire and total decree of reprobation from acts of different kinds, which they think are some indeed positive, but others only negative. For they think that God, in the same instant in which he elected and preordained some to eternal life, conducted himself negatively, not positively, toward others, that is, he simply did not elect them, and did not ordain them to life, but did not by a positive act will to exclude them from celestial life. And simply as regards the withdrawal of grace, and the permission of sin, they think that God also conducts himself in the same way. Namely, that in this part nothing else is to be conceived of God, except that from eternity he did not have the will to bring aid to certain ones, and to bestow that grace on them, which being posited they would not sin, or would rise again from sin, as he had toward the predestined. And yet they want those negative acts by which God did not elect certain ones, and did not decree to give them congruous and efficacious grace, and so allowed them to fall into sin, and remain in it, to be in some way part of reprobation and to pertain to it.

X. And consequently they distinguish a twofold reprobation, one positive, the other negative. And they want total reprobation to be constituted from both. As can be seen in

Puteanus in the general question on reprobation, doubt 2, conclusion 1. "Note," he says, "that by the name of total reprobation is signified in this place that which arises from negative and positive reprobation. But negative reprobation is defined, The abandonment of certain ones in the mass of perdition, and the denial of congruous grace, with the permission of some falling away from the ultimate end, and of permitting their sins for that time, or rather instant, in which God elects some to eternal life out of the mass of perdition. But the abandonment in the mass of perdition, and the willing of not giving congruous or efficacious grace, are not elicited acts from God truly and really. For God conducts himself only negatively toward those whom he abandons in the mass of perdition, in that instant in which he snatches some out of the same mass, and destines them to eternal life; and for this cause the abandonment in the mass of perdition is called negative reprobation. But positive reprobation is defined, the destining of certain ones to eternal punishments, on account of their final sins." Thus far Puteanus.

XI. Peter of St. Joseph also approves this distinction of positive and negative reprobation in the Idea of Speculative Theology, book 1, chapter 20. And it is also found in Eustachius of St. Paul, who thus proposes and explains it. "Reprobation is twofold. Negative, by which God did not will to give glory to some, and is opposed to the election of certain ones to glory. And so from this simply that God did not elect some, he is considered to have reprobated them. And to this pertains consequently the exclusion of some from eternal life: and the ordination of the same to the eternal punishment of loss, from foreseen original sin. But reprobation is called positive, by which certain ones are ordained to the eternal punishment of sense, on account of faults foreseen in them." In sum. Tractate one. Disputation 17, question 2.

XII. Moreover, just as the Doctors of the Roman Church variously define reprobation, and include more or fewer acts of Divine providence under it, so also they variously assign its effects, nor do all philosophize about this matter in the same way. However, they agree on two points. The first is that the eternal damnation of certain men, on account of their evil demerits, is the effect of their eternal reprobation, and that those eternal punishments are positively inflicted on them by God, by force of that decree, by which he adjudicated them to punishments of this kind, on account of their foreseen sins. The other is that the sins into which the reprobate fall, and by which they bring upon themselves just damnation, are indeed something necessarily antecedent to their damnation and presupposed to it; and that they happen with God knowing and permitting; but that they are not the effects of reprobation, nor is their cause to be ascribed to any decree of God, but simply to the free will of men.

XIII. But John Viguerius the Dominican, professor of Theology in the University of Toulouse, seems to be excepted from the common number in this part. For he seems to place sin among the positive effects of reprobation, although he denies that it is there from God. "The reason," he says, "is not similar concerning the cause of reprobation and of predestination, which as to all positive effects, does not have a cause in the one predestined, as reprobation does; which has only two positive effects in the one reprobated, namely, sin, and eternal

punishment: free will is the cause of sin, and sin is the cause of eternal punishment."

XIV. But setting this aside, some Theologians of the Roman School do not recognize any other effect of reprobation, than exclusion from the heavenly kingdom, and damnation to the infernal punishments. And this because they take reprobation strictly for the decree alone of damning certain ones from foreseen sins, and of excluding them from glory. Nor do they think that God provides anything concerning the reprobate, from the intention of damning them, and afflicting them with eternal punishments, before their final perseverance in sin has been foreseen. And consequently they deny that the permission of sin, by which the reprobate are allowed to fall into various sins, is to be referred to reprobation, as its effect. Nor do they want the reason why God permits the sins of the reprobate, to be derived from the decree of their reprobation.

XV. But very many and most celebrated Doctors of the Roman Church number the permission of sin among the effects of reprobation. But not all in the same way. For there is no small diversity of opinions on this matter in the Roman School. In order that this may be able to be grasped better, it must be noted that God is said to permit sins insofar as he does not impede them. But God, as far as pertains to this proposition, impedes sin by giving that grace, which being posited, he sees that sin will not follow: but he does not impede, when he denies grace of this kind. And so God is considered to permit sins, when he denies that grace, which if he gave, these and those sins would not be committed.

XVI. But there is a twofold permission of sin of this kind. One by which God permits someone to fall into the first sin. The other by which he permits him to persevere in sin, and to become worse, by adding new sins to old ones, and by hardening himself more and more in evil. The former is simply called the permission of sin: the latter is specially called blinding, hardening, and aggravation.

XVII. Moreover, certain Doctors of the Roman Church think that absolutely every permission of sin in the reprobate is the effect of their reprobation. Thus in Martin Becanus in the sum of Scholastic Theology, first volume, on Reprobation question 2, this is his first conclusion. "The effects of reprobation in adults are four. The first is the permission of sin. The second, Hardening in sin. The third exclusion from the heavenly kingdom. The fourth infliction of the Punishment of sense." But his second conclusion reads thus. "The effects of reprobation in little ones are three. The first, is the permission of contracting original sin. The second, the permission of dying in original sin. The third, exclusion from glory."

XVIII. But especially those who are called the more recent Thomists strictly hold this opinion, that the permission of any sin whatsoever, which finally issues in the damnation of the reprobate, is the effect of their reprobation, not excepting the permission of that first sin, by which our first parent failed, and fell from that innocence in which he had been created by God. Of which number is William Estius, as is clear from the things which he writes on the first book of the Sentences, Distinction 40, paragraph 11, where he proves and praises the opinion of those who teach that the permission of any sin whatsoever, even of that first one, which man, or Angel committed, is the effect of Divine providence concerning each and

consequently also of the reprobation both of Angels, and of those men, who from that sin have been led, or are to be led into damnation.

XIX. But others indeed concede that some permission of sin in the reprobate is the effect of reprobation, such as is the permission of final perseverance in sin, and the permission of those sins, into which God allows the reprobate to fall in punishment of preceding sins, and because he wants to punish them for some one or more preceding offenses. But they deny that the permission by which someone already justified from sin, is permitted to relapse into sin on account of which he may be damned, is rightly referred to God reprobating. And much more do they deny that that permission, by which God permitted the Angel, or the first man, to fall into sin, innocence having been abandoned, can be called the effect of the reprobation of the Angel, or of men dying in original sin. And this because they want the permission of sin of this kind to be referred only to common providence, and the agreeable disposition of things, by which God allows rational creatures to use their liberty: And besides they think that the decree of reprobation, with respect to men, supposes the mass of the human race already corrupted by sin. Which is the opinion of Peter of St. Joseph, and of Eustachius of St. Paul, as can be seen from the things which they teach about reprobation in the places already cited before.

XX. Again, those who say that either every, or at least some permission of sin must be referred to reprobation, as effect to cause, do not all, as I have already indicated, understand this in the same way. For Estius and other more recent Thomists, while asserting that every permission of sin, with respect to the reprobate, is the effect of their reprobation, want it to be signified by this, that the permission of sin in the reprobate is ordained by God through the decree of reprobation, to the manifestation of his justice in the just damnation of the reprobate. As can be seen in Estius on the first book of the Sentences, Distinction 40, paragraph 5. "For," he says, "everything which God does concerning the reprobate, in order to the manifestation of his justice, through their just damnation, is called the effect of divine reprobation." And in the following paragraph he thence proves that the permission of sin is contained under the order of divine reprobation, as its effect, since in the reprobate it is ordained by God to the manifestation of the justice of God avenging sin.

XXI. But the Jesuits Becanus and Gregory of Valentia, when they teach that the permission of sin is the effect of reprobation, do not mean that God permits the sins of the reprobate, for the purpose that his justice may be manifested in their damnation. But they seem to refer that permission to other ends. Which Martin Becanus sufficiently indicates, while distinguishing a twofold reprobation, or rather a twofold act of reprobation, one, namely, which is a certain rejection from grace, but the other which is a rejection from glory. And indeed he concedes that the effect of the former act is the permission of sin, and the hardening of the reprobate, but not of the latter. As can be seen in him in the place just now cited.

XXII. And similarly Peter of St. Joseph establishes that the permission of final perseverance in sin is the effect of negative reprobation, but not of positive, at least according to the ordinary law. Since from his mind, that permission indeed follows from the fact that God did not elect someone to life, and to that extent conducted himself negatively toward him, according to his mind, in which consists his negative reprobation; but it does not depend on that decree, by which God resolved to show his justice in the damnation of the reprobate, but rather presupposes such a decree as already made. Since God resolves to damn no one, ordinarily at least, except after foreseeing his final sin, that is, after he has foreseen that he will die in sin. Concerning which matter that Peter of St. Joseph must be consulted in the Idea of Speculative Theology, in the chapter on Election & Reprobation.

XXIII. But it is further asked, Whether the goods granted to the reprobate, and his very creation are effects of reprobation? The sense of which question is, Whether the creation of the reprobate, and the goods of different kinds, which are granted to them by God, are ordained by God through the decree of reprobation to the declaration of his justice, in their just and eternal damnation? This most Doctors of the Roman Church deny, as for example, Becanus, Gregory of Valentia, Eustachius of St. Paul, and Peter of St. Joseph, but the more recent Thomists, mentioned now more often, affirm it, and namely Estius in distinction 40 of the first book of the Sentences paragraph 5, where he inquires what effects are to be referred to Reprobation.

XXIV. For there he teaches clearly enough that all things which are provided by God concerning the reprobate are ordained to that end which is the manifestation of his justice; and consequently are to be referred to the decree of reprobation. For besides the permission of sin, hardening, and blinding, he says that there are many other things, which are rightly established as effects of reprobation, "Of which some," he says, "are remote, others near, others common, others singular, others indifferent in themselves, but ordained by God to the end of reprobation, but others determined in themselves." And afterwards he subjoins, "whence also it does not seem to be denied that the very creation of a reprobate man can be called the effect of his reprobation by this general reason. For men of this kind are created for the manifestation of the justice of God through their just damnation: in which way we defined the effect of reprobation above."

XXV. But in that paragraph where he expounds what are the effects of predestination, after he has said that certain effects of predestination are common to the predestined with the reprobate, for example, he subjoins these words, "As the incarnation, passion, merit and sacrifice of Christ, the preaching of the Gospel, and other things of this kind, which pertain indeed per se to the order of predestination, but nevertheless for some, who by their unbelief, and malice turn them for themselves into the matter of graver damnation, become effects of reprobation."

XXVI. Moreover, from that diversity of opinions, which obtains in the Roman School concerning the nature of reprobation, and its effects, it is ready to gather, how variously also it is necessary for them to think about its object. For those Doctors who include under the

decree of reprobation all those acts of Divine providence, which are concerned with those who fall away from the highest end, and consequently number the very creation of the reprobate among its effects, which the more recent Thomist Doctors do, as has been said, those Doctors, I say, if they want to be consistent with themselves, cannot say that the object of reprobation is man who is considered as already made, and corrupted by sin, but simply man as able to be created. Which Estius acknowledges enough in distinction 40 of the first book of the Sentences, where he treats that question, Whether the permission of sin is the effect of reprobation? For responding to the sixth argument of the adverse opinion, "No necessity," he says, "compels us to say that the reprobation and predestination of men presupposes the corrupt mass."

XXVII. Nor can those who otherwise dissent from the more recent Thomists have that corrupt mass for the object of total reprobation, who nevertheless place the permission of any sin in the reprobate among the effects of reprobation, even of the first sin on account of which someone may be damned, and of original sin. Of which number are some Jesuits, and among others Martin Becanus, as is clear from the things which we have related above about him.

XXVIII. Nevertheless, very many Doctors of the Roman Church think that the reprobation of men, as also election supposes the mass of the human race already corrupt, and infected with Original sin. And so for the object of Reprobation they establish man as already fallen, and corrupted by original sin. Which opinion Peter of St. Joseph holds in Speculative Theology chapter 20, Resolution 5. And Eustachius also of St. Paul, Tractate 1 of the Theological Sum, Disputation 17.

XXIX. But those who restrict divine reprobation to the decree concerning certain men, on account of their foreseen final perseverance in sin, to be excluded from glory, and eternally damned, and think that its only effect is exclusion from glory, and the infliction of sempiternal punishment, they, I say, cannot have for the object of reprobation simply man as fallen and corrupted by sin in divine prevision, but man as foreseen dying in sin, whether that sin be actual, or only original.

XXX. But among the Doctors of the Roman Church the principal contention is about the Cause of Reprobation, Whether, namely, Reprobation, by reason of its effects, has some cause in man? And, Whether God reprobating man is moved to this by any evil merit of the reprobate man? And indeed all agree in this that Reprobation related to some of its effects, but especially to its ultimate effect, which is the eternal damnation of man, has a cause in man, namely his foreseen sin. For there is no one, as far as I know, among the Doctors of the Roman Church, who does not acknowledge that God, while by his eternal decree he adjudicates someone to eternal punishments, does this on account of his foreseen sins. But the question is, Whether reprobation related to all its effects together and collectively taken has a cause in man? And whether there is some evil merit in the reprobate, on account of which the whole effect of reprobation falls upon them?

XXXI. But this question can again still have a twofold sense. For reprobation can be

considered in two ways, absolutely, or comparatively. Absolutely, as when it is simply asked, Whether he who has been reprobated is by some merit of his own worthy to have been reprobated by God in that way, that is, rejected from Grace, and Glory? Comparatively, as when it is asked, Whether there is present in the reprobate some cause, or reason, why they were reprobated rather than others. For it can happen that someone is in himself and simply worthy of some punishment, who nevertheless is not more worthy of that punishment than another who is rendered immune from it. For example, when a prince out of two thieves orders one to be hanged, but makes grace of the theft to the other, he who is hanged is worthy of hanging, and if it is asked simply, why the prince wanted him to be hanged, the reason for this will be in the thief, namely, that crime which he committed. But if someone asks, why since each was guilty of theft, the prince wanted this one to be punished by death according to his merit, rather than that one whom he dismisses free, the reason for this will be no longer in the thief, but must be referred entirely to the good pleasure of the prince. Therefore, in that way it can be asked, Whether Judas had in himself some evil merit, on account of which he was foreseen by God from eternity to be reprobated? Then supposing that in himself he was worthy to be reprobated by God, Whether a reason can be given from his side why he was reprobated rather than Peter?

XXXII. With these things thus expounded, there are two opinions on this question in the Roman School, which seem extreme, and fighting from the diameter. For there are some who assert that there is no effect of reprobation, which does not have some cause in man: and consequently that the whole decree of reprobation was constituted by God on account of some sin foreseen in man. And not only this, but besides they hold that a reason can be given from the side of the reprobate, why they were reprobated rather than others, especially, if the question is about adults, namely, their perseverance in sin, which God foreseeing from eternity reprobated them rather than others. It is necessary for those to think this way who restrict divine reprobation to the will alone of damning certain ones. For with the whole Roman School consenting, God wills to damn no one before his sin has been foreseen: and the sins in which someone dies are the reason why he is damned rather than another who does not similarly die in sins. And those Doctors of the Roman Church also come to this opinion, who want some reason, or cause of predestination to be found in man. For they think that the cause of reprobation, in whatever way it is considered, either comparatively, or absolutely, either as to all effects, or as to only some, resides with the reprobate much more.

XXXIII. But others, on the contrary, contend that total reprobation, and accepted according to the whole latitude of its effects, has absolutely no cause from the side of man, in whatever way finally it may be considered, whether absolutely, or comparatively. For they do not simply say that no reason can be given from the side of men, why these were reprobated rather than others: but besides they contend that of reprobation, as to all its effects, there is no merit in the reprobate man, and that the entire and total decree of reprobation follows the prevision of no sin. Which opinion it is necessary for all those to hold, if they want to be

consistent with themselves, who teach that the permission of any sin whatsoever, which issues in the damnation of the reprobate, is contained under the decree of reprobation. For if the permission of the first sin is included under the decree of reprobation, since the same sin cannot be the cause of its permission, it follows that it cannot be called the cause of the whole reprobation, and much less can any of those sins which follow the first.

XXXIV. But this especially follows from the doctrine of those, who refer the very creation of the reprobate to reprobation, as a cause, and consequently establish for the object of reprobation, not man made and fallen, but simply man as able to be created. Which, as was said before, the more recent Thomists do, as Alvarez, Estius, Rispolis, and others. But besides them many, who do not think with them in all things in this business also, strictly hold this doctrine, that no cause of reprobation, as neither of election, can be given from the side of men. Among whom are Cajetan, as is clear from the things which he writes on the question of Thomas about Predestination. Sixtus of Siena in Sacred Library book 6, Annotation 252. And in book 2, letter R, where he treats of the book of Repudiation. Domingo Bañez on the first part of Thomas question 23. Puteanus on the above said question of Thomas. And with Estius relating it in distinction 41 of the first book of the Sentences, Peter of Soto, Jodocus Tiletanus, Titelmannus, Guillaudus, and other writers of the previous age.

XXXV. But especially among the old Scholastics this opinion was very common and celebrated, which Giles of Rome, Bassolius, Marsilius, Gregory of Rimini, Denis the Cistercian, Lyra on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, and others held whom Estius cites in the remembered place and Vásquez on the question of Thomas about predestination, where he disputes at length about the cause of Reprobation. Thus, for example, among many conclusions which Gregory of Rimini posits about predestination the fourth is, "That no one is reprobated on account of the evil use of free will, which God foreknew he would have." The fifth, "That no one is reprobated, because he was foreknown to be finally with an obstacle to divine grace." The sixth, "That whomever God reprobated, he reprobated him without any cause in the reprobate himself." And similarly these are the words of Marsilius of Inghen, "No one predestined is predestined on account of some cause, which ought to exist in him in the future. Similarly neither is anyone reprobated reprobated on account of some cause, which ought to be in him in the future." In book 1 of the Sentences, Distinction 42, question 4.

XXXVI. But between these opinions which we have just now related, there is a certain other middle one, which establishes that reprobation considered absolutely indeed has from the side of man some reason and cause, nor did God reprobate anyone, except after some sin of his was foreseen, or evil merit, on account of which he was in himself worthy, to be reprobated by God: But nevertheless, if reprobation is considered conjointly with election, and in opposition to it, then it must be referred to the good pleasure of God alone, nor can any reason for it be assigned from the side of men. For they do not simply say that no reason can be given from the side of the reprobate, why they were reprobated rather than

others, nor do the foreseen sins of any reprobate cause why he was reprobated rather than another, nor why he was elected to life: since in many of the elect the same sins are found as in many of the reprobate, or perhaps even graver ones, and Original sin is common to all both elect and reprobate. Gregory of Valentia, Eustachius of St. Paul, and Peter of St. Joseph hold this opinion, and among the more recent Theologians not a few follow it today.

XXXVII. But among those themselves who think that from the side of men some cause is given of reprobation, at least considered absolutely, a great variety of opinions is still found, while they explain what that cause is. For there are some who constitute the cause of reprobation, as to its first effect, which according to them is the first denial of grace, and congruous vocation, by which man is rejected from the grace of the predestined, in the sin of the first parent alone, but not in any proper sin of those who are reprobated, whether that sin is established as actual, or original. For they think that the permission of any sin whatsoever, and the denial of grace must be justly attributed to the merit of the sin of the first parent: but that the permission of original sin in little ones who are reprobated, or the permission of the first actual sin in reprobate adults, who after the remission of original sin fall away from the grace of God, and relapse into sin, can justly be ascribed to no other sin. This is the opinion of Gabriel Vásquez vol. 1, disputation 95, chapter 3 and following. To which opinion Becanus approaches in the sum of Theology where he treats of the cause of Reprobation.

XXXVIII. But others, having followed Augustine in this part, think that a reason for the first effect of reprobation or rejection from the grace of the predestined, can be sought from original sin, by which they think that men presented to God reprobating are defiled; but that it must not be referred to other sins. For they think that in punishment of original sin all aids of grace are denied which are not granted, and that that sin is a sufficient cause, why God can justly deny to all, both little ones, and adults, the aids & remedies of his grace, but actually denies them to those who are reprobated: but they think that the denial of the first congruous and efficacious grace cannot be attributed to another sin.

XXXIX. To this opinion Peter of St. Joseph approaches. "It is more probable," he says, "that the negative reprobation of men was not constituted, except on account of Original sin foreseen." And a little afterwards, "It must be said," he says, "that a sin of this kind was simply the cause on account of which God willed to reprobate men negatively, even if it was not the cause, why he reprobated this one rather than that one in that way; since all were equally infected with original sin." In the Idea of Speculative Theology book 1, chapter 20, Resolution 5.

XL. But some think that in all the reprobate, the same cause of reprobation even as to its first effect must not be assigned. For they say that the cause of reprobation, from the side of the reprobate, in certain ones is original sin alone, namely, in little ones who die without Baptism: but in certain ones actual sin alone, namely in those reprobate to whom original sin has been remitted through baptism, or another remedy: finally in certain ones original and actual sin at the same time, namely in those reprobate to whom the grace of justification is never granted, and to whom original sin has never been remitted. This opinion, with Domingo Bañez

relating it, Domingo de Soto held writing on chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Romans, and Peter de Soto major Professor of Salamanca.

XLI. But what is amazing among those themselves who number the permission of sin among the effects of reprobation, and with Thomas concede that reprobation includes the will of permitting the guilt of certain men, and not only of inflicting the punishment of damnation for guilt, there are nevertheless some who teach that the cause of reprobation is the death of men and final perseverance in sin, whether actual, or original. Which latter dogma certainly cannot cohere with the former according to right reason. For the permission of sin cannot follow the prevision of final sin, since the prevision of sin is posterior to its permission. For God foresees no sin, which he has not first decreed with himself to permit. And yet this is the opinion of Gregory of Valentia. "The second opinion is," he says, "to be defended by us in every way, which asserts that those sins with which the reprobate departs from life, are the meritorious cause of his reprobation, not only as to the ultimate effect of reprobation, which is eternal punishment; but also as to that first effect, which is that permission of which we have spoken above." Vol. 1, question 23, disputation 1, point 3.

XLII. But again of those who simply deny that there is any cause of reprobation, considered as to all its acts and effects, there is not the same mind and opinion, nor are all led by the same reasons to assert this. For some constituting reprobation from two acts, one positive, which is the destining to eternal punishments, but the other negative, which is the passing over and abandonment of certain ones, while others are elected and predestined to eternal life, therefore say that no cause of total reprobation is given from the side of men: since that negative act by which the first part of reprobation consists, indeed follows the prevision of original sin, by which the whole mass of the human race is corrupted, but nevertheless is not done on account of that sin, nor is that sin its meritorious cause: since many infected with the same sin are not reprobated. Which is the opinion of Bellarmine on grace and free will book 2, last chapter.

XLIII. But others therefore deny that any cause of total reprobation is given, since the permission of any sin whatsoever, which issues in the perdition of the reprobate, is the effect of reprobation. But the permission of the first sin cannot be referred to the prevision of any sin as a cause: since no sin is prior to the first sin. Otherwise they think that God decreed to exclude no one from glory, except on account of his foreseen sins. In which opinion are most of those who deny that reprobation is from foreseen merits, or that any reason for it is given from the side of man. For they understand this about total reprobation, as has already been said, which includes the decree of denying the grace of the predestined, but not about that part of reprobation, which is the decree of rejecting someone from glory.

XLIV. But there are some who deny that a cause of reprobation is given for this reason, since God by a positive act decreed to exclude certain men from life and celestial glory, before he foresaw any of their sins. Vásquez in the place cited above attributes this opinion to Antonio Córdoba: and the more recent Thomists follow and profess it, and among others Diego Alvarez, as the things which we have related above from him make manifest.

**Theological Theses,
On the Nature, Object, Cause
& Effects of Reprobation.**

**IN Which is expounded the Doctrine of those who among Protestants are called Reformed
by a singular name, and is compared with the Doctrine of the Roman School.**

Thesis One.

From the Reformed Theologians not a few seem to include under the decree of Reprobation whatever things God decreed and ordained from eternity concerning those who fall away from salvation, and are adjudged to the punishments of hell. For they refer back to the decree of reprobation the act of the divine will by which God decreed to create the reprobate and to permit any sins of theirs whatsoever: and they think that God created the reprobate with that intention, and permitted their sins, even that first one by which they are born infected, so that at last he might show himself the avenger of sin in their just punishment.

II. For taking predestination in a certain general sense, as it includes under itself election and reprobation as two species, they define it thus. "Predestination is the eternal, most just and immutable counsel of God, concerning creating men, concerning permitting their fall into sin, and eternal death, concerning sending the son into the flesh, so that he may become a victim, and concerning saving some through the Holy Spirit and the Word, on account of the Mediator, in true faith and conversion, justifying through & on account of him, raising to glory, and gifting with eternal life, but concerning leaving some in sin and death, raising them to judgment, and casting them away into eternal punishments." Which is the description of Ursinus in part 2 of the Catechetical explication, in the chapter on predestination, question 2.

III. The definition of Jerome Zanchius agrees which he conceives in these words. "Predestination is the eternal and immutable decree of God, by which he established with himself from eternity: first to create all men, then to permit them both to fall into sin, and to rush into death: then of these to gift some freely with both his grace, and eternal life in Christ, but not to deem others worthy of this grace, but both to blind, and harden them with Satan, and to destroy them with eternal destruction: and this so that in the former the divine goodness and mercy, but in the latter the divine power and justice may be declared: and thus in all God may be glorified." Volume seven, tract on predestination number 9.

IV. The description of Bucanus is related. "The decree of predestination," he says, "is that by which God, now then when constituting to what end he would found them, men to be created by him, before he founded them, decreed, according to his right and mere will, for them so to serve his glory, that some of them would be vessels and examples of his goodness and mercy, but others vessels of his wrath, that is, of just vengeance on crimes, and of power." Topic 36, question 8.

V. The same also is the doctrine of Beza, who in the brief explication of the whole of

Christianity, places the decree of predestination in this, that God decreed to create men, as all other things, for his glory, but in two ways entirely different: namely, so that he may make some, whom it will have seemed good to him, according to his secret will, partakers of his glory, through mercy, but in others, whom it likewise will have pleased him to raise up for that use, show his wrath and power, so that in them also he may be glorified. Chapter 2 on predestination, Aphorism 2. And in chapter five, Aphorism one, he repeats that the Lord created the reprobate for this reason, so that he may be glorified in their just condemnation.

VI. Moreover, Gomarus, Piscator, Twisse, and Voetius approach the same opinion. And so all hold and profess it who among the Reformed are called supralapsarians, because, while assigning the object of predestination, they ascend above the fall of man.

VII. But nevertheless the greater part of the Doctors of the Reformed Church do not think that the decree concerning creating man, and concerning permitting the fall of the first man, and so the ruin of the whole human race following thence, makes a part of reprobation. For they refer back the whole decree of reprobation to that will, by which God decreed not to elect certain men, but to leave them in their own sins, and at last to damn them justly on account of their sins.

VIII. This was the opinion of the Synod of Dort, which in the chapter on divine predestination, Article XV, places the decree of reprobation in this, that God from his most free, most just, and immutable good pleasure, decreed to leave certain men in the common misery, into which they precipitated themselves by their own fault, and not to gift them with saving faith and conversion; but with them having been left in their own ways, and under just judgment, at last to damn and eternally punish them not only on account of unbelief, but also all other sins, for the declaration of his justice.

IX. With which definition most of the particular judgments of the Theologians who were present at that Synod agree. Thus in the judgment of the Theologians of Nassau, this is their first thesis on Reprobation. "The will of God by which he wisely, freely, and immutably decreed from eternity, out of the whole miserable and sinful human race, not to elect certain ones, and to damn them justly on account of their sins, is the whole decree of reprobation." And this was also the opinion of the Theologians of Leiden, as can be seen in the theses of Rivet on reprobation thesis 3.

X. Moreover, these Theologians are accustomed to distinguish a twofold act in reprobation. One is said by them to be negative, by which God decreed from eternity not to elect this one, but to pass over him, and not to lift him up from the fall: but the other positive, or of affirmation, by which he decreed to destine sinners having been left to themselves, and having abused the administration of common providence, by which they are not destitute, after long toleration, to deserved punishments, and to effect them with the same. Which are the words of Rivet in the same disputation thesis seven.

XI. Polyander agrees in the theses on reprobation published in the year 1625, thesis 19, where in reprobation he observes two distinct preordinations. "The former," he says, "is negative, which is designated by the terms of preterition and non-election, the latter is

affirmative, which is designated by the word of predamnation."

XII. But if it is asked in which of those preordinations reprobation chiefly consists, here the opinions of the Doctors seem to vary. And indeed Polyander seems to place reprobation especially in this last preordination. For while defining reprobation, he expressly mentions only it in thesis 18. "Reprobation," he says, "is the predestination of certain men having fallen into sin, and detaining the truth of God in injustice, or rejecting the Gospel preached to them in various ways and degrees, to the destruction of eternal death."

XIII. The older Doctors also of the Reformed School seem to place the reason of reprobation chiefly in the predestination of certain men to destruction and sempiternal death, as is clear from their definitions. But the Synod of Dort in reprobation especially considers the decree concerning denying grace to certain men, by which their hearts would be bent and softened to faith and repentance. As can be seen in the chapter on predestination, Article VI. "Which," it says, "that some in time are gifted with faith by God, others are not gifted, proceeds from his eternal decree, according to which decree he graciously softens the hearts of the elect, however hard, and bends them to believing, but leaves the non-elect, by just judgment, in their own malice and hardness. And here especially that profound, both merciful and just discrimination of men equally lost, or, that decree of election and reprobation revealed in the Word of God, opens itself to us."

XIV. Similarly Rivet in that disputation on reprobation, which is the fifth of those thirteen which he had on the just and gracious dispensation of God concerning the salvation of the human race, properly constitutes reprobation in that negative act, by which God from eternity did not elect certain men, but passed over them. For these are his words in thesis 8. "With these things premised we say that for that negative act, namely preterition which properly is reprobation, insofar as it is opposed to election, no cause is required, which ought to have preceded, so that it might move God to reprobate."

XV. Indeed the Theologians of Great Britain in their judgment which is had in the acts of the Synod of Dort place the whole reason of reprobation in that negative act, by which God resolved not to bestow on certain men that grace, by which the elect are led efficaciously and infallibly to faith and salvation. For thus they speak in the second chapter of that judgment of theirs. "On Reprobation, Thesis one Orthodox. Reprobation properly speaking, or non-election, is the eternal decree of God, by which with most free will he determined not to have mercy on certain men fallen in Adam to that extent, that he might efficaciously rescue them from their misery through Christ, and infallibly lead them to felicity." And afterwards they subjoin, in their judgment, reprobation insofar as it is opposed to election, does not infer, or denote any other proper actions, beyond the negation of the same glory, and the same grace, which God prepared for his sons in his election.

XVI. But the Professors of Saumur seem to restrict reprobation to the sole negation of saving grace. For they openly distinguish the decree of reprobation from the decree of damnation. And they define temporal reprobation, of which the eternal decree is that reprobation

about which the question now is, through exclusion from saving grace. For thus their XXXVI Thesis reads in the former disputation on Election & Reprobation, "Damnation itself is one thing, reprobation another: also the decree of damnation is one thing, the decree of reprobation another, and the cause of each decree. Damnation is the most just infliction of punishment deservedly owed. Reprobation is the exclusion, or denial of the saving grace of God, by which man believes, and is led by true repentance." With which Paul Testard teaches agreeable things in the Synopsis of Doctrine on Nature & Grace. Thesis 294. "Reprobation," he says, "is the purpose of hardening, that is, of delivering over to a reprobate mind, with efficacious grace of calling not granted by just judgment. But less properly and with a more extended signification beyond that purpose, the decree of condemning and afflicting, both with temporal punishments with malediction, and with eternal ones."

XVII. Moreover, just as the Reformed Theologians variously define Reprobation, and include more or fewer acts of divine providence under it, so also they variously assign its effects, or, as some prefer to speak, its consequences, and the means by which it is carried out. For those who define reprobation so broadly, that it includes the decree concerning creating man, and permitting the fall of the human race, and who want God to have created certain men for that end, that he might show and make known the glory of his justice in their just condemnation, they, I say, necessarily have to number among the effects, or means of reprobation the creation of the reprobate, and the permission of any sin which is the cause, or occasion of their perdition. Thus according to Zacharias Ursinus, the effects of reprobation are 1. the creation of the reprobate, 2. the privation of divine grace or desertion. By which name he seems to understand the permission of any sin. Catechetical Institution part 2 on Predestination question 4.

XVIII. The same is the Doctrine of Zanchius in the sum of lectures which is had in volume seven, tract on predestination number 22. "To be created," he says, "and to be allowed to fall into sins and into death are effects of predestination common to the elect and the reprobate. But to be deserted perpetually in sins, to be blinded, hardened, and finally damned are effects of reprobation proper to the impious." William Perkins also teaches that the common means of the predestination of men, both to death, and to life, is the creation of man, and the permission of the fall. But he understands that permission by which God justly permitted the defection of Adam and his posterity, by not impeding when he was able. As can be seen in his little book on predestination immediately under the beginning. To which Polanus agrees in Theological Syntagma book 4, chapter 10, where in Thesis 3 he teaches that the effects of Reprobation are the excitation, or creation of the reprobate, so that God may show his power and justice in them: Then the permission of the fall or of sin in which the reprobate perish.

XIX. Similarly Bucanus topic 36, question 38 among the common means of reprobation places the creation of man in integrity and justice, then the fall of men and their corruption. And question 39 among the peculiar means of execution of the decree concerning reprobating men he refers the infinite offspring of actual sins: which if they are means of reprobation, their permission is the effect of reprobation.

XX. But although he and others from the Reformed Theologians number various sins of the reprobate, indeed even the very fall of the first man, among the means, or consequences of reprobation, they nevertheless do not want any sins to be called effects of reprobation, and they teach that God indeed wills to permit them, but not truly to effect them. As can be seen in Ursinus and Bucanus in the cited places. Especially in Polanus in that tenth chapter of the fourth book, where treating of the effects of reprobation, he proves with many arguments that sin is not the effect of eternal reprobation. Nor do they want sins to be means per se serving the end of predestination, or reprobation, but only per accidens, and from the ordination of God eliciting good from evil. As can be seen in Perkins in the place now indicated.

XXI. Here nevertheless some Theologians distinguish between sins, insofar as they are sins, and between the same sins, insofar as they are sometimes the punishments of other sins. And they deny indeed that sins, simply as they are sins, are effects of reprobation; but they contend that certain sins in the reprobate both are, and deservedly are called effects of reprobation, insofar as they are the punishment of preceding sins. Of which sort is the blindness of mind, and hardness of heart of those who are delivered over to a reprobate sense; which namely, as it is the punishment of preceding rebellion, must be referred to reprobation as a cause: although in itself, and under the aspect of sin, it is not a properly so called effect of reprobation.

XXII. Which is the Doctrine of Zacharias Ursinus in the place cited before. where also, which is harder, he places perseverance in sins expressly and explicitly among the effects of reprobation. Which nevertheless is approved by neither others, nor ought to be approved. Since perseverance in sins is itself the greatest sin, and so cannot be referred to the decree of God, as a cause, without God being established as the author of sin as a consequence.

XXIII. Indeed it does not even seem that it should be said that sin, as it is punishment, is from reprobation, and is inflicted by God, as Ursinus speaks. For sin is never punishment properly so called, and inflicted by God, but when God in punishment of some sin deserts the sinner, and permits him to himself, whence it happens that he becomes worse, and falls into graver crimes, that which has the aspect of punishment is that desertion, and abandonment of God: but when sins are then said to be punished by sins it is an improper locution.

XXIV. But it is asked among the Doctors of the Reformed School whether the reprobate can be said to be preordained and destined by the decree of God to sinning. To this Zanchius Responds, that no one indeed is predestined to committing sin, insofar as it is sin, but nevertheless both the elect, and the reprobate were preordained to sin, even as it is sin, insofar as from it the glory of God was to be illustrated, and is illustrated, which are the words of his sixth Thesis on Reprobation question two, which is had in chapter two of Book five on the nature of God.

XXV. But that is said harshly, and with some offense to pious ears, and it is simply false that anyone was predestined, or preordained by God to sin, as it is sin, whatever restriction may afterwards be added: although to this both the elect and the reprobate were preordained,

that they might be allowed to fall and lapse into various sins, and God also preordained to illustrate his glory from their sins, which he himself permitted.

XXVI. Others here distinguish between an effective and an approbative decree, and between a moderating or permissive one, and from an effective and approbative decree indeed they deny that the sins of the reprobate come to be: but they contend that they are truly and legitimately attributed to the decree of God which they call moderating and permissive: so that, according to them, men can be said to be preordained to sinning by a permissive decree, but not by an effective one. Which is the doctrine and distinction of Bucanus topic 36, question 40. To which the Doctrine of Perkins is related in the book on Predestination, Response to the third accusation. But to others, and more rightly, it seems that harsh Locutions of this kind must be avoided.

XXVII. But setting this aside, since most of the Reformed Theologians think that the total decree of reprobation includes no other acts of the divine will, than that by which God decreed to leave certain men in the mass of sin, and at last to damn them justly on account of their sins, it follows from their opinion that the permission of the sin of the first man, and of original sin following from it, is not to be referred to reprobation, as its effect, but only pertains to common providence.

XXVIII. And much more is it necessary for them to assert the same about creation, which from their mind, does not depend on reprobation, as from a cause, but from a certain decree of common providence, which according to our way of conceiving, precedes the decree of reprobation, and is presupposed by it.

XXIX. But the permission of those sins, which in the reprobate follow original sin, and the negation of grace which is conferred on the elect, and at last eternal death, which is repaid to the sins of the reprobate by the just judgment of God, they reckon and acknowledge as proper effects and consequences of reprobation. As can be seen in the Theses of Rivet on Reprobation.

XXX. In this part nevertheless Peter du Moulin recedes from the common opinion. For he simply denies that the permission of sin is the effect of reprobation. And he disapproves the definition of Thomas, who says that the decree of reprobation is the will of permitting someone to fall into guilt, and of inflicting the punishment of damnation for guilt. "For," he says, "the permission by which God permits sin does not pertain to predestination, but to providence, however much it may serve predestination." In the Anatomy of Arminianism chapter 26, number 4.

XXXI. But those who restrict the decree of reprobation to the will alone of denying to certain men efficacious and salvific grace, by which the elect are gifted with true faith and repentance, which the Professors of Saumur do, as has already been said, and Testard in Irenicum, they, I say, do not think that damnation is the proper and immediate effect of reprobation, but only the negation of that efficacious grace, which works faith and repentance in the elect.

XXXII. But just as the Reformed Theologians variously define reprobation, and include more or fewer decrees of God under the name of reprobation, nor assign its effects in the same way, so also their opinions vary concerning its object. For those who think that the decree concerning creating man, and permitting his fall makes a part of reprobation, as Polanus, Beza, Zanchius, Gomarus, Ursinus, Bucanus, Twisse, and others, they want the object of reprobation considered according to all its acts to be, not man fallen and made, but simply man able to be created. Which opinion Voetius the Professor of Utrecht most fiercely defended a few years ago.

XXXIII. But some teach that the object of predestination generally taken, and so of reprobation, is man, considered indeed as made, but as not yet corrupted by sin. Which is the opinion of Francis Junius in the Friendly Collation with James Arminius on Predestination.

XXXIV. But according to the mind of the Synod of Dort, and most of the Doctors of the Reformed School today, the object of reprobation is not man simply as created and made in the prevision of God, but whom God considers, as fallen in Adam, and infected with Original sin. For in describing the decree of reprobation they do not ascend above the fall of man.

XXXV. But according to Sohnus once Professor of Heidelberg, the object of reprobation, as also of election, is not man simply as fallen in Adam, and corrupted by sin, but besides as called by God, and called and invited to faith and repentance, either through the Word, or through the works of nature and providence. As can be seen in that author in the tract on eternal predestination.

XXXVI. But with him in this part the Theologians of Bremen seem to agree in their judgment offered to the Synod of Dort, and the Salmurians in their Theses, and others who assent to them in the Doctrine on universal Grace. For they think that God, before he decreed to make any distinction between men through election and reprobation, determined to prepare Christ as redeemer for all in common, and to call and invite all to the participation of that grace by various grades and ways: and only then, when he saw that all, if left to themselves, would be unbelieving and impenitent, decreed to overcome the hardness and contumacy of certain ones by his grace, but to harden others, by not bestowing similar grace on them, and by permitting, that they resist God calling and inviting, and do not obey him.

XXXVII. Now as regards the cause of reprobation, that is, that question, Whether there is given from the side of man a cause, or certain condition from the prevision of which God was moved and induced to reprobate this or that man, or through which this and that one is worthy to have been reprobated from eternity, the Reformed Theologians also go away into various opinions. For those who describe reprobation so broadly, that it includes the eternal counsel of God concerning creating the reprobate, and permitting any of their falls: and who constitute the object of reprobation man, not made and fallen in divine prevision, but simply man able to be created, and number creation among the common means of reprobation, and the permission of the fall of the first man, they, I say, constantly and concordantly affirm that of the whole reprobation, and of all its acts and effects together and collectively taken, no

reason or cause is given from the side of man, from the prevision of which God was impelled to reprobate this or that man, and through which this and that one by some merit of his own was worthy that the whole effect of reprobation should fall upon him. And so they not only contend that it depends on the good pleasure of God alone why that one was reprobated rather than this one, but also that God reprobating foresaw nothing more in the reprobate, why they were worthy to be reprobated by God, than he foresaw something in the elect, by which they would deserve to be elected by God, and predestined to life. Whence it follows that total and entire reprobation, in whatever way finally it may be considered, whether comparatively, or absolutely, must be referred to the sole and mere will of God: nor can any reason for it be sought and given from the future sins of men.

XXXVIII. If anyone nevertheless considers the effects of reprobation one by one and separately, they acknowledge that certain of them have merit in man and are justly brought upon the reprobate by their sins. As, for example, the punishment of eternal damnation, which is the ultimate effect of reprobation, from the opinion of all Theologians, is inflicted on no reprobate, except on account of his sins, and evil demerits. And they think the same about hardening and blinding, and about that desertion by which the impious are delivered over to a reprobate sense, which are most just punishments by which God is accustomed to vindicate the contempt of his grace.

XXXIX. But if it pleases to divide the decree of reprobation into various acts, and partial decrees, and to consider separately that act of the divine will, by which the reprobate are destined and ordained to eternal death, the Theologians already mentioned, who from the fact that, while assigning the object of predestination, they ascend above the fall of man, are called supralapsarians, do not seem to think entirely the same thing, but to go away into different opinions. For many of them contend that God from eternity destined certain men to the eternal torments of hell, before the prevision of any guilt to be future in them: and consequently that the decree concerning damning these and those men has no reason or cause from the side of men: indeed that decree must be conceived as something prior to the decree concerning permitting the sins of the reprobate; which latter decree follows the prevision of the sins into which the reprobate, with God permitting, fall.

XL. This is the express doctrine of Polanus in Theological Syntagma book 4, chapter 10. On the efficient cause of eternal Reprobation. where this is his second Thesis. "The impelling efficient cause on account of which the decree of reprobation, whether affirmatively, or negatively, was made by God, is not sin, to which pertains also the evil use of free will." But in the third Thesis he denies that the eternal prevision of sin is the cause of the decree of reprobation. And this because, according to his opinion, in the same chapter where he explains the nature of reprobation, God in the decree of predestination first ordained creatures to their end, namely either to life, or to eternal death; then only subordinated means to executing his counsel; among which means the sins of the reprobate have a place.

XLI. Jerome Zanchius also teaches the same thing in book five on the Nature of God, chapter two. where he refutes those who indeed confess that the mere will of God, but not

the foreseen sins of men, is the cause of negative reprobation, which is that decree by which he determined not to have mercy on certain ones, and to deny them his grace; but of affirmative reprobation; that is, of that decree by which God resolved to adjudge certain ones to eternal punishments, they contend that the cause is the sins of the impious, but not the will of God alone, whom he says are deceived in this, that they assert that the primary cause, why God destined certain ones to eternal death is their foreseen evil works, and deny that it is the will of God alone. Since sins, from his mind, are indeed the cause of damnation in the impious, but not the cause of the divine decree concerning damning and punishing them, which in God, according to him, precedes the prevision of all sins, and so the decree concerning permitting the fall of the human race: which, according to him, as a decree concerning means, is subordinated to the former decree, as to a decree concerning the end. "This," he says, "was the first thing which God constituted from eternity concerning the reprobate, namely the destining of certain men to sempiternal destruction. But to this were ordained their sins, and to sins desertion, and the denial of grace."

XLII. With these Beza also agrees in the brief explication of the whole of Christianity, chapter two, Aphorism five. Where he says, when it is a question of the destruction of the reprobate, although the whole guilt remains within themselves, nevertheless the Spirit of God conveys us up to that lofty mystery, which precedes in order all the causes of their damnation; of which secret indeed no other cause is known to men, beyond the just will of God himself. And Beza also was followed by Piscator, which is manifest even from this, that he makes the decree concerning permitting the fall of Adam far posterior to the decree concerning damning the reprobate, and inserts many other decrees, as William Twisse relates in the Perkinsian vindications, Digression one, on the object of predestination.

XLIII. Moreover although that Twisse reprehends Piscator and others in this, that they establish that the decree concerning damning certain ones is prior in reason to the prevision of sin, at the same time nevertheless he also denies that that prevision in God is prior to the decree of damnation. For he teaches that the decree concerning damning certain ones, and the decree concerning permitting their sins, and the very prevision of those sins are in God by nature and reason at the same time, and are coordinated things, but not subordinated. And consequently he nevertheless agrees with them in this, that foreseen sins are in no way the cause, or reason why God by an eternal decree assigned certain ones to sempiternal damnation.

XLIV. But Perkins, although otherwise from the number of those Doctors who are called supralapsarians, affirms indeed that the entire decree of reprobation in God precedes all consideration of sin in the men to be reprobated, and so that no reason for it, or motive can be assigned from the side of men, but that it must be referred to the sole will of God: but nevertheless he reckons that that act of the divine will, by which certain men are ordained to punishment, has in God a certain preceding prevision and consideration of sin. For he teaches that of the decree of reprobation there is a twofold act. The former, according to him, is the purpose of deserting certain men, and of declaring justice in them. Of this act he

affirms that an impulsive cause outside God cannot be given: since, as he thinks, it arises from the mere good pleasure of God, no respect having been had either of good, or of evil in the creature. He says that the second act of reprobation is the ordination to punishment, or to just destruction. But he again distinguishes this ordination, according to the various mode of thinking into simple and comparative. Simple ordination for him is that by which this one, say Cain, or Judas, is ordained to punishment. And he says that this is done by God with respect to Original or actual sins, and that sin in divine foreknowledge precedes it by reason of order, although he denies that it follows thence that sin is the cause of the decree of damnation. But he says that comparative ordination is that by which one, not another, and in an equal condition this one more than that one is ordained to punishment. And of that comparative reprobation he asserts that the cause is the mere will of God, even without respect to any sin.

XLV. In which matter he seems to err. Since, just as he before collects, that just as God damns men on account of sin, so he decreed to damn them on account of sin: so we can collect that just as God damns this one rather than that one, since this one not that one dies in sins: so also he decreed to damn this one rather than that one, because he foresaw that this one rather than that one would die in sin.

XLVI. As it pertains to those for whom the object of reprobation is man fallen and corrupted by sin, all agree in this that God addicted no one to damnation by his eternal decree, except from his sin foreseen, and on account of his sin to be future. Indeed from their doctrine it manifestly follows that the entire decree of reprobation, in God has a certain previous consideration of sin once to be future in the man to be reprobated.

XLVII. Nevertheless to that question, Whether the decree of reprobation has some cause in man, which impelled God to reprobate this and that one, very many of them respond through the distinction. Namely, as has already been observed, they distinguish two acts in the decree of reprobation. One negative, by which God decreed to pass over certain men in the communication of salutary grace and eternal glory, which he destines for the elect. But the other positive, by which he resolved to addict them to the eternal supplices of hell. And they deny that the cause of that former negative act must be sought in the merits of men, but they assert that it must be referred to the will of God alone. But of the latter positive and affirmative act, by which certain men are destined to eternal damnation, they confess that the cause must not be referred to the will of God alone, but to the foreseen sins of those who are foreknown to be about to merit that damnation. Which doctrine is handed down by nearly all the Theologians, who were present at the Synod of Dort by common consent, As can be seen in their judgments, which are found subjoined to the Canons of that Synod in its acts.

XLVIII. But others add another distinction expounded by us above. For if reprobation is desired comparatively, and it is asked, for example, why Judas was reprobated rather than Peter, then they deny that the sins and evil merits of men are the cause of it: whether regard is had to that former negative act, which is called non-election, or preterition, or even to the latter affirmative act, which they call predamnation. For although God foresaw demerit of

damnation in Judas, before he ordained him by his decree to damnation, nevertheless in many of the elect he foresaw sins which would have sufficed for their damnation, unless he had decreed to use mercy toward them.

XLIX. But if reprobation is considered absolutely, and the question is, Whether this one, or that one was worthy by some merit of his own whom God would reprobate, then they respond that the foreseen sins of the reprobate were a sufficient cause on account of which God could justly reprobate and reject them, and that not only with respect to the latter act, which is predamnation; but also with respect to the former, which is preterition and the denial of grace, although they affirm it less boldly and explicitly, than about the latter. Which is the Doctrine of Rivet disputation on Predestination. For thus he speaks in thesis thirteen. "It is one thing to inquire concerning the cause why the reprobate are worthy of reprobation, another why God reprobated this one rather than that one? The former must be sought and established in sin, but the latter in the secret will of God alone."

L. But Louis Cappel in the first part of the Theses on Election & Reprobation, which are inserted in the second Volume of the Saumur Theses, denies indeed that the decree concerning not electing, or passing over certain men in the communication of salutary and efficacious grace, has a cause from the side of men, if the elect and reprobate are compared among themselves; although if this preterition is considered absolutely, they who are reprobated are worthy of that preterition by their own merit and sin, and were considered as such by God, while the decree of reprobation was framed by him.

LI. But as regards the decree concerning damning certain ones, in whatever way finally it may be considered, he affirms that its cause and merit is in the sins of men. Namely, their foreseen sins, were not only the cause why they were adjudicated to eternal damnation by the decree of God, but also why they rather than others. For he does not want anyone to be preordained to eternal damnation, except from the prevision of final unbelief and impenitence. as can be seen in thesis 36. But in the following thesis these are his Words. "Of reprobation, if it is considered in itself and absolutely, the cause is sin, that is, man as a sinner deserves to be reprobated by God, or is worthy to whom God may deny, if he wills, his grace and the gift of faith, he is unworthy to whom God may confer so great a benefit. But God Reprobates no one, or excludes from grace, except him whom he considered lying in sin and corrupted, and foresaw from eternity." But in thesis 38 "Of reprobation," he says, "considered comparatively no other cause is than the mere good pleasure of God."

LII. Moreover those Theologians who teach that reprobation, at least considered absolutely, has from sin foreseen in men a cause, motive, or reason, do not explain for the most part what sin they mean. Whether Original sin alone, Whether also actual, and Whether final impenitence alone, Whether also other sins? Nevertheless the most celebrated Molinaeus in the Anatomy of Arminianism chapter 26, after he asserted in number 6 & 7 that sin is the meritorious cause of reprobation, not however the cause of the distinction between the elect and the reprobate, in the following paragraph asserts that men are reprobated not on account of original sin alone, and on account of the stain which is common to the reprobate

with the elect, but also on account of actual sins, which they are going to commit in the whole course of life.

LIII. But if it must be said, not what perhaps each one thinks, but what follows from the Doctrine of each one, and what it is necessary for each one to think, if he wants to stand by his own principles, since according to the greatest part of the Reformed Doctors, and especially of those by whom the Synod of Dort consisted, the object of total reprobation, and considered as to all its acts, is the human race as fallen in Adam, and infected with Original sin, but not men, as already contaminated by actual sins and vices, they necessarily have to say that reprobation, as to its first act, which is preterition, or non-election, does not have the preceding consideration of any sin, besides Original, and so if they say that there is in man any worthiness or merit of preterition and non-election considered absolutely, they must refer it all to Original sin.

LIV. But truly, if reprobation is considered as to the latter act, which is predamnation, and a certain ordination to eternal death, since they say that on account of what sins someone is damned, on account of the same having been foreseen from eternity he was ordained and destined by the decree of God to damnation: but it is manifest that men are damned not on account of original sin alone, but on account of any actual sins committed in the whole course of life, indeed that no one is damned, except he who perseveres in sin unto death, thence it follows, according to their opinion, that reprobation, as far as it regards this act, and insofar as it is conceived, as the preordination of certain men to eternal death, and sempiternal torments, was not made except from final perseverance in sin having been foreseen, and so on account of it, and with respect to it.

LV. Whence also it can be evidently and openly collected that final perseverance in sin is the cause and reason of reprobation, as to that ultimate act, not only when reprobation is considered absolutely, but also when it is considered comparatively. For God does not simply damn this and that one, because he dies in sin, but also when it is asked, why God adjudges this one rather than that one to eternal death, it can be responded rightly and truly, that God does that for this reason, because this one dies in sin, but that one rises again from sin before death. And just as those Doctors about whom we are now treating conclude, that just as God damns men on account of the sin in which they persevere unto death, so also he decreed to damn them on account of the same sin, so also they ought to conclude, that just as God damns this one rather than that one, because this one and not that one ends life in sin, so also he decreed to damn this one rather than that one, because he foresaw that this one rather than that one would be about to end life in sins.

LVI. But those who want the object of election and reprobation to be man called to the participation of the grace of Christ, whether through the express and explicit preaching of the Gospel, or in some other way, they can admit that not only Original sin, but also actual sins, and vices voluntarily contracted by man, are the cause of reprobation, not only as to the latter act which is predamnation, but also as to the former, which is preterition, at least when reprobation is considered absolutely. For if God electing and reprobating men, considers

them as resisting the divine vocation as much as is in them, and if left to themselves, he certainly sees them worthy to be rejected, not only with respect to original sin, in which they were conceived and born, but also with respect to actual sins, by which they voluntarily polluted and contaminated themselves: although he sees no worthiness in them, why these rather than those, should either be converted by grace, or left to their native depravity and contumacy.

LVII. But from these things it can be gathered that the more common and probable opinion in the Reformed Schools concerning the cause of Reprobation, is that which establishes that Reprobation, as to that act which is preterition or non-election, indeed has some merit and reason from the side of the reprobate man, if reprobation is considered in itself and absolutely, but does not have it, if it is considered comparatively. But if the question is about that other act which is predamnation, and destining to death, then the perseverance of man in sin is its merit and cause, in whatever way finally someone may consider it.

LVIII. But now, if someone according to those things which have been expounded by us, compares the Doctrine of the Roman School about reprobation, with the Doctrine of the Theologians of the Reformed Church about the same article, he will easily see that there is properly no question and controversy about this matter, which divides the Reformed Church from the Roman Church. For there is nothing concerning the nature, object, cause and effects of Reprobation, which the Roman School denies by unanimous consent, but the Reformed School affirms, or the contrary. But if the Doctors of the Roman Church condemn anything by common consent in some of the Reformed, that also many others of the Reformed reprehend in them. And vice versa, if in anything the Reformed commonly recede from the opinion of certain Doctors of the Roman School, in that also they are condemned by many Theologians of their communion.

LIX. But scarcely anything of such sort occurs in this business. For in the various questions which are moved concerning Reprobation, there is great diversity of opinions, as appears, both in the Roman School and in the Reformed School. And there is scarcely any which does not have both its adversaries and its supporters in each School. For on both sides there are both those who include more acts, and those who include fewer under the name of Reprobation, and consequently who assign to it more, or fewer effects also.

LX. And as certain of the Reformed number the creation of man and even the permission of the first fall among the effects, or means, as they speak, of Reprobation, some from the Doctors of the Roman School also do the same. But as most of these call back such effects, not to reprobation, but only to common providence, the greatest part of the Reformed Doctors also does the same.

LXI. But both by common consent deny that sins are effects of reprobation, and so it is imputed to the Reformed by calumny that they affirm the contrary, and place sins among the effects of Reprobation. But if something slipped from one or another of the Reformed which seems to pertain to that, as when Zacharias Ursinus, imprudently and against his own doctrine, numbers perseverance in sin among the effects of reprobation, we see the same

thing happened to Viguerius the Dominican, whose words have been related by us in the preceding Theses. It must nevertheless be confessed that some of the Reformed used certain harsh words and locutions in this matter, which gave some appearance and occasion of calumny, as can be seen in the examples cited before, and especially from Jerome Zanchius. But most of the Reformed abstain from them, nor approve the way of speaking of the rest.

LXII. Besides, as many of the older Reformed in assigning the object of reprobation ascend above the fall of man, so also from the doctrine of most of the old Scholastics, it cannot be assigned otherwise. But most of the more recent Theologians in each School constitute fallen man the object of reprobation.

LXIII. Finally concerning the cause of reprobation the Theologians both of the Roman Church and of the Reformed Church seem to contend among themselves in the same way. For among both there are those who deny that from the side of the men who are reprobated, any cause or reason of total reprobation can be given in whatever way it can be considered either absolutely, or comparatively, but refer it to the good pleasure of God alone.

LXIV. There are also those who think that some cause and merit of reprobation, at least considered absolutely, is found in the sins of men. And besides who refer that cause to original sin alone, and also who refer it not to original alone, but to sins both original and actual at the same time.

LXV. To these most of the Doctors of each School here distinguish reprobation into negative and affirmative, or positive. And indeed they teach that a cause of negative reprobation cannot be given from the side of men, but they refer it to the will of God alone. But they acknowledge that the cause and merit of positive and affirmative reprobation resides in the reprobate themselves.

LXVI. In this question nevertheless there is one thing which a few of the Reformed affirm, which however the Doctors of the Roman Church condemn by unanimous consent. Namely, that the predestination of certain men to eternal death and destruction was made from the mere good pleasure of God, and that no cause and reason for it must be sought in the sins of men, since the permission of them is the effect of that kind of predestination.

LXVII. But by far the greatest part of the Doctors of the Reformed School also rejects this opinion. Nor does the opinion of certain Doctors of the Roman Church, which we related in the preceding disputation, abhor much from it. Of those, namely, who teach that God by a positive decree excluded certain men from eternal and celestial glory, before any prevision of sin in them, and that the permission of any sin is the effect of that decree, by which God resolved to declare and manifest his justice in certain men. Which opinion Diego Alvarez and William Estius hold and defend, and with them some other more recent Thomists.

**Theological Theses,
On the Order of Divine
Decrees, Concerning the Elect and Reprobate.**

IN Which is expounded the Doctrine of the Roman School, and also of those who among Protestants are called Reformed by a singular name.

Thesis I

The Doctors of the Roman School lay down as a certain and immovable foundation for this question that in God, who is most simple, there are not many acts of will and intellect, which are the same in God with his very essence; but that God by a single most simple act willed and ordained whatever things he willed and ordained from eternity, and consequently that in God there are not many decrees, between which there is a true and natural order of prior and posterior. But while we think that the divine intellect and will are referred and terminated to various objects, thence various conceptions are formed, which are called the decrees of God, and are conceived as if they were many, when that which corresponds to them in God is really one.

II. Since therefore God willed and ordained many and diverse things about the ultimate end of men, and the means conducing to that end, as the act of the divine will and intellect is referred to this and that end, and to these and those means, about these and those men, it is divided by the human mind into many, among which reason constitutes a certain order, according to which human conceptions of that divine act variously considered ought to be disposed and arranged.

III. And this is the whole of that which the Roman School asks, when it disputes about the order of divine decrees concerning the elect and reprobate. And certainly since all agree how the matter holds itself in God, namely, as we have already said, that there is only a single decree in him, in which there is not given prior and posterior, thence it follows that the question can only be about the order of human conceptions, which matter seems nearly arbitrary: since one can multiply those conceptions and divine decrees at will, and besides reason can devise various orders, according to which those conceptions can be arranged, and with respect to which one decree of God, is conceived now as prior, now as posterior to another.

IV. For if someone begins that order from the final cause, the decree about the object which has the nature of an end will be conceived as prior to the decree about another object, which to that end has the nature of a means. But if someone rather has regard to the efficient and disposing cause, then the decree about the means, which promote the end and dispose to the end, will be thought prior to the decree about the end. Whence it happens that among the doctors there is great diversity of opinions about this matter.

V. Among the old Scholastics John Scotus Philosophizes thus about this matter. From his mind, God first had at the same time present to his view Peter and Judas, for example, and efficaciously decreed to bless Peter, before he foreknew his merits: but about Judas he decreed nothing concerning glory, but conducted himself negatively about him. Secondly he determined to call Peter, and to give his grace to him: but about Judas he conducted himself negatively in the same way. In the third he predetermined to permit, that Judas should fall

into sin up to the last of life, and from those two negations posited he foresaw that he would die in sin. Fourthly God foreseeing the exit of each decreed to give glory to Peter, and to punish Judas with eternal punishment, As Gabriel Vásquez relates vol. 1, disputation 95, chapter 1. Where he testifies that many more recent authors follow the opinion of Scotus in this part. Nevertheless some add, As Córdoba, and Diego Alvarez, that God in that first instant, before any works were foreseen, decreed, not indeed to punish Judas with the punishment of sense, but to deny him blessedness and glory.

VI. According to Bellarmine this was the order of predestination in the divine mind, according to our mode of understanding. First God foresaw, if he should found man, that he would fall with all his posterity, and at the same time saw that he could free either all, or some, in various ways, according to his choice. Then he willed to found man, and to permit that he should fall, and to free certain ones mercifully from the number of the fallen, with the rest having been left in the mass of perdition. Thirdly he devised remedies suitable for saving the elect, among which the incarnation and passion of the Savior had the first place. Fourthly he approved those remedies, and then elected Christ and us in him before the foundation of the world. Fifthly he disposed, ordained, and in a certain way commanded that it should so be done.

VII. But Becanus thus explains the order of predestination and reprobation. "From our opinion," he says, "this is the order of predestination and reprobation. First God determined to create the whole human race for eternal blessedness, and with a simple affection desired all to arrive at it. Secondly from this will he decreed to give them grace in the state of innocence, permitting to them the free use of will, in which is contained also the permission of sin. Thirdly he saw the first man with his whole posterity fall, that is, he saw the actual sin of Adam in which all sinned. I say nothing yet about the Original contracted in each one. Fourthly willing to prepare a remedy for fallen man he predestined Christ and his merits. Fifthly he determined to apply the merits of Christ in a different way to men. For he willed to preserve the blessed Virgin from Original sin through the merits of Christ, he permitted all the rest to be conceived in original sin. These again are divided. For he reprobated certain little ones on account of original sin, to others out of mercy alone he granted baptism or another remedy, and predestined them to life. But to all adults he provided sufficient grace, although he decreed to bestow greater on another. Sixthly he absolutely saw that these would use grace well, those badly. Seventhly he absolutely willed to give to these eternal reward, to those punishment and eternal damnation." In sum of Theology vol. 1, chapter 15, question 5.

VIII. But truly according to Gregory of Valentia, "First God saw from eternity not only the natures of all men but also their sins, if indeed those also, since they are committed by the vice of nature alone, pertain also to the natural order. Secondly he prepared for them a Redeemer by predestining Christ. Thirdly he willed to confer on all on account of the foreseen merit of Christ sufficient aids of grace, and for the most part also abundant ones, by which they could obtain salvation by the benefit of Christ the Redeemer. Fourthly those

whom he saw (I do not say because he saw, but whom he saw) either through their cooperation with the aid of God, or through the application of baptism to finish life in divine grace, he mercifully predestined: but others, because they either did not cooperate with divine grace, or because baptism was lacking to them, he did not deem worthy of the benefit of predestination, but rather on account of sins, either actual, or original, in which he foresaw that they would finish life, he justly reprobated."

IX. Finally Eustachius of St. Paul in the first part of the sum, thus conceives the series of divine acts in the business of predestination. "In the first place," he says, "God determined from eternity that he would found this whole Universe, and in it both angels, and the first parents, and through them all other men to be future. Then with the creation of all things having been foreseen he determined that he would permit, that some angels, and the first parents, as the heads of the whole human race should fall into sin, which indeed would be propagated ordinarily into all posterity through the way of generation; and thus from the universal multitude of men to be future there would be made a certain mass as it were of perdition. Thirdly with that fall of the Angels and first parents having been foreseen, and the universal mass of perdition, he determined that he would send his son in the flesh at least passible, beloved and elect above all, and the head of all to be elected and predestined. Fourthly with the future mission of Christ the first elect and predestined having been foreseen; he elected to glory not only the good Angels in him, but also certain men from the Mass of perdition: and at the same time he both positively reprobated the evil Angels, and also at least negatively reprobated the rest of men, and consequently excluded them from eternal glory for eternity. Fifthly with election having been presupposed, and the future glory of the elect having been foreseen, and the exclusion of the reprobate from it, he determined that he would bestow on the elect the means by which they would infallibly arrive at the aforesaid glory, namely the grace of calling, justification, and final perseverance, with which grace he certainly foresaw that they would cooperate: but to certain of the reprobate he determined that he would permit, that they should die in original sin alone, and thus destined them only to the punishment of loss; but to others, and those adults, he determined that he would permit, that they should Fall for their liberty into certain actual sins. Then with their first sins having been foreseen he determined that on account of them he would withdraw, or deny special aids, by which they would without doubt be converted: indeed also, as we judge probable, at least for some time, even the necessary and sufficient aids. And besides he determined that he would permit that they should fall into other subsequent sins, and should finally persevere in them. With all which things having been foreseen, he determined that he would addict them to eternal supplices." Tractate 1, disputation 16, question 5.

X. And thus the Doctors of the Roman Church divide, multiply, and dispose the divine acts about the elect and reprobate according to their choice, so that here there are nearly as many opinions as there are heads. But lest we delay over every minutia, which occur here the questions of some moment seem to be these. Whether we ought to conceive that first of all God decreed to show the glory of his mercy in certain men, but in others to manifest his

justice avenging and vindicating sin. Then for this end decreed to found men, and to permit that they should fall into sin, then to lift certain ones out of that fall, but to leave others in sin and perdition, and the rest which regard election and reprobation. So that to the decree concerning manifesting the glory of divine mercy and justice the decree concerning creating man and permitting his fall is subordinated. Estius affirms it, and some other more recent Thomists: but most of the Doctors of the Roman Church deny it.

XI. Likewise whether before the decree of predestination and reprobation a conditional knowledge must be presupposed in God, by which God foresaw, before any decree of his, in what way these and those men would use their free will, if they were called in this and that way, and were gifted with these and those aids of grace, Whether, namely, they would cooperate with grace, or whether they would resist it and place an obstacle by their contumacy. Not a few Doctors of the Roman Church deny it, and especially the Dominicans, but nevertheless very many affirm it, especially the Jesuits.

XII. Besides, Whether the decree concerning permitting the fall of the human race, and also the decree concerning sending Christ the Redeemer precedes the entire decree of predestination and reprobation, or whether it is included in it, and makes a part of it? Very many deny it, some affirm it.

XIII. Then also whether the absolute and fixed decree concerning giving glory to certain men ought to be conceived as prior to the decree concerning giving to them efficacious grace and final perseverance? Which many affirm, and many also deny.

XIV. Similarly whether in reprobation the decree concerning excluding certain ones from glory, and denying eternal life to them is prior to the decree concerning rejecting them from grace, and the prevision of the evil use of their free will? Diego Alvarez affirms it, and some other more recent Thomists, but the rest deny it.

XV. But whether the decree concerning damning certain ones, and ordaining them to eternal punishment precedes in God the decree concerning permitting their sins, and the prevision of those sins, the Doctors of the Roman Church deny by common consent.

XVI. But as regards the Doctors of the Reformed Church they Philosophize in the same way concerning the divine decrees in general as the Theologians of the Roman School are accustomed to. For all agree in this that one decree of God is not prior to another in time and duration. And this because they acknowledge that all the decrees of God are no less eternal than God himself. But in eternal things one cannot precede another in duration.

XVII. Besides the same Theologians commonly teach that God is most simple and utterly devoid of all composition. Whence it follows that all things in God are really one and the same. And just as the divine will is not really distinguished from the very essence of God, so the acts of the divine will are distinguished neither among themselves, nor from the divine will itself really, or from the nature of the thing, but only according to our mode of conceiving. And consequently just as one cannot be really distinguished from another so also one cannot be by nature prior or posterior to another. Therefore since the divine decrees are acts of the divine will, it is manifest that one cannot by nature precede another, nor can a properly

so called order of nature be found among them. But the order which is conceived among the divine decrees depends on and is constituted by reason alone.

XVIII. But that this may be understood better it must be known, that although God is most simple, nevertheless on account of his infinity, his whole perfection cannot be perceived by us at the same time, and exhausted by one conception. And therefore we are compelled to divide it into various conceptions, to which indeed one and the same thing corresponds, which according to diverse respects, and various operations, for which one through itself suffices, is considered by us in different ways. But nevertheless our conceptions are distinguished from one another, and can be variously compared among themselves, and a certain order can be established among them, with analogy drawn from those things which are observed in created things.

XIX. Thus since God understands and wills through his essence, we form one conception of the divine intellect, and another conception of the divine will, of which conceptions one is not the other. And also by comparing those conceptions among themselves, we say that the divine intellect is prior to the divine will: since we observe that rational creatures, in whom the intellect is distinguished from the will, understand by nature prior to willing.

XX. Similarly although there are not really many acts of the divine will, but only one entirely simple and undistinguished, nevertheless, since the same act of the divine will is terminated to many and diverse objects, and so has various relations, it is conceived by us after the mode of many. For we cannot conceive at the same time so many and so diverse respects. But on that account we necessarily have to conceive separately the divine will, insofar as it is, for example, concerning creating the world, and insofar as it is concerning destroying it, insofar as it is referred to the salvation of certain ones, and insofar as it is referred to the damnation of certain ones, insofar as it regards the permission of sins, and insofar as it regards their forgiveness. And thus as many as are the diverse objects of the divine volition, and respects to external things, so many acts of the divine will can be conceived, which are really the same divine volition, but only diversely related and considered.

XXI. And these are what we call divine decrees. Which our mind compares among themselves, and arranges in a certain order among themselves, with analogy drawn from those things which happen in the human will. And this is that whole which is asked among Theologians, namely, in what order our mind ought to arrange the various conceptions which we form concerning the divine will. Whence it is evident that the question concerning the order of the divine decrees is rather Philosophical, than Theological, and such that Theology could easily lack it.

XXII. And certainly Christian piety and faith did not introduce it, but rather the too great temerity of men breaking into the secrets of God. Whatever it may be we think it such, that concerning it good men, with faith and charity safe, can dissent among themselves, nor ought they to move quarrels and exercise hatreds among themselves on account of it. For it is not disputed concerning a certain order of divine acts which is really present in God, but only concerning the order of various conceptions, which we form concerning one simple act

of God. Which conceptions, since they are nothing other than the works of our mind, seem to be able to be composed among themselves in many and various ways, of which none will be inconvenient, and absurd, as one will follow this, that one another analogy.

XXIII. And certainly it often happens that what in one respect is conceived, as something which is by nature prior, in another respect is rightly conceived as something posterior. Thus more general things are prior to more particular things, if regard is had to the nature of the one generating; and more particular things are prior to more general things, if regard is had to the nature of the one intending. And consequently here it is not so much contended about the thing itself, which some deny, others affirm, as about the various method of handing down and explaining the same thing.

XXIV. But that this may be more clearly evident it must be known that not all the Doctors of the Reformed School seek the reason of prior and posterior in the divine decrees from the same foundation. For in this business the Theologians proceed by a twofold way. For some, so that we may arrange the decrees which we conceive in God in a decent and fitting order, think that attention must be paid to the order which God observes in execution: nor do they want the order of executing to be one, but truly the order of decreeing another: but that the decrees about things must be composed among themselves in the same order, in which order the things themselves which have been decreed exist in time.

XXV. And this is the opinion of many Theologians who receive the decrees of the Synod of Dort: and especially of those who follow the opinion of Cameron in the article on Grace and Predestination. As can be seen especially in Paul Testard in the Synopsis of doctrine on Nature and Grace, number 278. Where treating of the order of the divine decrees he teaches that it is safest in arranging the divine decrees to follow the same order which the decreed things themselves observe among themselves in time. "For," he says, "God decreed to do things from eternity in the same order in which he executes them in time, and it is impossible to know the decrees of God otherwise than from posteriors."

XXVI. According to which in the following he teaches that the first decree of God about man is that by which he resolved to create man in the state of intact and mutable nature. Which Decree was followed by the prevision of the fall of Adam sinning freely, and submerging himself, and the whole human race to be propagated from him by the natural law of generation into the deep whirlpool of misery. But to this prevision he subjoins in God the affection of mercy toward the human race. Whence he says arose the second decree which he divides into many, namely into the purpose. I. Of giving Christ to the world as Mediator, Victim, treasury of Grace. II. Of justifying and glorifying believers made one with Christ through faith, according to the mode of revelation and testimony, of condemning those rejecting grace by unbelief, and punishing them with eternal penalties. III. Of testifying to the world grace prepared in Christ by means sufficient in themselves to elicit faith in some degree at least. IV. Of efficaciously calling certain ones from the world not comprehending the light shining in the darkness, and miserably abusing the testimony of grace sufficient in itself, and otherwise about to perish in unbelief with the rest, to whom they are not better,

and so of justifying and glorifying them: of leaving the rest to the hardness of their own heart, deserting, hardening, damning, and so also of punishing them with eternal penalties.

XXVII. With this order Joshua Placaeus also agrees, although he does not want the order of the divine decrees to be sought from the order alone in which things exist in time. For he wants the first decree of God about man to be the decree concerning creating him, but afterwards the decree concerning permitting his fall, which two decrees, according to him, are not included in predestination, but are presupposed by it. But when with the two former decrees having been made, God had before the eyes of his foreknowledge the human race lost, he was inclined, as he says, by a certain mercy which he calls necessary, that he willed to save all believers out of the whole human race. But since the justice of God, unless satisfaction was made to it, could not allow that, he decreed to send his son, through whom all believers might be justified and saved. Which he decreed to signify to the human race with the command of believing. But because he foresaw that it would happen that no one of men, although invited by the preaching of the Gospel, would truly believe, unless to the preaching of the Gospel there was added the efficacy of the spirit overcoming all the malice and resistance of the human heart, he decreed on account of Christ efficaciously to call certain ones to faith, so that having been gifted in that way to Christ, they might first be justified through him, then glorified, according to the order constituted by the preceding general decree.

XXVIII. But about reprobation he acknowledges one general decree concerning damning all persevering in unbelief: but another by which he determined, not to indulge to many lying in their native unbelief equally with the elect that internal efficacy of the spirit, which having been indulged, justifying faith is infallibly generated in the elect. Whence follows their final unbelief, and at last damnation, to which they are adjudged from unbelief foreseen. All which things are found explained more extensively in the special tract, whose title is, "Defense of the opinion of Joshua Placaeus concerning the Order of the decrees of God."

XXIX. But others on the contrary think that the decrees of God must be disposed in an order plainly contrary to that in which the decreed things are carried out to execution. And this because in constituting the order of decrees, which are acts of the divine will, attention must be paid to the order not of execution, but rather of intention. But now, according to the Philosophers, what is prior in intention is posterior in execution.

XXX. This among others is the opinion of Piscator, as Twisse relates in the defense of Perkins against Arminius, Digression one on the object of predestination. For in chapter seven of the Response to the Preparation of Conrad Vorstius Piscator enumerates eight subordinated decrees of God, according to the executions of the divine decrees, gradually succeeding according to the spaces of times. Of these he wants the first to be concerning manifesting the glory of God through the mode of mercy in the elect, through the mode of justice in the reprobate. The second concerning saving the elect and damning the reprobate. The third concerning justifying and sanctifying the Elect, but not the reprobate. The fourth concerning calling the Elect, but not the reprobate. The fifth concerning reconciling the Elect

through Christ the Mediator, but not likewise the reprobate. The sixth concerning electing certain men from the fall, but reprobating the rest. where he takes election and reprobation for certain external and temporal acts of God, but not for the decrees of God, which acceptation nevertheless is most customary. The seventh concerning the permission of sin in Adam. The eighth and last concerning the creation of man.

XXXI. Zanchius does not so break up the divine decrees, but nevertheless he also wants the order of the divine decrees to be gathered from the event and order in which things happen, according to that rule, What is first in intention, that is, in counsel and thought, that is last in execution. As can be seen in him on the Nature of God book 5, chapter 2.

XXXII. But here the opinion of William Twisse is singular. For about the elect and reprobate he does not want it to be conceived that there are except two decrees, which are subordinated, and of which one is prior to the other. One is concerning the end, the other is concerning the means. The decree concerning the end is that by which God determined to illustrate his glory in exercising mercy toward certain men, justice vindicating toward others. The decree concerning the means is that by which God decreed for this end to create men, to permit that they should fall, to prepare a Redeemer and savior for certain ones, and to gift them with faith in him, to justify, and glorify them: but to leave others in sin, to harden, blind, and at last damn them. Which decree concerning the means is posterior to the decree concerning the end and subordinated to it.

XXXIII. But if anyone divides that decree concerning the means into many acts, he will indeed conceive many decrees of God, one, for example, concerning creating man, another concerning permitting his fall: one concerning sending Christ, another concerning ingrafting the elect into him through faith: one concerning glorifying and blessing the elect, another concerning calling, and justifying them: And similarly one concerning damning the reprobate, and another concerning permitting their sins, and hardening them in them. But he contends that all those decrees are not subordinated among themselves, but coordinated, nor must one be conceived as prior to another. As can be seen in his Perkinsian defense, Digression on the object of predestination, and elsewhere very often.

XXXIV. Similarly he acknowledges indeed that God through that decree concerning illustrating his glory, determined to manifest not only his justice and mercy, but also his wisdom and omnipotence, and other virtues. But if anyone again wants to divide this decree concerning the end into many, which are concerned with the singular virtues of God, and to compare, for example, the decree concerning manifesting his own goodness, power, and wisdom, with the decree concerning showing the glory of mercy and justice, he teaches also that those decrees must be conceived at the same time, nor must the order of prior and posterior be sought among them. Nevertheless he adds that God indeed at the same time decreed to illustrate the glory of all his virtues, but nevertheless in such a way that the explication of the rest of the virtues served the explication of divine justice and mercy. Of the same work book 1, part 2, section 2.

XXXV. But although nearly every single Theologian, while ordering the decrees of God,

disagree from one another in certain apexes, nevertheless all those Doctors who, as we mentioned before, constitute man as not yet fallen and made in divine prevision the object of election and reprobation, and number among the effects common to election and reprobation the creation of man and the permission of the fall, they, I say, all agree in this that the first decree which must be conceived in God about men is that by which God resolved to show in certain men the glory of mercy, but in others the glory of his justice: To which decree they subject and subordinate as posterior to it the decrees concerning creating man and permitting his fall, and concerning giving Christ the Mediator and Redeemer to the elect; but leaving the rest in the fall and perdition. Which decrees again, as is evident from the things said, they variously and not all in the same way divide and order.

XXXVI. But all those who teach that the object of predestination is man whom God in his eternal foreknowledge considers as already fallen and corrupted by sin, by this very thing necessarily have to confess that the decrees concerning the creation of man, and concerning the permission of that first fault, which rendered the whole human race liable to sin and perdition, are prior to the decree of predestination, nor make a part of it. But nevertheless most of them order the acts of the divine will, and also of the divine intellect about the elect and reprobate far otherwise, than those mentioned above, who follow the opinion of Cameron in the doctrine of grace and predestination.

XXXVII. And lest I relate the opinions of each one, this is the more common opinion among them concerning the order of the divine decrees in the business of predestination. First they establish that God, when he foresaw from eternity the fall of the first man, and thence to be derived the corruption into the whole human race, decreed to use mercy toward certain men designated by him in his eternal counsel, by liberating them from merited perdition, and gifting them with eternal salvation: but in others to show his justice, by passing over them, and leaving them in their native corruption, and owed malediction. The second decree of God, according to their opinion is that, by which God decreed to send his son into the world to redeem and reconcile those whom he destined to eternal salvation, but not likewise those whom he passed over in the former decree. Then they subjoin a third decree to that other by which God determined to gift the elect unto salvation with faith and repentance, but to deny that grace to the rest, who are called reprobate, and to permit them to their own corruption and malice. But this desertion is followed in God by the prevision of their final unbelief and impenitence. And at last the decree concerning damning them eternally and afflicting them with sempiternal punishment.

XXXVIII. To these things are briefly reduced back what most of the Reformed Doctors Philosophize concerning the order of the divine decrees: although still more and more minute distinctions of opinions could be observed among them: But those are enough, so that thence we may gather what is their opinion about those principal questions which we briefly touched on above, and at the same time what can here be of controversy between the Roman School and the Reformed School.

XXXIX. And indeed first to that question, Whether according to our mode of conceiving the decree concerning illustrating the glory of his mercy and justice in certain men designated by him is prior in God, namely, of justice in these, of mercy in those, but posterior the decree concerning founding men, and likewise the decree concerning not impeding, but permitting their falls and sins, to that, I say, question the Theologians Respond diversely, as is evident from the things said, in each School both Roman and Reformed. Evidently those Doctors who, both in this and in that School, in assigning the object of predestination ascend above the fall of man and his creation, they, I say, affirm that in God the decree concerning manifesting divine mercy and justice precedes, but the decree concerning the creation of man and the permission of his fall and sin follows: because, namely, they think that the creation of man and the permission of sin were from the intention of God certain means destined to the manifestation of divine mercy and justice.

XL. But others, who are far greater in number in each School, think that the decree concerning creating man and permitting his fall is prior in God to the decree concerning exercising justice toward the reprobate, mercy toward the elect. And that since they think that God proposed to himself, when he resolved to create man, the exercise of his goodness power and wisdom, but not of justice and mercy. And besides they think it is abhorrent to reason that we should think that God decreed to free certain men from owed misery, or to show his glory in their just destruction, before he took counsel concerning creating them, and could foresee their guilt and misery. Since it is agreeable that we think first concerning effecting some work, than concerning either repairing, or destroying and casting it away: nor can we with reason take counsel concerning punishing the guilt of someone, or relieving misery, without first considering him as guilty and miserable. Which also seems to us far more probable.

XLI. But whether conditional knowledge must be premised in God to the decree of predestination, by which before any decree of his he foresaw in what way both these and those men would use their free will, if they were called in this and that way, and were gifted with these and those aids of grace, very many of the Reformed deny with the Dominicans and more recent Thomists, but especially Twisse and Retorfort, who have written ex professo against the middle knowledge of the Jesuits. Nevertheless some in God seem to admit that conditional knowledge, as Louis Crocius Professor in the School of Bremen, Gomarus and Walaëus, and others of whom we made mention in our Theses on Middle Knowledge. But nevertheless that opinion, which in the Roman School is today most common, seems rarer in the Reformed School.

XLII. Besides from the things said it appears that most of the Reformed teach that God by an absolute decree determined to save and glorify these and those men, but to use his justice toward others, before he decreed to send Christ the Redeemer into the world. Nevertheless on the contrary those who follow the doctrine and Method of Cameron think: that God decreed to send his son into the world first, before he absolutely determined to gift these and those men with salvation and glory, but to exclude others from it. But Twisse thinks that

those decrees concerning sending Christ and concerning saving and glorifying certain ones are coordinated, and one must not be conceived as prior to the other. But in the Roman School the more common opinion holds that the decree concerning sending Christ precedes the decree concerning saving certain men. Although not a few approach the first opinion of most of the Reformed.

XLIII. Similarly neither the Doctors of the Roman School, nor also of the Reformed School agree among themselves, whether the certain and fixed decree concerning giving glory to these and those men, ought to be conceived in God as prior to the decree concerning giving to them efficacious grace, and final perseverance. Very many affirm it in the Reformed School: but the Theologians of Saumur, and certain others recede from the common opinion in that. Since they want the decree concerning giving faith and repentance to precede in God: but from foreseen faith and repentance glory to be decreed to certain men. As can be seen in the Irenicum of Testard, and the Theses of Louis Cappel on election and reprobation. But Twisse, conformably to the principles posited by himself, establishes that the decree concerning giving glory is neither prior nor posterior to the decree concerning giving faith and efficacious grace: but that these two decrees in God must be conceived at the same time, nor is one subordinated to the other.

XLIV. But as in the Reformed School the opinion of those who establish that the decree concerning conferring glory on certain men is prior to the decree concerning gifting them with faith and justifying and sanctifying them prevails: so on the opposite in the Roman School the more common and received opinion holds today at least, that the decree concerning gifting the elect with faith and justifying them is prior to that concerning crowning them with celestial glory.

XLV. Moreover that difference of opinions among the Reformed does not arise only thence, that in arranging the divine decrees some think that the order of execution, but others rather of intention must be followed: but also thence that it is doubted and disputed among them, whether with respect to God decreeing, celestial glory must be conceived as a certain end, but the sanctity and justice with which the faithful are clothed in this life as a means destined to it, which some affirm, but others deny; since sanctity and justice, which is a moral good, from its kind is something more excellent than felicity and celestial glory, which they conceive as a certain Physical good.

XLVI. But whether God decreed to exclude certain ones from life and celestial glory before he foresaw any sin of theirs, and to that decree the decree concerning denying grace by which they would avoid sin is posterior, which a few Doctors of the Roman Church affirm, it also comes into disputation among the Reformed. And there are enough many who affirm that, namely, all those who are called supralapsarians, except one Twisse, who denies also that the order of prior and posterior must be sought between these decrees. But other Reformed, and indeed in far greater number, deny that, and think that the decree of God concerning rejecting certain ones from eternal life follows the prevision of some sin at least in them, and so the decree concerning not giving grace, by which he would have preserved

them from that sin.

XLVII. There remains scarcely one thing which in this business the Doctors of the Roman Church condemn by common consent, but some Reformed affirm, namely that the decree of God concerning damning certain ones, and punishing them with eternal punishment in God is prior to the decree concerning permitting their sins, and the prevision of any sin. Polanus holds and teaches this in his Syntagma, where he treats of reprobation. Beza in various places. Piscator in the place alleged above. And especially Zanchius book 5 on the Nature of God chapter 2. "This was," he says, "the first thing which God constituted from eternity concerning the reprobate, namely, the destining of certain men to sempiternal destruction. But to this were ordained their sins, and to sins desertion, and the denial of grace. Therefore the affirmative part of reprobation was prior in the mind of God, that is, the destining to eternal death, for the sake of showing his wrath, and by that illustrating his glory. But the negative part was posterior, that is, the decree of not having mercy, so that by that reason they could be justly damned."

XLVIII. But this opinion is commonly rejected by the rest of the Reformed, and certainly rightly so. Since neither is damnation the end of sins, or of the permission of sin, nor does damnation exist in time prior to sins. And so there is no reason on account of which damnation ought to be thought decreed by God prior to the permission of sin. For, in my judgment at least, the order of the divine decrees ought to be taken from the analogy of the human will proceeding ordinately: so that we conceive that God decreed that first which he would have willed first, if he willed in the mode of a man using reason. Moreover in those things which among themselves have the nature of means and end, it is certain that we by nature will and intend the end first, before we will the means to the end. And consequently also in God the decree concerning the end must be conceived as prior to the decree concerning the means. But in those things which compared among themselves are not as means and end, if some order of the decrees of God must be established, it ought to follow the order of the existence of things, and be sought from that order which is discerned among the things themselves, while they exist successively in time.

**Theological Theses,
In which is expounded the
opinion of those who are called Remonstrants or
Arminians, and also of the Doctors of the
Augsburg Confession, concerning the
predestination and election of men.**

Thesis I

After we have expounded and compared among themselves the Doctrine of the Roman School and of the Reformed School about the nature, object, effects and causes of Predestination, Election, and Reprobation, and also about the order in which they arrange

the divine decrees in this business, it seemed not useless briefly to subjoin what is the opinion about the same matters of those who in Belgium call themselves Remonstrants, and also of the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession.

II. And indeed first, so that we may begin from the use of words which obtains among them, the Remonstrants are accustomed to take predestination in two ways. First so that it may signify that general decree, by which God constituted, by his most free will, not to save or damn this and that one precisely, but in general to save believers, and to reprobate unbelievers, that is, to designate and institute in his mind one certain way, according to which he wills to save and damn, when it was possible and free for him to act and proceed by another way and reason about the salvation or perdition of men, and to determine and decree otherwise about that whole business.

III. Secondly so that it may signify the special divine decree by which he resolves, according to the preceding decree, to save these, but to destroy those, that is, to destine these considered as faithful to eternal life, to addict those considered as unfaithful, or who are unwilling to believe to eternal death and destruction.

IV. The former act, according to them, simply and in general, ought to be called predestination to life and to death: but the latter, predestination of this or that one to life or to death.

V. Similarly a twofold election is distinguished by them: the former is to grace, and the latter to glory. Election to grace for them is not a certain decree by which God absolutely determined to gift this and that one with repentance and faith, but simply thus to call men to communion and participation of the singular benefits which are comprehended in the Gospel, that they may be able to believe if they will, and sometimes also may believe: and they can also, if it pleases, not believe, and also sometimes not believe.

VI. But election to glory for them is that by which God wills eternal life and glory for men. But again this election is established by them as twofold. For they observe that glory can be considered in two ways, either under the aspect of end, or under the aspect of reward: and similarly the act of the divine will is twofold; One by which God loves and intends some good of man, and so procures and offers to men means suitable for acquiring that good: but the other by which he simply determines and decrees to confer some good actually and in reality on men.

VII. Whence it happens that they conceive that God first desires and wishes the blessedness and glory of men, as a certain end to which his will is borne; then from that affection and love of eternal glory and salvation, which he would desire to be communicated to his creatures, he is as it were efficaciously moved to conferring and supplying those means which are necessary for obtaining that end. But by reason of that affection they contend that God can be said to will the salvation of men, and indeed efficaciously, although it often happens that men do not rightly use the means offered by God, and fail of the end which God intends. For they say that he is thought to will the end efficaciously, or something under the aspect of end, who by love of the end is moved to seek, or supply, those means which conduce to

obtaining that end and are necessary for it, whether the end itself is obtained, or not.

VIII. But besides they acknowledge another act of the divine will, by which God wills to confer glory actually and in reality on certain men, as the reward and prize of faith and obedience rendered by them. Each of these acts of the divine will is called by them Election to glory. And by the former they say that men are elected to glory under the aspect of end, but by the latter are elected to glory under the aspect of reward.

IX. That former election to glory precedes election to grace; because from it arises the decree of communicating those means through which glory can be arrived at; the latter follows election to grace, since it presupposes in the elect man the right use of those means.

X. Besides since, from their hypothesis, any means whatsoever offered through grace can be refused and rejected, hence it is that, with the former election to glory posited, they teach that the collation of eternal glory and salvation is not necessarily posited, and so he who is elected in that way can perish for eternity. But election to glory under the aspect of reward has the actual and real communication of eternal salvation conjoined to itself.

XI. Finally that election to glory under the aspect of end extends itself commonly and without any discrimination to all those who become partakers of divine gracious vocation, but the latter pertains to those alone who persevere in faith and obedience unto death.

XII. To this distinction another is related. For since they suppose that some can have true faith and charity for a time, and remain for some time in the state of grace, but afterwards fall away wholly, and also finally from true faith and grace, they want that as long as they retain true faith and charity, these can and ought to be called elected in a singular way, in opposition to those who called to grace, and thus comprehended by that general election described by us a little while ago, nevertheless resist grace, and do not use it rightly, whom they also think can be called, reprobated for that time: although afterwards changed for the better they persevere in faith and charity to the end, and thus become from the number of the Elect, and are gifted with eternal life: just as the former finally become reprobate, and are addicted to eternal damnation.

XIII. Moreover they say that election of those who believe for a time is incomplete, revocable, and not peremptory: to which they oppose the election of those who persevere and die in faith, which at last they say is complete and irrevocable, and, as they love to speak, peremptory, because it always and infallibly has conjoined to itself the communication of eternal blessedness.

XIV. And so, from their mind, election can be divided into general, by which God wills in a certain way the salvation of all, and offers and communicates to them means necessary to salvation, so that they can use them, if they will. And particular, by which are elected those who respond to the divine vocation, and rightly use the means offered through grace. But again that particular election must be distinguished into incomplete and revocable election, which is suited to those who for a time only adhere to Christ through true faith and charity: and into complete and peremptory election, by which those alone are elected, whom God considers as dying in faith and grace, and adhering to Christ to the last breath.

XV. They similarly distinguish reprobation into reprobation from gracious vocation which happens through the Gospel, and into reprobation from glory, or eternal felicity. However, they want no one simply rejected or reprobated from grace. For this is their sixth thesis concerning the decree of predestination, which is had in their Synodical writings, where they declare their opinion on Predestination. "Neither from eternal life, nor from means sufficient for it was anyone rejected by some absolute and antecedent decree: so that the merit of Christ, vocation, and all the gifts of the spirit can avail for salvation for all, and truly profit, unless they themselves turn them to their own destruction by the abuse of the same."

XVI. But reprobation from glory and eternal life, also from their sense, must be distinguished into incomplete and revocable reprobation, and into complete and peremptory reprobation. By that former incomplete and revocable reprobation those must be thought reprobated who remain unbelieving for some time, and can be brought to better fruit by no admonitions and exhortations, as long as they remain such. Because they are in that state, in which if they persevere, they are to be eternally rejected from the face of God and condemned: even if it happens that afterwards they change life for the better through faith, and constantly remain in that faith to the end of life. But complete and peremptory reprobation falls upon those alone whom God sees to die in unbelief and impenitence.

XVII. Moreover when they speak of Election and Reprobation simply, they do not understand for the most part election to grace and reprobation from the same grace: But election to glory, and reprobation from the same glory, and still not any kind whatsoever, but peremptory and irrevocable.

XVIII. But they establish the first and adequate object of such peremptory and irrevocable election to be all and only those believing in Jesus Christ by the aid of divine grace, and persevering in that true faith, or dying. But on the contrary they establish the first and adequate object of peremptory reprobation to eternal and lamentable destruction to be all and only unbelievers, that is, either those unwilling to desist from their unbelief, or those not persevering in true faith. For they want no one rejected from eternal life apart from the consideration of antecedent unbelief, and perseverance in unbelief. As neither, from their opinion, did God decree absolutely to gift anyone with life and eternal glory, without the previous consideration of his final perseverance in true faith and charity.

XIX. But in assigning the object of reprobation, they observe that by the name of unbelievers they do not understand unbelievers only negatively so called, such as are infants, the deaf, and the insane, and those also who have never heard anything about the Gospel, such as those nations to which the preaching of the Gospel has not yet come: but here they call unbelievers those alone whom God calls to faith, and to whom he offers and supplies all means necessary for believing, and who nevertheless are unwilling to believe, and spurn the grace offered by God.

XX. But of that Election which they call incomplete and revocable, according to their mind, the object are all those who believe for a time, although they are at some time going to fall away from faith. And similarly of revocable and not peremptory reprobation, which is

opposed to that election, all those must be thought the object who resist grace, and refuse to believe the Gospel, although they are at some time to be changed for the better, and to be brought into the obedience of faith, and so finally to persevere in faith.

XXI. Finally of that general Election, which they call election to glory as end, from their doctrine, it must be said that the object is the whole human race, which God considers as fallen and miserable, and so needing his aid and grace, so that thence it may be able to emerge, and arrive at glory and eternal felicity:

XXII. Now as it pertains to the fruits or effects of election, of that Election which they call peremptory, and which is always understood by them, when there is talk of Election simply, they do not want the gifting and sending of the Savior to be the fruit or effect, since, as is evident from the things said before, that election presupposes faith, and is from faith foreseen in the savior.

XXIII. But much more they deny that of reprobation, which is opposed to the already mentioned election, the effect or consequent is the negation of the savior, or the negation of grace by which one can believe in Christ the savior, and the impenitence and unbelief which follow thence: since unbelief, from their opinion, is something antecedent to reprobation.

XXIV. But of that general and indefinite predestination, or by which God resolved not these and those precisely, but in general all and only the faithful and believing to save, they teach, that faith can be said in some way the fruit, because from that decree flows the necessity of another decree concerning conferring such means without which faith cannot be conceived and had, indeed through which faith both can be, and is accustomed to be engendered. But nevertheless, from their mind, faith is only abusively called the fruit or effect of election even of that one: since with it posited, as they say, it can nevertheless happen that no one believes, and all remain altogether unbelieving.

XXV. Indeed not even of that election which is to grace, can faith otherwise be called the effect, than through the same catachresis, according to their opinion. For they do not acknowledge that faith is the infallible effect, and necessary consequent of election itself to grace: but only in this way, that without election to grace faith cannot be engendered, and by the benefit of that alone it is engendered and effected in all who believe: when otherwise with grace of whatever kind posited from the side of God to which someone is said to be elected, faith can always not follow from the fault and stubbornness of man.

XXVI. But as regards the causes of election and predestination, they teach indeed that the general decree, by which God resolved in general to save believers, and to reprobate unbelievers, is most free, and has no other cause, than the pure will and choice of God. Nor can that decree, as they say, be said to have the prevision of anything, as the occasion or cause of itself. For they establish that the dignity, or merit, or any intrinsic prerogative of faith here by no means comes into consideration, why namely, God willed to select it from the order of all other things; or why he decreed to save apart from it, and to save men through it alone: but only the good pleasure of the Divine will to have place here.

XXVII. But of the other decree, by which God definitely and peremptorily predestines those indeed to life, but others to death, they teach that a reason and cause from the side of men can be given and assigned. For that God elects these and those to life and glory, the reason is their perseverance in faith, which God foresees from eternity, and so faith of theirs in this decree must be considered as a cause without which not, and a condition rendered by them. Which nevertheless does not hinder, from their mind, that this decree can be thought gratuitous: because faith for that reason is not a cause which either impels, or effects by virtue, merit, or intrinsic dignity and perfection that God wills to save this believing one.

XXVIII. But in those whom God by his decree rejects from eternal life, and reprobates, unbelief and contumacy must be considered, not only as a cause without which not, but also as a meritorious cause on account of which God wills to condemn this man, and exclude from eternal life: since the intrinsic foulness, baseness, and malice which is in unbelief, deserves that.

XXIX. Moreover the Remonstrants in their Synod constitute this order of divine decrees in Election and Reprobation, where they declare their opinion about the first article on Predestination. "First," they say, "God for the praise of his overflowing goodness decreed to create man to his image. 2. Having created man in this way he placed a law on him, which it was, not only possible, but also most just to be fulfilled by him, with the commination of death having been added besides if he should transgress it. 3. When Adam most freely had transgressed this law, and consequently had involved not only himself, but with God so ordaining, all his posterity through natural generation in the evil of death and condemnation, the affection indeed of mercy remained in God for liberating miserable man, but because justice which had been injured obstructed it, and the truth of divine commination, by which favor should be done for such a transgressor, it did not will to go out into act the mercy of God, unless satisfaction was made to justice first, and before all it was made manifest, that God seriously hated sin, and loved justice. 4. But so that divine justice might be satisfied, God willed to constitute a Mediator, who for all sinners might become an expiatory victim, and for them undergo death, and who through his blood, poured out for the reconciliation of the same, might acquire the right by a certain law of conferring on them salvation and eternal life. 5. With this blood having been poured out, or considered as poured out, God decreed that all those who truly believed in that Redeemer, and persevered in faith to the end of life, by mercy of grace, should become partakers of salvation and eternal life through him: but those who were unwilling to believe in him, and were going to persevere in that unbelief and disobedience of theirs, should be punished on that account with the penalty of eternal death and condemnation. 6. But because it could not happen, that sinners from themselves, or by their natural powers, would believe in this their Redeemer, and would persevere in such faith, and consequently so that they would not be arraigned guilty of unbelief: hence it is that God decreed to supply to them means necessary and sufficient for faith and repentance, by which they would either actually and in reality be rendered suitable for conceiving faith, or would be disposed, prepared, and as it were advanced by certain grades more and more to

conceiving faith at last. From which at last flows the ultimate decree, concerning saving by name those, who by the benefit of those means were going to believe, and to persevere in faith: but damning, or reprobating from salvation all those who were going to remain impenitent and unbelieving to the end of life, or at least to die in unbelief."

XXX. Moreover the opinion of the Theologians of the Augsburg confession, who are called Lutherans, is nearly the same in this part as that of the Remonstrants, or Arminians, except that they treat this question less subtly and curiously, nor do they dissect the matter so much: And they use certain words in a slightly different sense, not approving their use which obtains among the Remonstrants. As that they employ predestination in a middle sense, and assign two species of it, one to life, and the other to death. Likewise that they call that affection by which God wills all men to be saved election.

XXXI. But with them they deny that God by an absolute decree precisely elected anyone to salvation and life before the prevision of his final perseverance in faith and obedience. And much more that God by such a decree excluded certain ones from glory and eternal life before the prevision of their final impenitence and unbelief.

XXXII. Nor also do they want that God simply and absolutely elected certain men to faith and repentance, but rejected the rest from that grace. Since they teach that God by a certain general affection wills and desires salvation for all men, and from that affection procures for them all means necessary and sufficient for salvation. Indeed that God, as much as is in him, wills to be efficacious in all men through the Word and Holy Spirit. But that the Spirit of God works faith in certain ones, but by no means in others, according to their doctrine, is from this that those indeed admit the efficacy of the spirit working through the word, but others despise the Word of God and resist the Holy Spirit.

XXXIII. And so they want that of the decree of reprobation, by which very many men are excluded from the kingdom of God, and adjudged to infernal punishments, the cause and merit is with the men themselves, namely their foreseen impenitence and unbelief.

XXXIV. But they teach that the decree of predestination and election to life is indeed gratuitous, and does not have a cause and merit in man, but nevertheless, as has already been said, they deny that it is absolute: since none are elected by God to salvation, except from their foreseen faith and repentance, and indeed such as perseveres all the way to death.

XXXV. But in ordering the decrees of God they think that the same order must be preserved which is discerned in the very execution of the decrees, not otherwise than the Arminians. For they teach that first God decreed to create all men to eternal life in Adam. Then he foresaw that Adam with all his posterity would fall. But afterwards he decreed to send the son as a remedy for the fall, who in turn would restore life for all men. And because medicine does not profit without application, he also decreed to offer the benefits of the son through the word to the whole world, and to kindle faith in the hearts of men by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit. But then he foresaw that certain ones would madly repudiate the word and offered goods; but that certain ones by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit through the word would

perseveringly believe in Christ. Which foreknowledge at last was followed by Election and Reprobation. For he reprobated those, but elected these in Christ.

XXXVI. And so election for them is nothing other than the eternal decree of God by which he ordained to life and eternal glory those whom he foresaw about to believe perseveringly in Christ by the efficacy of the Holy Spirit through the word. But reprobation is the adjudication to eternal death made from eternity by the just judgment of God of those whom God foresaw about to die in unbelief and impenitence. Which things drawn out more extensively can be seen in John Gerhard in Theological Commonplaces, Vol. 2, tract on Election and Reprobation. Likewise in the Book of Concord, Title on Predestination.

XXXVII. But now the Augsburg Theologians teach indeed that in the composite sense the elect cannot perish, and the reprobate cannot be saved, that is, it cannot happen that someone is at the same time elect and perishes, reprobate and is saved: But nevertheless they teach that in the divided sense he who is elected can fall from grace, in which case he would not be elect; and he who is reprobate can embrace grace, in which case he would not be reprobate.

XXXVIII. But to the question, Whether someone can be certain of his own election they respond that concerning this an absolute certainty cannot be had, but nevertheless the faithful both can and ought not to doubt concerning their election, but to conceive a certain confidence concerning it.

Theological Theses, On the Certainty Which Belongs to Faith.

Thesis I

Certainty in general is a certain firmness of assent by which the mind assents to the thing proposed without doubt and dread, and adheres to it tenaciously and firmly.

II. Moreover for the sake of teaching certainty can be distinguished into subjective and objective. I call subjective certainty, that which any assent actually obtains in the mind of someone. But objective certainty is said to be that which is owed per se to some assent: or, which with reason had to the object, ought to be present in the mind: and which the object, so to speak, by its own right demands from the mind.

III. But this distinction must especially be observed. For sometimes subjective certainty is greatest, where objective certainty is small, or none. Namely men all too often firmly persuade themselves of those things which, are either in themselves false, or for assenting to which they have no solid and firm foundation. And on the contrary where the object demands the greatest certainty, the assent of the mind is weak, on account of some vice, or defect of it.

IV. But that certainty, which indeed is present in the mind, but nevertheless has no legitimate foundation in the object, is not certainty of the true name, but rather an obstinate and blind persuasion.

V. But for engendering certainty of the true name in the mind it is required on the part of the object some solid foundation on which the intellect may rest: and besides that the mind rightly apprehend its force and solidity, and the object may seem to it such as it is. For sometimes it happens, from slowness of wit or prejudice of mind, that the mind does not sufficiently perceive the force and light of the object, and consequently conceives only a slight persuasion of that thing, concerning which nevertheless there is no place for hesitating and doubting.

VI. But many things can move the intellect to assent to the thing proposed, and to judge firmly and certainly that it is true. And indeed first the clear perception of the object, which happens to be done in many ways. For sometimes the thing itself thrusts itself upon the external senses, and can be perceived by bodily sense. Thus we are certain of those things which we see and touch, as that the sun is bright, fire hot, and snow cold. And this certainty is called certainty of experience.

VII. But at other times the object does not strike the senses themselves, but only offers itself to the mind, and is clearly and distinctly perceived by it. And this again in two ways. For either the thing proposed immediately, or by its own and inherent light, without any discourse and reasoning, moves the mind to assent. In which way we perceive the truth of principles, and of those things which are known through themselves. Of which sort is, the same thing cannot at the same time be and not be, twice two are four, if you add equals to equals the wholes will be equal, and things which are of this kind. And this certainty can for the sake of distinction be called certainty of intelligence. Or the thing, which is offered to the mind to be judged, does not indeed so strike the mind by its own light, but the intellect by discoursing and reasoning from principles known through themselves collects and judges that it is entirely and simply impossible that the thing should hold itself otherwise. In which way the mind perceives the truth of conclusions, which it evidently deduces from first principles; and which for that reason can be said to see by a certain light reflected from them. And this certainty is called certainty of science.

VIII. Besides the intellect sometimes gives firm assent to something, not on account of some demonstration, by force of which it clearly perceives that it is simply impossible that the thing should hold itself otherwise; but because from many signs and indications it collects and judges that in reality the thing so holds itself, nor as things are, and morally speaking, can it happen that it holds itself in another way, although the contrary is not absolutely impossible. Thus a man, who receives some letter from his wife or familiar man does not doubt but that it is his, but persuades this to himself for certain, being led to that by the draught of the characters, the reason of the style, the contained matter, and other similar things: although it can happen that some evil genius counterfeited something similar.

IX. Finally there is a certain certainty which constant fame engenders, and the consent of

men so confirmed and celebrated, that it entirely excludes from the mind all dread and doubt. Thus there is no one, who has some use of things and letters, who does not indubitably and most certainly persuade himself that the Roman people formerly had their Consuls: and afterwards were subjected to Emperors. Likewise that there is in Thrace a city by the name of Constantinople, which is the seat of a certain great empire: and that the king of Spain subdued the greatest part of America, and rules it. But this last species of certainty, as also that about which we treated in the Thesis above, is accustomed in the Schools to be called moral certainty.

X. But if anyone compares this moral certainty with those former species of certainty, it must be confessed that it is of a lower grade, nor so great of its kind, as is the certainty of science, or of intelligence. For the intellect is more strongly and powerfully convinced of the truth of those things, which it clearly and distinctly perceives, and the contrary of which it sees to be plainly impossible, than of those things which it judges and collects to so hold themselves from the constant fame and testimony of men, or from various signs and indications, although it is not absolutely impossible, that they should hold themselves in another way.

XI. Nevertheless certainty, which we call moral, does not cease to be certainty of the true name. Nor must it be thought that by that name is designated some infirm, dubious and fluctuating assent: but it entirely excludes doubt and hesitation. For the weight and gravity of that authority on which it rests, and the moral evidence of the signs and indications which engender it, suffice to entirely persuade the mind, and to effect that it constantly and intrepidly assent to the thing, as is manifest from the examples proposed, and others which it would easily be to gather in great number.

XII. And so greater certainty is not needed for instituting life. Nor do most of the duties, and offices, of which life consists, preexact in us any other than moral persuasion. For, for example, we are only morally certain that these are our parents, relatives and blood relations, but those are our princes, and magistrates; to whom nevertheless we are held in conscience to render those things, which such grades and dignity, or conjunction of blood, demands by divine and human right.

XIII. And here it comes to be observed that it can happen that moral assent is in a certain respect firmer in the mind, and adheres to it more tenaciously and strongly, than another assent, which rests on demonstration, or experience. Which so that it may be understood another distinction of certainty must be noted which some Scholastics proffer. Evidently one certainty is that which can be called of cognition, or speculation, but the other which is called certainty of adhesion. That former certainty depends on the conviction of the mind alone, but the latter also on the affection of the will. The former the object duly proposed extorts from the mind, without waiting for the consent of the will. But the latter follows the command, and consent of the will. By how much that certainty is greater, which is said to be of cognition, by so much farther it removes all doubt from the mind. But by how much greater is that, which we say of adhesion, by so much the mind embraces assent more closely: and retains it more firmly.

XIV. The measure of the former certainty is the very evidence and clear perception of the thing, which by how much it is greater, by so much also the certainty in the mind is greater. For certain and evident in this respect are convertible. And indeed also nothing can be said to be morally certain, which is not in some reason evident. For although certain assent is accustomed to be divided by the Philosophers into evident assent, such as is of science, and intelligence: and into obscure and unevident assent, such as is that which is born from signs and indications, and to which human authority impels: nevertheless this very one is in a certain way evident, namely by evidence which is called moral. For when we certainly judge that something is so, moved to this by the fame, consent and testimony of men, as in the examples proposed before, we do that because our intellect from various indications and arguments collects and sees, both that the witnesses who are produced are worthy of trust, and that in reality this and that testimony is exhibited by them.

XV. But that latter certainty arises from the moment and gravity of the thing, which by how much more it conduces to the good, honor, and advantage of man; by so much also the mind more strongly apprehends it, and suffers itself to be torn away from it with more difficulty. Thus a man of good heart would concede anything else rather than that he should deny his own parents: because, namely, it is a matter touching conscience, and whence his honor and reputation depends.

XVI. But besides those things enumerated above, which can move and impel the mind to assent firmly and certainly to a thing, one remains, namely, divine testimony, and divine revelation; which is the object of that faith concerning the certainty of which the present disputation is instituted. Moreover that it is highest and absolute, and surpasses the very certainty of the sciences, not only the consent of the schools acknowledges, but also the common sense of Christians: so that even in trivial speech, the articles of faith are accustomed to be named for the example of a thing, most certain of all.

XVII. But here before all it must be noted, that faith can be considered in two ways. Either according to essence, as the Philosophers speak, that is, as it can be, and ought to be by its own nature, and according to the perfections which are owed to it from its kind, and with reason had to the object which it regards. Or according to existence, that is, as it actually is in this or that subject. If faith is considered in this latter way, it is manifest that to it, at least always, that highest and absolute certainty does not belong. For in many faith is infirm, and is shaken by various temptations, and has a perpetual struggle with doubt and diffidence. Of which sort was the faith of that one who said to the Lord Jesus Christ, "I believe Lord, help my unbelief." And of the disciples, whom Christ called ὀλιγοπίστους, and who for that reason also said to him, "Increase our faith."

XVIII. Nor for that reason does faith weak and infirm in such a way, cease to be true and salutary. For such was without doubt the faith of the disciples, and of that one who had the lunatic son, when they so prayed the Lord Jesus Christ. And so, so that faith may be true and salutary, that highest and most absolute grade of certainty is not necessarily required in it.

XIX. But, when so great certainty is preached by the Theologians to belong to faith, they consider it in the former way, and have regard, not to that certainty, which it actually obtains in the mind of this or that one, which can be called subjective: but to that which it claims for itself from itself, and its own nature, or which the object of faith by its own right demands from the mind, which therefore must be called objective certainty.

XX. The Theologians prove this to be highest and absolute, and, as we have said, to surpass the very certainty of the sciences, from this that the foundation on which it rests is the very authority and truth of God, than which nothing is more firm, and immutable, and which can less deceive. For the proper and, as the Schools speak, formal, reason why faith assents to things to be believed, is divine testimony, or divine revelation. For we believe this and that article, for example, that in God there are three distinct persons, and that Christ is God and man in one person, because God has said and revealed this in the word of the Gospel.

XXI. But it must be confessed that this reason of the Theologians thus nakedly proposed does not take away every scruple from the mind, nor is an inquiring mind satisfied through this. For this, indeed, so that any testimony and authority whatever may render our mind certain concerning something, two things are altogether required. First that we judge that he, who exhibits the testimony, is worthy that faith should be applied to him, and either cannot, or does not want to deceive. Then that we are certain that such testimony is truly exhibited by him, nor is fictitious and supposititious.

XXII. But now it is indeed known through itself that God is most true, and it can plainly not happen that he should lie, and exhibit false testimony. And so if anyone certainly and evidently perceives that something is said and asserted by God, thence without doubt will be formed in his mind the highest and absolute certainty.

XXIII. But the whole difficulty is, whence, and in what way we can be certain that this, or that was said, and revealed by God: And that what is proposed, as the Word of God, and testimony is truly such in itself. For that word, by which things to be believed are confirmed, to be truly divine, is not perceived by sense, nor also is the thing known through itself to the intellect, nor also is it something properly demonstrable, in the manner of some Mathematical conclusion, the contrary of which the mind plainly sees to be impossible and clearly perceives, nor can it doubt about it for a moment.

XXIV. Nor also can recourse be had here to some other testimony of God by which the Word of God may become known. For one part indeed of the divine word can bear testimony to the other part, and one revelation be confirmed through another, and become known, just as the New Testament bears testimony to the Old, and confirms its authority. But here progress cannot be given to infinity, and it must be stopped at last in some testimony of God, in which the mind acquiesces, and which ought not to become known through another prior one.

XXV. And this difficulty equally urges all Christian Theologians, and is incumbent on them to solve. For whether we say, as must truly be said, that sacred Scripture is the only Word of God delivered to men, from which alone all things to be believed can be sought and

confirmed, and which cannot be confirmed by some other Word of God, nor needs it: Or with the Doctors of the Roman Church, that besides Scripture, there is another revelation, entrusted to the faith of the Church without writing, by the authority and testimony of which Scripture solemnly becomes known to us, and is rendered certain; always, as I said, it must be arrived at some first revelation, in which it is necessary for the mind to be fixed, and which is not more certain, or known by another, by the authority of which it is commended and consigned to us. Concerning this therefore the question is in what pact, and by what reason we are rendered certain of it.

XXVI. And indeed all Theologians, both ours, and the Romanists, acknowledge that for this, so that someone may receive the Word and revelation of God, as is fitting, and be rendered certain of it, there is need of a certain secret operation of the Holy Spirit, which they commonly call the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. But none of them, as far as I know, by that testimony understands some express voice of God, which the faithful hears within, and feels, and by the authority of which, and as it were indication, he embraces the revelation proposed extrinsically. But by this in general they understand nothing other, than a certain operation of the Holy Spirit, by which he engenders faith in us, and which does not hold itself to faith in the manner of a means, or argument, on which faith may rest; but rather in the manner of an efficient cause. Nor also, from their common opinion, does that internal operation of the Holy Spirit exclude the necessity of certain means and incitements, by the regard of which our mind may be moved and impelled to receiving the revelation, which is proposed to it.

XXVII. But since, as was said before, that this is divine revelation, and that that is the Word of God, is not a thing mathematically, or logically demonstrable; those incitements and means, which move us to receive the Word of God as such, cannot be more than moral arguments, which make evident to a well disposed mind not mathematically, but morally that what is proposed as the Word of God, and heavenly doctrine, is truly such in itself. And so those arguments cannot of themselves engender in the mind, except that certainty, which we have called moral, and which from its kind is inferior to that certainty, by which we assent to principles known through themselves, and to conclusions evidently deduced thence. For, although a man whose mind is illustrated within by the Spirit of God, and who duly attends to the notes and various <illegible> of the word of God judges and sees that it is impossible that it proceeded from another than from God, nevertheless the proofs deduced thence, by which he is impelled to so judge, are only moral, and that which he is said to see must not be understood concerning any other than moral evidence.

XXVIII. Whence that highest certainty, and greater than the very certainty of the sciences which the Theologians attribute to faith seems to fall. For if we assent to the dogmas to be believed, because God has revealed them in his word, but we are not persuaded that God has revealed them by force of some demonstration, but only by moral arguments; thence it follows that faith is reduced at last to those arguments, and consequently that to faith belongs only moral certainty, and which is inferior to the certainty of the sciences.

XXIX. Moreover for taking away this difficulty, it matters nothing to inquire whether that judgment, by which we establish that the revelation, which is proposed to us, and through which things to be believed are confirmed for us, is truly divine, is an act of faith, and ought to be called such: or whether it is a certain judgment preceding faith, and prereduced by it; which some of the Theologians affirm, but others deny. But this is truly a mere *λογομαχία*. For as it will please to restrict, or amplify the definition of faith, so also that act will either be included in faith, or excluded from it. For, if anyone defines faith as the assent by which we establish that something is true, on account of the authority and testimony of God saying it, then that judgment is not an act of faith, but only something which necessarily precedes faith, and is presupposed by it. For that testimony, which is the argument of all the rest of the things to be believed, is not believed on account of another divine testimony, by the authority of which our mind may be moved; unless someone here wants to admit a circle, or progress to infinity, both of which are absurd, as was observed before. But if anyone defines faith as that assent by which we receive the divine word as such, and on account of it assent to all things which are proposed to us in it to be believed; then two acts of faith must be assigned, of which the former will be that judgment by which we establish that this word is truly divine, but the other the assent which we apply to all things which are contained by it. But however it may be concerning that, and whether that judgment is called an act of faith, or not, certainly, if we are uncertain whether the revelation which is proposed to us is divine, we cannot on account of it apply certain assent to those things which are commended to us by its authority.

XXX. Many Theologians, so that they may extricate themselves from this, deny that faith is so reduced to those arguments, or incitements, that its whole certainty depends thence. For they say indeed that the Holy Spirit uses them to impel and lead us to faith, but nevertheless imprints a greater certainty concerning the Word of God on the minds of the faithful, than arguments of that kind bear per se. And so they refer that highest certainty of faith to the internal testimony of the Spirit, that is, as we have already explained, to the hidden and most powerful operation of the Holy Spirit, by which he immediately instills that most certain persuasion concerning the Word of God into the minds of the faithful. Which we also have followed in other Theses.

XXXI. But those things thus nakedly and briefly proposed leave some scruple in the mind. For just as it is not fitting for a rational creature, that it should give assent to anything, without it first perceiving the truth of it through itself, or collecting it from certain signs and arguments, or at least being moved to believing by some grave authority; So also it does not seem to be fitting for the same, that its assent should be more certain than the arguments by which it is moved to assenting demand. Otherwise in that assent there will be at least some grade destitute of all reason, and resting on no solid foundation, which is abhorrent to the genius of a rational creature. But it must be established that the Holy Spirit works faith, and other virtues, or acts of virtues in us in a certain way congruous and agreeable to nature, and which although it is above nature, is nevertheless by no means contrary to nature.

XXXII. So that this scruple may be taken away we think that that distinction can be conveniently applied here which Bonaventure, most celebrated among the Scholastic Doctors, uses. For comparing faith with the sciences as to certainty, he distinguishes certainty, as we have done before, into certainty of cognition, or speculation, which pertains to the intellect alone, and certainty of adhesion, which chiefly regards the will, and depends on it. And he says that faith is more certain than the sciences, not by certainty of speculation, or certainty of speculation, but only by certainty of adhesion. Since, he says, faithful Christians can be led, or inclined, neither by arguments, nor by torments, nor by allurements, to deny, even with the mouth alone, the truth which they believe: which no one skilled in some science would do, if he were compelled by the sharpest torments to retract his opinion concerning some Geometric, or Arithmetic conclusion. For a Geometer would be foolish and ridiculous who for his opinion in Geometric controversies would dare to undergo death, except insofar as faith dictates that one must not lie.

XXXIII. Therefore with respect to that certainty, which we have called of speculation, or cognition, faith is not more certain than science properly so called; but is rather surpassed by that certainty. For by how much greater that certainty is, by so much farther it removes all doubt from assent. But faith is more liable to doubt than science, for example Mathematical. For if anyone has perceived the force of some Geometric demonstration he cannot doubt for a moment concerning the conclusion. But the faithful often has to struggle with doubt and diffidence, by which his faith is assailed.

XXXIV. But if anyone should say that this only proves that the certainty of faith, which we called before subjective, is less than the certainty of the sciences, but not the objective certainty of faith, about which the question now is. I respond that that faith which is actually shaken by various temptations in the faithful, and struggles with diffidence, does not cease to be true faith. But if anyone had less perceived the force of some Geometric demonstration, and doubted concerning the truth of the conclusion, in him there would not be science of the true name. And by this very thing it is evident that science per se and from its kind excludes doubt more than faith.

XXXV. Add that, as was said before, the measure of that certainty, which is called of cognition, is evidence. For what excludes doubt from the mind is the perception of truth, and the conviction of the mind. And consequently by how much more clearly someone perceives the truth, by this very thing all doubt is removed farther from his mind. But the Theologians do not fear to confess that our mind perceives less clearly that this is the Word and testimony of God, than it perceives things known through themselves, or conclusions Logically demonstrated. There is no reason therefore why they should fear to acknowledge that assent to be less certain to that extent.

XXXVI. Nor for that reason is faith, at least from this part, left uncertain. For what does not attain the certainty of science and intelligence is not immediately uncertain. Indeed, as was shown before, certainty which is called moral, even if it is of a lower grade, is nevertheless certainty of the true name, which renders the mind secure and undoubting. Nor is another

required so that men may be obliged in conscience to the duties and offices of life, and also efficaciously impelled: even up to exposing their own life, and willingly undergoing death, which a subject sometimes does for a prince, and a father for children, that they are his he is not otherwise certain.

XXXVII. And indeed that judgment, by which our mind establishes that the word and testimony, which is proposed to it as the argument of things to be believed, is truly divine, is not indeed born from such perception, as is that by which our intellect admits the innate light of first principles, and the truth of propositions which are necessarily deduced from them: but nevertheless it is founded on arguments, notes and indications, which at least morally, render the thing evidently so to hold itself, and so can, and ought to take away all doubt from a well disposed mind, and render it certain and secure.

XXXVIII. But a man once indubitably establishing, and certainly persuaded from various indications notes and arguments, that the word which is directed to him is divine, and that revelation has arisen from God, if he duly attends, and seriously considers that it is God who speaks, and how grave and atrocious a thing it is to spurn the Word of God and reject his voice, struck by the authority of so great a witness is borne wholly into his obedience, and receives the Word of God with the highest veneration, and most closely embraces it, and adheres to it tenaciously and firmly, and establishes for certain, and efficaciously judges that anything must rather be suffered, and all things renounced, than that he should reject the Word of God, and derogate faith from those things which are contained in it, and confirmed by its authority.

XXXIX. Whence arises in faith a certain greater certainty than is in any science. Since the faithful mind thus affected and disposed receives the Word of God, and the things which are of faith, more eagerly, embraces more closely, and retains more firmly: than anything else under whatever light it may finally be proposed, and by whatever strength of demonstrations it may be confirmed. And so a man imbued with true faith has it fixed and ratified in mind and soul to renounce all other sciences rather than to cast off faith. Nor is there any cognition which he so firmly and studiously guards and retains; Nor any assent, which he would suffer to be torn away from his mind with more difficulty and pain.

XL. And so faith, by which we embrace the divine word, indeed perceives its object less clearly, than assent, which takes place in human sciences: but nevertheless assent of faith is firmer in the mind, and affects it more powerfully and efficaciously, and penetrates more deeply: so that the faithful is prepared to shake off any other assent rather than this.

XLI. Which firmness of faith and powerful and tenacious adhesion in the mind is not born from the evidence of the object, but from the gravity and moment of the thing itself. Namely the mind illuminated by the Holy Spirit perceives that any other cognition conduces nothing or little to living well and blessedly, but that on this depends the blessedness of man, nor can it be rejected, except with the certain destruction of the whole man: and therefore adheres to it more tenaciously, and more powerfully, than to any cognition whatsoever, or science. Finally, so that I may briefly conclude the things which have been said more extensively, faith

does not remove doubt so far from the mind, as science, which is born from demonstration; but nevertheless the mind adheres more tenaciously to faith, and as so to speak, guards it more studiously, and anxiously. And therefore, although faith can perhaps be said to be less certain by certainty of speculation, than sciences altogether demonstrative, nevertheless without doubt it is more certain than all those by certainty of adhesion.

XLII. Moreover hence it can be clear, how not without reason we have elsewhere taught that the whole certainty, which is found in faith, is not resolved into the very light of the divine word, that is, into the various notes and arguments by which the Word of God proves itself to be such, nor are those arguments the measure of its whole certainty; But that the Holy Spirit imprints a greater certainty concerning the Word of God on the minds of the faithful than such notes and arguments bear per se: and so that highest certainty, by which faith embraces the Word of God, must be referred to the internal operation of the Holy Spirit, who imprints that full and firm assent on the minds of the faithful by a certain force which is greater than every argument and reason.

XLIII. For that certainty of adhesion, by which faith surpasses human sciences, is not measured by the evidence of the thing, nor simply depends on the force of the arguments by which something is proved to be true: And in engendering it in the mind of the faithful the efficacy and force of the Holy Spirit chiefly exerts itself, who not only opens their eyes, so that they may perceive the light of the divine word, that is, that moral evidence by which it can become known to our mind, and perceive the force of the signs and arguments which prove and show that God is its author: but besides so disposes and affects the mind of the man to be converted, that he seriously thinks and animadverts that the voice of God, is directed to him, and teaches and admonishes him concerning things, not light and of small moment, but on which depends the whole good of the soul, and the eternal salvation, or perdition of man. But now that nothing is graver and more atrocious than not to render assent and due obedience to God speaking: And also that nothing is more insane than to neglect those things in which the true happiness of man is situated, and which cannot be rejected and contemned without destruction and highest misery. Whence is formed in the mind of man an efficacious purpose and judgment, by which he establishes to receive the Word of God with due veneration and obedience, and to embrace it firmly, and to adhere to it entirely. Which so that it may happen it is necessary for the will to be abstracted from earthly and perishable things, and to be inclined to God and heavenly things, and for the obstacles of depraved affections to be broken through, which so pervert, and obscure the mind: so that in these things it can judge nothing sound, since as each one is affected so he judges: to all which things is required the most powerful and most efficacious operation of the Spirit of God in our souls.

XLIV. Nor nevertheless does the Spirit of God do anything in us through the mode of rapture or enthusiasm: but moves and impels men in a certain way most agreeable to nature, and as is fitting for a rational and free creature. And although that highest firmness and certainty of faith, which the spirit imprints on our minds, is not to be referred wholly to the light or

evidence of the object, nevertheless it is not destitute of reason from any part, nor does it lack every foundation even from the part of the object. Since it is born from the dignity and gravity of the thing itself, which the mind, as is fitting, weighs and attends, in the way which has now been expounded.

XLV. But still from another part a certain certainty accrues to faith. For after someone has admitted the Word of God by true and sincere faith, that word powerfully and efficaciously works in him. For first it terrifies and strikes the conscience with the sharpest sense of sin and of the wrath of God. Then it soothes it with the sweetest consolation, and creates in it a peace which surpasses all understanding and joy unspeakable: Phil. 4:7, 1 Pet. 1:8. Then also it changes the affections of men, corrects the depraved ones, composes the disturbed ones, cleanses and purifies the impure ones: And frees the soul from the servitude of vices, so that it may willingly and cheerfully worship God, and serve him: and so it so renovates the whole man within and without, that renouncing all impiety and worldly desires, he lives soberly, justly and piously in this age, and for that reason deserves to be called a new creature.

XLVI. But the Word of God cannot work those things in the souls of men, without they feel the finger of God in themselves, and acknowledge a certain divine efficacy, which within moves and affects their minds in wonderful and various ways. Nor can they reflect the mind to that, without thence being validly confirmed in faith, and by a certain new argument collecting that that word is truly divine of which they feel so divine a force and ἐνέργειαν in themselves. To which the Apostle has regard when he congratulates the Thessalonians that they had received the word of the hearing of God, not as the word of men, but as it truly is, as the word of God; which also, he says, works in you who have believed, 1 Thess. 2:13.

XLVII. Whence accrues to faith a certain certainty, as so to speak, experimental: and in that also is to be noted a certain internal testimony of the Holy Spirit notable very much and illustrious, by which the Word of God is sealed in the hearts of the faithful, and its divinity and truth is sanctioned. Nor in another way does the Spirit of God testify together with our spirit that we are sons of God, as the Apostle speaks, Rom. 8:17. Concerning which the Spirit of God cannot render us certain by his testimony, without at the same time rendering us certain that God is our father, who addresses and speaks to us in the Gospel.

XLVIII. But this testimony of the Holy Spirit, which he exhibits within to our adoption and to the truth and divinity of the Evangelical word through the various and plainly divine effects which he produces in us, by means of the Word of God received and admitted by faith, must be distinguished from that other operation of his, by which he creates and infuses faith in us, and which is also commonly accustomed to be called the internal testimony of the Spirit. For this testimony by nature precedes faith, as is evident, but that other follows faith, and supposes it.

**Theological Theses,
In which it is inquired,**

**whether sufficient Grace for Conversion, and
avoiding Sins is given to all Men?
And concerning that matter the Doctrine of the Roman School is expounded,
and compared with the Doctrine of the Protestants.**

Thesis I

Concerning this question the Doctors of the Roman Church do not altogether agree. For first there are those who disapprove the distinction of grace into sufficient and efficacious, nor do they want there to be any sufficient grace which is not efficacious. But they openly teach that sufficient grace either for conversion, or for avoiding sins is not given to all men; since it is plain that grace efficacious for those things is not given to all. Which opinion Jansenius and his Disciples defend, as conformable to the doctrine of Augustine.

II. But the common opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church is to the contrary: at least as far as pertains to the Doctors of today and more recent ones. For they think that sufficient grace for conversion, and avoiding sins is given to all by God. But so that they may so think they are induced by the places of Scripture, in which it is said that God wills that all men be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth: likewise that he wills that no one perish, but that all come to repentance; and other similar things. For those things do not seem to be consistent, that God wills the salvation and conversion of men; and nevertheless denies to them grace necessary for faith and salvation. And besides, unless sufficient grace is given to all men, they think that many can be excused, if they are not converted, and abstain from sins; namely all those to whom such grace has not fallen. For they do not think that anyone can be justly condemned, because he has not done those things for which he did not have necessary and sufficient aids: although Scripture teaches that all those are inexcusable, who persevere in sins, and are not converted to God.

III. But all who seem to agree in that general Thesis concerning sufficient grace granted to all, do not explain and understand that grace in the same way. For those who are called the more recent Thomists, and who teach that the efficacy of grace consists in a certain Physical determination of free will, say that sufficient grace is given by God to all men, since sufficient aid is given to them by God so that they may be able to work well: although with that aid no one ever works well; but for this it is necessarily required that there be another efficacious aid really distinguished from sufficient, which determines the will to good, and which is not granted by God to all men. And so according to them, sufficient grace is given to all men so that they may be able to work well: but nevertheless which without new aid does not suffice so that they may actually work well.

IV. But Molina, and most of the other Theologians of the Roman School, teach that sufficient grace is given to all, not only so that they may be able to work well, but also so that without another previous aid they may actually work, if they will, and it is situated in their liberty and power to use, or not use that grace.

V. But it must be observed that it is agreed among all the Doctors of the Roman School, that grace which immediately suffices for obtaining salvation is not given to all men. For they confess that with respect to adults faith in Christ is necessary for this, which one cannot have, unless Christ is preached to him, or becomes known in some other way: although it is evident that to many men the name of Christ is entirely unheard.

VI. And so when they urge a certain universal and sufficient grace, they understand that which at least mediately suffices, so that by its benefit men may be led to eternal salvation: namely, if they use well that measure of grace which is first indulged to them, God may be ready always to bestow more ample, until at last he leads them to the salutary knowledge of his son, through means either ordinary, or even extraordinary: as happened to Cornelius, who piously worshipping God according to the module of knowledge indulged to him by God was admonished by an angel to summon Peter, by whom he might be further instructed in the way of salvation, and perceive the doctrine of the Gospel.

VII. Indeed they do not even want grace to be given to all men which is immediately sufficient for avoiding sins, and overcoming temptations, but only that by which they can, at least mediately, avoid sins, and overcome temptations. They acknowledge, namely, that many with present aid are unequal for overcoming temptation, and unless God adds greater aid, it will certainly happen that they succumb to depraved desire: but they contend that at least aid is not lacking to them by which they can pray to God, and obtain from him the grace then necessary for them.

VIII. But the Theologians of the Roman School here move various questions about which there is not the same opinion for all. And indeed first they ask about infants, Whether also sufficient grace for salvation is given by God to all of them? Not a few in the Roman School deny it: since many infants die, before Baptism could be administered to them, without which nevertheless they think that no infant can arrive at salvation. Which is clear, especially in those infants, who are extinguished in the maternal womb without the fault of the parents.

IX. In that opinion is Vásquez. who warns that here it is not asked whether Christ instituted means sufficient of themselves for salvation for all little ones: but whether he so provided and disposed them, that he left the application of them in the free faculty of someone. And afterwards, a certain distinction having been applied, he teaches that to certain little ones, namely those brought forth into the light, and those who die in the maternal womb by the negligence of the parents, sufficient remedies were provided, which could be applied to them, although by the negligence of adults they were not applied: but to certain little ones it was not granted by God in any way, to be able to apply sufficient remedies by human diligence, either to those brought forth into the light, when water is not granted, or to those dying in the maternal womb by the force of nature alone. Vol. 1 on 1 Thomas, disputation 96.

X. But on the contrary others affirm, that even with respect to the infants themselves, sufficient grace is given to all: and that since God, as much as is in him, prepared baptism for all infants, and gave to parents, and others in whose power the infants are, either immediate, or mediate faculty of baptizing them, and thus of procuring their salvation.

XI. This is the opinion of Charles Joseph Tricassin Capuchin Preacher, in a book recently published on grace necessary for salvation given to all and each one, in the last section of the second part, where this is his conclusion, All and each little one has sufficient grace for salvation, not indeed in themselves, since they are incapable of receiving it, but in their parents, and friends of the parents, who can lead them to baptism, and through this to salvation.

XII. But afterwards he explains in what way parents can lead them to baptism. Namely if they are unbelieving, they have grace by which they can either immediately, or at least mediately believe, and thus procure baptism for their own. But if they are believing, they can pray for the salvation of their little ones, so that God may preserve them up to birth, at which time they ought to be solicitous, so that they may quickly procure baptism for them. They can also beware of sins, lest on account of them their little ones may be deprived of their temporal life before they are born. And especially mothers can beware of all those things, which can be noxious and lethal to themselves, and to their little ones, whom they bear in the womb. Which if they well observe, their little ones are going to arrive at baptism, and thus to eternal salvation.

XIII. But as it pertains to adults, those themselves who teach that sufficient grace is given to all adults, do not agree among themselves, Whether that sufficient grace is perpetually present to them, Or whether it is given to them only for place and time; so that they are sometimes destitute of it. For the Jesuits of today, and most of the other Doctors of the Roman School establish that sufficient grace is perpetually present to all adults, to the end of life, by which they can both avoid each sin of which the occasion offers itself, and to which they are tempted and impelled, and by which they can also be converted to God, and snatch themselves from the state of sin.

XIV. But others use a certain distinction here. For there are those who think that indeed no one is to whom God does not bestow grace by which he can convert himself to God, and become a partaker of salvation in some moment at least of life: but they deny that that grace is always present to all: for many are justly destitute of it by God on account of sins. But they contend that God never denies to any man grace by which he can abstain from new sins, and resist an assailing temptation, namely, either immediately, or as has been said, at least mediately, through aid, which indeed he does not have, but which he can obtain by prayers. In which opinion is Cardinal Bellarmine, as can be seen in the first chapters of the second book on Grace and free will.

XV. Nevertheless some of the patrons of universal and sufficient grace do not even admit that grace is always present to all by which they can avoid sins: because, namely, certain ones on account of too much abuse of divine grace, and in vindication and punishment of preceding sins, are so deserted by God, that thenceforth they are entirely handed over to their own depraved desires, nor can they not sin any longer. Of which number they think are those whom scripture calls hardened and blinded.

XVI. Vásquez attributes this opinion to Tostatus Bishop of Avila, Cardinal Cajetan, John

Fisher Bishop of Rochester and Cardinal, and Ruard Tapper Professor of Louvain; whom he affirms to think, that sometimes on account of former sins, men are so destitute for some certain period of life, that not even sufficient and necessary aid is granted to them, by which they may be able to observe the commands of believing, doing penance, and other things of this kind, and avoid sins. Vol. 1 on 1 Thomas, disputation 96, chapter 2.

XVII. As regards the Doctors of the Reformed School, by far most of them do not acknowledge any grace which suffices for converting man, and leading him to salvation, which also does not really convert man, and lead him to salvation. And so, according to their opinion, there is no sufficient grace, which is also not efficacious: nor ought this to be distinguished from that. And consequently since they teach that the grace of God is efficacious in the elect alone, it is so far from their acknowledging that sufficient grace either for conversion, or for avoiding sins is given to all men, that they contend that this falls only to the elect.

XVIII. But nevertheless some are found today among the Reformed Theologians who defend and preach a certain universal grace, which they want to be common to all men, and which they also say of itself and per se to suffice for salvation. And so asked whether sufficient grace is given to all men? They Respond that it is so. But they constitute that grace, not in a certain internal operation of the spirit, which moves and excites the mind, will, and affections of man, so that it may be borne to God, and flee sin: but only in the external preaching and declaration of divine mercy, and invitation to faith and repentance, under hope of obtaining remission of sins, and partaking of salvation, whether that declaration and invitation are made through the external proclamation of the word; or through the various effects of divine providence, which exert themselves around men corrupted by sin.

XIX. But they call this grace sufficient, not because, from their mind, it simply suffices for actually converting man, without any other divine aid: but because it so renders salvation possible for man, that he can be saved, if he wills: nor is there any, as they speak, Physical impediment which obstructs his salvation: since both salvation is duly offered to him, and he has natural faculties, mind, namely, and will by which he can embrace it, if he rightly uses them.

XX. But they acknowledge that those natural faculties of man, namely mind and will, are so corrupted and vitiated by sin, that unless a certain internal grace of God accedes, which illuminates the mind and bends the will, it cannot happen that man uses those faculties of his well, and obeys and complies with God calling and inviting to the participation of his grace offered extrinsically; which is morally impossible for him on account of the vice inhering, without such internal grace.

XXI. Nor for that reason do they think those less inexcusable who do not render obedience to God calling. And that since that moral impossibility is situated in the voluntary hardening and obstinacy of the will in evil, which does not at all excuse sin, as is evident by the example of demons: since we are excused only through those impediments, which do not depend on our own will, and which however much we may will, and strive ourselves, we

cannot remove.

XXII. And besides they think that grace commonly offered to all men is enough, so that God can be said to will that no one perish, but to will and seriously desire the salvation and conversion of all men: since through that God renders salvation possible for all, under a condition which depends on their will, and which they can fulfill if they will: since there is no external cause, or external impediment which obstructs their salvation, but only their perverse will, which rejects and contemns the means offered by God, and obstinately refuses to use them.

XXIII. But they want internal grace, without which no one can embrace divine mercy, to be proper and peculiar to the elect, and to fall to none other than the elect, it is so far from it being common to all. As can be seen in Amyraut in the dissertations on particular grace, and on universal grace; and in Paul Testard, on nature and grace, chapter 7, whose title is, On supernatural grace, and the power of salvation indulged through it, and its universality.

XXIV. But they teach that grace, which they call universal, is universal, not only with respect to adults, but also with respect to infants themselves, to whom, namely, God has made the power of salvation, insofar as he willed that infants should follow the condition of the parents: but he has rendered salvation possible for all parents: and so the salvation of infants who are to arise from them, and who are considered as certain appendages of them.

XXV. But here it must not be omitted that the most illustrious Amyraut in his Dissertation on Particular Grace refers a certain third opinion, which he attributes to some of the Reformed, although he does not publish their name. They therefore, with him referring it, not only admit a certain Universal grace external and objective, which suffices for salvation; but besides a certain subjective and internal grace, which is also Universal, and of which all men are made partakers by God, so that by its benefit they may be able to believe and be converted, which without it could not happen. Although besides that subjective and universal grace, they do not deny that there is another peculiar to the elect. They make, he says, each grace so much internal (which he calls subjective) as external (which he names objective) in some way universal: So that although they do not deny that in the elect a certain peculiar efficacy exerts itself, they nevertheless think, that just as God reveals his mercy to all men, by which they are invited to faith and repentance; so also he affects the minds of all intrinsically to that extent, as to the objective grace, if they will, they may be able to embrace and retain it. And he says that these have not published their doctrine in type, but only in private observations, which nevertheless having been scattered far and wide have flown through the hands of men, have carped at subjective grace particular only to the elect, and have thought that the dogma concerning the absolute decree of Reprobation, as abhorrent from the truth, must be exterminated from the boundaries of religion.

XXVI. Moreover those who in Belgium are called Remonstrants, or Arminians, place among their principal dogmas that one concerning a certain universal and sufficient Grace, which God bestows on all for this end, that they may be able, if it pleases, to repent and be converted to God. For they openly teach and defend with most of the Theologians of today's

Roman School, that not only salvation is offered extrinsically by God to all and each man, but that God also so acts within in the souls of all, that it is plainly free for them, and situated in their power to use that internal and universal grace well or badly: and thus either to reject the offered salvation, or at least gradually and by degrees to arrive at true conversion and faith, and so to obtain eternal salvation.

XXVII. But those Theologians of the Augsburg Confession who are called Lutherans reject the distinction indeed of grace into sufficient and efficacious, as useless and superfluous but nevertheless seem to think the same, or nearly the same with the Remonstrants in this question. For they think that all are universally called and excited to salvation by God, and indeed by a calling, which of itself, and from the intention of God is efficacious: but that it does not have effect in many, is from this that many reject God calling and resist the divine calling, nor admit the efficacy of grace offered to them, or once admitted do not use it well; but spontaneously cast off the Divine grace. When others on the contrary lend an ear to God calling, nor place an impediment to the operation of the spirit in them. Which doctrine drawn out more extensively can be seen in John Gerhard, Vol. 2, tract on Election & Reprobation, chapter 7.

XXVIII. Moreover from the things said it is evident that the dogma concerning a certain sufficient grace, which is given to all men, in the Roman Church is not yet held as an article of faith, which cannot be denied without the mark of heresy, but although it is held by most of the Doctors, there are nevertheless still some who oppose it: And in turn not a few of the Reformed today defend a certain universal grace, and sufficient in its kind, although to the contrary is the more common opinion of the Reformed Churches. And so what very many in the Roman School affirm, that sufficient grace is given to all men, both for conversion, and for avoiding new sins, is simply denied by very many of the Reformed.

XXIX. But those very Reformed Doctors, who, at least verbally, confess a certain universal and sufficient grace with most of the Theologians of the Roman School, nevertheless really dissent from them. For what the Theologians of the Roman School understand concerning a certain internal and subjective grace, which renders the conversion of man, not only Physically, but also morally possible, the Reformed refer all that to grace only external and objective; which having been posited, with internal grace lacking to man, conversion nevertheless remains morally impossible.

XXX. Nevertheless those who, Moses Amyraut testifying, among the Reformed acknowledge a certain universal and sufficient grace, not external only and objective, but subjective also and inhering in men, do not seem to differ from the more recent Thomists and Dominicans to that extent; since both want that besides that universal grace which converts no one actually, for actual conversion it is necessary that there be a peculiar certain aid, which does not fall to all, but to those only who are actually converted.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:
ON
JUSTIFYING FAITH:
Its Nature & Essence, and its distinction from historical faith,
or dead and idle faith.
In which various opinions of Protestants are reported
and examined; and briefly refuted are the accusations
that a certain recent author of these Theses has made
on this matter.

Thesis I

Protestants call historical faith a mere and simple assent that many give to what is proposed in the Word of God, because of the authority of God who speaks and testifies; however, it does not move them to act rightly or make them better. By such faith, it is said Simon Magus believed, whose heart was not right before God, and who nevertheless remained in the gall of bitterness and in the bonds of iniquity, as judged by Peter, Acts 8. And similarly, those Jewish leaders believed who did not confess Christ because they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God, John 12.

II. Moreover, this faith is called historical, not because it concerns only those things which are narrated historically in the Scriptures. For those endowed with this faith truly believe whatever is contained in the Word of God, not less the promises, doctrines, and precepts than the histories and narratives. But this appellation is derived from the way this faith deals with its object. Just as when we read histories that do not pertain to us, we contemplate them dispassionately, and are not moved or affected internally: so those who have that faith idly speculate on what the Word of God teaches, without referring it to practice.

III. And this is the faith that James, in the second chapter of his epistle, calls dead faith; because, devoid of all motion and action, it is like a corpse. Therefore, it is of no benefit for salvation but rather increases the guilt and condemnation of those who adhere to it. As James says there, "What does it profit, my brothers, if someone says he has faith but does not have works? Can faith save him?" He even dares to attribute such faith to demons in the same passage: "You believe that there is one God. You do well. Even the demons believe—and tremble!" Hence, Protestants do not consider it worthy of the name of true faith; because, in their judgment, only that faith deserves to be called true which brings righteousness and salvation to the one who is endowed with it, which is not the case with this kind of faith.

IV. Hence they conclude that this faith must be distinguished from that faith which scripture adorns with the highest praises and commendations, to which we are so frequently and vehemently exhorted, and to which our righteousness and salvation are usually attributed, as being inseparably connected with it. As when it is said in John, "For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life." And similarly in Mark, "Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved." This is consistent with

Paul's statement in the Letter to the Romans, "For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes." Hence, it is evident that there is a kind of faith by which whoever has it is righteous before God and is gracious and acceptable to God for salvation and eternal life; and which is therefore different from the faith found in the wicked and demons. This very faith of the pious and the righteous is considered by Protestants alone worthy of the name of true, salvific, and justifying faith. John 3, Mark 16, Rom 10.

V. And from this, it is apparent that Protestants do not understand by justifying faith that which in any way prepares for justification, whether proximately or remotely; but that which actually justifies a person, or with which justification always and infallibly accompanies. And similarly, they do not call any other faith salvific than that which truly places a person in the state of grace and salvation.

VI. However, there is no complete agreement among the Reformed on how much historical faith and justifying faith differ from each other. Some only want there to be a distinction between the two so that the distinction of faith into historical and justifying is not said to be a distinction of genus into species, but of an ambiguous word into its meanings. In this opinion is Samuel Maresius, the most celebrated Professor of Theology at the University of Groningen, as can be seen in his *System*, place eleven, Thesis 21. Others say it is a division of genus into species, but not univocal ones, but analogous. This is the opinion of the most learned man Christophorus Wittichius, formerly of Nijmegen and now Professor of Theology at Leiden; in *Theologia Pacifica*, chap. 11, number 136, where he cites Paraeus and the Professors of Leiden, as agreeing with him in this regard.

VII. But how justifying faith differs from historical can be better understood from the definition of justifying faith and the exposition of its acts and parts. Furthermore, justifying faith is described variously by the Reformed, and several definitions are presented, which might seem more or less suitable, but nevertheless converge on the same meaning approximately. According to Calvin, justifying faith is a firm and certain knowledge of Divine goodwill towards us, which, based on the truth of the promise freely given in Christ, is revealed to our minds through the Holy Spirit and sealed in our hearts: to which corresponds the brief description of that popular Catechism, in which faith is said to be a certain persuasion or confidence that every Christian should have, that God the Father loves him for the sake of his Son, Jesus Christ.

VIII. However, Beza in his *Annotations* on the first chapter of Romans defines faith as that firm and constant persuasion of the mind, by which each of the faithful is certain within himself, not only that the Word of God is true in general, and therefore the promises of free reconciliation through Christ, but also that he personally believes these to apply to himself. For Ursinus and Pareus, justifying faith is not only certain knowledge, by which someone firmly assents to everything that God has revealed to us in his word, but also certain confidence, kindled in the heart of the faithful by the Holy Spirit through the Gospel, by which one rests in God, firmly determining not only for others but also for himself that remission of sins, eternal righteousness, and life are given; and this freely out of God's mercy, for the sake of Christ alone. In the *Catechetical Explanations*, part two, question 21.

IX. The same description is also provided by Rivet, once a celebrated Professor of Sacred Theology at Leiden University: "We call that saving and justifying faith," he says, "which arises from a certain knowledge of divine revelation, a firm assent generated in our minds by the Holy Spirit through the Gospel word, to all that God has revealed to us in his word, but especially to the saving promises in Christ, with which each faithful person, resting in certain confidence in God, firmly establishes not only that remission of sins is generally promised to believers but is also granted to him or her in particular; and eternal righteousness and life from it, out of God's mercy, for the sake of Jesus Christ alone." In a disputation on justifying faith. Similarly, Pierre du Moulin, also most celebrated while he lived, Professor at the Academy of Sedan, defines it as a firm assent to the promises of the Gospel, by which the faithful not only believe them to be true but also consider them to apply particularly to themselves, with the Spirit of adoption internally testifying that he is a child of God; hence peace, conscience, confidence, and works of charity emerge. In the theses on Justification and Justifying Faith, part 2, Thesis 12.

X. Samuel Maresius in his System, in the eleventh place, says faith is a Gift, by which we rest in the promises of the Gospel in Christ, as true and certain, and confidently apply them to ourselves. To this agrees Wendelinus, a well-known Professor of Theology at the Anhalt Academy, teaching that faith is that by which the elect believe in divine truth, and with a firm assent of will accept the promises of saving grace in Christ, applying Christ with all his benefits to themselves for eternal life. In Christian Theology, book 2, chapter 24, thesis. Nor is the definition of faith by Heinrich Alting, formerly a Professor at the University of Heidelberg, dissimilar; for him, faith is the knowledge of God's grace in Christ the Redeemer, and its confident apprehension, by which each faithful person singularly applies it to himself. In common places, part I, page 217.

XI. For Bucanus, a Professor of Theology at Lausanne, faith is defined as knowledge, assent, and longing for the promised grace in the word, and thus firm confidence in obtaining salvation through Christ. Or, from the knowledge and approval of the mind and judgment, a special desire and apprehension of the will or heart, by which we apply to ourselves individually Christ crucified with his benefits as offered in the word and sacraments. In location 29, question 7.

XII. According to William Ames, an Englishman, Professor at Franeker, faith is the heart's acquiescence in God, as in the author of life or eternal salvation, that is, to be freed through Him from all evil and to obtain all good. By this heart's acquiescence, he understands the act of the will by which it moves and extends itself to embrace the good approved by the intellect, as he explains his own meaning in The Marrow of Theology, book 1, chapter 3. In the same work, book 2, chapter 5, he defines faith as the virtue by which, adhering to God's fidelity, we lean on Him to achieve what He proposes. Ames agrees with the aforementioned Wittichius in this regard, as Wittichius defines faith as hunger and thirst for righteousness and heart's acquiescence in God, as the source and author of salvation; to commit our souls to Him in distress and temptations. In Theologia Pacifica, chap. 11, num. 128. This is similar to the definition of faith provided by the most learned man Jean Mestrezat, former Minister of the

Divine Word in Paris, in his French sermons, where he says justifying faith is the repentant sinner's refuge in God's mercy in Christ.

XIII. With Peter Martyr, faith is defined as a firm and certain assent of the mind to God's words, inspired by the divine spirit for the salvation of believers. He later explains what he means by firm assent, namely, one that is so strong and effective that it brings along the affection of trust, hope, charity, and all good works, as the frailty of this life allows. In common places, Class 3, chapter 4, nums. 3 and 5. Musculus similarly defines faith as a constant assent of the heart to what is either narrated or promised in the word. In the place on Faith, Section 1. And to this returns the definition of faith found in Joshua Placaeus, the most learned and astute Professor at Saumur, for whom Faith is a tenacious and effective persuasion of the truth of what has been revealed to us by God's word, especially the promise of the forgiveness of sins and eternal life obtained for us through Christ. In the Theses on Justification, Thesis 36.

XIV. Similarly, for Zanchi, faith is defined as a virtue given to us by God, by which we are persuaded that whatever was formerly proposed in the name of God by the Prophets and Apostles, but now is preached to us from their writings, is the Word of God, and we believe and profess the whole of it, both law and Gospel, as the certain word of God. In volume 4, book 1, chapter 12, on Faith, first thesis. But this definition of faith is generic for him. For later, in the second thesis, he divides faith, as thus defined, into living and dead. Living, which is effective through love and produces works of piety. Dead, which is devoid of this effectiveness. Since living faith and justifying faith are actually one and the same, since all justifying faith is living, and conversely, all living faith is justifying, it seems easily conceivable, from the teaching of Zanchi, what the true definition of justifying faith is. Namely, if we say that it is by which we believe and profess the whole Word of God, both law and Gospel, as the certain word of God, with an assent that is effective through love. Yet, in the same book and chapter, he defines justifying faith more narrowly. For him, justifying faith is a firm and undoubted assent to God's promises of forgiveness of sins, and of receiving righteousness and eternal life from God, for the sake of his son Jesus Christ, stirred in us by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Under the title On Confidence, in the Explanation of the First Thesis.

XV. But leaving aside the definitions of individual doctors, the descriptions of faith that are, as it were, sanctified in the public Confessions of the Reformed Churches, should be considered here primarily. Such as the one found in the Declaration of the Catholic Doctrine of the Reformed Churches at the Synod of Thorn, presented by the delegates of the Polish Churches in 1645, and in the Confession of the Church of England, published by the command and mandate of the English Parliament around the same time. The Polish Churches, in chapter four, paragraph eight of their Declaration, express their opinion on faith thus: We finally call true and justifying faith that which embraces the promise of the Gospel, offering forgiveness and life in Christ to the repentant, with a practical or fiduciary assent, and applies it to oneself with a truly contrite heart, and which thereafter is effective through charity: chap. 4, sect. 2, num. 8. The Anglican Confession describes saving faith as follows: By this faith a Christian truly believes whatever is revealed in the word of God, on the authority of God himself speaking in the word,

and acts and is affected differently concerning everything that this word contains; namely, obeying the commands, trembling at the threats, and embracing the promises of God, both for this life and the one to come. But the principal acts of this saving faith are to accept and receive Christ and to rest in Him alone for justification and eternal life, by the power of the covenant of grace: chap. 14.

XVI. The reason the Reformed doctors define faith in such varied ways is that some try to describe its entire essence, namely, both what it has in common with what they call historical faith, and what is unique to it; others only intend to note what distinguishes justifying faith from historical faith. Moreover, some describe justifying faith from one characteristic, others from another; however, these are not to be opposed but combined: as by the judgment of both these and those theologians, that faith claims both properties, even if they only explicitly mention one in their description.

XVII. Add that some describe justifying faith according to its complete and perfect being, and according to what it is naturally able to produce in the believer. For example, they attribute to it a firm and certain persuasion that the believer is in God's grace, and that their sins are forgiven, without which, however, faith can still subsist in a weak believer, at least temporarily; others, however, define faith based on those things without which true faith, no matter how small and weak, cannot exist even in the least. For example, those who define it through hunger and thirst for righteousness, and the heart's acquiescence in God. These will be understood more distinctly and clearly when we have explained various acts of faith, according to the Doctors of the Reformed School, in detail.

XVIII. Moreover, from all these definitions of justifying and salvific faith, it is apparent that two things, according to the Reformed, distinguish living and justifying faith from historical and dead faith. The first is that historical faith is theoretical and resides in the theoretical intellect; but justifying faith is a practical assent, through which the things believed, in any way, are brought back to practice, and the will and affections of man are effectively moved and affected; so they act in conformity with the things believed. The second is that historical faith provides only a general assent to divine promises, but justifying faith applies them individually to each believer.

XIX. Hence, it is also clear, from the Reformed perspective, that justifying faith is so different from historical faith that it includes all its virtue; and thus it is distinguished from it as the perfect from the imperfect, or with the distinction with which a higher degree differs from a lower. For justifying faith relates to dead and historical faith as the rational soul to the sensitive and vegetative, which eminently includes their power and faculties, life, sensation, and motion, and adds the degree of reason. For justifying faith also makes us believe all that is taught by the word of God, which historical faith provides. But it surpasses it in that it illuminates the theoretical mind more clearly, powerfully affects the practical aspect, and deeply penetrates; it generates a sharper sense of truth and a firmer assent in our minds than that inert and idle faith. Moreover, whatever it derives from the word of God, it refers to action, organizing life, and applies to each believer in a certain particular way.

XX. But to make it clearer and more evident what the Reformed think about the nature and essence of justifying faith, a few things they teach about its object, parts, and actions should be briefly explained. Therefore, regarding the object of salvific and justifying faith, they commonly affirm that it pertains to everything that God has revealed in His word. For that faith accepts nothing less when they are proposed, but they consider the primary and proper object of faith to be the promises of the Gospel, through which God's mercy and grace through Christ are offered to all truly believing and repenting individuals.

XXI. Thus, André Rivet in the Synopsis of Pure Theology of the Professors at Leiden says, "Although," he says, "faith, taken broadly, as it encompasses supernatural knowledge, assent, and confidence, includes everything revealed to us in God's word as conducive to salvation, there is, however, a particular object of faith insofar as it is justifying." He then explains what that special object of justifying faith is: "The special object of faith, insofar as it is justifying, and what properly distinguishes it from other understandings of faith, is the Evangelical promise about Christ the mediator. For it justifies and saves insofar as it apprehends and embraces Christ's merit, revealed to it in the Gospel word." In a Disputation on Faith, Thesis 19 and 20.

XXII. Similarly, Maresius in his System teaches that the adequate object of justifying faith is the Word of God; however, its own, special, and proximate object is the doctrine of Jesus Christ and the promise of the forgiveness of sins in His blood. In the eleventh location, Thesis 36. And in the exact same way, Henricus Altingius states that the object of faith, generally and adequately considered, is the whole Word of God and whatever it contains; but specifically and properly considered, the object is the Gospel or Christ the Redeemer, as offered in the Gospel and Sacraments. In common places, part 1, pages 218, 219. All other theologians agree with this, and there is no need to amass more testimonies.

XXIII. Moreover, Reformed theologians diligently warn that the promises of the Gospel are the object of justifying faith, not merely as their truth is considered in general, for example, that salvation and remission of sins were obtained by the death and passion of Christ for all who believe in Christ and repent; but also as they are considered to apply individually to this or that person, and are to be apprehended by faith and applied to oneself. "It is not sufficient," says Andreas Rivetus in the cited location, "if someone knows the historical account, namely, that Christ suffered, nor even if one agrees and believes that Christ suffered for the sins of all people: But in addition, a certain confidence is required, by which the sinner most firmly believes, not only that other believers are granted the remission of sins for the sake of Christ's merit but also that he himself individually is granted forgiveness and is received into grace because of His satisfaction, and that he applies this to himself with confidence.

XXIV. Wendelinus teaches similarly in Christian Theology, book 2, chapter 24, where this is his eleventh Thesis, "The proper, principal, and immediate object of Faith is the Evangelical promise of sins expiated through and for the sake of Christ's death, to all repentant and believing sinners, for the sake of Christ crucified, apprehended by faith, received into grace from mercy; this promise each believer individually applies to themselves through faith, and thus

they are said to believe unto salvation." To which he adds this explanation, "The proper object of justifying faith is Christ crucified for us, for me, for you, and the gratuitous remission of sins because of Christ's death and his blood shed for us, to be applied individually through faith; this is otherwise called special mercy."

XXV. The same teaching is held by Pareus in his first book against Bellarmine on Justification, chapter 8, where he states that the general object of faith is everything that God has revealed in His word; the specific object is the promise of special mercy. Similarly, Ames distinguishes between the object of faith that justifies, and by which it justifies. And he readily agrees that the object of faith that justifies is as broad as the word of God; but he narrows the object by which it justifies to the promise of mercy: And he grants that this mercy is special, but notes that by special mercy we do not understand that which precedes faith, but that which becomes special through faith itself. With these words, he indicates that faith does not justify a person because they believe their sins are forgiven, but because through faith they flee to Christ so that their sins may be forgiven to them in particular, and they trust they will be forgiven, through which faith they actually obtain the remission of sins. And therefore, he also says in the following that the proper object of justifying faith, as such, is not any proposition, but Christ himself, in whom one rests for obtaining justification from God. Namely, because he wants faith to truly justify, not insofar as it believes any true proposition, whatever it may be; but insofar as it takes refuge in Christ and relies on Him to obtain mercy and forgiveness of sins. In Bellarmine Overturned, book 5.

XXVI. Trelcatius, formerly a Professor at Leiden University, distinguishes the object of faith concerning the intellect and the will. "The object," he says, "in respect to the intellect, is divine truth; in respect to the will, it is God's singular grace, presented in the promises in Christ Jesus. Both are contained and circumscribed by the Word of God, which faith entirely and solely embraces as its adequate object, and in it, Christ crucified with all his benefits, as its principal, primary, proximate, and proper object." In the instruction of Common Places, under the title of Faith.

XXVII. Regarding the acts of faith, many Reformed theologians usually distinguish three acts or parts of justifying faith. The first is knowledge by which we recognize and understand the Word of God, at least in terms of what is necessary for salvation. The second is assent that we give to all that has been revealed to us in the Word of God. The third is confidence by which the believer specifically applies the general promise of the word to themselves. This is the teaching of Ursinus and Pareus in the Catechetical Explanations, question 21; of Wendelinus in Christian Theology, book 2, chapter 24, Thesis 13, 14, & 15; of Tilenus in a disputation on justifying faith, Thesis 20; and also of Trelcatius in the above-cited location.

XXVIII. Musculus likewise assigns three degrees or parts to faith but explains them differently. The first part of faith for him is by which we believe certain things about God: For example, that there is a God, that He is unique, the omnipotent creator of heaven and earth, etc. That Christ is the only begotten Son of God, true God, and true man, our Redeemer and Mediator, etc. And that the Holy Spirit is equal in divinity to the Father and Son, the illuminator

of minds, paraclete, teacher, comforter, etc. The second part of faith is by which we believe God, that is, we give credit to His word, as God's Word, of whose infallible truth it is impious to doubt. The third part of faith is by which we believe in God. To believe in God, he says, is to direct all hope to God and to depend firmly on His goodness. In common places of Sacred Theology, in the common place on Faith.

XXIX. Bucanus also teaches that there are three parts that constitute faith; however, he presents something unique in their exposition. The first part of faith for him is the knowledge of Christ crucified and His benefits. The second is consent or a double judgment: one general, affirming as true what the Word of God teaches about Christ and His benefits; the other special, by which the believer assigns to themselves those good and salvific things offered in the word, that is, judges the universal promises of the Gospel to apply to themselves; and finally, the third part is the heart's apprehension, by which with the heart and will, as with a hand, we grasp and embrace what our mind has judged to be not only true but also holy, good, and salvific, and to pertain uniquely to us. In location 29, question 6.

XXX. Perkins observes five stages in the origin of faith. The first is the knowledge of the Gospel through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, followed in all the enlightened by a general faith, which gives assent to the Gospel: The second is the hope of pardon, where the sinner, though not yet feeling their sin to be forgiven, believes it to be forgivable: The third is a hunger and intense longing for grace, which is offered in Christ Jesus: The fourth is access to the throne of grace, to find mercy with God by seizing Christ there: The fifth is a special persuasion impressed on the heart by the Holy Spirit, by which each person individually applies the evangelical promises. In The Golden Chain, chapter 36.

XXXI. Ames philosophically discusses this matter, saying that five things contribute to divine faith: 1. Knowledge of the thing attested by God; 2. A pious affection toward God, which makes His testimony most valid for us; 3. Assent given to the attested truth, because of this affection toward God, who is its witness; 4. Acquiescence in God for achieving what is proposed; 5. The choice or apprehension of the thing itself, which is presented to us in the testimony. The first, namely knowledge, is required for faith, but it does not constitute it. The third, namely assent, he considers to be the effect of faith. Therefore, he teaches that faith properly consists in the remaining three, namely in that pious affection, acquiescence in God, and the apprehension of the good that is presented to us in the Word of God. In The Marrow of Theology, book 2, chapter 5.

XXXII. Christophorus Wittichius, previously mentioned, distinguishes between acts preceding faith, essential acts of faith, and accidental acts of faith, which are only applicable to strengthened faith. According to him, the act preceding faith is the knowledge of revelation. The first essential act of faith, however, is assent, both general to all that is revealed, and special to this truth, that Christ is a sufficient savior for all who flee to Him, and therefore for me too, if I earnestly desire righteousness and wish to flee to Christ. The second essential act of faith is sincere love for Christ, which arises as soon as Christ is known as a suitable object and is thus apprehended through this fiducial assent. The third is confidence, by which we persuade

ourselves that we will receive certain aid from Christ the savior in all distresses and temptations, relying on the promises made to all who flee to Him. The accidental acts, which are only applicable to strengthened faith, are firstly, confidence in the forgiveness of sins obtained from God; secondly, solid joy arising from this feeling; thirdly, peace and tranquility of conscience. Expanding on this, he notes that for the essence of salvific faith, or its formal nature, it is not necessary to have confidence in the forgiveness of sins, either in the past or in the future, but that it is more the effect of strengthened and full faith. Because experience teaches that some weak believers truly have faith, as they have hunger and thirst for righteousness, yet due to their frailty, they cannot yet persuade themselves that they have or will obtain the forgiveness of sins. In *Theologia pacifica*, cap. 11. 2. 138.

XXXIII. And he is not alone in thinking that the certainty one has about the forgiveness of their sins, either already obtained or certainly to be obtained, does not pertain to the essence of salvific faith, but only to its completion and perfection. Perkins teaches this in several places, especially in the controversy on implicit faith, which is the sixteenth in his *Reformed Catholic*. Where he mentions a certain mode of implicit and undistinguished faith in terms of apprehension; namely, when a person cannot say for certain and distinctly about themselves, "I believe my sins are forgiven," which happens to many of God's children who are endowed with weak faith. And such have faith, but it's implicit; just as in a small and dry seed, leaves, flowers, and fruits are implicitly contained; and God nonetheless accepts such faith for their eternal salvation. Hence, he says that the instruction of some catechisms needs to be clarified, which seem to define faith in its highest and most perfect degree, when they say it is a certain and complete persuasion of the mind about God's love and favor towards us in Christ. For although, he says, all faith by its nature is a certain persuasion, only perfect persuasion is firm and consummate faith. And therefore, faith should be defined not only in general and in its highest degrees, but also its various degrees and measures should be declared; so that those who are weak can truly and correctly learn about their state. These are the same author's words, which he extensively confirms in the treatise titled *The Mustard Seed*; where after asserting that firm faith is that which causes full apprehension and persuasion of God's mercy in Christ and that this is not granted to all; therefore, there is a lower degree of faith, which is true faith, although weak and small, he adds the following words, "Whoever has this weak faith can truly affirm that they believe all their sins are forgivable: And that they desire their condemnation, but they dare not yet affirm without doubt that they have been forgiven; nevertheless, divine mercy does not fail or forsake them." To confirm this, he brings forth testimonies of Bradford, Knox, Taffin, and others. In the explanation and proof of the third Thesis.

XXXIII. Moreover, he is not the only one who believes that the certainty one has about the forgiveness of their sins, either already obtained or certainly to be obtained, does not pertain to the essence of salvific faith, but only to its completion and perfection. Perkins teaches this in several places, especially in the controversy about implicit faith, which is the sixteenth in his *Reformed Catholic*. There, he discusses a mode of implicit and indistinct faith in terms of apprehension; when, namely, a person cannot say for certain and distinctly about themselves, "I

believe my sins are forgiven," which he says happens to many of God's children who are endowed with weak faith. And such have faith, but it is implicit; just as leaves, flowers, and fruits are implicitly contained in a small and dry seed; and God nonetheless accepts such faith for their eternal salvation. Hence, he says the instruction of some catechisms, which seem to define faith at its highest and most perfect degree, as being a certain and complete mental persuasion of God's love and favor toward us in Christ, needs to be clarified. For although, he says, all faith by its nature is a certain persuasion, only perfect persuasion is firm and consummated faith. Therefore, faith should be defined not only in general and at its highest degrees but also its various degrees and measures should be declared; so that those who are weak can truly and correctly learn about their state. The same author extensively confirms this in his treatise titled *The Mustard Seed*; where, after asserting that firm faith is that which creates full apprehension and persuasion of God's mercy in Christ — and that this is not granted to all; therefore, there is a lower degree of faith, which is true faith, although weak and small — he adds the following words, "Whoever has this weak faith can truly affirm that they believe all their sins are forgivable: And that they desire their condemnation, but they dare not yet affirm without doubt that they have been forgiven; nonetheless, divine mercy does not fail or forsake them." To confirm this, he brings forth testimonies from Bradford, Knox, Taffin, and others. In the explanation and proof of the third Thesis.

XXXIV. Similarly, Ames, following in Perkins' footsteps and considering the special assent by which one grasps actual possession of grace already given, says that this particular certitude of understanding is lacking in some for a time, who nevertheless have true faith hidden in their hearts during this time, and experience teaches this. In *The Marrow of Theology*, chapter 3, the last number, and in *The Enervated Bell*, he concedes that not all justified individuals are immediately certain of their justification, book 6 on Justification, chapter 2. 11. But especially, Peter du Moulin, the son of Peter du Moulin, Doctor of Theology, and Prebendary of Canterbury, known to pious souls for his very useful book *On the Peace of the Soul* and other pious works published by him in French, clearly and openly concedes this sentiment. About him, however, the writer who accuses the Reformers of subverting Christian ethics with their doctrine of Justification, speaks disdainfully and imprudently confuses him with Louis du Moulin, his brother. Therefore, in a French treatise on the form or nature of justifying faith, he teaches that justifying faith is not accurately and prudently defined by firm confidence and full certainty by which the faithful believe their sins to be forgiven through Christ; because this firm and full certainty, regarding one's own salvation and the forgiveness of their sins, indeed indicates the supreme degree and utmost perfection of faith, but not the essential form of faith, which rather consists of these three things: 1. To embrace the merits of Christ; 2. To appropriate them for ourselves and make them our own; 3. Not to seek salvation outside Him, according to what the Belgic Confession asserts, affirming true Faith to be the one that embraces Jesus Christ with all His merits, claims Him as its own effect, and seeks nothing further outside Him. Article 22.

XXXV. Peter du Moulin the elder, the father of the aforementioned Peter du Moulin, taught his son the same in this regard; for after discussing the persuasion by which one applies

the promise of the Gospel to themselves, believing their sins to be forgiven through Christ, he adds the following words, "Yet this does not go so far as to expunge from the book of the faithful those who have not yet attained this aspect of faith, which God does not give to everyone at the same time or in the same measure. But it is to teach us that this confidence is commanded by God, to be earnestly sought from Him, and to be diligently pursued in prayer and good works to be strengthened and grown. Moreover, weak but not feigned faith has its place and is even discernible to bleary eyes. Not all who looked at the bronze serpent were equally perceptive. On Justification, part 2, Thesis 39.

XXXVI. Furthermore, the Anglican Confession of 1645 openly favors this opinion, as it discusses Salvific Faith and the certainty one has of being in God's grace in separate chapters, suggesting these are different from each other. And in chapter 18, where it discusses this certainty, it states that it is not so essential to faith that a truly faithful person cannot lack it for a long time, wait for it, and struggle with many difficulties before becoming a participant in this certainty.

XXXVII. From this, it is clear enough that not only Wittichius attributes to strengthened faith alone what makes the believer certain of the forgiveness of sins obtained or to be obtained in the future, since not only private Doctors we have cited agree with him, but also the public Confessions of the Reformers. Nor is he alone in considering sincere love of God and Christ among the essential acts of faith. Wendelinus shares this sentiment. Although he reduces the parts of faith to three - knowledge, assent, and confidence - he nevertheless teaches that love also pertains to the acts of faith. For he proves that not only the intellect but also the will is the subject of faith, "Because faith is also love, and love is an act of the will," which he supports with the testimony of Augustine saying, "To believe in Christ is to love Christ." In Christian Theology, book 2, chapter 24, in the explanation of the eighth Thesis.

XXXVIII. Similar views can be found in Chamier, who also uses the same argument to prove that faith is in the will, not just in the intellect. He says, 'All love is an act of the will; but faith is love; therefore, it is an act of the will.' He proves that faith is love because true faith is that which believes in God: But to believe in God is to love God, according to Augustine, 'What is it to believe in God? To believe is to love.' (Pancratia, Volume 3, Book 12, Chapter 4, Number 16).

XXXIX. And Wittichius himself in the previously cited place brings forward the words of Cocceius, a professor at Leiden University while he was alive. 'That faith,' he says, 'is a kind of love of God, by which I love God as the one who atones for sins and heals from the disease and penalty of sin, that I may be to His glory.' (On the last words of Moses, page 336). And in another place, 'Therefore, faith is inherently connected with charity; since faith itself is nothing but the outpouring of Christ's charity in our hearts, its sensation, and reciprocal recognition. One loves because they believe; and if they do not love, they do not believe.' (In Examen Apologiae, page 209). But many among the Reformed Theologians think differently, like Samuel Maresius, Robert Baronius, Bucanus, and ultimately all who place faith solely in the intellect, like Peter du Moulin and the Professors of Saumur. For all of them indeed teach that the love of God arises

from true faith and is an effect inseparable from it, yet they do not want it to be an act elicited by faith, as that would confuse faith with charity.

XL. But as much as Reformed Doctors seem to differ among themselves in explaining and listing the acts of salvific and justifying faith, they all agree that knowledge of the things to be believed by salvific faith is included and forms part of it, or at least, is required for it. However, by knowledge, they do not mean the knowledge properly said, which is, according to philosophers, knowledge of a thing through its cause, nor any accurate understanding of the thing, by which its manner and reason are grasped. For they recognize divine mysteries, which are presented to faith, not to be things that can be demonstrated clearly and understood accurately by us, but only known through revelation as to what the thing is, while often the cause and manner of the revealed thing remain unknown, if not to all, at least to the majority of the faithful. But by knowledge here, they only mean some apprehension and conception of the things presented in the Word of God to be believed, by which the mind in some way grasps what it is that it must assent to, and about which God in His Word provides testimony.

XLI. They also do not think it necessary for every individual's faith to explicitly and distinctly know everything conveyed and contained in God's Word. Indeed, they confess that faith can exist without the explicit knowledge of many things, and not the same measure of knowledge is demanded from everyone; but a broader and more distinct knowledge is required in a Church Teacher or Pastor than in a woman or a private believer. However, they only want all believers to have some explicit and explained knowledge concerning the main articles of faith. Nor can that faith be true and salvific, which does not distinctly grasp anything about the articles and doctrines of faith, but only vaguely believes what the Church believes; even if it does not know at all what the Church believes or ought to believe. Such faith is called by them implicit and is condemned by that name. Otherwise, they do not deny that it is sufficient for faith if the main points of salvific doctrine are known and grasped individually and explicitly, while the rest of what God's word conveys is believed at least generally and vaguely.

XLII. And yet, when they say that knowing and expressing a few main points of faith is sufficient for faith, they do not think it is pious or praiseworthy to rest in such knowledge and not seek a broader understanding. Although explicit and expressed faith in a few articles is demanded as absolutely necessary for salvation, they contend that every individual is obligated to strive to advance further in the doctrine of salvation according to their calling and to be more fully and extensively instructed in the word of God. To this end, the Apostle earnestly exhorts the faithful, as can be seen especially in the letter to the Colossians; where he wishes that they be 'instructed in love, and in all the riches of full understanding, in the knowledge of the mystery of God, both of the Father and of Christ Jesus. And he advises and commands that the word of Christ dwell in us abundantly, in all wisdom, teaching and admonishing one another in psalms, hymns, and spiritual songs': chapters 2 and 3. Hence, he severely reprimands the Hebrews in his letter to them, that although they ought to be teachers due to the time, they again need to be taught the basic elements of God's words; and they require milk, not solid food. Hebrews 5. From these, the Reformed rightly conclude that those who foster gross and stupid ignorance

among the laity under the pretext of implicit faith are seriously mistaken and erring. All these things are so clearly, openly, and unanimously conveyed by Reformed Doctors that it is hardly necessary to cite their testimonies on this matter.

XLIII. Moreover, many Doctors of the Reformed School, as we saw above, count confidence among the acts of faith; but they want it to be the proper formal and specific act of faith, and its primary part. Yet, others seem to be of a different opinion; they teach that confidence is indeed an outcome and effect of faith, but not an act of faith properly said. This is among others the opinion of Garrissoles, a professor at Montauban Academy while he was alive. 'If you ask whether faith is not confidence,' he says, 'I respond that confidence indeed adheres to faith with an indissoluble bond, yet, if we speak properly, it is not faith, but an effect, springing necessarily as it were from faith.' In the Explanation of the Catechism of Christian Religion, on the eighteenth section.

XLIV. Beza held the same opinion, writing about Paul's words in Ephesians 3, where it says, 'In whom we have boldness and access with confidence by the faith of him,' deducing that confidence differs from faith as an effect from its cause. 'From this passage,' he says, 'it is clearly apparent that confidence differs from faith as an effect from a cause, and therefore it is mistakenly substituted for faith by some, even though these two always coexist.' Peter du Moulin also teaches the same in his Second Disputation on Justification and Justifying Faith, Theses 19 and subsequent. 'We consider,' he says, 'faith and confidence to be different, and the latter to be the inseparable fruit and effect of the former.' To which Anthony Fayus adds, in Theses disputed in Geneva, Thesis 20, 'The liberty through which access to God is easy, and the confidence through which we cry Abba Father, are effects of faith.'

XLV. However, Zanchius distinguishes faith in general, as defined by him above, from confidence, and refutes those who say faith is nothing other than confidence. Because confidence relies only on promises and the Gospel; but faith also regards the law and whatever is God's word. (Volume 4, Book 1, Chapter 12, Title: On Faith). But in the same chapter, under the Title On Confidence, he teaches that the faith by which we are justified is really nothing but confidence, or at least hardly differs from it. 'Therefore,' he says, 'justifying faith and confidence are the same, or at least differ little from each other:' he demonstrates this by comparing the definition of justifying faith with that of confidence. For justifying faith, he says, is a firm and undoubted assent to God's promises about the forgiveness of sins, the receiving of righteousness, and the attainment of eternal life from God, through and because of the Son Jesus Christ, excited in us by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. And what is confidence? It is the most certain persuasion of the truth of God's promises, whereby we do not doubt that we will obtain whatever God has simply promised us in His grace: For to trust is to firmly believe and without any doubt hope that you will receive what has been promised to you by someone, or to be sure about the promised things because of the truth of the promiser. (In the Explanation of the first thesis).

XLVI. But it is important to note that confidence is understood in various ways by Reformed Doctors, and thus many of them, who seem to speak differently on this matter, actually agree with each other in essence, while others who appear to use the same language

actually differ in meaning. Christophorus Wittichius, often mentioned, who places confidence among the essential acts of faith, understands by this confidence the heart's acquiescence in God, as the author and source of salvation. To clarify this, he says it is necessary to distinguish different acts of confidence. 'Insofar,' he says, 'as confidence is understood as acquiescence in Christ and God, as the sole source and author of salvation, and as a sufficient savior for all who flee to Him, I say it absolutely pertains to the essence of faith. But if by confidence is meant the persuasion of the forgiveness of sins, whether in the past or future, I say there can be faith without it; but beyond that, those faithful are weak.' He adds that he first learned this opinion from the Reverend Widmarius, the renowned colleague of Maresius. (In *Theologia pacifica*, chapter 21, number 139).

XLVII. But undoubtedly, he later also learned this from William Ames, who philosophizes in exactly the same way about that confidence, which, according to him, is the primary and essential act of faith. 'This faith,' he says, 'by which we believe not only in God or about God but into God, is true and proper confidence; not the kind denoting a certain and absolute persuasion of a future good, but rather signifies the selection and apprehension of a sufficient and suitable means, on which such persuasion and expectation are founded.' In this sense, people are said to have confidence in their wisdom, power, friends, and resources. (In *The Marrow of Theology*, book 1, chapter 3, number 13). And later, in number 15, he adds, 'Therefore, to believe in God is to adhere to God by believing, to rely on God, to rest in God, as in our all-sufficient life and salvation.' Hence, he concludes that the general assent we give to God's word is not saving faith because it can exist without any life: the special assent, by which we determine God to be our God in Christ, is not the primary act of faith, but an act emanating from faith. For there is no greater certainty in you than in another of this truth, nor a truer apprehension of it before you have applied yourself to God in faith singularly. However, at the end of the chapter, he adds that this solid assent given to the Gospel's promises is called faith and confidence because the term is somewhat deserved, whether it is considered as a general assent, by which someone firmly believes the promises of grace made to believers and penitents to be true, or considered as a special assent, by which someone believes they are already a participant of divine grace; because, as a general assent, it begets what is properly called faith according to Ames, that is, the confidence by which someone adheres to God and leans on Him; whereas as a special assent apprehending the actual possession of grace already given, it flows from and arises from the said confidence. Therefore, in his view, the general assent is the cause of the confidence in which faith properly so-called consists, but the special assent is the effect of that faith. Both kinds of assent, however, can improperly be called faith according to that trope by which we sometimes attribute the name of the cause to the effect, and the name of the effect to the cause. The solid assent given to the Gospel's promises is called faith and confidence; partly because it begets faith as a general assent; partly because it flows from that confidence, which is a special and solid assent apprehending the actual possession of grace. Thus, the heart's confidence serves as a medium or argument, by the strength of which alone such a conclusion can be inferred.

Experience also teaches that this particular assurance of understanding is lacking for a time in some individuals, who nevertheless have true faith hidden in their hearts during this interim.

XLVIII. Ames teaches congruent lessons in his critique of Bellarmine; where he notes that the faith of special mercy is called so for two reasons. First, as it apprehends Christ, or relies on Him, to grasp the special mercy to be apprehended through Him: Second, as it apprehends the special mercy, as already granted. In the first sense, he says the faith of special mercy precedes justification, and is most properly said to justify; while the faith of special mercy, in the second sense, follows justification and is not in that respect by which we are justified through faith. There, he also explains Cardinal Contarini's words about what is meant by the apprehension with which we grasp Christ and rely on Him to obtain special mercy through Him: namely, not the apprehension related to the knowledge of the intellect, but the one by which we are said to grasp that by which we reach and attain what we touch after our movement. And he adds that many theologians describe justifying faith through the latter act of faith, by which we are made certain of the mercy and grace already granted and given to us by God in Christ because it is the same faith that applies God's mercy in Christ by apprehending and renders the application of that already made certain. And because the perfection and consolation of faith appear chiefly in this certainty, although it can be temporarily separated from faith. His understanding becomes even clearer in the following words, where he says that sins are forgiven, and we are justified through that act of confidence by which we lean on Christ or recline in God's mercy through Him; this act naturally precedes the act by which we believe our sins have already been forgiven. At the end of the chapter, he expresses surprise that a learned and sharp man, who attacked the Reformers anonymously as subverters of Christian Ethics, could trouble and misunderstand those words of Ames, 'Justifying faith precedes justification in order of nature, not time, as justification is its effect, not entirely.' As if Ames's intent wasn't clear enough that justifying faith precedes justification naturally, not temporally, due to certain acts in respect of which our justification is attributed to it as its effect, such as the confidence by which we lean on Christ and flee to Him; whereas in respect to other acts, faith does not precede but follows justification, of which the act of faith by which we are certain of Christ's merit being applied to us and that we have obtained mercy through Christ is an example.

XLIX. And since, according to Ames, that confidence by which we rely on and adhere to Christ constitutes the proper and formal act of faith that justifies, the learned man should not wonder why Ames, in the same place, states that the proper object of justifying faith, as such, is that in which faith rests to obtain justification, namely Christ or God's mercy in Christ; not a proposition or axiom. Therefore, to criticize Ames as absurd and ignorant is unwarranted. Ames' meaning is clear: the immediate and proper object of that confidence by which we rely on Christ, to which Ames attributes justification as an inherent act of faith, is Christ Himself, not the proposition 'my sins are forgiven through Christ.' Although justifying faith, having completed justification, reaches the truth and certainty of that proposition through another act. This is why Ames notes, some theologians speak as if the proposition 'my sins are forgiven through Christ' is the proper object of justifying faith.

L. But this is enough about Ames. Bishop Davenant of Salisbury, who was part of the Synod of Dort, concurs with Ames' view. He says the term 'confidence' signifies two things: the act of leaning on and adhering to Jesus Christ, by which we embrace Christ with both arms, seeking through Him forgiveness, grace, and glory from God the Father. This act always leads to justification, that is, absolution from sins and acceptance into God's grace and favor, whether the sinner at that very first moment conceives the obtained forgiveness or not. Sometimes, 'confidence' also denotes the consequent effect of justifying faith, namely the full persuasion and almost vivid sense of obtained forgiveness and divine favor. We admit this confidence is not justifying faith itself but a daughter of justifying faith, which the justified soul usually attains after many exercises of faith and holiness. Therefore, we conclude that this confidence in the Mediator, established and proposed by God in the Gospel, is that act to which God is pleased to grant the remission of sins or the justification of the sinner. In his book titled 'Determinations of Some Theological Questions,' question 37, Davenant teaches that the proper and formal act of justifying faith is that by which the sinner grasps the promise of salvation made in Christ to every believer and leans with all his heart on this Mediator to obtain the same, emphasizing that the act of faith that is always and immediately followed by justification is not mere knowledge of the divine word, nor general assent acknowledging as divinely revealed truth whatever is conveyed in the Scriptures, nor even conditional apprehension of gratuitous promises. While these acts, common to the repentant and unrepentant, prepare people to receive justification, the described confidence, by which the sinner leans on the offered Mediator and relies on Him, submitting himself to God's mercy for justification, is the ultimate act accompanied by justification itself.

LI. Peter Molinaeus, the son of Peter Molinaeus, previously mentioned, follows in these footsteps; in the aforementioned treatise on the form or nature of justifying faith, he distinguishes two types of confidence. The first is by which we flee to God and rely on Him, as mentioned in the Psalms, 'In you, Lord, I trust; I will not be dismayed forever,' Psalm 31, and in Isaiah, 'Let him trust in the name of the Lord and rely on his God.' The second is by which, with the Spirit of God bearing witness with our spirit, we trust that God is reconciled to us in Jesus Christ and that eternal life belongs to us; from this arises peace of conscience and a certain holy security. This latter confidence is born from the former, according to the Apostle, 'In whom we have boldness and access with confidence through his faith,' Ephesians 3:12. He calls the former confidence the confidence of refuge and the latter the confidence of sense. With these established, he asserts that it is not the confidence of sense, but solely the confidence of refuge—the movement of conscience that, aware of its guilt, embraces and grasps God's mercy through Christ—as the instrument of our justification and the essential form of justifying faith. This is because God's promises are made to those who come to Christ and seek and hunger for justice and God's grace in Christ, not to those who already possess Christ and have become partakers of grace. Furthermore, since the confidence of sense presupposes justification already made, it cannot be its cause or instrument. He then notes that there are two actions in faith: one direct, by which we embrace Christ and adhere to Him; and the other reflexive, by which we recognize our action

and feel that we have apprehended Christ; from this latter sense arises the subsequent confidence. And it is through the former action that we properly believe in Christ and are justified, not through the latter. Thus, there are many who truly apprehend Christ yet do not yet feel they have done so; they are nevertheless truly justified before God, even if they are not yet certain and persuaded of it, because this persuasion does not pertain to the essence of faith but only to its perfection and is a fruit and consequent of true and robust faith.

LII. And undoubtedly, this was also the view of the very famous John Mestrezat, who, as we observed above, defines justifying faith in various places as the refuge of the penitent sinner to God's mercy in Christ. Nor was it a different mindset for William Perkins, as can be seen from his teachings on the origin and stages of justifying faith. After observing four stages or movements of the heart in faith, of which the first is the knowledge of the Gospel and assent given to it by the illumination of the Holy Spirit, the second is the hope of forgiveness, where the sinner, although not yet feeling forgiven, believes forgiveness is possible. The third is a hunger and intense desire for grace offered in Christ Jesus. The fourth is the approach to the throne of grace, to find mercy with God by seizing Christ present there; he adds that this stage is immediately followed by the remission of sins before God, which is our justification. And finally, there follows the fifth and highest degree of faith, which is a special conviction imprinted on the heart by the Holy Spirit, by which each individual applies the Gospel promises to themselves. For this approach to the throne of grace, to find mercy with God by seizing Christ present there, is that very confidence of refuge we have just described, which, according to that author, is immediately followed by justification. The special conviction by which each person applies the Gospel promises to themselves is nothing other than what is called the confidence of sense, which, according to Perkins' view, follows the justification already made and, therefore, is not its instrument nor pertains to the innermost essence of faith, without which faith cannot even momentarily stand; it belongs only to faith's perfection, as we have also seen Perkins teaching above.

LIII. And it seems that what Antonius Valæus teaches in his common places, under the title 'On Our Justification Before God,' tends towards the same conclusion. After posing the objection that seems to prove faith is not confidence—If faith is the confidence in the forgiveness of sins, then we cannot be justified through faith, because justification is the effect of faith, and the effect of faith cannot be its primary object, as every object of an action precedes the potential by which it is apprehended—he responds by denying that the primary act of faith by which we are justified is the act by which forgiveness of sins is received, but rather the act by which Christ is received with His merit for the forgiveness of sins, not past but subsequent, and this is achieved not so much through particular assent as through that confidence of the will which follows general assent. We cannot, he says, assent to something unless it is true. But when we have not yet apprehended Christ through faith, it is not yet true that our sins have been forgiven, but it becomes true when we believe. Hence, according to Valæus, the confidence by which we are justified is an act of the will, not of the intellect, arising from the general assent we give to the promises of the Gospel, and preceding the special assent by which we are certain of

the forgiveness of our sins, which is not its proper and direct object, but rather Christ with His merit. This is completely in accord with the previously explained sentiment of Ames.

LIV. Nor could the intention of those who drafted the Anglican Confession in 1645 be any different. Indeed, they say the principal acts of saving faith are to accept and receive Christ, and to rest or rely solely on Him for justification, sanctification, and eternal life (chap. 4, sec. 2). Furthermore, they distinguish saving faith from the certainty that one is in God's grace, which they discuss separately in chapter 18. There, as we noted above, they state that this certainty is not so essential to faith that a true believer cannot be without it for a long time. Hence, it is clear that, according to their doctrine, that sense of confidence, which is this very certainty, is not the formal and proper act that constitutes the essence of faith since faith can exist without it, at least temporarily; but it is another kind of confidence through which we rely on Christ and rest in Him to attain mercy from God.

LV. However, other theologians of the Reformed School explain that confidence, which they say is the proper and specific act of justifying faith, in a different way: they teach that it is the persuasion by which individual believers are certain within themselves that they are pleasing and acceptable to God because of Christ's merit and that salvation and eternal life have been granted to them. This is how Wendelin explains the confidence he attributes to faith. "Confidence," he says, "is the third and principal part of justifying faith, by which we apply the general promises of the Gospel to ourselves, fully convinced that we are regarded as righteous by God because of Christ's merit and are heirs of eternal life." (Book 1, chap. 24, Thesis 15.) And in his Explanation, he adds, "In respect to this confidence, faith is called saving and justifying. For God justifies no one except those who place their confidence in Christ and firmly believe their sins to be forgiven because of His merit. Thus, to attain salvation, it is not enough to have knowledge of divine mysteries or even general assent, but confidence is also necessarily required."

LVI. Similarly, Rivetus, in the definition of faith that we previously mentioned, includes "Certain confidence by which each believer, resting in God, firmly decides that not only in general is the forgiveness of sins promised to believers, but it is also granted to him or her specifically, along with eternal righteousness and life resulting from it, out of God's mercy, for the sake of Jesus Christ alone." Sohnius, a professor of Theology at the University of Heidelberg in the previous century, says that confidence, which he considers a key part of justifying faith, is "Not only generally assenting to the promise of grace but also each of us applying that promise to ourselves, firmly establishing that it pertains to us as well, that God is propitious to us according to the promise of grace; therefore, we completely rest and rejoice in Christ, and through Christ in God." (Sohnius' Works, vol. 2, p. 789.)

LVII. Paræus also agrees, defining faith as "Certain confidence by which we rest in God, firmly establishing that not only for others in general but also for me and you in particular, forgiveness of sins, eternal righteousness, and life are granted, out of God's mercy, for the sake of Christ alone." (In book 1 of Bellarmino's Justification, chap. 4, in the Appendix.)

LVIII. And most accurately, Robert Baronius Scotus, while living and a Professor at the University of Aberdeen, elucidates his thoughts on this matter. To prevent any superficial obscurity or ambiguity, he distinguishes multiple interpretations of confidence and lists four meanings of the term. Confidence, he says, is firstly taken as a firm persuasion or a stable and solid judgment of the intellect, whereby we establish within ourselves, and believe due to God's testimony in His word, that our Lord Jesus Christ has redeemed us with His precious blood, and that God the Father, because of His merit, has forgiven all our sins; also, because of Christ's merit and His sacrifice on the cross, He will deliver us from all the miseries and calamities of this life, and will ultimately grant us His ineffable glory for eternity. Secondly, it is understood as an internal acquiescence in divine goodwill and grace, through which we completely depend on it, not expecting help or salvation from any other source. Thirdly, it denotes spiritual strength and courage, whereby we oppose our mental fortitude and robustness against the evils and dangers, whether temporal or spiritual, that we battle in this valley of tears. Fourthly, it signifies peace, tranquility, and almost a serenity of conscience, or a spiritual security, that brings rest from servile fear.

LIX. He adds that the first type of confidence serves as the basis and foundation for the following three. Because, he says, with firm persuasion and a certain judgment of the mind, we apply the Gospel's promises to ourselves, therefore we rest in God's goodwill and mercy; therefore, we valiantly fight against the world, Satan, and our own flesh; hence, finally, we have a calm and serene conscience. It's evident that although Baronius presents several notions of confidence, he nevertheless seems to omit or not fully address and correctly explain that confidence of refuge, which, according to the authors mentioned above, is the proper and formal act of justifying faith. Through this confidence, we don't just rest in divine grace and mercy as if we already partake in it, but we flee to Christ and lean on Him to become partakers of it, adhere to Him. This confidence indeed arises from the firm and solid assent we give to the Gospel promises but precedes the special assent by which we judge the promised goods to pertain to us and to already be ours, as is clear from what has been stated above. In contrast, Baronius seems to suggest that the latter three types of confidence stem from the first, which in his view, is that special assent by which we determine that God has forgiven all our sins and that we are accepted in grace because of Christ. Moreover, according to Baronius, through the second type of confidence, which comes closest to the described confidence, we rest in God's grace and mercy as if we are already certain of it, not merely fleeing to Christ to obtain it, which is characteristic of that confidence thoroughly explained by Amesius, Wittichius, and Peter Molinaeus.

LX. Regardless, after Robert Baronius presented these four interpretations of confidence, he answered the question, "Is confidence an act of faith?" with two assertions: The first is that confidence understood in the second, third, or fourth way is not an act of faith but its effect and consequence. His second assertion is that confidence, when understood in the first way, is a true and proper act of saving faith; indeed, it is its primary and specific act. In his work 'Philosophy Serving Theology,' Exercise three, Article 18.

LXI. However, in Article 20 of the same Exercise, titled "Is the object of saving faith the forgiveness of sins already obtained or rather the forgiveness to be sought and attained?" he affirms and substantiates with many arguments that the act of saving faith, which is the instrumental cause of justification, is not the confidence in forgiveness or remission of sins obtained, but rather the confidence in forgiveness to be sought. For, among other things, he says, "Whoever prays to God to forgive their sins, trusting that they are among those for whom Christ died and that God will hear their prayers because of Christ, undoubtedly obtains forgiveness of sins. Thus, there is no need to assert that the act of saving faith, which is the instrumental cause of our justification, is the confidence in obtained forgiveness."

LXII. To reconcile this with the doctrine of Article 18 as we've explained, he notes that he doesn't deny that believers have such confidence in obtained forgiveness through Christ's merit or that this confidence isn't an act of saving faith. But what he insists on is that this confidence in obtained forgiveness is not the act of faith that serves as the instrumental cause of our justification since it is by nature posterior to justification and thus follows it. He concludes about the object of saving faith that firstly, it should be held that the object of confidence is not only the forgiveness of sins to be sought and obtained but also the forgiveness already obtained. Secondly, that confidence in this context directs towards two distinct acts, one preceding justification as its instrumental cause and the other following it as its effect and consequence. Thirdly, the confidence act preceding justification as its cause is the persuasion of Christ's atonement for us specifically and of obtaining forgiveness through and because of His atonement. Fourthly, the confidence act following justification is the persuasion of having obtained forgiveness of sins and of our perseverance in that state until life's end. Finally, in concluding the Article, responding to a certain argument of Bellarmine, he says that justifying faith precedes justification, but not according to all its acts since some acts of justifying faith follow justification. Similarly, the faith of special mercy is posterior to justification, but not according to all its acts, for the persuasion of seeking or obtaining forgiveness is an act of this faith, which precedes justification, at least in the order of nature.

LXIII. In a similar manner, many other theologians distinguish various acts within the confidence they sometimes call the faith of special mercy; they note that some acts precede justification, while others do not. This can be seen in Wendelinus, who says, "As for special mercy, insofar as it precedes justification (if it does precede in time and not just in order), a person does not believe that his sins have already been forgiven prior to the act of faith concerning application; but he believes that the forgiveness of sins obtained through Christ's merit will also come to him. In the act of justification itself, he believes his sins are forgiven, and thus he receives forgiveness of sins: hence it is expressly said in Acts 26 that the forgiveness of sins is received through faith. After justification, he believes in the past application; he also believes that his future sins will be forgiven through future application. Therefore, justifying faith has as its special object the future, present, and past forgiveness of sins." - Christian Theology, book 2, chapter 24, thesis 11.

LXIV. This is also the doctrine of the Professors of Leiden, critiqued in the eleventh chapter of the Remonstrants' Confession, whose author is Andreas Rivetus. They say, "We do not say that the confidence by which we are justified is the forgiveness of sins already perceived, nor that the object of this confidence is the forgiveness of sins previously perceived; but that confidence by which we each believe our sins are forgiven in the present, not properly in the past or future, although both pertain to justifying faith, but not to the high, so to speak, formal aspect of justifying. When, therefore, the Gospel word offers mercy and forgiveness of sins through Christ to every believer, faith does not only believe in general that this is true, that sins will indeed be forgiven to all who truly believe in Christ, but also the believer confidently persuades himself that this promise applies to him, and by that act of confidence, he is then forgiven his sin, and it becomes his happiness mentioned by the Apostle in Romans 4:7. Just as by extending a hand and accepting a gift, the beneficiary who has approached becomes a participant. Thus, in a faithful person, there are simultaneously forgiveness of sins and confidence about that forgiveness; and by the faith through which that mercy and special grace were received, it is afterward retained, and what was believed about the future is embraced in the present, and what about the past remains certain afterward. But one who believes he will be justified if he believes in Jesus Christ is not yet justified in the past unless he believes in the present that righteousness is given to him, which he receives by the same act. What is later believed about the past does not justify him but presupposes him as justified. All these acts are of the same justifying faith, the first indeed predisposes to justification, the second properly justifies, the third pacifies the conscience."

LXV. Samuel Maresius also teaches clearly in his System, in the eleventh place, Thesis 57. He says, "A threefold act of faith is to be considered and distinguished in justification: One is dispositional, by which I believe that Christ by His merit is the forgiveness of sins, according to the teaching of the Gospel, and thus my sins will also be forgiven me if I repent and truly rest in Christ's merit. And when this act of faith is accompanied by our misery recognized from God's law, and that hunger and thirst for righteousness, about which Matthew 5:6 speaks, the accused is thus put in a state, as the Pragmatists say, to receive and hear his absolving sentence. Therefore, as faith regarding this act precedes actual forgiveness of sins in the forum of heaven and conscience, so it is also required in the Word to obtain it. The second is formally justifying, by which, when the justifying and absolving sentence is pronounced and made known to me by the spirit of adoption, I believe in the present for me, sorrowing over sin and henceforth promising serious amendment, that God through Christ has forgiven all my sins, both those I have committed so far and those into which I may fall due to weakness in the future; and that God will never impute them to me for condemnation but, attributed with my Savior's righteousness, will regard me as innocent and certainly grant eternal life. And this act is simultaneous with the actual justification and forgiveness of sins. The third is consolatory, by which in the past I believe all my sins have already been forgiven me, and I am no longer under any condemnation, as Paul says in Romans 8:1, and I trust that the absolution previously made known to me will be extended and applied by God's mercy to daily sins of intrusion, for which I also daily seek

forgiveness in that sense in the Lord's Prayer. And this act of faith follows justification and forgiveness of sins. Hence it is clear in what sense and to what extent faith is a condition sought for it; for in the first sense, faith relates to justification antecedently, in the second simultaneously, in the third consequentially.

LXVI. Similar views are seen in Paraeus. He states, "For faith, termed special mercy, naturally precedes justification in a repentant sinner, as seen in the tax collector who first pleads for mercy through faith; 'God, be merciful to me a sinner,' meaning, he trusts he will receive forgiveness of sins. This faith also accompanies justification; during the act of justification, he trusts that his sins are forgiven. Furthermore, it follows justification; for, justified, he descends to his house with the same confidence that his sins have been forgiven. Hence, he later infers that the special object of justifying faith is the promise of the Gospel about the future, present, and past, to each one, to me, to you, to him, believing in the Son, through faith in His blood, sins will be, are being, and have been forgiven." And he concludes, "Thus, before the act of justification, I mean by nature, not by time, our faith or confidence has this proposition about the future as its object, 'to me believing, sins will be forgiven.' In the act of justification, this is about the present, 'sins are being forgiven to me;' after the act of justification, this is about the past, 'sins have been forgiven to me.'"

LXVII. From this, it's evident that when these theologians define faith through certain confidence by which each faithful person firmly establishes, not only in general is forgiveness of sins promised to believers, but it is specifically granted to him or her personally, as done by Andreas Rivetus, or even when they say such confidence is the true and proper act of saving faith, indeed its main and specific act, as stated by Robertus Baronius, their intention isn't that this belief in our sins being forgiven is the act through which we are justified. Instead, they describe faith in this way because such belief is a characteristic of true faith, inherently capable of producing it and related to its perfection. And since this belief is indeed an act of justifying faith, distinguishing it from dead and historical faith, and is crucial for the peace and tranquility of believers, as well as nurturing piety, although it follows, not precedes justification, nor is it the instrument of justification, but rather a consequence.

LXVIII. If one were to ask why they define justifying faith by an act that truly doesn't justify but follows the already made justification, they seem driven to this because this subsequent act presupposes the preceding one and more clearly explains the perfection of faith and greatly contributes to the comfort of believers. Particularly because the certainty they attribute to the faithful regarding their grace and justification was mainly challenged by the Roman Church's doctors they were disputing with. Amelius hints at this when he says, "Because the same faith that specially applies mercy in Christ by apprehending, and makes that application already made certain, and because its perfection or consolation appears in this certainty, which even the enemies of grace chiefly attack, therefore, many describe justifying faith through this certainty (which, however, in terms of sensation, can be temporarily separated from faith)."

LXIX. Yet, among the Reformers, there are those who seem to concede that the act of faith by which we are justified is the belief that our sins have been erased and forgiven through

Christ. They don't see a contradiction in saying that God forgives us our sins and erases our sins because we believe they have been forgiven and erased. But they note that our sins can be said to be erased in two ways: first, regarding God's decree and Christ's death already completed based on that decree; second, regarding the effective application, both on Christ's part who grants forgiveness of sins and on the believers' part who receive it through faith. Thus, their understanding is that we are granted and applied forgiveness of sins because we embrace Christ with certain confidence and are persuaded that Christ, according to God's decree, has erased and atoned for our sins with his death. This is the teaching of Henricus Altingius.

LXX. Chamierus straightforwardly admits that our sins are forgiven before we believe and that faith follows justification. Yet, the faith by which we believe our sins have already been forgiven is said to justify because it occurs in the justified and is required by the justified; hence, no one who is indeed rational is justified unless he possesses this faith, and no one has this faith unless they are justified.

LXXI. Peter Molinaeus, often cited and Professor of Theology at the Academy of Sedan, seems to share this view. He considers justification to be from eternity and different from regeneration, which occurs in time and has a beginning. Discussing man's justification before God, he mentions, "It is from eternity, part of the decree of election, although its awareness is given to the faithful at a certain time. In contrast, regeneration happens in time, starting with the first sparks of faith and the initial movements of repentance." Thus, according to his hypothesis, a sinner's sins are forgiven before they believe, and faith justifies only because through faith we are aware of justification.

LXXII. However, he distinguishes this conviction from the confidence that arises from it, which he considers a constant companion of justifying faith, not the faith itself, but an inseparable effect of faith. By confidence, he means a firm hope, a kind of constancy, security, and tranquility of the mind, opposite to terror and trepidation, through which, as he puts it, terrors are dispelled, and the will is composed in peaceful joy, allowing the faithful to address God intimately and with great freedom.

LXXIII. Beza and Garissolius, among others we have cited, who agree with him, teach that this confidence is not a part of faith but merely an inseparable effect that, while closely linked with faith, is distinct from it. Hence, Molinaeus, Beza, and Garissolius essentially agree with those theologians who do consider confidence an essential part of faith but understand by confidence a certain conviction where the faithful are fully persuaded of God's grace and benevolence towards them, and judge that the promises in the Gospel particularly apply to themselves. While these theologians also recognize this conviction as part of faith, they prefer not to call it confidence, reserving that term for the tranquility, freedom, and steadfastness arising from such persuasion about God's benevolence towards us. Thus, while they agree in substance, they differ only in their mode of expression.

LXXIV. From what has been presented, it's evident that according to the general consensus among Reformers, justifying faith involves specifically applying the general word of the Gospel and promises of grace to each believer. However, not all Reformed scholars interpret

and understand this application in the same way. Many speak as if by this application they mean nothing other than the judgment by which the faithful determine that the good promised and offered in the Gospel specifically applies to them, and that they are and will be partakers of these benefits, as exemplified by notable figures like Peter Molinaeus, Ursinus, Paraeus, and Daniel Tilenus.

LXXV. Some, like Robert Baronius, expressly teach that the faithful, or the reborn, apply Christ's merit and God's mercy to themselves through not one but two acts. The first act is a certain conviction or judgment of the mind relying on God's testimony, by which we establish that our Savior Jesus Christ has fully atoned for our sins, and consequently, not only for others but also for us, forgiveness of sins, eternal justice, and life have been granted, all freely out of God's mercy, due to the merit of Christ alone. The subsequent act of grace is an ardent love by which the will embraces God's grace, earnestly seeking a more perfect sense of this grace in this life and a clear vision of God in the future. These are Baronius' words in '*Philosophia Theologiae ancillante*', Exercise 3, Article 19. He also teaches that both these acts are required for confidence because no one can be said to have confidence or trust in obtaining a good unless they possess a firm conviction in the intellect and a desire or love for that good in the will. However, according to him, the former act is the essence or the formal reason for confidence, while the latter is just an accompanying and concomitant act. Hence, he predominantly teaches that grace's application occurs through the former act.

LXXVI. Similarly, Bucanus teaches that Christ is applied to us not only through judgment and approval of the mind but also through the desire and apprehension of the heart, as evident from his definition of faith we previously mentioned. Namely, he says, "Faith is, from the knowledge and approval of the mind and a special judgment, a desire and apprehension of the will or heart, by which we individually apply to ourselves Christ crucified and his benefits offered in the Word and Sacraments." This view aligns with Baronius and Bucanus with all those who count love and desire among the acts of justifying faith, like Wendelinus, Chamierus, and others.

LXXVII. Others, speaking more distinctly on this matter, teach that indeed, after justification, a believer applies divine promises to themselves through a certain conviction that the promised goods pertain to them. However, a penitent sinner, before justification, applies the same promises through that trust by which they flee to God's glory and mercy in Christ, earnestly seeking and desiring it with their whole heart, and, relying on God's goodness and faithfulness, expects from God through Christ liberation from their evils and the communication of saving good. This is the teaching of Perkins, Davenant, Amesius, Wittichius, and many others, who understand by this trust, which they deem the most crucial part of faith, the aforementioned movement of the spirit.

LXXVIII. Finally, there are those who believe that this application, by which living and saving faith is distinguished from historical and dead faith, should not be limited to the Gospel's promises, though they are its primary and chief object. Faithful individuals through true faith, by which they are saved and justified, apply not only the promises of grace to themselves but also

everything else contained in God's word, each in its own way. This application consists in the true believer practically considering everything taught in the word of God, referring it to their personal action and use. Thus, for instance, they believe in the Gospel's promises of forgiveness of sins and eternal happiness and glory, firmly and effectively judging that their highest good and bliss, which they should wholeheartedly aspire to, are situated therein. They apply faith to the mysteries of our Redemption, fully believing that they should seek consolation and peace of conscience in them. Finally, they consider divine commandments in such a way as to firmly decide and constantly propose to lead their life according to these commandments.

LXXIX. And this opinion on the application through faith seems to have been held by those who published the Confession of Faith in England some years ago, as can be inferred from their description of saving faith we have previously presented. According to their view, through this faith, a Christian truly believes whatever is revealed in God's word, due to the authority of God himself speaking in the word, and acts and is affected differently concerning each thing that the word contains; obedient to the commands, trembling at the threats, and embracing the promises of God, both concerning this life and the one to come. But the main acts of this saving faith are to accept and receive Christ, and to rest in Him alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life.

LXXX. So, if someone asks what is the proper and essential act of saving faith, according to the understanding of those scholars, the answer would be that this act is the practical assent given to the entire word of God, specifically to the promises of the Gospel. This view aligns with Joshua Placaeus in his Theses of Saumur, where, as we have seen, faith is defined by him as "A tenacious and effective persuasion of the truth of those things which are revealed to us in the Word of God, especially the promise of the forgiveness of sins and eternal life obtained for us through Christ." And also with Peter Martyr, for whom faith is an assent given to God's word, which is so powerful and effective that it brings with it a feeling of trust, hope, love, and all good works, as far as the weakness of this life permits. Lastly, with Wolfgang Musculus, who defines faith as a "Steadfast assent of the heart to those things which are either narrated or promised in the Word."

LXXXI. To open up our position on each of these points we have so far presented, and where Reformed scholars seem to differ in opinion, we affirm, according to the common view of the Reformers, that historical faith must be carefully distinguished from saving and justifying faith, and there's a significant difference between the two. Historical faith is a mere and simple assent given to the Word of God; although it stems from the Holy Spirit, it remains theoretical, resting solely in the intellect and not moving the will and affections. In contrast, saving faith not only illuminates the theoretical mind but also affects the practical mind, moving the will and affections, and consequently, this saving faith refers what the Word of God teaches to the believer's use and applies God's promises specifically to the believer, which historical faith does not do; for it contemplates what it believes passively, as things not pertaining to oneself.

LXXXII. The Reformed scholars dispute whether historical faith and justifying faith are subcategories of the same generic or at least analogous category, or are they merely different

connotations of a homonymous term? However, we consider this question purely philosophical. As long as the distinction between historical faith and justifying faith is clear, the specific philosophical terms used to describe this difference are of little consequence to theology. But if we wish to use philosophical terms according to the convention in academic circles, I see no reason why historical faith and justifying faith cannot be considered subcategories of the same genus. They share not just a common name but also a concept represented by that name, as both involve a certain assent given to God speaking, illuminated by the Holy Spirit.

LXXXIII. We also demonstrated that justifying faith is described and defined in various and differing ways by the Reformed. This diversity primarily arises because many in their definitions omit what justifying faith shares with historical faith and choose to highlight only the aspects by which justifying faith differs from historical faith. For instance, some definitions do not mention the assent justifying faith gives to the entire Word of God as revealed and presented. Furthermore, some describe justifying faith from one characteristic, while others focus on a different aspect.

LXXXIV. For example, Calvin, Beza, and some common catechisms describe faith solely from the perspective of that trust or conviction, which saving and justifying faith carries regarding God's grace and benevolence towards us. To Calvin and Beza, as mentioned before, justifying faith is a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevolence towards us, grounded on the truth of the free promise in Christ, revealed to our minds and hearts by the Holy Spirit. A brief common catechism defines faith as the certain assurance or conviction every Christian should have that God the Father loves them because of His Son, Jesus Christ. This approach closely aligns with the definitions by renowned individuals like Peter Molinaeus, Samuel Maresius, and Henry Alting, where faith is described as a firm assent to the Gospel's promises, involving a personal application of these promises.

LXXXV. Others define faith by another act, namely, the trust by which a penitent sinner turns to God, adheres to Him, and relies on Him to obtain mercy through Christ. For Amesius, faith is defined as the heart's acquiescence in God as the author of life or eternal salvation, through whom we seek liberation from all evil and attainment of all good. Wittichius describes it as a hunger and thirst for righteousness and heart's acquiescence in God as the source and author of salvation, where we commit our souls to Him in difficulties and temptations. And for John Mestrezat, faith is the penitent sinner's refuge in God's mercy in Christ.

LXXXVI. Although in their definitions, these theologians do not mention the assent saving faith gives to the entire Word of God, they acknowledge such an assent is included in or required for faith, as clearly shown in our previous discussions. Similarly, those who define faith from the perspective of the conviction a believer has of God's grace and benevolence do not deny that faith includes the trust by which one adheres to God and seeks His mercy. Conversely, those defining faith from this trust do not deny that it leads to and includes the conviction of God's love and benevolence.

LXXXVII. However, it is inadequate and imperfect to define justifying faith merely as a firm conviction of God's benevolence and mercy towards us and that the good things promised in

the Gospel pertain to us. This conviction is not the act by which we are justified but follows after justification has occurred. It is against reason to define justifying faith by an act that presupposes already completed justification rather than by the act that justifies us, especially an act without which faith can exist, albeit weakly, and from which it can be separated. Moreover, it is illogical to describe justifying faith solely by one act when other equally necessary acts contribute to it. This is also where those err who define faith only by the trust through which we turn to God and seek His grace.

LXXXVIII. Therefore, we prefer those definitions that fully and distinctly explain and declare the nature of justifying faith. Such is the description of Faith found in the Anglican Confession of 1645, stating that saving faith is by which a Christian truly believes whatever is revealed in the Word of God, due to the authority of God himself speaking in the Word, and acts and is affected differently concerning everything that this Word contains; obeying the commandments, trembling at the threats, and embracing God's promises, both for this life and the future. But the principal acts of this faith are to accept and receive Christ and to rest in Him alone for justification, sanctification, and eternal life, by the virtue of the covenant of grace.

LXXXIX. But the most convenient, fullest, and at the same time, briefest definition seems to be the one previously mentioned by Joshua Placaeus, where justifying faith is a tenacious and effective persuasion of the truth of what has been revealed to us by the Word of God, especially the promise of the forgiveness of sins and eternal life obtained for us through Christ. By stating that this faith is a persuasion of the truth of what has been revealed to us by the Word of God, he expresses everything that this faith has in common with historical faith. When he adds that this persuasion is tenacious and effective, he encompasses everything that distinguishes justifying faith from historical faith. Placaeus' definition coincides with the previously mentioned description by Peter Martyr, who says Faith is a firm and certain assent to the Word of God, inspired by the Divine Spirit, for the salvation of believers. He explains firm assent through its power and efficacy to bring along a sense of trust, hope, charity, and all good works as the present weakness of life permits. And also the definition by Wolfgang Musculus, who defines faith as a constant assent of the heart to what is either narrated or promised in the Word. In my own words, I would say saving faith is a firm, practical, and trusting assent given to all that is revealed by God, especially to the promises of the Gospel.

XC. Regarding the object of saving faith, it has been observed that many Reformed Doctors distinguish between its adequate, generic, and common object, and its own, specific, or particular object. The generic and common object is said to be the entire Word of God or whatever is revealed by God to the believer. The specific object is the promises of the Gospel. To understand this correctly, it should be noted that when the Reformed say the specific and proper object of saving and justifying faith is the Gospel promises, they do not mean that this object is so specific to justifying faith that it is not also the object of historical faith. For historical faith, according to their hypothesis, believes the promises of God to be true, just as much as it believes the histories narrated in the Word of God. But they teach that the Gospel promises are the specific object of justifying faith because faith, as it saves and justifies, properly

revolves around those promises. This is what others mean when they say the entire Word of God is the object of the faith that justifies, but the Gospel promises are the object of it as it justifies.

LXXXVIII. Nevertheless, when it is said that faith, as it justifies and saves, primarily deals with the Gospel promises, it should signify mainly and principally, not exclusively. For faith, as it saves and justifies, does not deal only with those promises. Faith is said to save and justify as it is the condition of the covenant of grace, where God no longer demands from us, under the penalty of eternal death and curse, the perfect and absolute observation of the law in all its details as the covenant of works required, but instead requires living faith, which works through love. While the Law of Moses says, "do and live," the Gospel says, "believe and be saved." However, the faith that the Gospel demands as the condition under which it offers us salvation, does not only regard the promises of the Gospel but also its commands and doctrines, such as the Resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ, as is evident from the words of Paul, "If you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus and believe in your heart that God has raised Him from the dead, you will be saved." Therefore, the faith by which God, for Christ's sake, absolves us from sins and regards us as just is not just the mental and volitional act by which we embrace the promises of grace but also the act by which we assent to the Gospel mysteries as true. Therefore, we do not approve of those who seem to restrict the object of justifying faith to the promise of grace, although this promise is its primary object.

XCII. When many Protestants say that special mercy is the proper object of justifying faith, they mean nothing other than that it is proper for justifying faith, as distinguished from historical faith, to individually apply divine promises of mercy to each believer in such a way that before justification one trusts that their sins will be forgiven, and after justification believes their sins have been forgiven. But since this way of speaking is obscure and open to misinterpretation, I would prefer, as many do, to avoid it and simply say the primary object of justifying faith is the promises of grace, as they are to be apprehended and applied by the believer with practical and trusting assent, which comes down to the same thing.

XCIII. Regarding the parts or acts of faith, we also saw that Reformed Scholars do not agree on what they are and how many there are, enumerating them in various ways. First, there is a question about knowledge, as distinguished from assent, meaning a certain apprehension and pre-conception of the thing to be believed, whether it is a constituting part of faith, as Bucanus and others think, or only a prerequisite and antecedent act of faith, which is the opinion of William Ames and Christoph Wittich. We lean towards the latter opinion. Although no one can rightly believe without some knowledge and conception of what is to be believed, faith does not consist in that knowledge, which can exist without any faith in a purely secular mind, and in which no one can truly say there is even the slightest beginning of faith, as many atheists are not ignorant of what Christians are required to believe.

XCIV. Regarding assent itself, some doubt whether it is a formal and essential act of faith, as we observed about Ames, who teaches that assent is an act of faith, not faith itself, which he rather locates in certain acts of the will that we previously listed. But Ames departs from the common teaching of the Reformed School, which, along with all other Christian

schools, asserts that assent is part of the essence of faith. And indeed, who could reasonably deny that to believe the Gospel as it ought to be believed is an act of faith? But to believe the Gospel as it ought to be believed is nothing other than to assent to it in the proper way. And does not Paul himself explicitly include belief that God raised Jesus from the dead as an act of saving faith?

XCV. Similarly, there is doubt about whether love is a formal and essential act of faith. Esteemed scholars such as Chamier, Wendelin, Wittich, and Cocceius assert it, while others deny it. For my part, I think some distinction is necessary here. Faith can be taken in two ways. First, precisely, according to what it has distinct from hope, charity, and other Christian virtues. In this sense, love is not a formal act of faith but pertains to another virtue, namely, charity. Secondly, faith is taken for a composite of several acts or habits, which are included under the term "faith working through love." This is how many Reformed authors understand faith in this question, not as a single act or simple habit but as a complex of several acts or habits. From this, it follows that sincere love of God and Christ, without which faith cannot be conceived as living and working through love, undoubtedly belongs to faith as an essential act.

XCVI. Among the Reformed School, theologians discuss trust in various ways: while some, as previously seen, consider trust to be a primary part of faith and its inherent act, others deny this, teaching that trust is indeed the offspring and effect of faith but not its proper act. Moreover, trust is understood differently by different authors. First, trust is understood as the act through which we rely on God, lean on Him, and adhere to Him as the source and author of salvation, to obtain life and salvation from Him. Second, for many, trust signifies a firm belief in the grace and forgiveness obtained from God and in our reconciliation with Him. Third, trust is taken for spiritual fortitude and courage, whereby we oppose our mental strength and robustness to the evils and dangers we face in this mortal life. Lastly, trust is taken for the serenity and tranquility of conscience, or a kind of spiritual security, which opposes servile fear.

XCVII. Regarding trust understood in the third and fourth ways, there should be no doubt that they are only the fruits and effects of faith, not parts that constitute faith or acts of faith per se. All Reformed Scholars agree on this.

XCVIII. As for trust in the first sense, that is, the act by which we rely on and turn to God to obtain life and salvation, the same should be said as about love: it is not a formal act of faith if faith is precisely understood and distinguished from all other virtues. But if faith is considered as the aggregate of various acts that are designated under the name of living faith, which works through love, there is no doubt that this kind of trust is part of it and is included within it.

XCIX. The main question, however, is about trust understood in the second way, namely, the firm conviction that one has obtained grace from God and that the promises of the Gospel apply to oneself. Many, as we have shown above, define faith from this trust, speaking as if salvific and justifying faith could not exist without it, calling it the primary part of faith and the principal and specific act of justifying faith, as seen in the previously cited views of Robert Baronijs, Rivet, Ursinus, Pareus, Wendelinus, and several others. Others argue that such trust and conviction relate to the perfection of faith but not to its inner essence; they are present in

robust faith but not in weak faith, many justified believers lack this trust; hence they call it an accidental and not essential act of faith, not primary but secondary, not direct but reflex, and they consider it more correctly as a fruit and effect of faith rather than its main act. This is evident from the detailed quotes we cited from Perkins, Ames, Davenant, Wittich, Widmar, Peter du Moulin the son, and the English Confession itself of 1645.

C. We also embraced the latter opinion in theses published in previous years, and we believe it must be held. The conviction that one has reconciled with God and has been accepted by Him through Christ is not the primary and essential act of faith, but only a secondary and accidental one, can be clearly proven and demonstrated. No one can truly and legitimately persuade themselves of this or firmly establish it unless they first reflect on themselves, scrutinize and examine their conscience, recognizing and perceiving true and living faith in themselves based on its characteristics outlined in Scripture. Such conviction, without some special and extraordinary revelation, cannot be true unless it is the conclusion of a syllogism: "Whoever believes in Christ with living and operative faith is reconciled with God and accepted by Him through Christ. And as I examine my conscience, I recognize such faith in myself. Therefore, I am reconciled with God and accepted by Him through Christ." Therefore, this conviction presupposes the existence of faith already in the heart and thus cannot constitute its essence.

CI. Moreover, experience attests that many devout and God-fearing people, who do not doubt the truth of God's Word and the promises contained therein, and who constantly and earnestly turn to God, pleading for His grace and mercy, are not yet certain of having obtained it; they are troubled by various scruples, anxious about their own disposition, and doubt whether their faith and repentance are serious and genuine enough. There's certainly no reason to exclude these individuals from the truly faithful. Nor does it seem possible to comfort and uplift their afflicted consciences unless we teach them that this faith through which they turn to God, thirst for, and implore His grace is that very faith to which God has promised the forgiveness of sins and salvation. Advising them simply to be certain of God's grace, as if true faith could not exist without this certainty, would only pave the way to despair.

CII. Additionally, there's a specific question about the act through which faith justifies and the reason why justification is attributed to faith. For those who teach that the firm conviction that Christ has redeemed us with His precious blood and that God, due to His merit, has forgiven all our sins, is the primary and specific act of justifying faith, acknowledge nevertheless that this conviction is not the act through which faith justifies but follows upon justification already granted, as shown above regarding Robert Baronius, Rivetus, Wendelinus, Marelius, and Pareus. Although they describe faith through the trust that we are certain of God's grace towards us and believe our sins have been forgiven through Christ, they also teach that this conviction is not the act through which we are justified.

CIII. However, Chamierus and some others believe that justification is attributed to faith because of the act through which we believe our sins have been forgiven. But this view is entirely contrary to the truth. How can we be justified through an act that presupposes

justification has already occurred? But the trust by which we are convinced our sins have been forgiven presupposes that justification has already occurred, as a person to whom sins are forgiven and pardoned is already justified. Chamierus concedes that a person is justified and sins are forgiven before they believe. But this contradicts the entire Scripture, which consistently teaches that God's wrath remains on those who do not believe, and faith and repentance are the conditions under which forgiveness of sins is promised to us, without which it cannot be obtained.

CIV. Chamierus's argument that faith is said to justify because all who are justified eventually partake in it, and none is found justified without it, does not resolve the difficulty. By the same logic, we could also be said to be elected to grace through faith and good works because all who are elected to grace eventually exhibit faith and good works, and no one has faith and good works who is not also elected to grace.

CV. Therefore, several Reformed School theologians, understanding the essence of this argument, deny that the conviction through which one firmly believes their sins have been forgiven through Christ is the act by which faith is said to justify, although they describe this conviction as a proper and specific act of justifying faith and make prominent mention of it in the definition of faith. Here too they deviate from sound reasoning. It does not make sense to say that an act that does not justify is the proper and specific act of justifying faith, distinct from historical and non-justifying faith, and to define saving faith by an act that arises from it and emanates indeed but does not constitute its essence and only pertains to its perfection.

CVI. To explain how this trust, which individually applies the promises of grace to each believer, is the act through which we are justified, they distinguish a threefold act within this trust, as we've outlined previously. The first act is where we believe that in the future, our sins will be forgiven; the second is where we believe in the present, our sins are being forgiven; the third is where we believe in the past, our sins have been forgiven. According to them, the first act disposes one towards justification but doesn't justify until it persists; the second act receives forgiveness of sins and justifies; the third perceives and feels the justification already made, from which arises its consolation. Hence, they say the first act is dispositional towards justification, the second is formally justificatory, and the third is consolatory. This seems to be why they state that the latter is prominent in faith because it most directly and significantly contributes to the comfort of believers' souls.

CVII. However, they seem to philosophize too subtly and less solidly here. According to Reformed doctrine, a person's justification occurs instantaneously, hence at an instant. Justification is based on the moment the sinner fulfills the condition God requires for sins to be forgiven, ceasing to be subject to divine wrath and beginning to be gracious to God and accepted for eternal life, through Christ's merit and satisfaction. But how can a person precisely observe and note that instant when that condition is first fulfilled in them, forming the last and closest disposition to justification, to believe in the present that sins are being forgiven to them? And if a person's justification requires believing in the present that their sins are being forgiven, what

scruples must it cast on many pious and good men who could never notice that instant when their sins were being forgiven in the present?

CVIII. Furthermore, it is absurd to suggest that a person is justified through something that does not precede justification but only follows what has already been done. Hence, while this intricate distinction might explain how trust, which applies the promises of grace to each believer, is the act through which we are justified, it does so in a way that is overly complex and lacks solidity.

CIX. Among the acts of faith, some are more directly, others more remotely, preparatory to justification. In Reformed theology, when it's asked which act is the one through which we are justified, the essence of the question is: by virtue of which act is faith that ultimate and proximate disposition, upon which justification immediately and infallibly follows? Rivetus, Wendelinus, Paræus, and Marefius regard this act as the confidence through which we persuade ourselves that our sins are specifically forgiven in the present; a stance I cannot agree with due to the reasons already mentioned.

CX. The opinion of Robert Baronius seems more plausible, who teaches that the act of saving faith, which serves as the instrumental cause of justification, is the confidence of obtaining forgiveness. However, others dispute this if by confidence we mean a certain conviction derived from faith. They deny that a certain conviction about the remission of sins, whether past or future, is an essential act of justifying faith, as seen in the writings of Wittichius. Although they don't deny that hope of obtaining forgiveness or the confidence that is referred to in schools as '*fiducia spei*' has a place among the acts required for a person's justification.

CXI. Therefore, the view of Amesius, Davenantius, Petrus Molinaeus the son, and many others previously mentioned holds more probability. They identify the principal and specific act of justifying faith, to which justification is properly attributed, as the confidence with which we adhere to God, rely on Him, and seek His mercy to obtain grace and forgiveness. But to candidly express my opinion on this matter, I don't think the acts of saving faith should be so dissected and separated that justification is attributed to one, excluding the others. Indeed, the described confidence is part of that ultimate and proximate disposition promised for justification, upon which it is immediately and infallibly established. However, it alone does not constitute it, as other acts also pertain to this disposition.

CXII. Then, it seems somewhat uncertain when they distinguish between the act that predisposes one to justification and the act they say is formally justifying. According to the Reformed perspective, faith does not justify as a sort of form through which we are justified but rather as an instrument grasping Christ's merit, as many say, or as a condition of the covenant of grace, which God counts as righteousness for Christ's sake, as others prefer to say. These views, upon closer examination, converge to the same point. No one would say faith is a physical instrument of our justification; it can only intervene as a moral instrument. But faith can't be a moral instrument of justification unless in the sense that God has promised forgiveness of sins to believers, which cannot be attained without the intervention of a living and effective faith. This

is essentially the same as being a condition of the covenant of grace, wherein God offers grace and glory to believers and repentants.

CXIII. There's also a specific question about the act through which faith justifies and the reason why justification is attributed to faith. Even those who define faith through the trust by which we are certain of God's grace toward us and believe our sins have been forgiven through Christ acknowledge that this conviction is not the act through which faith justifies.

CXIV. Chamierus and some others contend that justification is attributed to faith because of the act through which we believe our sins have been forgiven. However, this stance seems to conflict with the core essence of faith and justification. How can we be justified by an act that presupposes justification has already occurred?

CXV. Some Reformed theologians argue that the firm conviction of having been reconciled with God and forgiven of sins is a product of faith, not its primary act, distinguishing between acts that prepare for justification and the act through which one is justified.

CXVI. Among these various perspectives, some find more plausibility in the view that faith justifies as it adheres to God, relies on His mercy, and seeks grace and forgiveness.

CXVII. Ultimately, the formal and proper act of saving faith, through which Scripture says we are justified, might be more broadly conceived, encompassing several particular acts that constitute this faith.

CXIII. In my opinion, the formal act of saving and justifying faith, seen as the condition under which we're immediately disposed toward justification, could be a practical and trustful assent to all of God's Word, especially to the promises of the Gospel.

CXIV. Thus, I also lean towards the view that the application inherent in justifying faith, which distinguishes it from historical and dead faith, should not be limited to the conviction that the promises of the Gospel apply personally but should extend to a practical consideration of the entire Divine Word.

CXV. From the Reformed teachings faithfully and sincerely deduced, it's clear how unjustly and irrationally a learned and eloquent man, who recently wrote against the Reformed stance as if it undermines Christian ethics, attacked me in his work, accusing me of deserting the common Reformed doctrine in my previously published theses on the certainty one can and should have about their justification before God.

CXVI. It has been made evident that the vast majority of teachers in the Reformed School do not consider that particular confidence, which we've discussed, as the condition under which or the instrument through which we are justified. Firstly, this is clearly seen in the case of Amesius, as we have demonstrated, where there is no room for doubt. As is evident from his previously cited testimonies, he teaches that sins are truly forgiven, and thus we are justified, through that act of confidence by which we rely on Christ or lean on God's mercy through Him, which naturally precedes the act by which we believe our sins have already been forgiven. They want this confidence through which we are justified to be an act of the will, not the intellect, and therefore the object of faith as it justifies is not the truth of any proposition, such as "my sins are forgiven through Christ," but Christ Himself or God's mercy in Christ. Similarly, the saving faith

by which we believe in God is indeed true and proper confidence: not the kind where the word denotes a certain and absolute conviction about a future good, but the kind that signifies the choice and apprehension of a sufficient and suitable medium on which such conviction and expectation are based. In this sense, people are said to have confidence in their wisdom, power, friends, and resources. Thus, to believe in God is to adhere to God in belief, to rely on God, and to rest in God as our all-sufficient life and salvation.

CXVII. We also proved that Davenant shares this view. According to him, the word 'confidence' signifies two things. Firstly, the very act of leaning on and adhering to Jesus Christ, by which we embrace Christ as if with both arms and through this act, we strive to obtain pardon, grace, and glory from God the Father: and he believes this to be the act that is always followed by justification, that is, the absolution from sins and acceptance into divine grace and favor; whether or not the sinner at that very first moment conceives that forgiveness has been obtained. Secondly, confidence sometimes also denotes the consequent effect of justifying faith, namely the full persuasion and almost vivid sense of having obtained forgiveness and divine favor. He admits that this confidence is not justifying faith itself but the offspring of justifying faith, which a justified soul typically develops after many exercises of faith and sanctity.

CXVIII. Peter Molinaeus, son of Peter Molinaeus and Theology Doctor and Canon of Canterbury, whom we also cited in those Theses that are contested by that author, uses the same distinction as Davenant, as we have shown. He teaches that the confidence which is the formal cause of justifying faith and the instrument of our justification is what he calls the confidence of refuge, through which we flee to God and lean on Him, embrace Christ and adhere to Him; not the confidence of feeling, which he terms as the confidence of sense, through which we feel that we have grasped Christ and obtained pardon from God. Indeed, there are many who truly grasp Christ yet do not yet feel that they have done so; they are truly justified before God, even if they are not yet certain and persuaded of it. This persuasion is not essential to faith but pertains only to its perfection; it is the fruit and a certain consequence of true and robust faith.

CXIX. We showed similar teachings to be present in Perkins in several of his works. For he says the act of faith, which is immediately followed by the sinner's justification, is to approach the throne of grace so that, by grasping Christ there, we may find mercy from God. And then follows the highest and most perfect degree of faith, which is a special persuasion by which each person applies the Gospel promises to themselves. He contends that this highest and perfect degree of faith is absent in many faithful, who cannot distinctly and certainly say of themselves, "I believe my sins are forgiven." While their faith may be weak, they are truly God's children, and divine mercy does not fail or forsake them. Therefore, he argues that some catechisms, which define faith as a certain and full persuasion of God's love and favor towards us in Christ, define faith in its highest and most perfect degree.

CXX. We also added the example of Antonius Walaeus, who denies that the primary act of faith by which we are justified is the act through which forgiveness of sins is received, but it is the act through which Christ is received with His merit for the forgiveness of sins, not past but subsequent; and this not so much through a particular assent but through that confidence of the

will which follows general assent. Nor can the mind of Johannes Mestrezatius be different, for whom justifying faith is defined as the refuge of a penitent sinner to God's mercy in Christ. CXXI. Additionally, we mention Antonius Walaeus, who denies that the primary act of faith by which we are justified is the act through which forgiveness of sins is received. Instead, he proposes it is the act through which Christ, along with his merit for the forgiveness of sins, not past but subsequent, is received. And this is done not so much through a particular assent but through that confidence of the will which follows general assent. The same must be the opinion of Johannes Mestrezatius, for whom justifying faith is defined as the refuge of the penitent sinner to God's mercy in Christ.

CXXII. It is also easy to deduce from the definitions of faith provided by Peter Martyr and Wolfgang Musculus that they did not consider the firm conviction of having obtained forgiveness from God as the primary and specific act of justifying faith, nor the very act by which we are justified. After all, they make no mention of this conviction in their definition of justifying faith. Musculus defines faith as a "constant assent of the heart to what is narrated or promised by the Word." Martyr describes it as a "firm and certain assent to the words of God, inspired by the divine Spirit for the salvation of believers." And by firm assent, he means an assent that is so strong and effective that it brings along the effect of confidence, hope, charity, and all good works. Here, by confidence, it is clear he means an effect of the will, not a persuasion of the mind, making it an effect of faith, not its primary or formal act. Similarly, Musculus explains believing in God as directing all hope in God and relying on God's goodness with firm confidence. Moreover, from Zanchi's definition of justifying faith, it is certain he did not consider the primary and formal act of justifying faith to be the confidence or persuasion of righteousness and forgiveness of sins obtained from God; rather, it is confidence in obtaining it. Indeed, he defines faith as a firm and undoubted assent to God's promises of forgiveness of sins and righteousness to be received and eternal life to be granted by God through and for the sake of Christ.

CXXIII. Particularly evident from what we have previously outlined is that theologians, whose works were used in the creation of the Anglican Confession of 1645, did not place the formal and essential act of faith in that conviction by which one is certain and secure of God's grace and benevolence towards them and of the forgiveness of their sins. As the Confession separately addresses saving faith in Chapter 14 and the certainty one has of being in God's grace in Chapter 18. There, while discussing this certainty, it teaches that it is not so essential to faith that a true believer could not lack it for a long time, and that one may await and struggle with many difficulties before obtaining that certainty.

CXXIV. Moreover, those very Reformed School theologians, whose testimonies the learned author chiefly relies upon to attribute to the entire Reformed School the opinion that the primary and formal act of justifying faith is the certain confidence of having obtained forgiveness of sins from God, explicitly and clearly deny believing this, as we abundantly proved above with quotes and testimonies from Robert Baronius, Rivetus, Wendelinus, Paraeus, and Marefius. Specifically, Baronius distinguishes between the confidence of obtaining forgiveness

and the confidence of having obtained it: both are proper acts of justifying faith for him, but the former precedes justification and is its instrument; the latter follows justification and is not its instrument. Rivetus, Wendelinus, Paraeus, and Marefius even more subtly distinguish between the confidence by which one believes sins will be forgiven, the belief that sins are being forgiven in the present, and the belief that sins have been forgiven. According to them, the first act disposes a person towards justification, the second act justifies them in actuality and reality, and the third doesn't at all, but through it, one perceives justification that has already occurred, and from this, comfort for the faithful soul is derived. Although we do not endorse this subtlety, it is certain that they cannot, without injustice and contrary to truth, be accused of teaching that the act by which we are justified is the one by which believers individually determine that their sins have been forgiven through Christ, as they expressly deny this. This is especially true in those very treatises and questions where they say this act is the main and specific act of faith, and through which they define justifying faith, obviously referring to it as the main act of faith because it chiefly contributes to the peace of conscience and the comfort of believers, and also as the specific one, because it distinguishes saving faith from historical faith: And they explicitly mention it in the definition of faith because there was a significant controversy between the Roman School and the Reformed School on this point.

CXXV. Even Peter Martyr, in those theses where he defines faith as the assent to the promises of the Gospel, not only believes them to be true but also particularly applicable to oneself, yet he notes that he does not exclude from the book of the faithful those who have not yet achieved this level of faith. He acknowledges that this certainty is indeed commanded by God but is not granted to all believers at the same time or in the same measure. He admits there is a weak faith, which is not feigned but lacks this certain persuasion and still does not cease to be salvific. This clearly shows that when defining faith through the assent by which one believes the promises of the Gospel to be not only true but also particularly applicable to oneself, he intends to describe what faith should be in its complete and perfect essence, including all the acts it is naturally capable of producing, not necessarily what is essential for the essence of faith, such that without it faith could not exist, as previously noted from Amesius and Perkins.

CXXVI. Let the fair reader and the learned man himself, who criticizes my theses, judge whether I rightly deserve to be reprimanded as one who has abandoned the doctrine commonly accepted in the Reformed School, deceitfully and against my own conscience, trying to impose or introduce into the school a novel opinion, recently proposed and accepted by only a few obscure Reformed ministers. This accusation is because I deny that the formal act of salvific faith, by which it is attributed justification, is the conviction by which believers individually determine their sins have been forgiven. It is evident in this matter that I follow or have the endorsement of some of the most learned and renowned men in the Reformed School, both from this and the previous century.

CXXVII. I leave it to the readers to judge how vain the glory of the learned man is, who boasts that no Reformer dares to accuse him of imposing anything on them while he boldly

claims, contrary to their explicit teachings, that the proper and formal act of justifying faith is the certain assurance of having obtained forgiveness of sins from God.

CXXVIII. Nor is it difficult to refute another accusation the learned man levels at me: that I not only conceal what the true doctrine of the Reformed School is to replace it with a novel and private opinion, recently accepted by a few obscure individuals among the Reformers but also go further in my dissimulation, daring to accuse the Roman Church's doctors of claiming that this is the Reformers' common opinion, which is actually such.

CXXIX. To prove this accusation, he presents the first of the theses he chose to attack. The thesis states that among the various calumnies with which the Protestant doctrine in the matter of justification is attacked, these also frequently occur: that they commonly teach that all individuals must with firm faith believe that their sins have been forgiven and that they are just before God. This conviction should be as firm as believing Jesus Christ is the Son of God and the Redeemer of the World, and other similar articles of faith. Such a conviction is deemed so necessary that without it, no one can be truly faithful and just, as if refusing to believe any of the primary and fundamental articles of faith. In this conviction, true and salvific faith is established, as in its own proper and principal act, and thus people are justified before God by such faith alone, even if they indulge in vices and do not strive for good works. This is especially seen in the writings of Bellarmine and Becanus, Jesuits, who either presuppose or explicitly and clearly attribute this to us in their disputes against us.

CXXX. I would like it to be carefully observed that the question between me and the learned man is not whether some Reformers have given cause for such accusations to be made against them. The thesis does not assert that these claims cannot be attributed to any Reformers without slander. Rather, the question is whether the theologians of the Reformed School teach these things with common consent as accepted doctrines and articles of faith, endorsed by all known and notable Reformers, with only two or three recent exceptions. This is what the learned man affirms, and what I assert in the thesis and reassert now cannot be stated without slander. Therefore, it suffices for the defense of my thesis if I clearly show that many old and recent Reformers, who are celebrated in their writings and considered pious and orthodox in the Reformed School, reject and repudiate what the learned man accuses us of. Conversely, the learned man achieves nothing if he can bring forth some Reformers who either taught these things or wrote something from which such conclusions seem to be drawn directly, provided there are others who assert the contrary and declare their different stance in this matter, without being considered heterodox by their peers.

CXXXI. But let's briefly touch on each point, starting from the latter and working backward. Is it not clear, from what we've previously outlined, that it's slanderous to attribute to Reformed theologians, with common consent, the teaching that the proper and formal act of faith, by which we are justified, is the certain conviction within each believer that their sins are forgiven and they are righteous before God? This is so much so that without this conviction, no one can be truly faithful and just, just as if they were refusing to believe in one of the main and foundational articles of faith. For we have repeatedly presented the testimonies of Perkins,

Davenant, Ames, Mestrezat, Peter du Moulin, Anthony Walaeus, and Wittichius, who follows Widmar, explicitly denying that the formal and principal act of salvific faith is the certainty and assurance of already received grace, but rather it is the act by which we seek refuge in God and rely on Him to obtain mercy through Christ. This is also the clear teaching of the Anglican Confession, written and published by the Presbyterian theologians. Can we, without slander, say that this is taught by common consent among the Reformers when so many celebrated theological professors among them, and even their faith confessions to which many subscribe, deny it? Not to mention those who, while not explicitly addressing this question, establish the form and essence of faith differently than in that certainty of having received forgiveness of sins from God, like Musculus and Peter Martyr, who define faith simply as a firm and constant assent of the heart to the Word, inspired by the Holy Spirit for the salvation of believers, explaining firm assent as one that brings with it feelings of trust, hope, charity, and all good works, and similarly explaining belief in God as directing all hope towards God and relying firmly on His goodness.

CXXXII. Moreover, it's evident that not all Reformed scholars agree that each believer should be as firmly and certainly persuaded of their righteousness before God and the forgiveness of their sins, thereby being assured of eternal salvation, as they are required to believe that Christ is the Son of God, the Redeemer of the world, and other fundamental Christian beliefs. This is evident because many Reformers, as shown, acknowledge that this certainty about one's salvation and the forgiveness of their sins can be separated from faith, at least for a considerable time, and is not essential to salvific faith but only relates to its perfection. Hence, it clearly follows, according to their view, that this should not be as firmly believed as the fact that Jesus Christ is the Son of God and the world's Redeemer. For certain belief in this article cannot be separated from true faith, nor can one be temporarily devoid of this belief and still remain truly faithful, according to the widely accepted and proven doctrine of the Reformed School.

CXXXIV. Furthermore, the British theologians, representatives of the Anglican Clergy at the Synod of Dort, express their views clearly and distinctly on this matter in their judgment on the fifth article of the Remonstrants' doctrine, included in the Acts of the Synod. Speaking on behalf of their church, they state about the assurance that believers can have regarding their grace and personal salvation that this assurance does not possess a degree of certainty that forever excludes all fear of the contrary. They explain that this assurance is sometimes vivid, sometimes weak, and sometimes, as in severe temptations, non-existent. They attribute the weakness of this assurance to its foundational dependence, which seems to fall below the certainty of dogmatic faith. They argue that the articles of Catholic faith directly affect our assent as immediate and primary principles. However, the truth of personal faith is not deduced from these as a necessary consequence but is added as an assumption. Therefore, the certainty of the conclusion formed by this personal faith cannot be greater than the weaker certainty found in the premises. Since this assumption relies on experiential signs weighed by an individual's conscience, which may sometimes be questioned for their genuineness or be obscured by the clouds of temptation, it's no

wonder that a lively and robust assurance of eternal salvation is not always readily available to the faithful.

CXXXV. From the doctrine of these British theologians, whose views influenced the drafting of the Canons of the Synod of Dort and whose judgment was included in the Synod's Acts, one can infer how justified the learned man is who critiques my theses for presenting the Synod's words as if it had determined that the assurance believers have of their grace and personal salvation is of the same nature, firmness, and necessity as the divine faith with which we assent to the immediately revealed articles of faith. The learned man draws this conclusion from the words found in the fifth chapter on doctrine, article nine, which states: "Concerning this preservation of the elect to salvation and the true perseverance of faith in the faithful, they can be certain according to the measure of faith, which they believe makes them true and enduring members of the Church, having forgiveness of sins and eternal life." These words alone do not define that the faith by which the faithful are certain of forgiveness of sins and eternal life is of equal certainty, firmness, and necessity as the divine faith with which we assent to the primary articles of faith. Is it likely that the learned man understands the Synod of Dort better than those who contributed to its decrees and were the first to endorse them?

CXXXVI. Then, in agreement with the British theologians in this matter, Ames clearly shows his perspective in words that the learned man cites to support his argument. Bellarmine had defined the question of the certainty one can or should have of their justification and the forgiveness of their sins—if it is established without fallacy or ambiguity—as whether one can or should be as certain, without special revelation, of the forgiveness of their sins as they are of any divinely revealed truth. Ames responds, "Without any fallacy or ambiguity, this state does not involve the certainty of divine faith; because Bellarmine does not distinguish between the levels of certainty with respect to principles that are directly revealed and the conclusions clearly drawn from them, and between the certainty of faith itself and that which comes from faith, either in perception or hope. But with these distinctions understood, we accept this question and will defend the affirmative against the negative of the Papists." Ames's meaning is clear to those well-versed in his teachings: not all that is believed by divine faith has the same level of certainty because divine faith not only applies to immediately revealed principles but also to conclusions evidently drawn from those principles. Therefore, faith does not embrace conclusions with the same level of certainty as it does the principles themselves. Hence, since the proposition "my sins are forgiven" is not directly revealed by God but is a conclusion drawn from revealed principles, faith grasps it, albeit with less certainty than it does the principles themselves.

CXXXVII. Furthermore, Ames indicates the need to distinguish between faith in itself, considered in respect of the acts required for its essence, and the confidence that arises from faith, through which we either grasp a present good or hope for a future one. He notes that the level of certainty in faith itself, and what is required of it, is greater than in the confidence that stems from faith, which assures us of either a present or future good, even though this confidence is also termed faith. According to Ames, when the faithful are said to be divinely certain of

received grace or forthcoming salvation, it's not the justifying and salvific faith in itself that is referred to but the confidence that arises from faith, through which we either recognize the forgiveness granted by God or hope for future salvation. Thus, according to Ames, this derived confidence possesses less certainty than faith considered in itself.

CXXXVIII. It is therefore evident, according to the express teaching of many Reformers, that within the aspects related to faith, there are varying degrees of certainty because faith does not hold the same stance towards all of them. There are some matters where our assent relies uniquely and immediately on divine revelation, while others partly rest on divine revelation and partly on other kinds of evidence and arguments, like conclusions drawn from one revealed proposition and another known through constant report, reason, or internal or external sensory experience. Both types relate to faith, and each kind of assent is considered an act of faith among the Reformers. However, according to their view, the firmness and certainty are not the same in both cases: the greatest is in those relying solely on revelation, and in others, it is greater or lesser depending on the certainty and clarity in the proposition added to the revealed one to deduce this or that conclusion, as I previously explained in the theses criticized by the learned man, not just from my private opinion but from the clear stance of many doctors of the Reformed School. This shows how baseless his proof is when, from the fact that Reformers call it an act of faith, he infers that, according to the common belief of the Reformers, each believer must be as certain of their forgiveness of sins as they are that Christ is the Son of God and the Redeemer of the world.

CXXXIX. Certainly, not only among the Reformers but also in the Roman School, not every assent referred to divine faith is immediately equated in firmness and certainty with the assent of Catholic or dogmatic faith. For example, in the Council of Trent, Catharinus argues that a just person can be divinely certain of their grace, and Jesuit Vasquez calls divine faith the confidence a penitent sinner has in obtaining forgiveness from God, and which a justified person can have about having obtained it. Yet, these men do not consider this personal faith to have the same certainty as Catholic faith. The Council of Trent, while defining that no one can know with the certainty of faith that they have achieved God's grace, adds "to which no falsehood can be attached," allowing Catharinus some leeway and not seeming to outright condemn his stance. Catharinus continued to hold his initial view and attempted to interpret the Council's words according to his understanding.

CXL. The learned man's attempt to use the testimonies of well-known Reformers, André Rivet and John Daille, to prove that they attributed the same certainty to the confidence one has in their grace and salvation as is due to the fundamental articles of faith, is in vain. It's well-known that even the most learned individuals can inadvertently make statements during heated debates that later need to be softened or twisted somewhat to align with a good interpretation. I have no doubt that if these learned men had been challenged on this point, they would have clarified their stance in a way that aligns with the explanation already given.

CXLI. However, for my purpose, there's no need to soften or excuse their statements. Even if John Daille and André Rivet differed in this matter from Ames and the British

theologians, whose views have been explained, and attributed the same certainty to the assurance individuals have of their forgiveness of sins as is due to the belief in the articles of faith, does that mean it can be attributed to the Reformers as a whole, that they all teach this unanimously? And who isn't aware that both individuals held particular opinions which were challenged by many Reformers? And why should we measure the faith of the Reformers more by the opinion of these two men than by the doctrine of Ames and the British theologians speaking on behalf of the Church of England and appointed to the Synod of Dort?

CXLII. Only one accusation remains where the learned man attempts to accuse me of slander. Specifically, it's regarding my statement that it is slanderous to attribute to the Reformers, by common consensus, the teaching that every single person can and should believe with certainty that their sins are forgiven and that they are just before God. To achieve his goal, he interprets my words, suggesting that I mean by "every single person" every single believer. Then he proves from Pareus that this indeed is the common doctrine of the Reformers, that every believer can and should have certain faith that they are just before God and that their sins are forgiven, and thus it can be attributed to the Reformers without slander.

CXLIII. However, there was no need for the learned man to cite Pareus here. My own Theses, which he chose to criticize, largely aim to prove according to the common doctrine of the Reformers: 1. Individual believers, without special revelation, can certainly believe they are in God's grace. 2. Not only can individual believers believe this, but they should be convinced of it; if they are not, it indicates a deficiency and weakness in their faith. 3. This certainty is commonly referred to as the certainty of faith among the Reformers. Thus, the learned man's conjecture is mistaken. I did not mean by "every single person" only every single believer. Nor was it my intention to accuse Roman Church doctors of claiming that the Reformers teach that all people universally, without exception, are required to believe with certainty that they are in God's grace. Rather, I referred to all individuals to whom the Gospel is proclaimed and who are in external communion with the Church, even if they live sinfully and indulge in vices.

CXLIV. Nor did I assert that Roman Church doctors explicitly state in so many words that the Reformers teach that all individuals to whom the Gospel is preached and who are in external communion with the Church can and should believe with certainty, regardless of how they live, that they are just before God and their sins are forgiven. Instead, I suggested that this is clearly implied in their arguments against the Reformers. The learned man's book provides ample evidence of this. What else does he emphasize throughout the book other than, according to the Reformers, even those who wallow in vices and are guilty of heinous crimes can and should firmly believe they have received God's grace and their sins are forgiven; and that this belief constitutes the act of faith by which we are justified? If, according to the Reformers, even those who surrender themselves to lusts and vices are required to firmly believe their sins are forgiven, and this belief constitutes the formal act of faith through which we are justified, doesn't their doctrine imply that all individuals in the external communion of the Church should believe this, regardless of their way of life, since they are required to elicit the formal act of justifying faith? Yet, it is utterly false, from the Reformers' perspective, that all individuals in external

communion with the Church, even though they live sinfully, should believe with certainty that they will be saved and their sins forgiven. Indeed, the Reformers teach that such individuals should believe they are on the path to perdition and can only attain life by genuinely and practically renouncing their sins and vices, believing with a faith that works through love. Only then, recognizing this faith in themselves, can and should they believe they are just before God and that God is reconciled to them through Christ. To suggest otherwise about the Reformers or to assume it without severe slander is false.

CXLV. Now, it is clear and thoroughly proven that in the Theses the learned man criticizes, I did not deviate from the common doctrine of the Reformed School, nor did I deceitfully impose a private opinion as a doctrine accepted in their schools. Nor was I unjustly complaining about the Roman School's doctors, accusing them of slanderously attributing those four points to the Reformers as if taught by their common consensus. Thus, the eloquent man's various conclusions and declamations, built on such a rotten foundation, collapse and vanish without the need for me to scrutinize and address each point minutely.

PART TWO: IN WHICH

The Doctrine of the Roman School is Explained, and Compared with the Doctrine of the Protestants.

Thesis I

Firstly, according to the doctors of the Roman Church, faith, when viewed absolutely, is nothing but an assent, moved and inspired by the Holy Spirit, given to all things revealed to humans by God; and this is because of the truth and authority of God who reveals.

II. Moreover, this faith either exists separately from the love of God and other pious works, found in many sinners, or is joined with the love of God and other good works. In the first respect, it is called dead and idle, in the latter, it is considered alive and effective.

III. This distinction of faith is extensively and precisely taught by Jaubertus, Archbishop of Arles, in the first volume against the shield of Molina, chapter 40. At the beginning, he notes that faith is taken in two ways: Firstly, as a supernatural act or habit of the mind, through which we believe everything contained in Scripture and everything God has revealed, and we do so because God has said and revealed it; this act is expressed in the schools as "believing God" and can exist without charity and good works, and then faith is called dead, because it is devoid of the life of charity. Secondly, there is another faith called alive because it is animated by charity and operates through it; the act of this faith is expressed by "believing in God" and is found only in the just, through which man hopes and expects the fulfillment of divine promises.

IV. This corresponds to the distinction widely used in Roman schools, distinguishing faith as informed and uninformed. Informed faith is called that which is alone and without charity, while formed faith is that which is united with charity and love. They teach that charity is the form of faith, not internal and properly so called, which constitutes the essence of faith

absolutely and in itself considered, but rather an external and improperly called form, which bestows some external and relative quality to faith; namely, that it is meritorious for eternal life and becomes, as they say, a work of salvation.

V. This Roman school's view is explained by William Estius: Faith is not called the form of charity as if it pertains to the essence of faith or because it properly informs faith, as the soul is said to be the form of a man, or as an accidental and extrinsic form, like the whiteness of a body. This would be false because charity and faith are two virtues distinct in kind, which perfect two different powers. Theologians, therefore, mean metaphorically that charity can be called the form of faith, according to an analogy to the properly called form, which in its way perfects the subject.

VI. These are consistent with what Gregory de Valencia notes, explaining the same distinction between informed and uninformed faith. Theologians affirm that faith is perfected by charity. However, they do not think that charity is properly the form of faith, or essential, as the soul is said to be the form of a human, or accidental and extrinsic, as the whiteness of a body. This would be false because charity and faith are two virtues distinct in kind, which perfect two different powers. Theologians, therefore, mean that charity, since it adds a certain perfection to faith, can metaphorically be called its form; this is according to the analogy to the properly called form, which in its way perfects the subject.

VII. The reason they had for calling charity the form of faith is that the faith which is valid for salvation is described by the Apostle as the faith that operates through love. And that James calls faith without the works of charity dead. Indeed, form is that by which something lives and operates, and these passages teach and suggest that faith lives and acts through charity; therefore, charity is to faith what the soul is to the body, the spirit or soul being the form of a living body.

VIII. However, the Roman school's theologians teach that one who has only dead and uninformed faith does not believe well or as he should, as can be seen in Bellarmine's work, "On Justification," in several places. But they still consider it to be a gift from God, belonging to the grace of Christ, and deserving the title and name of true faith. From their perspective, the assent that many sinful Christians give to the word of God is good in itself, inspired by God, and they internally and truly, not just externally and pretentiously, assent to the divine and most true doctrine; however, they do not believe well or as they should because they do not use their faith rightly, nor refer it to its proper end, nor do what faith dictates should be done. This is what Stapleton teaches. Although the act of faith without charity is good, it is not done well; therefore, it is not perfectly good. It is not done well because it is not directed to the ultimate good end.

IX. However, they acknowledge that dead and uninformed faith can be considered true and not true in different senses and respects, and the title of true faith can be restricted to formed faith. This is especially evident in the author who recently attacked the Reformers as subverters of Christian ethics. He observes that in matters of reality, 'true' is often used for what is in its due state of perfection. Thus, a 'true' King is one who does his utmost to govern his kingdom rightly; a 'true' Bishop is one who continuously watches over the salvation of his flock; a 'true' Christian

is one who lives as befits a Christian. Yet, the title of a 'true' King is not to be outright denied to one who, although a legitimate king, does not properly perform his royal duties; nor is the title of a 'true' Bishop to be denied to one who, although rightly called and ordained, does not fulfill the duties of a good bishop; nor is the title of a 'true' Christian to be denied to one who, baptized in Christ and genuinely believing all the mysteries of Christian doctrine, indulges in the works of the flesh and does not live a life befitting his profession. Hence, he concludes that although the remaining faith in those Christians who have fallen, not through unbelief but through other sins, after receiving grace in Baptism, is true faith and should be so called, it can still be said in a good sense that only the faith that is animated by charity is 'true' faith. This is because only such faith benefits us, makes us children of God, and allows Christ to dwell in our hearts. He supports this later with numerous testimonies from the Fathers and from the official Liturgy of the Roman Church.

X. Similarly, Stapleton admits that dead and uninformed faith can be considered feigned and hypocritical concerning the life and truth of justice. He states, "This faith, though dead and hypocritical in terms of perfect justice and its truth, is not so concerning itself and its own virtue."

XI. Whether uninformed faith is a virtue is a matter of debate among Scholastic Doctors. Thomas denies it is a virtue. Others, like Durandus and Bonaventure, affirm that even dead and uninformed faith is a virtue. However, they argue about the term 'virtue' because those who claim that this dead faith is a virtue take 'virtue' in a general sense, defined as a habit of the mind in accordance with right reason, inclining one to an act in harmony with divine law. In this general sense, no one in the Roman School denies that uninformed faith can be called a virtue. Even if uninformed, it remains, according to them, a habit by which the intellect, under the command of the will, is captured in obedience to Christ, firmly believing what is divinely mandated to be believed. Those who deny that uninformed faith is a virtue limit the term 'virtue' to that which leads to right living and inherently does good to the possessor. According to this definition, all agree that neither faith nor any morally good habit is a virtue without charity, as Estius explains.

XII. Whatever distinction Roman School theologians make between living and dead faith, formed and uninformed, they do not want these to be considered different species of faith. Instead, they argue that the difference is only an accidental perfection, and both are one and the same faith in essence. Faith can sometimes be found conjoined with charity and sometimes exist separately from it, retaining what is essential to faith in both states and receiving only an external and relative perfection from charity when it is present.

XIII. Furthermore, it's a common doctrine in the Roman School that the same faith can be alternately formed and living, or dead and uninformed. Peter's faith, intrinsically the same, is called uninformed and dead when charity is absent, and living and formed when charity is present. However, the stance that living and dead faith belong to the same species is defined within the Roman Church and counted among the doctrines of faith. In contrast, the view that the same faith can be alternately formed or uninformed is not as certain and is not held as a dogma

of faith. Some early Scholastics held the contrary view, though modern Doctors generally endorse it.

XIV. Gregory de Valentia, among others, illustrates this. He first proves that the same faith can be both formed by charity and also be uninformed, stating that attributes not essential to a thing's nature do not multiply it, as the same thing can underlie various accidents. Whether faith is formed by charity or not is incidental to it and does not pertain to its essence. He then notes that it is certain from faith that the same true faith can exist with and without charity, but it's not as certain from faith that the exact numerical faith can be both formed and uninformed. Although the Council of Trent didn't dispute this against the heretics but only sought to establish that true Catholic and Theological faith can exist without charity and indeed does so in faithful sinners, they did not define that it's the exact numerical faith. However, he adds that it's now so certain that theologians commonly view the opposite as rash because it contradicts the common opinion of Doctors in a significant matter.

XV. Furthermore, Roman Church theologians do not want dead faith to be called historical because it does not only concern historical facts but gives assent to everything contained in the Word of God, whether they are histories, doctrines, or promises. Also, they believe this assent is not historical, i.e., not based on any human authority, as when we believe what historians report, but because of the testimony of God speaking and revealing in the Word.

XVI. However, all Roman Church theologians agree that dead faith, which is not united with charity, does not benefit salvation, does not contribute to obtaining justice, and no faith act saves and justifies unless it is alive and works through love. This is especially the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. He, denying that uninformed faith is a virtue, proves that formed faith is a virtue from the fact that we are justified by it, for we are only justified by that which has the nature of a virtue. This same stance is explicitly taught by Martin Becanus, a Jesuit, attributing this belief to all Catholics: Catholics teach that faith does not justify unless it is confirmed by charity. Additionally, Catholics, along with Augustine, maintain that faith can exist uninformed; however, only formed faith justifies.

XVII. While Roman School theologians acknowledge and admit that dead and uninformed faith does not contribute to salvation and is useless for achieving righteousness, as Thomas Stapleton expressly states in many places, they still teach that faith, in itself and by its nature, whether accompanied by charity or not, is the first and most necessary disposition for attaining righteousness. This is because faith, viewed in itself, is the first act of the soul by which we are united with God. Therefore, through faith that is not yet formed, charity is obtained, which later forms it, provided that what faith suggests is done, i.e., if the prayer of faith is employed, as seen in Stapleton on Justification, Book 5, which is on Justifying Faith, Chapter 17.

XVIII. Hence, faith, considered absolutely, that is, as the assent given under the movement and inspiration of the Holy Spirit to all that God has revealed, is said to be the foundation and root of our justification before God. It is from this root that our righteousness before God typically begins and sprouts, and without which it is impossible to achieve it. However, if one remains in this bare assent without adding charity to perfect it, such faith cannot

lead a person to righteousness and salvation, just as a foundation is necessary for building a house but is useless without walls and a roof, as Arnold, a Jesuit, explains through the words of Jaubert, Archbishop of Arles.

XIX. Therefore, the common doctrine of the Roman School is that only living and formed faith actually justifies, but even faith that is not yet formed is considered a kind of disposition towards justification. It can be called justifying in a sense, as a necessary and prerequisite disposition, although if it remains alone, it is ineffective and does not justify. However, they do not entirely agree on how to interpret the passages in Paul's Epistles where the Apostle repeatedly asserts that a person is justified by faith, from faith, and through faith. Many believe Paul refers to faith that is living and formed, meaning that we are made and considered righteous before God through faith that works through love. Others think Paul is speaking of faith in the abstract, distinguishing between living and dead faith, suggesting that faith is the primary and most necessary disposition for achieving righteousness, and that a person is disposed to justification through faith, unable to reach it without faith, as Thomas Stapleton discusses in Books 8 and 9 of his work on Justification.

XX. Moreover, when Roman School theologians say that even uninformed faith is justifying in its own way because it disposes one to justification and serves as the root and foundation of a person's righteousness before God, they do not mean a passive, inert, or merely speculative faith. Instead, they refer to an active kind of faith that begins to be effective through good works, somewhat generating charity and striving towards it, though it may not yet have attained it. Vasquez explains that faith serves as a foundation and root of spiritual building and fruit only when it moves and excites the will towards good; faith that does not move the will and is not active in itself, as to attract the will to good, does not have the character of a root and foundation. Stapleton adds that through not yet formed faith, charity is obtained, which later forms the faith, provided that what faith suggests is done, that is, if the prayer of faith is used.

XXI. Regarding the object of justifying faith, Roman School theologians carefully note and teach that it includes everything conveyed and revealed by the Word of God to the Church, not only the promises of grace but also threats, commandments, and doctrines, whatever God has chosen to reveal and present to the Church. They assert that the faith which saves and justifies considers all these objects, and it does so even as it justifies and saves, meaning that faith justifies not simply because it embraces the promises of grace, but also because it assents to doctrines, believes in mysteries, and accepts threats and commandments with due obedience and reverence. In the matter of justification, faith views each of these elements in different ways, according to their understanding.

XXII. However, they do not deny that the primary and most important object of justifying faith is God's grace and mercy in Christ offered to believing and repenting sinners through the promises of the Gospel. This is acknowledged and confirmed by Thomas Stapleton among others, who, in his book on Justification, chapter 12, references the Council of Trent, saying that faith does not look solely at this object but certainly most importantly when it disposes a person to justification. The Fathers of the Council of Trent taught this in session 6, chapter 6, saying that

believers are prepared for righteousness by believing that what has been divinely revealed and promised is true, especially that they are justified by God's grace through the redemption in Christ. Therefore, justifying faith primarily looks at Christ as the Mediator and the redemption accomplished through Him but it is not the sole and unique object of justifying faith as heretics claim, since faith looks at many other objects while we are being disposed to justification.

XXIII. Among the various objects of justifying faith, Roman School theologians deny that the promise of special mercy is included; rather, they argue that a certain promise of special mercy pertains more to presumption than to faith, as Bellarmine testifies. He tries to prove that faith is justifying even if it does not consider special mercy; indeed, it is not justifying if it happens to consider it. Vasquez, along with others, contends that God's special mercy is not a necessary object of faith, as heretics fabricate, even though justification requires particular faith and confidence in divine promise and mercy, which will be more fully explained later. However, what they intend to deny is that for justifying faith, it's necessary for each person to believe their sins are forgiven. This is also understood by others who deny that special mercy pertains to the object of justifying faith.

XXIV. When inquiring about the acts of saving and justifying faith, what they are and their nature, all Roman Church theologians agree that the proper act of justifying faith consists in the assent that the faithful give to everything that God has revealed through His Word passed on to the Church, and they do so because of divine authority and testimony. However, they deny that knowledge is an act of faith, and that faith is knowledge, understanding, or intelligence. Bellarmine even argues that faith is distinguished from knowledge and is better defined by ignorance than by knowledge.

XXV. To understand their position, it's important to note that when they deny faith is knowledge, and assert faith is somewhat opposed to knowledge and intelligence, they mean by knowledge, understanding, and intelligence a certain evident or at least distinct and accurate cognition. Therefore, they mean that firstly, believers do not know the mysteries they believe in evidently, nor do they assent to them because of any evident reason they perceive in them, but solely due to the authority of God bearing witness in His Word. Secondly, distinct and clear apprehension of what is believed is not necessary for faith, as is found in those who can explain, prove, and defend the mysteries of faith against opponents, but a rudimentary and confused apprehension of divine mysteries, like that in simple believers who trust in the Trinity and Incarnation, even if they cannot understand or explain these mysteries distinctly and accurately. And finally, whatever the conception and apprehension of divine mysteries in the believer, faith properly consists not in that apprehension but in the assent given to those mysteries by the one who believes.

XXVI. Nevertheless, they do not deny, indeed they expressly teach, that faith is not without some apprehension, albeit rudimentary and confused, of what is believed. Therefore, in the believer, there are two elements: 1. apprehension, 2. judgment or assent, although that apprehension is not faith itself but something preceding faith.

XXVII. They also concede that it's not sufficient for salvation for someone to believe generally and implicitly what the Church believes, even if they lack explicit and explicit knowledge of any divine mysteries. Although they teach that general and implicit faith is sufficient with respect to many articles of faith, they nonetheless require in all believers, as necessary for salvation, some explicit and explicit knowledge of the first and foremost articles of faith, such as those contained in the Apostles' Creed, even though this knowledge, while explicit, remains rudimentary and confused.

XXVIII. Lastly, while they teach that it is sufficient for salvation to implicitly believe in most articles of faith and do not consider it necessary for salvation to have an accurate and distinct knowledge even of the primary and principal articles of faith, but only a rudimentary and confused one, they do not deny that knowledge of divine things is useful and praiseworthy, as it further ignites love for God. Just as those who advance in learning are commendable, so are those who are always learning and never come to the knowledge of truth rightly criticized.

XXIX. All these points are fairly clearly presented by Bellarmine in the previously mentioned seventh chapter, where he explicitly notes that in the believer there are two things: apprehension, and judgment or assent, although this apprehension is not faith but something preceding faith. He clarifies that apprehension is not properly called knowledge if it is rudimentary and confused, as found in simple believers. He differentiates between two types of assent: one that follows reason and the evidence of the thing, and another that follows the authority of the one presenting it, suggesting that the former can be called knowledge if we speak precisely, while the latter assent is called faith. Thus, he concludes that the mysteries of faith, which surpass reason, are believed, not understood, distinguishing faith from knowledge in this regard, and hence faith might be better defined by ignorance than by knowledge. He concludes chapter seven by saying that although faith is distinguished from knowledge, knowledge of divine things is also useful and praiseworthy because it increasingly ignites love for God: just as those who advance in learning are commendable, so those who always learn and never reach the knowledge of truth deserve criticism.

XXX. Vasquez also teaches similarly in his work, where he discusses justifying faith not needing to be perfect understanding or knowledge of the mysteries, but rather an assent to the thing believed because of the testimony. He critiques Calvin for insisting on a certain and explored knowledge for entry into the kingdom of heaven, suggesting that Calvin and his followers require, for fully necessary faith, an accurate and distinct knowledge of the doctrines of faith, enabling one to rightly explain, defend, and teach them to others. Against this, Vasquez argues that faith does not require an exact understanding or knowledge of the thing believed; rather, a mere assent due to the testimony is sufficient. He notes that we learn from experience that simple people truly believe many things they cannot teach or defend with reasons; their assent is fortified solely by the authority of the testimony, and this suffices for justifying faith. Therefore, he does not completely remove from faith, as less necessary, any knowledge or apprehension of the thing believed, but only the explored and precise knowledge or science, which penetrates the thing believed much more than mere basic cognition of faith.

XXXI. Gregory of Valencia, addressing the question of whether it is necessary for salvation to explicitly believe all matters of faith or if it suffices to believe some explicitly, notes first that we have explicit faith in a truth when we directly assent to it: it is implicit when we do not have assent to the truth itself but have it implicitly in another act that has a different immediate object. For example, when we explicitly and immediately believe that the scripture is the Word of God, we implicitly believe all that scripture contains, even if we do not have an explicit understanding of those things or have never thought about them. Then, clarifying his stance on the question, he asserts that in this era of grace, it is necessary for everyone to explicitly believe those articles of faith contained in the Apostles' Creed. However, other truths of faith contained in the scriptures or church definitions beyond those articles do not need to be explicitly believed by ordinary believers who are not charged with the duty to educate others and confirm them in faith; it is sufficient for them to believe such truths implicitly.

XXXII. Estius addresses this question by suggesting that every Christian is obliged to have a distinct or explicit faith in those articles whose distinct knowledge is necessary for leading a righteous life. Furthermore, those doctrines of faith that are widely known in the church's teaching, whether through the preaching of pastors or through the regular celebration of feasts and the use of ceremonies, must be explicitly believed by all who are not justifiably prevented from seeing, hearing, and understanding these publicly taught doctrines in the church, especially those that are emphasized against prevailing heresies.

XXXIII. Moreover, today's Roman Church theologians generally agree that saving and justifying faith does not require one to be convinced that they have received mercy from God or that their sins have been forgiven through Christ's grace. They argue that such a conviction is not an act of faith but leans more towards a kind of rash presumption and, thus, do not believe it justifies a person. However, in the previous century, there were notable theologians in the Roman Church who expressed in their writings that for a person's justification, it is absolutely necessary to firmly believe not only generally that sins are forgiven through Christ for those who truly repent but also that this individual's sins have been forgiven through faith in Christ.

XXXIV. Ambrosius Catharinus, who participated in the Council of Trent as a bishop, denies that the conviction one has about the forgiveness of their sins from God is an act of Catholic faith or at all necessary for a person's justification. However, he believes that any justified person, without a special revelation, can firmly believe through divine, though not Catholic, private faith that their sins have been forgiven. This is as long as they feel and experience within themselves those conditions under which God has promised forgiveness in His word. Vasquez elaborates on Catharinus's view, suggesting that such a belief, although it doesn't eliminate all fear unless based on special revelation, is still a gift from God and contributes to justification in some way.

XXXV. Vasquez himself considers that the conviction a person rightly has about having received forgiveness and justification from God can be called divine faith, although this type of faith differs from Catholic and dogmatic faith and belongs to private faith. He elaborates that for initial justification, it's not only necessary to have Catholic faith in the dogmas, history, and

universally made promises but also private faith in the promise that God will not deny effective help and that the individual will eventually be justified by God. Without this personal belief that God will grant forgiveness through the actions undertaken, one cannot have hope for God's mercy, which is as crucial for justification as faith.

XXXVI. Caffander acknowledges that the nature of justifying faith should assure the believer of their adoption and reconciliation with God through Christ's merit, a realization facilitated by the Holy Spirit. However, he views this certainty about the forgiveness of our sins as following justification, not as a prerequisite for achieving it.

XXXVII. Moreover, it's a common stance among Roman School theologians that the confidence in obtaining forgiveness and mercy from God is not an act of justifying faith but something distinct from faith. They emphasize this in their disputes against Protestants, evident in discussions about the nature of faith by Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia, Stapleton, and others.

XXXVIII. However, they do not deny that this confidence is one of the necessary conditions or dispositions for justification, as seen in the Council of Trent's sixth session, chapter six, where hope and confidence in divine mercy are listed among the necessary dispositions for adults to achieve righteousness.

XXXIX. When they state that confidence is not a part or act of faith, they refer to faith considered absolutely and in its own nature, not to living faith, which they call formed faith and acknowledge as truly saving and justifying. Living faith includes confidence, and confidence should be counted among its acts, just as love for God is included in living faith, even though, according to their doctrine, love is not an act of faith considered simply and as distinct from charity.

XL. Gabriel Vasquez not only recognizes confidence as part of living faith but also attributes the term faith to the conviction that someone, through true repentance, trusts God will forgive their sins. He teaches that not only does this conviction aid in justification, but it is also necessary, encompassing not only Catholic faith in general doctrines, histories, and promises but also a private faith in the promise that one will receive efficacious help from God and be justified by Him. Without this personal faith in obtaining forgiveness through their actions, one could not hope for God's mercy, making justification impossible, as hope is as essential for initial justification as faith.

XLI. Furthermore, the theologians of the Roman Church do not categorically deny that a believer can and should personally apply the promises of grace and salvation. They distinguish between two types of personal application of divine promises: one where an individual applies these promises to themselves, believing with divine certainty that they are among the true children of God, and another where, with moral certainty and conviction of being a child of God through His grace, one trusts in and awaits the fulfillment of these divine promises for themselves. They condemn the former type of application but approve and embrace the latter, as seen in the works of Archbishop Jaubertus of Arelate.

XLII. From what has been discussed in these and preceding theses about the nature of saving and justifying faith and its distinction from dead or idle faith, it appears that theologians from both the Roman and Reformed schools agree that divine faith, attributable to the Holy Spirit, can either be idle and devoid of good works or active and working through love.

XLIII. We also demonstrated that Roman School theologians, like the Reformers, admit that idle faith, devoid of good works, can rightly be called dead and hypocritical, being useless for salvation and justification, and that a person with such faith does not truly believe in the manner they should.

XLIV. Conversely, just as noted earlier, the Reformers do not deny, and willingly concede to the Roman School theologians, that even the faith they call historical, which leads to an assent to God's Word without motivating the will towards good deeds, should be counted among God's gifts and considered a certain perfection of the human intellect, enlightening minds to the truth that is inherently salvific. Those endowed with this faith are gravely at fault if they do not use such light for their salvation, as it inherently shows the way to righteousness and salvation.

XLV. Whether dead and idle faith should be called true faith is a matter of debate among theologians from both schools. Roman School theologians generally affirm it to be true, while Reformers deny it. However, this seems to be merely a terminological dispute. The Reformers reserve the title of true faith for that which genuinely saves and justifies, a stance that Roman School theologians do not dispute, although some among them allow for restricting the term "true faith" to living faith. Nonetheless, they believe that even dead and idle faith can rightly be called true faith since it involves genuine assent to God's Word, is called faith in Scripture, and is truly a gift of the Holy Spirit, illuminating the mind with the knowledge of what is good for salvation—a point Reformers do not contest.

XLVI. Also, as previously noted, Roman School theologians prefer not to call this dead faith "historical" but rather "dogmatic." However, as explained, they misunderstand the Reformers, who use "historical faith" not just to describe assent to scriptural histories but to denote a divine faith that, while assenting to all of God's Word, remains idle and merely speculative, commonly known as dead faith.

XLVII. Conversely, Reformed theologians disapprove of the Roman School's terminology of "dead faith" as "unformed faith" and "living faith" as "formed faith," as if charity were the form of faith. By this, Roman theologians mean not that charity is the internal, proper form that constitutes the essence of faith—something Reformers rightly find absurd—but an external form that adds effectiveness and salvific value to faith, which is merely a terminological, not a substantial, issue.

XLVIII. The common teaching of Roman School theologians, that saving and justifying faith is not fundamentally different from dead and unformed faith, may seem significant and seemingly at odds with their acknowledgment that dead and unformed faith is useless for salvation and justification. How can these stances coexist: that dead faith is ineffective for salvation, yet it is the same in essence as saving and justifying faith?

XLIX. To fully understand their perspective, remember they teach that living and formed faith is the same species of habit as dead and unformed faith. They even propose that the same faith can transition from dead to living and vice versa, but they agree that living faith surpasses dead faith with an external, accidental perfection, distinguishing the two. Moreover, they unanimously agree that only living, effective faith can truly save and justify a person, while dead, idle faith contributes nothing to salvation or justification.

L. Thus, while Roman theologians say that justifying faith is not different in kind from dogmatic (or what Reformers call "historical") faith, they, like Reformers, recognize that only living, effective faith can save and justify, not dead, idle faith. The debate boils down to whether living faith differs in kind from dead faith, as Reformers argue, or only accidentally, as the Roman School typically holds—a primarily scholastic and philosophical issue, secondary to the agreed-upon point that only living faith leads to salvation.

LI. If some Roman theologians occasionally attribute the term "justifying" to dead, idle faith, they mean it not as actively justifying but as remotely predisposing one to justification. In this discussion, Reformers focus not on remote predisposition but on the direct, infallible disposition to justification provided only by living, effective faith, a view Roman theologians share.

LII. In defining justifying faith, it appears that Roman Church theologians significantly differ from the Reformers. The former unanimously define faith as a firm assent to all that is revealed by the Word of God, given because of the authority and testimony of the revealing God. On the other hand, Reformers provide various definitions of justifying faith that seem quite different. Some agree with the mentioned definition of faith but add that saving faith is an effective assent, particularly focused on the promises of grace. Others define faith as a certain confidence by which we apply Christ's merit to ourselves or as a certain confidence and apprehension of obtaining salvation through Christ. Or, as previously discussed in more detail, a heart's acquiescence in God as the author of life and eternal salvation, to be freed from all evil and to obtain all good, and similar notions.

LIII. It should be noted that the goal of the Roman Church theologians here is to define faith as it is considered in itself, providing a definition that applies not only to living faith but also to dead faith. In this respect, no Reformer would dispute their definition of faith. When they simply define faith, especially as it serves as a category encompassing both historical and justifying faith, they use the exact same definition. However, when Reformers define justifying faith, their definition typically only includes what they believe is most inherent to living and justifying faith, adding to the general consideration of faith.

LIV. Thus, when Roman Church theologians provide a broad definition of faith, they do not deny that living faith, which they acknowledge as the only kind that truly saves and justifies, is a practical and effective assent that includes trust in divine grace and mercy. Conversely, when Reformers strictly define justifying faith, they do not intend to suggest that aspects not covered in their definition are irrelevant to its nature or deny that it is a firm assent to everything

contained in God's Word. Instead, they aim to highlight what they deem most characteristic of living and justifying faith, distinguishing it from historical or dead faith.

LV. Regarding the object of faith, it is clear from the aforementioned points that Reformers agree with Roman Church theologians that everything revealed in God's Word pertains to the object of justifying faith; thus, it is futile for Roman Church theologians to argue with Reformers as if they limit the object of faith solely to the promises of grace. Conversely, while Roman Church theologians argue that the object of justifying faith is as broad as God's Word itself, they do not deny that it primarily focuses on the Gospel promises, as Thomas Stapleton has shown with evidence from the Council of Trent. Thus, there seems to be no controversy on this matter since both parties agree that the promises of grace are the main object of faith but that the object of faith should not be restricted to these promises alone.

LVI. The remaining question appears to be whether God's special mercy pertains to the object of justifying faith and constitutes its main part. Protestants generally affirm this, while Roman Church theologians deny it. However, it's crucial to recognize that this special mercy can be considered in two ways, as previously demonstrated: either as an antecedent grace already received by the believer, like when one believes their sins have already been forgiven, or as something to be obtained through faith, like when we believe our sins will be forgiven. Some Reformers seem to make an antecedent special mercy the object of the faith by which we are justified, as if we are justified by the act of faith that confidently asserts our sins have been forgiven through Christ. This view finds agreement among some Roman Church theologians, as seen from the references to the theologians of Cologne through Georg Cassander. However, many Reformed theologians define the object of justifying faith not as antecedent mercy but as the mercy a believer trusts to receive from God. They do not claim that we are justified by believing our sins have already been forgiven but by believing they will be forgiven through Christ.

LVII. Vasquez explicitly teaches that such faith is necessary for justification and interprets the Council of Trent's canon on the faith by which we are justified in this light. Yet, most Roman Church theologians deny that any special mercy, viewed in any manner, is the object of faith; that is, they reject that it is an inherent act of faith to believe in the personal forgiveness or forthcoming forgiveness of sins.

LVIII. This does not mean they deny the necessity of trust in God's mercy for justification, where one relies on divine mercy and hopes or trusts to receive forgiveness from God. So here, too, it seems there might be some disagreement over terminology. When most Reformers assert that special mercy is an object of justifying faith, they are not discussing antecedent mercy but include trust under faith and consider this special mercy as an object of faith because it is the focus of the trust they regard as an act of faith. When Roman Church theologians deny that special mercy is an object of justifying faith, they primarily discuss antecedent mercy and distinguish faith from trust. Yet, they do not deny that trust in divine mercy is required for justification and is absolutely necessary.

LIX. Although many Reformed theologians do not consider antecedent special mercy as the object of faith concerning the primary and main act by which we obtain forgiveness of sins, they consistently teach that justifying faith involves this mercy in a secondary and reflexive act; that is, one justified by faith can be certain of the grace they have received from God through a reflective act of the same faith—a point Roman Church theologians deny. However, even though they deny that believers can be certain of their forgiveness through faith, they concede that believers can develop confidence in this forgiveness, so certain that it dispels doubt and anxiety, which barely differs from the Protestant view. Furthermore, some in the Roman School argue that this confidence or assurance that a faithful and just person has about their forgiveness is an act of a certain divine faith, as previously demonstrated with references to Catharinus and Vasquez.

LX. Regarding the acts of faith, the first question concerns the knowledge and understanding of the things to be believed: How far is it relevant and necessary for faith? As previously seen, Roman Church theologians concede to Reformers that some comprehension and apprehension of the object of belief are necessary for conceiving faith; indeed, explicit and distinct knowledge of at least the fundamental and primary articles of faith is required for saving faith. Even though they say that implicit faith in most religious doctrines or even a rudimentary and vague understanding of the chief mysteries of faith is sufficient for salvation, they acknowledge that a more distinct and accurate understanding of divine matters is beneficial and commendable as it increasingly kindles love for God. Hence, believers can and should be urged to advance in their knowledge of the mysteries of faith, according to their calling and individual capacity.

LXI. Conversely, Roman Church theologians concede to Reformed theologians that the nature and essence of faith lie more in assent than in knowledge, though some knowledge is included or presupposed in faith. They also agree that this knowledge, encompassed or presupposed by faith, is not strictly and properly called science, that is, an evident understanding of a thing through its causes; nor is it necessarily, if not evident, at least a distinct and accurate knowledge where not only the thing but also the mode of the thing is perceived.

LXII. Furthermore, they do not deny that for saving faith, it is not necessarily required from everyone to have an explicit, distinct, and detailed understanding of each doctrine of faith, but it is sufficient if they clearly know the fundamental and main mysteries of faith. Indeed, they do not even require individuals to have a distinct and accurate understanding of the main mysteries of faith that would enable them to defend, explain, and prove these mysteries, which is necessary for a Doctor or Pastor, but not for a layperson according to their view.

LXIII. Thus, Roman Church theologians argue in vain against Reformed School theologians as if they place faith more in knowledge than in assent or as if they require an exact, accurate, and distinct understanding of the mysteries of faith from everyone, which would enable someone to explain, defend, and justify them, as is required of a Doctor or Minister of the Divine Word.

LXIV. Likewise, Reformed theologians should not accuse Roman Church theologians of requiring no knowledge of the things to be believed for individual believers or of considering ignorance of divine matters preferable to their knowledge and understanding. They seem to greatly exaggerate Bellarmine's point that faith is distinguished from knowledge and that faith is better defined through ignorance than knowledge. Although this statement is harsh and awkwardly phrased, from Bellarmine's perspective, it signifies nothing that deviates from the Reformed doctrine, as shown from the previously discussed points. Bellarmine takes 'knowledge' here to mean a certain evident knowledge that we do not have regarding the matters of faith.

LXV. Concerning assent, some Reformers are found who deny that it is an act of faith but only something that precedes faith and is presupposed by it. However, most commonly include assent among the acts of faith. Yet, there seems to be some discrepancy between Roman Church theologians and Reformed School theologians, with the former insisting that the primary and chief act of faith consists of the assent given to the entire Word of God, which the Reformers deny. However, if one closely examines the Roman Church theologians' perspective, they are found to discuss faith in terms of assent primarily when considering faith abstractly and in itself, separate from both living and dead faith, not focusing on what distinguishes living faith, which alone justifies, from dead faith. Reformers, on the other hand, view assent as something common to both dead (historical) faith and living faith, which alone brings salvation and righteousness, implying that the proper and specific act of faith, as it saves and justifies, should be established in something other than mere simple assent.

LXVI. Furthermore, as discussed above, Reformed theologians commonly teach that it is intrinsic to saving and justifying faith to specifically apply the promises of grace and salvation to each believer, an application that Roman Church theologians seem to reject. However, when considering those Reformers who want this application to consist of living and justifying faith not being idle and speculative but referring whatever is presented in God's Word to practice and personal use of the believer, it is clear they teach nothing that deviates from the doctrine of Roman Church theologians. These, as seen before, openly admit that faith, unless it is effective and active, cannot justify or save.

LXVII. If someone, as is often the case, understands special application as the persuasion by which the faithful decide that the promises of grace and salvation specially pertain to them, Roman Church theologians reject this application, not simply and entirely, but with some distinctions. As mentioned earlier, they observe two types of special application of divine promises. One, where an individual applies promises made to true children of God to themselves as if they were divinely certain they are among that number. Another, where someone, morally certain and convinced they are a child of God through His grace, trusts in the divine promises and awaits their fulfillment for themselves. They condemn and reject the former application but approve and embrace the latter.

LXVIII. Hence, the question is not whether a believer can and should apply the promises of grace to themselves, but whether this application is an act of faith, as the Reformers hold, or whether it should be considered only an act of confidence, which is the view of Roman Church

theologians. Yet, among Roman Church theologians, there are those who attribute this persuasion or confidence, which a believer has about God's grace, whether already obtained or to be obtained in the future, to the category of faith, among whom Gabriel Vasquez is evident from the previously mentioned points.

LXIX. Conversely, many Reformers do not deny that this application pertains to confidence but argue that it is an act of faith because they merge confidence with faith and consider it a part of faith. There are indeed Reformers who distinguish confidence from faith and view confidence not as a part of faith but as its effect, yet most Reformers count confidence among the acts and parts of faith and define faith through confidence, as if it's the most crucial aspect. However, Roman Church theologians universally maintain that confidence should be distinguished from faith and does not constitute a part of or an act of faith. Yet, when they teach this, they consider faith simply and abstractly, as it is separated from both living and dead faith. However, if one specifically considers faith as living, they do not deny that confidence is included in faith, as shown from the previously cited examples.

LXX. Similarly, the situation regarding Love is such that we've seen some Reformers deny that love is an act of faith, while others affirm it. All Roman Church theologians agree that love is not an act of faith but belongs to another virtue, that is, if the nature of faith is considered in itself. Otherwise, they readily admit that living and formed faith includes love, and "believing in God," which is the act of this faith, is to love God and move toward Him.

LXXI. Here too, it becomes clear that there is much debate over terminology and verbal contention. When most Reformed theologians say that trust and love pertain to faith and should be counted among its acts, they are considering faith as living, distinguishing it from dead or historical faith. They assert that trust and love are acts of faith because love and trust, which cannot be separated from living faith, differentiate living faith from dead faith. However, they do not deny that if someone defines faith in general terms, encompassing aspects common to both dead and living faith, then in this context, neither love nor trust is part of faith or enters into its definition. Conversely, when Roman Church theologians deny that love and trust are acts of faith and argue that faith should not be defined by love or trust, they are considering faith in terms of what is common to both living and dead faith. Yet, if one considers living faith as such, they do not dispute that trust and love can be included in it and regarded as its acts.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:

ON

THE SUBJECT OF FAITH

OR;

**On the Faculty to which Faith Adheres: & on the Connection
of Faith with Charity and Good Works.**

**In which the Doctrine of the Protestants is Explained, and Compared
with the Doctrine of the Roman School.**

Thesis I

On the faculty to which faith adheres, and which is considered the subject of faith, the Reformed Theologians do not agree. There are among them very renowned men who think that the proper subject of faith is the intellect, not the will. For they attribute no act of faith that does not originate from the intellect and mind. This is the opinion of Peter Molinaeus, as clearly deduced from his Theses on Justifying Faith, part two, Thesis 18 and 19. Robert Baronius in "*Philosophia Theologiae Ancillante*" also holds this view: Faith, he says, resides in the intellect alone, properly, subjectively, and with respect to its essence. Exercise 3, Article 21, No. 5.

II. Especially Moses Amyraut asserts this as certain and explored in his Theses on Faith, part 1, Thesis 15, and following. "The subject to which the habit of faith is born and adheres, which is the faculty in man called the intellect, should be beyond controversy among all who consider this matter not entirely indifferently. Indeed, since having faith is nothing other than to believe, and to believe is to be persuaded of the truth of something, it cannot be but that faith pertains to the intellect. For truth is the object of the intellect; and persuasion happens only by admitting or introducing into the intellect those reasons and arguments by which each thing demonstrates itself to be true."

III. Therefore, these theologians believe that the proper seat of faith is only the human intellect, and that faith, in its entire form and essence, resides in the intellect alone. They constitute the whole nature of faith in the apprehension of heavenly truth revealed by God and in the judgment and a certain assent that revolves around this truth. They recognize no other proper act of faith than to know the Word of God and to believe and assent to it as is fitting, which two pertain to the intellect, not to any other faculty.

IV. However, by intellect, they understand not the theoretical but the practical mind: since they teach that the proper act of faith is not any assent, but a practical assent, which moves and affects the will. Therefore, although they consider faith to be subjectively in the intellect alone, they also want it to be effectively in the will, that is, through its effects. Namely, because although its proper act is received in the mind, it nevertheless excites many movements and operations in the will, which necessarily accompany it and without which true and saving faith neither exists nor deserves to be called such.

V. Tilenus explains this matter in his Disputation on Justifying Faith: "Faith," he says, "resides in the intellect primarily, per se, and properly; in the will secondarily, namely effectively, insofar as it moves and affects it. Just as knowledge, by which we discern good from evil internally, is subjectively in the mind but effectively in the will when it elicits or commands actions dictated by reason."

VI. Similar teachings are offered by Robert Baronius in the aforementioned article. Although he asserts in section five that faith is in the intellect alone, properly, subjectively, and with respect to its essence, he also affirms in section seven that faith pertains to the will in many ways: first, in terms of its origin; second, in terms of its connected act; and third, in terms of the fruits that arise from faith in the will. He further explains that faith pertains to the will due to its origin because our intellect is moved by a pious inclination of the will and brought into captivity.

Hence, the assent of faith is often called an act commanded by the will; it is also described as voluntary and free because it depends on a freely acting principle, that is, the will; and this is why Augustine said, "No one believes except willingly." Faith also pertains to the will in terms of the associated and accompanying act; for at the very instant when faith in the intellect assents to the Gospel promises and applies them with certain and stable judgment, the will embraces God's grace and favor with burning love. Lastly, faith pertains to the will in terms of its fruits and actions, because sanctification and softening of the will follow the enlightenment of faith in the mind.

VII. However, that saving faith pertains to the will in terms of many of its acts and accompanying fruits is uncontested among Reformed Theologians. Whether the assent we give to the Word of God originates from the will and should be considered commanded by the will is not entirely agreed upon among them. At least Moses Amyraut does not seem to have conceded this. In his *Theses on the Cause of Faith*, he teaches that faith necessarily arises and is produced by the direct operation of the Holy Spirit on the rightly affected and disposed intellect, just as sensation necessarily follows the presence of a sensible object if the sense organ is suitably conditioned. Hence, he concludes that no command of the will is required for the act of faith to be elicited by the mind.

VIII. On the contrary, other distinguished Doctors of the Reformed School, along with Robert Baronius, teach that a movement and affection of the will are required before the assent to the truths of faith, as is clearly gathered from the doctrine of Amesius. For one of the precursors to the assent given to divine truth is, according to him, a pious affection towards God, which maximizes the influence of His testimony in us. In *Medulla Theologiae*, Book 2, Chapter 5.

IX. Daniel Chamierus discusses this matter extensively in *Panstratiae*, Tom. 3, Book 12, Chapter 4, on Faith, Paragraphs 6 and following. He uses many arguments to prove that faith is voluntary, that is, it originates from the will, and is an act of the intellect commanded by the will; other acts of the intellect depend on the will, while some do not, but faith is of the former kind. Thus, just as all good works come from our will as their cause, so does faith from our same will as a secondary cause. He adopts Thomas Aquinas's assertion that believing pertains to the intellect as it is moved by the will to give assent. He presents the reasoning in Paragraph 13: The movement by which the intellect is drawn to truth, called assent, occurs in two ways. Sometimes it's through reason, that is, the evidence of the matter, as in many sciences where conclusions are persuaded by the force of principles. This assent is necessary because the mind is somewhat compelled by the force of reasons. Other times, this movement is from the will, especially when the matter is obscure, that is, more removed from human understanding, which then must grope as if in darkness, lacking the light of reasons. Just as the eye cannot grasp an object in darkness due to the absence of light, so the intellect cannot perceive obscure matters, lacking the light of reasons. Therefore, the will must necessarily be involved, for it moves the intellect to assent to something otherwise unknown. In Theology, who does not know that there is no evident

reasoning? Therefore, in Theology, there must either be no assent or it must come from the will moving the intellect. Thus far, Chamierus.

X. But setting aside the discussion on the faculty to which faith adheres, among the Reformed Theologians there are some who believe that this faculty is not the mind or intellect, but solely the will. For they want all those acts by which faith is properly constituted not to be acts of the mind, but of the will. This is the opinion of William Ames in *Medulla Theologiae*, Book 2, Chapter 5, Nos. 12 and following. After stating that five things contribute to faith—1. Knowledge of the attested thing; 2. A pious affection towards God, which greatly validates His testimony for us; 3. Assent given to the attested truth; 4. Resting in God regarding what is proposed to be achieved; and 5. The choice or apprehension of the thing itself presented to us in the testimony—he adds that the first of these is in the intellect, but does not constitute faith. The second, fourth, and fifth are in the will, and they constitute faith. The third is in the intellect but as it is moved by the will, and it is not properly a virtue of faith, but an effect. Thus, Ames places faith in the will according to its proper form and essence, yet it still requires some acts in the intellect, and some of its effects also pertain to the intellect, opposing his earlier stated opinion.

XI. In *Enervating Bellarmine*, Ames philosophizes on the same matter, noting that we place justifying faith in the will so that the preceding assent of the intellect to faith is required, and we recognize the power and virtue of faith in the consequent intellect. For these reasons, we usually describe faith as if it were partly in the intellect and partly in the will. Tome 4, Book 4, Chapter 1. It should be noted that in the earlier citation, Ames identifies assent as an effect of faith, but in this later citation, he requires the preceding assent of the intellect for faith, which seems to be a clear contradiction. How can assent be an effect of faith and yet precede it? Unless one reconciles this by saying, according to Ames, assent is an effect of faith because it follows one of the components that constitute faith, namely, the pious affection towards God, which makes His testimony highly valid for us. Yet, according to Ames, this assent precedes faith concerning other acts that also constitute faith; these are the resting in God regarding what is proposed to be achieved and the choice or apprehension of the thing itself presented to us in the testimony.

XII. Between these two extreme and seemingly opposite opinions, there is a third, more common middle ground in the Reformed School. It posits that justifying faith is not in the intellect or the will alone but properly, formally, and subjectively resides in both faculties. This is because faith consists of multiple acts elicited partly from the intellect and partly from the will. Justifying faith is not a single simple habit or act but a composite of several acts or habits.

XIII. This opinion is held by Daniel Chamierus, who first proves that faith is in the intellect and then also in the will. Among other things, he uses the argument that all love is an act of the will: But faith is love; Therefore, it is an act of the will. He proves that faith is love from the fact that true faith is that by which we believe in God. To believe in God, according to Augustine, is to love by believing. *Panstratiae*, tom. 3, book 12, chapters 3 and 4.

XIV. Wendelinus also uses this argument to prove that faith is not solely in the intellect but also pertains to the will, as discussed in *Christian Theology*, Book 1, Chapter 24, explaining

Thesis eight. He also notes that faith is not a simple virtue but consists of various parts: knowledge, assent, and trust, which do not pertain to the same faculty.

XV. Bucanus, in response to the question "What is the subject of faith?" states: "The human soul, specifically in the mind for knowledge or understanding, judgment, and assent that rests in the word and divine promise; and in the will or heart for apprehension or embrace." Loc. 29, ques. 18.

XVI. Rivet also asserts that the proper and specific subject of justifying faith in humans is not only the intellect but also the will. He explains that knowledge and assent pertain to the intellect, while trust pertains to the will. Justification requires that the intellect understands what belongs to God, and the will apprehends and embraces it, not just in theory but also in practice. He later emphasizes that faith, as justifying, is not absolutely a single, simple habit but is an aggregation, somewhat composite of two habits, which are only coordinated as one, insofar as faith involves a habit existing in the will, making the will ready to believe and trust in God.

XVII. Altingius teaches that the proper subject of faith is partly the human intellect and partly the will, because the promise of grace is offered in the word, not only to be known and approved as true but also to be embraced as good; thus, it is offered to both the mind and the will, and it is certain that it is accepted by the will as much as it is approved by the mind. Similar views are presented by Antonius Valæus, Trelcatius, Paræus, and many others, whose testimonies would be too lengthy and unnecessary to cite individually.

XVIII. To present my view on this matter, I hold it as certain that true and saving faith, in terms of its origin, somehow depends on the will. It cannot be doubted that such faith is a good and praiseworthy work, worthy of reward and salvation as a free gift from God, as taught by Apostle Peter in his first epistle. Every good and praiseworthy work is free and voluntary, originating from the free will.

XIX. Yet it is equally certain that true and legitimate faith is not a purely arbitrary assent lacking solid and certain reasoning. The matters proposed for belief in the Word of God are obscure and not self-evident, yet those who lend them proper faith are convinced of God's truthfulness and are moved by sound and adequate reasons to believe that these matters are testified by God.

XX. However, our perception of the force of these reasons and our attention to them somewhat depend on our will. As one is inclined, so does one judge. Earthly desires that turn our will away from heavenly things also cloud the mind and prevent it from engaging with matters that contradict such desires or from grasping the force of reasons that should lead us away from them, like those validating the truths of faith. Thus, to conceive faith, our will must be transformed by God's grace and new affections must be stirred within it, so that nothing hinders us from properly focusing on and understanding the things that encourage faith, allowing us to judge the mysteries of faith as true, moved by the most convincing arguments and significant motives.

XXI. Yet, this is not enough to say that the subject of faith is not only the intellect but also the will, as some Reformed Doctors seem to think. This indeed implies that faith comes

from the will, but not that it resides in the will as its subject. Just like any free contemplation is commanded by the will but is elicited by and resides in the mind alone as its proper subject.

XXII. To accurately assign the subject of faith, it's important to note that faith can be taken in two ways. First, strictly, as it is contrasted with hope, charity, and all other virtues. In this sense, faith is a single, simple habit, nothing more than a firm, serious, deeply penetrating assent given to God's Word and all that is revealed in it. Taken in this way, faith resides solely in the intellect and does not pertain to the will at all. Assenting to truth is an act of the intellect, not the will. And thus, the proper object of the intellect is, as the good is the object and habit of the will.

XXIII. However, most often in scripture and ecclesiastical writers, faith is designated as a composite of several acts or habits, including sincere love for God, an ardent desire for His grace, and the trust by which we seek refuge in God and rest in His favor. This is what we typically call living, saving, and justifying faith, which Paul refers to as "faith working through love," and which the Roman School calls formed faith. For faith understood in this way, the subject is not the mind alone but also the will, which acts to love God, desire His grace, and trust in Him.

XXIV. Thus, the opinions that faith resides solely in the intellect and those asserting it occupies both the intellect and will, assigning both faculties as its subject, can be reconciled. However, the opinion of Ames and those who agree with him that faith resides only in the will is utterly implausible, as it contradicts the basic rationale that faith, at least partially, consists of assent and that assent is an act of faith. This cannot be asserted without altering the common and accepted meaning of the word faith, which a wise and prudent person should not do.

XXV. Regarding the Doctors of the Roman Church, the common doctrine of the Roman School is that faith is subjectively in the intellect alone, not in the will. However, they do not deny that faith pertains to the will in some way and that not only the intellect but also the will contributes to the act of faith. William Estius explains this in his commentary on the third book of Sentences, Distinction 23, stating that faith is partly of the intellect and partly of the will, with the intellect as the subject and proper power, since believing or assenting, the act of faith, belongs to the cognitive part, but also of the will since faith depends on it as the commanding and consenting principle. As human reason is designed to discern and examine whether to assent to proposed matters, and as matters of religion are often such that they do not admit rational scrutiny, appearing mostly improbable to human wisdom, our intellect would hardly ever, or only rarely, acquiesce to such matters without being led to assent by the will's inclination, being captured into obedience or submission to Christ. Therefore, this benevolent inclination of the will is necessary for the intellect in believing, both to turn it towards reasons that suggest and nourish faith or at least show that what is believed is not absurd, and to reject those that could impede or delay assent. Hence, the statement about Abraham in Romans 4, who did not consider his body now dead, etc. Therefore, the assent of faith is consequently also an act of the will, commanded by the will, both in its inception and its continuation.

XXVI. These ideas align with what Thomas Aquinas writes regarding Paul's words, "For with the heart one believes and is justified." Aquinas states, "One believes with the heart, that is, with the will, for while other aspects pertaining to external worship can be done unwillingly, belief cannot occur without willingness. The intellect of a believer is not compelled to assent to the truth by the necessity of reason, as is the intellect of someone who knows, but by the will." Similarly, Salmeron interprets "believing with the heart" to exclude pretense, which many bring to Baptism, and to indicate that the faith conferring righteousness is commanded by the will, unlike coerced faith, such as that in demons or those who believed in Jesus due to signs, but whom Christ did not trust. This faith does not bring righteousness; just as knowledge arises from the power of demonstrating reason, so faith is not demonstrated but accepted by the power of the will, which captures the intellect in obedience to Christ, who instills it.

XXVII. When the Doctors of the Roman Church say the subject of faith is not the will but only the intellect, it undoubtedly refers to faith considered absolutely and in itself. When discussing living faith, which operates through love and which they call formed, there's no doubt that, even in their view, it occupies not only the intellect but also the will, as it includes trust and love, which are not only commanded by but also elicited from the will, thus residing in it as their proper subject.

XXVIII. This is supported by Cardinal Contarini's words in his treatise on Justification: "Faith begins with the will, which, obeying God and faith, causes the intellect to assent without hesitation to what is divinely revealed, thus trusting in divine promises and developing a firm confidence that pertains to the will, making faith start and end with the will in a kind of circle." Cardinal Cajetan echoes this, stating, "To believe in God is to trust and lean into God, encompassing both an act of the intellect and the will."

XXIX. As shown, some Reformed School Doctors concede to the Roman School Theologians that faith resides solely in the intellect as its proper subject, though it also moves and affects the will. However, most Reformers contend that both faculties, the will and the intellect, are the subject of faith, which is commonly denied by Roman School Doctors. Yet, as also discussed, this too seems to be largely a verbal dispute. When Roman Church Doctors deny that faith resides in the will as its proper subject, they consider faith absolutely and in terms of its common attributes, whether alive or dead—a perspective no Reformed thinker would dispute. In contrast, when Reformers say faith is not only in the intellect but also in the will, they refer to living, active faith, distinguishing it from dead or historical faith, a distinction Roman Church Doctors readily acknowledge, recognizing that such faith includes trust and love, acts of the will.

XXX. It's important to note that this entire discussion about the subject of faith, like many others, is philosophical and bears no direct relevance to piety and religion. What matters most for piety and religion is understanding what we must do to obey Christ the Lord's commands regarding embracing the gospel with true and living faith. Whether the acts constituting true faith are acts of the mind or the will is irrelevant to piety, as is the question of whether the mind and will are two distinctly real faculties or one faculty considered in different

ways, or whether judgment is an act of the mind or the will—issues philosophers can leisurely debate.

XXXI. Having discussed the subject of faith, it remains to briefly explain what the Reformed School and Roman Church Doctors believe about the connection between faith, love, and good works. The consensus among Reformers is that true and saving faith is inseparable from charity; true faith cannot exist in someone without charity or where love for God and neighbor is absent. True faith's nature is such that it necessarily generates charity and other virtues in the believer's soul, much like sunlight is never without heat.

XXXII. They acknowledge not only that a human form of faith and belief can be applied to God's Word and Christian Doctrine by those living in sin and lacking in love for God but also that many are enlightened by the Holy Spirit to recognize the truth of the divine word and assent to it theoretically, yet continue to indulge in vices and lack sincere love for God. While such individuals are often said to believe in Scripture, and Scripture grants them a form of faith, Reformers refuse to call this faith true and saving, as it does not confer righteousness and salvation, which is essential for faith they consider genuine and salvific.

XXXIII. In contrast, Roman Church Doctors unanimously assert that true and saving faith can exist separately from charity and good works, believing it possible for someone to truly believe in the Gospel, inspired by the Holy Spirit, without engaging in good works or sincerely loving God. They think that anyone moved and enlightened by the Holy Spirit to truly assent to God's Word has true faith, even if it's inactive or uninformed, deserving the title of true faith.

XXXIV. While they admit that dead faith does not aid in salvation or righteousness since it does not actively save or justify anyone, they often label it as salvific or justifying because it can, at least remotely, prepare a person for salvation and righteousness. Thus, according to them, saving and justifying faith can exist separately from charity and good works.

XXXV. If asked specifically whether living faith, which they admit is the only type beneficial for salvation and justification, can be separated from charity, they must respond with a distinction. In a divided sense, living faith can be separated from charity, meaning that faith, once alive with charity, can become separated and thus dead. But in a composite sense, living faith, which alone actively saves and justifies, cannot be separated from charity, as faith without charity cannot be living and beneficial for salvation.

XXXVI. Clearly, as discussed, Reformed Theologians agree with Roman Church Doctors that there exists a type of faith, if a gift of the Holy Spirit, through which one genuinely assents to God's Word, yet it is not coupled with charity and good deeds and is found in many wicked individuals. Both Schools of Theology agree this type of faith does not save or justify anyone actively and do not deny that Reformed Theologians consider it a remote preparation for salvation. The question is whether it should be called salvific and justifying because it remotely prepares for righteousness and salvation and is true faith since it genuinely assents to the true object under the influence of the Holy Spirit, even though it remains useless for the believer otherwise. This question, as it appears, is only about the name since the fact is agreed upon. Yet, it seems more aligned with reason and Scripture's style to call only that faith which actively

saves and justifies as such, not the one that is of no actual or real benefit to the possessor's righteousness and salvation. Similarly, the term "true faith" rightly belongs to the faith that achieves its end and through which one believes rightly and as they should, especially since Scripture often understands such faith, and no other, when it mentions faith simply.

XXXVII. Conversely, Roman School Doctors concede to Reformers that living faith, separated from charity and good works, never exists, nor does any faith that is not joined with charity and good works actively save or justify. However, when they say that faith, which operates through love and situates a person in a state of grace and salvation, can be separated from love and cease in someone who no longer possesses that charity and the commitment to the good works necessary for salvation, it does not mean faith ceases to justify or render the person pleasing to God and acceptable for eternal life during that time, which Reformers do not deny.

XXXVIII. Indeed, this aligns with the doctrine of Reformers in the Kingdom of Poland, as made evident in their Confession presented at the Thorun Colloquy. They refute the accusation that they believe those once justified cannot lose God's grace, its assurance, or the Holy Spirit, even if they indulge in sins at will, arguing instead that even the reborn, when they relapse into sins against conscience and persist in them for a while, retain neither true faith, God's justifying grace, nor its assurance or the Holy Spirit during that period, incurring anew the guilt of wrath and eternal death, hence, unless revived to repentance by God's special grace (which they do not doubt will occur for the elect), they are indeed condemnable.

XXXIX. For the reborn cannot persist in sins against conscience without losing true faith, separating it from love for God and neighbor, thus ceasing to be true, i.e., salvific and justifying, as it stops the act of saving and justifying and no longer renders the person pleasing to God or acceptable for eternal life. This also aligns with David Parry's stance: faith that remains only habitually in those who have fallen cannot be rightly called justifying or capable of justifying. Robert Baronius corroborates this, stating that in the reborn who sin mortally, the lively act by which faith justifies is interrupted, rendering it unable to justify during that state.

XL. The validity of this, where living and effective faith that has justified and sanctified someone can be separated from charity and other good works, turning into a form that no longer justifies or sanctifies the possessor, is evidenced by examples of holy men undoubtedly endowed with true and living faith who yet fell into grave sins, persisting notably in them without thereby becoming outright faithless or ceasing to assent to God's Word, as seen in David's case, who, for months, not only defiled himself with adultery with Uriah's wife but compounded the heinous act with betrayal and murder, yet didn't deny all faith in God's Word or the Law of Moses.

XLI. This stance on David and similarly fallen saints is expressly taught and affirmed by Theologians in Great Britain, as included in their judgment on the fifth article of the Remonstrants presented in the Acts of the Synod of Dort. They prove with examples of Peter and David that the regenerated and justified can fall into severe sins, incurring damnable guilt, and by their own fault, subject themselves to eternal death, losing their present readiness to enter the kingdom of heaven. They further assert, while it was certain that God's servants David and Peter would reach heaven due to divine election, it was equally certain they could not be saved if they

had been caught unrepentant in adultery, murder, or denial of Christ, respectively. This leads to their thesis: in the interval between incurring guilt from grave sin and renewal through faith and repentance, the sinner, though destined to be absolved by Christ's merit and firm resolution, remains condemnable by his own merit until absolved through revived faith and repentance. This clearly aligns with the belief that faith, once living and active, can be separated from the necessary works of charity for salvation, ceasing to justify and leaving the person liable to eternal damnation for that period.

THEOLOGICAL THESIS:

On the use and acceptance of the word 'Justification' in the scriptures and the schools

THESIS I

To justify, which is in Hebrew צַדִּיק (tsaddiq), in Greek δικαιόω (dikaioo), is generally used in sacred scripture with a legal sense, that is, it does not signify making someone just from unjust, but rather declaring, having, recognizing him who has been accused of some crime or fault, or called into suspicion.

II. Undoubtedly, this is the meaning of this word wherever God is said to be justified by man, whether among men, which is quite frequent in the Old and New Testament Scriptures. Thus, in Psalm 51, the Prophet says, "Against you, you alone, have I sinned, and done what is evil in your sight, so that you may be justified in your words, and prevail when you are judged." Where being justified is explained by prevailing in judgment. But God prevails in judgment when it appears that He behaves towards men in such a way that He always remains truthful and just, whether He punishes or shows mercy, while the attempts of the profane to inquire into His providence are in vain. Likewise, in Matthew 11, wisdom is said to be justified by her deeds, because those who were endowed with true wisdom and enlightened acknowledged and proclaimed the supreme wisdom of God in the life and teaching, both of Christ and of John, shining brightly and illuminating against various calumnies of the Scribes and Pharisees. By which means also the people and tax collectors, having heard the testimony of Christ concerning John the Baptist, justified God, being baptized with John's baptism; but the Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel of God for themselves, not having been baptized by him. As it is written in Luke 7:29.

III. In the same sense, the word justifying is used where a man is said to justify himself, when he either asserts his innocence or claims his righteousness. As when in Luke 10, a certain lawyer, wanting to justify himself, said to Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?" And when in the same book, chapter 16, Christ rebukes the Pharisees, "You are those who justify yourselves before men, but God knows your hearts."

IV. Add to these places where to justify is set forth as an action of a judge, as when in Psalm 82, judges are commanded, to whom in that place the appellation of gods and sons of God is given, to justify the humble and orphan; but in Isaiah chapter 5, woe is pronounced upon judges who justify the wicked for bribes.

V. But this acceptance of the term is most clearly evident in those places where justification is opposed to condemnation. An example of which we have in Proverbs 17, "He who justifies the wicked and he who condemns the righteous are both alike an abomination to the Lord"; and in Matthew 12, "By your words you will be justified, and by your words you will be condemned." To which may be added Job 9, "If I justify myself, my own mouth will condemn me."

VI. Moreover, that perpetual signification of the word justifying in sacred scripture, and never indicating a real change, by which someone is made just and holy from impious, is

affirmed by some among Protestants. But most think otherwise, and in my judgment, with great reason. For that word, in several places of scripture, can hardly admit that legal sense, and to be justified does not signify only to be declared or pronounced just, but truly to become pious and just. Almost all agree on the interpretation of the passage in Daniel 12, "Those who are wise shall shine like the brightness of the firmament, and those who turn many to righteousness like the stars forever and ever." Where by those who turn many to righteousness, they understand not those who have many righteous, but who declare them, but, as the Vulgate has it, those who instruct many unto righteousness; or, as our vernacular translates it, those who lead many to righteousness. So that to justify there is the same as to render righteous by doctrine and example of life.

VII. Nor does the legal sense fit the passage found in Ecclesiasticus 18:22, "Do not delay to turn to the Lord and do not put off from day to day, for suddenly the wrath of the Lord will come forth, and at the time of punishment you will perish." Where the purpose of the writer is to warn men to repent, and the upright and holy are meant by true and sincere study of piety. Hence our vernacular translates those words, "Do not wait to be a good man until death."

VIII. Indeed, in the Pauline Epistles themselves there are some passages where very learned and celebrated men among Protestants think that justification is not simply being absolved in the divine judgment and pronounced just, but being made holy and just by the innovation of the Holy Spirit: such is that famous passage which is read in Romans 8:30, "And those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified." For when there Paul weaves a certain chain of divine benefits, of which we are made partakers by the grace of Christ, from our very predestination to that glory which we await in heaven, it seems that he has not omitted that singular and chief thing, namely, that by which we are freed from the slavery of sin, and true holiness and righteousness inherent in us; nor does he make distinct and express mention of it. Hence it follows that it is comprehended under some of the benefits enumerated by the Apostle. And nothing can be more aptly referred to than justification, which most theologians acknowledge Scripture sometimes to denote and include that grace. For what some say of this passage, that Paul embraces sanctification under glorification, is harsh and foreign, and does not agree with the style and usage of Scripture, from which no passage at all can be produced in which to glorify is to bestow holiness and righteousness.

IX. Similarly, those learned men think that justification does not signify solely absolution from the penalties of sin, but also a real abolition within us, a true change and renewal of ourselves, as in 1 Corinthians 6. "And such were some of you. But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit of our God." For there, Paul attributes our justification to the Holy Spirit, whose proper work is to renew us inwardly. Furthermore, it is evident that by justification Paul signifies some change, by which the Corinthians ceased to be what they previously were, namely, fornicators, drunkards, etc., such as cannot inherit the kingdom of God. But by mere absolution from the penalties of sin, someone infected with these vices is not cleansed, but by the internal renewal of the Holy Spirit.

Moreover, if justified there means nothing other than being absolved from the penalties of sin, the prayer of Paul, after he has said what is greater, but as if exaggerating adds what is less. For washing is more than simply being absolved from punishment; for besides the pardon of punishment, it includes a true purification from the filth of sin.

X. A third passage of this kind is found in the epistle to Titus, chapter 3, where it is said that God saved us through the washing of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit, whom he poured out on us generously through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that, having been justified by his grace, we might become heirs having the hope of eternal life. For, as is evident, the Apostle there teaches that God has regenerated us through the Holy Spirit, whom He has abundantly poured out upon us; so that thus justified by His grace, we may legitimately hope for the inheritance of eternal life; and therefore, it is necessary for us to be regenerated and renewed by the Spirit, in order to be justified, in which sense he takes the term justification there. But if we need regeneration and internal renewal by the Holy Spirit to be considered justified before God, certainly justification according to the Apostle in that passage comprehends our sanctification.

XI. Moreover, among those Doctors who think that in the passages cited justification does not include only the remission of sin, but also the donation of some internal righteousness, may be numbered Beza, Zanchius, Bullinger, and the Professors of Leiden, in their Synopsis of Pure Theology. For thus Beza speaks in his larger notes on the passage from the Epistle to Titus just cited. "I take the term justification in a broad sense, so that it includes everything we obtain from Christ, both by imputation and by the efficacy of the Spirit in sanctifying us, so that we may be His own, that is, perfect and complete in Him. Thus the word justifying is taken, Romans 8:30."

XII. But Zanchius, in the epistle to the Ephesians, chapter 2, verse 4, speaking of Justification, after observing that the term justifying has a double meaning, and first, that it is opposed to condemning, and signifies to absolve someone accused of crimes and pronounce him just and innocent in judgment, adds, "The other meaning of the word is for a man to be made just from unjust, just as to be sanctified is to be made holy from profane. For this reason, the Apostle said, 1 Corinthians 6:11, 'And such were some of you; but you were washed, but you were sanctified, but you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit of our God.'"

XIII. Anthony Thysius also in the Synopsis of Pure Theology of the Professors of Leiden, Disputation 33, Thesis 3, testifies that he holds the same opinion: "Yet we do not deny, for the sake of the close and very strict connection, that justification sometimes seems to include sanctification itself, as a consequence. Romans 8:30, Titus 3:7, etc."

XIV. However, Henry Bullinger, in the same passage 1 Corinthians 6:11, writes thus: "The Apostle uses different words to signify the same thing, when he says, 'You were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified.' But he said washed because of holy baptism, sanctified because of the Holy Spirit, but justified because of justifying faith, etc."

XV. Indeed, Calvin himself seems to find it probable that regeneration is included under justification in those passages, although he does not think it necessary. For in his Commentaries

on the Epistles of Paul, when explaining that of the Apostle in Romans 8, "And those whom he called he also sanctified," he says, "The term justification can not improperly be extended to the continuous course of divine grace, from the Call to death: but because Paul uses this word throughout the epistle for justification by imputation, there is no necessity to depart from this meaning." And likewise in Titus 3:7, he says, "If we accept regeneration in its proper and usual sense, the Apostle seems to put justification for the regenerated; and sometimes this is what it signifies, but more rarely. However, there is no necessity to depart from its proper and more genuine signification. And a little later, "This indeed is certain, that Paul brings justification as a free gift of God; it only remains to inquire what he means by the name of justification. The context seems to require it to be extended further than to imputation of righteousness: in this sense it is rarely found in Paul. Nevertheless, nothing prevents it from being restricted to the remission of sins.

XVI. However, among Protestants, few are found who do not acknowledge that the word "justification" has a forensic sense in Revelation 22:11. "Let the one who does right continue to do right, and let the holy person continue to be holy." Where it is quite apparent, according to the mind of the Holy Spirit, that to justify there does not mean to declare just the one who is already just, nor even to make the unjust simply just, but rather to make the already godly and righteous more just and righteous; therefore, to be justified in that context signifies to progress and increase in piety and righteousness.

XVII. Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church unanimously confess that justification is taken in all these ways in Holy Scripture: not only to signify being justified, acquiring righteousness, or growing in righteousness, but also frequently to declare or acknowledge one as just. This is seen in the writings of Becanus, a Jesuit, in his *Summa Theologiae*, volume 2, tract 4, chapter 3, section 1. "Justify," he says, "is used in Sacred Scripture in three ways. First, to mean the same as to make just, as in Romans 4:5, 'To the one who does not work but trusts God who justifies the ungodly.' Secondly, to mean the same as to make more just, as in James 2:24, 'You see that a person is considered righteous by what they do and not by faith alone.' And in Revelation 22:11, 'Let the one who does right continue to do right.' Thirdly, to mean the same as to declare or pronounce someone just, as in Proverbs 17:15, 'Acquitting the guilty and condemning the innocent—the Lord detests them both.' Hence, justification is also understood in three ways: first, for the acquisition of righteousness. For the one whom God justifies, that is, makes just, is said to acquire righteousness. Secondly, for the increase of righteousness. For since righteousness has breadth, the one who has obtained righteousness once can grow and progress in it. Thirdly, for the declaration of righteousness. For one who was previously suspected or even accused of unrighteousness can be pronounced and declared as just, even if not truly just."

XVIII. Similarly, Bellarmine teaches in his work on Justification, book 1, chapter 1, among other things, that the term justification in the sacred scriptures is understood to mean the acquisition of righteousness, as in 1 Corinthians 6:11, "And such were some of you. But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified." Also, in Romans 8:30, "And those he

predestined, he also called; those he called, he also justified." Furthermore, it is understood to mean the increase of righteousness. For, he says, just as we say someone is heated, not only if they were cold and became warm, but also if they were warm and became warmer, so too one is said to be justified not only if they were unjust and became just, but also if they were just and became more just. Thus says Ecclesiasticus 18:22, "Do not be too sure even of eternal life." And James 2:21, "Was not our father Abraham considered righteous for what he did when he offered his son Isaac on the altar?" And Revelation 22:11, "Let the one who does right continue to do right." Lastly, it is understood for the declaration of righteousness in a certain forensic manner, so that one is said to be justified when, having been accused by someone of wrongdoing, they are declared just by the judge's sentence and absolved. Thus Solomon uses this term in Proverbs 17:15, "Acquitting the guilty and condemning the innocent— the Lord detests them both." Isaiah 5:23, "Who acquit the guilty for a bribe, but deny justice to the innocent." And Luke 7:35, "But wisdom is proved right by all her children," and Luke 10:29, "But he wanted to justify himself."

XIX. Indeed, in the very Epistles of Paul, there are certain passages where the Doctors of the Roman Church acknowledge and observe that the word "justification" is taken in a forensic sense. Such is the passage in Romans 2:13, "For it is not those who hear the law who are righteous in God's sight, but it is those who obey the law who will be declared righteous." Regarding this, Estius notes in his commentaries that to be justified there is the same as to be considered just, or declared just, a very common phrase in Scripture, as he himself says. And so, according to him, the sense of that passage is, "Those who observe the law's commands will be judged, declared, and held as just by God." This interpretation is also approved by Ruardus Tapperus in Article 8, page 32. He says, "Regarding the aforementioned, it must be considered that in the Scriptures, 'to justify' not only means to imbue, donate, or adorn with righteousness, but sometimes also to pronounce, declare, judge, prove, and appoint as just. According to this meaning, the blessed Augustine interprets the Apostle Paul's statement, 'Those who obey the law will be justified,' that is, they will be considered just, held as just."

XX. Similarly, many interpreters of the Roman Church understand the words of Paul in Romans 8:33, "Who will bring any charge against those whom God has chosen? It is God who justifies," in a forensic sense. Thus Tolernus writes about this passage, "The word 'justification' in this passage is understood in the sense opposed to condemnation, namely, to justify and pronounce just, just as a judge absolves and pronounces innocent by his judgment. For this reason, Pererius also explains the same passage. And this was also taught previously, as reported by Adamus Saphout; 'God is the one who justifies,' that is, who absolves from sins and from intended actions. These words Estius retains in his Commentary."

XXI. Furthermore, from the various meanings of the word "justification" accepted in Scripture, the Protestant schools, in their Disputations on the justification of man, have adopted only the first one, according to which justification is taken in a forensic sense. For by justification before God, they understand nothing other than the absolution of the sinner, by which he is pronounced free from the penalties due to sin, which are exclusion from the heavenly

kingdom and condemnation to eternal torment. Therefore, according to their understanding, justification truly signifies nothing other than the pardon of punishment.

XXII. Hence it is that they distinguish human justification from regeneration or sanctification, which they teach to be two benefits, distinct in their nature, although they cannot be separated from each other. For according to their opinion, God absolves no one from the punishment of sins without also freeing them from the bondage of sin, wiping away the stains of sin, adorning their souls with new righteousness, and filling them with true and sincere love for God. But by the name of justification, they usually mean only absolution, while by sanctification, they mean purification from the filth of sin and the bestowal of internal righteousness. Although they acknowledge that these terms are sometimes interchanged in the Holy Scriptures, as observed by Chamierus, Volume 3, Book 10, Chapter 1, number 6: "We are not such inept estimators of words, as not to know, or such stubborn sophists as to refuse the interchange of the terms justification and sanctification; indeed, we especially call saints such because they have forgiveness of sins in Christ. And we read in the Apocalypse, 'Let the one who is righteous still be righteous,' which cannot be understood as referring to a deficiency of inherent righteousness, and perhaps we do not deny that in other places they indiscriminately come into use."

XXIII. Therefore, when they deny that believers are justified by works, they do not want to deny that true righteousness exists in believers, which God graciously accepts through Christ and which, by the moving and stirring of God's grace itself, produces many and varied fruits of good works. These works, according to their view, only teach that there is no inherent righteousness in believers and no good works, even those produced by the grace of God, that can withstand the rigorous examination of divine justice if God were to enter into judgment with them without mercy and compassion. And they believe that no one can be acquitted in God's judgment if God were to examine his life and works severely, as the law threatens, and thus believers are pronounced free from the punishment of sin by mere grace in Christ, not on account of any righteousness inherent in them or by its merit and consideration.

XXIV. However, when they affirm that we are justified before God by the imputed righteousness of Christ, they mean nothing else but that Christ's passion and obedience are so given and communicated to us by God that they truly become ours and should be considered ours. And this righteousness given to us is such that by its merit and consideration we are absolved from the curse of the law, which consists, as mentioned, in perpetual exclusion from the kingdom of God and condemnation to eternal fire.

XXV. Finally, when they say that we are justified by faith alone, they understand that living and efficacious faith, demonstrated by good works, and not dead and idle faith, is not the only condition demanded by God from us to partake in the forgiveness of sins and to be accepted by God unto eternal life. It is not only the sole and only instrument by which we receive and apprehend such a great benefit. All these things are of such truth and clarity that, without being exposed to slander and misunderstanding, they cannot be denied by anyone. Indeed, Roman Catholic doctors agree with us regarding these matters, as we have already made clear in several discussions.

XXVI. Protestants cannot reasonably be accused of misusing words in this respect. Since our absolution from the punishment of sin and the real deletion of sin within us by the infusion of new righteousness are two benefits, connected and inseparable, but nevertheless distinct in nature, why should it not be permissible for Protestants to use distinct terms for these distinct concepts in their schools, for the sake of more precise doctrine? Especially when it is universally agreed that the word "justification" in the Holy Scripture most often denotes judicial absolution, and one is said to be justified not because they are actually righteous but because they are considered and accounted as such.

XXVII. However, Roman Catholic theologians use the term justification differently in their schools. For among them, justification does not only signify the forgiveness of the debt of sin but also the real abolition of sin and the acquisition of a certain internal righteousness. Thus, according to their view, one is said to be justified not only when absolved from the guilt of sin but also when newly infused with righteousness or when they advance and grow in the righteousness already received. Hence, they distinguish two kinds of justification, the first and the second. The first is when someone is made holy and righteous from being a sinner, unjust, and impious. The second is when someone who was already righteous becomes even more righteous and receives an increase in righteousness. However, when they speak simply of justification, they usually mean the first kind, which among them is often called the justification of the impious.

XXVIII. Therefore, when they say that men are justified by inherent righteousness before God, it is not their intention to imply that Christ's believers possess such righteousness by which they can stand before God's tribunal if God examines them according to the strictness of the law, devoid of all mercy. Rather, they only mean to say that believers are clothed with new and inherent righteousness through the grace of Christ, which is truly and sincerely accepted by God, and which God will reward with the glory of His kingdom in the final judgment.

XXIX. Similarly, when they deny that we are justified by the imputed righteousness of Christ, they do not intend to deny that Christ's righteousness is given to and communicated with believers, and that by His merit alone they escape the punishments of hell, otherwise due to their sins. But their sense is that Christ's merit and obedience are not that form by which believers are called just and holy in the Scriptures, but rather that they derive this denomination from the righteousness within which they are endowed by the power of the Holy Spirit.

XXX. However, when they teach that we are justified not by faith alone but also by works, they do not mean to imply that believers merit the forgiveness of their sins by certain good works, properly speaking, nor that it is not entirely gratuitous. Instead, they want to emphasize that faith is not merely a single condition—separate from hope, trust, hatred of sin, love for God, etc.—that God requires from us to obtain the gift of the Holy Spirit and the forgiveness of our sins. And they also believe that after a person has been justified by the grace of Christ, they grow in the exercise of good works in righteousness and sanctity and receive an increase in the accepted righteousness, according to the divine promises. All of which Protestants

readily concede and do not contend against when discussing the doctrine of free justification with the doctors of the Roman Catholic Church.

XXXI. Moreover, they do not consider it a crime if someone extends the concept of justification to include our internal renewal under it. They acknowledge that this term has often been used by the Fathers in this sense, but they do not think that this should provoke any dispute. Thus Chemnitz speaks in his Examination of the Council of Trent: "We are by no means such troublemakers as to be so unfair and eager for contention that, even if a pious and wholesome consensus had been reached on the matter, we would seek grounds for quarrels from the conflicts of words. For the Fathers, although they often take the word 'justify' to mean renewal, by which we are made righteous through the works of the Spirit, we do not engage in dispute when they rightly and appropriately set forth, according to Scripture, how and why a person is reconciled to God, receives the remission of sins and adoption, and is accepted into eternal life" (Examination of the Council of Trent, page 129).

XXXII. Indeed, the most renowned theologian of the Augsburg Confession, Johann Brenz, understands the term justification in such a way that he considered it to include the renewal of man. He testified to this in his letter to Melanchthon on this matter, as is evident from Melanchthon's response to him, which is found in Melanchthon's Consilia, page 245. He says to Brenz, "Men are justified by faith because we receive the Holy Spirit by faith, so that we may then become righteous, namely, by the fulfillment of the law, which the Holy Spirit accomplishes in us." Yet no one among the Protestants considered Brenz deserving of harsh censure for this. Johannes Gerhard says, "Far be it from us to suspect Brenz of the error of the Papists regarding justification just because he uses the Latin compound of the term 'justification' in a broader sense" (Theological Loc. 3, chap. on Justification by Faith, number 245), where he quotes at length Brenz's position on this matter from his Apology of the Württemberg Confession on Justification.

XXXIII. And certainly, when the term 'justification' is sometimes used in the judgment of many Reformers in Scripture to encompass our sanctification, those who retain sound doctrine cannot justly be condemned. They use this term with the understanding consecrated in the Word of God, as Martin Borrheus, formerly a professor at the University of Basel, did, if what I see cited from his commentary on Genesis chapter 15 is true, where these words are attributed to him among many others of the same kind: "Thus just as Blessed Paul, in our justification, when he says, 'Whom he justified, them he also glorified,' comprehends everything that pertains to reconciling us to God the Father and attaining the glory of renewal in us, such as faith, righteousness, Christ, and the gift of righteousness exhibited by Christ, by which we are regenerated to fulfill the justification required by the law, so we also desire to include everything in this matter that pertains to the restoration of righteousness and innocence. However, when these things are taught, they are not new but confessed by all ancient and modern professors of sacred literature who indeed taught correctly and truly, unless perhaps they are said by us in a somewhat more distinct manner than is commonly expressed in this matter of justification; however, there is no doubt that there is no disagreement in reality. For they all warn us that in the

justification of the impious, these things are included: Christ our righteousness, remission of sins obtained by his death, the Holy Spirit, by whose power and imputed righteousness of Christ we are given grace for our sins, and our renewal by loving God and our neighbor purely, etc. But this book is not at hand for us."

XXXIV. Moreover, the question always remains as to what sense Paul takes justification when he affirms that God justifies the ungodly and that we are justified freely by God's grace, not by works but by faith. Does justification designate only some judicial absolution from the guilt of sin, distinct from human sanctification, as Protestants wish, or does it also signify our internal renewal by the grace of the Holy Spirit, in which our regeneration and sanctification consist, as the Doctors of the Roman Church wish? To this question, we observe first that when there is agreement on the thing itself and the manner of teaching is not contrary to the analogy of faith, there is not much effort to be made in disputing different interpretations of a certain passage or the various meanings of this or that word in it. Rather, each person's judgment should be left and should be free in this matter. As Protestants, who agree in substance among themselves, easily allow some of their own to interpret this very term of justification differently in certain places, such as Daniel 12:3, Romans 8:30, 1 Corinthians 6:11, Titus 3:7, and Revelation 22:11, where some think that a forensic sense can be retained, while others think differently, as has been explained by us previously in many instances.

XXXV. Secondly, it should be observed that in other more contentious passages, where there is no dispute among Protestants themselves, but with the Doctors of the Roman Church, whichever sense is taken of the word 'justification,' whether it is restricted to mere absolution from the guilt of sin or is also considered to encompass our sanctification, it will always be useful and consistent with the Apostle's style and the analogy of faith. For just as it is true that we are absolved from sins freely by Christ's grace, so also are we sanctified and regenerated freely by Christ's grace. As sins are forgiven through faith, so also are hearts purified and sanctified by faith. Lastly, just as our absolution is not by works, so also our sanctification or regeneration, according to the Apostle's phrase, cannot be said to be by works.

XXXVI. For firstly, according to Paul's doctrine and mode of speaking, what is not by grace is by works. Indeed, these are opposed concepts that mutually destroy each other: grace and works. For as the Apostle says, "But if it is by grace, it is no longer on the basis of works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace" (Romans 11:6). Moreover, no one can call into doubt that man's sanctification is a free gift of God and a wholly singular grace. Therefore, according to the Apostle's doctrine, it is not by works.

XXXVII. Lastly, what follows from the Apostle's mind is that what is by works is according to obligation. For, as he says, "Now to the one who works, his wages are not counted as a gift but as his due" (Romans 4:4). But the new holiness and righteousness that we attain in Christ are given to us freely, not according to obligation, as is evident to anyone. Therefore, it is certain that we are not sanctified by works but rather made holy and righteous before God.

XXXVIII. Furthermore, that salvation by which we are said to be saved through Christ (Ephesians 2:8, 2 Timothy 1:9, Titus 3:4) does not consist solely in the forgiveness of our sins

but also in liberation from the bondage of vices and in our transformation into the image of God, which consists in true righteousness and holiness. Therefore, our sanctification is indeed included and comprehended primarily in this salvation. Yet in all these passages, the Apostle affirms that we are not saved by works or according to works. For thus he writes to the Ephesians: "For by grace you have been saved through faith. And this is not your own doing; it is the gift of God, not a result of works, so that no one may boast" (Ephesians 2:8-9). And to Timothy, he mentions that God has saved us and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given to us in Christ Jesus before the ages began (2 Timothy 1:9). Similar sentiments are expressed in his admonition to Titus: "But when the goodness and loving kindness of God our Savior appeared, he saved us, not because of works done by us in righteousness, but according to his own mercy, by the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit, whom he poured out on us richly through Jesus Christ our Savior" (Titus 3:4-6). Therefore, even though justification may be extended to encompass both aspects of the salvation that believers obtain through Christ in this life—namely, the forgiveness of sins and the inner renewal of man—we are no less truly justified by the grace of Christ and faith, not by works, even if it is taken more strictly to mean solely absolution from the guilt of sin.

XXXIX. Furthermore, in that last passage taken from the letter to Titus, the Apostle does not attribute our justification to works of righteousness but rather to the renewal by the Holy Spirit. For he says, "He saved us, not because of works done by us in righteousness, but according to his own mercy, by the washing of regeneration and renewal of the Holy Spirit" (Titus 3:5). Therefore, it follows that our sanctification, which is accomplished through that washing of regeneration and the renewing Spirit within us, should not be said according to Paul to be from works of righteousness that we have done. Since they are opposed, it cannot be said both that the renewal of the spirit occurs through works of righteousness that we have done.

XL. Moreover, after the Apostle, with the words quoted from the letter to the Ephesians, states that we are saved by faith and not by works, he confirms this by stating that our good works are the fruits and effects of our salvation, and therefore they cannot be its cause. For he says, "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them" (Ephesians 2:10). By these words, he indicates that it is necessary for us to be prepared and restored by God's grace before we can engage in good works. This is a kind of new creation, prior to our ability to perform good works. For in the last words of the Apostle, there is a certain hypallage, and when he says that God prepared good works for us to walk in them, he means that God does not prepare us by his grace to walk in good works. This reasoning also clearly proves that we are sanctified by faith and not by works. Just as in the same way, our good works are not the cause but the fruit of our sanctification, through which we, who are naturally sinful, are truly made holy and righteous. As Augustine said, just as good works follow justification and do not precede it, we can also say that the same good works do not precede sanctification but follow it. For we do not perform good works well

until God sanctifies us by his grace. But God sanctifies us by his grace so that we may later be able to perform good works well.

XLI. Lastly, just as the Apostle often says that we are justified without the works of the law, so we can also truly and appropriately say, according to the Apostle's style, that we are sanctified without the works of the law. For by the works of the law, the Apostle means such observance of the law that excludes the necessity of divine grace and for which reward is to be given according to obligation, not according to grace—according to the saying, "To the one who works, his wages are not counted as a gift but as his due" (Romans 4:4). Moreover, "But if it is by grace, it is no longer on the basis of works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace" (Romans 11:6). Therefore, to be justified by the works of the law is to have performed obedience to the law, to which life is owed according to the promises of the law, and by which, according to the terms of the covenant of the law, one ought to be acquitted in God's judgment from all punishment. But to be justified without the works of the law is to be acquitted in the divine judgment and pronounced free from all guilt, as one who has not rendered obedience to the law according to the strictness of the law. And yet, who does not see that this applies equally to being sanctified without the works of the law? For in order to be regarded and made holy before God, it is not necessary for us to have fulfilled the divine law according to its full rigor, and if we were to be examined according to the standard to which the covenant of works obliges us, we would in no way be found to have sinned against the law. But just as God absolves the ungodly—that is, those whom the law convicts and condemns—provided they embrace the living and efficacious faith in Christ's merit, so also does he prove and acknowledge as truly holy and righteous those in whom faith is found working through love, even though they may have frequently transgressed the law and fallen short in many things that would be necessary for one who should be pronounced holy and righteous according to the legal covenant.

XLII. Furthermore, when the Apostle affirms that a man is justified without the works of the law, he specifically intends to teach concerning our justification before God that it is not necessary for us to observe the Mosaic ceremonial laws, as can especially be seen in the letter to the Galatians. In the same way, we are sanctified without the works of the law. For it is no more necessary for us to observe the ceremonial laws in order to be holy before God than it is necessary for us to be acquitted of all guilt in his judgment.

XLIII. Therefore, whether the term 'justification' is restricted solely to absolution from guilt or also extended to the attainment of new and inner righteousness, it is equally true that we are justified freely, by the grace of Christ, through faith, not by works, and without the works of the law. And whether it is taken in one way or the other, it does not interfere with the Apostle's purpose, who teaches that in order for us to be partakers of salvation and righteousness, it is not necessary to observe the Mosaic law, or the covenant of works, or to adhere to the legal requirements, according to the solemn clause, "Do this and you will live." It is sufficient to believe in the Gospel of Christ with a living faith, which operates through love, so that sinners may be considered and deemed just before God by no other means. Since these things, I say, are so, it seems superfluous to dispute this matter, nor should we be troubled that the doctrine of

justification is understood in one way or another, since in it, true faith and sound doctrine are not endangered.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:
Wherein is explained how we are justified by faith.

Thesis I

That you are justified by faith, through faith, and from faith, Scripture so clearly and frequently inculcates that no Christian can doubt this matter. However, theologians do not agree among themselves on how this should be understood, and in what sense the justification of a sinful human by the Holy Spirit is attributed to faith. Thus, theologians' discussions obscure the matter greatly, and the controversy is agitated with great contention, in which the mind seeks to bring some light, as much as God will give.

II. First and foremost, it must be known what that faith is which is said to justify. To understand this matter, it must be noted in Sacred Scripture that sometimes believing and having faith are said of those who give any assent to the Word of God and are convinced and persuaded of the truth of the heavenly doctrine, even if they do not obey its precepts or strive to conform their life to it. Thus, in John 12:42, many of the rulers believed in Christ but did not confess him because of the fear of the Jews, and because, as John notes, they loved the glory of men rather than the glory of God. Similarly, Simon Magus is reported to have believed when Philip preached, and he marveled at the signs and great miracles performed by Philip. Yet at that very time, when Peter rebuked him, his heart was not right before God, and he was bound in the gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity, as can be seen in the same chapter, verses 21 and 23.

III. However, Scripture often designates by the name of faith not just any assent given to a doctrine revealed by God, but only that which moves and affects a person so that love and trust in God are born from it, along with proper obedience to His precepts. This is the faith that divine writings praise and commend so much, attributing victory over the world to it and testifying that salvation, life, and adoption are inseparably connected with it. As when John says, "Everyone who believes that Jesus is the Christ has been born of God, and this is the victory that has overcome the world—our faith" (1 John 5:1, 6). And Christ himself said, "For God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life" (John 3:16). Likewise, "For this is the will of my Father, that everyone who looks on the Son and believes in him should have eternal life, and I will raise him up on the last day" (John 6:40). For not all who believe in Christ and his words in any way have eternal life and are adopted by God as sons, and overcome the world, but only those who offer due obedience to God from faith and have a faith that is effective in good works.

IV. Therefore, the former kind of faith is found in many impious and hypocrites; the latter only in truly pious and good people. The former is merely speculative assent, which clings to the theoretical intellect. The latter is practical assent, which moves the affection and affects the will. Therefore, the act of the former is expressed by the phrase "to believe God," which

means to assent simply to God speaking; that of the latter, by "to believe in God," which includes with assent trust in God and love for God, according to Augustine's words, "What is it to believe in God? It is to believe in love, to believe in love, to believe to go to him, and to be incorporated into his members." Therefore, the former faith is dead and useless. For just as a body without a spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead, as James testifies in his epistle (James 2). On the other hand, the latter faith is alive and working through love, and it draws with it all the obedience that Christ requires from us.

V. Furthermore, that dead, inert, and useless faith, which Protestants call historical, cannot justify. For James clearly teaches that such faith can also be found in demons and that it profits nothing for salvation, and thus it does not contribute to righteousness. "What good is it, my brothers, if someone says he has faith but does not have works? Can that faith save him?" (James 2:14). And later, "You believe that God is one; you do well. Even the demons believe—and shudder!" (James 2:19). Hence, Paul, writing to the Galatians, affirms that nothing avails in Christ except faith working through love; and consequently, faith itself does not avail unless it works through love. For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision counts for anything, but only faith working through love (Galatians 5:6). Lest anyone be deceived by this and indulge in the name of faith in a certain inert and useless faith, devoid of charity and good works, in other places the same sentiment is repeated, substituting for faith working through love either the new creation or the observance of God's commandments. Thus, the same Apostle, in chapter 6 of the already cited epistle, verse 15, says, "For neither circumcision counts for anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creation." And in 1 Corinthians 7:19, "For neither circumcision counts for anything, nor uncircumcision, but keeping the commandments of God." So, to the Apostle, these three are equivalent: keeping the commandments of God, a new creation, and faith working through love.

VI. Therefore, when we are said to be justified by faith, it must be understood not of dead faith, but of living faith; not of idle faith, but of effective faith, from which new obedience and good works proceed, bringing with them the transformation of the whole life. Moreover, among Protestant theologians, it is certain that faith, even if living and effective, does not justify as that righteousness by which we stand before the severe judgment of God, or as a part or beginning of that righteousness. For since the chief duty of faith is to seek divine mercy, how could a person bear the strict examination of divine justice through it and by its virtue? For there is a contradiction between needing God's mercy and being able to challenge His justice.

VII. It is equally clear among them that faith does not justify us or obtain righteousness from God by our own merit and worthiness. For although it is fitting and congruent with divine goodness to receive the believing and repentant into grace, and indeed, it demands the utmost equity and wisdom of God that He forgive sins and extend mercy to the penitent and believing, yet God is not obliged by justice to forgive sins to the believer and make him a participant in the righteousness of Christ and accept him unto eternal life. And the way in which God acts so kindly and paternally towards the believer must be entirely attributed to His pure grace and mercy. This is frequently and clearly taught in Scripture, which often emphasizes that we are

justified freely and according to grace, not according to merit, especially in the third and fourth chapters of the epistle to the Romans. For if faith deserved justification, justification would not be free, not by pure grace, but we would be justified by debt.

VIII. The Orthodox Doctors refer to these matters when they deny that faith justifies us as a work. For by this they intend to signify nothing other than that faith is not the cause of justification, as the Schools speak, formal or meritorious, that is, as we have already said, of that righteousness by which we can stand before the strict judgment of God, as part or merit or price by which it is acquired and obtained. But although the Reformed Theologians agree on these points, they do not agree on how faith is said to justify.

IX. Some, indeed, want faith not properly to justify, and they consider the justification of faith to be attributed only very improperly, because, namely, through faith we have a sense of justification, even before it, and without it being done. For they think that justification is something that precedes faith, and that the elect of God are justified even before they believe and convert. And this because in their minds, justification was either made from eternity or at least when Christ the Mediator was promised to men, who would take our sins upon himself and offer himself as a sponsor for divine righteousness. Therefore, justification, properly understood, is nothing else to them than the certain will of God to absolve the elect from sin for the sake of Christ, nor does faith have any other power or function with regard to this justification than to lead us into its knowledge and make us certain and secure about it.

X. But they misuse the term "justification." For justification is not God's will to absolve men from sin or to forgive men's sins, but it is the actual forgiveness of sins and their absolution. And just as the will to save or sanctify is one thing, but salvation and sanctification themselves are another, so they should be clearly distinguished: the decree or will to justify some and to forgive their sins, and the actual justification and forgiveness of sins. For the will to justify and to forgive sins is indeed eternal and precedes faith, but the actual forgiveness and justification occur in time and follow faith.

XI. This will be evident if we carefully consider what the forgiveness of sins consists of and in what it consists, which, in substance, is the same as the justification of the sinner: sins are forgiven to someone when he ceases to be liable to punishment for sins. And achieving the forgiveness of sins and defining it are clearly the same as being exempt from the punishment due to sin. But no one defines being liable to punishment as much as the sins deserve before he has forsaken them by true repentance and fled to God's mercy in Christ. For the law of God is firm and stable, and in his word it is often inculcated that whoever indulges in sin, and does not turn to God through true conversion, remains liable to the judgment and wrath of God. Hence David's words: "The wicked shall not stand before your eyes; you hate all evildoers" (Psalm 5:5). "The face of the Lord is against those who do evil" (Psalm 34). Also what our Lord Jesus Christ says, "Unless you repent, you will all likewise perish" (Luke 13:3). And, "Whoever does not believe stands condemned already" (John 3:18). As long as someone persists in sin and has not yet turned to God and embraced Christ the Redeemer by faith, he remains the object of God's hatred and wrath, and is certainly liable to eternal damnation by God's law.

XII. Indeed, from eternity God decreed to make the elect immune from the punishment due to their sins; however, not by violating the law to which those who persist in sin are subject to eternal damnation, nor by excepting them from that law, but by imparting grace to them in time, by which they believe in Christ, truly convert to God. Only then do they cease to be liable to wrath and eternal damnation, as they were when they served sin. And this is accomplished by virtue of that Evangelical ordinance by which God has decreed to deliver from the penalties of sin, and to account righteous all those who, with living faith in Christ, turn away from sin and embrace the pursuit of newness of life. According to what Paul says to the Romans, "If you confess with your mouth that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved" (Romans 10:9). And to the jailer of Philippi, "Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved" (Acts 16:31). This is also what Solomon means, "Whoever conceals his transgressions will not prosper, but he who confesses and forsakes them will obtain mercy" (Proverbs 28:13). And what God says through Ezekiel, "If a wicked person turns away from all his sins that he has committed and keeps all my statutes and does what is just and right, he shall surely live; he shall not die. None of the transgressions that he has committed shall be remembered against him; for the righteousness that he has done he shall live" (Ezekiel 18:21-22). Hence Peter says to the Jews, "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins" (Acts 2:38). And to Simon Magus, "Repent, therefore, of this wickedness of yours, and pray to the Lord that, if possible, the intent of your heart may be forgiven you" (Acts 8:22).

XIII. In these places, as it appears, the forgiveness of sins is presented as a certain benefit to be obtained from God and promised to us by him, and that under a certain condition only. Hence, it is least to be conceived as some decree made before the ages, depending on no part of man, and by which sins, in act and fact, are forgiven to man even before he believes and converts. For God's decrees are not objects of divine promises, and indeed of promises that are made under a condition, nor do they belong to those things that we request from God with reason and prayers; these belong to future things, whereas the forgiveness of our sins is one of the chief things that our Lord Christ commands us to ask God for, inserted into this clause dictated by him in the prayer, "Forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our debtors."

XIV. And certainly, if anyone were to go through all the passages of Scripture where justification of man is mentioned, not one would be found where even the slightest indication appears that justification is to be understood as some eternal decree of God. In fact, scarcely one exists where something does not occur from which it can easily be inferred that by justification a certain benefit conferred in time is meant, which follows after man's faith and conversion, but does not precede them. For, to omit many places where we are said to be justified by faith and through faith, and to believe in Christ so that we may be justified by faith, in which places faith is clearly presented as something prerequisite to justification, justification is attributed not once but several times to the Holy Spirit poured out on the elect of God, and it is said to be done through Him. Clearly, according to the mind of Holy Scripture, no one is justified before receiving the Holy Spirit from God. For, as the Apostle testifies, "whom He poured out on us

richly through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that being justified by His grace we might become heirs according to the hope of eternal life" (Titus 3:6). And in 1 Corinthians 6:11, those faithful whom he addresses are said to have been sanctified and justified in the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of our God.

XV. Moreover, in the same place, the Apostle clearly opposes the present state of the faithful, in which they were justified from their sins, to their preceding condition in which they had indulged in various sins. This opposition would be vain and null if, even before renouncing them and while still immersed in them, they were already justified. "And such were some of you," he says, namely, fornicators, idolaters, adulterers, homosexuals, thieves, covetous, drunkards, revilers, extortioners; "but you were washed, but you were sanctified, but you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of our God."

XVI. But particularly noteworthy here is the passage of Paul found in Romans 8:29-30. Where the Apostle, weaving together the series and chain of graces and benefits flowing from God's eternal love for the elect, and enumerating each in its order, explicitly places calling before justification as something preceding it. For he says, "For those whom He foreknew, He also predestined to become conformed to the image of His Son, so that He would be the firstborn among many brethren; and these whom He predestined, He also called; and these whom He called, He also justified; and these whom He justified, He also glorified." Therefore, one must indeed be blind not to recognize, according to the mind of the Apostle, that justification is something midway between calling and glorification.

XVII. Moreover, if we say that justification precedes calling, and that the elect are justified not only in God's divine decree but actually and effectively before they believe in Christ and are converted, many absurdities follow which plainly contradict the Apostolic doctrine. For one who is justified and has obtained forgiveness of his sins from God passes from death to life and no longer remains in death. But one who has not yet turned to God still remains in death, since he neither loves God nor his neighbor with true charity. For, as John affirms, "Whoever does not love his brother remains in death" (1 John 3:14). But under the hypothesis we are refuting, it is necessary for someone who is justified to still remain in death when he dies, neither having passed from death to life, or, contrary to the express statement of the Apostle, not loving God or his neighbor, yet not remaining in death.

XVIII. Furthermore, whoever is already justified is thereby adopted as a son of God, and constituted heir of eternal life by God. But whoever indulges in sin and does not turn away from it through true repentance is of the devil. For, as John testifies, "Whoever makes a practice of sinning is of the devil." And by this, the children of God and the children of the devil are manifest: whoever does not practice righteousness is not of God. Therefore, it is either necessary to consider anyone who indulges in sin and is enslaved to it as justified, or to admit, contrary to the clear teaching of the Apostles, that one can commit sin and not practice righteousness, yet not be of the devil but of God, or, what is no less opposed to truth, to consider one as simultaneously a child of God and a child of the devil, or at least to suppose that someone is justified who is not yet a child of God.

XIX. Furthermore, one who is already justified and whose sins are all forgiven is thereby fit to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven. And if it is supposed that he dies in this state, there is nothing for which he should be thrust into hell and excluded from the entrance to the kingdom of God. For one for whom all sins are truly forgiven is freed from all punishment of sin, especially from the torments of hell and the deprivation of heavenly glory and happiness. The Apostle often affirms that those who live wickedly and practice the deeds which he calls the works of the flesh will not inherit the kingdom of heaven. "Do not be deceived," he says, "neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor homosexuals, nor thieves, nor the covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners will inherit the kingdom of God" (1 Corinthians 5:10). And elsewhere, after listing various works of the flesh such as adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lewdness, idolatry, sorcery, enmities, strife, jealousy, outbursts of anger, contentions, factions, envy, murders, drunkenness, and similar things, he adds, "I warn you, as I warned you before, that those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God" (Galatians 5:21). Therefore, either the Apostle spoke falsely, or it is false that those whom he designates as committing the aforementioned sins, yet have not yet renounced them, are already justified, or it must be said, contrary to the common sense of Christians and the manifest truth, that sins which are supposed to be already forgiven and from which one is considered already justified can nevertheless hinder him, if death overtakes him, from being admitted into heavenly glory and consequently cause him to be adjudged to eternal punishments in hell.

XX. Therefore, we think it must be plainly stated that no one is actually and truly justified before the Holy Spirit creates and arouses faith and repentance in them, and applies Christ himself to them. This is the explicit statement of the Anglican Confession of Parliament, as they call it, published with authority some years ago. It reads as follows in Chapter 11, Article 4, as it could be translated into French: "God from all eternity decreed to justify all the elect. And at the completion of the times, Christ died for their sins, and rose again for their justification. However, they are not justified until the Holy Spirit applies Christ to each of them in their own time. And the same opinion is held, if they are sure of themselves, it is necessary for all those who think that faith is the means by which we are justified, which undoubtedly constitute the vast majority of the Reformers.

XXI. Furthermore, those who hold this opinion do not explain in the same way how faith intervenes and contributes to the justification of the sinner. Here they speak in various ways. Many say that faith justifies because it is the instrumental cause of our justification, through which the righteousness of Christ offered in the word of the Gospel is accepted and applied to us for the remission of our sins. Nor does it seem to be otherwise the meaning of those who teach that faith justifies relatively or objectively. By this they do not mean any other significance than that faith does not justify by its own power, but only inasmuch as it apprehends the merit and obedience of Christ, through which alone we are truly justified before God. Others prefer to say that faith justifies because it is a condition demanded by the covenant of grace, or the Gospel, for our justification. For indeed, the forgiveness of sins in Christ's blood and eternal life are offered to every believer.

XXII. It seems simplest to us to say that faith justifies, because to the believer, his faith is imputed to him as righteousness. For thus the Apostle himself explains his intention, explicitly addressing the justification by faith in Romans 4. He says, "To the one who does not work but believes in him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted as righteousness." And to this end, he cites that of Moses: "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him as righteousness." Faith, however, is said to be imputed for righteousness because God regards and counts as righteous the one who believes with a living faith in Christ, freeing him from the penalty of sin and accepting him for eternal life because of Christ's death and obedience.

XXIII. But the same opinion returns to those who teach that faith justifies us as it is a condition of the covenant of grace. For in their view, nothing else is intended but that God holds us as righteous and accepts us for life and eternal glory for Christ's sake, not requiring anything else in the Gospel from us than to adhere to Christ with a living faith and through love. And under this condition alone, the word of the Gospel offers and promises us salvation and forgiveness of our sins. And this is the reason why we are said to be justified by faith in Scripture.

XXIV. However, we must finally arrive at the same conclusion as those who say that faith justifies us as the instrument by which it apprehends the righteousness of Christ and receives the forgiveness of sins, if they want to express their intention with clear and proper words, which are consistent with truth and reason. For when they say that faith is the instrument of justification, they cannot understand it as a physical instrument properly speaking. For faith does not physically and properly obtain the forgiveness of sins, in which justification consists, but morally, how can faith be an instrument of justification unless it is a condition required on our part? Likewise, when it is said that faith apprehends the righteousness of Christ, for which we are acquitted in God's judgment, and accepts the forgiveness of sins offered, it is clear that these terms of acceptance and apprehension are not to be taken literally, but metaphorically. For faith is said to accept the forgiveness of sins and apprehend the righteousness of Christ only because God grants forgiveness only to believers and imputes righteousness to His children. It is necessary to believe in Christ with a living faith in order to become partakers of Him and to be accepted for eternal life because of Christ's merit and obedience. And it would be cold and foreign to their minds, with whom we are dealing, to explain that apprehension in terms of the knowledge we have through faith of the obedience imputed to us by Christ, the forgiveness of sins, and the merit obtained from God. Because we are said to apprehend what we perceive with the mind. And this has already been sufficiently refuted by us with arguments showing that faith justifies us differently than by giving us the sense and knowledge of our justification.

XXV. Therefore, nothing more probable, simpler, and more congruent with Scripture can be said than to attribute justification to faith because faith is the condition demanded by the Gospel for us to be considered righteous and innocent before God, and as God deals with such people, freeing us from the penalties due to sin for Christ's sake and making us heirs of the heavenly kingdom. But another question arises here, namely, whether faith alone justifies? The

doctrine that only faith justifies is common and accepted among Protestants, but it must be taught and explained cautiously so as not to leave room for error and calumny.

XXVI. First of all, it must be observed here that when we ascribe justification to faith alone, we do not deny that justification, in addition to the faith required on our part, has many causes outside of us, either principal ones, such as God's mercy and Christ's merit, or instrumental ones, such as the word of the Gospel and the Sacraments. Therefore, by saying this alone, we mean that within us and on our part, there is one faith by which we are justified. Thus, faith here is opposed to works alone, and by this, it is not meant to imply anything other than that faith justifies, but not works.

XXVII. In this matter, we have the Apostle Paul as our forerunner, who frequently emphasizes and insists on the same thing in his Epistles, especially in Chapter 4 of his epistle to the Romans, where he teaches that Abraham was not justified by works, but by faith, according to the Scripture, "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him as righteousness." Hence, he concludes that God justifies not the one who works but the one who believes, and imputes righteousness to man without works, which he also confirms by the testimony of David. In the previous chapter, his conclusion is as follows, after being proved and confirmed by many arguments: "We conclude that a man is justified by faith apart from works of the law." These are consistent with what he writes to the Galatians, Chapter 2, verse 16: "Yet we know that a person is not justified by works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ, so we also have believed in Christ Jesus, in order to be justified by faith in Christ and not by works of the law, because by works of the law no one will be justified."

XXVIII. Moreover, when we assert with Paul that a person is justified by faith alone, and not by works, it is quite evident from the foregoing that we are far from believing that faith, which is alone, and especially when separated from good works, has the power to justify. Indeed, we recognize no other justifying faith than that which is alive and produces good works from itself.

XXIX. Nor do we, in speaking thus, intend to affirm that this new righteousness, which the Holy Spirit creates in believers and by which they are often called righteous and holy in Scripture, consists solely of faith, but not also of charity and other virtues, which are formed by the grace of God and make us conform to Christ. For we do not intend by this to deny that, in addition to the act of faith, many other things are required by God and are aroused in us by His grace before we are endowed with that habitual righteousness on account of which we are called new creatures and created anew in the image of God in Scripture. Such acts include the fear of divine judgment, detestation of sin, earnest endeavor to amend one's life, devout invocation of God's name, and similar ones. Moreover, we also confess that this righteousness once given to us by God is daily augmented and increased by the exercise of good works, and that God, those who make use of the grace received, diligently engaging in good works, not only adorns and enriches with greater grace day by day but also promises life and eternal glory to them, according to Christ's solemn promise, "To him who has will more be given."

XXX. Indeed, when we say that faith alone justifies, we do not even mean by that merely the act of believing taken precisely, as it is opposed to acts of love and hope, and is distinguished from repentance, or penitence, as being the condition demanded by the new covenant, or Gospel, for us to obtain the remission of our sins and to be absolved from them because of Christ. For just as the hope of pardon and the love of God, as well as sorrow for sin and the purpose of leading a new life, and, in a word, all the acts necessary for true and sincere conversion, are also required, so they are necessary and altogether prerequisite so that anyone may be received into favor by God and may be regarded by Him as justified. Indeed, that living and operative faith which we affirm justifies alone includes and involves all these acts.

XXXI. And just as Scripture frequently asserts that we obtain the remission of sins through faith, so, no less frequently and expressly, does it teach that repentance and the entire conversion of the sinner to God are conditions without which the remission of sins cannot be obtained from God, and which, no less than faith, are required beforehand for it, although it neither effects nor merits it. To this belongs Solomon's saying, already cited before, "He who hides his sins will not prosper, but he who confesses and forsakes them will obtain mercy." And what Christ says in Luke, "Unless you repent, you will all likewise perish." Hence it is that Peter thus exhorts the Jews, "Repent and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of your sins," Acts 2:38. And, "Repent, therefore, and turn again, that your sins may be blotted out," Acts 3:19.

XXXII. But when Scripture says that a man is justified by faith, and not by works, or without works, when we say that a person is justified by faith alone, the sense is simply that no one can be justified by rendering to the law the works it demands from man, so that he may be justified by it, but that a person is justified only by faith in Christ, a lively and efficacious faith, which is required by the Gospel to make us acceptable to God. By the works which the law demands for our justification is understood the perfect and unbroken obedience to all the commandments of the law, which excludes all transgression and all sin. For the law says, "Do this and you will live," and "He who does these things will live by them." But it strictly denounces a curse on all sinners and transgressors, saying, "Cursed be everyone who does not abide by all things written in the book of the law, and do them."

XXXIII. Therefore, the law justifies not the unbeliever but the doer, and that according to debt, not according to grace. For the law strictly taken does not confer or promise grace to anyone but sternly denounces to everyone what is due to him by strict justice. And hence it does not justify any impious and sinful person, however much he may be supposed to return to better conduct led by repentance. Therefore, since all men are born in sin and are guilty of many sins, no one at all can be justified by the works of the law and by the law.

XXXIV. But from all those from whom we cannot be justified by the law of Moses, through Christ everyone who believes will be justified. For God promises in the Gospel that, on account of Christ, He will receive all believers into favor and deliver them from the curse of the law, and offer the remission of all sins in the blood of Christ to all indiscriminately who have embraced Christ with a lively faith and through love, promising them life and eternal glory as to

the righteous. Therefore, the Gospel admits even the greatest sinners to justification, provided they renounce their sins and bring forth fruits worthy of repentance and believe in Christ with a lively and efficacious faith. For it justifies not of debt but of grace. It does not say, "Do this and you will live," but "Believe and you will be saved."

XXXV. Therefore, whenever the Apostle affirms that we are not justified by works, but by faith, he does not intend to teach anything else than that no one can be justified at all by performing the works which the law demands from man to obtain life through it, but only by believing in Christ with a lively and efficacious faith, which the Gospel demands to make us acceptable to God. By the works which the law properly taken, and as it is opposed to grace or the Gospel, demands for the justification of man is understood the perfect and uninterrupted observance of all the commandments of the law, which excludes all transgression and all sin. For the law says, "Do this and you will live," and "He who does these things will live by them." But it strictly denounces a curse on all sinners and transgressors, saying, "Cursed be everyone who does not abide by all things written in the book of the law, and do them."

XXXVI. Anyone who attentively considers what Paul differs about this matter in the Epistle to the Romans and the Epistle to the Galatians will easily recognize this Apostolic mindset. For Paul, to be justified by works simply, to be justified by the works of the law, and to be justified by the law are the same. Just as he holds that to be justified by faith and to be justified without works are for the same purpose. However, according to Paul's teaching, the righteousness of the law consists in accurately doing everything commanded by the law, just as the one who believes in Christ with a living faith, because such faith is imputed to him for righteousness. For he diligently opposes the law, which does not demand faith but perfect obedience, and says, "The one who does these things will live by them." Likewise, cursed is anyone who does not continue in all things written in the book of the law to do them, contrary to the Word of faith or the Gospel, which offers righteousness and salvation freely to those who believe, since its essence is this: "If you confess with your mouth the Lord Jesus and believe in your heart that God raised Him from the dead, you will be saved." (Romans 10 and Galatians 3)

XXXVII. Therefore, according to Paul, by the law or works, no one is justified unless they are completely free from transgression and have fully satisfied those conditions. "The one who does these things will live by them." But those who believe in Him who justifies the ungodly, God imputes righteousness without works, for God considers him righteous even if he has not ceased from works required by the law for justification. Likewise, when the Apostle opposes the believer who works, he teaches that God justifies not the one who works, but the one who believes, without works, by working, he understands the one who has performed the works prescribed by the law in such a way that they are not done by grace but are owed to him as wages of righteousness. As it is seen in Romans 4, "To him who works, the wages are not counted as grace but as debt. But to him who does not work but believes on Him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is accounted for righteousness." When the Apostle says that the one who believes does not work, it is evident that he does not mean that the one who believes is devoid of all good works. For in the one who believes with a living and saving faith, necessarily many good works

are found, such as sorrow for committed sins, detestation of the sinful life, a desire and effort for a better life, hope for forgiveness, trust in God, and finally fear, love, and devout invocation of His name. But it is said that the one who believes does not work because he does not perform works according to the law necessary for obtaining life. And although many pious and holy works accompany his faith, God, as the Apostle speaks, imputes righteousness to him without works, because he lacks the works of the law, namely, that perfect and exact obedience by which the law pronounces no one righteous.

XXXVIII. Hence it is that the Apostle proves in the following passages that God imputes righteousness to man without works, because no one reaches life and blessedness, and consequently is held righteous before God, unless God forgives his sins, according to David's saying, "Blessed is the one whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." For just as many good works can be found in the one who needs the forgiveness of sins, yet if God considers him righteous, necessarily righteousness without those works required by the law of grace is imputed to him, which makes him righteous. Since those works consist entirely of the perfect observance of the law, from which the one who has transgressed the law once and needs any forgiveness of sins is devoid.

XXXIX. And from this, an easy and convenient way to reconcile Paul with James opens up, who seemingly contradicts Paul. For Paul, as we have already seen, affirms that God imputes righteousness to the believer without works, and justifies him who believes and does not work, and vehemently contends in many places that man is justified by faith without works of the law. But James, with explicit words and many arguments, proves that man is justified by works, not by faith alone. But although their words seem to be in conflict, their meaning is in perfect harmony. For Paul denies that man is justified by doing works that the law, opposed to the covenant of grace, requires for man's justification, which James does not affirm at all. But James intends to assert that man is not justified solely by a bare and idle assent to the word of the Gospel, but by a faith that operates through love and is accompanied by many good works, which Paul himself expressly taught, far from denying it. Therefore, when James says, "You see then that a man is justified by works, and not by faith alone," it is the same as if he were saying, "You see that God does not consider righteous the one who simply and bare believe and assents to the word of God, but the one who combines faith with good works and whose faith is efficacious in good deeds."

XL. Moreover, we consider it sufficiently explained what are the parts of faith in justification and in what sense works are excluded from it. But since many questions have been raised here and considerable contention has arisen among the Roman School and the Reformed School, it will be worthwhile to inquire briefly what the theologians of the Roman Schools think about the above-explained chapters, so that the questions that are properly raised can be perceived more easily and clearly, and the importance of the controversies that are usually debated here.

XLI. First of all, it must be understood that the Doctors of the Roman Church, like us, distinguish between living and dead faith and explain that distinction in the same way. For by

dead faith, they understand a lazy and inert assent given to the word of God, which is accompanied neither by love for God nor by any truly good works. And by living faith, they mean that which is active and working through love, which includes both love for God and trust in Him. And they usually distinguish the act of the former by believing God, and the act of the latter by believing in God. This distinction is so accepted and common among them that it is unnecessary to cite testimonies from them on this matter.

XLII. Moreover, they confess that dead and idle faith does not justify a person, and that it absolutely does nothing for righteousness and salvation; and therefore, we are justified by faith alone, which operates through love. Thus Thomas Stapleton, an Englishman and Professor at the University of Douai, asserts in many places that faith without charity and the work of obedience is dead, that is, as he explains it, completely useless, vain, and futile for salvation and righteousness. As seen in his book on Justification, chapters 2 and 12, and in the Prolegomena to the fifth book, he teaches from the Apostle that faith, in order to attain righteousness, is of no value unless it works through love. Similarly, Bellarmine in book 1 of Justification, chapter 14, proves with many arguments that faith which is separated from hope and love, and therefore is not living, cannot justify. To this Vasquez adds, in the second volume of his first second, dispute 210, chapter 7, number 54, where he observes that the faith which the Council of Trent teaches to have the nature of a root and foundation in our justification is that which moves and excites the affections; but faith which does not move the affections, nor is active in itself to attract the will to good, does not have this nature of a root and foundation. Therefore, justly, the Jesuit Becanus attributes to his Catholics that they teach, by common consent, that only formed faith, by which term the Roman School designates that which is joined with charity, justifies. "Catholics," he says, "teach that faith does not justify unless it is formed by charity. Likewise, Catholics teach, along with Augustine, that faith can exist without form, but it cannot justify unless it is formed."

XLIII. Therefore, they teach that no other faith justifies than that by which we believe not only in God but also into God, that is, which has confidence in God and hope of obtaining pardon from Him. Hence arises love and affection for God, as is gathered from the Council of Trent itself, session 6, chapter 6. "They are disposed to that justice," it says, "when, excited by divine grace and aided, they conceive faith from hearing, they are freely moved towards God, believing what has been divinely revealed and promised; and, chiefly, when they understand from divine fear of justice that usefully alarms them, turning to consider the mercy of God, they are uplifted in hope, trusting that God, for Christ's sake, will be propitious to them, and they begin to love Him as the source of all justice, etc."

XLIV. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman Church acknowledge that faith does not justify as the meritorious cause of the remission of our sins and the gift of righteousness. When a person is transferred from a state of sin to a state of grace, their justification is purely gratuitous, not owed to any of our merits, but solely attributed to divine grace, obtained for us through the merits of Christ alone. This was expressly defined by the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 8. "But we are said to be justified freely," it says, "because none of those things that precede

justification—whether faith or works—merit the grace itself of justification; for grace is no longer grace if it is based on works; otherwise, as the Apostle says, grace is no longer grace."

XLV. Among Pontifical Theologians, they dispute among themselves whether faith, at least congruously, merits justification. Some of them maintain that faith does not merit the remission of sins and the first justification, by which a person, being a sinner and unjust, becomes just, because the Council of Trent simply excludes from faith the merit of justification, nor does it apply any distinction in this matter, as is Thomas Stapleton's opinion in the Prolegomena to the fifth book on Justification. Others, however, believe that the Council of Trent only excludes merit from condignity, but does not deny that faith congruously can merit the justification of a sinner through faith in Christ, which is the opinion of Bellarmine and Vasquez.

XLVI. Moreover, by merit of condignity, they understand a work to which a reward is owed according to justice; but by merit of congruity, a work to which nothing is owed by justice, but which obtains something from divine goodness and deserves some acknowledgment of divine goodness and equity. Therefore, all the Doctors of the Roman Church agree that the remission of sins and the justification of a sinner is a gratuitous gift from God and is not owed by justice to faith. However, when some of them say that faith merits congruously, by this they do not mean anything else than that faith, which operates through love, obtains from divine goodness the pardon of sins and justification, and it is fitting for divine goodness and wisdom to absolve the sinner who, through effective faith and good works, seeks refuge in the mercy of God in Christ and grants him pardon and righteousness.

XLVII. Furthermore, they say that faith justifies in the manner of disposition, or even as a part and beginning of justice; in this respect, faith is referred back to the formal cause of justification. For the understanding of this matter, it must be observed that the Doctors of the Roman Church, by justification, do not mean solely absolution from sins, but also the renewal of the inner person, which we designate by the name of sanctification. Moreover, faith is understood in two ways by them: Firstly, as an act of faith, which is stirred up in the soul by the actual help of God before habitual grace is attained. Secondly, as the habit of faith, which is infused into the soul of the one who already believes, along with the habits of hope and charity. Taken in the former way, faith justifies, according to their view, by the manner of disposition: because through it the soul is prepared and disposed to receive from God the remission of sins; and at the same time, also that habitual justice by which the faithful are called righteous and holy in Scripture. But faith taken in the latter way pertains to the formal cause of justification: because it is a part of that new justice which the Holy Spirit creates in the faithful, and by which he truly and effectively makes them righteous and holy.

XLVIII. However, they think that what is attributed to faith in this respect also applies to other Christian virtues and works done by grace. So, if faith alone were considered precisely and as opposed to other virtues, they deny that it justifies. For, according to their teaching, just as the act of faith disposes a person to obtain from God the grace of justification and is therefore said to justify, so also the fear of divine judgment, hatred and detestation of sin, hope in mercy, the

intention to amend one's life, the beginning of love for God, and similar acts are necessary dispositions, ordained by divine order, for someone to obtain from God the remission of sins and the gift of habitual justice. And just as the habit of faith is a part of the justice which God infuses into the justified sinner, so too the other virtues, not faith alone, according to their understanding. Therefore, in their view, the other virtues, no less than faith, pertain to the formal cause of justification, and many good works, which precede justification by faith, justify in the manner of disposition.

XLIX. But although they believe that the justice by which we are formally justified before God consists of faith, hope, and charity, they do not want to consider faith and other virtues as constituting any justice that could withstand the strict examination of divine judgment. So that, if God were to judge the faithful strictly, without any mercy or leniency toward them, they could not avoid damnation and hope for eternal life by the justice infused and inherent in them. For even the most perfect among the faithful acknowledge, when they stand before God's severe tribunal, that they are bound to say with David, "Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for no man living shall be justified in thy sight." This is because of the sins that precede their justification, as well as those into which the justified fall daily due to weakness. Therefore, their understanding is that the virtues infused by the Holy Spirit into the faithful constitute that form by which the faithful are justified and made righteous before God, and establish true and sincere justice, not only according to the judgment of men but also of God himself, who, when he sits as judge on the last day, will solemnly approve, praise, and reward with life and eternal glory.

L. And similarly, although they say that acts of penance, fear, hope, and love are certain dispositions for justification along with the act of faith, they do not understand such works to properly, speaking, either effect or merit justification. For they are not, in their opinion, physical dispositions that by their own virtue bring about the remission of sins and new justice, but only moral dispositions, that is, conditions that, according to divine ordinance, must precede the remission of sins and the gift of habitual justice in us, and without which God does not want or usually confer those benefits on man, as can be seen in Peter à Sancto Joseph in the Idea of Speculative Theology, book 4, chapter 9, resolution 3. Nor do they attribute to any works the power to merit the grace of justification, which, as noted by the same Council, is not only the remission of sins but also the sanctification and renewal of the inner man. This remission and renewal all theologians of the Roman Church acknowledge to be purely gratuitous and not due to any of our acts or dispositions out of justice: although some of them, not approved by the others, say that penance, as well as faith, merits this grace out of congruence: since it is fitting and agreeable to divine goodness to bestow it graciously on those who believe and repent.

LI. However, the Doctors of the Roman Church apply a distinction here between the first justification, by which a man becomes just and holy from being a sinner and impious, through the remission of sin, and through the adoption of sanctifying and regenerating grace, and the second justification, by which a man already justified grows in justice and holiness and becomes more just from being just, more holy from being holy. And the first indeed they wish to be gratuitous. But as for the second justification, they teach that it is due to merits, and that a just

man thus grows in justice and holiness through good works so that he merits an increase in sanctifying and justifying grace by condignity.

LII.LII. From what has now been explained, it is clear that the Doctors of both the Roman and Reformed Schools recognize by common consent: 1. That faith is rightly distinguished into dead and living, idle and active, one that is devoid of good works and the other that works through love and involves trust in God. 2. That only living faith justifies, while dead faith contributes nothing to justice and salvation. 3. That not only the act of believing taken precisely but many other acts also, which concur to true repentance and serious conversion to God, are conditions required by God for one to obtain from Him the remission of sins and the infusion of new and habitual justice. 4. That the remission of sins and the renewal of the inner man are purely gratuitous gifts of God, which are not due out of justice to faith or any works, however much performed by the grace of God. 5. That it is fitting and suitable to divine goodness and wisdom to remit sins and grant the grace of the Holy Spirit to a sinner who sincerely repents and flees to God's mercy by faith, but not to the unbelieving and impenitent. 6. That the new justice which the Holy Spirit creates in the faithful consists not only of the habit of faith but also of other Christian virtues. 7. That this justice is not only preserved but also increased by the exercise of good works, and that those who rightly use the grace already received and devote themselves to good works receive an increase of grace day by day. 8. That the justice which by the grace of the Holy Spirit is in the faithful is true and sincere, not only in the judgment of men but also of God Himself: and therefore it will be that God, when He judges the living and the dead, will bear solemn and glorious testimony to it and reward it with eternal life. 9. That there is no justice in the godly that can endure the strict examination of divine judgment, if God judges a man without mercy and does not use any indulgence and clemency towards him.

LIII. But although the Doctors of both Schools agree on these points, there is nevertheless a controversy among them about how faith justifies. For the Pontificians, as we have already said, teach that faith justifies by way of disposition or even as part of the form, that is, the justice by which we are justified: which the Reformers do not approve of. However, since justification in the sense of the Pontificians includes not only the remission of sins but also the sanctification and renewal of the inner man, their meaning is that the act of faith, from which our conversion to God begins, is a moral disposition, that is, a condition that God pre-requires so that we may receive from Him the forgiveness of sins and the gift of habitual justice: and also that the habit of faith is part of that new justice which the Holy Spirit works in us, and by which we are truly called and are just and holy; not only before men but also before God Himself, who so approves and accepts that justice, that He will reward it with eternal life and glory in the final judgment, according to the promises of the Gospel: which is not alien to the doctrine of the Reformed School.

LIV. However, since the Reformers distinguish justification from sanctification, and understand justification to mean nothing other than being absolved in divine judgment, when they deny that faith justifies us by way of disposition, or by way of form, that is, as *justitia*, or a

part of the justitia by which we are justified, their intention is that faith is not such a disposition that merits or effects the remission of our sins, and also that neither the act nor the habit of faith is part of that justitia for which, and by whose merit, we are absolved from the guilt of our sins, which is solely Christ's obedience; although it is a condition without which we cannot attain to that absolution: which is not at odds with the doctrine of the Roman Church.

LV. Furthermore, the question arises whether faith alone justifies or whether works also do. Indeed, the Doctors of the Reformed School contend that faith alone justifies, not works, as we have already observed. But in their intention, in order for us to be just and acquitted in the judgment of God, we are not required to perform works that the law, opposed to grace, demands for the justification of sinners, i.e., the complete observance of the law, which excludes all sin and transgression altogether, but it suffices that we believe in Christ with living faith, and through effective good works, even if we have previously been steeped in sin, and afterward, through weakness, are prone to lapses. And furthermore, when they deny that works justify, they mean to signify that the remission of our sins and absolution from their guilt in the judgment of God are purely gratuitous and not owed to the merits of any works; and also that none of our virtues or works constitute such a justitia that can withstand the strict judgment of God, and through which, if God were to examine us severely and grant us no grace, we could evade eternal death and attain blessed immortality; all of which the Roman School readily admits.

LVI. However, since the Theologians of the Roman School affirm that we are justified not by faith alone but also by works, their view is that not only the act of believing, precisely considered, but also many others, such as fear of divine judgment, sorrow for one's sins, detestation of them, the resolve to lead a new life, hope of obtaining mercy from God, and from this the arising of love and affection for God, and if there are any such, are moral dispositions, that is, conditions which, according to the order established by God, should precede in us the remission of sins and internal renewal by the Holy Spirit; and without which God usually does not bestow that grace upon us. Furthermore, along with faith, they consider other virtues to constitute true righteousness, by which the faithful are called saints and righteous in Scripture; and which God will also confirm in his judgment when he rewards it in eternal life on the last day; both of which are clearly granted by the statements of the Reformed Theologians mentioned earlier. Thus, it appears that we are disputing only about words here, not about the substance of the matter.

LVII. What some of the Pontifical Theologians say, that certain good works merit congruously the remission of sins and the gift of righteousness, is their particular opinion, as we have already indicated, but not the common doctrine of the Roman Church. However, by this, they do not mean that the infusion of righteousness and the remission of sins by the works of penance are owed by justice and are not a gratuitous gift from God, but only that it is fitting for the divine goodness and suitable and appropriate for Him to forgive sins and grant habitual righteousness to those who truly convert to God and bear fruits worthy of repentance; which the Reformed Theologians do not deny: although in this matter, they rightly reject the term "merit" because it is not used in Scripture and sounds somewhat proud.

LVIII. Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church teach in another sense that works justify; because, according to their understanding, they deserve condignly the second justification, which they call an increase in that grace by which a person grows in holiness and righteousness; which is their unanimous opinion. However, we indeed admit that by the exercise of good works, a person advances in righteousness and holiness, and obtains a greater grace from Christ, according to his promises. But nonetheless, we deny that it should be said that our works merit that grace. Because, indeed, grace and debt are mutually exclusive. And grace is not, that is, the gratuitous gift of God, that which is owed to our works by justice. For the Apostle clearly opposes that which is according to grace to that which is according to debt. Romans 4:4. Which pertains to the same Apostle's statement, "If by grace, then is it no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace; otherwise work is no more work." Romans 11:6. But the weight of this question we will examine more carefully on another occasion, with God's favor, when we expressly discuss the merits of works.

LIX. However, what we have said about many of the aforementioned questions is that the Roman School, in substance, agrees with the Reformed, even though they argue much among themselves in words. Yet, concerning these specific questions, one will find, if one compares the common and solemn doctrine of the Roman School with that which is also accepted in our schools by common consent, that we do not deny that some private Doctors, regarding the aforementioned questions, teach certain singular things in both schools, which not only differ in words but also in substance from the opinion of the opposing party. For we do not intend to assert that the common doctrine of the Roman Church does not conflict with that very truth which they are compelled to acknowledge here, and that it does not, consequently at least, overturn it. Finally, it must be acknowledged even by those who rightly feel in this matter that many things arise for debate in which they seem to contradict themselves, and which require a gentle interpreter so that they may be brought back to a good and profitable sense.

THEOLOGICAL THESIS:

On justice through the grace of Christ Inherent in the faithful.

Thesis I

It is common for the doctors of the Roman Church to inveigh against Protestants as if they acknowledged no internal and inherent righteousness in the faithful, nor conceded any internal renewal and sanctification of the inner man through the grace of the Spirit. Thus Bellarmine asserts that Calvin, along with the Lutherans, admits no inherent righteousness. On Justification 1.2, ch. 1. Becanus attributes to Calvin the proposition that in justification, grace and righteousness are not infused, by which a person is inwardly renewed and made righteous and holy, but only the external righteousness of Christ is imputed to him, by which he is considered righteous outside himself. On Calvin's Institutes, ch. 2.

II. Similarly, Campian, speaking in Reckoning 8 about Protestants, says, "They teach that not even the regenerated and holy have anything intrinsically except mere corruption and contamination." And a little later, he adds, "They assign excellent parts to grace, which is neither infused into our hearts nor strong enough to resist sins; but they place it outside of us solely in the favor of God, who does not correct the wicked by favor but, with God conniving, allows that old dross to remain and stink, lest it become ugly and odious." To these, Duræus adds even more boldly, "I am not surprised that Calvin acknowledges no internal renewal in us, considering that he believes the blessed themselves to be perpetually contaminated by their sins, even in those most blessed abodes." Reckoning 8.

III. To dispel this slander, it seemed fitting to briefly address the righteousness and sanctification that the Holy Spirit works in the faithful soul and to briefly explain what and how much Reformed theologians attribute to it.

IV. Therefore, by the common consent of Reformed and Orthodox theologians, it is taught that God, in receiving the faithful into grace, renews and sanctifies them inwardly, infusing in them a new righteousness and holiness by which they reflect the image of their Creator and Redeemer. It would be superfluous to gather the opinions of individuals on this matter, and it would be an infinite task. Nevertheless, to make this slander more evident, it seemed advisable to present publicly certain statements and explanations attested by the Confessions of the Reformed Churches. Thus, the Confession of the Reformed from Poland, publicly read at the Thorun Conference in 1645, states in chapter 4, section 2, number 7, "We are falsely accused as if we denied all inherent righteousness to the faithful and declared that they are justified only by the imputation of the external righteousness of Christ without any internal renewal. However, we teach that to true penitents and those who believe with a living faith in Christ, righteousness is imputed, and at the same time, through the same faith, their hearts, broken by the Holy Spirit, are vivified, stirred to ardent love for Christ, and prompted to new obedience, namely, to be purified from wicked desires, and thus we teach that righteousness and holiness are initiated in a new life and perfected day by day." This is in accordance with the Anglican Confession published in the same year, in chapter 13 on Sanctification, which teaches that those who are effectively called are more and more truly and personally sanctified by virtue of the death and resurrection of Christ, the dominion of sin over their entire bodies is laid low, and they are strengthened more and more in all saving grace so that they may dare to true sanctity, without which no one will see the Lord. Similarly, the French Reformed Confession, in article 22, expressly affirms that we are regenerated into newness of life by faith and receive the grace to live holy lives through the same faith, in the fear of God, even though we are by nature slaves to sin.

V. Indeed, when left to himself and outside the grace of God, man is entirely tainted by sin and turned away from God: all his faculties are inclined to evil, and that image of God initially impressed upon man is, in our misery, soiled and dispersed. From there, deep darkness has occupied the mind of man, and his will has been perverted, and there has arisen great disturbance in his desires, such that the carnal man, not yet redeemed by grace from the bondage

of sin, becomes an enemy of God and does not subject himself to the divine law; indeed, he cannot even do so, as the Apostle teaches in Romans 8:8.

VI. However, God, in those whom He mercifully calls to Himself through faith, remedies such great evils. For, indeed, He dispels the darkness introduced by sin and illuminates it with a certain heavenly and divine light. He corrects the perverse will and softens the hardened heart, and kindles and inflames it with love for the good. Finally, He arranges the disturbed and disordered affections and appetites, and brings them into order, stripping rebellious concupiscence of its dominion and subjecting it, as it were, to a yoke. From all these things emerges that holiness and righteousness which, under the guidance of the Word of God, we readily recognize in the faithful and which, as is sufficiently evident from the above, consists not merely in certain good works but primarily in an internal and enduring grace that affects and adorns the soul in the manner of a habit.

VII. Moreover, it is clearly deduced from many passages of Scripture that the matter stands thus. Firstly, because the faithful are called new creatures (2 Corinthians 5:17; Galatians 6) and God's workmanship or creation (Ephesians 2:10). Also, because they are born of God, so that they have the seed of God abiding in them (1 John 3:9). Also, because they are raised from the death of sin and vivified, so that they may live henceforth by the Spirit (Ephesians 2:5; Colossians 2:13). And finally, because it is attributed to them the renewal by the Holy Spirit (Titus 3:5). Indeed, from all these words and expressions, a certain great and total change effected by the power of the Holy Spirit in the faithful is designated: such a change, indeed, that they are said to be a new creation and to have received a new life; by which, as by something inherent and immanent in them, they are distinguished from other men who are born only of the flesh and remain in the old state and death of sin. However, since in the faithful and regenerated, the same physical and mental faculties remain, and nothing changes in them as far as the nature and essence of man are concerned, it is absolutely necessary that this moral change be effected and consist in holy gifts and habits, by which the Spirit adorns and disposes them to act rightly, piously, and justly.

VIII. Moreover, those who are called faithful are directed towards what are called the participators in the divine nature, and stones from corruption, which is in the world through lust, 2 Pet. 1. 4. Also, they are cleansed from sins, sanctified, purified, and clothed with a new man, which is created according to God in righteousness and sanctity of truth, 1 Cor. 6. 11. Acts 20. 32. And they are renewed in knowledge according to the image of him who created them, Ephesians 4. 24. By these words, righteousness and sanctity are clearly attributed, and indeed not only pretended and apparent, but real and true, and in which a certain image of divine sanctity and righteousness shines forth, and therefore by reason of which the faithful become, in a certain way, participators of the divine nature.

IX. Furthermore, Scripture specifically attributes to the faithful a renewed mind, Rom. 12.2. And it testifies that they are no longer in darkness, but in the light of the Lord, Eph. 5. 8. He gives them a new heart and a new spirit, and affirms that their stony heart is taken away and replaced with a heart of flesh, Ezek. 16. 26. And it teaches them to crucify the flesh with its

desires, Galatians 5:24. In these places, the sanctity and righteousness which we assert to be in the faithful by the power of the Holy Spirit are described in parts.

X. Just as a bad tree bears bad fruit, and a good tree produces good fruit, so the faithful, renewed and sanctified by the grace of Christ, and endowed with the righteousness described above, produce good and holy works, which in Scripture are also called works of righteousness; as John says, "He who practices righteousness is righteous, just as He is righteous," 1 John 3. 7. And Christ Himself said to His disciples, "For I say to you, that unless your righteousness surpasses that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter the kingdom of heaven," Matthew 5. 20. And the former righteousness is indeed called habitual, while the latter is called actual in the Schools.

XI. Moreover, in Scripture, the faithful are often called just and holy, opposed to the wicked and sinners, from whom Scripture distinguishes them by the title of the righteous. As when it is said in Peter, "The eyes of the Lord are on the righteous, and His ears are open to their prayers; but the face of the Lord is against those who do evil," 1 Peter 3. 12. Also, "If the righteous are scarcely saved, where will the ungodly and the sinner appear?" 1 Peter 4. 18. And the faithful are not only called just and holy in general; but many are designated by this title individually from among the faithful, as for example, Noah, who is said to have been a just and blameless man in his generations, Gen. 6. v. 9. And Lot, whom the Apostle Peter designates by the name of righteous, 2 Peter 2. v. 7, 8. also Joseph of Arimathea, Luke 23. 50.

XII. But since the voice of Scripture is the voice of God, from the fact that the faithful are called saints and righteous by reason of righteousness inherent in them, it is certain that they are regarded as such by God, and are indeed holy and righteous not only in the sight of men, and by their opinion, but also by the judgment of God Himself. This is clearly taught by Luke, when he testifies of Zacharias and Elizabeth, the parents of John the Baptist, that they were both righteous before God, walking blamelessly in all the commandments and statutes of the Lord, Luke 1. 6.

XIII. And certainly, since that sanctity and righteousness which is formed and effected in the faithful by the grace of the Holy Spirit is, as the Apostle teaches, the sanctity and righteousness of truth, that is, true, genuine, and sincere sanctity, not simulated and hypocritical, and in it there is a certain imitation and likeness of divine sanctity and righteousness itself, it cannot fail to please and be approved by God, according to the saying of the Prophet, "The Lord loves righteousness; His countenance beholds the upright," Psalms 11. Considering this, Peter recognizes that in every nation the one who fears God and works righteousness is accepted by Him, Acts 10. 11.

XIV. Moreover, since God greatly esteems that sanctity and righteousness which is inherent in the faithful, and promises them not only in this world but also in the future, He rewards it magnificently. For, as the wise man says, "Good shall be repaid to the righteous," Prov. 13. 21. And godliness, which consists of that sanctity and righteousness, has promises not only of this, but also of the future life, as the Apostle teaches in 1 Timothy 4. 8. And when God will judge the living and the dead, He will solemnly testify to the righteousness of the faithful, and will praise and reward it before the whole world with life and eternal glory, which He has

freely promised to all who seek sanctity and righteousness. For, as our Lord Christ Himself says, "The righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father," Matthew 5. 43. Hence it is that that virtue and glory are called by the Apostle the crown of righteousness, 2 Timothy 4. 8. "Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness," he says, "which the righteous Judge will give to me on that Day."

XV. Furthermore, this righteousness which is so pleasing to God and promises life and eternal glory to the faithful, differs greatly from human and civil righteousness. Especially in this, that human righteousness is acquired by human effort and human strength. For it consists of the habits of mortal virtues, which are gradually formed in the soul by frequently repeated acts of the same. But human powers cannot attain to that righteousness which is pleasing to God by far surpassing nature; nor can anyone prepare himself for it by his own powers and strength. But, as is sufficiently evident from what has already been said, it is necessary that it be infused by God Himself, and be formed in our minds by the working of heavenly grace. Since those who attain to such righteousness, and by God's favor become holy and righteous, are said to be vivified, regenerated, and recreated anew by God. For before, they were dead in sins, John 3.6. and born of the flesh were nothing but mere flesh, in which those who are in the flesh cannot please God, but are enemies of God in mind and in evil works, Colossians 1. 21.

XVI. However, although no one can of himself attain to true righteousness and sanctity, or prepare himself for it, yet it is necessary that God should first dispose and prepare them to receive such righteousness by certain acts and affections excited within their minds, by the power and assistance of that grace by which God prevents men from being estranged from Him, and still dead in sins.

XVII. Those acts leading to true justice and sanctity or preparatory to it are the sense and acknowledgment of sin, fear of divine judgment, the purpose of a better life, and hatred and detestation of past life; then there is a certain hope of forgiveness and confidence in divine mercy, and even love of God for some, but primarily effective and active faith, from which hope, love, and confidence arise. For before a person receives the Spirit of sanctification and that internal grace by which the soul is renewed and adorned with Christian virtues, according to the order established by God and the law given by Him, it is necessary for him to believe in the word of God, be struck with fear, and, feeling remorse and sorrow for sins, flee to divine mercy with the purpose of amending his life and abstaining from sins in the future.

XVIII. For that sanctifying Spirit, filling and adorning the soul with grace, is not promised in the Gospel except to those who believe and repent. "He who believes in me," says Christ, "out of his heart will flow rivers of living water." But he said this about the Spirit whom those believing in him were about to receive. And Peter, addressing the Jews already moved in heart, thus explains to them what their duty is: "Repent, and let every one of you be baptized in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins; and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit." And before anyone is satisfied with justice, it is required that he should hunger and thirst for it, according to Christ's pronouncement, "Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they shall be filled."

XIX. Nevertheless, that grace by which we are inwardly sanctified and justified in the sight of God should not be attributed to the merit and efficacy of those actions which also precede from divine ordination. For the sanctification and adoption of God's faithful is plainly a completely gratuitous gift. Neither repentance nor faith as prerequisites can by themselves effect or merit it. Therefore, the Apostle straightforwardly calls it a free gift of God, or grace. "For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life." Indeed, according to the interpretation of the most learned commentators, namely Diodati and Beza, eternal life there does not have the subject's reason, but the predicate's. And the Apostle does not simply intend to say that eternal life is something given freely by God, but rather the righteousness and sanctity which God freely bestows upon us while regenerating us by the Spirit and the Word, leading us to eternal life as its end and reward; just as sin brings eternal death to the impenitent and slaves of sin.

XX. Therefore, since our regeneration or sanctification should be attributed entirely to divine grace, it is certain, according to the sense and style of the Apostle, that it is not from works; neither are we regenerated or sanctified by works, that is, made holy and just before God by the merit and efficacy of our works. For the Apostle's general rule is this: "If by grace, then it is no longer by works; otherwise grace is no longer grace. But if it is by works, it is no longer grace; otherwise work is no longer work."

XXI. And indeed, that part of salvation of which we are made participants by the grace of God in this life mainly consists in liberation from the bondage of sin and the acquisition of true righteousness and sanctity. And yet the Apostle abolishes that salvation by works, in chapter three of his letter to Titus. "But when," he says, "the kindness and the love of God our Savior toward man appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, through the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Spirit, whom He poured out on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Savior." Where he opposes the works of righteousness we have done to the washing of regeneration and renewing by the Holy Spirit, and he does not want our salvation (that is, redemption from sin or from the bondage and filth of sin, coupled with true righteousness and sanctity) to be attributed to those works as efficient or meritorious causes, but to the operation of the Spirit renewing and regenerating us, so that they are contrary, to be from works and to be by the grace of the Spirit.

XXII. Considering this, the same Apostle says in Ephesians 2 that we are made alive and saved by grace through faith; not of works, lest anyone should boast. For we are God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand that we should walk in them. Here he teaches us that we are saved from our sins, or liberated, not by the force and merit of our works, but by that grace whereby God not only forgives our sins but also, by the power of the Holy Spirit, as it were, creates us anew, so that being made new men we may henceforth live piously and justly and strive to do good works.

XXIII. Furthermore, that righteousness and sanctity to which the faithful are renewed by the grace of the Holy Spirit, as long as this life lasts, never reaches its summit but continually needs to be increased and perfected. And therefore, even those who have made the greatest progress in it must acknowledge that they are not yet perfect, and they must constantly strive to

make progress in the grace of Christ, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God. Paul himself teaches us by his example, surpassing all the faithful in sanctity as he seems to have done. For now being near death, he confesses that he has not yet attained the goal, nor is he already perfect or completed. And then he adds, "But one thing I do, forgetting those things which are behind and reaching forward to those things which are ahead, I press toward the goal for the prize of the upward call of God in Christ Jesus." Therefore, even the most saintly of men await that voice of the angels at the end of the Apocalypse, "Let him who is righteous be righteous still, and let him who is holy be holy still."

XXIV. Moreover, that righteousness and sanctity do not simply fall short of the highest degree of perfection in this life, but are also obscured by many faults; nor does this hinder those who are endowed with them from often stumbling into sin from weakness. For these are the words of the Apostles themselves: "For we all stumble in many things." Likewise, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." And therefore Solomon plainly declares, "There is not a just man on earth who does good and does not sin," that is, one who does good always without any sin.

XXV. However, they do not aim at anything else here than what Protestant theologians teach about the imperfection of that righteousness which adheres to the faithful through the grace of Christ. For, when they claim it to be only initiated and imperfect, they do not intend by this expression anything other than indicating that this righteousness never reaches the supreme degree of perfection and excellence on earth, but rather is far from it. Therefore, they assert that it must be pursued and promoted through various degrees daily until it is finally fully consummated and perfected in the future life. Moreover, they maintain that believers, no matter how much they progress in righteousness and holiness, always have their own defects and remain liable to many lapses until they shed this mortal body.

XXVI. Moreover, when they call the righteousness inherent in believers initiated, they do not want to deny that it is complete in essence and integral parts. Similarly, when they affirm it to be imperfect, they do not mean that it lacks anything necessary for the true nature of righteousness and sanctity. They readily concede the perfection of essential and integral parts to it. Nor do they consider it to be righteousness and holiness, either defective and mutilated, or apparent and falsely so called, but true and sincere, consisting of all its members and parts, by which a person is made conformable to the divine law, though not perfectly, and therefore has the true, complete, and integral nature of righteousness and holiness. Hence, in this matter, they carefully and often distinguish between the perfection of degrees and the perfection of parts, whether essential or integral. Indeed, they deny that the former belongs to our inherent righteousness, but they acknowledge that the latter must not be denied and assert it.

XXVII. However, the truth of this matter is so evident that even those who seem to contradict it with words are found to say the same thing in reality. For the Doctors of the Roman School clearly speak against the Reformers. For they do not want righteousness infused into the faithful by the Holy Spirit to be called only initiated and imperfect, and they strongly contend that it is and should be called perfect and absolute. However, when they explain their meaning

more distinctly, they clearly agree with the Reformed theologians. Indeed, when they call the righteousness we are discussing absolute, they do not understand it to be such that it has reached the highest point and nothing can be added to it. Similarly, when they say it is perfect, they do not understand perfect absolutely, such that nothing is lacking at all. For they admit that the righteous in this life still have blemishes and sometimes fall into various sins; not indeed so serious that they fall from righteousness because of them, but sins that still require divine mercy and forgiveness. And they also teach that the righteousness of even the most saintly people is of such a kind that it can be perfected daily and can receive an increase. Therefore, they call the righteousness of the faithful in this life only absolute because it truly, simply, and really is such; not, however, righteousness improperly so called or according to some fiction. Similarly, they call it perfect because nothing is lacking in it that pertains to the essence of true righteousness, although it lacks a certain accidental perfection and is far from the highest perfection by many degrees.

XXVIII. That this is indeed the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman School, while they call the righteousness inherent in us perfect and absolute, is clearly shown by Vasquez, in Book 2, on the first part of the second part, question 202, chapter 4, number 26, where these are his words: "Moreover, it clearly appears that our righteousness and true holiness are perfect. For if Scripture teaches us to be just, blameless, and pure, as we mentioned in chapter 2, then our inherent righteousness is shown to be true and perfect. But I say perfect, not in the sense that it is in the highest or most excellent degree, but because nothing whatsoever is lacking in it that would prevent us from truly being and becoming just by it. And a little later he adds: "Therefore, if Scripture absolutely pronounces us just, it follows indeed that we both have righteousness and it is also true and perfect. Therefore, our righteousness should not be proved by certain testimonies of Scripture in which perfect and outstanding charity is commended, but rather by those in which we are taught that we have righteousness in us; for righteousness is not where it is not true and perfect, in the sense that we have explained perfect and righteousness hitherto. Where it is evident that he takes true and perfect to mean the same thing, and he deals with the perfection of essence, not of degrees.

XXIX. But Bellarmine also indicates no less clearly in what sense he calls the righteousness and holiness of the regenerated perfect and absolute, in Book 2, on Justification, chapter 13. For there he confesses that the infused virtues by which the righteousness of the faithful is constituted are in a manner so perfect that they must be perfected more and more every day. And shortly thereafter he adds that the once-infused virtue requires daily new remission of sin. For although the righteous, he says, perform many good and just works, yet they often also fall into light and venial sins. In the following chapter, he asserts that habitual righteousness is indeed perfect in such a way that through it we are truly and properly called and are just by it. But concerning actual righteousness, he speaks thus: "Although it is in some way imperfect because of the admixture of venial offenses and requires daily remission of sin, nevertheless, it does not thereby cease to be true righteousness and is in a way also perfect by itself."

XXX. And thus indeed speak and teach the stricter among the Catholics. But those among them who are more equitable openly and simply admit that the righteousness inherent in us is slight, initiated, and imperfect. Among them, Cardinal Contarenus is especially noteworthy; for in his Treatise on Justification, published in the year 1572 after the Council of Trent, and with the approval of the Doctors of the Theological Faculty of Paris, he clearly and expressly teaches and emphasizes the imperfection of the righteousness inherent in the faithful. "This righteousness of ours," he says, "is initiated and imperfect, which cannot protect us from offending in many things, from frequently sinning."

XXXI. Moreover, since the righteousness and holiness of the faithful, whether it has the nature of virtues with which they are inwardly adorned by God or of the good works that flow from them and in which they exercise themselves, is only imperfect and initiated, it is certain that no one, by the power of his own righteousness and good works, can stand before the severe tribunal of God and bear the strict examination of divine judgment; nor can anyone escape damnation before God, be declared innocent, and be deemed worthy of eternal life if God considers only the righteousness inherent in him and his good works without any indulgence and mercy towards him but rather deals with him according to the strict rigor of the considered law.

XXXII. This clearly teaches the Psalms, "If thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquities, O Lord, who shall stand?" (Psalm 130:3). Job also acknowledges this with these words, "I know it is so of a truth: but how should man be just with God? If he will contend with him, he cannot answer him one of a thousand." (Job 9:1). Hence, the Prophet uses this supplication before God, "And enter not into judgment with thy servant: for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." (Psalm 143:2). It also pertains to that daily prayer, which, according to Christ's command, or those who are among the holiest of men, ought to be used, "Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors."

XXXIII. And here there is such force of truth, and such a lively sense of conscience, that even those who seem to attribute the most to inherent righteousness voluntarily submit to it, nor dare to resist, even those who seem to attribute the most to inherent righteousness. For the doctors of the Roman school acknowledge that no one can subsist in divine judgment by righteousness inherent and infused to himself, since God would deal severely and without mercy with man if He wished. For they prove that of Gregory the First, "However great their righteousness may be, it cannot suffice for innocence or for the elect; if they are required in strict judgment." And they openly confess and teach that any man needs divine forgiveness, not only with respect to those sins which precede his justification, but also because of various lapses due to weakness, into which, even after he is justified, he often falls; and for which he would rightly be excluded from heaven if divine mercy did not come to his aid.

XXXIV. The witness of Vasquez himself, the most rigorous defender of inherent righteousness among the Pontiffs, testifies to this. For in his 2nd volume, in the first part of the second dispute, chapter 6, number 44, he responds to the objection brought to him from Psalm 142, according to the Vulgate version, that the Psalmist rightly asks God not to enter into judgment with him, that is, not to judge him without the grace of mercy. For, he says, unless

God's mercy first anticipates him, so that he may be justified from sins, he cannot but be condemned in God's judgment; and each of us can say this, even after justification, since many venial sins remain, which, unless they are erased by God's mercy before they are called to the judgment of God, man cannot be justified completely, that is, he cannot escape the judgment and vengeance of God.

XXXV. Especially Cardinal Contarenus, in the aforementioned treatise on Justification, candidly acknowledges that righteousness, which adheres to believers through the grace of Christ, cannot be opposed to the severe judgment of God. But when we think of that judgment, we should rely on the righteousness of Christ for the foundation of our salvation. "I entirely believe," he says, "that we should rely, rely, I say, as on a firm thing, which certainly supports us, on the righteousness given to us by Christ, not on the sanctity and grace inherent in us. For our righteousness is indeed initiated and imperfect, which cannot protect us without offending in many things, without sinning constantly. Therefore, in the sight of God, we cannot be held righteous and good because of this righteousness of ours, as it is right for the sons of God to be good and holy.

XXXVI. Just as that holiness and righteousness, which the Holy Spirit instills in believers, does not hinder them from needing divine mercy and forgiveness for the remission of their sins, both those committed before their justification and those committed daily after it; so also that remission, with respect to us, is entirely gratuitous, and it is not to be thought that God receives us into favor and forgives our sins because of any righteousness inherent in us, or because of those works by which we are disposed to true righteousness and sanctity; as if our works or the righteousness impressed on us by the Holy Spirit were meritorious of the remission of our sins.

XXXVII. This is clearly taught by Sacred Scripture when it says, "And you, being dead in your sins and the uncircumcision of your flesh, hath he quickened together with him, having forgiven you all trespasses" (Colossians 2:13). Also, when it repeatedly emphasizes and inculcates that we are saved and justified by grace, through the grace of God, and not by works (Romans 3, Ephesians 1, Titus 3). For no one can doubt that that salvation and the forgiveness of sins includes justification. And so the passion and obedience of Christ to the death of the cross is the only merit by which God is moved to grant us the forgiveness of sins and to liberate us from the guilt of sin. Hence the Apostle says, "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins" (Ephesians 1:7), and "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood" (Romans 3:24-25).

XXXVIII. And in this regard also, we have the agreement of the Pontiffs themselves. For they acknowledge that the entire justification of the impious and sinful man, which according to them consists of the remission of sins and the renewal of the inner man, is gratuitous. Nor do they establish any meritorious cause for it other than the death and obedience of Christ, as can be seen in the Council of Trent itself. For in Session 6, chapter 7, listing the causes of justification, it enumerates no meritorious cause other than the passion of Christ. "The cause of this

justification," it says, "is indeed the glory of God and Christ and eternal life. But the efficient cause is merciful God, who washes freely; the meritorious cause is our most beloved only-begotten Lord Jesus Christ, who, being made an enemy for us, through excessive charity with which He loved us, merited justification by His most holy passion on the wood of the cross and satisfied God the Father for us. But in the following chapter, it expressly denies that any of those things which precede justification merit the grace of justification itself. For we are said to be justified freely, because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merit the grace of justification itself. For if it is by grace, it is no longer of works; otherwise, as the Apostle says, grace is no longer grace.

XXXIX. Therefore, Becanus complains that his own suffer slander, as if they taught that the justification and remission of sins of the impious were by merit and not truly gratuitous. And he asserts that the dispositions which precede justification, although good works, do not, however, merit the initial justifying grace and remission of sins; and consequently, the initial justification is purely gratuitous and not owed to us in any way by justice. In summary of Scholastic Theology, volume 2, tract 4, chapter 4, similarly, Bellarmine accuses Chemnitz of bad faith when he says that among Protestants and the Roman Church the controversy is called into question: what is it for which God receives man into grace? Is it the merit of the Son of God, or the beginning of newness in us? And therefore, they acknowledge that we are not received into grace because of any merit inherent in us. Nor is the novelty of life meritorious of our reconciliation with God. On Justification, book 2, chapter 2.

XL. Although in many things which we have listed so far, concerning the nature and merit of justification, and sanctity which belongs to the regenerate, Protestants and Pontiffs agree among themselves; yet among them there is a great contention of minds stirred up regarding this question: Whether we are formally justified before God by the righteousness inherent in us? which the Pontiffs affirm after the Council of Trent, but the Protestants deny with great consensus. In order to judge correctly the state and importance of this question, it is necessary to set forth more distinctly and clearly the mind of the contending parties.

XLI. As for what concerns Protestants, they take the word "to justify" in this question in a forensic sense; and by "to be justified" they understand nothing other than to be absolved from sin and pronounced innocent. But these words before God are the same as in the strict judgment of God and according to the institution of the law. Therefore, when they deny that we are justified before God by inherent righteousness, their meaning is that no one by reason of any sanctity and righteousness found in himself and the good works he has done can be pronounced innocent in the severe judgment of God and absolved from all guilt; nor can anyone escape damnation in God's judgment and be deemed worthy of eternal life if God rigorously examines our righteousness and works, and there is no mercy or compassion toward us.

XLII. However, they by no means deny, as is clear from what has been explained before, that true righteousness and sanctity are found in those who are reborn by the grace of God; through which they are truly holy and righteous and can truly be called such, not only before men but also in the sight of God, who acknowledges and approves that righteousness as genuine

and sincere; and therefore, in the final judgment, in which God will judge men mercifully and according to the covenant of the Gospel, and not strictly according to the rigor of the law, He will give glorious and solemn testimony to the righteousness and good works of the regenerate, and will benignly reward them with eternal life, according to the promises of the Gospel, but in which the divine righteousness will also shine forth in its fullness.

XLIII. So that no one of the adversaries may slander, thinking that this is not the genuine sentiment of the Reformers when they deny that we are formally justified before God by the righteousness inherent in us, and thus detract more from inherent righteousness than we ourselves attribute, it seemed good to infer here what the already cited Confession of the Reformers from Poland says briefly about this matter, chapter 4, section 2, no. 13. "We also deny," it says, "through that inherent righteousness, that we are justified in such a way that by and for it we are absolved before the judgment of God from the punishment of death, adopted as sons, and pronounced worthy of eternal life, in the forensic sense the term 'to be justified' is used in this doctrine. For though it may be said in a forensic sense that believers are justified by charity and other infused virtues, that is, they are made just and holy, yet this righteousness is imperfect in this life, and, as mentioned above, it cannot at all consist before the true judgment of God, which is especially considered in this doctrine."

XLIV. Which are in agreement with what John Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, lately in England, teaches and defends about habitual and actual righteousness. For in the discussion of habitual righteousness, in chapter 22, he speaks thus: "We grant that there is in all the justified a certain inherent righteousness, which if they set up as the formal cause of justification (although the term may be stretched), we will oppose it. But the aforementioned righteousness, which answers to the strict examination of the heavenly judge, cannot be either formal or meritorious in any way. And in the third chapter, he proves from this infused or inherent righteousness that all the faithful, or all those who are reborn, are called and considered just; and this by God Himself. Not indeed because this infused sanctity or inherent righteousness is perfect, but because it is true, not hypocritical, known and pleasing to God, who has infused it into the minds of the regenerate. But what often occurs among the Reformers, namely, that no one is just before God by inherent righteousness, as chapter 2 teaches, is to be understood not as simply and absolutely stated, but comparatively only, and to a certain extent. Namely, it is not meant by this that we have no righteousness upon which we can rely if we are strictly examined before the divine tribunal, or that we do not have the righteousness which the law of God requires for the avoidance of the curse and the attainment of eternal life.

XLV. But now the doctors of the Roman Church maintain that justification is not in a forensic sense, but in a moral sense. And to be justified is the same as to be sanctified and cleansed from the stains of sin. Therefore, when they claim that a person is formally justified before God by inherent righteousness, they mean that righteousness infused by the Holy Spirit is what they consider to be the form by which the faithful are called holy and justified in Scripture, and by which they are truly constituted as such; not only before men but also before God himself, who approves and accepts the righteousness he has bestowed upon them as true and

sincere: which, therefore, will endure and stand firm in the fire of the final judgment, when Christ will judge the living and the dead, and it will receive praise and the reward of life and eternal glory from Christ.

XLVI. However, as it has been sufficiently proven above, people do not believe that they can stand before the severe tribunal of God based on their inherent righteousness and good works, and avoid damnation and obtain eternal life if God were to strictly judge them and their works, forgiving them nothing and granting no indulgence. Thus, they readily concede that no one can be found just before God in this sense, but all need divine mercy and forgiveness of their sins. Indeed, they freely admit that this forgiveness is a completely gratuitous gift from God, not owed to any merits of human beings, although the very goodness and justice of divine nature somewhat require that he receive into favor those who, through faith and repentance, seek his mercy. Some doctors of the Roman Church, such as Bellarmine and Becanus, look to faith and repentance as meriting, in a congruous manner, the remission of sins. However, others reject this way of speaking, such as Thomas Stapleton.

XLVII. From these things, it is easily gathered that Protestants and Catholics, in this question indeed, seem to contradict each other in words, but nevertheless agree on the substance of the matter between them. For if the ambiguous and contentious terms are removed and the same thing is expressed with different terms, Catholics do not affirm, as is clear, what Protestants intend to deny when they deny that anyone is justified before God by inherent righteousness. Nor do Protestants attack what Catholics defend when they plainly affirm the opposite, namely, that this inherent righteousness is the formal cause of our justification with God. Thus, the whole difficulty hangs on the varied use of the term "justification," which indeed Catholics use in one sense, but Protestants in another.

XLVIII. The same judgment seems to be made regarding the related controversy, namely, whether a sinful man is prepared and disposed by certain works for justification? This is similarly taught and defended by Catholics, but denied by Protestants. For when the doctors of the Roman Church affirm this, their meaning is nothing other than that God, before sanctifying the sinner by His Spirit, accustomed to precede him with His grace, by which He arouses in him certain acts of faith, hope, and charity, and other Christian virtues, and by which he may also awaken a fear of divine judgment, sorrow for sin, and a purpose of a new life, if there are any such, which are like certain previous conditions and moral dispositions, without which God does not usually pour out His Spirit on sinners.

XLIX. However, this does not diverge from the doctrine of the Reformers, as is evident from what we have taught before, Thesis 16 and the following. Which are in conformity with what Amelius argues quite extensively, *Disput. Theologica de Preparatione peccatoris ad conversionem*; which is appended to his response to Nicolaus Grevinchovius, where he affirms in explicit terms that in every sinner, after the use of reason, turning and regenerating precede certain dispositions, although in different degrees, according to the wisdom of divine dispensation.

L. But what are those dispositions, he later explains in the words of the British theologians who attended the Synod of Dordrecht. They speak thus in their judgment on Articles 3 and 4: There are certain external works, ordinarily required by men before they are brought to the state of regeneration or conversion, etc. There are also certain internal effects for conversion or regeneration, which are stirred up by the power of the Word and the Spirit in the hearts of those not yet justified. Such as knowledge of the divine will, sense of sin, fear of punishment, thought of liberation, some hope of pardon. To which they later add: For just as in natural generation there are many preceding dispositions that precede formation; so also in the spiritual, through many preceding actions of grace, one reaches spiritual birth.

LI. However, what the Reformers are careful to guard against here is the idea that man, by the natural powers of free will, can somehow prepare himself for grace, or by any works whatsoever, even those done with the help of grace, can merit the remission and forgiveness of sins or the gift of the Holy Spirit: they think that the preparations and various dispositions that Catholics teach for justifying and sanctifying grace should be aimed at. Nor do they dispute and attack the dispositions or preparations with any other intention and purpose.

LII. For otherwise, they do not unwillingly concede that before justification, taken in the forensic sense, or what is the same, before the remission of sins, many things are required in man, which can easily be called dispositions: provided they are not considered to be efficient or meritorious causes of justification. Such as those we have often mentioned before, namely, the sense, knowledge, and detestation of sin, fear of divine judgment, desire for divine grace, and some love of God, and the like. Regarding these, Peter exhorts the Jews in Acts 3:19: Repent therefore, and turn back, that your sins may be blotted out.

LIII. Regarding this matter, Paraus in his work "Bellarminum lib. 5. de Iustif. cap. 3" can be consulted. Secondly, he says, it must be understood that it is not the same to say that dispositions precede justification or are required before justification, and to say that dispositions are required for justification, but justification is acquired through dispositions. We deny the latter. We rightly concede the former. Similarly, Amesius in "Bellarmino Enervato, Tom. 4. lib. 5. cap. 4." in response to the fourth argument, grants that some love precedes forgiveness of sins or justification, as a prerequisite disposition, although love does not necessarily precede forgiveness as a causing disposition. And in response to the fifth argument, repentance, which is sorrow and detestation of sin, indeed precedes justification as a prerequisite disposition, but not as a cause. These statements are in agreement with what the British theologians assert in the aforementioned judgment. Concerning the state of justification, in which we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ, divine grace usually does not lead people through sudden enthusiasm, but through many preparatory actions prompted by the ministry of the Word. This can be seen in those who, having heard Peter's sermon, feel the burden of sin, fear, sorrow, desire liberation, conceive some hope of pardon; all of which can be inferred from their words in Acts 2:37. "When they heard this, they were cut to the heart and said to Peter and the other apostles, 'Brothers, what shall we do?'"

LIV. Especially in this regard, Davenant accurately explains and illustrates the opinion of the Reformers in his work "De Justitia actuali, capite 31", where the fifth conclusion is as follows: "Some good works are necessary for justification as concurrent or preparatory conditions, although they are not necessary as efficient or meritorious causes." He immediately adds, "Among these good works, there are internal ones, which are of great importance before God, even though they do not appear to human eyes; such as sorrow for sin, detestation of sin, humbly submitting to God, seeking refuge in God's mercy, placing hope in Christ the Mediator, making a resolution for a new life, and other similar acts. For divine mercy does not justify stocks, that is, those who do nothing; nor does it justify horses and mules, that is, those who resist and stubbornly adhere to their lusts; but it justifies humans, especially those who are contrite and contrite, and who follow the guidance of the Word and Spirit of God. Just as for the recovery of a sick person, it is required that they sense the illness, desire recovery, visit a doctor, identify the illness, and take the medicine; yet none of these actions, taken individually or collectively, achieve healing as proper meritorious causes or as proper efficient causes, but only the work of the doctor and the power of the medicine; similarly, to obtain justification, certain acts or pre-existing or concurrent dispositions are required; however, we do not obtain justification by their efficacy or merit, but by the grace of God, who mercifully assists us, and by the power of that divine medicine, namely, the blood of Christ, by which the souls, leprous and diseased, are cleansed and cured."

LV. It seemed appropriate to explain this a bit more extensively, so as not to leave room for opponents to detract, and so that no one might doubt that Protestants do not simply deny that certain dispositions or preparatory conditions are required in the sinner before justification, whatever way it may be understood, either in the sense of the Catholics or the Protestants, but they only deny such dispositions for justification which are attributed to the powers of free will or considered to contribute efficiently or meritoriously to justification.

LVI. However, the Doctors of the Roman Church, or at least most of them, seem not to acknowledge any such dispositions. Since they profess, along with the Council of Trent, that nothing preceding justification merits the grace of justification, and they attribute those dispositions to the aid of grace arousing and preceding, not to the natural powers of free will. One witness for all is Thomas Stapleton, an Englishman, the staunchest enemy of Protestants and the fiercest defender of inherent righteousness, who seems to have thoroughly treated the doctrine of the Catholics regarding justification. For in his "Prolegomena to the fifth book of Justification," after enumerating various dispositions ordinarily required for it, according to the mind of the Council of Trent, he notes two among others. One is, "We are disposed to initial righteousness not by works as proceeding from our powers, but as effects of prevenient grace, assisting and preparing us." The other is, "We are not so disposed by these works that we merit initial righteousness, not even congruously." And afterwards, he diligently emphasizes that purely moral works, produced solely by the powers of nature, do not dispose or prepare for Christian righteousness, nor in any way merit anything pertaining to spiritual life or glory. And finally, he notes that justification itself is not obtained from these dispositions as if they were its

cause. In this matter, many Doctors of the Roman Church themselves could be cited as endorsing this view, but for the sake of brevity, we will refrain.

LVII. Therefore, since Protestants do not simply deny that certain conditions or moral dispositions are required before justification, which is no more than what the Roman Church demands in this regard, and since Catholics do not want these dispositions to be regarded as efficient or meritorious causes with respect to our justification, which is precisely what Protestants abhor, it can be concluded that there is no real controversy between the two regarding these dispositions, but only a certain verbal dispute, which, once the ambiguity of certain formulas and words is resolved, vanishes.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:

On the justice of Christ imputed to the faithful

Thesis I

A man once made guilty of eternal death by sin could not be liberated from the punishment due to sin and have the right to eternal life unless by the highest mercy of God forgiving those sins and gratuitously accepting him to eternal life.

II. Moreover, God is inclined by nature to succor the miserable, but He is not only merciful, but also just, and just as mercy compels Him to forgive the sinner, so justice demands that sin not go unpunished but rather uphold the force and majesty of His laws by taking punishment for sins.

III. Therefore, divine wisdom deemed it not proper to forgive sins unless satisfaction was made to justice and punishment due to sin was taken in some manner.

IV. But it was impossible for a sinful man to have both sin forgiven and yet be punished for it as deserved. For since sin deserves death and eternal perdition, it could not happen that the sinner be saved and become a participant in life and salvation through divine mercy, yet at the same time undergo punishment suitable for sin.

V. So, in order for God's mercy toward humans to be exercised and yet justice to be served, it was necessary for a surety and sponsor to intervene, into whom the punishment due to humans would be transferred.

VI. However, it was fitting for this surety to also be a human, so that sin would be punished in the same nature in which it was committed, but not involved in the same guilt as other humans. For indeed, if he himself were guilty in the divine judgment for his own sins, he could not voluntarily undergo the same punishment for others.

VII. Nor could a simple and mere man, who succumbed to the burden of divine curse, bear punishments equivalent to those committed by the whole human race, for which infinite force and dignity were required. Hence, it follows that such a Surety had to be both God and man.

VIII. Therefore, it is why the Most Good and Merciful God, having compassion on the human race and desiring to rescue it from deserved destruction, sent His eternal Son, who is also

God Himself, into the world, who, assuming human nature, and therefore truly God and truly man, being in all things like us, offered Himself to God the Father as Mediator and Surety for us, to satisfy the punishments due to us, and by satisfying divine wrath, to fulfill divine justice on our behalf.

IX. To accomplish this, at the appointed time by divine providence and as foretold by prophetic oracles, that Son of God, who did not consider equality with God something to be used to His own advantage, assumed the form of a servant and appeared among humans, voluntarily taking upon Himself all the miseries and infirmities of human nature, except sin, and after living a most holy and innocent life on earth for several years, He finally subjected Himself to the accursed and ignominious death on our behalf, becoming obedient to God the Father unto death, even death on a cross.

X. Regarding this, the Prophet Isaiah very clearly prophesied many centuries before Christ's advent in Isaiah 53, where, according to prophetic custom, speaking of future events in past tense, he describes the sufferings of the coming Messiah for us. "Truly he has borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows, yet we considered him stricken by God and afflicted."

XI. Considering this, the Apostle Peter says, "Christ suffered for our sins, the righteous for the unrighteous," and "he himself bore our sins in his body on the cross." And Paul says, "Christ became a curse for us, because it is written, 'Cursed is everyone who hangs on a tree.'"

XII. And it is also why the Sacred Scripture frequently speaks of Christ's death as a sacrifice by which our sins were expiated, as especially seen in the epistle to the Hebrews and in Isaiah's aforementioned chapter, where it is said that the Messiah offered his soul as an offering for sin. And also as the price by which we are redeemed from death and perdition, as when Paul says that Christ gave Himself for us. And Christ Himself said that the Son of Man did not come to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many. Hence, Peter affirms that we were not redeemed with corruptible things like gold and silver, but with the precious blood of Christ, a lamb without blemish and without spot.

XIII. Furthermore, Christ's passion and obedience offered to God the Father for us up to the death on the cross is denied only by those who deny that Christ satisfied for our sins by His death. For it cannot be perceived how satisfaction offered by a surety is not imputed to the one on whose behalf it was made, or how one can consider a guarantor to have paid money for a debtor and the creditor accepted the payment, yet the paid money is not imputed to that debtor for whom it was paid. Therefore, whoever acknowledges that Christ satisfied for our sins by His death and bore the punishments due to them admits through clear and necessary consequence the merit of Christ's death and His obedience being given and imputed to believers by God.

XIV. That obedience of Christ thus given and imputed to us is the only righteousness for which and by whose merit we are absolved from the guilt of our sins and escape the eternal perdition due to us, and thus from being children of wrath, as we all are by nature, we are adopted as children of God and heirs of eternal life.

XV. Indeed, God does not absolve anyone for the sake of Christ without also clothing him in the garment of true righteousness and sanctity, which gradually progresses from its initial

stages to perfection, to which we will finally attain in the future age. But although this righteousness may not reach the highest degree of perfection on earth and may be obscured by many lapses due to weakness, it does not fail in essentials and is pleasing and acceptable to God. And even though through it believers cannot be justified before God if He were to deal with them without any indulgence or mercy, nevertheless, it holds the promise of eternal life and glory, which God will mercifully and faithfully fulfill according to the gospel of grace when He judges the world.

XVI. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that God, in order to impute to us Christ's satisfaction and merit and to grant us forgiveness of sins and adoption as children for Christ's sake, requires from us that we believe in Christ with living and efficacious faith and repent truly and sincerely for our sins. For it would not be fitting for His wisdom to forgive sins to those who persist obstinately in sin or to make them participants of grace and salvation who reject the grace of Christ and refuse to acknowledge and worship Him as their Savior and Redeemer. However, although faith and repentance are prerequisites required by God for us to receive this benefit from Him and without which we cannot become partakers of it, neither faith nor repentance merit forgiveness of sins and adoption as children, nor are they causes for which and by whose dignity, merit, and efficacy we obtain such great grace. Rather, everything must be attributed entirely and solely to the obedience and merit of Christ; and as far as we are concerned, it is purely gratuitous, owed to none of our actions or works.

XVII. The Sacred Scriptures clearly and openly teach that the blood and redemption of Christ are not obtained through works, but freely, to be justified and receive forgiveness of sins. As the Apostle's words indicate, "For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God. They are justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God offered as a propitiation through faith in his blood." (Romans 3:23-25) Similarly, "For by grace you have been saved through faith, and this is not of yourselves; it is the gift of God, not of works, so that no one may boast. For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand so that we may walk in them." (Ephesians 2:8-10) These teachings are consistent with what is written to Titus, "But when the kindness and love of God our Savior appeared, he saved us, not because of righteous things we had done, but because of his mercy. He saved us through the washing of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit, whom he poured out on us generously through Jesus Christ our Savior, so that, having been justified by his grace, we might become heirs having the hope of eternal life." (Titus 3:4-7)

XVIII. It also pertains to what the same Apostle says about Christ redeeming us from the curse of the law, as he became a curse for us (Galatians 3). That God made him who knew no sin to be sin for us, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God (2 Corinthians 5:21). That Christ was made by God for us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption (1 Corinthians 1:30). And just as through one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so also through one man's obedience many will be made righteous (Romans 5:12).

XIX. This is also what the Reformed School Doctors refer to when they say that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us for justification, and that we are justified and made

righteous before God through the imputed righteousness of Christ, not through any inherent righteousness in us. By these and similar statements, they mean nothing other than the obedience of Christ unto death, rendered to God the Father in our name, being given to us by God so that it may truly be counted as ours, and that it is the only righteousness for which and by the merit and virtue of which we are absolved from the guilt of our sins and adopted as children of God and heirs of eternal life. They affirm that there is no righteousness in us, nor any good works by which we may merit such great blessings or withstand the strict judgment of God's law if He were to deal with us according to its rigor. Therefore, when we contemplate the judgment seat of God and the curse pronounced upon transgressors by the law, according to that dreadful clause, "Cursed is everyone who does not continue to do everything written in the Book of the Law," we can oppose nothing to it except the merit and satisfaction of Christ, in which alone, terrified by the conscience of our sins, we can find a safe refuge against divine wrath and obtain peace and comfort for our souls.

XX. However, they by no means intend to deny that true and living faith, as well as sincere and genuine acts of repentance, are required in us by God, so that we may become partakers of the forgiveness of our sins and adoption as children of God through Christ's death and obedience. Furthermore, they affirm that by His death and passion, Christ not only absolves believers from the guilt of sins but also merits for them the grace by which they are renewed in the image of God and adorned with true righteousness and holiness. Although this righteousness, while on earth, may not attain to the highest degree of perfection and may be obscured by many lapses due to weakness, it does not fail in essentials, being pleasing and acceptable to God. And although by it believers cannot be justified before God if He were not to use His indulgence and mercy toward them, they nevertheless have the promise of eternal life and glory, which God, judging the world according to the Gospel of grace, will mercifully and faithfully fulfill.

XXI. This is undoubtedly the genuine opinion of the Doctors of the Reformed Church, as cannot be doubted by those who have candidly examined their writings, as it can be clearly seen from the numerous testimonies of their statements. It should be noted, for example, that they profess this doctrine explicitly in the declaration of their opinion presented at the Thorun convention. In Chapter Four, concerning Grace, they state that God, calling and sincerely repentant, not only justifies, absolves, and adopts us as children by the merit of Christ imputed to us by pure grace, without any works on our part but also pours forth the spirit of charity into our hearts, renewing daily our sincere holiness and obedience, making us truly just and holy.

XXII. Afterwards, dismissing many calumnies against them, they testify that we are falsely accused, as if we denied all inherent righteousness to believers and asserted that they are justified solely by the external righteousness imputed to them by Christ, without any internal renewal. However, they declare that only to penitents and those who truly believe in Christ is righteousness imputed, and through the same faith, their hearts are contrite and vivified by the Holy Spirit, stirred to ardent love for Christ and a renewed zeal for obedience, being cleansed from sinful desires, thus initiating and perfecting righteousness and holiness in a new life, which

can stand the strict judgment of God only through the merit of Christ and His satisfaction, and not by any merit or virtue of our own.

XXIII. When believers are frequently called just and holy in Sacred Scripture, the Doctors of the Reformed Church confess that this appellation is not ordinarily taken from the righteousness given and imputed to them by Christ as a certain form, which, though external, nevertheless designates them, but rather from that righteousness and sanctity to which they are renewed through the grace and merit of Christ. Thus, they are rightly and truly said to be justified and constituted just not by that as if by a certain form, but rather by considering the formal cause of this designation to be the righteousness inherent in us.

XXIV. This is noted by Bishop Davenant of Salisbury, who wrote most accurately about the doctrine of Justification of all the Reformers, and received great applause from the Orthodox School. For in his book on Habitual Righteousness, chapter 27, he says, "I would like you to observe in passing that we do not affirm that the designation 'just' in Scripture is commonly taken from an extrinsic form but from those who are justified. For just as the saints are called in Scripture by some from the righteousness inherent in them: they are called justified from the most perfect righteousness of Christ imputed to them. And in the third chapter of the same book, he proves and explains these two propositions successively. First, That habitual righteousness is given or infused to all the justified, or whether it inheres in them. Then, From this infused or inherent righteousness, all believers or the renewed are called and considered just, and this by God Himself.

XXV. Furthermore, the orthodox interpretation of these sentences must be carefully observed against the Doctors of the Roman Church, who either do not understand the doctrine of the Reformers in this regard or maliciously distort it. For when they hear the Doctors of the Reformed Church commonly saying that we are justified and made just before God through the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and not through any righteousness inherent in us, they infer from this that we do not recognize any righteousness inherent in believers, by which they are truly considered just and holy before God. And they misconstrue it as if we were teaching that believers always remain wicked, unclean, and unjust in themselves, but that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to them only to cover their sins, not to remove them. Therefore, when believers are called just and holy in Scripture, this designation is not taken from any form, namely, righteousness inherent in them, but from the righteousness of Christ alone, which, though external to them, still designates them because it is imputed to them by God.

XXVI. Thus, Becanus, a Jesuit theologian, presents and interprets the sentiment of our theologians in the *Summa Theologiae Scholasticae*, Volume 2, treatise 4, chapter 2, titled "On Justification according to the Sentiment of the Calvinists," where he boldly asserts the sentiment of the Calvinists, as he calls them: In justification, sins are not taken away, but only covered and not imputed. Nor is inherent righteousness infused into man by which he is renewed inwardly and made just within himself, but the righteousness of Christ is imputed to him by which he is considered just outside of himself. Therefore, man remains within himself a sinner, unclean, and impious, and is only considered as righteous, pious, and just because of the righteousness

imputed to him by another. And all his works are considered unclean, impure, defiled, and mortal sins, although they do not bind him because they are covered and hidden by the righteousness of Christ. Hence, justification does not consist in internal renewal of the soul or sanctification but solely in the concealment and non-imputation of sins.

XXVII. And from this it follows that the Doctors of the Roman Church, thinking that we, under the doctrine of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, conceal and foster such monsters, vehemently oppose it. But we have made it clear from the true and genuine exposition of our doctrine that we are far from it. For we freely admit that the one who is justified is simultaneously cleansed from sins by the Holy Spirit and that inherent righteousness is infused into believers or the renewed, by which they are inwardly renewed and made just. Nor do we say that believers are considered as clean, pious, and just before God, although they remain impious and unclean in themselves, but rather that they truly become pious, clean, and holy through the grace of the Holy Spirit. We also acknowledge that many of their works are pious, holy, and just, not simply unclean and impure, and therefore mortal sins. And finally, in addition to that judicial justification, which we refer solely to the merit and righteousness of Christ and which we establish in absolution from the guilt of death and perdition, which we have incurred by violating the law of God before His severe tribunal," we agree with Davenant, in *On Habitual Righteousness*, ch. 21, "That there is a certain justification, so to speak, which we do not disapprove of being called the formal cause of inherent righteousness in us." And with the Polish theologians, in the *Synod of Confession*, ch. 4, "We do not deny that in a sound sense, believers can be said to be justified by charity and other infused virtues, that is, to be made just and holy."

XXVIII. But when our theologians deny that we are justified or made just before God by our own righteousness inherent in us, their intention is that no one, as far as I know, dares to say that relying on his own inherent righteousness, he can stand before the severe tribunal of God and not be found guilty, even if God were to judge them without mercy. Or who protests against Stapleton's confession, admitting that each one of us, both before and after justification, is bound to say with the Psalmist, "Enter not into judgment with thy servant. For if God does not prevent us with His mercy so that we may be justified from our sins, we cannot but be condemned in the judgment of God. And even after justification from mortal sin, many venial sins remain, which, unless they are erased by God's mercy before we are summoned to God's judgment, man cannot be justified altogether, that is, completely escape God's judgment and vengeance." And after justification, when we are released from mortal sin, many venial sins remain, which, unless they are erased by God's mercy before we are summoned to God's judgment, man cannot be justified altogether, that is, completely escape God's judgment and vengeance. Tom. 2. in 1.2. Disp. 202. ch. 6. num. 44.

XXVIII. However, when our theologians deny that we are justified, or made righteous before God by our own righteousness inherent in us, but rather through the righteousness of Christ alone imputed to us, their view is that no one, no matter how just and holy they may be, can escape being found guilty before the tribunal of God's judgment and condemnation if God does not choose to deal mercifully with them, but rather judges them strictly according to the

rigors of the law. For indeed, all are convicted of sin by the divine law, and no one can in any way avoid or escape the curse that the law denounces upon all sinners, through the power and merit of our own righteousness and the good works we have done, if God does not choose to show them grace, but rather acts according to His own right toward them. But that believers are delivered from eternal death and perdition, which they justly deserved by their sins, and are adopted as sons of God and heirs of the heavenly kingdom, is solely owed to the merit of the death and passion of Christ, which God grants and communicates to us in such a way that it truly becomes ours and is accounted as such, not in any way because of some of our good works or any righteousness of ours, by the merit and dignity of which God may be moved and impelled to deliver us from the destruction otherwise due to us and grant us the right to the inheritance of eternal life.

XXIX. This is the true and genuine doctrine of the Reformers concerning our justification through the righteousness of our Lord Christ imputed to us, which they make so clear and evident both by the analogy of faith, the common sense of Christians, and the internal voice of conscience, that not even the doctors of the Roman Church dare openly contradict it, but when it is simply and plainly proposed, they are compelled to acknowledge it and subscribe to its truth.

XXX. Indeed, none of them, as far as I know, dares to say that the faithful, relying on their own righteousness inherent in them, can stand before the severe tribunal of God and not be condemned, even if God judges them without mercy. Or who would protest against Stapleton, who admits that if God were to judge men according to strict judgment, no human righteousness could stand in that judgment? (Book on Justification, Chapter 14). And to Vasquez, who acknowledges that each of us, both before justification and after justification, is bound to say with the Psalmist, "Enter not into judgment with thy servant" (Psalm 143:2). For unless God by His mercy prevents us from being justified, we cannot avoid being condemned in the judgment of God. And even after justification from mortal sin, many venial sins remain, which, unless they are erased by God's mercy before we are summoned to God's judgment, a man cannot be justified at all, that is, completely escape God's judgment and vengeance (Volume 2, in 1. 2, Disp. 202, chap. 6, num. 44).

XXXI. Nor is there any Doctor of the Roman Church who does not acknowledge that we all need the remission of sins before God, so that we may avoid eternal death and be adopted as children of God and heirs of eternal life; but that this remission and adoption as children of God are gratuitous with respect to us, and not owed to any of our works. This is expressly taught by the Council of Trent, Session 6, Chapter 8, declaring that we are said by the Apostle to be justified freely, because nothing of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification. For under justification, remission of sins is combined with sanctification and the inner renewal of man, as is seen in Session 6, Chapter 7. And in Chapter 3 of the same Session, it describes the justification of the ungodly as a transfer from that state in which a man is born a son of the first Adam, to the state of grace and adoption of sons of God, through the second Adam, Jesus Christ our Savior. Hence it is clear from the mind of that

Council that the remission of sins, our renewal, and adoption as children of God are benefits granted to us by God freely, and which are not merited by any of our works.

XXXII. Moreover, the same Council, in Session 6, Chapter 8, teaches that this justification, which according to it is not only the remission of sins but also sanctification and the inner renewal of man, by which man becomes righteous from unrighteous, and from enemy becomes a friend, so that he becomes an heir according to the hope of eternal life, has as its meritorious cause our Lord Jesus Christ, who merited justification for us by His most holy passion on the cross, and satisfied God the Father for us. And no one can be justified except those to whom the merits of the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ are communicated. And this is certainly the same as what our theologians intend to signify when they say that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us and we are justified before God through it. For what else do they mean when they speak thus, as has been often emphasized, except the remission of our sins and adoption as children of God and heirs of the heavenly kingdom, not owed to any merits of ours, but solely to the merit and satisfaction of Christ, which are truly given and communicated to us by God?

XXXIII. Indeed, not even our way of speaking is dared to be simply condemned by the Roman School of Theology, for they concede that it can be said in a sound sense that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us and becomes ours. Indeed, that sound sense according to which they interpret that expression is the very one that we intend. This is clearly evident from Bellarmine, Book 2, On Justification, Chapter 7, §4: "Fourth, it is refuted. For," he says, "if heretics wanted only the merits of Christ to be imputed to us, because they are given to us, and we can offer them to God the Father for our sins, since Christ undertakes the burden of satisfying for us, and not reconciling us to God the Father, their opinion would be correct."

XXXIV. To this are added what the same book adds in Chapter 10, Response to the first argument: "It is said, Christ is our righteousness, because he satisfied the Father for us, and that satisfaction, when he justifies us, is given and communicated to us in such a way that it can be said to be our satisfaction and righteousness. For even if we are truly and rightly called and are righteous by inherent righteousness, yet we do not satisfy God for our sins and eternal punishment by it. But that inherent righteousness comes with the remission of sin and eternal punishment, the effect of Christ's satisfaction, which is conferred and applied to us in justification. And in this way it would not be absurd if someone said that the merits of Christ are imputed to us, when they are given and applied to us, as if we ourselves satisfied God; provided that it is not denied that there is in us also an inherent righteousness, which is true and absolute righteousness, which is not liable to punishment but to glory."

XXXV. Similar sentiments are also found in Gabriel Vásquez, Volume 2, in 1. 2. Disp. 222, chap. 1. For the words of the Council of Trent, "Although no one can be just unless the merits of the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ are communicated to him," mean entirely the same thing as if it were said that the merits of the passion of our Lord Jesus Christ are imputed to him. However, in Disputation 203, he rightly affirms that it can be said that the merits of Christ are

imputed to us when it concerns the meritorious cause of justification. For to have the merits of Christ imputed to us is the same as having those merits applied and communicated to us.

XXXVI. Now, who among us has thought anything else when it was said that we are justified by the sole righteousness of Christ imputed to us, than that Christ Himself satisfied God the Father for us, and that satisfaction is so given and communicated to us by God when He justifies us, that it can be called our own satisfaction and righteousness? Therefore, the remission of guilt and eternal punishment that we obtain from God in our justification is the effect of Christ's satisfaction alone, not of any righteousness inherent in us. Or who has inferred from this that there is no righteousness produced by the grace of Christ in us, by which we are truly called and are righteous, which is true and absolute in essence and integral parts, although it may fall short in degrees from the highest perfection and may have many flaws and blemishes adhering to it due to the daily failings of the faithful? This is acknowledged by the Doctors of the Roman Church, and specifically by Bellarmine himself, as was previously proven in the Theses on Righteousness inherent through the grace of Christ. Hence it is evident that the theologians of the Roman School unjustly criticize our doctrine of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, since we truly believe nothing in this matter that the force of truth does not compel them to acknowledge.

XXXVII. But whether the glory belongs to the righteousness that is infused into the faithful by the grace of the Holy Spirit, as Bellarmine contends, is another question, which, God willing, we will discuss at another time when we explicitly address the merits of good works. We only briefly say this, that although nothing is owed to God by the good works of men in themselves, nevertheless God has liberally promised the crown of life and heavenly glory to the righteousness and sanctity of the faithful, and according to His promises, He will mercifully and faithfully render it when He judges the dead and the living. In this matter, He will not exercise that proper justice by which someone fulfills what is strictly due, but only a certain justice so called by a common reason, which, as the older Scholastics speak, pertains to the congruity of divine goodness and includes faith in keeping promises. This is openly acknowledged and recognized by the greater and more sound part of the Pontifical School, in agreement with us.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:

Wherein is Explained, whether & how sin is removed in those who are justified

Thesis I

The removal of sin in those whom God receives into grace is a matter that is agreed upon among Christians and is so clearly and openly taught in Scripture that it cannot be called into doubt by anyone who reveres its authority.

II. For Sacred Scripture, praising God's goodness towards humanity, often testifies to His action of forgiving, removing, indeed, casting sins into the depths of the sea. Thus Moses in Exodus attributes this glory to God, "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and abundant in mercy and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity

and transgression and sin." Exodus 34. Micah the Prophet imitates this, saying, "Who is a God like You, pardoning iniquity and passing over the transgression of the remnant of His heritage? He does not retain His anger forever because He delights in mercy. He will again have compassion on us, and will subdue our iniquities. You will cast all our sins into the depths of the sea." Micah 7. With these words, the Prophet alludes to the Egyptians, enemies of God's people, whom God once overwhelmed with the waters of the Red Sea and submerged in its depths.

III. Similarly, God Himself comforts His people through Isaiah, "I, even I, am He who blots out your transgressions for My own sake; and I will not remember your sins." Isaiah 43. Likewise, "I have blotted out, like a thick cloud, your transgressions, and like a cloud, your sins." Isaiah 44. Hence, believers confidently implore this grace from God, as David did, "Hide Your face from my sins, and blot out all my iniquities." And this grace continually invites sinners to repentance and conversion, as the Apostle Peter says, "Repent therefore and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out." Acts 3.

IV. However, since God confers such a great benefit on us through and for Christ, it is said by John the Baptist, "Behold! The Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world!" John 1. To the same effect, John says in his first epistle, "You know that He was manifested to take away our sins." And the Apostle also, in his letter to the Hebrews, teaching that Christ appeared once for all to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself, and that He was offered once to bear the sins of many.

V. But to understand more distinctly how Christ takes away the sins of men, it must be observed that there are two aspects to sin. One is the depravity and filthiness that stains and defiles the sinner, rendering them hateful to God and contrary to reason and divine law; the other is the liability and ordination to punishment demanded by divine justice, and threatened by the law.

VI. Both are removed by the grace of Christ. Firstly, it is certain that Christ liberates those who earnestly seek refuge in Him from the punishment due for sin and dissolves in penitent believers that obligation by which, on account of committed sins, they stand guilty and debtors before God unto eternal death. This grace Christ merited and obtained for us when, as our representative and in our name, He endured the most grievous punishments on the cross and suffered for us, the just for the unjust. Hence, it is said that our sins were borne by Him in His body on the tree. Likewise, He redeemed us from the curse of the law when He became a curse for us. According to what Isaiah the Prophet had predicted, "He was wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement for our peace was upon Him, and by His stripes, we are healed. All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned, every one, to his own way; and the Lord has laid on Him the iniquity of us all." Isaiah 53:5-6.

VII. But Christ does not simply make us free from sin by His death. Nor should it be thought that when God forgives us sins for Christ's sake, He only relaxes the punishment of sin, while sinners, as before, remain within us; just as earthly rulers are said to pardon a criminal when they exempt him from just punishment, even if by that nothing is internally changed, but remains as it was before.

VIII. For God does not pronounce anyone free from the punishment of sin without also correcting within him the corruption of sin and removing the filthiness through true repentance and the efficacy and power of the Holy Spirit. Nor was Christ suffered only for this end, that we might justly escape the punishment our sins most deserved, but also to deliver us from the corruption of sin and to render us righteous and holy before God, from being ungodly and sinners.

IX. For as Paul testifies, "Our Lord Jesus Christ gave Himself for our sins, that He might deliver us from this present evil age." Galatians 1. "And Christ died for all, that those who live should live no longer for themselves, but for Him who died for them and rose again." 2 Corinthians 5. Hence, Peter concurs with this when he says, "Who Himself bore our sins in His own body on the tree, that we, having died to sins, might live for righteousness—by whose stripes you were healed." Titus 2. Furthermore, according to the Apostle, the purpose of that saving grace revealed in the Gospel is "that we might live soberly, righteously, and godly in the present age."

X. Moreover, the efficacy of Christ's grace, by which sin is destroyed in us so that we may be clothed with true righteousness and holiness, is expressed in Scripture by various terms and shadowed forth by many metaphors, as it also describes variously the wickedness and turpitude of sin.

XI. For Scripture considers sins firstly as certain filths and uncleannesses which defile and soil the soul, rendering it abominable and odious to God, in accordance with Christ's words in the Gospel, "What comes out of a man, that defiles a man. For from within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders, thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lewdness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness. All these evil things come from within and defile a man." Mark 7. This also pertains to what is read in Revelation, "He who is unjust, let him be unjust still; he who is filthy, let him be filthy still." Revelation 22.

XII. Furthermore, Scripture speaks of those who indulge in sins as if they were slaves to sin's fervor and servants of vices, who are pressed under a certain harsh dominion of sin and are almost sold under it. Christ says, "Everyone who commits sin is a slave to sin" (John 8). And Peter, in his second epistle, affirms that those wicked ones whom he rebukes are slaves of corruption, saying, "For by whom a person is overcome, by him also he is brought into bondage" (2 Peter 2). Hence, Christ is said to redeem us from iniquity, as if we were captives under it, and to vindicate us from the filthy servitude of sin into freedom. Paul says, "Sin shall not have dominion over you, for you are not under law but under grace" (Romans 6). For, as he teaches there, our old man was crucified with Christ, that the body of sin might be done away with, that we should no longer be slaves of sin. And at the end of that chapter, he says, "Having been set free from sin, you became slaves of righteousness."

XIII. Our sins are also compared to diseases and wounds, with which our souls are sick and sore. Therefore, God is said to heal our infirmities or diseases through His grace. David acknowledges and celebrates this divine blessing in Psalm 103, saying, "Bless the Lord, O my soul, and forget not all His benefits: Who forgives all your iniquities, Who heals all your

diseases." And because it is Christ who obtained that grace for us through His death, we are said to be healed by His wounds. Peter says, "By whose stripes you were healed." Therefore, the Prophet Malachi also calls Him the sun of righteousness, in whose wings, that is, in His rays, healing is found: "But to you who fear My name the Sun of Righteousness shall arise with healing in His wings" (Malachi 4).

XIV. But Scripture does not speak simply of sin as a disease or infirmity, but also as death, from which we lie by God's grace and by which we are raised up and into a new life. For, as the Apostle says, "But God, who is rich in mercy, because of His great love with which He loved us, even when we were dead in trespasses, made us alive together with Christ" (Ephesians 2). Similarly, in Colossians 2, he says, "And you, being dead in your trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, He has made alive together with Him." And he had previously said that believers are buried with Christ in baptism, and raised with Him.

XV. From all these things, it is clearly and certainly inferred that sin is removed by the grace of Christ in believers, not only as to guilt or obligation to punishment, but also as to the stain and corruption itself, which infects the soul. For if God were only to relax the punishment due to sinners on account of Christ's merit and satisfaction, but sins themselves were to remain in their souls as before, then they would still remain enslaved to sin, captivated by it, sick with vices, indeed dead in sins, as before; and therefore it could not be said that by the grace of Christ they are cleansed from sins, purified, and sanctified; liberated from the slavery of sin, healed from spiritual infirmities, and finally raised from death to start a new life with Christ, no longer walking according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit.

XVI. However, this purification and cleansing from sins does not happen all at once, but rather is promoted gradually and by various degrees. Hence the Apostle exhorts those who are supposed to be partakers of Christ's grace, and among whom he includes himself, to cleanse themselves more and more and to perfect sanctification. He says, "Therefore, having these promises, beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God" (2 Corinthians 7). This is also the meaning of the passage in Revelation: "He who is righteous, let him be righteous still; he who is holy, let him be holy still" (Revelation 22).

XVII. Therefore, when Christ the Lord speaks of those who are washed by His blood and Spirit, saying, "He who is bathed needs only to wash his feet, but is completely clean," he implies that even those who are purified and sanctified by His grace still have some earthly filth clinging to them, from which they must be cleansed and washed. Just as those who wash their bodies cannot help but collect some dust on the feet that touch the ground, they are contaminated by it at least in that part. Therefore, he prays to the Father for the disciples, whom he had already declared to be clean, that he may sanctify them by his word: "Sanctify them by Your truth. Your word is truth" (John 17).

XVIII. For as long as we dwell in this mortal body, the remnants of our innate corruption and depravity remain within us. Indeed, this corruption cannot condemn those who are grafted into Christ by true and living faith, nor exclude them from eternal happiness. Moreover, by the

grace of Christ, it is so broken and weakened that it no longer reigns in them but yields to the Spirit and is subjected to it. However, it is not completely eradicated. Hence believers themselves feel very prone to evil and experience great difficulty in doing good. Nor do they cease to struggle against the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which opposes the divine law and continually draws them in the opposite direction, requiring them to constantly fight against it.

XIX. Furthermore, this innate corruption is augmented in the godly themselves by vicious habits contracted through past sins, which, though forgiven, gradually through the grace of Christ are effaced and abolished. Nevertheless, they are not entirely eradicated, and therefore they continue to incline and impel believers to various sins.

XX. Therefore, those who are justified and sanctified by the grace of Christ still daily fall into various sins from weakness, as James says, "For we all stumble in many things" (James 3). And Solomon in Ecclesiastes, "For there is not a just man on earth who does good and does not sin" (Ecclesiastes 7). Likewise in Proverbs, "Who can say, 'I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin'?" (Proverbs 20). John also declares, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us" (1 John 1).

XXI. Therefore, those whom God has received into grace through Christ are indeed cleansed from the stains of sins, but not in such a way that nothing filthy remains in them. Their souls, indeed, are healed through the mediation of Christ, their strength against diseases is broken, and they are beyond the danger of death. Yet, there always remains some residue of their former weakness and infirmity. In short, sin no longer reigns over them, and its powers are increasingly weakened day by day. However, there still cling to them certain remnants of it, with which they must constantly struggle.

XXII. And this is what Reformed theologians mean when they sometimes argue that sin, through the grace of Christ, of which we are partakers in this life, is not eradicated or extinguished but continues to exist within us. Although it is not imputed, and we are covered before God by the merit and righteousness of Christ. For they do not understand the justified sinner to remain as he was before, wallowing in the same filth and being just as liable to sin. Rather, it is only through Christ's death and satisfaction that they are freed from the punishment they deserve. They acknowledge, as we have already said, that when God forgives them the punishment of sins, He also cleanses them from the filth and stains of sin and grants true righteousness, holiness, and sanctity so that they no longer serve sin but present their members as weapons of righteousness to God. Yet their intention is not that sin is completely eradicated from believers, for there still remains some residue of sin in them, as they daily slip into many sins, for which reason they need to say in their daily prayers, "Forgive us our debts." Furthermore, since even in the most holy and perfect individuals there remains that perverse desire and innate vice, which constantly wages war against the mind and impels them towards evil, hindering and delaying them in doing good, and inciting movements contrary to reason and divine law.

XXIII. For they argue that this desire can rightly be called sin because it is something evil in the general category of morals, displeasing and detestable to God, and contrary to reason and

divine law, deviating from the order established by God in creation itself. Indeed, sin, in general, is any bad disposition or action of a rational creature inherently opposed to any law of the Creator that was either given or prescribed to that creature. Therefore, they teach that the corrupt dispositions and vicious habits, whether innate or acquired, still remaining in believers after their justification, have the nature and character of sin, insofar as they affect the person in whom they are found in a manner contrary to what was originally ordained by God in creation. They are something shameful and evil, not simply physical but moral, which, taken together with sin in its entirety, they consider to be interchangeable and reciprocal. However, they concede that the desire that remains in the regenerated is not strictly sin in the strictest sense of this term, according to which sin sometimes, especially in Augustine's usage, signifies evil deserving punishment by divine ordinance, which, when found in a person, makes them guilty in divine judgment and subject to punishment. This distinction is used to reconcile certain statements of Augustine that seem contradictory on the surface, namely, in which he sometimes denies and sometimes affirms that the desire that remains in the regenerate is sin.

XXIV. And this orthodox interpretation of the matter must be firmly held and observed, especially against the Doctors of the Roman Church, who assail our position as if we were teaching that sins are not removed from those who are justified, but only controlled and not imputed, and therefore, even after justification, a person remains in themselves unclean, unjust, and impious, and is only considered righteous, godly, and pure because of the righteousness imputed to them. Thus, all the works of the justified are considered unclean, impure, and polluted, even mortal sins, although they do not harm them because they are covered and hidden by the righteousness of Christ, as can be seen in the works of Becanus on Jesuitism in the *Summa Theologia Scholastica*, vol. 2, tract 4, chap. 2, entitled "On Justification according to the Doctrine of the Calvinists," and in the works of Gabriel Vásquez, vol. 2, in 1.2, disp. 202, chap. 4, where he affirms that heretics, as he calls them, dogmatize that sins are not truly removed and eradicated in the justified but remain, although covered and hidden.

XXV. But the attribution of these assertions to us is clearly false and unjust, as can be seen from what we have said. For we openly confess that God purges those whom He justifies and receives into grace from sins and transforms them from sinners, unclean, and impious into righteous, just, and holy, and so works in them through the Spirit that, having renounced all ungodliness and worldly desires, they strive for good works and produce fruits worthy of repentance.

XXVI. However, we still maintain that sin is not completely removed and abolished through the grace of Christ, so that some sin remains in believers and the justified as long as they live this life. For this reason, they always need the mercy and grace of God, as we have explained above. This matter is so certain and well-established that even the Doctors of the Roman Church are compelled to acknowledge it and subscribe to its truth.

XXVII. First of all, they themselves confess that no one in this life, at least according to the ordinary law, lives without any sin. But those who are justified and maintain the grace of justification are still liable to many daily and lighter sins, which can coexist with justifying

grace. They do not immediately cast them off, as they think they do with more serious and heinous sins, which the Apostle calls works of the flesh. This is explicitly proven and defended by Bellarmine against the Pelagians, in Book 1, on the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, chapters 5 and 6.

XXVIII. Furthermore, although the theologians of the Roman Schools say that in the one who is justified, sins are completely removed and abolished, and when sins are forgiven by God, the entire stain left by them is washed away, yet they do not deny that vicious habits resulting from those sins persist even after their forgiveness through actual sins committed against them, and that they gradually need to be erased and abolished by the help and assistance of divine grace, and that progress in virtue and sanctification partly consists in this among the faithful, as can be seen in Bellarmine's Book on the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin, Book 1, chap. 13.

XXIX. Moreover, especially after the remission of original sin through justifying grace, they nevertheless acknowledge that in the justified, there remains what they call material sin, namely, a proneness to evil and difficulty in doing good, and a certain, as they say, disorder and perversion of nature contrary to the order established in the original creation. By this disorder, the lower faculties of the soul are inclined to resist and rebel against reason and divine law, and the whole person becomes inclined to evil and experiences great difficulty in doing good. And this proneness to evil and depravity of nature is what is commonly called concupiscence and kindling.

XXX. Furthermore, they do not deny that this concupiscence, which remains in the regenerated, opposes divine law, inasmuch as it incites towards what the law prohibits and restrains from what the divine law commands. Therefore, they confess it to be something blameworthy and reprehensible, and therefore, a defect, a vice, and a moral evil, which must be resisted and restrained, indeed destroyed and crucified. They consider it necessary for the faithful to diligently work and strive in this matter, and the more progress they make in this work, the greater will be their perfection and sanctity.

XXXI. Indeed, they concede that concupiscence, even as it exists in the justified, is something that God condemns and hates. But in order to reconcile this with what the Council of Trent defines, namely, that God hates nothing in the regenerate, they make a distinction in God's hatred: one that is directed towards a person and one that is not. In the former sense, they say that God does not hate the concupiscence that remains in the regenerated because it does not render the person in whom it resides hateful to God. But in the latter sense, they acknowledge that God does indeed hate concupiscence because it is displeasing to God and something He wants removed from the regenerated. Although this does not prevent the faithful person from being pleasing and acceptable to God. For, as Bellarmine says, according to whom this distinction is made, God does not want to condemn the regenerated on account of the concupiscence that exists in them but rather desires to gradually consume concupiscence so that the regenerated may be perfectly healed and liberated. (On the Loss of Grace, Book 5, Chapter 13, towards the end).

XXXII. Finally, although they deny that concupiscence, which exists in the regenerated, should be called sin according to the true and proper meaning of this term, they nevertheless

acknowledge that it can be called iniquity and sin in a broader and improper sense, because, namely, it arises from sin and leads to sin; indeed, it inherently contains a certain disorder, insofar as, through it, the lower faculties, which should obey the higher faculties according to the order originally instituted by God, become disobedient and rebellious. And therefore, they interpret many passages of the Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans, where he designates concupiscence by the name of sin, in this sense, as can be seen in the same Bellarmine, Book 5, On the Loss of Grace, and the State of Sin, Chapter 13. From all these points, I leave it to any prudent person to conclude how little the Doctors of the Roman Schools differ from the doctrine of the Protestants on this article, in which, nevertheless, they declaim so vehemently and inveigh so harshly.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:

On the certainty which one can and should have about his justification before God

PART ONE: In which the view of the Reformed Church is explained

Thesis I

Among the various calumnies with which the Protestant doctrine regarding justification is assailed, these also frequently occur: They teach, by common consent, that all and each one of the people can and should believe with a certain faith that their sins have been remitted, and that they are justified before God. This conviction ought to be so firmly persuaded in them, as that Jesus Christ is the Son of God and the Redeemer of the world, and similar dogmas of faith. Such persuasion is deemed necessary, so much so that without it, no one can truly be faithful and justified; just as if someone were to refuse to believe in some of the principal and fundamental articles of faith. In such persuasion, true and saving faith is established, as in its own proper and chief act. Therefore, people are justified before God by such faith alone, even though otherwise they may indulge in vices and not strive for good works.

II. This is especially seen in Bellarmine and the Jesuits, who either suppose or expressly and distinctly assert such things against us in their disputations. Therefore, after we have already refuted many such calumnies with our preceding theses on Justification, and the connected questions, by a plain and clear exposition of the truth, according to the sense of the Reformed Doctors, it seemed fitting to counter these in a similar manner with the present Disputation.

III. First of all, it is certain and established among us that no one can legitimately and truly claim to be justified before God, and to be pleasing and accepted by God unto eternal life, unless they have sincerely renounced from the heart worldly vices and desires, so that, according to the grace of the Gospel, they may live soberly, piously, and justly in the present world. Therefore, whoever persists in their sins and indulges in the desires of the flesh, no matter how much they profess the faith of Christ and give some assent to Evangelical Truth, if in any way they persuade themselves in their mind that they have obtained mercy from God and that God is

reconciled and propitious to them in Christ, undoubtedly this is a mere fallacy of Satan and carnal and pernicious security; for forgiveness of sins is not promised, and divine mercy and grace are not offered, except to those who seriously repent and not only confess their sins but also forsake them. According to Solomon, "He who conceals his sins will not prosper, but whoever confesses and renounces them will find mercy."

IV. But as for those who, sincerely repenting of sin, flee to the mercy of God in Christ and strive to obey the precepts of Christ with true faith and sincere hearts, we consider them able to be assured of God's mercy toward them and to be certain that their sins are forgiven; therefore, whatever holiness and righteousness they seek after and diligently pursue, we believe it to be accepted by God unto eternal life.

V. This is evident from various examples of the saints, both in the Old and New Testaments. Thus David trusted in his righteousness before God and bore a certain confidence of eternal life when he said in Psalm 17, "But as for me, I shall behold your face in righteousness; when I awake, I shall be satisfied with your likeness." Similar to this are the verses in the following Psalm: "The Lord rewards me according to my righteousness; according to the cleanness of my hands he repays me. For I have kept the ways of the Lord, and have not wickedly departed from my God. For all his rules were before me, and his statutes I did not put away from me. I was blameless before him, and I kept myself from my guilt." And he also shows the same confidence when he rejoices in his soul in Psalm 103, "Bless the Lord, O my soul, and forget not all his benefits, who forgives all your iniquity, who heals all your diseases, who redeems your life from the pit, who crowns you with steadfast love and mercy, who satisfies you with good so that your youth is renewed like the eagle's."

VI. Moreover, the pious King Hezekiah also believed in the grace of God toward him and considered himself truly righteous in God's eyes when he was sick and near death, daring to mention his piety and integrity in prayer to Isaiah, as recorded in Isaiah 38. He says, "Please, O Lord, remember how I have walked before you in faithfulness and with a whole heart, and have done what is good in your sight."

VII. How often indeed Paul speaks confidently of God's kindness and mercy toward him and perceives Christ living and dwelling in him through his grace! He says, "I have been crucified with Christ. It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me. And the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave himself for me." And similarly, what he writes in 1 Timothy 1, "I thank him who has given me strength, Christ Jesus our Lord, because he judged me faithful, appointing me to his service, though formerly I was a blasphemer, persecutor, and insolent opponent. But I received mercy because I had acted ignorantly in unbelief, and the grace of our Lord overflowed for me with the faith and love that are in Christ Jesus." Hence, he boasts in the Lord in 2 Timothy 4, "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, will award to me on that day."

VIII. Nor indeed is it to be thought that this was peculiar to those departed men, but faithful ones also, who enjoy no singular privilege, cannot determine with certainty within

themselves whether they are in the grace of God and truly partakers of the benefits obtained for us through Christ. For in many ways it is gathered from Scripture that all who are united to Christ by true and living faith can, without any rashness, conceive a certain confidence and persuasion on this matter. For first the Apostle teaches in Romans 8 that all the faithful receive the spirit of adoption, by whom they recognize and call God as Father; and the Spirit of God bears witness to their spirit that they are children of God and co-heirs with Christ. For you have not received, he says, the spirit of slavery again in fear; but you have received the Spirit of adoption as sons, by whom we cry, "Abba, Father." For the Spirit himself bears witness to our spirit that we are children of God. And if children, then heirs; heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ. But how can we not rightly and deservedly be certain about that which the Spirit of God testifies to us by his movements and effects in us? And how can the same Spirit be said to bear witness to our adoption in our minds unless we can certainly perceive and acknowledge the testimony of his effective presence in our hearts? Now if we are certain that God is our Father and we are his children, then without a doubt we are certain that our sins are forgiven through Christ and we are renewed by his grace in true righteousness and sanctity, which is pleasing and acceptable to God.

IX. Furthermore, the Spirit of Christ generates in the minds of the faithful a certain heavenly peace and indescribable joy. For as the Apostle teaches in Galatians 5:22, the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace. And in Romans 14:17, the kingdom of God is righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit. Indeed, that peace of God is said to surpass all understanding, as in Philippians 4. And Peter affirms that believers rejoice with inexpressible joy and glory, in the first chapter of his first epistle. But what peace and spiritual joy can be conceived in those who do not know whether they have God as a Judge who is pleased with them, or indeed whether they have him as their own Father? And whether they are in a state of salvation or rather of damnation and eternal perdition. And from where can that ineffable joy of true believers in Christ arise, if not from the innermost and vivid sense of divine love and favor towards them, and a certain confidence in eternal blessedness and glory?

X. Moreover, whoever is certain that they have the Spirit of God dwelling within them cannot doubt that they are justified by true faith and accepted by God. For that Spirit is not given to anyone except true believers. But the faithful can certainly recognize and discern whether they have the Spirit of God. Otherwise, John would say in his first epistle, chapter 3, "By this we know that He abides in us, by the Spirit whom He has given us." And in the following chapter, "By this we know that we abide in Him, and He in us, because He has given us of His Spirit." For if we cannot recognize and judge whether we have the Spirit of God and of Christ, how can that Spirit be an argument to us of our communion with Christ? And how can we infer from having the Spirit of God that Christ abides in us and we in Him?

XI. Similarly, unless we can discern from certain and indubitable signs whether Christ dwells true and living faith in us, Paul would fruitlessly exhort us to prove and examine ourselves, whether Christ is in us and whether we are in the faith. Nor would he marvel at one who, having Christ dwelling in him, did not sense or perceive it, saying, "Examine yourselves as

to whether you are in the faith. Test yourselves. Do you not know yourselves, that Jesus Christ is in you?—unless indeed you are disqualified."

XII. Moreover, it is a perpetual duty of the faithful to give thanks to God for the benefits bestowed on them in Christ, namely, the forgiveness of sins in the blood of Christ, and deliverance from the bondage of sin and the power of darkness by the power of that Spirit. For indeed, writing to the Colossians, Paul exhorts us to give thanks joyfully to God the Father, who has made us worthy or fit to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light, and who has delivered us from the power of darkness and translated us into the kingdom of the Son of His love, in whom we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins. And likewise, in his first epistle, Peter wants us to proclaim the virtues of Him who called us out of darkness into His marvelous light. But how can we give thanks to God for translating us into the kingdom of His Son and enrolling us among His saints, if we cannot be certain whether we truly belong to the kingdom of Christ and are numbered among His saints? For who can legitimately and appropriately give thanks to God for that benefit which he does not know whether he has been given or not, seeming rather to mock than to testify to a grateful mind?

XIII. Hence it is also evident that the faithful who are in the grace of God can not only, but also ought to, be certain of it. And if they are not certain about it and fluctuate and doubt about this matter, this deficiency and weakness should be blamed in them. For to lack that disposition and that affection of mind, without which you cannot perform your duty, is a flaw of imperfection. And therefore, since all who are partakers of the benefits of Christ through true faith are bound to give thanks to God for the grace received, and no one can properly fulfill that who is not certain of the grace received, it follows that such certainty must be in them, and if they are found lacking in this regard, it must be attributed to their own fault and weakness.

XIV. And certainly that spiritual joy with which the faithful rejoice in Christ, and which cannot exist without certainty of one's own grace, and springs from that source, is not only a certain fruit of the Holy Spirit arising from piety and faith but also something that pertains to the duty of the faithful; and it cannot be absent from them without some fault of their own. For Scripture often exhorts to that joy. "Rejoice always," says the Apostle in 1 Thessalonians 5, and in chapter 4 of his epistle to the Philippians, "Rejoice in the Lord always. Again I will say, rejoice." And among the various duties of the faithful, described in Romans 12, he includes, "Rejoicing in hope."

XV. Moreover, there cannot fail to be a blameworthy defect which perfect charity expels, and which cannot coexist with it. But since perfect charity cannot coexist with uncertainty about justification and one's own grace, perfect charity cannot persist. For, as John says, "There is no fear in charity, but perfect charity casts out fear; because fear has punishment. But he who fears is not perfect in charity. But he who doubts whether he is justified and accepted by God through the grace of Christ cannot help but be troubled by that fear which carries punishment with it. Therefore, perfect charity cannot tolerate such doubt.

XVI. To these add that we are commanded to approach with confidence the throne of grace, Heb. 4, and that we are said to have confidence in Christ, or boldness, and access with

confidence through his faith, Eph. 3. But with what boldness or confidence can one approach God, who is uncertain and doubtful whether God is pleased with him or not? What else can such uncertainty engender in the mind than anxious fear and mere trepidation?

XVII. Moreover, although the faithful cannot doubt without fault about their own grace and forgiveness of their sins, yet those who are not altogether certain about the true number of the faithful are not to be excluded. Indeed, this argues for a small and moderate faith, but not a nonexistent and false one. And although it does not consist with perfect faith, nevertheless, it can still persist with sincere but weak faith. Namely, as our faith is greater or lesser, stronger or weaker, so it makes us more or less certain about God's grace and causes us to doubt more or less.

XVIII. Therefore, there are not a few who, with sincere faith in Christ and consequently truly reconciled to God, are nevertheless not certain about the grace received, and some do not attain to that certainty before the moment of death. Indeed, when temptation assails, even the most holy men may fluctuate and be greatly troubled about whether they are in God's grace and accepted for salvation. Not because they hesitate about the truth of divine promises, but because they focus too much on their own unworthiness and weakness.

XIX. This is evident from the examples of the prophets themselves that are read in sacred Scripture. For what mental state did the holy Prophet experience within himself, and with what doubts was he beset about God's grace, favor, and help, while he burst out into those complaints in Psalm 77? "Will God cast off forever? Or will he never be favorable again? Has his mercy ceased forever, his promise come to an end from generation to generation? Has God forgotten to be merciful? Will he keep his wrath forever? And similarly, with what terrors and anxieties was the Psalmist struck, as he lamented in Psalm 88? "Your fierce wrath has come upon me, and your terrors have destroyed me. Why, O Lord, do you cast off my soul? Why do you hide your face from me? I have been afflicted and close to death from my youth; I suffer your terrors; I am desperate.

XX. But in those holy men, this was an argument of great human weakness, not an example of virtue to be imitated. Therefore, if any such doubt arises in the minds of the faithful, it should not be fostered under the pretext of humility, but earnestly fought against, and the faithful should strive with all their might to cast it off from their minds, advancing in faith to attain a certain confidence in God's grace. For this purpose, frequent prayer, practice of piety, and constant exercise in good works are helpful. This is what the Apostle Peter aims at when he urges us to make our calling and election sure through good works. 2 Pet. 1.

XXI. Moreover, since true faith, although weak, can still persist for a time without a certain and absolute confidence in the forgiveness of sins obtained from God through Christ's grace and our reconciliation with God, it is evident that this confidence is not the proper and formal act of saving and justifying faith. For justifying faith can never persist without its own proper and formal act.

XXII. Moreover, add that this confidence in the forgiveness of sins already obtained through Christ presupposes true faith existing in the heart. For no one can legitimately persuade

himself of this unless feeling and perceiving his own faith, he reasons thus within himself: Whoever believes in Christ with true and living faith, his sins are forgiven, and according to the Gospel, he is justified before God. But such faith I feel and experience. Therefore, my sins are forgiven, and I am considered just before God because of Christ. Hence it is evident that the confidence expressed in this conclusion is something that follows from and presupposes faith, arising from the sense and consideration of one's own faith. But the proper and formal act of faith does not presuppose faith but constitutes it, and it is not something arising from the sense of existing faith but in which the essence of faith consists.

XXIII. Furthermore, the confidence described above is something subsequent to justification and follows the justification already accomplished. For it is necessary first for someone to be justified before they can truly persuade themselves that they are already justified. But the proper and specific act of justifying faith is something, in nature at least, prior to justification. For according to the doctrine of Scripture and the common opinion of theologians, faith is the condition of our justification, or the instrument.

XXIV. Indeed, many theologians teach that confidence in God through Christ is the very formal and specific act of living and justifying faith. But learned men observe that there are two kinds of confidence. One which they call refuge and adherence, by which the faithful adheres to God and seeks salvation and righteousness in Christ, which confidence is usually expressed in Scripture by the terms trust and hope. The other which they call the confidence of feeling, by which one confidently believes in the righteousness and salvation already obtained and approaches God without fear and dread. This confidence is signified by the Hebrew word and is called *παρησία* in the New Testament. The former belongs to the essence of living and justifying faith and is the instrument of our justification, or condition without which no one is justified. The latter is the fruit or effect of faith, which is not always exercised and which does not always appear and is not necessarily the source of salvation and justification. Peter Molineus, son of Peter Molineus, French Treatise on Justifying Faith.

XXV. And to further illustrate the matter, it has been rightly observed by the same learned men that to this twofold confidence, a twofold doubt and hesitation are opposed. One in which someone doubts concerning the promises of God, whether indeed they are true or not, and whether one should seek refuge in God and salvation in Christ. But the other in which someone, not doubting at all about the truth of the divine promise, is certain to seek refuge in God and to seek salvation in Christ, yet doubts about their own salvation and the remission of their sins due to the sense of their own weakness. And because shaken by temptations, they do not seem to recognize in themselves a faith firm enough, nor worthy fruits of repentance. The former doubt is pernicious and deadly and simply contradicts the nature and truth of faith. The latter is not so. For even though perfect faith expels it, it arises from a certain deficiency of faith, like a kind of illness; yet, it still coexists with living faith and is not yet an argument of dead faith. And so, what James says in his Epistle, chapter 1, that one who doubts should not expect anything from the Lord, should be understood concerning the former doubt, not the latter.

XXVI. From this, it is clear that the certainty one has about their justification before God is not entirely of the same kind and nature as the certainty we have about the articles of faith and doctrines that God has revealed in His Word. For the latter is absolutely necessary in the faithful. And no one can remain faithful and rightly regarded as such, and yet doubt the articles of faith, for example, whether Jesus is the Christ and the Son of God, or whether the dead will rise again. Yet, as already mentioned, just because someone doubts whether they are justified and accepted by God for eternal life, they should not be judged immediately as lacking true faith, nor being in the grace of God, nor can it be in any way considered as a doctrine of faith that this or that person is justified and a partaker of divine grace.

XXVII. It is indeed customary for Reformed theologians to call the certainty of faith that by which someone believes themselves to be reconciled to God and that their sins have been forgiven through the blood of Christ. But this is done by them because this certainty is based on another proposition revealed in the Word of God, namely, that whoever believes in Christ has forgiveness of sins in His blood. But the other, which is known to the believer by internal sense and experience, namely, that they truly believe in Christ and place their trust in His death. For the faithful, while examining themselves and scrutinizing the hidden movements of their souls, can undoubtedly feel and perceive whether they truly believe in Christ, seriously love God, and are led by His fear, which are signs and marks of living faith. But they believe that this suffices to refer to some aspect of faith, namely, if it is deduced from one proposition that God has revealed in His Word, and from the other, which is through experience or some other certain reason. Yet they do not think that everything referred to faith is of the same nature and necessity. For whatever is related to faith in any way is relevant if it is in any way supported by divine testimony. But there are some things that are wholly supported by divine testimony; others, however, which are partly supported by divine testimony, and partly by human sense, testimony, or reasoning. But those of the former kind undoubtedly have more weight than those of the latter.

XXVIII. Indeed, although, as has already been proven, that certain persuasion that the faithful can have about the remission of their sins and their reconciliation with God through Christ is not a formal act of justifying faith, it can still be considered in some way as supporting that faith. In order to understand this, a twofold act must be distinguished in saving and justifying faith. One is direct and primary, the other is reflexive and secondary. The direct one is that by which the faithful acknowledge and embrace Christ as our Redeemer and Savior, and seek salvation and righteousness in Him. But the reflexive one is that by which the faithful reflect on their own faith, recognize it, and experience its effects, namely, fear, love of God, and love for neighbor, in their hearts. From this, they conclude that they are truly united to Christ, participants in His grace and benefits.

XXIX. Therefore, that persuasion we are discussing is indeed an act of faith, but a reflexive, not a direct one; not primary, but secondary. It does not pertain to the essence of faith but only to its perfection. The former is the one by which we are justified, to which salvation and the forgiveness of sins are promised. But the latter is not the same. For, as we have already said, this latter presupposes faith as already existing in us, and follows justification as already

accomplished. And therefore, in itself, it cannot consist in the nature and essence of faith, but is rather a certain fruit and complement of it. Nor can it be the condition of justification, or instrumental cause, but only a certain understanding and apprehension of it.

XXX. However, just as faith is either greater or lesser, more vivid or more languid, so also its sense is greater or lesser, sharper or more relaxed in our minds. Hence it is that as faith grows and increases, that confidence in God's favor and grace towards us, and our grace and righteousness before God, is strengthened and reinforced in the same proportion, and is diminished and weakened in the opposite manner, whereby faith decreases and wanes.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:

On certainty Which one can and should have, on one's Justification before GOD.

PART TWO: In which the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church is set forth, and the state of the controversy is gathered and examined.

Thesis I

As the Doctors of the Roman Church explain their opinion on this matter, they introduce many distinctions of certainty, as can be seen in Bellarmine's "De Justificatione," Book 3, Chapter 2. First, for them, there is one certainty of the object, that is, of the thing known or believed, and another of the subject, that is, of the person knowing or believing. The former certainty is the immutability of the thing, which cannot truly be otherwise than believed or known. Thus, we say it is certain that God is good, that sin is evil. The latter certainty is a certain firmness of our assent to the thing proposed to be believed or known. This is the certainty we speak of when we say, "I am certain about this matter," "I am convinced of this," meaning, "I adhere so firmly to this proposition that I have no doubt at all about its truth." The present question concerns not the certainty of the former kind, but only of the latter.

II. Furthermore, this firmness of assent sometimes has no foundation in the thing itself but arises solely from the error, affection, or obstinacy of the assenting person, and then it is not true certainty in the proper sense. For those who firmly believe what is false should be called persuaded rather than certain. On the other hand, such firm assent may rely on clear perception, solid reasoning, or legitimate testimony. And then it is true and properly called certainty, which has no place unless persuasion is not only firm but also true and legitimate. In the present question, we are not concerned with that prior kind of certainty, improperly so-called, but only with the certainty of the latter kind, which not only denotes the firmness of assent in the believer or knower but also its legitimate foundation in the thing itself.

III. True and legitimate certainty is further divided in the Schools into evident and obscure. And in each of these, three degrees are usually distinguished. Evident Certainty consists of those things that are somehow seen, that is, clearly perceived. The first degree of this certainty is held by the first principles which are self-evident, that is, known to be true by everyone without further reasoning, such as that the same thing cannot be and not be at the same time, that

the whole is greater than its part, and similar truths. The second degree of evident certainty is held by conclusions clearly deduced from the first principles, and this is called scientific certainty. The third degree is held by things perceived by the senses of the body, and this is called experiential certainty.

IV. Obscure Certainty consists of those things held by faith or opinion alone. The first degree of this certainty is held by things believed with certainty due to divine authority. This is the certainty of divine faith, and it is simply and absolutely certain, since no reason can be given for it to be false. The second degree of obscure certainty is held by things believed on human authority but confirmed and renowned in such a way as to exclude all fear. Such are the belief that Cicero and Virgil were eminent men, that Augustus ruled a large part of the world successfully, that there are many famous cities in distant provinces, Constantinople in Thrace, Goa in India, Mexico in America. And this is called the certainty of human faith, or moral certainty. Although it is not so great that it cannot in any way be false (since every man is fallible), it is so great that anyone who contradicts it is rightly judged rash or contentious.

V. The third degree consists of those things supported by so many signs and conjectures that they make a person feel secure and dispel anxiety, although they do not exclude all fear. And this is called conjectural certainty and is more a matter of opinion than of faith. For example, when someone recognizes from the style and manner of expression, or from the strokes and shapes of the letters themselves, that a letter or book was written by someone, or when from various indications one infers that a person is suffering from such and such an illness.

VI. Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church here distinguish the certainty of faith into the certainty of Catholic faith, in which things that must be believed by all according to the teaching and testimony of the Church are believed to be revealed by God, and the certainty of private faith, in which things believed by a private individual are not revealed by God to the whole Church, or at least do not belong to the common object of faith.

VII. According to the opinion of the Roman School, any kind of certainty, even conjectural, which holds the lowest degree, excludes doubt and is opposed to it. For one cannot be said to be certain about anything if one doubts it. For someone who doubts properly speaking dares not assent to either side of a contradiction and suspends judgment between them. But whoever is certain, even if only conjecturally, assents to one side and judges definitively that the matter is so.

VIII. However, although all certainty, according to the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church, excludes doubt, it does not exclude all fear. For according to their doctrine, to doubt is one thing, and to fear is another. The one who doubts, as I have already said, completely suspends judgment and remains neutral between the two sides of a contradiction. But the one who forms a definite and determined judgment about one side of a contradiction and decides that the matter is thus, while at the same time judging that it is possible for the matter to be otherwise, is said not to doubt but to fear properly speaking. For example, someone who, after examining the style, manner of expression, or strokes and shapes of the letters, determines without hesitation that a letter belongs to a certain person known to him, can be said to be certain about

that person; but at the same time, he judges that it is not impossible for a demon or some skilled and notorious impostor to produce something similar. And therefore, according to the style of the Roman School, there will be no doubt in that person about the matter proposed to him, but he will nonetheless not be without all fear concerning it.

IX. Thus Vasquez distinguishes and explains fear and doubt: "Every fear," he says, "can exist without the doubt of the opposing party. For doubt is the hesitation of the intellect between the two sides of a contradiction, so that no agreement between the extremes appears to it, in the knowledge of which assent consists. But fear does not arise from doubt between the two sides of a contradiction; for it can exist with a determined assent to an opinion. But it arises from a certain judgment by which someone, weighing the principles from which he has drawn his assent, judges that they are of such a nature that perhaps what is the object of his opinion is different from what it appears to be. We have already pointed out that this judgment is found in external principles, and thus it is found together with a determined assent to the other side. " (First Part of the Second Part, Vol. 2, Disp. 200, chap. 8, towards the end).

X. Although, according to the Doctors of the Roman Church, doubt, strictly speaking, occurs more than fear; nor does everyone who fears necessarily doubt; sometimes, however, they include fear itself under doubt, and they use the very word of doubt to signify fear. Therefore, according to them, doubt is taken in two ways. First, strictly and properly; second, broadly and improperly. Doubt taken in the former way signifies that disposition of the mind by which one dares not assent to either party; for those are properly doubtful who vacillate so much that they dare not decide anything. But doubt taken more broadly and improperly also includes fear itself, which sometimes we have from the opposite side, even if we assent to one party. As you can see in Bellarmine, *On Justification*, book 3, chapter 10, section "You will say."

XI. Finally, they distinguish between the certainty of faith and the certainty of hope or trust. The certainty of faith depends solely on the word of God and the promise of God, and is not based on any other foundation; therefore, it is absolute in its kind, and infallible, and excludes not only all doubt but also all fear. But the certainty of hope or trust is based on two foundations. One is on God's part, which is the promise of God itself. From this perspective, the certainty of hope equals the certainty of faith. The other is on man's part, which is the disposition required by God in his word for man to partake of the promised benefit. For just as someone legitimately hopes for either the gifts of grace or glory, it is not enough for them to be certain that divine promises are true and firm, but it is also required that they feel and acknowledge within themselves those conditions under which God has been pleased to promise grace and glory to human beings. However, from this perspective, our hope and trust do not have as much certainty as faith itself: but only a moral or conjectural certainty, insofar as someone, by diligently examining and scrutinizing themselves, gathers from various signs and movements of their soul that they are truly led by repentance for sins and sincerely love God, and perform other things that God requires of us so that we may obtain the good things promised by Him. This certainty is not altogether infallible, nor does it exclude all fear and anxiety; however, it nevertheless removes doubt and anxiety from the soul.

XII. Thus Bellarmine philosophizes about this matter, in his book *On Justification*, book 3, chapter 2, towards the end, section "Then." He says, "The adversaries, he says, confuse faith with trust, just as they confuse the certainty of faith with the certainty of trust. However, there is much difference between each certainty. For the certainty of faith, because it relies solely on the authority of God, excludes all doubt from every side. Trust, on the other hand, partly relies on the divine promise, partly on one's own disposition; and as far as it concerns the divine promise, it likewise excludes all fear and is absolutely and simply certain; but as far as it concerns one's own disposition, it does not entirely exclude fear, nor is it absolutely certain, but rather is so to a certain extent and conjectural; nevertheless, it is so much so that it suffices to generate security. This same thing he further pursues and amplifies in the same book, chapter 11, section 9, 'But moreover.' Where he also observes that a twofold certainty can be considered in hope: one on the part of the intellect, which we have described in words; the other on the part of the will, which is a firm adherence of the will to the hoped-for thing: which can be very great, even if from the side of the intellect a person is not certain that they will obtain that thing. But that certainty which is in faith affects only the intellect.

XIII. Similar things are taught by Thomas Stapleton, in his book *On Justification*, book 9, chapter 11. This, he says, must be carefully distinguished in the place of faith: the certainty of faith which heretics posit, and the certainty of hope which Catholics posit, so that it may be understood whether by denying the certainty of faith, we place the faithful in perpetual doubts; therefore, just as hope is distinguished from faith, so also the certainty of hope is distinguished from the certainty of faith. Faith relies solely on the word of God as its proper object, and therefore the certainty of faith arises from the word of God itself, without any consideration of any quality on the part of the believer. But it is true that faith says, whoever he may be, or in whatever manner he may be affected who believes. Therefore, this certainty is altogether and in every way infallible. Hope, however, relies not only on the word of God, but also on human effort and diligence bestowed through the grace of Christ; therefore, its certainty arises from both. Therefore, its certainty on the part of the word and promise of God is no less than the certainty of faith; but as regards the condition and disposition of the one hoping, it is doubtful and uncertain. And after he has shown by several arguments that the faithful do not rely solely on the divine promise, but also on their own faithful disposition, he adds, "Therefore, the certainty of hope does not only rely on divine promises (from which part it is most firm, no less than the certainty of faith), but also on our condition and disposition, which we contribute; and from this part, although the certainty of hope is lesser than the certainty of faith (because we cannot be certain from faith that our legitimate disposition is certain without special revelation), still there is no fluctuating doubt leaning in this direction one moment and in that another, depending on how one thinks they are accepted by God, with equal opinions alternating, always anxious and suspended, that is, firmly assenting to neither side; heretics falsely teach us: but there is certainty on the part of the subject, certain and firm, which is the certainty of all moral things, which relies on great arguments and grave authority, which fully suffices for the tranquility and peace of mind."

XIV. With these things thus explained, it is agreed among all the Doctors of the Roman Church that those who are truly faithful and just can be in some way certain of their own grace, and can attain to some true and legitimate assurance of the remission of their sins and their justification before God, even without any special revelation. But what and of what kind that certainty is, and to what category it belongs, is not agreed upon among them, and there is some diversity of opinions in their schools on this matter. As can be seen in Bellarmine, *On Justification*, book 3, chapter 11, section "For there are three."

XV. First, among them is the one who judges that righteous men cannot have the certainty of divine faith regarding their justification without special revelation, not indeed Catholic, but private. Thus thought and taught Ambrosius Catharinus, one of those bishops who constituted the Tridentine Synod, whose opinion Vasquez reports and explains at length in 1.2. Tom. 2. Difp. 200. cap. 3. Where he notes from Catharinus that this consent of faith regarding one's own justification can be obtained in two ways. One way directly and proximately through the internal revelation of God and the testimony of the Holy Spirit, to which we give assent inwardly; the other way not from direct revelation, but from certain things certainly revealed, together with others perceived by the senses, and by experience within himself, man learns. For just as some consent is considered to be of divine faith, it is not necessary to rely proximately on revelation and to arise from it alone; but it suffices if it is gathered from revealed principles, combined with others that are evidently known by experience or by another reason. And this latter way, this Bishop believed, whoever is justified can be certain of being in grace by private divine faith. Because, namely, every adult who is justified by the Catholic faith believes that he is justified, who approaches the Sacrament properly disposed, or who is disposed outside the Sacrament by contrition and love: but anyone who is just can have evident experience of this disposition, and therefore can also believe by divine faith that he is justified. Moreover, he proves from this that the disposition necessary and sufficient for justification is evidently known to the one justified, because, if it were not so, divine providence would be frustrated, which requires something from us by which we are disposed to the grace of the remission of sins, so hidden and concealed that it is not evident to us ourselves. Add that it is necessary for that person to be foolish who cannot know about himself, whether he approaches the Sacrament sincerely and with a right conscience.

XVI. However, this opinion of Ambrosius Catharinus seems difficult to reconcile with the decree of the Tridentine Synod, which is found in Sess. 6. cap. 9. at the end. Where it is affirmed that No one can know with the certainty of faith, which cannot be false, that he has obtained the grace of God. Therefore, after the Council of Trent, this opinion, as erroneous, was commonly rejected in the Roman School: although that Catharinus, who was part of that Council, not only always retained it, but also publicly defended it, as not condemned at all in the Council of Trent, whose words he extends, according to the mind of those who formulated the decree, not to contradict his own doctrine.

XVII. The second opinion which has a place in this question in the Roman School does not indeed teach, according to Bellarmine, that the righteous can have the certainty of divine

faith regarding their own grace; nevertheless, it affirms that they can, indeed, especially men who are perfect, for the state of this life, come to such security that they have no fear of their own justification in any way at all, just as they believe without any hesitation, and without fear of deception, that Caesar ruled in Italy, Alexander in Greece; that Cicero was an orator, Livy a historian, Virgil a poet; that Constantinople is a city in Thrace, and Antioch in Syria, although we have not seen either of them. This certainty is properly called moral, and is distinguished from conjectural certainty.

XVIII. This opinion Vásquez attributes to Dominic Soto, Andrés de Vega, and Ruard Tapper. And indeed, that Tapper, differing from the present question, says in Art. 9. Lovan., "In this," he says, "all Scholastics agree, that all kinds of certainty cannot be had from us, but it can be probably obtained through signs, which are more certain the clearer and more manifest they are. Sometimes they are so clear that there is no fear, no hesitation is connected with such knowledge. And in the following page, after posing as a problematic question, and disputable on both sides, Whether for a long time in the exercise of a holy life, indeed even penitents, without the revelation of God, by signs, testimonies of Scripture, and experiences of the visitations of the Holy Spirit, can have certainty without rashness, and by just reason, not indeed infallible, but fit without fear and hesitation, lest perhaps it may not be as they think, that is, they may not have grace: it sufficiently indicates which way he inclines, adding, that the most effective arguments can be had for the presence of grace, and no likely cause of doubting or fearing arises."

XIX. What indeed are those arguments afterward explained by Vega himself in the words he quotes from his book 9, on the Council of Trent, chapter 48? "Those," says Vega, "the rest and security with which many migrate from this life, that burning desire with which charity, when perfect, cries out, 'I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ,' and the joy with which they exult, understanding that the day of their death is near, saying with David, 'I rejoice in those things that have been said to me, we will go into the house of the Lord.' Woe to me, for my sojourning is prolonged. Also the eagerness and admirable constancy of the martyrs, and the contempt of torments, what else are they but the most evident testimonies of such certainty, which they have of their justice and grace before God? They would not exult at the approach of death, they would not desire it thus, they would not rejoice in torments, nor would they depart from this life with such peace and tranquility of mind, who would hesitate, and doubt or be uncertain of their state, or fear in any way. Then after he cited many things in this sense from Bernard, especially these words from his Epistle 107: 'If the heavenly mercy looks upon him and sends the spirit of compunction into him, so that he sighs, repents, changes his life, subdues the flesh, loves his neighbor, cries out to God, and proposes to live henceforth for God,' from this visitation of heavenly light, and the sudden change of the right hand of the Most High, let him recognize himself indeed, no longer as a son of wrath, but as a son of grace, indeed, one who experiences the divine affection of paternal kindness toward himself. Finally, he concludes that just as those who feel and experience this in themselves are certain, according to Bernard's opinion, without fear and doubt, of the present grace, so they surely know themselves to be certain, not thinking themselves liable to be deceived in any way. Yet there is no rashness here.

Finally, he adds that faith, which is an infused virtue, tends to incline toward that certainty, because this certainty depends on the statements of Scripture, although it is much inferior to the certainty of faith.

XX. However, this opinion which establishes that people, at least the more perfect ones, can have certainty about their own grace and justice, not indeed of faith, but moral certainty, which excludes not only all doubt but also all fear, is rejected today by the majority of theologians of the Roman School; and this because it does not seem sufficiently congruent with the decrees of the Council of Trent. For these are the words of that Synod, Session 6, chapter 9: "For just as no one pious should doubt about the mercy of God, about the merits of Christ, and about the virtue and efficacy of the sacraments, so too, while anyone looks at himself and his own weakness and indisposition, he can fear and be afraid of his grace, because no one can know with certainty the faith in which it is impossible to be false, that he has received the grace of God." Where since the Council decrees that anyone just can fear about his grace, it is clear from its mind that the faithful in this life cannot attain to that certainty about their own grace which in this respect expels all fear and doubt.

XXI. Therefore, in the Roman Church, a certain third opinion prevails, and it is much more common, which not only denies to the faithful the certainty of faith regarding their own righteousness but also that moral certainty which excludes all fear and doubt of deception, and unless there is a special revelation, it wants to have here only that conjectural certainty, and the certainty of hope or trust, which is nevertheless accompanied by a certain fear and dread, but still expels doubt and fluctuation from the heart, by which someone would not dare to judge himself accepted by God, and to trust in the forgiveness of his sins, and therefore it suffices to calm the mind and to generate peace of conscience in the faithful and the just.

XXII. To this opinion is added Bellarmine, in book 3 of *On Justification*, chapter 11, in response to the final argument. After stating that there is no Catholic writer who teaches that people should perpetually doubt and hesitate about their reconciliation with God, he presents three opinions of his fellow Catholics. The first is that of Catharinus, who attributes certainty of divine faith to his justification; the second is of those who believe that the just can come to such security that they have no fear of their justification; and the third, which he himself approves as truer and more common, does not entirely remove all fear, yet it removes all anxiety and hesitation, and even doubt itself, if someone hesitant is said to not dare to assent to the other side. For, he says, it is not a good argument to say Catholics do not have certainty of faith in their justification, therefore they always doubt, hesitate, and are anxious, just as neither would the opposite conclusion be correct: Catholics are not anxious, nor do they doubt their justification, therefore they are certain with a certainty of faith that their sins have been forgiven. For there is something in between these extremes, namely, a certain moral certainty on the part of the intellect, and hope and confidence on the part of the will. Which is in agreement with what he writes in the same book, chapter 3.9. Furthermore, he says, Catholics do not deny that a certain confidence should be placed in God, and confidently believe, after legitimate penance, and after duly receiving the Sacrament of Baptism or Absolution, that their sins have been forgiven. But

their opponents, as they confuse faith with confidence, so they confuse certainty of faith with certainty of confidence. In chapter ten, §, you see, therefore, he admits that persuasion and security of grace may arise from the fruits of penance, as from certain signs, yet not the certainty of Catholic or Divine faith.

XXIII. Thomas Stapleton teaches similar things in book 9 of *On Justification*, chapter 11. As he says, "Just as those who fight legitimately certainly believe they will be crowned, and those who are the firstborn sons certainly believe they will inherit their father's estate, and those who commit to a journey certainly believe they will arrive safely; likewise, every Christian certainly believes they have been baptized as infants and are children of their mother who claims them as her child; and yet none of these are held with certainty of faith, but only with a certainty, partly of hope and confidence, partly moral; so also can one believe with certainty that they have obtained the remission of sins and the grace of God, who knows that they have prepared themselves as God requires for obtaining these; nor, however, can one believe or ought to believe with certainty of faith, because such certainty is lacking, therefore they are uncertain, doubtful, or hesitating, or are in a state of wavering. For such a person, as James describes, is like the waves of the sea, moved and carried by the wind. And therefore, the extreme opinion of the Protestants, which is certainty of faith excluding all fear and timidity about one's own disposition, with that security which is not suitable for this pilgrimage, nor the constant fluctuation of a suspended mind, uncertain and inconsistent, which is swayed hither and thither in a moment, Catholics do not teach concerning the remission of sins or present righteousness; but they teach the middle opinion, which is certainty of hope on the part of divine promises, very firm, and a certainty, either conjectural or even moral, on the part of one's own disposition, of which anyone who is legitimately disposed is conscious; which indeed excludes all doubt in the sense of the Protestants, that is, it excludes consent to either party, and brings firm peace and consolation to consciences against all the assaults of temptation, or of doubt, or of pusillanimity, or finally of despairing doubt.

XXIV. Finally, Vásquez agrees with these things, thus closing in chapter 9 of that 200th Disputation, often cited: "Let us conclude, therefore, that it is possible for the just to have a certain assurance of their grace, a certainty taken as a determined and true assent, yet not a certainty taken as an assent without any fear, nor a certainty which cannot have falsehood under it, and thus we speak of certainty in this controversy.

XXV. Hence it is clear how the Doctors of the Roman Church, who seem to speak in this question conflicting and contradictory things, are to be reconciled with each other. For when they respond to our arguments, or explain and establish the state of this controversy, they deny that they take away from the faithful all certainty about their own grace; they admit that they can truly persuade themselves, be certain, and be secure about their justification before God, and that it is not necessary for them to perpetually hesitate, waver, and doubt about the remission of their sins; and yet when they dispute against us, or preach among their people, they contend with many arguments to prove that the faithful are doubtful and uncertain about their own righteousness, not knowing if they are in God's grace; nor can they, except rashly, assert with

certainty and without doubt that they have obtained the remission of their sins through Christ. But when they affirm that the faithful and the just do not know if they are in God's grace, and cannot judge this with certainty, they speak of the certainty which they call divine faith, or at least that which excludes all fear from the opposing party; but not of that conjectural certainty which is indeed opposed to proper doubt, and signifies the true and determined assent of the other party of the contradiction, but which can still coexist with some fear. And when they attribute to the faithful some doubt about their grace and righteousness before God, they do not properly understand it as doubt or hesitation of the mind, which does not dare to assent to either party of the contradiction, but only as a kind of doubt more broadly taken, which consists with a fixed and determined judgment of the mind, and says only some fear of the opposing party. For although, as Vázquez says, with a determined assent of the other party through its own principles, there cannot be doubt between the two parties through the same principles, nevertheless, there can indeed be that fear which we mentioned, through extrinsic and universal principles, through which we understand that a thing may be otherwise than we think, and perhaps at that time different from what we think; which fear indeed seems to be a kind of doubt. In that ninth chapter already cited, where he explains the matter with several details.

XXVI. The doctors of the Roman Church teach that the faithful and righteous can not only, but also must be assured of the forgiveness of their sins and of their justification before God, not doubtful or uncertain, but certain, and that this certainty grows and increases in them as they progress in righteousness and holiness. Therefore, it pertains to their duty to acquire greater and firmer certainty daily in this matter, which happens as they diligently exercise themselves in piety and good works, noticing clearer and more manifest signs of divine adoption and of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Hence, if certain righteous individuals do not dare to persuade themselves and believe that they are pleasing and accepted by God, and adopted by Him as children, they reveal some deficiency and weakness in themselves. For, as I have already said, the more perfect ones are accustomed to be differently affected and disposed and to have a certain confidence in their reconciliation with God, not to waver and doubt about it.

XXVII. These things are clearly deduced from what we have already reported from Vega, Stapleton, and Bellarmine, where they teach that the faithful and righteous should not be suspended, doubtful, and anxious about whether they are in God's grace, and that such fluctuation and hesitation are foreign to them. Therefore, those who are among the more perfect ones have all the more a full and firm persuasion of their own grace and righteousness before God. Moreover, the theologians of the Roman School expressly confess that the righteous cannot doubt their justification if they behave prudently; indeed, they must absolutely believe themselves to be in grace if they wish to perform any actions that require grace, as seen in Vázquez, Disputations, Chapter 8, cited several times. He observes, saying, "The Council did not say that anyone could doubt his grace, but that he could fear his grace, which is the same as to dread it; however, every fear can be opposed without doubt. Doubt is hesitation of the intellect between two contradictory propositions, so that no agreement between the extremes appears to it, upon which assent is based. Although the righteous person is not doubtful about his

righteousness, indeed, he must absolutely believe himself to be in grace if he wishes to perform any actions that require grace, such as the administration and reception of the Sacraments; however, even with this absolute assent, he may still have fear about his righteousness, etc. Therefore, when we say that anyone among the righteous can prudently fear about his justification, we do not mean that he can doubt if he behaves prudently and judges about neither side of the contradiction.

XXVIII. Moreover, Stapleton's doctrine on this matter is expressly set forth in Book 9, Chapter 20 of *On Justification*, where, after discussing that Catholics are falsely accused by Protestants of teaching that a sinner, having repented and possessing true faith, cannot and should not establish with certainty the forgiveness of sins for himself, he writes that they can indeed hope well and promise themselves the best of God's mercy; however, this hope must not be left suspended in the midst of fluctuating doubt, because it may be false to faith and hope may fail; thus, among other things, he states their opinion, "We do not deny that penitents should establish with certainty the forgiveness of their sins for themselves, but we deny that certain faith, which cannot be false, must be established by anyone. However, we acknowledge and teach a certain confidence, such as the certainty of hope brings." And later, "We do not leave the sinner suspended in the midst of fluctuating doubt, after he has rightly completed repentance and is conscious of himself. And in the following chapter, speaking about the Fathers and Doctors of the Roman Church, he says, "They teach that truly penitent individuals, who legitimately attend to any indisposition in themselves, and to the extent possible, reform themselves by the testimony of conscience, observe God's commandments, avoid sins, at least deadly ones, should conceive firm and certain consolation and persuasion, not of faith, but of confidence and hope in God's grace." And after citing several passages from the Fathers and Scholastics, he says, "In all these places, it is taught firm and certain consolation, hope, confidence, and various certitude, both of the remission of sins and of present righteousness before God, in all those who, attending to their own disposition, are conscious of neither sin nor affected negligence. However, only the certainty of faith, as Protestants teach, is not taught, because indeed the faithful believe most certainly that they are in grace; they do not believe, however, that they cannot be deceived; the certainty of this kind, infused divinely by faith alone, is its own.

XXIX. Therefore, the doctors of the Roman Church have no doubt or diffidence about the grace of God and His benevolence towards us on account of virtue or any praiseworthy adjunct of faith; but it is due to deficiency and weakness, with which if any faithful and righteous person struggles, he must endeavor and strive to free himself from it and, through the study of good works and constant prayers, to attain to a certain confidence in God's grace, shaking off that anxiety of the mind and excessive scruples of conscience. Protestants say, as Stapleton has already been cited several times, that we teach that this doubt about the grace of God is a virtue that adorns and commends faith, so that without it, there is empty confidence, not justifying faith. But it is a lie because not doubt, but rather just fear and trembling with which Paul enjoins us to work out our salvation, namely, about our own indisposition or conceived insufficiency, is a virtue praised by Catholics; not that it adorns and perfects faith, with which it has nothing in

common, but to restrain man from empty confidence and security, or rather presumption, in this weakness, which, however, Catholics clearly teach is to be joined with true confidence and firm hope; which truly opposes the sense of doubt of Protestants. In Book 9 of *On Justification*, Chapter 10. And a little earlier in the same chapter, "They say that our doctrine concerning the grace of Christ is mere doubt, which affirms no certain and firm consolation to consciences, by which they can rise and sustain themselves in the struggle of temptations. It is a lie because we teach and inculcate certain and firm hope, both of the remission of sins in particular, against doubts about reconciliation with God, and of present righteousness before God, against the temptations of pusillanimity or premature doubt about God's benevolence towards us.

XXX. Moreover, from what has been set forth by us both in this disputation and in the preceding one, it is evident that among the theologians of the Roman Church and Protestants, there is no question whether the faithful, justified by the grace of Christ, can and should be firmly persuaded and have a certain confidence of their reconciliation with God; since, as we have already shown, the doctors of the Roman School openly confess, with common consent with Protestants, to teach that those endowed with living faith in Christ not only can but also must believe in the forgiveness of their sins and in their righteousness before God, and to have a certain persuasion.

XXXI. Nor is it even sought among them what follows from this, namely, whether the hesitation with which someone hesitates and fluctuates, concerning whether there is something praiseworthy and deserving of nurture in the faithful regarding God's grace, and whether God is propitious and benevolent towards him, is something to be lauded and encouraged, or rather a defect and temptation against which one must struggle, and from which one must strive in every way to extricate oneself: For we have just heard Stapleton confessing this, and the rest of the Roman School theologians do not dissent, who readily concede that the faithful can be overly scrupulous, as they say, if their conscience does not accuse them of any grave sin for which they have not repented, yet they doubt their own grace.

XXXII. Furthermore, it is not disputed here whether the certainty and confidence that the faithful can and should have regarding their justification and adoption are such that they are sufficient to dispel all anxiety of the mind and to generate tranquility and peace of conscience, and to admonish the faithful to give thanks to God seriously and with full affection for such a great benefit. For on both sides, it is confessed, and not denied by the Doctors of the Roman Church.

XXXIII. Here also it is not a question whether full and absolute persuasion of obtained forgiveness of sins and reconciliation with God is so necessary for the faithful that without it they can by no means be justified and accepted by God, indeed they should not even be considered among the truly faithful. For, as we made clear in the previous discussion, Protestant theologians commonly acknowledge that there are many faithful who have not yet attained that full persuasion and who, focusing too much on their own weakness, often fear and doubt whether they are partakers of divine grace and possess that faith to which salvation and forgiveness of

sins are promised. Nevertheless, they should not be excluded from the number of true believers, nor do they deny that God is propitious and appeased in Christ.

XXXIV. Nor is there any controversy whether someone can legitimately persuade himself to be justified and pleasing to God, even though he does not feel in himself the love of God, nor acknowledge worthy fruits of repentance, but persists in his sins without intending to change his life for the better. For whatever the adversaries of the Protestants may impute to them, they always teach and instill that presuming vainly and rashly is wrong if someone, indulging in sin, believes that he pleases God and that he will be exempted by God's mercy from the punishments that his sins otherwise deserve. They do not consider any true confidence and certainty of God's grace to arise unless from the testimony of a good conscience and the experience of God's love.

XXXV. And certainly, whatever that certainty may be, and by whatever name it may be called in Christian schools, all theologians unanimously agree that it arises not only from the divine promise but also from the internal sense of one's own faith and repentance, without which no one can rightly conclude and establish that the righteousness, life, and salvation promised by the Word of God belong to him, or that he is, or will be, a partaker of them. For in order for someone to legitimately conclude this, it is not sufficient for them to assent to those general pronouncements of Scripture, such as "Whoever believes in Christ will have forgiveness of sins in his name"; "He who believes in the Son will not come into judgment, but has passed from death to life." But it is necessary for them truly to affirm, "But I believe," that is, I feel and experience in myself that faith which God requires, namely, living faith, which works through love, and which is never without the endeavor to do good works and with a serious intention to change one's life for the better.

XXXVI. It is also agreed that no matter how great that confidence and certainty to which all the faithful should strive and contend, and to which those among them who are more perfect attain, it does not entirely dispel all fear, but there is a certain fear that accompanies it and which should be its perpetual companion. For here Protestant theologians distinguish between the fear of doubt or distrust, and the fear of pious solicitude, which is opposed to carnal security, with which we are commanded to work out our salvation. Love sends the former away, from which confidence arises before God; but the latter stands and is reconciled with firm hope and confidence.

XXXVII. Moreover, according to the common Protestant doctrine, as is clear from what has been set forth in the previous discussion, the certainty that one has before God regarding his justification is not of the same nature as the certainty one has concerning the articles of faith and those doctrines expressly contained in the Word of God; namely, it is neither of the same degree nor of equal necessity. For whereas someone who doubts whether Jesus is the Son of God is rightly considered an unbeliever, not everyone who doubts whether he has obtained forgiveness of his sins is deemed such, because he does not dare to assert with certainty that his faith and repentance are truly genuine and sincere. Thus, the question is not whether the same faith by which the doctrines of faith are believed obliges every believer to believe that he is in the grace

of God and truly regenerated and justified, as Protestants acknowledge a certain diversity among these.

XXXVIII. Nor is there any controversy between the Roman and Reformed Schools whether a certain confidence in the forgiveness obtained from God is the proper, formal, and specific act of justifying faith, by which we are said in Scripture to be justified by faith. For this is not commonly asserted by Protestants. Indeed, they ascribe to the penitent and justifying sinner confidence in obtaining the forgiveness of sins from God through Christ's mercy as a necessary and preceding condition for justification, but they do not attribute to that person confidence in that forgiveness already obtained. Just as Protestants readily admit that confidence in the forgiveness already obtained is not that by which the ungodly are justified, nor is it something preceding their justification; likewise, the Doctors of the Roman Church do not deny that in order for someone to be justified from sin, it is necessary for them to have hope of pardon and confidence in obtaining mercy from God. In fact, this is what the Council of Trent itself established and defined, Session 6, chapter 6, where among other things it teaches that people are prepared for justification when, recognizing themselves as sinners, they are moved by fear of divine justice, with which they are profitably troubled, to consider God's mercy, and, turning to it, they are lifted up in hope, trusting that God will be propitious to them through Christ. This is supported by that saying of Christ to the paralytic, "Son, your sins are forgiven you" (Mark 2).

XXXIX. These are consistent with what is read in Vasquez in 1.2, Tom. 2, disp. 210, chap. 4. There, he distinctly teaches that for both the initial and subsequent justification, not only is it helpful but necessary, not only to have the Catholic faith in doctrines, history, and promises universally made, but also a private faith in the promise, by which each believes that God will not fail them, nor deny effective help, and that they will ultimately be justified by God. For, he says, if anyone were to think that God would deny them effective aid for salvation, all progress towards justification and disposition would be hindered, as is evident. Among other things necessary for initial justification, there must be hope of pardon, which, however, cannot exist without a special faith. For even if someone were to believe what is promised to all, namely, that sins are truly remitted to true penitents, and that pardon and justification are obtained from God through penance and other good works, unless they also believe that they will obtain pardon from God through the works they perform, which is truly faith in the promise, they cannot hope for pardon from God now, and therefore will not be justified, since their disposition for justification is no less necessary than faith.

XL. Indeed, it is true that some Protestants speak in such a way about the persuasion that the faithful have of the grace of God and the forgiveness of their sins, as if justifying faith primarily consisted in it. But in the same way, some whom the Roman School considers Catholic also speak. For in a book published by the Canons of Cologne in the year 1536, in a certain Provincial Council, which is called the *Enchiridion* Cologne, these explicit words are read: "We do not command people to doubt perpetually about their justification and acceptance, etc. For we admit that for the justification of man it is absolutely necessary that a man believe for certain, not only generally that sins are remitted to true penitents on account of Christ, but that they are

remitted to the man himself believing on account of Christ, etc." To this, the book called *Antididagma*, whose authors are the same Cologne men, agrees. For they say in the chapter on Justification, "We are justified by faith, in which without any doubt we firmly trust, we who have true repentance, that our sins are remitted to us on account of Christ." And just as the Doctors of the Roman Church now feel differently about this matter, so at least most theologians of the Reformed Church explain the same thing differently. And they do not place among the acts of faith preceding justification before God, as we have said, the persuasion of the reconciliation already made with God, but only the trust in obtaining it.

XLII. Therefore, the controversy that arises here between Protestants and Roman Catholics seems to return to whether the certainty that the faithful participants of Christ's grace can and should have of their justification before God is a certainty of Divine Faith or only a certainty of another kind and to be called by another name. The former is affirmed by common consent of Protestants; the latter, with very few exceptions, by the Roman School, according to which this certainty is not of faith, but of hope or trust, which is compared to the certainty of faith of a lower kind, namely, moral or conjectural certainty, which is somewhat less than strict moral certainty, which is supported by very serious argument and authority, while conjectural certainty is gathered from probable signs; although this conjectural certainty is often called moral in a broader sense.

XLIII. However, it must be noted here that Roman Catholics do not deny the certainty about which we are speaking to be Divine Faith in the same sense that Protestants commonly affirm it. For when the Doctors of the Roman Church deny that the faithful and righteous are certainly in the grace of God by Divine Faith, they only want it not to be believed by them with as much firmness or necessity as the articles of faith, which are expressly revealed in the Word of God, are believed and should be believed by faith, which Reformed School Doctors readily concede, as has been explained in the previous discussion. But even though they say that this certainty is Divine Faith, it is because they think that not only those things which are supported by God's word alone pertain to Divine Faith, but also those things which are gathered from the Word of God, along with other things which are known either by human sense and experience, or by some other reason, even though these latter are partly inferior in certainty to the former, which is based on God's Word. But those who are truly grafted into Christ by living faith can certainly gather that they are justified and pleasing to God from the general pronouncements of the Word of God, by which it is asserted that "To him who believes, righteousness is imputed," and "The faith of the believer is imputed to righteousness," along with the testimony of their own conscience, by which, as they prove and examine themselves, they acknowledge that they believe in Christ, not superficially but sincerely, and that they place their trust in God, and are led by His love, which are certain signs and indications of living faith. This is acknowledged even by the theologians of the Roman School themselves.

XLIV. Hence it can rightly be seen that there is much of a battle of words and verbal contention here, since the Doctors of both communions deny and affirm not in the same sense the certainty of divine faith to that persuasion which those endowed with faith through charity

might and ought to have regarding their justification before God. For while it is agreed between them whence this certainty arises and on what foundations it is based, namely, one proposition expressly and clearly expressed by the word of God, the other known to us by the testimony of our conscience and by some internal sense, by which we perceive our own faith and repentance, to Protestants such certainty seems to be able to be called the certainty of divine faith, because it relies on the testimony of God, even if not solely; but to the Roman Catholics, on the contrary, it seems the opposite because it does not rely solely on the testimony of God, but on another proposition which is not as certain as those expressly handed down by the word of God. According to the philosophers, in syllogisms, the conclusion is considered to follow the weaker part.

XLIV. Yet those very Doctors of the Roman School who do not want that certainty to be called divine faith do not greatly object to attributing that name to it, provided it is not equated with the certainty of faith which they call Catholic and dogmatic. This can be seen in Vega, who concedes that for the peace of the Church, this certainty may be conveniently called the certainty of faith, because it flows in part from divine faith, and faith mediately contributes to it, and those who are certain of their righteousness owe a good part of their faith to that certainty. For, he says, if they did not assent by faith to those greater propositions concerning faith, God does not deny grace to one doing what is in himself; turning to God with all his heart, one finds and obtains His grace. They would never have any certainty about their grace, etc. And he adds that through faith one can know if we are in grace; and the Council of Trent does not deny this, but only denies that this can be known with the certainty of faith: namely, it distinguishes these two, knowing through faith, and knowing with the certainty of faith. And the former should take precedence here, not the latter, according to the mind of the Council of Trent. In the Council of Trent, decree on justification, book 9, chapter 47.

XLV. But what is remarkable is that Vasquez himself, who so laboriously refutes Catharinus, attributing to divine faith the certainty of his grace, in the above-mentioned disputation, elsewhere expressly teaches and contends that the name of faith is appropriate to that persuasion by which one believes oneself to be justified, which he wishes to be a certain kind of faith distinct from the Catholic or dogmatic faith. For, concerning private faith, which is opposed to the Catholic, and which does not agree with everyone but only with some, the object of which is not proposed to the whole Church for belief, enumerating various kinds, he says that it pertains to that faith by which one believes oneself to be justified. For after he has placed the first faith in that order, by which one believes what is peculiarly revealed to oneself, he adds the second faith in miracles. The third faith is similar to this, namely, by which one believes that he will obtain something from God which, however, is not promised specifically to him alone, as when one believes that he will have suitable assistance for justification, perseverance, and will even attain eternal salvation, because the efficacious grace of God will not be denied to him. There is also a faith of this kind, by which one believes that he will obtain from God through prayer what he asks, whether spiritual or temporal pertaining to spiritual matters. Let us also add the faith by

which one believes himself to be justified. For this also pertains to the gift of God, if a man believes it as he ought. In the first part, second tome, second disputation, question 209, chapter 4.

XLVI. Whatever equivocation may lie in that term "certainty of faith," which in the Roman School is strictly taken for the sole certainty which we provide through the articles of faith or the express word of God: among Protestants, however, it is used more loosely and extended to those things which are deduced not only from the sole and immediate word of God but also from others known elsewhere. Therefore, although it may rightly seem that the contention is solely about words between Protestants and those Roman School theologians who acknowledge that such great certainty of having received grace can be found in the faithful as to exclude all fear, even if they wish to call that certainty not divine faith but merely moral, nonetheless, there remains some real disagreement between the same Protestants and those Doctors of the Church of Rome who want, without some special revelation, to hold that such certainty can only be conjectural, which is said to be of a lower moral kind, and not to exclude all fear of deception, from which all Protestants strongly recoil.

XLVII. And yet that disagreement is made more obscure if we consider what arguments the dissenting parties put forward when they argue with each other. Since all the Doctors of the Church of Rome admit here a true certainty of the true name, which consists in a determined and fixed assent, which excludes all fluctuation and hesitation, and leaves the faithful with such confidence in a believing man, that it suffices for peace and tranquility of mind, and spiritual joy, and makes a man secure about the grace of God: so they confess that good believers believe most firmly that they are in grace, and that they are not mistaken in this opinion, and they say that the fear which consists in that persuasion of the faithful is constituted in the fact that those good believers indeed believe that they are not mistaken in it, but nevertheless do not believe that they cannot be mistaken, namely, that such certainty is of faith alone divinely infused.

XLVIII. However, the doctors of the Reformed School acknowledge the certainty that faithful believers have in their faith and true and sincere repentance, and consequently that they are justified before God. They do not equate this certainty, which is required in the assent we owe to the articles of faith and to believing that Christ is the Son of God and the Savior of the World. They also do not deny that there is a certain fear opposite to the security of godly solicitude, which should never be absent from the faithful in this life. Indeed, the faithful often doubt and fear about God's grace towards themselves, and this does not prevent them from remaining faithful and righteous. Therefore, they do not disapprove of Calvin's words found in the "Antidote to the Council of Trent" in Session 6, where speaking about what the faithful experience in recognizing God's grace towards them, he says, "Certainly, while we teach that faith should be certain and secure, we do not imagine any certainty which is not touched by doubt, nor any security which is not troubled by anxiety. Rather, we say that there is a constant struggle for the faithful through their own self-distrust. So far are we from placing their consciences in some peaceful tranquility which is not disturbed at all."

XLIX. And indeed, if the Doctors of the Roman Church, when they say that the certainty about which this question is raised is without any fear, mean nothing else than that, while a

faithful and pious person believes themselves to be in grace, they indeed believe that they are not deceived in this regard, yet they do not believe that they cannot be deceived, because it is easy to err and be deceived in judgments about oneself, as Thomas Stapleton seems to explain this fear; we readily grant that the certainty which faithful believers have about their righteousness is connected with such a judgment. But we deny that such a judgment is sufficient for it to be said that there is no fear. Stapleton himself rightly recognizes that such a judgment is absent from the sole assent which we give through faith to the Word of God, but not from any other assent. For when we apply faith to God speaking, we not only judge what he says to be true, but also conclude that it is impossible for it not to be true, because it is impossible for God, who is truth itself, to lie. But when we judge that what is perceived by sense, reason, or any human testimony is true, we cannot judge that we are simply unable to be deceived in it, because every man is fallible, reason often deceives, and the senses can be deceived in many ways. Furthermore, it is not impossible for something not to be true, simply because it is perceived by sense, deduced by reason, or confirmed by any number of human testimonies, just as it is impossible for what God testifies not to be true, simply because it is testified by God himself. And so, any assent, not only moral or conjectural but also based on reason and experience, would have fear attached to it, which is neither true nor what the Doctors of the Roman Church say. For who would say that it is without fear to believe that snow is white, fire is hot, and ice is cold, or that every triangle has three equal angles, two of which are right angles, or even that Augustus once ruled in Rome? Because there is no fame so constant among men, no demonstration, no perception of the senses that deserves such a certain assent as the authority of God speaking himself.

L. However, if it is said that some fear of deception is never absent from the certainty that believers have about their righteousness because that judgment always stands, that is perhaps contrary to the matter at hand, and it might be that the matter is different from what I suppose, as Vásquez explains that fear. We say that such a judgment conflicts with any certainty that is of true nature, not excluding moral or conjectural certainty. Indeed, all certainty, whether moral or conjectural, excludes fluctuation and hesitation, as admitted by the Doctors of the Roman School themselves, and it is not found unless in a fixed and determined assent, which we judge to have. However, someone who opines and conjectures about how things are, nevertheless judges that they may be otherwise, lacks this part of hesitation and fluctuation, and although he may lean more towards one side, he still does not have a fixed and determined assent towards it, and therefore lacks, or at least has the minimum degree of certainty found in what they call conjectural certainty. Therefore, he conjectures, suspects, and opines, but he is by no means certain. For when someone collects and decides with certainty and determination, from various signs and indications, whether a thing is so or not, such as, for example, whether this or that person is suffering from dropsy or consumption, or whether this letter is sent or written by a friend or relative, he no longer says to himself, "Perhaps it is not so," but rather, "Without a doubt, things are this way," and reason does not allow him to judge otherwise, although at the same time, he judges absolutely speaking, that it is not impossible for it to be otherwise.

LI. But what we most complain about is that the Doctors of the Roman Church are not sufficiently consistent with themselves in this question. For when they must confront the arguments or accusations of Protestants, they testify that they do not deny to faithful and righteous people all certainty about the grace of God. Indeed, they acknowledge here that they do not recognize that certainty which is called divine faith, but they admit to another certainty of a lower kind, namely, moral certainty, according to some, which excludes fear in more perfect people, or at least, according to many, conjectural certainty, which is always accompanied by some fear unless there is a special revelation. And yet they affirm that such certainty is enough to prevent a person from hesitating and wavering, nor does it leave him in doubt and suspense, and thus it is sufficient to generate and foster peace of conscience and to soothe the person with spiritual joy. Therefore, they openly assert that faithful, pious, and righteous people should not remain ambiguous and doubtful about their righteousness and the forgiveness of their sins, but should conceive a certain confidence in it, even if they have not yet attained it; it is their duty to strive for it through frequent prayers and wishes and the pursuit of good deeds.

LII. However, as we have noted above, when they argue against Protestants and attempt to refute their opinion, they present many arguments with which they contend that faithful people are not certain about the righteousness they have attained, that they do not know if they are in grace, and whether they are worthy of God's love or hatred, and that those who convert and repent are doubtful and uncertain about the forgiveness of their sins, and while faithful people examine their own conscience and inquire whether they have true and sincere faith and repentance, they offer them many arguments for doubt and declare that they cannot rashly judge and determine that their faith and repentance possess those marks of truth and sincerity which God necessarily requires in those whom He justifies.

LIII. In this matter, they either openly contradict themselves or greatly abuse words. Indeed, they say in order to reconcile these things, as has also been observed by us, that righteous people are uncertain, do not know, are ignorant of whether they are in grace, believing that they do not have the certainty of divine faith in this matter, nor do they know and understand how matters of faith are known. However, while they speak in this manner, they claim not to exclude from faithful and pious individuals the knowledge and moral or conjectural certainty about their grace and righteousness before God. Similarly, when they attribute to the faithful some doubt about their own grace, they claim not to understand such doubt properly, by which someone dares not assent to either side of the contradiction, but rather a certain broader doubt, which is often called fear in schools.

LIV. But it is entirely absurd and against reason to say that someone does not know this or that, and is uncertain about it, because divine faith is not certain about it. For we could then say that we do not know those very things and are uncertain about those which we hold by demonstration, such as the earth being smaller than the sun, or those which we perceive by sense, such as sugar being sweet, or those which constant fame attests, such as Romans once ruling in these provinces, and Homer and Virgil being distinguished poets, since divine faith does not make us certain about any of these. However, who would tolerate someone saying that these are

uncertain, or that any of these and similar things are unknown and unknowable to the learned and wise?

L.V. Indeed, it would seem to pervert the meaning of words and speak against the common sense of humanity for someone to say that he doubts and is uncertain, and does not know and is ignorant about those things which he certainly concludes from various signs, and judges to be so truly and definitively. For does a doctor, even when various signs and symptoms indicate that someone is suffering from pleurisy or arthritis, remain uncertain and doubtful about it? Or when someone receives a letter or epistle from a friend or acquaintance, and all the signs and testimonies concur for him to judge that it is his, and truly render him certain about this, nevertheless, must it be said that he simply does not know this?

L.VI. Indeed, it is not acceptable to common people, nor even to the use of the School itself, to say that someone is ignorant, doubtful, uncertain, and ambivalent when he not only truly but also firmly and definitively judges a matter to be so, without which no one has any certainty, either moral or conjectural. But when someone is said to be doubtful and uncertain, or to not know something, we immediately understand that he is wavering between both sides of the contradiction, and does not definitively judge and determine anything about the matter in question. This is evident from the experience of the Roman populace itself. For when they are accustomed to hearing their doctors publicly disputing and asserting in their sermons that the faithful do not know whether they are in God's grace, and do not know whether God loves or hates them, and that they are doubtful and uncertain whether they have truly obtained the forgiveness of sins and the gift of righteousness, they gather from this that the faithful should have a suspended and ambivalent mind about these matters, and cannot make a firm and definitive judgment about them without rashness and arrogance. Therefore, the pious and righteous concerning these matters do not even have the certainty that the Schools grant them, namely, moral or conjectural certainty. And thus, the doctrines of the Roman Schools in this regard greatly differ from the sense that their own Doctors usually instill in the listening populace through their preaching.

**Theological Theses,
On
The Distinction Between
Mortal
and
Venial Sin
Part One.
In which is explained the Doctrine of the Roman School**

Thesis I.

The Doctors of the Roman Church observe that venial sin is spoken of in three ways, either from the cause, or from the event, or from the very nature and essence of the sin itself. They call that sin venial from the cause, which is committed through ignorance or infirmity. This kind of sin is not called venial to distinguish it against any mortal sin whatsoever; but against mortal sin from malice. For although sins from ignorance or infirmity are often purely mortal, yet they are all called venials, because there is something in them that diminishes the wickedness of the fault, and by reason of which he who has sinned is nearer to pardon. Of this kind of sin the Apostle speaks when he says, "I was a blasphemer, and a persecutor, and injurious; but I obtained mercy, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief." 1 Tim. 1.

II. They call that sin venial from the event, which is any sin that is expiated through repentance, and actually obtains pardon from God, however grievous and atrocious it may otherwise be in itself. And so in this sense venial sins are not absolutely opposed to mortal sins, but only to those which are never actually remitted, and on this account lead to eternal death.

III. Finally, they call those sins venials from the nature and essence of the sin itself, which, as they judge, do not contend against the charity of our neighbor, and do not induce the guilt of eternal punishment. And this is the proper acceptation of venial sin among them. And understood in this sense, venial sins are considered to be simply and absolutely opposed to mortal sins; by which name they designate more grievous sins, which cannot consist with the love and charity of God, and render the person guilty before God's tribunal of eternal punishment.

IV. Therefore they believe that there are certain sins which can by no means be compatible with the love and charity of God, and into which man cannot fall without being altogether turned away from God, and becoming His enemy, and thus being totally deprived of spiritual life, which consists in our conjunction with God through His grace dwelling in us; and falling into new guilt of hell and eternal death, which he can by no means avoid if he be overtaken by death in that sin, and unless before death he rise again from that sin by a new grace of God, and be again reconciled unto God. So that if a just person commit such sins, he altogether falls from his justice, nor can he any longer be accounted just and holy: nor is there found in him that sanctification, "without which no man shall see the Lord." And these are what they call deadly sins, because they are as certain deadly wounds which bring death upon the soul, entirely extinguishing the life of grace in it, and rendering the person guilty of hell, which in the Scriptures is called the second death.

V. But besides these sins, they teach that there are certain lighter sins, which indeed somewhat retard man's course towards God, and diminish the fervor of Divine love; yet they do not altogether turn man away from God, nor extinguish the love of God in him. And therefore through sins of this kind man does not become God's enemy, nor is he deprived of spiritual life, since they do not expel that grace which is the principle of that life. Nor do such sins bring upon him the guilt of eternal death, but only of some

temporary punishment: so that by them a just man is neither stripped of his justice, nor loses that holiness which is necessary that one may see God. And hence, although death should overtake a man with sins of this kind upon him, yet he is not for this reason to be excluded forever from salvation, and adjudged to eternal torments in hell. Whence it is inferred, that sins of this kind are indeed wounds of the soul, but easily curable; not, however, diseases or deadly wounds: and therefore they are rightly called not deadly, but only venial sins.

VI. Moreover, they divide these venial sins again into two kinds; for they teach that some are venial from their kind, and others only from the imperfection of the work.

VII. They call those venial sins from their kind, which have indeed for their object something evil and inordinate; but which is not repugnant to the love of God and our neighbor: such as an idle word, immoderate laughter, and things of this kind. And they oppose to these mortal sins from their kind, as perjury, adultery, and the like; which openly contend against the love of God and our neighbor.

VIII. Those they call venial from the imperfection of the work, which, although they might be mortal from their kind, are yet rendered venial through the imperfection of the work; because, namely, the mere imperfection of the act causes them not to be judged repugnant to divine love and charity.

IX. And again, they divide venial sins from the imperfection of the work into two members: for some of them they call venial sins from subreption, others from the smallness of the matter. Those from subreption they call venial, which are not fully voluntary; such as sudden motions of anger, cupidity, envy, and other like emotions, which exist in the mind before reason could fully deliberate whether they should be admitted or not. Which are indeed sins, since they might have been prevented or immediately repelled if reason had been watchful: and yet they are venials, since they were without the full consent of the will. From the smallness of the matter they call those venials, which are committed in a small and light case; such as the theft of a penny, which neither notably injures one's neighbor, nor is a thing which among fair judges could dissolve friendship.

X. But although the Doctors of the Roman Church unanimously teach that there are certain lighter sins which can consist together with true justice and holiness, and do not dissolve man's friendship with God, nor involve him in the guilt of eternal punishment and death, and on this account are called venial sins - while there are other more grievous sins, which immediately constitute man from just to unjust, and render him God's enemy, and therefore liable to eternal punishment and death, and on this account are called mortal sins - nevertheless, it is not settled and determined among them with absolute certainty, whether those lighter sins have this from their own nature, and are such in themselves, that it is repugnant to the Divine justice to impute them unto eternal death, and on account of them to reject man forever and altogether; since on account of their lightness they can justly deserve only temporary punishment and wrath: Or whether indeed they might justly be punished with perpetual exclusion from the kingdom of God, and with the everlasting fires and torments of hell; but that they are not imputed unto so great a punishment, but only unto a temporary one, is to be attributed to the will and clemency of God, who has appointed by His law the punishment of eternal death only for more grievous and atrocious sins, but threatens and actually inflicts on the lighter ones only certain temporal punishments, although if He should choose to use strict justice, He might deal far more severely and vehemently with man.

XI. For there are some among the Doctors of the Roman Church, and indeed of no mean repute, who teach that all sins may be justly punished by God with eternal death; but that the reason why some of them are imputed only to temporal punishment, and do not bring upon the sinner the guilt of eternal death, and are on this account distinguished from mortal sins, is to be attributed to the clemency and forbearance of God, who in this particular does not choose to use His full right against man. This is the opinion of that

John Gerson, who was Chancellor of the University of Paris about two hundred and sixty years ago, and a most celebrated theologian among those of the Sorbonne, which he argues at length and maintains in a treatise entitled "On the Spiritual Life," in the first reading; where, treating of the essence and aggravation (as he terms it) of sins, he lays down this conclusion: "Every sin, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and against His eternal law, is from its own condition and unworthiness deadly, according to the rigor of justice, and separative from the life of glory."

XII. And in the following he confirms this his opinion by many arguments: for he proves that every offense against God is in itself deadly, from the fact that it may be justly punished by God with the punishment of death, both temporal and eternal; yea, even with annihilation. And this because no such punishment is so evil, as any offense against God is evil. But that death and annihilation are not so evil as the very offense against God itself. Hence he deduces, that every death and annihilation would rather be to be endured, than that any, even the smallest offense, should be committed against God; because the opposite being granted, a case might be given in which an offense against God might be lawfully committed; namely, if death and annihilation could not be avoided otherwise.

XIII. Moreover, he says, every offense against God, unless it were remitted, would exclude forever from the glory of God, and be punished without end; otherwise the disgrace of the fault would remain without the honor of justice. But that the offense is diminished or remitted, is from the mere liberality of God remitting it, and no longer imputing it. Finally, an offense against God is not less to be shunned, than that good is to be chosen, in order to obtain which no offense against God ought on any account to be committed. But for an infinite good no offense against God ought to be committed; and if any one possessed infinite good things, he might be justly despoiled of them all by God, if he fell into any offense against God.

XIV. After this, from the same conclusion he deduces several corollaries, the first of which is this: "No offense against God is venial from itself, but only by respect to the Divine mercy, which does not in fact choose to impute every offense unto death, when it most justly might." And so it is concluded, that mortal and venial sin are not distinguished in their essence intrinsically and essentially; but only by respect to the Divine grace, which imputes this sin to the punishment of death, and another not.

XV. But his third corollary is as follows: "We are obligated to make satisfaction to God, and to give thanks to Him from the fact that He does not impute our venial sins unto death, just as we are bound to do for the remission of mortal sins; since in each case alike the mercy of God concurs, not imputing sins otherwise than to a temporary punishment, which from their unworthiness are imputable to death, one by possibility, the other by the statute law. And perhaps it might be said the same even of all our justices, which as far as they are ours, are as a menstruous cloth, especially after sin, or in the absence of grace."

XVI. John, Bishop of Rochester in England, in his refutation of the thirty-second Article of Luther's Assertion, teaches things agreeable to these, where, after having quoted Luther as saying, "A venial sin is such, not from its own nature, but from the mercy of God;" he subjoins, "That a venial sin is such only from the mercy of God, in this I agree with you: but since we also believe that even a mortal sin may through the mercy of God become venial, I would have you explain to us more openly, what distinction you think ought to be established between mortal and venial sin." And he afterward states this distinction, that mortal sin immediately expels grace from the soul, and brings the sinner himself into a state of hatred to God; but venial sin does not do this. And a little after, he grants that venial sin is damnable, if judged with strictness. Yet he afterwards denies that it follows that venial sin is mortal; "For," says he, "mortal sin expels grace from us, wherefore also it must deservedly come under

damnation; but venial sin does not in like manner do this. This difference is sufficiently ample, that venial sin cannot be called mortal."

XVII. But when towards the end of the last century, this opinion was held and publicly affirmed by some theologians in Belgium, it was, together with many other of their assertions, specially condemned by the Popes Pius V. and Gregory XIII. in a certain Bull as erroneous. In which Bull, among many other articles, they condemn this one also: "No sin is venial from its own nature, but every sin deserves eternal punishment;" as Bellarmine relates, Book I. "On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin," Chap. 10, par. "Confirmatur."

XVIII. Whence it is that the Roman School does at this day, by common consent, establish the contrary, namely, that certain sins are venial from their own nature, and not merely from the mercy and indulgence of God; although this has not yet become with them an article of faith, and a thing altogether certain and determined.

XIX. Moreover, although it is the common doctrine of the Roman School, that venial sin does not from its nature deserve eternal death, yet it teaches nevertheless that venial sin is punished with eternal punishment, in those who depart this life with mortal sin, and are adjudged to hell. And this, after Thomas Aquinas, who asserts that eternal punishment is due to venial sin, if it be found in any one of the damned together with mortal sin, because in hell there can be no remission. 1, 2, quaest. 87, art. 5, in the 3d argument.

XX. Scotus indeed thought differently: for on the Fourth Book of Sentences, dist. xxi. quaest. 1, parag. "In ista quaestione," he teaches that to a venial sin, which remains in conjunction with a mortal sin, eternal punishment is not due in another life; but that at length the punishment of it in hell comes to an end, the punishment alone which is due to mortal sins continuing forever.

XXI. But the common opinion of the Roman School maintains the contrary, namely, that the punishment of venial sin in the damned will be perpetual. And this because every sin, however light, renders the person deserving of torment and punishment, as long as it remains in him, and is not retracted and expiated by some repentance. But in the damned there is given no repentance, and no expiation of sin; and therefore in them the stains contracted even from venial sins remain forever. For they cannot retract or expiate any sin whatever by any act of love or contrition; since these things have no place in hell. And thus, since the stain and pravity of venial sin eternally perseveres in them, they also remain eternally deserving of torment and punishment on account of it.

XXII. Yet they deny that it follows from this, that venial sin is not venial from its own nature, and deserves eternal punishment in itself. Because those who are not in mortal sin, if they sin venially, are not on this account deprived of grace, charity, and spiritual life: and therefore in them this sin may be easily removed and obliterated, by some act of love and contrition. Which being posited, even if God should will to remit nothing from that punishment which is due for this sin, they would remain obligated not to eternal, but only to temporary punishment. But that in the damned this sin can neither be removed as to its guilt, nor even remitted as to its punishment, is something accidental, and because in them it is found in conjunction with mortal sins, on account of which they are forever deprived of the grace of God and spiritual life.

XXIII. Hence they gather that venial sin differs from mortal sin in its nature and essence in two ways: First, in that mortal sin, since it extinguishes the life of the soul, and expels the grace of God from the soul, leaves no principle remaining in man by whose power it can be removed and obliterated: but for this it is necessary that, as it were, God should raise man anew from the dead. Whereas the case is otherwise in venial sin, as has been already said. Secondly, in this, that if we conceive mortal sin to have

been retracted through some act of contrition and love, and so to have been removed from the soul as to its pravity and stain thence left; yet if, nevertheless, God wills to remit nothing to man from His own right and the punishment which He might exact, he who has committed such a sin remains obligated to eternal punishment, on account of the Divine law having been once violated by it. Whereas, the guilt of venial sin being removed, no debt of eternal punishment can remain upon man, but only a debt of some temporary punishment. Which is the doctrine of Bellarmine, *On the Loss of Grace*, Book I. Chap. 14, Answer to the 3rd Objection.

XXIV. But here the Theologians of the Roman Church inquire, Whether venial sin is against the law of God, or only beside the law of God. And indeed there are many among them who think that venial sin is not so much against the law, as beside the law; and in this they constitute the difference between mortal and venial sin, that mortal sin is against the law, venial only beside the law. Which is the opinion of Bellarmine, Book I. *On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin*, Chap. 11, in the Explanation of the fifth Argument. But others judge that both venial and mortal sin are against the law of God; which opinion Vasquez maintains, Tom. I. on the 1, 2, Disp. 143, Cap. 3.

XXV. But they who think that venial sin is to be affirmed not so much against as beside the law, observe many things by which they explain and soften this their opinion. And first, they say that they do not mean to deny that there is some law which prohibits venial sin; and therefore, that venial sin is against the law viewed materially, that is according to the thing commanded or prohibited. But their meaning is, that venial sin is not against the law formally considered, that is in reference to the end of the law, which is charity, because such a sin does not take away charity. As may be seen in Eustachius à S. Paulo, in the 2nd part of the *Summa Theologica*, Tract 5, Disp. 7, Quaest. 1, towards the end.

XXVI. Others note that venial sin is not said simply to be against the law of God, because by the law of God are commonly understood those precepts which bind under mortal sin, and the observance of which is necessary unto salvation; according to that saying, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments." Yet they concede that in a certain sense it is true that venial sin is against the law, because, generally, every sin is a transgression of the law; and moreover, because it cannot be doubted that venial sin is repugnant to right reason, which is a certain impression of the Divine law in us. These things are from Peter à S. Joseph, in his *Idea of Moral Theology*, Book 2, Chap. 3, Resolution 5.

XXVII. But Bellarmine maintains that it is rightly said that venial sins, of whatever kind they may be, are not against the law, but beside the law: because if they are against any precept of the law properly so called, as those venial sins which are said to be from subreption; such as the desire of an unlawful thing not fully deliberated, they are not perfectly voluntary: and for this very reason they are not perfectly against the law, except materially, because the law is properly set for our will alone. Or if they are perfectly voluntary, the precept which they transgress is not perfectly and in strictness a law. For, says he, since the end of the precept is charity, and precepts are to be measured from their end, if any precept be established concerning a matter which pertains very little to that end, as if it were prohibited by a special precept that no one should utter an idle word, that precept could not be perfectly and strictly, and as others speak, by way of eminence a law. *On the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin*, Book I. Chap. 11, towards the end.

XXVIII. But they who teach that venial sin is against the law, and some precept, and not merely beside the law; distinguish between precepts necessary for the preserving of charity and obtaining of salvation: and precepts which are indeed useful for this, but not necessary; and the violation of which does not hinder salvation. And they say that venial sin is not, like mortal sin, against some precept necessary for obtaining salvation and preserving charity; but beside it. Yet they deny that it should

therefore be denied that venial sin is against some precept which is simply a precept, although it be not one of the principal precepts necessary unto salvation. As may be seen in Gabriel Vasquez in the disputation just cited, Chaps. 3 and 4.

XXIX. Consonant to these things are the teachings of Becanus the Jesuit in his Scholastic Summary of Theology, Tom. 2, Tract 2, Chap. 2, Quest. 7, where his first conclusion is this: No venial sin is properly against the end of the law. But his second is, Although no venial sin is against the end of the law, yet every venial sin is in some way against the law, whether perfectly or imperfectly.

XXX. And indeed he says that venial sins, from their kind, are perfectly against the law; as immoderate laughter, an idle word; and also venials from the smallness of the matter, as the theft of a thing of little moment; if such sins be committed deliberately. But those sins which are venial from the defect of perfect deliberation, such as the sudden and indeliberate motions of anger, hatred, envy, pride, lust, etc. are imperfectly against the law. As for example, an indeliberate motion of concupiscence is imperfectly against that law of the Decalogue, "Thou shalt not covet."

XXXI. Hence he gathers that venial and mortal sin are not against the law in the same way. First, because mortal sin is so against the law, as to be also against the end of the law; which venial sin is not. Secondly, because every mortal sin is perfectly against the law, but many venials imperfectly. Thirdly, because all mortal sins are against some law which is simply necessary unto salvation, but not so deliberate venials.

**Theological Theses,
On
The Distinction Between
Mortal
and
Venial Sin
Latter Part.**

**In which the Doctrine of the Protestants is set forth and confirmed, and the State of the
Controversy is examined**

Thesis I

The Protestant Theologians, first of all, with one consent establish that every sin, by its own nature, deserves eternal death, and the hatred and wrath of God; and that there is no sin, however light it may seem in the judgment of men, which cannot be punished by God with everlasting punishment, and exclude man from the love of God, if God should deal rigorously with man. According to that of the Mosaic law, "Cursed is every one who does not abide by all things which are written in the book of this law."

II. Nay more, they teach that in the reprobate and impenitent, any sins whatever, even the smallest, such as an idle word, shall sometime be actually punished with eternal punishment. According to that saying of Christ in the Gospel, "But I say unto you, that for every idle word which men shall speak, they shall give an account thereof in the day of judgment." For according to the common doctrine of the Christian Schools, after the day of judgment no other punishments than eternal ones shall have place.

III. But on the other hand, they teach that there is no sin so grievous and atrocious, which cannot obtain pardon from the mercy of God, through the faith and repentance of the sinner: Except only that sin which they call the sin against the Holy Ghost. By which name they understand the total, voluntary, and deliberate rejection from determined malice of the Divine truth once known and tasted. Which sin is remitted neither in this nor in the future world; because it is impossible (according to the doctrine of the Apostle, Heb. 6) that those who have fallen into such a sin should be renewed unto repentance.

IV. Nay rather they teach that in the elect all sins, however atrocious, are remitted and pardoned gratuitously; nor are punished with any punishment, properly and strictly so called. And this because, being moved and excited by the grace of God, before the end of life they are sincerely converted, and renounce sin, and by faith take refuge in the merit and righteousness of Christ; and on account of this they obtain from God remission of their sins.

V. Yet although they maintain that any sin whatever deserves of itself eternal death, and rejection from the love and favor of God, they are far from holding with the Stoics that all sins are equal and alike. For they confess that there is found a great difference between sin and sin, and that one is by far more grievous and atrocious than another; and therefore, although some eternal punishment corresponds to every sin, yet there are various degrees among the punishments of sins, and one should be punished by far more mildly than another. As the Gospel teaches that that servant who knew his lord's will and did it not, shall be beaten with more and severer stripes than he who violated it in ignorance, although this last shall not pass with impunity.

VI. On this point the Later Helvetic Confession, which is found in the Harmony or Collection of Confessions, and which was confirmed by the subscriptions not only of the neighboring Churches of the Zurichers and Bernese, and others whose confession it is, but also of the more remote Hungarian, Polish,

Scotch, French, and other Reformed Churches, speaks distinctly. For in that Confession these words are read verbatim: "We confess that not all sins are equal, although they flow from the same fountain of corruption and unbelief; but some are more grievous than others, as the Lord said, 'It shall be more tolerable for Sodom than for the city that rejects the Word of the Gospel. 'We therefore condemn all who have taught things contrary to this, especially Pelagius together with all Pelagians, as also the Jovinians, who make all sins equal with the Stoics.'"

VII. Moreover, from this disparity and inequality of sins, and the lighter or more grievous nature of some compared with others, it comes to pass that God, dealing graciously with His sons whom He has adopted in Christ and regenerated by His Spirit, according to the gracious covenant of the Gospel, in so far pardons certain lighter sins in them, that even though they are not without sins of this kind, into which they daily fall, and should die in some one of them, yet He does not on that account declare them unworthy to be admitted into heaven, and made partakers of eternal glory and felicity. And therefore sins of this kind may consist with a good conscience, and purity of heart, and that measure of sanctification which God requires of us in this life, that in the other we may enjoy and see Him. Nor do sins of this kind expel peace of conscience and spiritual joy, and hope and confidence of the remission of sins and eternal salvation, from the believing and godly man. Of this kind of sins are, for example, an idle word, immoderate laughter, a vain thought, and the flaws and defects cleaving to the good works even of the pious, in which they ever come short of the perfect standard of the law.

VIII. But there are other more grievous sins, which cannot consist at the same time with a good conscience, and with that righteousness and holiness without which no one shall see the Lord, and to which all who are truly pious and believing are renewed in this life through the grace of Christ. Whence it is that the Gospel itself absolutely declares that those whose ordinary course is to commit sins of this kind, and who are overtaken by death in any one of them, shall be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. And therefore they who fall into sins of this kind, and for some time persevere in them, are bound with the guilt of eternal death, and lose (so to speak) their present fitness for entering into the kingdom of heaven; nor for that time can they retain peace of conscience, confidence of salvation, and the joy which is the fruit of the Holy Spirit, and the companion of sincere piety and probity. Nor is there good ground to hope for the salvation of him whom sudden death overtakes while committing any grievous crime of this kind; such, for example, as adultery, idolatry, and deliberate homicide.

IX. And indeed these things are evidently gathered from the Sacred Scriptures: for the Sacred Scripture teaches in many places that no one lives without sin; as when it says (James 3), "In many things we all offend;" and Solomon in Ecclesiastes, "There is no just man upon the earth that doeth good and sinneth not;" and John in like manner, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Whence it necessarily follows, since no believers, however pious and studious of righteousness, live without sins in this life, that there are some sins which may consist together with true righteousness and holiness, and along with which a good conscience may be preserved, and those gifts and fruits of the Spirit, which the Scripture declares to be the properties of the pious in this life. James 3, Eccles. 7, 1 John 1.

X. But this same Scripture no less clearly and frequently inculcates that those more grievous sins, which it calls the "works of the flesh," exclude man from the kingdom of heaven; nor can he who commits sins of this kind please God, and become an heir of His kingdom. "Be not deceived," says Paul, "neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of God." Also, "Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are, adultery, fornication, uncleanness,

lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like; of which I tell you before, as I have told you in time past, that they who do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God." Whence it appears no less evidently that those who are accustomed to commit flagitious sins of this kind, and whom death overtakes while engaged in any one of them, cannot be partakers of eternal salvation; and therefore all sins of this kind are altogether inconsistent with that holiness to which life and eternal glory are promised; nor along with them can a good conscience be retained, nor legitimate confidence of eternal salvation: but as long as any one remains involved in any one of sins of this kind, so long is he held bound by the guilt of eternal death and perdition, not only according to the rigor of the law, but also according to the very equity of the Gospel. 1 Cor. 6, Gal. 5.

XI. The Theologians of Great Britain clearly deliver this doctrine, in their Judgment concerning the Fifth Article of the Remonstrants, which is inserted in the Acts of the Synod of Dort: for there, in the chapter concerning Perseverance, as it respects the elect themselves, and the certainty of it as to the thing, this is their second Thesis: "Although the elect, being placed in this state" (namely, of adoption and salvation), "by reason of the remains of concupiscence, in every good work omit something, and daily commit lighter sins of subreption, negligence, and inadvertence, yet neither is the state of their justification shaken thereby, nor the use of their hereditary right to the heavenly kingdom intercepted."

XII. To which Thesis they immediately subjoin this declaration and confirmation: "According indeed to the rigor of the law, every sin, even the lightest, is deadly, and excludes the sinner from the favor of God and the kingdom of heaven. But with those His sons already adopted and justified in Christ, God never deals according to strict law. There are indeed some sins, on account of which God denounces anger and indignation against these His sons - nay, threatens them with exclusion from heaven and eternal death, Which sins may be seen enumerated 1 Cor. 6:10, Gal. 5:19, 21, Col. 3:6 concerning which mention shall be made in the following Theses. But there are also certain other sins, on account of which the merciful God is not wont either for a time to deprive His sons of the light of His countenance, or to strike them with the fear of condemnation or death. Sins of this kind are the rebellious motions of concupiscence, concerning which the Apostle complains, Rom. 7; also the defects and flaws which cleave even to the best works of the regenerate. Finally, the daily lapses of human infirmity, which are committed without any set purpose of committing them, and are remitted by daily asking pardon. Concerning which it is said, James 3:2, 'In many things we all offend;' and 1 John 1:8, 'If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.' Notwithstanding these sins, any one of the faithful may rightly say, 'There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.' Nay, in the midst of these infirmities, God says to every justified person, as He said to the Apostle, 'My grace is sufficient for thee, for my strength is made perfect in weakness.' They do not fall from the state of justification through their infirmities, by whose infirmity the power of God is perfected, and who can meanwhile glory that the power of Christ dwelleth in them, as is declared in the same place."

XIII. After this their third Thesis is as follows: "The same persons, being regenerated and justified, do sometimes through their own fault fall into grievous sins, and by these incur paternal indignation from God, contract damning guilt, lose their present fitness for entering into the kingdom of heaven."

XIV. Which Thesis they thus confirm in what follows: "By the examples of David and Peter, it appears that the regenerate may precipitate themselves into most grievous sins, God sometimes permitting this, that they may learn to acknowledge with humility that they were saved from eternal death, and endowed with eternal life, not by their own powers or merits, but by the mere mercy of God alone. While

they continue in sins of this kind, and securely acquiesce in them, the paternal indignation of God arises against them: 'If they profane my statutes, and keep not my commandments, I will visit their iniquity with stripes, and their sin with blows.' 'Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil.' Nay more, they contract damning guilt, so that while they persist impenitent in that state, they neither ought nor can persuade themselves otherwise than that they are liable to death: 'If ye live after the flesh, ye shall die.' For they are bound by a capital crime, by the desert of which, according to the Divine ordination, they are subject to death; although they are not yet consigned to death, nor are to be consigned, if we regard the paternal love of God, but are first to be delivered from this sin, that so they may be delivered from the guilt of death. Finally, in their present condition, they lose their fitness for entering into the kingdom of heaven; because into that kingdom shall not enter anything that defileth, or worketh abomination. For the heavenly crown is not bestowed except on those who have fought the good fight, and finished their course in faith and holiness. Unfit, therefore, to attain to this crown, is whosoever still cleaveth to works of impiety." Psalm 89:31, 32, Rom. 2:9, and 8:13, Rev. 21:27, 2 Tim. 4:8.

XV. But their fourth Thesis is as follows: "The immovable ordination of God requires that the believer thus wandering should first return into the way through the renewed act of faith and repentance, before he can be brought to the goal of the way, that is, the heavenly kingdom."

XVI. And to this Thesis is subjoined the following explanation: "By the decree of election the faithful are so predestinated to the end, that they are brought to that same end not otherwise than through the means instituted by God, as by a certain royal way. Nor are the decrees of God concerning the means, the mode and order of events, less firm and certain, than concerning the end itself, and the events themselves. If any one therefore enter upon a way contrary to the Divine ordination, that broad way, for instance, of impurity and impenitence, which leads directly to hell, he can never in that manner arrive in heaven. Nay, if death should overtake him while wandering in that devious path, he cannot but fall into everlasting death. This is the constant and clear voice of the Scriptures: 'Except ye repent, ye shall in like manner perish.' 'Be not deceived, neither idolaters,' etc. 'shall inherit the kingdom of God.' In vain, therefore, are they who think that an elect person wallowing in such flagitious courses, and dying in them, shall nevertheless necessarily be saved by virtue of his election. For God indeed appointing, the salvation of the elect is fixed and firm: but God decreeing also, it is fixed and firm only through the way of faith, repentance, and holiness. 'Without holiness no man shall see the Lord.' As, therefore, it was fixed from the decree and promise of God that all who were with Paul in the same ship should come safe to land out of the shipwreck; and yet that saying of Paul's was equally certain, 'Except ye abide in the ship, ye cannot be saved:' so it was fixed that the elect servants of God, David and Peter, should arrive at the kingdom of heaven; and yet it was no less fixed, that if the former had continued impenitent in adultery and murder, and the latter in denial and perjury, neither of them could have been saved." Luke 13:5, 1 Cor. 6:9, Heb. 12:14, Acts 27:31.

XVII. Finally, after interposing some things to this purpose, they add a fifth Thesis in these words: "In that interval which is between the contracting of guilt from grievous sin, and the renewed act of faith and repentance, such a sinner stands condemned by his own desert, to be absolved by the merit of Christ and the firm purpose of God; not however actually absolved, until by renewed faith and repentance he has obtained pardon."

XVIII. Moreover, it is not difficult to show that the other Reformed hold the same thing as to the matter itself with these British Theologians: for in those same Acts of the Synod of Dort, the Theologians of Bremen, in their Judgment on the same Article, in their eleventh Thesis, teach that "The regenerate, when they fall into any grievous sins, lose a good conscience, purity of heart, and spiritual joy; which

does not happen to them when they fall into lighter sins daily."

XIX. With whom Paraeus agrees, in his work against Bellarmine on the Loss of Grace, Book I. Chap. 7, where he confesses that a believer, when he falls into grievous sins (as David did), loses purity of heart, uprightness and newness of spirit, joy of salvation, consolation of grace, goodness of conscience, etc. And afterwards he teaches that in a believer who has thus fallen, the justifying act of faith does not exercise itself. "Faith," says he, "is then said to justify, when it can and does exercise its proper act of receiving the remission of sins. But this act a sick, wounded faith, oppressed with the filth of the flesh, and bound as it were with the fetters of sin, cannot exercise, nor has it power to exercise it." And below, "But to those justified persons who have fallen, God does not impute their sins, namely, if they repent; but before repentance He certainly imputes them, so as to inflict temporal punishments, and would even inflict eternal punishments, unless they repented." And at length he thus concludes: "Then, therefore, faith which remains in the fallen only in a habitual manner, cannot properly be said to justify, nor to justify them."

XX. But the Theologians of Poland, in their declaration of their opinion presented in the Conference at Thorn, expressly teach that the regenerate, as often as they fall into sins against conscience, and for some time persevere in them, do not, during that time, retain justifying grace, nor the Holy Spirit; but incur new guilt of wrath and eternal death; whereas the case is otherwise, when they sin not against conscience, but from infirmity and inadvertence. For these are their words: "We are falsely accused, as if we affirm that those once justified cannot lose the grace of God, nor the assurance of it, nor the Holy Spirit itself, although they wallow in sins at their pleasure. Whereas, on the contrary, we rather teach that the regenerate themselves, as often as they fall into sins against conscience, and for some time persevere in them, do not retain true faith, nor justifying grace, much less the assurance of it, or the Holy Spirit during that time, but incur new guilt of wrath and eternal death: and therefore, unless by the special grace of God exciting them (which we doubt not is done in the case of the elect), they are again renewed to repentance, they would in reality be damned." On the Title concerning Grace, Sect. 2, No. 11.

XXI. To this pertains the distinction of sin in use in the Reformed Schools, according to which sin is distinguished into that which wastes the conscience, and that which does not waste the conscience. Which distinction is found in William Amesius and Lewis Crocins. For by that sin which wastes the conscience is meant that which cannot consist with true piety and a good conscience: but by that sin which does not waste the conscience is meant that which, being committed through infirmity and negligence, may be found in one who is truly pious, and has a good conscience towards God. Amesius in the Marrow of Theology, Book I. Chap. 14, No. 11; Lewis Crocins in his Compendium of Sacred Theology, Book III. Chap. 38, Nos. 23 and 24.

XXII. But the distinction of sin into reigning and not reigning, as Ursinus delivers and explains it in his Catechetical Expositions revised by the labor of David Paraeus, comes to the same thing. "A reigning sin," says he, "is one against which the sinner does not strive through the grace of the Holy Spirit, and therefore becomes obnoxious to eternal death, unless he repent and obtain pardon through Christ. Or it is every sin which is not lamented, and against which resistance is not made by the grace of the Holy Spirit, and on account of which, not only by the ordination of the Divine justice, but in reality, he who has it is guilty of eternal punishments. Such are all the sins of the unregenerate: also some sins in the regenerate, as error in the foundation of faith, and a lapse against conscience; with which the confidence of the remission of sins and the consolation of life cannot consist, until they recover themselves. For that even the regenerate may fall into a reigning sin, is sufficiently shown by the most grievous lapses of most holy men, as of Aaron, David, etc. A sin not reigning is that against which the sinner strives through the

grace of the Holy Spirit: and therefore he is not obnoxious to eternal death, because he repents and obtains pardon through Christ. Sins of this kind are all the defects, inclinations, depraved lusts, and many sins of ignorance, omission and infirmity, that remain in the saints as long as they are in this life: which however they acknowledge, lament and hate, and against which they strive, and for the remission of which to themselves they continually pray on account of Christ the Mediator, saying, 'Forgive us our debts.' And therefore in these they retain faith and consolation." Part I. on Actual Sin.

XXIII. From all which it evidently appears that, as we have said, the Doctors of the Reformed School acknowledge two kinds of sins. One of lighter sins, which may consist at the same time with a good conscience, and that purity of heart without which no one shall see the Lord; and which therefore do not actually render the believing person in whom they are found, obnoxious to eternal damnation, and unfit to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven, even if he should be overtaken by death in any one of sins of this kind. The other, of more grievous sins, into which if any one fall, and before he rise again from them by repentance, he cannot preserve a good conscience, and that purity of heart necessary to see God: but by them he becomes in reality guilty of eternal death, and obnoxious to it, and unfit to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven; so that if death should oppress him in that state, he would be to be condemned forever, and excluded from celestial glory.

XXIV. Moreover, from what has been said, it appears that the Reformed do not approve the distinction of sin into mortal and venial, as it is commonly expounded in the Roman School. Since they believe that every sin deserves of itself, and by its own nature, punishment and eternal death, they cannot admit that there are certain sins which are not of themselves deadly, but venial. Nevertheless, they do not altogether reject this distinction, but confess that it may be used in a convenient sense.

XXV. And first indeed, they allow sins to be called venials, which do actually obtain pardon, on account of the faith and repentance of the sinner, however grievous they may be in themselves: but in a peculiar sense they call mortals those which do in reality bring death and eternal perdition upon sinners, on account of their unbelief and impenitence. Which is what the Roman School calls mortal and venial from the event, as was before observed.

XXVI. In like manner they acknowledge that sins may in a certain sense be called venials, which have this from their cause, that they the more easily obtain pardon; because they are not done from determined malice, but from infirmity and ignorance. As the Apostle says that he was a blasphemer, a persecutor, and injurious, but obtained mercy, because he did it ignorantly. Which in the Schools is called venial from the cause. For those sins of Paul's, although they doubtless deserved eternal death, yet obtained mercy and pardon, because he had sinned through ignorance. Whence the Father of mercies was more easily moved to grant pardon to him who had not sinned from malice. And in this sense venial sins are opposed to those which, because they are committed from determined malice, more rarely and with more difficulty obtain mercy and pardon, and are more frequently punished with eternal death. Which distinction John Rainolds, an Englishman, relates and approves in his treatise on the Apocryphal Books, Reading 164.

XXVII. Moreover, some Reformed Doctors sometimes call venial all sins which may, by means of repentance, obtain remission and pardon: but mortal, that which cannot be remitted, but necessarily brings eternal death. In which sense the mortal sin is only the sin against the Holy Ghost, while all other sins are venials. So that this distinction is the same with that of John, in the fifth chapter of his First Epistle, where he distinguishes a sin unto death, and a sin not unto death: and with that by which the Schools commonly distinguish sin into remissible and irremissible. In this sense Gomarus, in his

Syntagma of the Leyden Disputations, Disp. 13, Thesis 19, and Piscator, in the First Volume of his Theological Theses, loco 7, Disp. 2, Thesis 64, distinguish sin into mortal and venial.

XXVIII. But there are some also who take the distinction of sin into mortal and venial in another sense. For Zacharias Ursinus in his Catechetical Expositions, and David Paraeus, who revised them, say that a reigning sin may, in a peculiar sense, be called mortal, but a sin not reigning may, in a peculiar sense, be called venial. And thus a mortal sin is that against which the sinner does not strive through the grace of the Holy Spirit, and on account of which he becomes actually and really obnoxious to eternal death. Sins of this kind in the regenerate themselves are lapses against conscience, along with which the confidence of the remission of sins and true consolation cannot consist, until they repent. But a venial sin is that against which the sinner strives through the grace of the Holy Spirit, and on account of which, God being merciful, he does not become actually obnoxious to eternal death. Sins of this kind are all the inclinations and depraved lusts, and many sins of ignorance, omission and infirmity, that remain in the saints as long as they are in this life, which however they acknowledge, lament and hate, and against which they strive, and for the remission of which to themselves they continually pray on account of Christ the Mediator, saying, "Forgive us our debts." And in these also they retain faith and consolation, as that place from Ursinus, just cited, on Actual Sin, declares.

XXIX. In like manner John Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, seems to explain the distinction of sin into mortal and venial. For he calls, in a peculiar sense, mortal, those more grievous sins which waste the conscience, and bind the believers themselves who fall into them with new guilt of eternal death, and which, as long as they do not rise again from them, render them unfit to enter into the kingdom of heaven. But to this kind of sins he teaches that the defects which cleave to and are intermingled with their good works, although they have the nature of sin, and deserve death according to the utmost rigor of the law, do not pertain. Whence he concludes that defects of this kind ought not to be called mortal sins in an appropriate sense. As may be seen in his work, On Actual Righteousness, Chap. 35.

XXX. "It is to be noted," says he, "that sin may be called mortal, or deadly, in three ways. First, that which brings with it the absolute, certain and irrevocable desert of eternal death. In this sense the sin against the Holy Ghost alone is accounted mortal. Secondly, that sin is commonly called mortal which involves the sinner in the guilt of death, but in such a way as to be remissible; and which does not suffer him to have any part in the kingdom of God, until he revive, and return into the narrow way. Sins of this kind are all those which are recounted by the Apostle, 1 Cor. 6: 'Be not deceived, neither fornicators,' etc. 'shall inherit the kingdom of God.' The same doctrine is repeated, Gal. 5: 'The works of the flesh are manifest, which are, adultery, fornication,' etc. 'They who do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.'"

XXXI. "In this class are to be placed, not only those which are expressly enumerated by the Apostle, but all others also, whether external or internal, which are of the same nature, as the Apostle plainly indicated in the latter of these places, in which he said that 'they who do these and similar things shall be excluded from the kingdom of God.' But similar things are all those in which obedience is yielded to the flesh lusting against the spirit, even to the perpetration of an impious deed. For all these are commonly called mortal, because they bring the sinner under new guilt of death, and into the very way to hell, until by repentance he desist from sins of this kind: according to that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 8: 'If ye live after the flesh ye shall die; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.'"

XXXII. "Thirdly, any sin whatever is called mortal by some of our Theologians, which would involve him who has it, or who commits it, in death, according to the rigor of the law, if the person were

judged without the mercy of God in Christ: although now to him who is ingrafted into Christ it is not imputed unto death, but is remitted to him although he is still involved in it. In this class we place the remains of original sin which adhere to the regenerate, the defects of perfect love which are mingled with their good works; also the vicious lusts and motions against which they strive, and which by holy motions they overcome and mortify, and do not suffer to have dominion in this mortal body. All these, if you regard the nature of the thing, and the law of God, are sins, and therefore mortals, that is, deserving of death. 'For the soul that sinneth, it shall die.' 'The wages of sin is death.' But if you regard the mercy of God, and the state of the person, they are not deadly, but pardoned: the guilt of which is renewed from those who are ingrafted into Christ, and do not suffer this old man to reign in them. 'There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus,' Rom. 8:1. The Apostle did not say, There is nothing in its own nature damnable, or deserving death, in the regenerate; but, 'There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.' Nor did he simply say, 'There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus;' but with this addition, 'who walk not after the flesh.' For as often as the regenerate, giving loose reins to the flesh, and obeying its lusts, fall into fornication, murder, or similar sins, they are involved in deadly guilt, nor can they ever enjoy eternal life, unless they be delivered from the same by a renewed act of repentance and faith."

XXXIII. Having observed these things, he proves that the culpable defects which cleave to the good works of the regenerate, although they are truly sins, and according to the strict rigor of the law deserve death, and are therefore sometimes by our writers called mortal sins, are not, meanwhile, to be called mortal sins in the peculiar and appropriate sense, secondly above explained. This he demonstrates by the following argument among others: "That sin is called mortal in an appropriate sense, which induces a new deadly guilt, until it be washed away by a new act of repentance. But the sin which cleaves to the good works of the regenerate, although according to the rigor of the Law it might condemn man out of Christ, yet does not so condemn the regenerate man ingrafted into Christ; nor even involve him in any new guilt. For since every regenerate person has, as it were, two men in himself, the new and the old man, whatever the old man raise a tumult, and rebel against the law, it is not imputed to the regenerate man and new man, following, in so far as in him lies, the rule of the law, and abhorring and refraining, so far as he can, the rebellion of concupiscence."

XXXIV. Similar to these are the things which Robert Baron, formerly Professor of Theology in the University of Aberdeen among the Scots, teaches at length and accurately concerning the true distinction between mortal and venial sin, in his Theological Disputation on that subject. For there, in accordance with the other Reformed, he asserts that every sin is of itself mortal, nor is any sin venial except by accident: and moreover that all the sins of the reprobate are and ought to be called mortal sins; both because by their own nature they deserve eternal death, and because in them they are actually punished with eternal death. But yet he maintains that in believers and the regenerate, some sins are with the highest reason called mortal, and others venial: and indeed, mortal sins, the more grievous and atrocious ones into which believers themselves sometimes fall; but venial, the lighter sins into which they daily run: because for those God denounces anger and indignation against them, nay, threatens them with exclusion from heaven and eternal death; but for these He strikes them with no fear of condemnation or eternal death, nor deprives them of the sense of His favor, or confidence of remission of sins.

XXXV. For in that Disputation, Part First, Section Second, this is his first assertion: "Every sin is of itself mortal, nor is any venial except by accident." 2. "All the sins of the reprobate are mortal sins: and therefore not only from demerit, but also from the event." 3. "And if all the sins of the reprobate are mortal, it is not on the contrary to be said that all the sins of the elect are venials. For," says he, "their

atrocious sins, wasting the conscience, not only deserve exclusion from the favor of God, and from the heavenly kingdom; but also actually exclude them from that degree of favor with which they were before beloved of God, and if they should persevere in them, would exclude them forever from the heavenly kingdom. Concerning which sins the Scripture positively teaches that whosoever commits them cannot be made partaker of the heavenly kingdom and eternal life, 1 Cor. 6, and elsewhere; and that God hates and abominates those who do such things, Prov. 6 and 22."

XXXVI. But his fourth assertion is this: "Some sins of the regenerate are rightly called venials; because according to the gracious covenant of God, and paternal clemency, they do not exclude them from the hope of the heavenly kingdom, nor from that degree of favor with which they were before beloved of God." Sins of this kind he says are the rebellious and involuntary motions of concupiscence. Also the defects and flaws which adhere to the good works of the regenerate. Finally, those which from the smallness of the matter are called venials; because, namely, they are committed in a light matter, or one of little moment. Concerning which sins he thinks the Scripture speaks, James 3: "In many things we all offend;" and 1 John 1: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us;" and Ecclesiastes 7: "There is no just man upon the earth, who doeth good and sinneth not."

XXXVII. After this he enunciates his fifth and sixth assertions in these words: "That sins of this kind in the regenerate do not exclude them from the favor of God, and the hope of the heavenly kingdom, they have simply and absolutely, not from their own nature, but from the mercy of God. But truly if the lighter sins of the regenerate be considered comparatively" (that is, if they be compared with their more grievous sins), "and the question be asked, Why those rather than these are venials, and do not exclude from the favor of God? it is to be said that they have this from themselves and their own nature." "For," says he, "although, speaking absolutely, these sins are grievous, yet comparatively they are light: and this their comparative lightness, which is founded in their very nature, is doubtless the reason why God willed to punish them more clemently under the covenant of grace, than atrocious sins wasting the conscience."

XXXVIII. But in what follows he recounts at length the various discriminations between that sin which he calls mortal, and that which he calls venial. And first indeed, he says that mortal and venial sins differ in respect to avoidability, that is, in respect to the power which we have through the grace of God to avoid them. For, says he, a regenerate man can, by the power and help of grace, partly internal or inherent, which is called habitual, partly external or assisting, which they call special assisting grace, avoid those manifest works of the flesh, those atrocious sins which are recounted, 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, Gal. 5:19, 20, 21. But those lighter sins, which are called venials, no saint can for any long time avoid, much less during the whole period of his life, through that measure of grace which God is wont to mete out to them in this life.

XXXIX. Secondly, he says these sins differ in respect to the obligation by which we are bound to avoid them. For the understanding of which thing, he notes, first, that the covenant of works, or the law precisely considered, binds to the perfect observance of each and every precept of the law, and that in all its particulars, conditions, and circumstances of exact obedience; and therefore to the avoidance of all sins, even the lightest; and that strictly and precisely, under the peril and penalty of eternal damnation. Secondly, that the covenant of grace does not simply remove the obligation of the law by which it binds us to all degrees, conditions, and circumstances of perfect obedience, and consequently to the avoiding of all sins, even the lightest. Since we are still bound to strive and aspire after that perfection, so far as in us lies, and to grieve seriously that we fall short of it, and daily to implore pardon from God for that defect.

XL. Thirdly, the covenant of grace, although it does not simply and altogether remove this obligation, yet takes away the rigor, or severity and terribleness of this obligation. For although, says he, it

sets before us the entire perfection of righteousness as a thing to be sought after, and, as far as possible, attained, yet it does not require it strictly and precisely under the peril and penalty of eternal damnation. For to a certain measure of obedience indeed, which is possible through ordinary grace, it binds strictly and precisely, that is, under the peril of eternal damnation, requiring that we should actually have it. But to a farther measure, which we cannot attain by the power of ordinary grace, it binds less strictly, namely, requiring that we should have it at least in wish and endeavor. For example, to perfection by parts, as they call it, it binds precisely. For it promises eternal life on no other condition than that we should actually have it. But to that perfection which is called of degrees, it does not bind so strictly and precisely; but only requires that we should strive and endeavor to attain to it, so far as the grace afforded us will permit.

XLII. Hence he gathers that believers, even according to the Evangelical covenant, are strictly and precisely, under the peril of eternal death, bound to live without those sins which are called mortal. Because the perfection of parts pertains to this, that we should not only repent of those more grievous sins, but also abstain altogether from them, that is, that we should no more commit them for the future; according to that of Christ, "Thou art made whole, sin no more." But that they are not bound in like manner to live, for the future, without every sin, even the lightest. Because to live without those lighter sins which are called venials, pertains to the perfection of degrees, which excludes all flaws and defects of human obedience.

XLIII. Thirdly, he says that mortal and venial sin differ in respect to the very acts themselves: because the foulness or deformity which is found in venial sins is much less than that which exists in mortal sins: for this reason, that in every venial sin there is something which extenuates the offense committed by it, and in a certain way excuses it with a gracious judge. Which he afterwards proves by going through those three species of venial sin which are commonly distinguished by the Scholastics. For as to the first of them, that is, venial sin from its kind, with God judging graciously, and according to the multitude of His tender mercies, the lightness of the offense (comparative, that is, since no sin is absolutely light) which it has from the very specific nature of the act considered in itself, without respect to the mode of acting, or the particular matter in which it is committed, excuses it, as is evident, for instance, in an idle word, immoderate laughter, etc. But the second species of venial sin, that is, sin from subreption, is excused by the lightness of the offense which it has, not from the specific nature of the act considered in itself, but from the mode in which that act proceeds from the agent; because, namely, the agent did not fully and sufficiently deliberate: as, for example, in a sudden appetite of revenge, or lust. Because the appetite of revenge is not from its specific nature a light sin; but accidentally light, because it takes place from indeliberation. But the third species, that is, venial sin from the smallness of the matter, is excused by the lightness of the offense which it has, not from the proper nature of such an act, but from the limitation of it to a particular matter; as in the theft of a penny. For theft is not from its specific nature a light sin, but accidentally light, because it is committed in a matter of little moment.

XLIV. Fourthly, he says that mortal and venial sins differ in respect to the repentance required for the remission of them. First, because the ordinary and daily exercise of repentance is graciously accepted by God, and deemed sufficient for the expiation of venial sins. But as those mortal sins themselves are grievous, horrid, and rare and extraordinary in the course of a Christian life; so the repentance which is necessarily required for the expiation of them ought to be singular, more accurate, and extraordinary; such as was that of David after his adultery and murder, and of Peter after his denial of Christ.

XLV. Then, because for the expiation of the guilt of mortal sins a special acknowledgment and confession of them, and a special grief and contrition, are required. But for taking away venial sins, for the most part that general, but humble, serious, and sorrowful acknowledgment of our corruption, joined

with that general deprecation, "Cleanse thou me from secret faults," is accepted. Because those lighter and daily incurred faults for the most part escape our knowledge. Although those of this kind which are observed by us ought also to be specially acknowledged and deplored.

XLV. Thirdly, in fine, because the repentance necessary to the remission of mortal sins, and the salvation of those who commit them, ought to be perfectly practical, that is, to go forth into an actual and real cessation from all sins of this kind, as is seen from Prov. 28:13, John 5:14. For if any one, leaving some one or two mortal sins, should afterwards fall into others, he can obtain neither grace in this life, nor glory in the future, as the Apostle teaches, 1 Cor. 6:9, 10, Gal. 5:21. But on the other hand, the repentance required for the remission of venial sins is not, nor can it be, perfectly practical, as it respects sins of this kind. For as all confess, no one can live without sins of this kind: and consequently the salvation of the pious is not endangered, although before the end of life they cannot escape this kind of sin.

XLVI. Fifthly, he affirms that mortal and venial sins differ in respect to the effects which follow the acts of sin, that is, the detriment which they bring upon sinners; because the calamities and losses which from mortal sins befall believers, are much more grievous and sad than those which follow the lighter sins, or venials. He then proceeds to expound severally the three evils or detriments which follow the mortal sins of the regenerate; which nevertheless, according to the dispensation of Divine Providence under the covenant of grace, do not follow the lighter sins committed by them.

XLVII. The first evil or detriment is the exclusion of the sinner from that degree of Divine favor with which he was before beloved of God. For although, when a regenerate and elect person falls into any grievous sin, and for some time perseveres in it, God does not on that account revoke His eternal purpose of saving and glorifying him, according to which it shall come to pass that God will give him grace to rise again from that fall, and so to arrive at the destined end; yet during that time in which he remains involved in that sin, he no longer pleases God as before, but incurs the hatred and displeasure of God, according to those general declarations of Scripture, by which He declares that He hates all workers of iniquity, and does not delight in those who withdraw themselves.

XLVIII. Moreover, during this state not only are the sins committed by the regenerate displeasing to God; but also their obedience, prayers, and thanksgivings. Nay, nothing can proceed from them which for that time can be acceptable and well-pleasing to God. But that favor and complacency in which they are acceptable and well-pleasing to God, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit, the faithful do not lose on account of their lighter sins into which they daily fall. And although these in themselves not only displease God, but also might justly cause that our whole obedience should be foul in the eyes of the Lord, and altogether displeasing to Him, yet God, notwithstanding these, accepts our imperfect obedience in Christ, and as it were turning His eyes from the blemishes which adhere to it, graciously regards the sincerity and humility of the same, and from these takes complacency and delight.

XLIX. Then when the regenerate by their own fault fall into atrocious sins, the Divine benevolence towards them is so bound and hindered, by the obstacle which their sins place in its way, that during this state He cannot confer upon them remission of sins, peace of conscience, spiritual joy, and similar gifts of the Holy Spirit. But no such thing follows from the lighter and daily sins of believers, which do not prevent God from remaining ever prompt and ready to confer upon them the wonted and ordinary effects and evidences of His saving grace, namely, confidence of the remission of sins, peace of conscience, and spiritual joy: although the lightest sins also, from themselves and their own nature, render us incapable and unworthy of the gifts of Divine grace.

L. But the reason of this difference between sins of the two kinds, he says, is, that the regenerate when fallen into those atrocious and conscience-wasting sins, cease to render that obedience which the

covenant of grace requires from us, as necessary to the obtaining of further gifts of grace in this life, and the beatific vision of God in the life to come. And therefore as long as believers and regenerate persons remain involved in those grievous and atrocious sins, they are incapable of these benefits, not only from their own demerit, but also according to the sentence of the covenant of grace, until by special, extraordinary, and perfectly practical repentance they return unto God, and take away all this malignity of their actings from before His eyes. But when the elect and justified commit those lighter sins, from inadvertence, or infirmity, they do not cease to render that obedience which the covenant of grace exacts, as precisely necessary to salvation. And notwithstanding these, they are said to walk according to the Spirit; nay, and to follow the Lord with their whole heart, and walk blamelessly in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord.

LI. The second effect of a more grievous sin, which he calls mortal, and in which he says it differs from lighter sins, which are called venials, is a manifold diminution of grace inherent in us through the Holy Spirit. For although, according to him, by even the more grievous sins the habits of faith, hope and love are not altogether done away and removed, yet they are much diminished and weakened by them, and that not only extrinsically as to the fervor and facility, or promptitude, of using these habits; but also intrinsically, as to their very entity. For, says he, these habits have a certain latitude of degrees, within which, as they are in fact increased, so also they may be diminished by acts contrary to them.

LII. And moreover, although he teaches that the remains of these habits persist even in those who sin most grievously, yet he warns that their principal acts and operations cease and are interrupted in them. For in that state they cannot exercise the acts of justifying faith, and confidence and hope concerning their own salvation and remission of their sins, nor retain spiritual consolation and peace. But nothing of this kind befalls the regenerate when they fall into lighter sins through infirmity: For sins of this kind do not prevent faith and hope, and that holy confidence which the Holy Spirit begets in us, from putting forth their wonted acts in them: but along with sins of that kind there remain in them confidence in the Divine mercy, and certain hope of salvation, and a sense and persuasion of the remission of their sins.

LIII. Finally, he teaches that the third effect of mortal sin is that a justified man, when he contracts the guilt of it, loses his present fitness for entering into the kingdom of heaven: because into that kingdom shall not enter anything that defiles, or works abomination: and the heavenly crown is placed only on those who have fought the good fight, and finished their course in faith and holiness; and therefore whosoever still cleaves to works of impiety is unfit to attain to this crown. Although, however, all sins, however light, deserve exclusion from the heavenly kingdom according to the rigor of justice, yet according to the administration of Divine Providence under the covenant of grace, sins of this kind do not take away present fitness for entering into that heavenly kingdom: But if death should overtake a man only in sins of this kind, he is not on this account excluded from heaven, nor deprived of eternal glory and blessedness.

LIV. As respects the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession, in this too they all agree that all sins are by their own nature mortal; and therefore in the unregenerate there is no venial sin. But in the regenerate some sins may be called mortal, or rather deadly, because they involve them in new guilt of eternal death, and extinguish spiritual life in them: but others venial, or rather not deadly, because they are not imputed to them unto death, but are graciously pardoned on account of Christ. Of the former kind, according to them, is every sin against conscience, and proceeding from malice; but of the latter, sins of infirmity, depraved concupiscence, and similar human lapses. But with this distinction they wish that other distinction to coincide, by which sin is distinguished into reigning and not reigning. And by reigning

sin, or mortal, they teach that the regenerate cast out faith and the Holy Spirit, and lose grace and eternal life: but by no means incur these evils through sins which are called venials.

LV. On this whole subject John Gerhard treats at length in his *Loci Theologici*, where concerning this distinction he explains his mind in these words: "That some sins are called venials, others only mortals, does not arise from the nature of the sins, but from the mercy of the Father, the merit of the Son, and the sanctification of the Spirit; and this division respects not all men in general, but only the regenerate; nor is it to be taken from the law, which accuses and condemns all sins whatsoever and howsoever small; but from the Gospel, which shows that to believers in Christ, sins of infirmity, ignorance, and depraved lusts are not imputed, if they resist them, that is, if being regenerate, 1. They acknowledge these evils dwelling in the heart: 2. Grieve seriously for them: 3. Seek and believe to be covered by the merit of the Mediator as by a veil: 4. By no means give loose reins to them, but resist them by the Spirit, crucifying the flesh with its affections. From all which it appears, 1. That in the unregenerate there are no venial sins, but all are mortals: 2. That venial sins are not such from the nature of the act itself, but from the condition of the sinning person, which if it be in Christ through faith, sins of infirmity are covered: 3. That the name mortal sin is not very suitable, it should rather have been called deadly and reigning: 4. Nor is the name venial sin very suitable, they should rather have been called sins of infirmity, human lapses, depraved lusts, etc. For they are not therefore called venials because they are in themselves and of themselves deserving of pardon, but because God pardons and deigns to pardon them to believers." Tom. 2, Tract 13, On Actual Sins, Chap. 19, No. 92.

LVI. But afterwards, in answering some passages objected by Bellarmine, he says: "This at least may be proved from those and similar sayings, that there is a certain difference of sins; so that some are committed by the regenerate, and yet do not actually exclude them from the kingdom of heaven, while others, if committed by the regenerate, cast out faith and the Holy Spirit, which we do not deny." In the chapter just cited, No. 100. Then in the following number he subjoins: "But often in the very lightest sins, and sometimes through inadvertence, sin creeps upon the regenerate, through which they do not cease to be just." And some things being interposed, he says: "Where there is true faith in Christ, efficacious through love, there man lives spiritually, this spiritual life he does not lose through any sins of ignorance and infirmity, provided he acknowledge them, deplore them, and cleaving to Christ, mortify the lusts of the flesh by the Spirit; but through sins committed against conscience, by which the Holy Spirit is cast out, faith and spiritual life are lost."

LVII. Moreover, from what has been expounded in these and the preceding Theses, it appears that by far the greatest part of the Doctors of the Roman School establish by common consent, that there are certain sins which of themselves and by their own nature are not mortal, but venial; because of themselves they do not induce the guilt of eternal death; nor do they extinguish the spiritual life of the soul, which consists in the love and grace of God: Nevertheless this is not yet held by them for an article of faith, and a thing altogether certain and settled: because in the Roman School there are some Theologians, and indeed of the most celebrated, who hold the contrary, and who think that all sins are of themselves and by their own nature mortal, nor do they judge that any are venial except through the clemency and mercy of God.

LVIII. Hence also it is manifest that the same Doctors of the Roman School do not deny that all sins, and even those themselves which are called venials, may be punished in those who finish life without the grace of God with eternal punishments, and are in fact so punished, and that most justly, and according to the judgment of God, which is according to truth.

LIX. On the other hand, it is clear from what we have said, that the Theologians of the Reformed School freely confess and teach that there are various degrees of malignity among sins, and that all sins are not equal; nor are all punished by God with equal punishments; but some will be punished in the judgment of God much more mildly, and others much more severely.

LX. Besides, we have taught that the Reformed acknowledge that there are certain grievous and atrocious sins which waste the conscience: so that as long as a man perseveres in them, and does not actually and really depart from them, he cannot be accounted pious and holy, and in that state preserve a good conscience, and retain spiritual joy, and confidence of salvation: But that there are other lighter sins, which do not prevent the believer, although he daily falls into them, from preserving a good conscience, and that measure of righteousness and holiness which in this life is necessary that any one may see God in the future life; and therefore which do not take from man inward peace, and legitimate confidence of salvation and remission of sins.

LXI. Nay, we have shown that most of the Reformed openly teach that there are certain sins, into which if the believer fall he is actually involved in new guilt of eternal death, and rendered unfit to enter into the kingdom of heaven, until by repentance he has renounced them, and has actually and altogether abstained from them: so that if death should overtake him in sins of this kind, as for example robbing and committing adultery, and lying in wait for his neighbor's life, he could by no means be saved, and become a partaker of celestial life and glory: but that there are other sins which do not induce new guilt of eternal death, nor render a man unfit to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven, although death should overtake him in any one sin of this kind. Sins of this kind are, in their opinion, certain lighter sins, as a frivolous thought, immoderate laughter, an idle word, and the defects cleaving to the good works of believers, and by reason of which they come short of that highest perfection which the rigor of the law exacts.

LXII. Moreover, it appears from what has been said that most of the Protestants, namely, all the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession, and some even of the Reformed themselves, admit the distinction of sin into mortal and venial, taken in a sound sense, and call in a peculiar sense mortal sins those more grievous and atrocious sins which waste the conscience, and actually involve the regenerate and justified themselves in new guilt of eternal death, when they fall into them: but venial sins those lighter sins, which may consist with a good conscience and sense of remission of sins, and through which a believing person is not bound with new guilt of eternal death; nor rendered unfit to be admitted into the kingdom of heaven, although he should die in some sin of that kind.

LXIII. Therefore that alone remains in controversy between the Roman School and the Protestant Theologians, Whether there are certain sins which by their own nature do not exclude the grace of God, nor deserve eternal death, and for which alone God could not justly reject man, and forever and altogether repel him from His friendship, if He should deal rigorously with him? Which the Doctors of the Roman Church commonly affirm; but the Protestants deny.

LXIV. But the principal reasons on which they rely are these: And first indeed they prove that all sins are of themselves and by their own nature mortal, from the fact that even the lightest sins, the mercy and gracious pardon of God being set aside, forever exclude the sinner from the heavenly kingdom, and consequently give him over to eternal punishment. For that which belongs to sin, the mercy of God being excluded, beyond doubt belongs to it by its own nature and of itself. But now that every sin, however light it may seem, forever excludes from the heavenly kingdom, the mercy of God being excluded, is manifest from this, that every sin, however light, stains and defiles the sinner. But nothing that defiles shall enter into the kingdom of heaven. And therefore even he who has sinned most lightly cannot enter the kingdom of heaven, unless God first mercifully cleanse him, and graciously pardon his sin.

LXV. Moreover, any sins whatever, however light they may appear to us, will after the day of judgment be punished in the impenitent with eternal punishment; according to that saying of Christ in Matthew: "But I say unto you, that for every idle word which men shall speak, they shall give an account thereof in the day of judgment." For after the day of judgment there will be no place for temporal punishments. But if any sins whatever may be punished with eternal punishment, and shall in fact be so punished in the impenitent, they are beyond doubt deserving of such punishment, and deserve eternal punishment; otherwise God would act unjustly in punishing sin with a heavier punishment than is due to it: whereas it is the common opinion of Theologians that God punishes sinners beneath what is condign. But every sin which is deserving of eternal punishment may be called and accounted mortal.

LXVI. Thirdly, that the sins which are called venials deserve of themselves eternal punishment, is thus proved: That which can never be remitted, can be punished forever, and that justly. But any sins whatever, even the very lightest, in whatever person they may be found, absolutely speaking, might never be remitted: because whenever any sin is remitted by God, it is remitted of mercy and grace; which the very name of remission imports. But whatever God does of grace and mercy, that, absolutely and simply speaking, He might not do: and therefore to the very just, simply and absolutely speaking, and without respect to the promises gratuitously made in the Gospel, God might not remit even the lightest sins, and so might punish them forever.

LXVII. Moreover, when God entered into the legal covenant with man in his integrity, He required of him obedience altogether perfect, and complete in all its parts, as a condition without which he could not attain unto eternal and blessed life, and escape the Divine malediction. Now that perfection which the law in its rigor, and as it was first given to man, demands, excludes every sin, even the very lightest. And therefore by any sin whatever, even the lightest, man in his integrity might fall from eternal life, and incur the Divine malediction. Whence it manifestly follows that every sin, however light, is by its own nature mortal, not venial. But that under the legal covenant, man in his integrity would by any sin whatever have fallen from the promise of eternal life, is evident from this, that under that covenant there was no place for pardon and remission, the promises of which are peculiar to the Evangelical covenant. Nor did the law precisely considered, and as opposed to the Gospel and grace, give place to repentance, without which every sin excludes forever from the heavenly life.

LXVIII. Finally, every sin, even that which is called venial, offends the infinite Majesty of God, and therefore has a sort of infinite malignity, namely, objectively. And also the stain contracted from any sin whatever, of itself and the mercy of God being excluded, endures forever. Whence it follows that to every sin is due an objectively infinite punishment, which deprives of an infinite good; and moreover which is infinite extensively, that is, which endures forever, that so the punishment may have proportion with the fault. And thus every sin ought to be called mortal by its own nature, as being to be punished from justice with eternal punishment.

THEOLOGICAL THESES ON THE REMISSION OF SINS

In which it is explained what it is, and how and when it pertains to the Elect.

Thesis I

Since sin is something contrary to the nature and laws of God, and by which the supreme majesty of God is offended, it excludes man from the favor and grace of God, and renders him liable to the punishments which divine justice demands for such an offense, and makes him a debtor to God.

II. When that debt is paid, and a man ceases to be liable to those punishments which divine justice demands from sinners, the sins of man are said to be forgiven; however, they are retained as long as the sinner remains bound to punishment by them in the sight of God. Therefore, the remission of sins consists in this: that he who was previously excluded from the favor of God and liable to the punishments which the law of God threatens to transgressors, ceases to be such.

III. Furthermore, God has eternally decreed to forgive all sins of the elect. For they do not enjoy any grace in time which has not been prepared and destined for them from eternity. However, the decree to forgive or remit the sins of the elect must be distinguished from the actual remission and forgiveness of those sins. It is one thing to make the elect cease to be truly liable to the punishments that sin deserves, and another thing to form a decree about performing this in the future. Just as it is one thing to sanctify the elect, and another thing to decree their future sanctification. God, therefore, forgives the sins of the elect by making them cease to be liable to the punishments to which sin binds them.

IV. However, God did not decree to forgive the sins of His elect except in a manner consistent with His justice and wisdom. Thus, He did not wish for them to be exempt from the punishments that their sins deserved unless some satisfaction was made to His justice for the sins, thereby manifesting the extent of His hatred for sin. Consequently, He determined that no one's sins would be forgiven except through the intervention of the death and passion of Christ, His Son, whom He gave to humanity as a surety, to take their sins upon Himself and endure the punishments due to them. This was achieved by Christ bearing the gravest torments in both soul and body, and ultimately voluntarily undergoing the cursed and ignominious death of the cross for them. For no one's sins are forgiven, nor have they ever been forgiven, except by the merit and view of Christ's satisfaction, once to be accomplished and now accomplished in due time.

V. However, even given Christ's satisfaction, the sins of the elect cannot be said to be forgiven unless His merit has been applied to them according to God's law and ordinance. For adults possessing the use of reason, Christ's merit and satisfaction are not applied—that is, they do not receive the benefit of Christ's merit—except through true repentance, living faith, and effective love.

VI. No one ceases to be subject to the divine wrath provoked by their sins solely because of Christ's death and passion unless they first retract and forsake their sins through sincere

repentance, accompanied by faith, by which they seek God's mercy in Christ. This is the law eternally established by God: whoever perseveres in sin remains bound to the punishments due to sin. Conversely, a sinner becomes free from this obligation as soon as they renounce sin, seek, and implore God's grace and mercy with a contrite heart.

VII. Hence, the Gospel consistently presents faith and repentance as the necessary conditions for the remission of sins. The Lord Jesus says, "Unless you repent, you will all likewise perish" (Luke 13). Similarly, the Apostle Peter states, "Repent and turn back, so that your sins may be blotted out" (Acts 3:19). This aligns with Solomon's words, "Whoever conceals his transgressions will not prosper, but he who confesses and forsakes them will obtain mercy" (Proverbs 28:13). Similarly, Christ's words are, "Whoever believes in Him, namely the Son of God, is not condemned; but whoever does not believe is condemned already, because he has not believed in the name of the only Son of God" (John 3). John the Baptist adds in the same chapter, "Whoever does not believe the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God remains on him."

VIII. Indeed, it is entirely contrary to divine wisdom that one who hardens themselves in sin and refuses to forsake it should avoid the punishments due to sin. Such a person cannot partake in the benefits of Christ's death, as they trample on Christ's blood and refuse to obey and acknowledge Him as their Savior and Redeemer.

IX. It should be noted here that just as some sins are lighter, from which even the faithful and righteous can never be entirely free in this life, while others are graver, which the Apostle calls "works of the flesh" and are incompatible with true righteousness and holiness, so also the nature of the repentance required for the remission of these sins differs. For the remission of these graver sins, a special sorrow or contrition is necessary. But for those lighter sins, which theologians call "daily incursions," a general, humble, and sincere recognition of our corruption is acceptable to God, accompanied by the general prayer used by the prophet, "Cleanse me from my hidden faults, O Lord" (Psalm 19). For these lighter offenses largely escape our knowledge.

X. Furthermore, the repentance necessary for the remission of graver sins must be perfectly practical, that is, it must result in a real and actual cessation of all such sins. If someone, having left one or two of such sins, still occasionally falls into others, they can neither attain grace in this life nor glory in the next. For as the Apostle repeatedly states in many places, "Those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God." In contrast, the repentance required for the remission of lighter sins is neither perfectly practical nor can it be, regarding such sins. For no one can live without such sins, and consequently, the salvation of the pious is not endangered even if, before the end of their life, they cannot entirely avoid this type of sin, as Robert Baronius of Aberdeen in Scotland rightly observes in his *Theological Disputation on Mortal and Venial Sin*, part 1, section 6, numbers 11 and 12.

XI. Moreover, from what has been said, it is clear that for a person to obtain the remission of sins, nothing more is required on their part than to flee to God's grace through Christ with active and effective faith and to strive for works worthy of repentance. But the question arises, what is the divine action by which a person is absolved from the guilt of their

sins and becomes a partaker of the remission of sins? This seems best understood if we consider how that guilt is contracted, which the remission of sins removes, and what directly opposes it.

XII. That guilt consists in the fact that by sinning, a person offends the Divine Majesty and becomes liable to the punishments that a just God requires from sinners. Therefore, such guilt is a certain relation that, once sin is committed, results in a person by virtue of the eternal law, which stipulates that a sinner, as long as they remain in sin, is subject to such punishments and remains a debtor to them before God. And to produce that guilt, no other action of God is required besides what directly results in time from it: that is, for God to pronounce a specific sentence declaring that this sinner is bound to the punishments that sin deserves. For relations are not produced by actions that directly and immediately result in them, but they result from the foundation's establishment without any other new action. For example, as soon as a wall is built here, it immediately bears a certain resemblance to all other white walls, no matter how far away, and no other action is required to directly and immediately produce such resemblances.

XIII. Now, the remission of sins consists in this: that the relation called guilt ceases in a person, and another arises in its place, by which a person is said to be reconciled to God and absolved from sin. Just as guilt results from sin by virtue of the said eternal law and is declared in God's word, so also, when sin is retracted and forsaken through true repentance, and active faith is established, by which the sinner seeks God's mercy in Christ, the relation by which the sinner was subject to the curse and divine wrath ceases, and another arises by which they are pleasing to God and accepted unto eternal life. This is by virtue of another law, which God also eternally sanctioned, that every sinner, upon departing from sin through true contrition and earnestly imploring divine mercy and embracing it through living and effective faith, should be free from the punishments due to sin and should be pleasing and a friend to God, and should be considered just unto eternal life: which law God also ensured was published in His word.

XIV. Therefore, for a person's sins to be forgiven, for them to be considered absolved from their sins before God and reconciled to Him, it suffices that God, through His grace, leads the sinner to true repentance and instills in them a living and effective faith. Once this is established, the person immediately ceases to be subject to the curse and divine wrath and begins to be pleasing and acceptable to God unto eternal life, by virtue of the aforementioned eternal law established by God. There is no need for any further divine action to produce the remission of sins directly and immediately in the person, nor for God to pronounce a specific sentence in time declaring the sinner to be absolved and received into grace by God. Such a sentence is no more necessary to cease being guilty before God than an opposing sentence is needed to make a person guilty of eternal punishment after committing a sin. For both are sufficiently covered by God's eternal decree concerning both sinners and penitents, established and solemnly promulgated in the Gospel.

XV. Furthermore, from what has been said, it is clear that the sins of the elect are not forgiven from eternity but are actually forgiven in time. Some theologians indeed assert the contrary, but they erroneously confuse God's decree with its execution. God did decree from eternity to forgive the sins of the elect, but their sins are only actually forgiven in time. What

does it mean to have sins actually forgiven, if not to be freed from the actual guilt of eternal death contracted by sins? Now, the elect contract this guilt only in time, when they are born infected with original sin and subsequently fall into various sins. Therefore, they can only be freed from this guilt in time.

XVI. But you may ask, "If God from eternity does not will to punish the sins of the elect, then are their sins not actually forgiven from eternity?" I respond that the proposition, "Whose sins God does not will to punish are actually forgiven," is either false or at least true only with a distinction. For God is said not to will to punish someone's sins in two ways. First, because someone is in a state in which, according to God's established order, their sins are not to be punished. Thus, God does not will to punish the sins of a person who repents and embraces Christ by faith, because, according to God's established order, the sins of a believing and penitent person are not to be punished. In this sense, whose sins God does not will to punish are actually forgiven. Second, it can be said that God does not will to punish someone's sins because He has decreed to transfer them to a state in which, according to divine justice, their sins will no longer be punishable, even if they are not yet actually transferred to that state. Thus, God did not will to punish Paul's sins before his conversion because He had decreed to transform him by His grace and make him embrace Christ, whom he was then persecuting, with true and living faith. In this way, He would deliver him from the state in which he was subject to eternal damnation. It is false, however, to say that sins are actually forgiven to someone whom God merely does not will to punish in this latter sense. Because one who God has decreed to transfer into a state of grace can still remain for a time in a state of perdition. One who is still in a state of death and perdition has not yet had their sins actually forgiven. In short, whose sins God does not will to punish are either actually forgiven if God does not will to punish them in the first way, or they are at least to be forgiven if God does not will to punish them in the second way.

XVII. It is also clear from this that no one's sins are actually forgiven until they have converted to God through true faith and serious repentance. Some theologians seem to assert the opposite. However, they either think wrongly or do not express themselves well; for anyone who serves sin and does not believe in Christ remains under God's wrath, is condemned by God's sentence, and, as Scripture says, remains in death and has not passed from death to life. Those who serve sin and do not believe in Christ have not yet converted to God through faith and repentance. How can these two things be reconciled: that someone's sins are actually forgiven and yet they remain in death and under God's wrath?

XVIII. Indeed, if the sins of the elect were actually forgiven before faith and conversion, Scripture would pointlessly and without reason present faith and repentance as conditions for the remission of sins, conditions without which we cannot obtain forgiveness. Furthermore, the person whose sins are forgiven has peace with God and is reconciled to Him. But how can this apply to those who are still alienated from God and enemies of Him in mind and evil deeds? Such is the condition of the faithful and the elect before their calling and conversion, as described by the Apostle Paul in Colossians 1:21. Finally, sacred Scripture proclaims blessed the one whose sins are covered and iniquities forgiven. But who would dare call blessed someone

who, still committing sin, is not yet of God but of the devil, and, lacking charity, hates their brother and does not have eternal life abiding in them, nor has passed from death to life, as the Apostle John testifies in his first epistle, chapter 3: "Whoever makes a practice of sinning is of the devil." Likewise, "Whoever does not practice righteousness is not of God, nor is the one who does not love his brother." And, "Whoever does not love abides in death."

XIX. But you may argue, "Before an elect person believes and converts, Christ has already paid the penalties due to their sins on the cross; therefore, they are no longer indebted to those penalties before God's tribunal: for no one is still bound to a debt that someone else has paid for them. But if someone is no longer indebted to the penalty their sins would otherwise deserve, are their sins not actually forgiven?" I respond that what Christ did for us on the cross was to enable us to obtain forgiveness of sins from God through faith and repentance, despite the divine justice that was satisfied by Christ's death. But the price of Christ's death does not actually remove anyone's debt and guilt unless it is first applied to them through faith and repentance. Therefore, in Christ's death, we indeed have a sufficient price that we can offer to God for our sins, but we remain eternally liable for those sins until we make that price our own through faith and offer it to God. Thus, the remission of sins has indeed been procured for us by Christ's death and passion, on the condition of faith accompanied by repentance, but the remission of sins should not be considered as actually granted to us until we fulfill that condition and Christ's death has been applied to us through faith.

XX. And indeed, the intention of those theologians who say that our sins are forgiven before we believe does not seem to be any different; for some of them, such as Henry Alting, observe that our sins can be said to be blotted out in two ways: first, according to God's decree and Christ's death in line with that decree; second, according to the effective application, both from Christ granting the remission of sins and from believers receiving it by faith. In the first way, our sins are blotted out and forgiven before we believe; in the second way, they are blotted out and forgiven only when we actually believe. But certainly, this is not enough to simply and absolutely say that our sins are forgiven before faith. When we hear that our sins are forgiven, we immediately think of the remission of sins not only decreed and obtained under certain conditions but actually granted and applied. Therefore, it is dangerous to speak this way, not accurate enough, and very prone to misinterpretation.

XXI. Thus, no one should be said to have their sins forgiven until they have believed in Christ and repented of their sins. But when someone believes and converts, then they are actually granted the remission of sins—those sins they have committed so far and for which they are seriously penitent, not, as some seem to suggest, also future sins. It is entirely against reason to say that sins not yet committed are actually forgiven. Indeed, sin is forgiven when the guilt contracted by sin is resolved. Therefore, sin cannot be forgiven where there is no guilt arising from sin. But no one is guilty of a future and not yet committed sin. Since guilt is a relation arising from the committed sin and consequent upon it. Indeed, if someone were guilty of a future sin, a person in a state of innocence before sinning would already be guilty and in need of the remission of sins. But it contradicts itself to say someone is both guilty and innocent

simultaneously and, while entirely free from sin, still in need of the remission of sins. No theologian would dare say this about Adam before his fall, claiming that he needed God to forgive his sins while in that state.

XXII. Furthermore, no one can repent of a sin that has not yet been committed: but without repentance, sin cannot be forgiven, and to obtain forgiveness from God, it is necessary first to be led to repentance for the sin. Nor can anyone be absolved from the guilt of a sin in which they persist and have no intention of abandoning. But if all future sins are simultaneously forgiven to one who converts to God, then a person who has once converted to God must be considered forgiven for all sins, however grave, into which they later fall, even while committing them, and even when they are far from true repentance, accumulating sin upon sin. For example, David's adultery with Uriah's wife would be considered forgiven, even when he not only persisted in that adultery but plotted Uriah's death, attempted to induce him to drunkenness, and treacherously flattered him. Consequently, it would have to be said that David was not subject to eternal death in that state, but accepted by God for eternal life and suitable to enter the kingdom of heaven, which contradicts what Scripture declares through John: "Whoever does not love remains in death. And you know that no murderer has eternal life abiding in him." Unless one wishes to say that David loved his neighbor as he should for salvation, while he defiled his wife and unjustly plotted his death. Or that his sins were actually forgiven, even though he remained guilty of eternal death and would be excluded from eternal life if death had overtaken him; notions which contradict the common sense of Christians.

XXIII. But here someone may say, "Whoever converts to God through true faith and repentance is thereby united to Christ as a member to the head, becoming one body with Christ; thus, they are considered to have suffered and died in Christ, having paid a sufficient ransom for all their sins. But whoever pays a sufficient ransom remains free of their debt; they are no longer liable to punishment, which is the essence of the remission of sins." I respond that the death and passion of Christ, when we are united to Him by faith, become ours so that we are considered to have paid a sufficient price in Him for all the sins of which we are currently guilty and which we have sincerely repented of and abandoned: not, however, for those sins of which we are not yet guilty, do not yet need remission, and have not yet been able to repent, without which no sin's remission is granted due to Christ's death. Since Christ did not merit the remission of sins for us in any other way than under the condition of faith and repentance, through which Christ's merit must be applied to us. Therefore, it follows that we should not be said to have paid a sufficient price in Christ for any sin until we have fulfilled the necessary acts of faith and repentance in respect to it, under the condition for which Christ satisfied on our behalf and merited its remission.

XXIV. It is true indeed that those who have embraced Christ by faith have a prepared remedy in Christ for even future sins: that is, they can be certain that when they fall into any sins, they will obtain forgiveness and pardon through Christ's death, provided they resort to renewed acts of repentance and faith, to apply that remedy to the new evil that oppresses them. But this does not mean that future sins are already forgiven, but only that they will be forgiven through

Christ's grace, provided the person does not fail to apply it. Nor do those who speak otherwise seem to mean anything different from us in this matter: for they say that our absolution and justification are applied and extended to our daily sins by the various acts of faith continually elicited, reflecting on Christ's merit and the reconciliation offered to us in Him. As seen in Samuel Maresius's place, I Th. 58. For if our justification is applied and extended to the sins we daily fall into through new acts of faith, it was not extended to them in fact before those new acts, nor was it actually applied to them: and therefore, before those sins were committed, according to the minds of those learned men, they were not yet actually forgiven. But it must be admitted that they speak dangerously and provide a pretext and occasion for our doctrine to be calumniated: as is evident from the things that the famous author, who recently accused the Reformed with great pomp of words, tries to deduce against them in his book on Subverted Christian Ethics.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:
In which is explained
The Doctrine of the Roman Church
Concerning The Veneration and Adoration of Images

Thesis I

In the Roman Church, many, especially those who are more thoughtful among the common people, and even some Doctors, complain that they are slandered when they are said by Protestants to worship the images of God, Christ, and even the Saints who have died. They profess not only themselves but also their Church to be entirely opposed to this worship, and they do not attribute the worship of adoration to anything except to the one true God. Therefore, we thought it worthwhile to carefully inquire into the true doctrine of the Roman Church and School regarding the veneration and adoration of images, so that no one might attribute a foreign opinion to it, and also to see whether the Reformed justly accuse the Roman Church of the adoration of images.

II. In order to be certain of the true doctrine of the Roman Church concerning the veneration of images, we must first consult the Councils that are considered General in that Church and approved by the Roman Pontiff. Moreover, we must see what is the universal and accepted practice of that Church. Finally, we must examine what the common consensus of the Doctors received in that Church states about this matter: for from these three sources can be drawn the true and genuine Doctrine of the Roman Church. And what is defined in the General Councils of the Roman Church, confirmed by its universal practice, and held and embraced by the common consensus of its Doctors, can safely be held as a doctrine of Roman faith.

III. Furthermore, there are three Councils that the Roman Church considers Universal, which deal with images and their veneration. The first and oldest is the Second Council of Nicaea, held in the year of Christ 787, during the reign of Constantine and his mother Irene. The second is the Council of Constantinople, held in the year of Christ 869, during the reign of Basil. The third is the Council of Trent, held over several years in the sixteenth century, as is well known.

IV. Regarding the Second Council of Nicaea, which in the Roman School is called the Seventh Universal, its consistent and manifest doctrine is that the images of Christ and the Saints are to be venerated. For in the letter of this Council to Constantine and Irene, these words are found towards the end: "In this confession and without any doubt, we believe that the depiction of venerable images is accepted and pleasing before God, and that those who display the images of our Lord Jesus Christ and also of the undefiled Virgin Mother of God, indeed of the glorious Angels, and of all the Saints, should venerate and greet these images. But whoever is not so disposed, but labors and doubts concerning the adoration of venerable images, our holy and venerable Synod anathematizes him." Tom.3. Conc. Edit. Cologne Edition of 1606, page 391, letter A.

V. In the same Council, in the second session, after the reading of the letter of Pope Adrian to Tarasius, the Pope's legates asked whether they agreed with it or not; among other things, Tarasius responded, "We agree and confirm the power of the letters read, and according to the ancient tradition of our fathers, we receive and desire these images, to venerate them in the name of Christ our God, and of our undefiled Lady the Mother of God, the Virgin, and of the holy Angels and all the Saints." To these words of Tarasius, the Synod itself added, "The whole holy Synod so believes and so teaches." Same volume, page 313, letter B.

VI. Furthermore, the Fathers of this Synod distinguish that adoration, which they believe should be given to images, from veneration, as something that imports more than simple veneration. For they condemn those who confess that they venerate images but refuse to adore them: as seen in the fourth session, where, after reading certain words of Anastasius, Bishop of Theopolis, Tarasius the Patriarch speaks thus: "Therefore all who confess that they venerate the holy images but refuse adoration are rebuked by the holy Fathers as hypocrites. For since they truly refuse adoration, which is a symbol of honor, they are known to do the contrary, namely, to revile the holy ones." Same volume, page 335.

VII. However, this Council carefully distinguishes the adoration it commands to be given to images from a certain worship which it wants to be peculiar to God; which worship it sometimes simply calls Latria, and sometimes even Latria in spirit, because it chiefly consists in the internal acts of faith, hope, trust, invocation, and similar things. Thus, Tarasius, after the cited words, in which he professes to agree with the letters of Pope Adrian and to adore the images of Christ, the Virgin Mother of God, and the Saints with him, immediately adds, "But we openly testify that we refer and attribute Latria and our faith only to the one true God."

VIII. Similarly, in the fourth session, the words of Anastasius, Bishop of Theopolis, are reported and approved: "Let no one be offended by the word adoration. For we adore both men and holy Angels, not, however, that we render Latria, that is, divine worship. For Moses says, 'You shall worship the Lord your God, and Him only shall you serve': where you will carefully observe that in the latter statement (namely Latria) he added 'only,' but did not add it to the former. Therefore, it is allowed to adore, but by no means to serve with Latria. Nor is it permitted to render Latria, which properly means to worship God."

IX. These are consistent with what is read in the seventh session in the Synodal Letter to the Emperors, which we cited above: "The divine Scripture says, 'You shall worship the Lord your God, and Him only shall you serve': it places worship absolutely, and does not add 'only' to signify the different notion and equivocation of the words. But it said 'you shall serve only,' which is why we attribute Latria only to God and refer it to Him."

X. The adoration, which they think should be given to images and is distinguished from Latria worship, they call honorific and teach that it is an emphasis or demonstration of honor, as found in the words of Anastasius, Bishop of Theopolis, mentioned above, "For what else," he says, "is the adoration of anyone than an emphasis of honor shown to them?" They constitute this emphasis of honor in certain external signs and testimonies of honor, which if anyone refuses to give to the images of Christ and the Saints, they consider him a hypocrite, even if he otherwise

professes to venerate them, that is, to regard them reverently. This is seen in the words of Tarasius, which follow the words of Anastasius and were previously related by us.

XI. As for what these testimonies of honor are, due to the images of Christ and the Saints, the Synod explains in various places. Namely, according to the Synod, they are such as kisses and embraces, as well as the offering of lights and incense. This can be gathered from what is read in the definition of the Synod, which is found at the beginning of the seventh session. There it says that the images of Jesus Christ, the Virgin Mother of God, and all the Saints should be dedicated and placed in Churches and other public and private places: not only that all who contemplate them may be brought to the memory and recollection of the prototypes and their desire, but also that they may offer them veneration and honorific adoration, not (it says) according to our faith, true Latria, which belongs only to the divine nature, but as we approach the type of the venerable and life-giving cross, and the holy Gospels, and other sacred objects, with the offerings of incense and lights, as has been piously accustomed among the ancients. For the honor given to the image reflects upon the prototype, and whoever venerates the image also venerates the subject depicted in it." Same volume, page 386.

XII. These are consistent with what is read in the first Synodal Letter to the Emperors: "These, namely the images of Christ and the Saints, are also to be venerated, that is, to be kissed and loved; for in the ancient Greek dialect, the words adorare (to adore) and φίλειν (to kiss) and ἀγαπᾶν (to love) mean the same. The preposition πρὸς signifies desire, as in προσκυνεῖν. Hence the letter concludes that the word προσκυνέω signifies embrace and intense love." Same volume, page 390.

XIII. The doctrine of this Synod is confirmed by the Council called the Eighth General, held, as we said, in the city of Constantinople, in the year of Christ 867. For in the tenth session, this is its third Canon: We decree that the sacred image of our Lord Jesus Christ is to be venerated with the same veneration as the holy Gospels. For just as all obtain salvation through the syllables pronounced from the Gospel, so also the learned and unlearned alike derive benefit from the images painted and depicted in colors. For what the speech expresses through syllables, this the painting represents and teaches through colors. Therefore, whoever does not venerate the image of Christ the Savior, shall not see His face at His second coming. In the same way, we venerate and adore the image of His undefiled Mother, and the holy Angels, as they are depicted in the pages of the Holy Scriptures, and of all the Saints. Whoever thinks otherwise, let him be anathema. But that this Council compares images, in terms of the worship of veneration, with the Gospel, refers to the custom of the Greeks, who venerate and adore the very codex of the Gospels with certain rites, as they do with the image of the cross.

XIV. Finally, the Council of Trent subscribed to and sanctioned the decrees of those prior Councils, teaching indeed that images do not possess divinity or any power for which they should be worshiped, nor should any trust be placed in them, but nevertheless they deserve veneration and honor, and that they should be kissed, and that the head should be uncovered and prostrated before them; because the honor given to them is referred to the prototypes they represent; so that through the images we adore Christ Himself, and venerate the Saints whose

likenesses they bear. The words of this Council are in the twenty-fifth session: Further, that the images of Christ, the Virgin Mother of God, and the other Saints should be held and retained in Churches, and that due honor and veneration should be imparted to them, not because any divinity or power is believed to reside in them, for which they should be worshiped, or that anything should be sought from them, or that any trust should be placed in the images, as was once done by the Gentiles who placed their hope in idols. But because the honor given to them is referred to the prototypes they represent, so that through the images we kiss and uncover our head and prostrate ourselves, we adore Christ and venerate the Saints whose likenesses they bear, which was sanctioned by the decrees of the Councils, especially the Second Nicene, against the opponents of images.

XV. From these it is clear, according to the doctrine of the Roman Church and the decrees of its Councils, first, that some worship, honor, and veneration are due to the images of Christ and the Saints. Secondly, that such worship is legitimately shown by kissing the images, saluting them, embracing them, prostrating oneself before them, and uncovering one's head, and offering incense and lights to them. Finally, that this worship is rightly expressed by the word adoration; but not that images are to be adored as gods, and worshiped with *Latria*, that is, with the highest and absolute adoration, which is reserved for the one true God alone; but that the adoration that should be shown to them is to be understood as relative and referred to the prototypes, and terminated in them. Therefore, nothing is to be asked of the images, nor is any trust to be placed in them, nor any divinity or power attributed to them.

XVI. However, what and what kind of adoration, according to the mind of the Roman Church, is due to the images of Christ and the Saints, cannot be more certainly gathered than from the solemn and universal practice of that Church. By this name, the worship that is openly exhibited to images in the churches of the Roman Church, known and seen by all, through certain solemn and public ceremonies, in which the Roman people constitute a part of their piety, is rightly considered meritorious; not objected to or disapproved of by the ordinary pastors, bishops, or the Pope; but on the contrary, it is publicly approved and defended by many Doctors and Bishops, while others silently consent by their silence and not speaking against it.

XVII. Such is not only the custom of saluting, kissing, and bending the knee before the images of Christ and the Saints, and also offering incense and lights to them, which, as we have seen, are expressly approved by the Councils of the Roman Church; but also the accepted custom of placing images on altars, adorning them with precious garments and ornaments, carrying them in solemn procession through public streets, dedicating vows to them, consecrating gifts to them, and undertaking religious pilgrimages to them.

XVIII. These things are done throughout the whole Roman Church, and are not publicly disapproved of by any who are eminent in authority, doctrine, or dignity in that Church, and who are considered orthodox, but on the contrary, are publicly approved and defended by many. For example, by Jesuit Coster in his "*Enchiridion of Controversies*" in the chapter on the use and veneration of images. Therefore, he says, Christians who adore and pray to Christ in His image with knees bent, heads uncovered, and hands joined, asking for mercy, help, and assistance from

Him, are not to be reprehended. Nor are those who adorn the images with garments, ornaments, and similar things. Nor is the custom of Christians reprehensible, but commendable, by which they light candles before the images in honor of the Saints. Finally, the custom of carrying statues and images in processions is approved by ancient usage and rightly commendable.

XIX. Similar things are seen in John Molanus, the theologian of Louvain, who in his book on the history of sacred images, defends and promotes their public procession, placement on altars, and the practice of adorning them with precious garments. For in the second book, chapter thirty-four, the title is, "The Procession of Images in Supplications is Defended against Superstition." And the title of chapter thirty-nine is, "The Images of the Saints are Not Profaned and Pagan, but Religiously Adorn the Altars." And the title of the following chapter is, "The Images of the Saints are Rightly Covered with Gold and Silver, and Adorned with Crowns or Precious Garments."

XX. But in some, the practice of the Roman Church seems not to be in full agreement with the decrees of its Councils. For as we have seen above, the Second Nicene Synod, along with Anastasius, teaches that it is not allowed to ask anything from the image. And similarly, the Council of Trent teaches that nothing is to be asked from the image. Yet in the public use of the Roman Church, there are some prayers directed to the images themselves.

XXI. For in the Breviary of the Roman Church, established according to the decree of the Council of Trent and published by the command of Pope Pius V, there is found this prayer directed to the cross, as distinct from Christ: "O Cross, more splendid than all the stars, famous throughout the world, much beloved by men, holier than all, which alone was worthy to bear the ransom of the world, sweet wood, sweet nails, bearing a sweet burden, save the gathered company praising you today." On the Feasts of May 3rd and September 14th.

XXII. In the hymn which begins, "The royal banners forward go," and which is customarily sung on the Saturday before Passion Sunday and on other solemn days, the cross is adorned with various praises which distinguish it from Christ, and it is called "Beautiful and bright tree, adorned with the purple of the King, chosen to touch so holy limbs. Blessed is the wood on which hung the price of the world." Then this prayer is conceived: "Hail, O cross, our only hope, in this time of the Passion, increase the grace of the pious and grant forgiveness to the guilty."

XXIII. And Thomas Aquinas, the chief of the Roman School, recognized that this prayer is directed to the cross, as distinct from Christ. For from this he concludes that the cross is to be worshipped with Latria, using this argument: "We offer Latria to that in which we place our hope of salvation; but we place our hope of salvation in the cross of Christ: for the Church sings, 'Hail, O cross, our only hope, in this time of the Passion, increase the grace of the pious and grant forgiveness to the guilty.' Therefore, the cross of Christ is to be worshipped with Latria." The conclusion of the article is conceived in these words: "The cross of Christ, on which Christ was crucified, is to be worshipped with Latria both because of its representation and because of the contact with the members of Christ; but the image of the cross in any other material is to be

worshipped with Latria only because of its representation." In the Summa, part three, question 25, article four.

XXIV. However, those who, to avoid this absurdity, today want to interpret the cross by a certain metonymy as referring to Christ Himself in such prayers, do violence to the very words. For what laws of speech allow the cross to be taken for Christ crucified in those places where it is opposed to Christ, and is distinguished from Christ, and is celebrated as ennobled by the contact of Christ's body?"

XXV. There is also a certain prayer, said to have been issued by Pope John XXII, with the concession of ten thousand days of indulgences for those who devoutly recite it while gazing at the Veronica, to which this prayer is directed. The Veronica is called a certain image of the face of Christ imprinted on a cloth, which is said to be kept in the church of Saint Peter in Rome, as well as in a certain city in Spain, according to Marineo Siculus in the fifth book of his "De Rebus Hispaniae." This image is called Veronica by the name of the woman to whom the cloth is said to have been given, which was applied to the face of Christ, stained with blood and sweat, and retained His likeness. Furthermore, this is how the prayer, which is read in the book titled "Antidotarius Animae," goes:

Hail, holy face of our Redeemer,
In which shines the appearance of divine splendor,
Imprinted on a cloth of snowy whiteness,
Given to Veronica as a sign of love.
Hail, glory of the age, mirror of the Saints,
Which the spirits of heaven long to see;
Purify us from all stain of vices,
And join us to the company of the blessed.
Hail, blessed image of the Lord's face,
Marvelously adorned with eternal grace:
Shed light in our hearts by your given power,
And take away the bonds from our senses.
Hail, strength of our Christian faith,
Destroying the heretics who are of vain mind:
Increase the merit of those who truly believe in you,
The image of Him who is the King from the bread.
Hail, our joy in this harsh life,
Fleeting and fragile, soon to perish:
Lead us to our homeland, O blessed figure,
To see the pure face of Christ.

XXVI. Moreover, the Council of Trent decreed that it should not be believed that there is any power in images for which they should be worshipped. But the practice of the Roman

Church presupposes the opposite; not only in the aforementioned prayer, in which the image of the face of Christ is attributed the power to shed light in hearts, but also in others that are more solemn and customary in that Church. For when the Bishop blesses a cross made of stone or metal, he has a prayer addressed to our Lord Christ, which is included in the Roman Pontifical under the title "On the Blessing of a New Cross." In this prayer, contrasting the true cross on which Christ was affixed with the cross made of metal or stone, he asks Christ the Lord to sanctify the cross to be consecrated with the holiness of His true cross and to grant that, by the merit of this stone or silver cross, the souls of the servants of Christ may be free from all committed sin. The words of the prayer are:

You owe no other more fitting service than that which the dedication of the body affixed to you then offered; nor is there any offering more familiar to you than that which was consecrated by the familiar extension of your hands. Therefore, receive this cross with those hands with which you embraced that other one, and sanctify this one with the holiness of that one; and just as through that cross the world was cleansed from guilt, so may the souls of your most devout servants, by the merit of this cross, be free from all committed sin; and by the intercession of your true cross, may they shine with perpetual triumph.

XXVII. There is also a prayer directed to God the Father, in which the Bishop asks that the sign of the cross which he holds in his hands may be a saving remedy for the human race and a protection and defense against the darts of the enemies. The prayer is conceived in these terms: We ask you, holy Lord, almighty Father, eternal God, that you deign to bless this sign of your cross, that it may be a saving remedy for the human race; the solidity of faith; the progress of good works; the redemption of souls; and a comfort and protection and defense against the fierce darts of the enemies, etc. Those who have such a prayer to God, if they trust that they will be heard, must necessarily believe that this stone or metal cross thereby receives power from God, through which it can procure various blessings for men, both temporal and spiritual, contrary to the definition of the Council of Trent. For otherwise, how could it be said that it was made, as the prayer asks, a saving remedy for the human race and a defense against the fierce darts of the enemies?

XXVIII. The same applies to those wax images, commonly called the "Agnus Dei," which the Pope is accustomed to consecrate in the first year of his Pontificate, and also afterwards, every seventh year, to serve as symbolic images of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the true Lamb of God who takes away the sins of the world. For while the Pope consecrates them, he repeatedly prays to God with many prayers, asking that those images may receive power against diabolical deceptions, against storms, against pestilence, against epilepsy, and other evils and inconveniences. This can be seen in the book of sacred ceremonies, in the chapter titled "On the Consecration of the Agnus Dei." Among many similar prayers, one is in which the Pope, after some prefatory remarks, addresses God thus: Just as that Lamb, whose blood was used to anoint the doorposts and lintels of houses after it was sacrificed, delivered your people from Egyptian

persecution at midnight: and just as that innocent Lamb, immolated by your will on the altar of the cross, Jesus Christ, your Son, delivered our first parent from diabolical power, so may these spotless lambs, which we offer to be consecrated in the sight of your Divine Majesty, receive power. May you deign to bless, sanctify, and consecrate them, so that, sanctified by your abundant blessing, they may receive the same power against all diabolical deceptions and the wiles of the wicked spirit, so that no storm may prevail against those who devoutly carry them, no adversity may dominate, no pestilential aura or corrupted air, no epilepsy, no storm at sea, no fire, nor any iniquity may dominate or prevail against them; may mother and child be preserved in safety, etc."

XXIX. Indeed, Pope Urban V. was quite confident that his prayer had been heard when he sent three Agnus Dei to the Greek Emperors, along with these verses, which are transcribed at the end of the already cited chapter:

Balm and pure wax, with the water of chrism,
Make the Lamb, which I give you as a great gift,
Sanctified through mystical waters as if born from the font.
It drives away lightning from above, all malignant
Sin it breaks, as Christ's blood does, and it assuages.
The pregnant are preserved, and childbirth is delivered.
It grants gifts to the worthy, destroys the power of fire:
Carried purely, it rescues from the waves.

Given these facts, according to the mind of the Pope, who is the head of the Roman Church, these wax lambs are to be excluded from the number of images, which the Council of Trent declares have no power for which they should be worshipped.

XXX. Regarding the Doctors of the Roman Church, some of them seem to teach contrary to what we have found defined by the Councils of that Church. For there are those who simply deny that images should be worshipped and claim that it is a slander to say that they worship the images of Christ and the Saints, as we have already observed above. Yet the Councils of the Roman Church, namely the Second Nicene and the Constantinopolitan, which is called the Eighth General, approved by the Council of Trent, have anathematized those who say that adoration is not to be given to images. However, the intention of these Doctors is not to condemn the already mentioned Councils or in any way depart from their doctrine. For when they deny that images are to be worshipped, they mean this in terms of the highest and absolute adoration, which is given to something as the ultimate end and first principle and primary author of all good, which adoration they acknowledge to be due only to God; but not in terms of relative or inferior adoration, which they do not deny can be given to images, and which the Councils of the Roman Church sanction as to be given to images alone.

XXXI. On the contrary, among those who are eminent in the Roman School, many do not simply teach that images are to be worshipped, but insist that the images of God and Christ are to

be worshipped with latria, which the Roman School usually designates as the highest worship, proper to God alone. However, the Councils of the Roman Church carefully distinguish the adoration they want to be given to the images of Christ and the Saints from latria, as we have shown above. But even they do not wish to appear to disagree with these Councils and think that their view can be easily reconciled with the definitions of their Synods. They say, namely, that the images of God and Christ are indeed to be worshipped with latria, but not for their own sake, but because of the prototypes, and thus that latria is not absolute but relative; or at least that latria is given to them not per se, but per accidens, as they are considered together with the prototype, constituting one entity with it. And the Councils, which do not want latria to be given to any images, are to be understood as speaking of absolute latria, not of relative; or of latria per se, not of latria per accidens.

XXXII. Therefore, the Doctors of the Roman Church, although they speak somewhat differently, nevertheless agree among themselves regarding those things which have been sanctioned and defined by the Councils of that Church. First, namely, that images are to be held and retained in churches not for mere commemoration, but that some worship and honor are due to the images of Christ, the Blessed Virgin, and other Saints, and can rightly be given to them. Secondly, that this honor can rightly and sensibly be expressed by the word adoration. Thirdly, that the signs of reverence and submission shown to those images by uncovering the head in salutation, kissing them, bending the knee before them, and finally offering incense and lights, are legitimate marks of honor and by no means blameworthy.

XXXIII. Consequently, Vázquez rightly asserts, according to the mind of the Roman School, that it is a Catholic truth that adoration should be given to images, that is, signs of servitude and submission, by embrace, lights, offering of incense, uncovering the head, etc. And so, he does not simply classify as erring those who, in the time of the Seventh Synod, judged that images should be retained everywhere, not just for decoration, but also to arouse the memory of the exemplar among the faithful, so that they might venerate the exemplar in front of the images, but who did not show any sign of honor or submission to the images, neither by kissing, nor by bodily inclination, nor in any other way, because they said this was idolatry. Therefore, they did not kiss the images, nor bow their bodies to them, nor offer incense; but standing straight before them, being reminded of the exemplar, they directed their minds to it alone. For this reason, they were condemned in the Seventh Synod, and against them it was defined in that Synod that it is not enough if one says he venerates images unless he also adores them. In the third part of Thomas, vol. 1, disputation 106, chapter 1 and 2.

XXXIV. However, from this error Vázquez in the same place defends Holcot, Durandus, and Pico della Mirandola, whom he shows did not deny that we should embrace images, salute and kiss them, and uncover the head before them; even if they said that images are only improperly adored by this, and that it is not properly adoration of the image but of the exemplar. Therefore, at the end of the second chapter of the aforementioned disputation, he affirms that it is a crime and an intolerable error to judge that images should not be adored in any way.

XXXV. But although the theologians of the Roman School by common consent acknowledge that images are to be worshipped and adored in some way, and that it is pious and laudable to devoutly kiss them, burn incense to them, light candles before them, and bend the knee or prostrate oneself before them, they do not agree among themselves on what the nature and character of this worship should be. This is observed by Vázquez in the already cited disputation 108, chapter 1. For while all Catholics, he says, against the Iconoclasts easily agree that some worship, adoration, is to be given to images, they vary in the manner or very nature of the adoration.

XXXVI. To better understand this disagreement, first of all, we need to note and explain certain distinctions commonly used in this question to clearly explain their position. First, they observe that something can be honored either per se or per accidens. Something is honored per se, they say, when it is the subject in which the reason for veneration resides; per accidens, when it is something connected with the thing that is worshipped but is not itself the reason for worship. For example, when a king is honored, the person who is the king is honored per se; the royal robes and other adjuncts and accidents are honored per accidens, except for the royal dignity which, although it is not the thing that is honored, is that by which the person is honored. Thus, the person is honored per se, as is the royal dignity, while the other things are honored per accidens.

XXXVII. Secondly, they say something can be honored either for its own sake or for another reason. It is honored for its own sake, they say, if it has within itself a reason for veneration that does not depend on anything else; and in this way, only the nature of reason is venerable. Something is honored for another reason if it has within itself a cause for honor, but that cause entirely depends on something else. And in this way, the signs of sacred things are venerable; they have in themselves a relationship of resemblance or representation of a sacred thing and hence some excellence, but that excellence depends entirely on the sacred thing itself.

XXXVIII. Thirdly, they note that something can be honored either properly or improperly. Something is properly said to be honored when it is truly honored for its own sake. It is said to be honored improperly when it is honored in place of another. An ambassador of the king is sometimes honored as an ambassador, and in that case, he is properly honored, even though he is honored for another; sometimes he is honored in place of the king with the honor proper to kings, and in that case, he is improperly honored; properly, the king is honored in him. This becomes clearer when a funeral is held in the absence of the body, around a statue, and all the actions that would be done around the body are done around the statue, etc. All these distinctions are found in Bellarmine's second book on the Church Triumphant, chapter twenty.

XXXIX. With these observations in mind, the Roman School inquires whether images are to be properly adored or only improperly. There were some among the old scholastics who acknowledged that images are to be adored in some way, and that it is lawful to kiss them, bow

before them, and perform other signs of honor around them, but they did not thereby consider images to be properly but only improperly and abusively adored because these actions, although done around images, are not done in honor of the images but in honor of the prototype, and the images are not the terminus to which that adoration is referred.

XL. This opinion is attributed to Durandus, Holcot, and Pico della Mirandola, but it is generally rejected by more recent scholastics and is considered rash. This can be seen in the works of Vázquez, Suarez, Bellarmine, Gregory of Valencia, Puteanus, and others who commonly assert that images are properly and truly to be adored.

XLI. Although recent theologians agree that images are properly and truly to be adored, they nevertheless dispute among themselves about the manner and nature of this adoration. They all admit that images should not be adored for their own sake but only for the sake of the exemplar they represent and whose likeness they bear. But the question is whether, although the image is adored for the sake of the exemplar, it can still in itself be a complete object of adoration, so that it is adored with an adoration different from that given to the exemplar, and which thus terminates in the image itself, making the image alone, not the exemplar, the proximate and immediate material of the adoration. Just as the ambassador of the king is honored for the king, whose name he represents, but can still be honored in a way that terminates directly in himself, with a different and lesser honor than that due to the king himself

XLII. Some, like Gabriel Vázquez, reject this manner of adoration as superstitious and foolish because, they say, it is foolish for a rational creature to subject itself to an irrational creature and exhibit servitude to it. Therefore, they contend that an image, per se and without the prototype or separate from it, cannot be licitly adored; not only because it must be venerated for the sake of the exemplar as the remote reason, just as the ambassador is honored for the king, but also because whoever adores an image must venerate in it and through it the exemplar as the terminus and proximate material of veneration. These are the words of Gabriel Vázquez in volume one on the third part of Thomas, disputation 109, chapter 3.

XLIII. However, many others teach that it is licit and proper to adore images without at the same time adoring the exemplar, so that the images themselves are the proximate and complete terminus of adoration. Among these is Francisco Suarez, who affirms that although it is true that images can only be adored for the sake of the exemplar, they can nevertheless be properly adored in themselves without directly adoring the exemplar as the object. Volume one on the third part of Thomas, disputation fifty-four, section 5.

XLIV. Likewise, Bellarmine holds this view, stating that the images of Christ and the saints are to be venerated not only per accidens or improperly but also per se and properly, so

that they themselves terminate the veneration as considered in themselves and not only as standing in place of the exemplar. The Church Triumphant, book two, chapter twenty-one.

XLV. This is also the doctrine of Puteanus, who acknowledges that the image of Christ, and therefore the image of any saint, can be adored so that the material object of our adoration is the image alone. In the third part of Thomas, question twenty-five, article three.

XLVI. Among these theologians who teach that images can be adored without at the same time adoring the exemplar, and with a peculiar worship that terminates in the images themselves, there is a question about what kind of worship this is and what it should be called. According to Bellarmine, the worship properly due to images is a certain imperfect worship that analogically and reductively pertains to the type of worship due to the exemplar. He explains it this way: Images are not properly subject to latria, hyperdulia, dulia, or any other kind of worship given to rational nature. A lifeless and irrational thing is not capable of such worship; rather, it is a certain inferior and varied worship according to the variety of images. Therefore, the worship due to images of the saints is not properly dulia but a lower form of worship, which can be called dulia in a certain respect or analogically and reductively. Similarly, the worship due to images of the Blessed Virgin is not simply hyperdulia but hyperdulia in a certain respect or analogically and reductively. Finally, the worship due to images of Christ is not true and simple latria but a certain inferior worship, which is nevertheless reduced to latria as the imperfect to the perfect. The Church Triumphant, book two, chapter twenty-five.

XLVII. According to others, it should simply be said that the image of Christ, when adored alone and separately from the exemplar, is indeed owed latria, but relative, not absolute. This is the first conclusion of Puteanus on article three, question twenty-five, cited above. When the material object of our adoration is only the image of Christ, and the reason for adoring is Christ alone, represented by that image, this adoration is not properly latria, or as others say, it is not absolute latria. Rather, it is latria that is given because of the created excellence that exists in the thing worshipped, not because it is a created thing, but because it has some relationship to the uncreated excellence.

XLVIII. Moreover, according to this doctrine of Puteanus, it should similarly be said that the images of the Virgin Mary are to be adored with hyperdulia, not absolute but relative; and the images of other saints are also owed relative, not absolute dulia.

XLIX. Furthermore, there is a question among the Doctors of the Roman Church about whether the image and the exemplar can and should be adored simultaneously with one and the same act of adoration, namely, while considering the exemplar as clothed in the image and the image as containing the exemplar, and as if animated by it, so that in the mind of the adorer the image and the exemplar constitute one thing. Some Doctors of the Roman School do not acknowledge this mode of adoring images and consider the adoration of the image to be always a different act from that by which the exemplar itself is adored. This is the opinion of Martin Perez

de Ayala in his book on Traditions, where he deals with the cult of images, and of Ambrosius Catharinus in his singular work on the adoration of images, as testified by Vázquez and Suarez in the frequently cited disputations.

L. However, many Doctors of the Roman Church are of the opinion that an image can and should be adored with the same adoration as the exemplar, so that the image is adored for the sake of the prototype, and the prototype is adored in the image with one and the same act, of which the adequate object is both the exemplar and the image together. This opinion is extensively supported and explained by Francisco Suarez, in his first volume on the third part of Thomas, disputation fifty-four, frequently mentioned before. To clarify his position, Suarez observes that although the image does not really contain the prototype in its own being, it does contain it representatively. Therefore, when a person is presented with such an image, they apprehend the prototype as if it were truly present in the image and conceive both together as one. Thus, with this apprehension, the worshipper's mind is carried by one act of adoration, primarily towards the prototype and concomitantly towards the image, so that by kissing the image, they adore Christ himself; not through deception, since they do not judge the image to be Christ, but through the simple and vivid representation of the prototype in the image, as if it were present.

LI. Vázquez, on the other hand, believes that the image can indeed be adored with the same act as the exemplar, but he contends that images cannot be adored except with the exemplar, and must be adored with it. "The widespread and ancient theological opinion, which I consider true," he says, "is that the motion of adoration towards the image passes into its prototype and exemplar so that they both fall under the same veneration, and the image cannot be adored by itself, without the exemplar, or separated from it." He further teaches that not only can the image be adored with the exemplar in the same act of adoration, but also that the image in itself, unless it contains and is joined with the exemplar, is not capable of any veneration or adoration and therefore is to be venerated only with the exemplar, which together with it constitutes the complete and proximate terminus of adoration. Disputation one hundred and eight, cited above, chapter three.

LII. The foundation of his opinion is that no inanimate or irrational thing without a rational element is capable of honor, worship, reverence, or adoration in itself. This is because adoration is the will to show a sign of submission due to some excellence. Now the mind's submission and servitude are directed only towards what one apprehends as superior and endowed with greater excellence, which, in relation to humans, an image without the exemplar cannot be considered. He elaborates on this in chapter nine of the aforementioned disputation. He also asserts that anyone who venerates an image in itself, without the exemplar in it, can be accused of folly or idolatry: either because they subject themselves to an irrational thing and exhibit servitude against right reason, or because in submitting to it, they attribute to it some divinity, dignity, or virtue, which is a heathen error, not a Christian religion.

LIII. Moreover, as can be gathered from the aforementioned points, Vázquez notes that an act of adoration consists of two parts. One is the external sign of submission, such as kneeling, bowing the head, etc. The other is the internal affect of submission, by which one, from an apprehension of excellence and dignity, desires to show that sign to someone as excellent. Without this, the external sign would not be adoration and worship; it could be done in jest or mockery. The external sign and the internal affect of submission are not two adorations, but from both, one act of reverence and honor is constituted, just as in general a virtuous act is constituted by the internal and the external.

LIV. Again, therefore, the question arises whether, when the image and the exemplar are adored together with one and the same act of adoration, both parts of that act, i.e., both the internal affect of submission and its external sign, pertain and are terminated not only to the exemplar but also to the image. Vázquez, consistent with his stated foundation, believes that when the image and the exemplar are adored together, only the external sign of submission pertains and is terminated to the image, while the internal affect of submission is directed only towards the exemplar and regards only it. For in chapter seven of the frequently mentioned disputation 108, he states that it is manifestly gathered from various testimonies of Councils and Fathers that the adoration of the image and the exemplar is one and the same, not as theologians usually think, but in such a way that there is one act of submission which is directed solely towards the exemplar, while the external sign of it regards only the image and, through it, the submission passes in thought and desire to the exemplar itself.

LV. Francisco Suarez, however, asserts that when the image and the exemplar are adored together with one and the same act, not only the external sign of submission but also the internal submission of the mind is directed towards the image and that submission regards not only the exemplar but also the image with the exemplar: so that the entire and complete object of that adoration is the image, not just what is external and sensible in that adoration. "It must be said," he states, "that it is rightly possible for the prototype in the image and the image for the prototype to be adored with one interior and exterior act." Volume 3 in the 3rd part of Thomas, disputation 54, section 3. And he adds that when someone apprehends the image and the prototype as one object, the person is carried to worship that object with a single movement of the body and a single act of the will: it is not necessary to distinguish formal reasons in such an act. He concludes from this that the image is also adored not only with an external act, which is insufficient for adoration, but also with the internal movement and intention of the worshipper, not merely abusively, but truly and properly.

LVI. Furthermore, from this hypothesis, that the image can and should be worshipped with one and the same act of adoration as the exemplar, it follows that images can and should be worshipped with the same kind of worship as the exemplar. Therefore, the images of saints can be worshipped with *dulia*, which is the worship proper to saints; the images of the Blessed Virgin can be worshipped with *hyperdulia*, which is her proper worship; and the images of God and

Christ can be worshipped with latria, which is the worship due to God. This is also acknowledged and taught by many scholastics with Thomas Aquinas.

LVII. The theologians of the Roman School attempt to show in various ways how an image can be worshipped with latria without committing the crime of idolatry. First, Bellarmine says that sometimes the image serves as a substitute for the exemplar, and what is done around the image as if it were present is done around the image with the mind fixed only on the exemplar, not on the image, and then it can be said that the image is worshipped with the same worship as the exemplar, not properly but improperly. Thus, according to him, on Good Friday, when the crucifix is gradually unveiled and presented for adoration, many acts pertaining to the worship of latria are done around the image of the crucified, but all those acts are understood to be offered to Christ himself through the image: at that time, properly speaking, the honor of latria is not given to the image but only to the exemplar, yet it can be said that the image is also honored with latria improperly.

LVIII. Moreover, he teaches that the image of Christ can be worshipped with latria not only improperly but also properly, though accidentally, not per se: if someone worships Christ as he is objectively present in his image, and venerates him thus represented and as if clothed in the image. Then necessarily, the image is worshipped with the same worship as Christ himself because the image is at that time conceived as conjoined with the exemplar being worshipped. Whoever worships someone also worships all that is conjoined with them; just as one who worships a robed king worships both the king and the robes. But this worship is accidental, not per se because in that case, the image is neither the suppositum that is worshipped nor the reason for the adoration but something adjunct. Bellarmine believes that it is forbidden to worship the image with latria properly and per se, but not to worship it with latria improperly or accidentally. However, since what is true only improperly or accidentally should not simply be affirmed, he does not want to say that latria is due to images, but rather the opposite, especially if the sermon is to the people. *The Church Triumphant*, book 2, chapters 22 and 23.

LIX. Vázquez, however, addresses this difficulty differently according to his own principles. Although he insists that the image should be worshipped along with the exemplar in one act of adoration and not otherwise, in that act, as already explained, he distinguishes two parts: one is the submission of the mind itself, and the other is the external sign of that submission. He does not want the former, the submission of the mind, to regard the image in any way or to terminate in it, but to be referred only to the exemplar. Only the latter part, the external sign of submission, he wants to be given to the image and through it to pass to the exemplar. Thus, when someone kneels or bows before the image, they do so, according to his opinion, as a sign of servitude and reverence, which is thought to be due not to the image but to the prototype alone. He interprets the term "latria" to signify not the external sign of submission and reverence in itself, but the affect of subjection, and the sign itself as it is completed by the internal affect of servitude toward God. Therefore, he concludes that the Second Council of Nicaea rightly denies

that latria should be offered to images because they are not to be given that internal submission in which latria properly consists.

LX. Nevertheless, he contends that it can be said absolutely that images are adored with the adoration of latria. Although images are not given that affect of servitude, which is called latria, they are worshipped accidentally with latria because they are given external worship through signs derived from the affect of latria towards the exemplar. He considers this sufficient to say that the image is worshipped accidentally with the prototype, not per se, with the adoration of latria.

LXI. Finally, Francisco Suarez, who believes that the image can be worshipped with the exemplar in one and the same act of adoration, both internal and external, not only abusively but truly and properly, also teaches that the image of Christ can be worshipped truly and properly with the adoration of latria. This act, being one and indivisible, terminates both in the prototype and the image. He does not think this contradicts the Councils of the Roman Church, which prohibit offering latria to images or any other creatures. For when the image of Christ is worshipped in this manner, the act of latria primarily tends towards Christ and only secondarily towards the image. Although, in his judgment, a creature cannot be primarily worshipped with latria, it can be worshipped with latria concomitantly; just as the king's robe is worshipped with the honor given to the king. He adds that the same act of adoration, by which Christ and his image are worshipped, is absolute latria with respect to Christ and relative latria with respect to the image. This is because that honor is given to Christ due to his excellence, and to the image due to Christ's excellence, whom it represents. He finds no contradiction in worshipping a creature with latria as long as that latria is relative and not absolute, that is, as long as the worship given to the creature is for the sake of God and not for the creature itself.

THEOLOGICAL THESES ON THE WORSHIP OF IMAGES:

PART TWO.

In which the Doctrine of the Reformed Church is Explained and Confirmed.

Thesis I

From the points raised in the preceding theses, it is evident that the councils of the Roman Church do not indeed teach that any images should be considered gods or that any power should be attributed to them for which they should be worshiped with the highest and absolute worship. However, these same councils consistently state that images, not only of Christ but also of the Virgin Mary and other saints, are worthy of some form of worship, not for their own sake, but because of the exemplar they represent.

II. We have also clearly demonstrated that the worship which the Roman Church offers to images, according to the common practice of its school and indeed the definitions of the councils to which it submits, can rightly be expressed with the term "adoration." Thus, this worship, according to the teachings of those councils and the practice of the Roman Church, is legitimately and piously rendered to images by bowing, kneeling, uncovering the head, kissing them, and offering candles and incense.

III. From this, it is clear that the doctors of the Roman Church unjustly complain about Protestants attributing to the Roman Church the adoration of images, as if this were a calumny. For what calumny is there in attributing to the Roman Church what its school teaches should be done and what it professes to do in its councils, declaring it rightly and piously done under anathema?

IV. There is no reason for them to say that the adoration they offer to images is not the highest and absolute adoration which they acknowledge to be owed only to God; nor do they consider images as gods, but they only worship them with a certain inferior adoration, which is referred to the prototypes. For when Protestants accuse the Roman Church of worshipping images, they do not intend to attribute to the Roman Church that it considers images as gods, nor do they worship them with another adoration than a relative one and which is below the highest. Moreover, they are so far from that, that they do not even think it can be attributed to the more intelligent and not utterly foolish pagans without injury. For their wise men and philosophers often declare that they do not consider stone or wooden images as gods, nor do they worship them with any other mind than to honor the deities of which they are signs and representations. Since, therefore, Protestants believe and say that images are worshiped by the Roman Church in no other way than that which it approves and professes, it is clear that they do not impute anything to it in this matter by calumny.

V. However, although the whole Roman Church and school agree that some form of worship is to be given to images of Christ and the saints, and that this worship can rightly and appropriately be signified by the term "adoration," it has been shown that the Roman school doctors disagree greatly among themselves in explaining the nature of this worship, diverging into various opinions on this matter. To better understand this variety and briefly present it, it should be noted with Francisco Suarez that adoration can be directed to an image in three ways: first, by directing the whole intention of the mind to the exemplar represented in the image as the object properly, for itself, and solely worshipped, and not to the image; second, by directing the adoration to both the represented exemplar and the image in which it is represented, forming from both together in the mind one adequate object to which it is directed and which is the adequate material around which the adoration revolves, according to the intention of the worshiper; third, by directing the adoration to the image alone as the matter or thing worshipped in itself, but to the exemplar only as the reason for worship. (Tomus Primus in Tertiam Thomæ, Disputatio 54, Sectio 4).

VI. Some of the older scholastics believe that images should only be worshipped in the first way, that is, it is lawful indeed to bow and kneel before them and to offer candles and incense, but the worshiper should direct his whole mind's intention not to the image itself but only to the exemplar represented by the image as the object worshipped properly and for itself. Hence, they conclude that images are only worshipped improperly and abusively. However, in the more recent school, this opinion is entirely rejected as rash and improbable, and it is established as something certain and indubitable that images are to be worshipped properly and truly.

VII. Therefore, others teach that images can be worshipped not only in the first way but also in the second way, meaning that it is lawful not only to worship the exemplar in the presence of the image but also to direct and terminate the adoration to both the exemplar and the image together, forming one total object from the two in the mind. However, they reject the third mode of adoration as illicit, in which the image alone is worshipped as a thing worshipped in itself, even if it is worshipped because of the exemplar, which is the reason for that adoration.

VIII. Conversely, some reject the second mode of worship, in which the exemplar and the image are worshipped together with one and the same act of adoration as one total object, but believe that images can and should be worshipped not only in the first but also in the third way, so that the adoration is directed to the image alone as the thing worshipped in itself, while the exemplar is only indirectly regarded, namely as the reason why the image is worshipped. Although the image should be worshipped in itself and for itself, it is not worshipped except for the sake of the exemplar, just as a means is loved for itself and in itself, although it is not loved except for the end.

IX. Finally, most theologians of the Roman Church believe that images can be rightly and piously worshipped in all three ways, namely by directing adoration properly and for itself either to the exemplar alone, to the image alone, or to both the exemplar and the image together as one total object.

X. Again, those who believe that the image and the exemplar can and should be worshipped together with one and the same act of adoration differ among themselves in that some think that only what is external in adoration refers to and terminates in the image, while the internal movement of the heart is referred to the exemplar alone. However, many others contend that the image can be worshipped together with the exemplar not only with the same external act of adoration but also with the same internal submission of the mind, as was more fully explained in the previous theses. In these, it was also shown that the worship given to the image, according to the opinion of many, is of the same kind and nature as that given to the exemplar itself, so that the images of Christ are to be worshipped with latria, those of the saints with dulia, and those of the Blessed Virgin Mary with hyperdulia. According to others, however, the worship that is

properly and for itself given to images is of a different and inferior kind and order than the worship of the exemplar itself, but nevertheless is analogically referred to and reduced to it.

XI. But whatever may be said about this diversity of opinions in the Roman school, all its doctors agree on this, as has often been stated: 1. That some form of worship is to be given to images of Christ and the saints. 2. That this worship can rightly be signified by the term "adoration." 3. That this worship is legitimately rendered by uncovering the head, kneeling, and offering lights and incense before the images.

XII. All such worship, by whatever name it is called, Protestants unanimously reject as superstitious and contrary to the word of God. And this is the status of this controversy between the Roman Church and all Protestant Churches: whether it is pious and pleasing to God to bow, uncover the head, burn incense, light candles, and perform similar religious rites before images, whether of Christ or of the saints. This the Protestants unanimously deny, while the doctors of the Roman Church affirm it as something decreed by their Church under anathema and confirmed by its solemn and universal practice.

XIII. Furthermore, what moves the Protestants to hold this opinion is the express command of God contained in the Decalogue and often repeated in sacred Scripture: "You shall not make for yourself a carved image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the waters under the earth; you shall not bow down to them nor serve them." Where, since God simply forbids us to worship or serve any likeness of things in heaven, on earth, or in the waters, they rightly conclude that images of God, or Christ, or the saints reigning in heaven are not to be worshipped with any adoration or service, just as no other images are to be; since both images of Christ and of the saints are among the likenesses that represent things in heaven, to which God's law abrogates all worship.

XIV. To this, the Doctors of the Roman School respond in various ways, but their arguments are not difficult to refute. First, some indeed concede that by this command of God, all worship and adoration of images are prohibited, whatever form they may take, and that it was God's intention that no images, whether of any creature or of God Himself, should be erected and set up for worship in a manner suitable for adoration. However, they contend that this command is positive and ceremonial, and thus was abrogated by the Gospel, like other things that pertained to legal rites, and that the Church is no longer bound to observe it. This is the opinion of Gabriel Vasquez, which he proposes and attempts to defend extensively in the first volume of his work on the Third Part of Thomas, in Disputation 104. This view is also embraced by Jesuit Lorinus, writing on the seventeenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. They follow Ambrose Catharinus, Martin de Ayala, and Dominic à Soto, writers of the previous century.

XV. But if this prohibition, "You shall not make for yourself a carved image, etc.," is a positive law that temporarily forbids any images of God or any creature to be proposed for worship, then indeed it constitutes a particular commandment that should not be confused with the first commandment, "You shall have no other gods before Me," which is a moral commandment and purely natural law. It is clearly different to acknowledge the one true God and have no other gods before Him, and to worship that God in no image nor make any figure for adoration and worship, especially according to the hypothesis of the Roman School, which believes that those who offer adoration and worship to images of God and the saints do nothing against that law, "You shall have no other gods before Me." Consequently, in the Decalogue, not ten but eleven commandments should be counted, and it should be called the Hendecalogue instead of the Decalogue; although Moses named this summary of divine law the ten words, that is, ten commandments. If, as the Roman Church wishes, the law against coveting contains two commandments, one prohibiting the coveting of a neighbor's wife, the other prohibiting the coveting of a neighbor's house, it follows that there are seven commandments in the second table, to which should be added not just three, but four commandments from the first table, since the prohibition against making any images for worship would necessarily constitute a particular commandment.

XVI. But from where do they infer that the commandment by which God forbids any images to be set up for worship is positive and ceremonial? Indeed, we infer from the words of the Apostle Paul, in Colossians 2:16, that there is something ceremonial in the fourth commandment, in so far as it precisely commands the sanctification of the Sabbath, that is, the seventh day of each week, where he advises the faithful not to be condemned in food or drink, or in part of a feast day, or a new moon, or Sabbaths, all of which were shadows of things to come, of which the body is Christ. But where has Christ or the Apostles signified anything similar regarding the prohibition against making any images for worship? And is there a single word in the New Testament that suggests to Christians that it is permissible to worship God and His saints in images, which was not allowed before?

XVII. And certainly, it is clear that this law is not positive, which only concerned the Jews, but moral, which obliges all men universally and always; because the worship of images and their making to represent divinity is reproached to the nations in God's word, as is frequently seen among the Prophets. Nor is it usually blamed on the nations that they transgressed the positive laws given to the Israelite people by Moses; but only that they violated the moral law impressed on the hearts of men by nature.

XVIII. Nor is this only in the Old Testament, but also in the New Testament, where it is a crime against the nations to dare to depict God in images and represent Him under the form of men and various animals. For Paul, in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, accuses the wise men of the nations of foolishness in that they "changed the glory of the incorruptible God

into an image made like corruptible man—and birds and four-footed animals and creeping things."

XIX. Nor should anyone argue that the foolishness of those wise men from the nations was not simply because they set up images for God, but because they imagined God to be corporeal and distinct with various members, similar to humans or various animals in external form. Whatever might be said of the rude and heathen common people, and the Epicureans attributing to their inert and unworthy God the form of humans, it is certain that those wise men of the nations, about whom the Apostle speaks, who expressed God under various human and animal forms to worship Him, especially the Egyptians to whom he seems particularly to refer, did not think that the images of men or animals consecrated to God were similar to God in external form and bodily features, but only thinly and symbolically represented God and were mere weak likenesses and obscure signs of divinity, as expressed by Plutarch and Maximus of Tyre.

XX. Indeed, regarding the figures of animals, or even the living animals worshipped by the Egyptians, Plutarch in his treatise on Isis and Osiris extensively teaches that various virtues and benefits of the deity were mystically and symbolically represented by them. According to Augustine in his work "The City of God," Varro testifies that the ancients who made images of gods in human form followed this view because they believed that the human soul, which is in a human body, is most similar to the immortal mind, just as if vessels were placed to denote the gods, and an oenophore would be set up in the temple of Bacchus to signify wine, through that which contains what is contained; thus by an image that has the human form to signify the rational soul, since by such a vessel that nature is usually contained, and they wished the gods to be of that nature. (Book 7, Chapter 5).

XXI. These sentiments are echoed by Maximus of Tyre, in his discourse on whether statues should be set up for the gods. After establishing that God is the father and creator of all things, older than the sun, older than heaven, greater than time and age, he adds, "Since His essence surpasses our senses, we seek assistance from words, from men and animals, from figures of gold and silver, etc., to reach an understanding of the divinity through these means."

XXII. From these points, it is evident that the wise men of the nations gravely sinned when they represented God under various figures and proposed to worship Him in those forms, even if they only attributed mystical and symbolic significance to those figures; thus it is not only by positive law but by moral law, which perpetually obliges all men, that the Decalogue prohibits setting up any likenesses of God or anything else for worship.

XXIII. This is why the ancient Doctors of the Church, with common consent, affirmed that the Decalogue contains nothing other than a brief summary of the moral and natural law, to the observation of which all are universally bound, except only the commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath, or the seventh day; in which they observed something ceremonial,

namely, the precise and strict observance of the seventh day from creation and scrupulous cessation from all work: although in substance, and as far as it commands a certain day to be solemnly sanctified to God, it is also moral.

XXIV. This can be seen in Irenaeus, Book 4, Chapter 34, "The words of the Decalogue the Lord spoke to all alike; therefore, they remain with us, receiving extension and increase, but not dissolution through His coming in the flesh." Tertullian, in his book on Idolatry, Chapter 4, speaks of the law forbidding making any likeness of things in heaven or on earth as a law given by God to the whole world: "The divine law proclaims, 'You shall not make an idol'; and adds, 'Nor any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the waters under the earth.' He has forbidden such arts to the whole world." And in the next chapter, he says, "If you observe the same God, as indeed the author of the law, you have His law, 'You shall not make any likeness.'" Similarly, Cyprian refers these words of the second commandment, "You shall not make for yourself a carved image," as pertaining to Christians, in his book 3, to Quirinius, Chapter 59. Especially Augustine explicitly states, "The Decalogue pertains to us primarily, which is contained in those two stone tablets, except for the carnal observance of the Sabbath." (Against Two Letters of the Pelagians, Book 3, Chapter 4).

XXXIV. Nor should it be objected that Jeroboam, about the calves he had made, said, "Here are your gods, O Israel, who brought you up out of the land of Egypt," just as the Israelites in the desert had said about the golden calf. For from what was said before, it is evident, first, that although the words are in the plural form, they nevertheless have a singular meaning, according to the nature of the Hebrew language and the frequent use in Scripture. Furthermore, the name of God was attributed to these calves because they were symbols and images of God, not because they were believed to be the very deity itself that had miraculously brought the Israelites out of Egypt before they even thought of forming the calves. Just as today, those who call a certain image dressed in imperial and papal attire "God the Father" do not therefore believe that image, without any figure and literally, to be God the Father, but only its symbol and representation.

XXXV. It is also trivial that Bellarmine adds, to make it seem probable that the Israelites did not intend to worship the true God in the calf, that they are said to have forgotten their Savior God when they worshiped the calf; Psalm 106: "They made a calf in Horeb and worshiped a molten image. They forgot God their Savior, who had done great things in Egypt, wondrous works in the land of Ham, and terrible things by the Red Sea." For in Scripture, they are said to have forgotten God, not only when faith and thought of God were utterly erased from their minds, but when they acted as if they did not remember God, openly disobeying His commands, however much they professed to believe in the true God. Thus, in Psalm 90, the prophet severely rebukes thieves, adulterers, and blasphemers, accusing them of having forgotten God: although many who indulge in such vices retain some faith in God and have not entirely erased the memory of God from their minds.

XXXVI. But it can be more plausibly objected that God, through the prophet, reproaches Jeroboam, saying, "You have made for yourself other gods and molten images to provoke me to anger, and you have cast me behind your back" (1 Kings 14:9). How, then, can it be said that by making calves, he made for himself other gods, if he worshiped God in those calves? Moreover, in 2 Chronicles 11, it is said that Jeroboam appointed priests for the demons and for the calves he had made. It follows that in those calves, not the true God, but demons were worshiped. However, according to the Holy Scripture, they are said to serve other gods and demons who usurp worship contrary to the divine will, even if they think they are worshiping God in doing so. Whatever their intention may be, God utterly rejects such worship, and only the devil rejoices in it, as it is by his instigation that they violate God's law and institute worship condemned by it. Therefore, we must distinguish between their judgment and God's judgment: as far as they are concerned, they think they are honoring God; but God, through their disobedience, considers Himself dishonored and sees His adversary, Satan, honored as they obey his will in this matter.

XXXVII. But there are Doctors of the Roman Church who acknowledge that Jeroboam and his successors, as well as Micah and the ancient Israelites in the desert, worshiped the true God in their images. However, they argue that they are not simply reproached in Scripture for this but for two other reasons: firstly, because they imagined God to be corporeal and similar to the idol; secondly, because they sacrificed to the idol, while according to Scripture, sacrifices should be offered to God alone.

XXXVIII. As for the first point, it is a baseless assertion to claim that Jeroboam and his people believed God to be corporeal and similar to a bull in external form. Josephus, the historian who was closer to the time, had a different opinion and could better understand the cult practiced among the ten tribes. When he introduces Jeroboam speaking and persuading his people that it was unnecessary to go to Jerusalem to worship God, he attributes these words to him: "Just as no place is devoid of God's presence, and He is not confined to any place, but hears prayers and vows everywhere and regards those who worship Him" (Antiquities of the Jews, Book 8, Chapter 3).

XXXIX. And indeed, since the Israelites, whom Jeroboam sought to subject to himself and detach from the house of David, had hitherto believed that God was immense and omnipresent, what would be the point of the cunning man trying to persuade them that God was a bull or similar to a bull, when he could more easily achieve his goal without this absurd idea? And how could he have made such a large multitude believe something so contrary to their previous beliefs in an instant?

XL. Moreover, Jeroboam, when he made the calves to be symbols and images of divinity, imitated, as many believe, the custom of the Egyptians, among whom he had long dwelt, and who worshiped the bull Apis with great superstition. The Egyptians, however, did not regard the bull as the supreme God, as Bellarmine believes; but they venerated it in honor of Serapis, their

highest deity, as a symbol of that deity. This is evident from Augustine in "The City of God" (Book 18, Chapter 5), where he says that Egypt, deceived by marvelous vanity, adored the bull Apis with lavish honors in honor of Serapis. This is confirmed by Plutarch, an expert in these matters and acquainted with Egyptian rites, who testifies that the animals worshiped by the Egyptians were not considered gods but only symbols of gods because the wise men of Egypt believed they observed certain divine virtues in them. This is also supported by the author of the "Recognitions," attributed to Clement of Rome. He reports that the Egyptians said the animals they worshiped were figures and allegories of certain virtues by whose aid the human race is governed (Book 5, p. 99).

XLI. Some, not improbably, believe that Jeroboam intended to imitate the cherubim placed on the Ark in the Jerusalem Temple with those calves. For the cherubim are believed to have had the face of a calf, as evidenced by comparing the first chapter of the Prophet Ezekiel with the tenth chapter. In the first chapter, verse ten, the animals supporting God's throne in his vision are described as having the likeness of a man's face, a lion's face on the right side, a bull's face on the left side, and an eagle's face for each of the four. In the tenth chapter, where the same vision is repeated, verse fourteen describes their faces as having four faces: the face of a cherub, the face of a man, the face of a lion, and the face of an eagle. Where in the first chapter it is called the face of a bull, here it is specifically called the face of a cherub, indicating that cherubim were commonly known to have the face of a bull. Therefore, if the calves made by Jeroboam were imitations of the cherubim on the Ark, as Dr. Moncæius of the Sorbonne and Caffarellus after him believed, Jeroboam would have thought even less that the supreme deity was a bull or similar to a bull in form, as these calves were only mystical symbols of divine presence.

XLII. The Doctors of the Roman Church say that even if Jeroboam intended to worship the true God in the calves, he nevertheless gravely sinned because he sacrificed to those calves, as sacrifices should be offered only to God and are a principal act of Latria. However, this reasoning does not align well with their own hypotheses. They teach, as shown in the preceding theses, that nothing prohibits the images of divine persons from being worshiped with Latria, the supreme worship due to God, provided it is done not directly but indirectly, not absolutely but relatively, not primarily but only secondarily and concomitantly. If it is conceded that the Israelites worshiped the true God in the calves, it is evident that all that worship was relative and not absolute; and the calves were worshiped not for themselves but for God, not primarily but only secondarily and concomitantly. If the images of God can be worshiped with other acts of Latria, both internal and external, in the manner already described, why could they not also be worshiped with sacrifices and offerings of victims in the same way? Namely, improperly, or indirectly, or concomitantly, which is how, and no other way, according to the given hypothesis, the Israelites worshiped the calves.

XLIII. Vazquez, along with other Scholastics, offers a reason why images cannot be worshiped with sacrifices, not even indirectly or relatively; namely, because in sacrifices there is a profession of divine omnipotence and dominion. However, if this reason is valid, as it indeed is, it also follows that other acts of Latria (worship) cannot be offered to images, not even relatively or concomitantly. For no act of Latria exists without including the acknowledgment and profession of some divine power and excellence, without which it could not be called an act of Latria. According to the Roman School's use, Latria differs from Dulia in that Dulia is the honor due to created excellence, while Latria is the honor due to uncreated excellence. If the acknowledgment of some divine excellence, present in other acts of Latria, does not prevent them from being offered relatively to images, why would the profession of divine omnipotence and dominion in sacrifices prevent it?

XLIV. Indeed, the profession of divine omnipotence in sacrifices and the immolation of victims is no greater than in acts of hope, whereby we expect our salvation from God. Yet, according to Thomas Aquinas, the principal teacher of the Roman School, we place our hope of salvation in the cross, which is a type of image. He proves that the cross on which Christ was crucified, and even its representations, are to be worshiped with Latria because we offer to it the worship of Latria, in which we place our hope of salvation. According to his view, we place our hope of salvation in the cross, as the Roman Church sings, "Hail, O cross, our only hope, in this time of passion, increase righteousness for the pious and grant pardon to the guilty."

XLV. But according to the truth of the matter, not only is it not permissible to offer sacrifices to images, but not even the smallest part of religious worship should be given to them, as can be clearly inferred from the story in the eighteenth chapter of the Second Book of Kings, where it is said that King Hezekiah of Judah broke the bronze serpent that Moses had made, because the children of Israel were burning incense to it, and for this reason, the king's piety is commended.

XLVI. For if there ever existed an image deserving any veneration, it was undoubtedly that serpent. Moses, a man of great stature, had made it by God's express command; it had been an instrument of notable deliverance for the Israelites in the desert, its memory was preserved among the people, and it was a distinguished type of Christ who was to come and be lifted up on the cross. Yet Hezekiah, being moved by God, not only forbade the Jews to worship it but, out of indignation that the children of Israel were burning incense to it, he broke it into pieces. How, then, does it agree with God's will that the Second Council of Nicaea decreed that images should be approached with reverence, offerings of incense, and candles? And what small part of the honor given to the images of Christ and the saints in the Roman Church consists of the burning of incense and the offering of candles?

XLVII. Finally, if the commandment prohibiting the making and worshiping of any likeness of things in heaven or on earth only forbids us to regard images as gods and worship

them with absolute adoration as gods, it would follow that this commandment did not forbid the idol worship instituted by the wise men of the nations. As we indicated at the beginning of this discussion, they distinguished images from the deities themselves and did not worship them with absolute adoration but with worship that, in the minds of the worshipers, referred to the deities of whom the images were symbols.

XLVIII. Celsus often protests this in Origen, especially in Book 7, where he says it is ridiculous wisdom to despise statues because stone, wood, bronze, or gold polished by this or that person is not God. He adds, "For who else but a complete fool would believe these statues to be gods, not the statues dedicated to the gods?" Similarly, as Arnobius testifies in Book 6 against the Gentiles, the defenders of idols used to say, "The ancients were not ignorant that the signs have no divinity and no sense; but for the untamed and unlearned common people, they beneficially formed them with this design, that by such visible representations, they might drive away the harshness of their minds and, thinking they were in the presence of gods, might lay aside impious deeds and be transformed into human virtues."

XLIX. Therefore, they professed to worship the invisible God in their images, saying, "We worship visible images for the honor of the invisible God." This is found in the author of the "Recognitions," attributed to Clement of Rome, in Book 5. Similarly, Lactantius says, "We do not fear them themselves, but those whom the images represent and to whom they are consecrated" (Institutions, Book 2, Chapter 2).

L. Whatever may be said of the rude and foolish populace who perhaps among the pagans sometimes revered images as if they were the deities themselves, at least those who established and defended pagan superstition did not think, as Arnobius says, that the materials of gold and silver were gods and sacred deities in themselves, but worshipped the gods through these images and venerated the divine presence in them. Therefore, even if they sinned against God's commandment, "You shall have no other gods before me," when they joined other false gods to God, they cannot be said to have transgressed the commandment prohibiting the making and worshiping of any likeness if we are only forbidden by it to regard and worship images as gods. Nevertheless, despite their explanations and excuses, as reported by the ancient doctors of the Church, they are considered to have gravely violated this prohibition.

THEOLOGICAL THESES ON THE Worship and Veneration of Angels and Saints.

In which the Doctrine of the Church and the Roman School is Explained.

Thesis I

First of all, the Doctors of the Roman Church, especially Bellarmine, observe that worship in general comprises three different acts. First, an act of intellect, by which we apprehend the excellence of the one we worship. Second, an act of will, by which we internally incline ourselves to them, and intend to perform some interior or exterior act to demonstrate their excellence and our subjection. Third, an exterior act, by which we bow our head, bend the knee, or show some other sign of subjection. (On the Beatitude of the Saints, Book 1, Chapter 12)

II. Secondly, they observe that there are as many kinds of worship or honor as there are kinds of excellence; because honor or worship is due to a person because of their excellence. But with regard to the present topic, there are three kinds of excellence. The first is divine and infinite excellence, which corresponds to the first kind of worship, called Latria by the theologians of the Roman Church. The second is human or natural excellence, which is found in human virtues, dignities, ranks, etc., and corresponds to the second kind of worship, which can be called civil worship and a kind of human observance. The third is a certain excellence between divine and human, such as the grace and glory of the Saints, which are supernatural gifts; and to this corresponds the third kind of worship, called Dulia in the Roman School.

III. Furthermore, since the Blessed Virgin, as the Mother of the Son of God, surpasses other Saints to the extent that, according to the opinion of the Doctors, she can be called our Lady and Queen, which applies to other Saints only very imperfectly, the Scholastics divide this third kind, which they call Dulia, into proper Dulia and Hyperdulia, assigning the latter to the Blessed Virgin and the former to other Saints. Although the common practice is to use the terms Dulia and Hyperdulia to distinguish this specific worship from other kinds, this usage has not yet been officially sanctioned and defined by the Councils of the Roman Church. Therefore, Martin Perez, a Spanish bishop, in his work on Traditions, as reported by Bellarmine, testifies that he does not much approve of the name Dulia taken for the worship of the Saints, since Dulia properly signifies servitude, and we are not servants of the Saints, but fellow servants.

IV. Indeed, even those who most approve of this use of the terms Latria and Dulia as employed in the Roman School acknowledge that those terms are confused in profane writers and in common usage; indeed, in the Sacred Scripture among Greek interpreters, Dulia sometimes refers to human servitude; often, however, both in the New and Old Testaments, it is used for the worship of the supreme God alone. However, they contend that the Theological School has not without reason devised this distinction between Latria and Dulia. For when there is a manifest distinction between the worship of God and the Saints, it was appropriate to designate each worship with a distinct term to avoid equivocation. They also believe it was appropriate to choose the terms Latria and Dulia for this purpose; because Latria in the New Testament is used only to signify the worship of God, whereas Dulia is used for all kinds of servitude, both to God and to humans.

V. Whatever the case may be, just as it was permissible for the ancient Church to invent new terms against old heretics, such as the terms "Trinity," etc., so it was also permissible for the later Church to invent certain new terms or at least to use terms previously used in another sense against later heretics. Moreover, the fact that we are not properly the servants of the Saints, but fellow servants, does not prevent the term *Dulia* from being apt to signify the observance with which we venerate the Saints, because in the Scriptures *Dulia* is not only taken for the servitude of slaves but also for honorary subjection, as when the Apostle says, "By charity serve one another," (Gal. 5). Although we are not slaves of the Saints, we are in a certain imperfect sense their servants, in that they move and assist us to good works by their example and intercession with God. Furthermore, due to the majesty and glory they possess, we who are still pilgrims from the Lord are much inferior to them.

VI. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman School observe that these three kinds of worship are not univocal, that is, of the same nature, nor are they contained under the same univocal genus; but they are only analogous due to a certain proportional similarity, which exists between divine excellence and the worship due to it, and created excellence and the worship corresponding to it. Just as excellence is not said univocally and in the same manner of the excellence of God and creatures, so they teach that the worship due to excellence should not be said univocally of the worship of God and creatures.

VII. If someone asks whether the worship due to the Saints should be called religious or not, they respond that religion, strictly and properly speaking, signifies a special virtue that has for its object the worship of God and is distinct in species from the virtue with which we venerate the Saints: which is a kind of observance of another order. However, sometimes the term Religion is taken more broadly, namely for any virtue by which we worship God, or the friends of God, and other sacred things, and which is distinct from political and purely human worship. In the former sense, they deny that the worship of the Saints is an act of religion, but in the latter sense, they concede it. Or, what amounts to the same thing, they say the Saints should be venerated with the worship of religion, not primarily but secondarily.

VIII. Similarly, when it is asked whether the Saints are to be adored, and whether the worship due to the Saints should be called adoration or not, they respond in the same way: adoration is sometimes taken strictly for the worship of *Latria*, which is appropriate to God alone; and in this sense, the Saints are not to be adored. However, adoration is sometimes taken more broadly and extended to human worship and the worship due to creatures, and in this broader sense, the Saints should be adored, and their worship can be called adoration.

IX. However, it should be noted here that among the Scholastic Doctors, the term adoration has a stricter and broader meaning. In the broader sense, adoration includes all the worship that is to be given to either God or the Saints, but sometimes it is taken more strictly for certain specific acts of worship due to either God or the Saints. Thus it is that Scholastics

sometimes include sacrifice, the administration, and reception of Sacraments, petitions for grace and forgiveness, the beating of the breast, the construction of temples, the institution of feasts, vows, and oaths among the acts of adoration. Sometimes they want adoration to be a special act of religion distinct from sacrifice, prayer, vows, oaths, etc. As can be seen in Thomas Aquinas in the second part of the second question 84, where he assigns the first place among the external acts of Latria to adoration, and by adoration, he understands that by which one presents his body to God to be venerated. Therefore, adoration taken in this strict sense consists of external signs of submission exhibited from an internal affection to the one we wish to worship. Such signs are prostration of the body, kneeling, or something similar.

X. Moreover, they teach that Latria, which is the worship proper to God, is easily and best distinguished from Dulia, which is the worship due to creatures concerning internal acts. For internal Latria is a certain supreme prostration and inclination of the will, with the apprehension of God as the first principle and last end, and thus the highest good, which is the kind of adoration appropriate only to God. Internal Dulia, however, is a much lesser inclination of the will, with the apprehension of a certain excellence more than human indeed but much below the divine.

XI. But as for external acts, they say it is not easy to distinguish Dulia from Latria; because almost all the external acts with which either worship is exhibited are common to both Dulia and Latria. However, they exclude sacrifice and what pertains to it, such as temples, altars, and priests, which they believe belong solely to the worship of Latria. For it is not lawful for anyone to offer a sacrifice except to God, or to dedicate temples, altars, and priests.

XII. Although the Doctors of the Roman Church do not want sacrifices to be offered to the Saints, they consider it permissible to offer sacrifices in honor of the Saints, not to the Saints themselves, but to God. Therefore, it is common in the Roman Church to celebrate Masses in honor of the Saints. Although according to the doctrine of that Church, the Mass is properly called a sacrifice, in which the true body of Christ is daily immolated and offered to God the Father. Hence they call Masses by the names of the Saints, such as the Mass of Saint Roch, the Mass of Saint Anthony, etc. They call Masses in this way where there is a particular commemoration of a Saint, and through his merit and intercession, God's help is implored, and solemn thanks are given to God for the glory granted to this or that Saint.

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through his merit and intercession, God's help is implored, and solemn thanks are given to God for the glory granted to this or that Saint.

XIV. Furthermore, although sacrifices are not offered to the Saints in the Roman Church, various offerings are made to them, and it is customary to consecrate gifts to them in memory of the benefits believed to have been received from them, or obtained through their intercession. Many such offerings can be seen in the churches and chapels named after them.

XV. Even though the Doctors of the Roman Church deny that temples should be built for the Saints, it is nonetheless customary to name and refer to churches by the names of Saints, such as the Church of the Blessed Virgin, the Church of Saint Peter, Paul, Francis, etc. Regarding this matter, not all Doctors of that Church explain their views in the same way. First, some, as reported by Bellarmine, believe that sacred buildings cannot properly be erected except to God, just as sacrifices cannot be offered except to God. However, since many temples are consecrated to God, they distinguish among themselves by naming one after one Saint and another after another Saint; not because they are erected to them, but because the memories of those Saints are particularly honored there, and they are invoked as patrons in those places. Thus, when a temple or sacred building is called, for example, the Church of Saint Peter, the meaning is, according to them, that the temple is dedicated to God in memory and name of Saint Peter; or that it is dedicated to God so that God may be prayed to through the intercession of Saint Peter. Similarly, a certain Mass is called the Mass of Saint Peter, not because the sacrifice is offered to Peter, but because it is offered to God in thanksgiving for the glory given to Saint Peter, and at the same time, Peter is invoked as a patron and advocate before God. (On the Cult of the Saints, Book 3, Chapter 4)

XVI. But Bellarmine himself holds a different view; for in the chapter just cited, his fourth proposition is that sacred houses can be properly erected not only to God but also to the Saints, for two reasons: first, as a temple, second, as a basilica. A sacred house has the nature of a temple insofar as it is erected for offering sacrifices; it is called a basilica insofar as it is erected to adorn the tomb of a Saint and to provide convenience for those visiting the Saint's relics. He acknowledges that it would be idolatry to erect sacred houses to the Saints as temples, but denies that it is idolatry to erect basilicas to them. Just as, he says, it is not idolatry to donate gold or silver reliquaries to the Saints, in which their relics are enclosed; so, a basilica is nothing other than a large reliquary in which smaller reliquaries and tombs are enclosed. Hence, he concludes, it is one thing to say the Mass of Saint Peter, and another to say the Basilica of Saint Peter, since the Mass is not offered to Saint Peter in any way, neither primarily nor secondarily. But the basilica is truly built for Saint Peter, if not primarily, then secondarily. Therefore, he maintains that sacred houses are truly and properly built for the Saints, not under the aspect of a temple, but as a basilica or memorial.

XVII. However, the Roman Pontifical, dealing with the dedication or consecration of sacred buildings, does not designate them by the name of Temple or Basilica but simply calls them Churches and under this name says they are dedicated in honor and name of the Saints. For example, on page 173 of the Paris edition of 1615, it orders that in the Litany recited in such solemn dedication, the name of the Saint in whose honor and name the Church is dedicated should be mentioned in its place. Later, the Pontiff repeatedly prays to God to purify and bless the Church which he consecrates in memory of this or that Saint.

XVIII. In common usage and popular books, which are widely used among the Roman faithful, without any scruple, temples are said to be dedicated and consecrated to the Saints, especially the Blessed Virgin Mary. Thus, in a popular booklet titled "Merbodius on the Veneration and Honor of the Virgin Mary," authored by Alexis de Salo Capuchin, chapter eight begins with these words: "The Church, always led by the Holy Spirit, has at all times erected and consecrated temples and altars to the Mother of God." And later, on page 262 of the same book, it says, "Christians build temples, erect altars, and consecrate vows to her." Similarly, in the Manual of the Sodality printed in Liège in 1624, the following words are found on page 110: "We worship and venerate her with temples, oratories, and altars, which were indeed first erected to God, but in honor and memory of his most dear mother."

XIX. Moreover, what Bellarmine said earlier, that sacred houses are built for the Saints to adorn their tombs and for the convenience of those who visit their relics, and that basilicas named after Saints are large reliquaries in which smaller reliquaries and tombs are enclosed; this should not be taken as if, according to Bellarmine, it is not lawful to build a sacred house for a Saint unless their relics are present there, or as if a sacred house could only be called dedicated to a Saint because it is designated for preserving their relics. For Bellarmine himself, in the same place explaining his mind, teaches that basilicas can be built for the Saints for the purpose that those who come there, reminded by the very name of the basilica, may worship and pray to the Saint whose name it bears and in whose honor and memory it is said to be consecrated.

XX. Furthermore, he maintains that sacred houses can be built for the Saints, not only where their proper relics are found, such as bones and clothes, but also in places where they lived or performed some notable deed. For this reason, he says many churches have been erected in honor of the Blessed Mary and even of the Angels, whose relics cannot be had, namely in places where they appeared and performed some miracles. Indeed, he adds, as we commonly see, basilicas can be built for the Saints to preserve their memory, either by an image or by the name alone. For many churches are called by the name of the Blessed Virgin and are dedicated to her, although no relics of hers are seen there, nor is it reported that she performed any miracle in that place before.

XXI. Regarding the altars, which are also called by the names of the Saints and are said to be consecrated to them, Bellarmine similarly notes that the same stone is called an altar,

insofar as sacrifices are offered on it to God, and is called a tomb or sepulcher, insofar as it touched the bones of some Martyr. For all altars are considered the tombs of the Saints. Thus, altars are said to be dedicated to the Saints, not under the aspect of altars but under the aspect of tombs. For it would be idolatry to erect altars to the Saints, but not idolatry to erect stone tombs for them.

XXII. But the practice of the Roman Church does not align well with this doctrine and observation of Bellarmine. For how many altars are dedicated to the Blessed Virgin in that Church, called by her name, and yet are not her tomb or sepulcher, indeed where no relics of hers are said to be kept?

XXIII. But what is most noteworthy is that the Roman Pontifical, which describes the rites of blessings and consecrations customarily performed by Bishops, a book sanctioned by the public authority of the Roman Pontiffs, indicates that altars are dedicated to the Saints in a manner quite different from what Bellarmine established. For in that book, the consecration of the altar as a certain tomb is separate from its consecration as an altar. Indeed, as a tomb, it is consecrated with these words: "May this Sepulcher be consecrated and sanctified in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." But when the same stone is consecrated as an altar, the Pontiff uses these words: "May this altar be sanctified in honor of Almighty God, and of the glorious Virgin Mary, and of all the Saints, and in the name and memory of Saint N., in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit." (Paris Edition, 1615, p. 229)

XXIV. It should be noted that any altar is indeed sanctified in the name and memory of a particular Saint, from whom it takes its name, and in respect to whom it can be considered a tomb, as Bellarmine says. However, all altars are sanctified not only in honor of Almighty God but also in honor of the Virgin Mary and all the Saints, to whom the notion of a tomb does not pertain. According to Bellarmine's recent teaching, it is only under this condition that it is permissible to dedicate altars to the Saints.

XXV. Although it is not permissible, according to the Doctors of the Roman Church, to institute priests for the Saints, it is nevertheless customary in that Church to establish confraternities and sodalities in honor of the Saints, especially the Virgin Mary. These confraternities dedicate themselves to their worship and veneration and, according to their particular institution, adore and invoke them.

XXVI. With regard to feasts, the Doctors of the Roman Church usually consider them among the things proper to the worship of God. However, it is customary in the Roman Church to institute feast days in honor of the Saints. To reconcile this, many of them say that feasts called the feasts of the Saints are not dedicated to the Saints properly but to God in memory and honor of the Saints. Just as temples are consecrated only to God but in honor and memory of the Saints. Similarly, the Mass sacrifice is offered only to God, but this does not prevent the Mass from being celebrated in honor of the Saints, as previously explained.

XXVII. However, others, particularly Bellarmine, maintain that the honor of feast days pertains immediately and terminatively to the Saints as well, although primarily to God and only secondarily to the Saints. They say this kind of worship is *Dulia*, not *Latria*, and is therefore an act of religion; but religion not as the name of a special virtue that disposes man to the worship of God but as a general name. This can be seen in Bellarmine's work, *On the Cult of the Saints*, Book 3, Chapter 16.

XXVIII. The Doctors of the Roman Church also consider the vows made to the Saints as part of their worship. It is very common in that Church to make vows to the Saints, especially the Blessed Virgin, which the Doctors argue is permissible. However, since theologians place vows among the acts of religion owed to God alone, there arises the difficulty of how vows can be made to the Saints without idolatry. According to Thomas's doctrine, the answer is that vows are not properly made to the Saints: vows made to the Saints include two promises; one to the Saints, which is not formally a vow but the matter of a vow; the other to God, which is formally a vow. For example, when someone says, "I vow to the Blessed Mary that I will make a pilgrimage to such a place," he promises this pilgrimage to the Virgin, but this promise is not a vow; and at the same time, implicitly and tacitly, he promises to God that he will fulfill the promise made to the Virgin, and this second promise is truly a vow.

XXIX. However, this solution does not satisfy Bellarmine, because this observation of Thomas can indeed be applied to vows that include a promise made to a mortal man. For example, when someone vows obedience to a prelate, the vow is really made to God alone, although obedience is promised to the prelate. For in that vow, he intends to worship and honor not the prelate but God. But when someone vows fasting or a pilgrimage to the Saints, he intends to honor the Saints religiously. Furthermore, some promises made to the Saints appear to be not only the matter of a vow but a formal vow. Thus, when someone vows to join a religious order, he formulates the vow in this way: "I vow to God, and the Blessed Mary, and all the Saints, to obey such and such a prelate." Here, only the promise made to the prelate is the matter of the vow, while the other promise made to God and the Saints is formally the vow itself.

XXX. Therefore, Bellarmine, following Cajetan, answers differently, namely that vows are made to the Saints not as creatures participating in reason but insofar as they are gods by participation, and as God dwells in them by glory, so that vows said to be made to the Saints are made to God in the Saints; just as curses directed at the Saints are called blasphemies because God is cursed in the Saints.

XXXI. Nevertheless, Bellarmine maintains that those vows made to God in the Saints do not terminate solely to God but also to the Saints, so that they are indeed made to them, just as alms given to Christ in the poor are truly given to the poor themselves. To show that there is no idolatry in this, he says that the vow is not made to the Saints and God in the same way; something is truly and properly promised to the Saints just as it is promised to God, but not with

the same end or intention. For when someone vows and promises something to God, he does so as a sign of gratitude to the first principle of all goods and in recognition of the benefit received from Him as the first author, and therefore that promise is an act of Latria; but something is promised to the Saints as a sign of gratitude only to mediators and intercessors through whom we have received benefits from God; and therefore that promise is not an act of Latria but of Dulia.

XXXII. Bellarmine considers both promises, the one made to the Saints and the one made to God, to be correctly called vows: namely according to the usage of Scripture, in which he admits a vow is said to be made only to God; but according to the usage of the Church. According to which, a vow is a general term, used analogically for promises made to God and the Saints. Among these vows, some distinguish that a vow made to God is absolute, while the one made to the Saints is relative: namely, because although it terminates in a way to the Saints, as has been said, it ultimately refers to the glory and honor of God.

XXXIII. Moreover, Bellarmine's doctrine, already explained, about vows made to the Saints and directed to them, is common and popular in the Roman Church, as it is taught in books commonly used by the Roman faithful. For example, a book called the Manual of the Sodality of the Blessed Mary states: "To this we give honor with the vows made to her, not only as we vow to God out of love and reverence for his mother Mary, calling her as a witness to the obligation by which we bind ourselves to God, and establishing and hoping for the fulfillment of the vow by her glorious and powerful intercession, but also by terminating the vow and promise in her." (Chapter 2, part 3, number 7)

XXXIV. Moreover, the theologians of the Roman Church also consider an oath as an act of Latria or Religion, that is, worship due to God alone. And yet in the Roman Church, it is customary to swear by the Saints and by their relics. To excuse this, they say with Thomas Aquinas that one should not swear except by God, primarily and principally; but it is permissible to swear by creatures, at least secondarily, insofar as divine truth shines in them. Thus, they swear by the Saints, not according to themselves, but as they believed and observed divine truth. This can be seen in Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2.2, question 89, article 6.

XXXV. But among the acts of worship due to the Saints, in the Roman Church, particular commendation is given to what is called adoration, which consists of external signs of submission and reverence arising from an internal and true affection of the soul, such as the prostration or bowing of the entire body, genuflection, uncovering of the head, and similar actions. This is the adoration which Gabriel Vasquez contends and tries to prove in several ways that the Saints are to be adored. (In the third part of Thomas, first volume, disputation 97, where the second chapter begins with these words: "The opposite Catholic opinion, confirmed by the perpetual use and tradition of the Church, is that the Saints are owed sacred adoration.")

XXXVI. Particularly, those popular books that the Doctors and Rectors of the Roman Church put into the hands of the faithful strongly commend both internal and external adoration

of the Blessed Virgin; and they require their devotees to testify to their reverence for the holy Virgin by frequent bowing and genuflection, both privately at home and publicly in churches. This can be seen especially in the *Method of Venerating and Honoring the Virgin*, published in Italian by Alexis de Salo, a Capuchin, which was later translated into French and frequently printed with many approvals from Doctors. In the Preface, the author testifies that his aim is to teach many devout and excellent ways of revering and adoring with the deepest (as he says) reverences, that is, by bowing of the body or genuflection, the Queen of Heaven, our lady and mistress. And later he promises first to show the excellence of such adorations. Second, how pleasing they are to the holy Virgin. Third, he will prove with four reasons that she is most worthy of being adored. Finally, he will deal with the way in which these adorations or genuflections are to be practiced and can be devoutly performed both internally and externally.

XXXVII. However, although the Doctors of the Roman Church teach that the adoration given to the Saints pertains to *Dulia* and not to *Latria*, some of them question whether the Virgin Mary can also be adored with *Latria*. And to that question, they answer affirmatively. This can be seen particularly in the works of the Jesuit Francisco Mendoza. When the question is posed, "Can the Blessed Virgin be adored with the adoration of *Latria*?" he notes that three kinds of dignity can be observed in the Virgin. The first dignity consists in her holiness, for which she should be venerated with the adoration of *Dulia*. The second dignity is that she is the Mother of God, for which she should be adored with the adoration of *Hyperdulia*. The third is that she touched our Lord Jesus Christ, for which reason he considers the Virgin to be adored with the adoration of *Latria*. Just as, according to Thomas, the cross and nails and other things that touched the body of Christ should be venerated with the adoration of *Latria*. After considering many objections, he concludes the question as follows: Nevertheless, it must be said that the Blessed Virgin can be adored with the adoration of *Latria* because of her physical contact. Thomas does not absolutely deny this, but only when there is a risk of scandal or idolatry, as his interpreter Cajetan explains. Therefore, if someone is capable of discerning the reasons for adoration and avoiding all scandal, he could adore the Blessed Virgin with the adoration of *Latria* because of her contact with Christ. Although this adoration of *Latria* is not primary and absolute, it is secondary and relative, stemming from the same disposition of religion. (In *Virid.*, Book 2, on Sacred Flowers, Problem 4, as referred by Charles Drelincourt in *On the Honor Due to the Blessed Virgin*, Volume 1, page 355.)

XXXVIII. The doctrine of the Jesuit Francisco Suarez, a highly renowned figure, aligns with this. Inquiring into the primary reason why the Blessed Virgin should be adored, he teaches that there can be three reasons for adoration in the Virgin. The first reason for which the Virgin can be adored, he says, is extrinsic, similar to the cross or the nails of Christ. Just as the cross touched Christ and was an instrument of our redemption, so the Blessed Virgin most perfectly touched Christ and cooperated in our redemption. Thus, the Blessed Virgin is adorably extrinsically, that is, insofar as she touched Christ, so that the entire reason for this adoration is Christ. He speaks of the adoration of *Latria*, at least relatively and secondarily, according to this

reasoning. Therefore, he immediately adds: And yet it should be observed that, although this reason considered speculatively is sufficient for the Virgin to be adored, practically or in use, she should not be adored in this way, especially in the common and public adoration of the Church, not because this is intrinsically evil, for it truly is not. For if someone is capable of discerning the reasons for adoration, avoiding all danger and scandal, there is no disorder or malice in such adoration. But he says the common use of this adoration should be avoided, both because of the risk that someone might attribute divine excellence to the Virgin, and because the greater honor is given to the person adored when she is worshiped absolutely for her intrinsic and proper excellence with an adoration inferior to Latria than if she were adored with relative Latria because of her contact with the divine person. Therefore, he wants the Virgin to be commonly adored for other reasons, namely both for her intrinsic holiness and for her dignity as the Mother of God; which corresponds to a worship inferior to Latria and distinct from Latria. (In the third part of Thomas, question 37, article 4, disputation 22, section 2.)

XXXIX. There is no need to be surprised that such eminent figures in the Roman School, like Vasquez, Suarez, Mendoza, and many others, openly assert as a Catholic truth that the Saints are to be adored; although many in the Roman Church deny this and many others affirm that God alone is to be adored and that they worship no one other than God. For there is no contradiction between them: those who deny that the Saints are to be adored understand this in the sense of the highest and absolute adoration, which belongs to God alone. But those who say the Saints are to be adored mean a form of adoration lower than the highest, which the former do not deny to the Saints.

XL. But the chief part of the worship that is given to holy men and angels in the Roman Church consists in their invocation and prayers directed to them, both vocally and with the mere affection of the heart and internal speech of the mind. To accurately understand the doctrine of the Roman School on this matter, it should be noted that their theologians generally assume that the Saints reigning with Christ do not know everything that happens here on earth, but at least all that pertains to and contributes to their own beatitude. They believe that it contributes to the beatitude of the Saints to know the worship given to them and the prayers and petitions by which the faithful on earth seek their help. Therefore, these theologians are certain that the deceased Saints perceive and understand the prayers of the living directed to them.

XLI. How the Saints hear and perceive the prayers of the living is not certain or defined among them, but various opinions exist. Costerus, in his *Enchiridion*, says there is no doubt that the Saints in heaven know what we do on earth through the intermediaries of angels and those who migrate from this life; especially that divine revelation makes known to them what is done by men to promote their glory. For God, who desires the perfect joy of His saints, hides nothing from them that could in any way affect or complete this joy. Such are the prayers poured out to them by the living and all that is undertaken for their glory.

XLII. However, according to his view, things are revealed to the absent differently than to the Saints enjoying eternal glory. To the former, secrets are made known by inspiration; to the latter, by the contemplation of the divine essence, in which all things are seen, like in a mirror, and are much more perfectly known than in themselves. He added that it is not unreasonable to admit that the Saints in heaven see our deeds on earth. Since they are not impeded by any corporeal bulk, neither the distance of places nor the bodies interposed prevent them from hearing our prayers, seeing our actions, and thus seeing in our hearts and thoughts what we wish to be manifest to them. Just as without an external voice or sensible sign, angels speak to each other and to souls and are heard and understood in turn; so men by their will alone can reveal internal desires and thoughts to spirits, both good and evil, and be understood by them, despite being clothed in a body or separated by any distance, however great. The thoughts and mind of the unwilling, however, are known to no one but God alone, who searches hearts and reins and to whom God chooses to reveal. (Cap. 12. on the Veneration of Saints in the explanation of the second proposition.)

XLIII. Indeed, Henri Holden, a Doctor of Paris, affirms that it can be demonstrated by natural reason that any pure spirit perfectly knows and understands the nature, motions, and actions of all corporeal things. Thus, he attributes gross ignorance to those who think that the Saints reigning in heaven do not hear the prayers of mortals. (In the Analysis of Divine Faith, Book 2, Chapter 7.)

XLIV. However, Bellarmine considers two opinions to be the most probable among the many on this subject. One is of those who say that the Saints see in God, from the beginning of their beatitude, all things that pertain to them in any way, and therefore also our prayers directed to them. The other is of those who think that the Saints do not see our prayers in the Word from the beginning of their beatitude, but that these are revealed to them by God only when we make them. Just as the Prophets knew the future by God's revelation, and many Saints on earth had the gift from God to know the thoughts of men and even the most hidden deeds. The former opinion seems to Bellarmine simply more probable, while the latter is more suitable for convincing heretics. (On the Beatitude of Saints, Book 1, Chapter 20.)

XLV. Secondly, the Doctors of the Roman Church assume that the Saints in heaven not only know the needs of the living but also pray to God with greater charity for their salvation than they did on earth. They not only pray in general for the Militant Church but also specifically for the needs of individuals who seek their help and patronage. Therefore, the Saints can rightly be called our intercessors, advocates with God, and mediators, not of redemption, which belongs to Christ alone, but of intercession.

XLVI. They note, however, that the Saints do not intercede for us directly with God, but their intercession relies on the merit of Christ, through whom they ask for benefits for us from God. These are the words of Bellarmine: "The Saints are not our immediate intercessors with

God, but whatever they obtain for us from God, they obtain through Christ." (Book 1, on the Beatitude of Saints, Chapter 17, Proposition 2.)

XLVII. Furthermore, although the theologians of the Roman School teach that there is no mediator of redemption except Christ, whose death and obedience rendered to God the Father is the only price by which we are redeemed from eternal death, they nevertheless maintain that the Saints can help us not only by their prayers but also by their merits. Not that by their good works they have merited for us grace and salvation, and other benefits we need, as Christ has merited for us; but because God is often moved and induced by their holy works and the piety and charity they have excelled in to grant us various benefits, though He is not bound by any right or special promise to do so. Hence, in the Liturgy of the Mass, they are accustomed to pray to God through the merits of the Saints whose relics they believe they possess, thereby presenting to God the outstanding deeds the Saints have done and suffered for His glory, so that He may be more easily and willingly moved to grant what they ask of Him.

XLVIII. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman Church also hold that the faithful living are governed and directed not only by angels but also by the spirits of blessed men. Bellarmine seeks to prove this in many ways in his work on the Beatitude of Saints (Book 1, Chapter 18). Similarly, Costerus believes it is clear from Scriptures that the Saints reigning in heaven with Christ care for and administer earthly affairs, having authority to compel, restrain, and punish the impious and to rescue the pious from their hands. He adds that the Saints, by the benefit of their glory, can accomplish whatever kings can with their power, the wealthy with their riches, and the wise with their wisdom. Therefore, he argues, if kings defeat enemies with their armies, the wealthy help the needy, and doctors heal with their art; the Saints can do these things no less than angels, one of whom destroyed 185,000 in one night, another restored Tobit's sight, took money from Gabael, and enriched the entire family at the marriage of his son, and another liberated Peter from prison, etc. (In the Enchiridion of Controversies, Chapter 12, in the explanation of the fourth proposition.)

XLIX. Furthermore, it is customary in the Roman Church for individual kingdoms, cities, and villages, as well as various guilds and professional groups, to have a particular patron Saint to whom they especially commend themselves. Thus, Luke is considered the patron of doctors, Ivo of advocates, Crispin of shoemakers. Spain has long taken the Apostle James, and the Dominions of Venice the Evangelist Mark as their patrons. Similarly, in various other cases. Moreover, it is also customary to turn to specific Saints for help in certain diseases, dangers, and needs. For example, those in danger at sea seek the help of the Apostle Paul and Nicholas of Myra, Margaret is called upon by women in labor, Roch by those suffering from the plague, Apollonia by those with toothaches; each is believed to provide particular help in these situations.

L. However, the Doctors of that Church warn that all Saints can intercede equally for any needs, and it is free for each faithful person to turn to any Saint to obtain any necessary blessings with their help. It should not be thought that God has assigned specific duties among the Saints in such a way that one is responsible for one matter and another for another, but rather that people of various nations and professions, and in various needs, turn to different Saints based on occasions such as the art or profession the Saint practiced, the type of suffering and death they gloriously endured, the particular gifts of divine grace in which they excelled, a notable miracle they performed either before or after their death, or simply based on some allusion or affinity of names. For example, doctors have chosen Luke as their patron because he practiced medicine. Sailors turn to Paul and Nicholas because, by Paul's favor, God saved the lives of 276 people from shipwreck, and similarly, it is said that God miraculously saved a ship from shipwreck at the prayers of Bishop Nicholas of Myra. This can be seen in Cardinal Perron's work, refuting the response of the King of Great Britain (Book 1, Chapter 3), and also in Jaubert, Archbishop of Arles (Volume 2, against Molineus' Shield, Chapter 1, Section 24).

LI. And these are the foundations on which the doctors of the Roman School build the invocation of saints. However, how the saints should be invoked, and what the difference is between the invocation that God claims for Himself and the one by which we implore the help of the saints, is explained in the Catechism issued by the decree of the Council of Trent. It states: "For we do not invoke God and His saints in the same way; we pray to God that He Himself may either give us good things or deliver us from evil; but we ask the saints, who are gracious to God, to take up our cause so that they may obtain for us from God the things we need." Hence, we use two different formulas; for God, we say, "Have mercy on us, hear us;" for the saint, we say, "Pray for us." Catech. Rom. part 4. cap. 6. sect. 1. num. 3.

LII. Similarly, Bellarmine asserts, "We are not permitted to ask the saints to grant us glory, grace, and other means to happiness as if they were the authors of divine benefits. Therefore, according to him, we should ask nothing from the saints except that they may obtain for us from God what is useful to us." *De Sanct. Beatitudine* lib. 1. cap. 17. Cardinal Perron calls the former invocation, by which someone is invoked as the author of good things, an absolute prayer. The latter, by which someone is asked to pray for us, is called a relative prayer, which terminates not in the saint but in God. And he teaches that the former should be reserved for God alone, while only the latter should be used for the saints. *Adversus Regis Magnæ Britanniae responsum* lib. 5. cap. 1.

LIII. Nevertheless, in the public worship of the Church, many prayers are directed to the saints, in which they are not simply asked to pray for us but to have mercy on us, to deliver us from the evils of body and soul, and to grant us the good things we need. Thus, in the hymn "Lux mundi beatissima," these words are addressed to the Blessed Virgin, "We beseech you to be present, with our supplicant voices, Come now, sweet Lady, Remove our troubles, Confer heavenly gifts." And in the hymn "Ave Maris Stella," this prayer is made to her, "Unique Virgin,

Among all gentle, Free us from sin, Make us gentle and chaste; Grant a pure life, Prepare a safe journey, That seeing Jesus, We may always rejoice." In the hymn "Memento salutis author," these words are found, "Mary, Mother of grace, Mother of mercy, Protect us from the enemy, And receive us at the hour of death." Finally, in the antiphon "Alma Redemptoris Mater," Mary is addressed as follows: "Virgin before and after, From Gabriel's mouth taking That 'Hail,' have mercy on sinners." In the Litanies, not indeed received by the public use of the Roman Church but added to Bonaventure's Psalter and published for the use of the Roman faithful, after the Blessed Virgin is often invoked under various titles and praises with "Pray for us," she is finally also addressed, "Be propitious, Spare us, Lady. From all evil, deliver us, Lady. From the wrath of God and His indignation, From dangerous despair, From precipitating pride, From disturbing lust, etc., Deliver us, Lady. Sinners, we beseech you to hear us; That you may preserve the Holy Church, most gracious Lady, We beseech you to hear us." Finally, she is addressed, "Mother with your most holy Son, have mercy on us; Most beloved Mother, Lady, have mercy on us." In the Psalter of Our Lady published in French in Paris, by Claudius Chappelet in the year 1601.

LIV. Similarly, a hymn about John the Baptist begins with these words: "Glorious Baptist of Christ, Who reveal Christ to us, Look upon us with mercy, Cleanse our sins." And in another hymn addressed to him, it is said, "Remove the guilt of our polluted lips, Holy John." To the Apostle John, this prayer is made: "We beseech you, we pray to you, Holy Apostle of God, remove the plague, take away the ulcer, and comfort the afflicted: Drive away disease, slay the enemy, and remove scandal." And in another hymn addressed to John, it is said, "We beseech you with humble hearts, Heavenly Senator: Grant us to see the face of the Word, Who teaches us to believe the Word."

LV. To Saint Martin, this hymn is usually sung, "Martin, equal to the Apostles, Favor us who celebrate your feast, Who wish your disciples to live or die, look upon us. Do what you did before, Now make the prelates glorious, Increase the honor of the Church, Crush the deceptions of Satan. You who thrice conquered Chaos, Raise those sunk in guilt: You who divided your cloak, Clothe us in justice." Finally, to Saint Benedict, it is said in the hymn about his translation, "Grant us to climb the narrow path, Bestow the eternal kingdom." And in the hymn about Saint Nicholas, which begins "The heavenly hall exults," this prayer is directed to him: "O venerable Pontiff, Pious and not tardy Workman, To all who with faithful hearts Seek you in danger, Remove the threats of death, Grant the help of life: That after the exile of the flesh, We may be with you in glory."

LVI. To reconcile these prayers and many other similar ones used in the Roman Church with the above doctrine, Bellarmine notes that when he said, "We should only ask the saints to pray for us," he was not speaking of the words but the sense of the words. For as to the words, he says, it is permitted to say, "Saint Peter, have mercy on me, save me, open the gates of heaven for me. Also, give me bodily health, give me patience, give me strength, etc., provided we

understand, save me, and have mercy on me, by praying for me, give me this or that through your prayers and merits." De Sanctor. Beatitudine lib. 1. cap 17.

LVII. Similarly, the Roman Catechism, after saying that to God we say "Have mercy on us" and to the saint "Pray for us," adds by way of explanation, "However, it is also permissible to ask the saints themselves in another manner, that they may have mercy on us; for they are very merciful: so we can pray to them, moved by the misery of our condition, to help us by their grace and intercession with God."

LVIII. However, Bellarmine's exposition just mentioned, which states that prayers to the saints, whatever words they use, have this meaning according to the mind of the Roman Church, that the saints provide what is asked by praying and obtaining it, and not otherwise. This exposition, I say, does not adequately fit those prayers addressed to the saints in which they are not simply asked to absolve sins, sanctify hearts, and open heaven, but to do so by command, power, and authority, such as many prayers found in the public worship of the Roman Church.

LIX. Thus, in the hymn which begins "Exultet cælum laudibus," it is said to the apostles: "You who close heaven with a word, and release its bonds, release us from all our sins by your command, we ask. The salvation and sickness of all are subject to your command. Heal the fields from diseases, restoring us to virtues." This is consistent with what is often said to the apostles in the Breviary: "You who close temples to worship, and release their bonds with a word, release us guilty from sin by your command, we ask. The sickness and health of all are subject to your command. Heal languid minds, increase us in virtues." A specific prayer for Peter is composed as follows: "Now good shepherd Peter, kindly receive the prayers of the suppliants, and by your power, release the bonds of sin, which you close and open heaven with a word." This also pertains to John the Baptist: "Now powerful through the merits of our Lord, repel the hard stones of our hearts, smooth the rough path, and direct the winding ways." Here, the saint is asked to provide these things as one powerful through his merits.

LX. Certainly, reason does not allow us to say that what we obtain from God through prayer is done by command, power, or authority. Therefore, the authors of these prayers intended not simply to ask the saints to obtain the goods they requested through their prayers to God, but also to regard the saints not only as intercessors with God but also as dispensers and administrators of these goods under God. Costerus also attests to this view, asserting that the saints are administrators of God's goods. He concludes that the saints should be asked both to intercede with God for us and to help us directly. In the Enchiridion, chapter 12, in the explanation of the fifth proposition, Costerus, commenting on the hymn Ave Maria Stella, on the words "Solve vincula reis," uses the gloss: "Solve by prayers, solve by merits, solve by authority, solve by command. You can remove all external bonds by a mere nod and will." And explaining other words of the same hymn, "Mala nostra pelle," he says: "Therefore, remove our evils by prayer, merits, and power."

LXI. Moreover, a large part of the worship given to the saints in the Roman Church consists of praises, titles, and eulogies with which they are adorned, which are diligently accumulated in their prayers, hymns, and other devotional books. This kind of honor is especially given to the Blessed Virgin. Thus, she is called absolutely Queen and Lady in their hymns and litanies, Queen of Heaven, Queen and Lady of the World, Queen of Angels, and even Glorious Monarch. She is called Mother of Mercy, Mother of Grace, and the Fountain of all grace; also, the Gate of Heaven, the Happy Gate of Heaven, the Window of Paradise, the Ark of the Covenant, the Star of the Sea, the Morning Star, the Health of the Sick, the Refuge of Sinners, the Help of Christians, the Light of the World driving away all schisms. She is also saluted as the Hope of the World, Our Hope and Life, and the Light driving away all schisms and clouds. She is also said to have saved the world through her, lifted it up, defeated death, and granted life. Examples of these can be found both in the ordinary litanies of the Holy Virgin and in ecclesiastical hymns, along with the Book of Psalms printed in Paris by William Chaudiere in 1582; where the aforementioned hymns are also found.

LXII. Furthermore, in the Paris Breviary, on the Feast of the Assumption, it is said to the same Virgin: "Rejoice, Virgin Mary, you alone have destroyed all heresies in the whole world." And on the second day within the octave of the Assumption, these words are read about her: "She who is closely united to God of hosts, deserves to be called powerful in her own way over hosts and virtues. She is our Warrior, of whom it was said to the ancient serpent, 'She shall crush your head.'" Later, it is recounted that King Philip the Valiant, who obtained a notable victory over the Flemish rebels, dedicated the horse and armor in which he had conquered to the most glorious Virgin. Finally, there is a hymn at the end of the works of Almainus, which Antoninus testifies is publicly sung in the Roman Church, in which these words are said to the Virgin Mary: "Mediatrice of men, Cleanser of sins, Comforter of all, Pardon of sinners, Cleanser of crimes." And in the litanies added to Bonaventure's Psalter, mentioned above, Mary is called the Health and Beatitude, and the Illuminator of Hearts.

LXIII. Private doctors strive to add something to these praises, devising new praises and titles to exalt the Blessed Virgin. Thus, Viegas in the Apocalypse says that she is the Princess and Mistress of all creatures. Jacobus de Voragine says that she rules in Heaven, in the World, and in Hell. Costerus says she is the Queen of Queens, and is absolutely called the Queen of all places and all creatures. The writer under the name of Anselm, in his work on the Excellencies of the Blessed Virgin, says that Mary is the supreme Lady and the only Mistress of heaven and earth. Salazar, a Jesuit, says that the Virgin Mother of God is truly and properly, and not metaphorically, Queen and Supreme Empress because she is the Mother of the supreme King and Emperor of all things; not by any election or privilege, but by natural right. Similarly, Mendoza says that this dominion of the Virgin is not metaphorical but proper and genuine, derived from maternal dignity. Not only is she the Queen of the world, but she also makes the kings of the world. Finally, the aforementioned Salazar says she is the Queen by political and

civil empire; the Lady by direct dominion of all things, and the mistress by power over servants and slaves. And by divine right, she has acquired spiritual dominion over souls.

LXIV. Not only do they subject all creatures to the Virgin as their proper Lady, but they also attribute dominion and authority to her over Christ Himself, now gloriously reigning in heaven. This is related to the old rhythmic prose, often cited by us: "Rejoice, heavenly Matron, You wanted to call yourself the handmaid of Jesus Christ: But as divine law teaches, You are His Lady: For the law and reason teach, that the Mother rules over the Son. Therefore, pray humbly, And command sublimely, That in the evening of the world, He may lead us to the supreme kingdom." These are in harmony with those inserted in the old Paris Missal: "O happy Mother, Expiating our sins, By the right of a Mother, command the Redeemer."

LXV. And although these have been erased from some missals, they have been replaced in others not long ago, and many doctors of the Roman Church approve and defend them. Thus, Cardinal Damian, speaking of the Virgin Mary, says: "She approaches the golden tribunal of the Divine Majesty, not asking but commanding, as a Lady, not a servant." Likewise, Albertus Magnus, in what is called the Bible of Mary, says: "Mary prays as a Daughter, commands as a Sister, and rules as a Mother." Pelbartus of Temeswar says: "Therefore, the supreme dominion of the Blessed Virgin is real, for she rules not only over creatures but even over God as a Mother over her Son. Furthermore, for the salvation of those who pray to her, she can not only pray to her Son, as other saints do, but also command Him with maternal authority. Therefore, the Church prays, 'Show yourself to be a Mother'; as if to say to the Virgin, 'Command imperiously and with maternal authority, pray for us.'" Finally, Bernardinus de Bustis, in whose writings these words are found: "This is a true proposition, that everything is subject to the dominion of the Lord, including the Virgin. And again, this is true, that everything is subject to the dominion of the Virgin, including God."

LXVI. Nor are their more recent followers ashamed; Francis Costerus, a Jesuit, serves as a witness, who addresses the Virgin in this way: "All others pray as servants, but you, as a Mother with authority, are heard out of reverence for you." Also, "What does it mean to be the Mother of God? The Mother is the cause of the Son, the Mother is superior to the Son, honor is due to the Mother from the Son, and the Son is bound to obey the Mother." Another witness is the Jesuit Salazar, who believes that the most holy Virgin has parental authority over her Son so that nothing escapes her universal dominion. And Mary rejoiced in a certain royal power over Christ by maternal right; and that Christ, being both God and Man, was subject to her maternal power and quasi-domination, just like other sons. It is not likely, given the divinity to which His human nature was united, that Christ was emancipated from parental power, which other parents naturally hold over their children. Indeed, he believes this right still remains with the holy Virgin, and that she often uses it. He says, "The most holy Virgin often used this right and power, but especially when she intercedes with her Son for us." Another witness is John of Argent, also a Jesuit, whose words are cited about the Blessed Virgin, "As if forgetting her

condition, assuming dominion over her Son, she placed her throne above the very throne of God." And he further professes that he believes Jesus still serves Mary; "Lord Jesus, most lovable Savior, allow me to do something for your Mother; and if you do not want to believe this, at least allow me to serve you while serving your Mother." Hence, he gives the Blessed Virgin this title, "that she is the Lady of God; this is," he says, "the supreme dignity of the Blessed Virgin, the highest and most adorable power, that God is subject to her, and she has dominion over Him."

LXVII. Not only is the Holy Virgin called the Lady and Queen of all in the Roman Church, but she is also given the name of Goddess by many. This is frequent in their sacred poems, as in this one by Lipsius, "Then to you, Goddess, will every age and sex offer praises." Also, "Is not Judas a Goddess in this generation?" And in this one by Coster, "Lead us, Goddess, to the blessed superiors." And many others. Moreover, those who write prose not rarely give the title of Goddess to the Blessed Virgin: thus Mendoza, a Jesuit, says that through prayer, the Virgin becomes as a Goddess to the whole creation; thus Philippus Beroaldus says, "What greater praise can be said of our Goddess than that she nurtures us with maternal affection and indulgence?" Similarly, Ambrosius Catharinus, one of the fathers of the Council of Trent, citing Augustine, says, "Augustine used the word 'Goddess' for our Lady, which I will not hesitate to repeat." Also, "It is not fitting to call her a mere human who is the Mother of God, who is clothed with the sun, crowned with twelve stars, and has the moon under her feet. Certainly, Goddess, you who were so much a part of the Divinity, that you alone were preserved as the paradise of God, to be cultivated by God's hands." Even Cardinal Bembo, writing on behalf of Leo X to a certain Italian city, advises them to donate better wood for the use of the house of Loreto, "lest you seem to have mocked not only us but also the very Goddess with a useless gift of poor wood." Antoninus and Bernardinus de Bustis also assert that the Blessed Virgin can rightly be called the Goddess of Goddesses, but in consolation of sinners, they prefer to call her the Queen of Mercy.

LXVIII. This can also be referred to what Alexis de Salo and John of Argent say, that God is in the Virgin not only by essence, power, and presence, as in other creatures; nor only by grace, as in the soul of the just; but in a much more excellent way, that is, by identity.

LXIX. Moreover, the dominion attributed to the Virgin according to their doctrine is not an empty name or merely an honorary title, but a true and real power, which she is considered to exercise in many ways over the human race. For they say she is the one who dispenses God's grace and various gifts to all others: thus Jesuit Salazar affirms that all the flow of grace and help is conveyed to us through the Virgin as through the moon; and all spiritual goods are in the power and discretion of the Virgin; indeed, if we are to believe him, "the faithful, while they live in the world, are carried in the womb of the Virgin, who breathes nothing good of the spirit or inspiration that is not inspired by Mary." It may be said, "All live by the spirit of Mary." Cornelius a Lapide similarly says, "She is the treasurer of divine graces; and Christ placed in her

the fullness of all good, so that the Lord willed that we should have nothing except through her hands." Similarly, Pelbartus teaches that Mary is the dispenser of all grace, having jurisdiction and authority in all temporal processes of the Holy Spirit, so that no creature has obtained any grace or virtue of the Holy Spirit except according to her dispensation; and if we believe him, "All gifts, all virtues, and graces, and all good things, which she wills, when she wills, how she wills, and as much as she wills, are administered by her hands."

LXX. Therefore, Bernardinus de Bustis, often mentioned, says that God made the Virgin his Cellar; because God loved her so much that He willed that we should have nothing except through her hands. Hence Alexis de Salo says that the Virgin Mary is the neck through which our Savior, who is the head, flows into the Church, providing all spiritual motion and sensation, being the trunk through which the root supplies life to the branches, producing flowers, fruits, and leaves. She is the basin that receives the abundance of living grace waters and distributes them through her channels to others according to each one's merit and capacity. Jesuit Osorius confirms this, saying that all our good depends on the Virgin; and that the Son, to honor the Mother, committed all the dispensation of grace to her. Salazar even decrees that all other saints can do nothing, and no good flows from them, except through the Virgin as the moon intercedes and moderates their influx.

LXXI. They do not only want this to be understood of spiritual goods but also of temporal ones. Thus Salazar philosophizes about this matter, "Generous men and lovers of their wives, and greatly trusting them, usually commit to them the keys and custody of their money and all domestic expenses; they themselves, meanwhile, attend to more serious duties. Similarly, God, the Greatest and Best, has given to His most holy spouse Mary the same, granting her the custody of temporal goods and the keys, so that whatever of these goods is spent in this great house of the world, it passes through the hands of Mary and is distributed at her discretion."

LXXII. Some even go so far in the Roman Church as to say that Mary is the cause of things and that she made the world and preserves and governs it. For example, Gabriel Biel says: "To her, that is Mary, all things look as to their medium, as to the ark of God, as to the cause of things, as to the business of the ages, and those who dwell in heaven and those in hell, and those who preceded us, and we ourselves, and those who will follow, and the children of our children, and those who will be born from them." And Alanus, who is venerated as a saint, says in similar words: "This Mary is the Lady of all, who made the whole world, and who preserves and governs all things in it." Therefore, Salazar, following Bonaventure, does not hesitate to say to the Virgin, "By your arrangement, most holy Virgin, the world perseveres, which you and God founded from the beginning."

LXXIII. Nor do these seem sufficient to them; they add that the Virgin has done more for God than it seems God Himself has done for mankind. For after Bernardinus the elder, who was canonized, had made a long comparison between God and the Blessed Virgin, he concludes with

these words: "Therefore, rendering each one their due, that is, what God did for man and what the Blessed Virgin did for God, you see that it can rightly be said that Mary has done more for God than God did for man; hence God is greatly obligated to us because of the Virgin." This is elaborated and cited in its place by Andrew Rivet in his *Apology for the Most Holy Virgin Mary* and by Charles Drelincourt in his books written accurately and extensively on the honor due to the Blessed Virgin Mary; from which these few things have been excerpted out of many, and to which the curious reader is referred if they wish to read more of this kind and inquire with the authors.

LXXIV. However, these things are said only by private doctors and are not defined by public authority, but the fact that they are not disapproved by the Roman Church is made clear by many and significant signs. Firstly, it is gathered from this, that those who have spoken more harshly on this matter are counted among the saints, such as Bernardine of Siena, Antoninus, Alanus, and Bonaventure. Another significant indication is that the books in which such things are found are approved by many doctors and bishops, and even by some popes. Especially notable is that these statements are diligently inserted and emphasized in books intended for the people and aimed at fostering popular devotion, and this is done not only without prohibition or objection but rather with the open favor of bishops and other pastors.

LXXV. Furthermore, it is evident when Protestants raise these objections, men of great weight and renown in the Roman Church are unwilling to openly condemn them but instead strive to excuse them by all means. This can be seen in the writings of Cardinals Bellarmine and Richelieu, and in those of Peter le Camus, the bishop celebrated for his numerous writings, in his discussion with Charles Drelincourt regarding the honor due to the Blessed Virgin Mary.

LXXVI. Finally, the same is demonstrated by the Expurgatory Indices, which carefully note and order the deletion of what seems suspicious or even ambiguous in the writings of the Roman Church's authors. However, they leave untouched those passages that cause scandal to the Reformed and are often observed and objected to by them as greatly exceeding all bounds of reason and measure. For example, the propositions we have cited from Bernardino, Bembo, Costerus, and Catharinus are not marked by any censure in the Expurgatory Indices. These indices, however, order the deletion of the following propositions from Augustine's writings: "We have not set up temples to the saints nor sacrificed to them. Temples should not be built for angels. It is not lawful to build temples for the saints. To build temples for creatures is sacrilege." Therefore, we rightly conclude that those to whom the censorship of books in the Roman Church is entrusted consider these propositions to be either disapproved or suspicious, but not those about which we are now speaking and in which the aforementioned praises are attributed to the Blessed Virgin.

LXXVII. Moreover, it seems that the honor given to the saints in the Roman Church is greatly increased by the cult of their relics and the images set up in sacred places and worshiped

in various ways. However, this should be reserved for special discussion. Here it only remains to note that it is indeed a matter of faith in the Roman Church to believe that the saints can be lawfully and piously invoked. However, they admit it is not necessary for each individual believer to pray and invoke the saints, for someone can attain salvation by invoking God through Christ without such invocation. As can be seen in Henry Holden's "Resolution of Faith," Book 2, Chapter 7: "Indeed, we profess that the saints can be invoked without any harm, but we do not assert that all Catholics are bound to the actual exercise of such invocation as a Christian truth. For some Catholics may indeed be saved who have never invoked the saints crowned in heaven.

THEOLOGICAL THESES On the Cult and Veneration of Angels and Holy Men.

PART TWO.

In which the Doctrine of the Protestants is Explained, Compared with the Doctrine of the Roman School, and confirmed by various Arguments.

Thesis I

In the previous theses, we briefly and clearly explained the Doctrine of the Church and the Roman School regarding the cult and veneration of Angels and Holy Men. To summarize what was stated earlier: The Roman Church bestows a certain kind of veneration on Angels and Holy Men, which is intermediate between the worship due to the Majesty of God and the honor given to those who stand out among men either by civil dignity and authority, or by gifts, virtue, and excellence that nevertheless do not exceed the order of nature.

II. This cult is not of the same univocal kind as the worship that properly belongs to God, but it bears some analogy to it. However, it can be called religious, not in the proper and strict sense, but in a broader and less proper sense. Similarly, the term adoration can also be applied to it, although adoration is often restricted to the worship proper to God.

III. To make this cult more easily distinguishable from the divine, the Schools have designated each with a specific term: they assigned the term Latria to the divine worship, and the term Dulia to the veneration due to Holy Angels and men. This Dulia is further distinguished into hyperdulia, which is attributed to the Blessed Virgin, and dulia properly so-called, which is appropriate for the rest of the Saints; although they acknowledge that in the usage of Scripture this distinction between Latria and Dulia is not always strictly observed.

IV. Furthermore, they argue that the honor which is due to the Saints is greatly different from the divine worship in terms of internal acts and can be easily distinguished; however, this is not the case with external acts and the external signs of worship and honor, which are commonly

used in both the worship of God and the veneration of Saints, except for sacrifice and what specifically refers to sacrifice, such as altars, temples, and priests.

V. Indeed, they do not consider it lawful to offer a sacrifice properly so-called to any creature, although it is very common among them to honor and venerate Saints with sacrifices offered to God in their honor. And this not only in such a way that thanks are given to God for the grace and glory bestowed upon them, but also so that they may be invoked in solemn liturgy, and divine assistance may be implored through their prayers and merits. What is more, the very sacrifice of the body and blood of Christ, as they believe, is offered to God through their merits and prayers. For example, in the Mass of Saint Andrew they say, "May our sacrifice be acceptable to you, O Lord, through the intercession of Blessed Andrew the Apostle, in whose honor it is solemnly offered, that by his merits it may become acceptable."

VI. Similarly, although altars, according to the doctrine of the Roman School, should not be consecrated to Saints under the notion of altars, we have shown that their doctors believe they can be consecrated to them under the notion of tombs. Indeed, according to the practice of the Roman Church, each altar is sanctified not only in honor of God but also in honor of the Blessed Virgin and all the Saints. In the same way, temples, according to the opinion and usage of that Church, are not constructed for the Saints as such, but they can and should be built and dedicated to them under the notion of sacred houses and basilicas, in which they are solemnly worshiped and invoked with various rites.

VII. Thus, it is customary throughout the Roman Church to worship Saints in those buildings dedicated to them and named after them, with various rites performed before their relics, statues, and images, by bowing the body and bending the knee, lighting candles, and burning incense, and offering all kinds of gifts. To these they add feast days specifically dedicated to the veneration of the Saints, societies named after them and instituted in their honor, and also frequent vows made and religiously fulfilled in their names.

VIII. However, the principal part of the cult rendered to Saints is their invocation, through which the help and assistance of the Saints departed in Christ are privately and publicly implored. It is assumed that they intercede not only in general for the Church Militant but also for individual members; indeed, they are considered to be the guardians, patrons, and protectors of the human race, who can see the needs of individuals and hear prayers conceived in the heart alone.

IX. Nevertheless, the Doctors of the Roman Church profess that Saints are to be invoked not as if they themselves grant the goods we need, as if they were their authors and dispensers, but that they may obtain them from God by their prayers and merits. This does not prevent them from frequently asking for any blessings of body and soul simply from the Saints, and using the same forms of prayer to the Saints as they do to God, although they say they direct them to the Saints with a different sense than to God.

X. As for the theologians of the Reformed Church, the doctors of the Roman School are accustomed to charge them with denying all cult and honor to the Saints and simply teaching that Saints should not be venerated. But they are far from that, and all unanimously profess the contrary. They concede that not only divine but also created excellence deserves its own cult and honor; and that the greater the excellence of grace and glory that God communicates to the Saints, which surpasses all civil dignity and natural gifts and privileges, the greater honor and observance are owed to them.

XI. However, no matter how great that observance with which we ought to honor those whom God has adorned with saving grace in this life and crowned with glory in the next, they contend that it differs only in degree from the honor we are bound to give to those who stand out among others by civil authority and dignity, or by some natural virtue and excellence; but it is entirely different in kind from the honor that the divine Majesty demands and requires.

XII. As to what name this honor should be designated by, they consider it of little importance, provided it is clear in what matters it should be constituted, and by what acts and signs it should be testified and exhibited. They do not want it to be simply called religious, because religion properly and directly pertains only to divine worship; but rather civil, or as Augustine puts it, social and affectionate. Not that they confuse it with that worship which civil dignity and certain natural excellence require: for this, as mentioned, it surpasses at least in degree. But since there is a double citizenship, one earthly and the other heavenly, they think it can be called civil by denomination taken not from the earthly city, but from the heavenly; to which grace and glory pertain, and to which that cult and honor should be rendered.

XIII. Abraham Ramburtius explains his view on this matter as follows: "It should be known," he says, "that there is a double honor. There is religious honor due only to God; and there is civil honor given to creatures. Civil honor is further given either in respect of the worldly city, which encompasses all the duties of reverence, love, and fear that are owed to men, even if they are alien to the faith. Thus, we honor princes, parents, elders, wise men, and fellow citizens. Or civil honor is said in respect of the heavenly city, with which we honor the domestic household of faith: and this includes the mutual love with which we embrace each other, as in Romans 12:10; the respectful opinion we hold of our brothers, as in Philippians 2:3; and the solicitude with which the members are mutually affected. Moreover, the observance and reverence, according to the various conditions, excellent gifts, and even the glory of those who constitute that heavenly city. And in this sense, we honor the holy Angels with love, as Augustine says, not with servitude, but with the cult of affection and society, just as in this life we honor the Saints of God; as mentioned above. We praise them in a due manner; we love, imitate as much as we can, and proclaim their virtues, so that our zeal may increase and be inflamed." (The Treasury of Sedanen Theses, vol. 2, Theses on Religious and Idolatrous Cult, thesis 16.)

XIV. Vossius teaches similar things in his Theological Theses. After stating that the honor owed to Saints, Angels, and men should not be called religious or servile cult, since it is merely human and civil cult, he immediately adds: "This appellation indeed seems ridiculous to Bellarmine, but unjustly; because those Saints were men; and together with the Angels, they are 'fellow servants' with us, as the Apostle teaches, who shows that they share a common servitude with us. But Bellarmine confuses the secular and ecclesiastical cities, of which one is by nature, the other by grace. For we are called citizens of one city, one Republic, and one people, both by reason of the heavenly as well as the earthly city. A part indeed is in the homeland; a part is on pilgrimage from the homeland, as the Apostle says, but although they are absent from us, and we from them, yet both they are present with each other, and we with each other, and God is present with both in the Son through the Holy Spirit. Therefore, since nothing prevents us from being called citizens of one city, there will be no reason why the civil honor given to heavenly citizens should not be called civil just as much as that given to earthly citizens; for although these honors differ in degree, both are civil." (Disputation 7, thesis 47 and following.)

XV. Daniel Chamierus, however, philosophizes somewhat differently on this matter. He observes that civil cult can be understood in two ways: formally and causally. Civil cult formally is that which is in itself truly civil and distinct, even separate from religious cult. Civil cult causally, whatever it may be in itself, is nevertheless from merely civil causes. Otherwise, a cult that is formally civil can be from non-civil, but supernatural causes. And such, in his view, is the honor owed to Saints reigning with Christ. Although their dignity is supernatural, and therefore the cult owed to them is not causally civil, it is nevertheless entirely distinct from religious cult; and therefore formally civil, unless one prefers to call it officious. (Panstratia, vol. 2, book 19, chapter 5, numbers 2 and 3.)

XVI. Although he does not wish to call the honor by which Saints should be venerated religious, but rather civil or officious, he nonetheless acknowledges that it flows from religion and is an act of religion, not elicited but impetrated. This is seen in the first chapter, number 11, of the book already cited, where he teaches that the cult of God is essentially distinguished from the cult of men by religion. This means there are two kinds of cult: one religious, the other civil. The former is an elicited act of religion; the latter, an impetrated act of the same. For to worship God, he says, is religion itself: just as to love is love itself: and religion is to worship God, just as love is to love. But civil cult flows from religion, that is, from the cult of God: just as in the Samaritan, washing and binding wounds flowed from love. Indeed, it is an effect of religion, not religion itself: just as an effect is not the cause

XVII. Charles Drelincourt observes that something religious can be said in two ways: first rigidly and exactly, as religion properly signifies that which binds souls to God and prescribes the manner of worshiping Him. In this sense, he teaches that only God should be religiously worshiped: nor should the honor by which Saints are venerated be called religious in this sense; for it is entirely of the same species as that by which we honor the faithful living on

earth and differs only in degree. But sometimes religious is said in a broader sense to mean all that which not only constitutes the essence of religion but also depends on it and flows from it. And in this sense, he concedes that the honor by which we venerate the Blessed Spirits and the Holy Virgin, the mother of Christ, can be called religious. (Response to the question of Peter le Camus, already mentioned, page 27.)

XVIII. However, the commonly made distinction of religious cult into Latria and Dulia is generally rejected by the doctors of the Reformed School. This is for two reasons. Firstly, because there is only one cult that deserves to be properly and simply called religious: namely, the cult proper to God. The cult rendered to creatures, even the most excellent and holy, cannot be called religious except improperly and equivocally. Secondly, because in the use of Scripture, the terms Latria and Dulia are often confused. For in the Greek interpreters of the Old Testament, the term Latria is sometimes used for human service; but more often, both in the Old and New Testaments, it is restricted to divine cult alone.

XIX. Some Reformed theologians, however, testify that it does not seem inconvenient to them if the term Latria is reserved for divine worship, as proper to it; and the term Dulia is particularly applied to the honor and observance given to creatures, to distinguish it from divine and religious worship. This can be seen in Chamierus. For after establishing for certain that religious cult is entirely due to God, and civil cult pertains to creatures, he adds that for signifying this matter, we can use the terms Latria and Dulia: provided we understand that these names do not indicate different degrees, as if one were more and the other less, but different kinds: so that religious cult and civil cult are entirely different in kind; nor can both Latria and Dulia be compared to each other. (Panstratia, vol. 2, book 19, chapter 1, number 11.)

XX. Gerardus Johannes Vossius in his Theological Theses presents similar views. He states that the distinction between the terms "latria" and "dulia," where the former is said to belong to God alone and the latter also to creatures, is not observed either in the Holy Scriptures or in classical writers, as even Valla, Vives, and others acknowledge. Indeed, the term "dulia," unless taken metaphorically, is less fitting for Saints than for God because in terms of religious worship, it pertains not to the creature but to God, as recognized by Pontifical Perezius, although Bellarmine disputes this in vain. Nevertheless, we do not disapprove of those who support this distinction, partly because a prudent person should avoid all ambiguity, partly because it does not seem useless to apply different names to cults that differ entirely in kind, such as those of God and creatures, to avoid homonymy, and partly because Augustine did not reject this. Thus, we do not deviate, nor do we support the cause of the Romanists in any way because, as Calvin acknowledges in discussing this distinction, the issue is about the matter, not the term. Namely, what we condemn in the Romanists is that they do not keep their worship pure for God but transfer a large part of divine honor to the Saints.

XXI. Moreover, to see in what this honor consists, which they confess is owed to the blessed spirits in heaven, whether of men or angels, the doctors of the Reformed School state in general that no cult can be lawfully offered to them other than that which is suitable for a creature that is absent or is as if absent, with whom we have no mutual commerce.

XXII. Therefore, they remove from that cult all that, according to the doctrine of Scripture, pertains to divine worship. For a cult to be considered divine, it is not necessary, in their view, for the one offering it to consider the object worshipped as the supreme Deity, upon whom everything depends, who depends on nothing, and who is the first principle and ultimate end of all things: and thus, to terminate their worship absolutely in Him and intend to refer it to no other superior. But it suffices that the cult be such that it truly cannot befit a creature because it presupposes something divine in it; even if the one offering such a cult mistakenly judges otherwise.

XXIII. Therefore, they consider a cult to be divine if it presupposes that the one worshipped, although invisible and not exposed to any senses, can still be viewed by all who worship him, at any time and place, as present; and although requested and invoked simultaneously by countless people scattered everywhere on earth, with various petitions, can perceive and understand all their requests, even those conceived only in the mind, and can help each one at the same moment with the aid they ask from him. Even if the one using such a cult professes that the one he worships is not considered by him as God, but only as a friend and minister of God, in whom he thinks he honors the supreme God Himself: because whatever humans can imagine and presume, in reality, such majesty and power belong to none but God.

XXIV. Moreover, the Reformed theologians believe that many acts and signs pertain to divine worship, no less than sacrifices. These include, in their view, feast days, sacred buildings, and offerings dedicated and hung in sacred buildings, oaths, vows, and prayers by which we ask for the goods of the body and soul, especially the gifts of grace and glory, from anyone. Thus, just as, in the judgment of the Roman School, it would be considered latria to offer sacrifices to a creature under any pretext and would not be excused by saying that one offers the sacrifice to some creature, not absolutely, but relatively, not as to God Himself, but as to a certain friend and minister of God, to whom ultimately that honor of sacrifice, from his intention, is finally referred: so also, according to the Reformed, one is not purged from the crime of offering divine worship to creatures if one dedicates sacred buildings to them, offers them gifts, makes vows to them, swears by them, and asks them for grace and glory, no matter how much one professes to render and exhibit these things to creatures otherwise than to God Himself, and thus intends to refer these things to God's worship and glory.

XXV. Therefore, they consider it absolutely unlawful to dedicate sacred buildings to angels and saints received into heaven, not only to offer sacrifices to them but also to worship and invoke them with any rites, although they do not condemn the custom of the ancient Church,

in which it was customary among other things to build sacred buildings to preserve the memory of the martyrs and give thanks to God for the victories obtained through His grace by them, and for this reason, Eucharistic sacrifices were offered to God, which greatly honored the holy men. This can be seen in Andreas Rivetus' "Consideration on the Third Article of the Judgment of a Learned Man" regarding his "Apology for the Blessed Virgin," found at the end of that Apology.

XXVI. Likewise, they deny that it is lawful to consecrate feast days to angels and blessed men, since feasts pertain to the solemn worship of God, although they see no objection to making special and solemn commemorations of certain saints on certain days, giving thanks to God for the benefits bestowed upon them and through them, and presenting their virtues and notable deeds to the Christian people for imitation. For such feasts are dedicated to God alone, although they greatly honor the holy men, as is customary in the Anglican Church; in whose liturgy the feasts of the Apostles and certain other holy men are commemorated.

XXVII. Similarly, they completely disapprove of the custom of swearing by the Saints and consider it as prohibited as swearing by any creatures, just as offering sacrifices to them is prohibited because Scripture condemns not only those who swear by those who are not gods but also those who offer sacrifices to anyone other than God alone. They see no more reason to swear secondarily by the Saints because divine truth shines in them than to offer sacrifices to them secondarily because they exhibit signs of divine omnipotence and goodness.

XXVIII. They hold the same opinion about vows, which Scripture commands to be made and fulfilled to the Lord alone, and they believe it is no less contrary to true piety to vow to the Saints, considering them as gods by participation or as impetrators of the goods we need than to offer sacrifices and victims to them under the same title.

XXIX. Finally, they do not believe that those escape the crime of divine majesty's violation who in their prayers address the Saints with the same formulas as God, asking them for grace and glory, and any goods of the body and soul, even though they do not consider the Saints as the primary authors of those goods, but only as their dispensers and administrators under God: just as the crime would not be avoided by someone who, under a similar pretext, wanted to offer sacrifices to the Saints.

XXX. Furthermore, the doctors of the Reformed School believe that it is not only unlawful to transfer what pertains to divine worship to angels or saints received into heaven, but there are also many forms of worship and honor, which we can rightly use towards living humans on earth, that reason and piety forbid to use towards the spirits of the dead.

XXXI. Thus, we courteously greet holy men with whom we converse, uncover our heads to them, and bow our bodies: but we use such signs of honor only towards those present. It would be absurd if someone, in honor of a holy man traveling among the Americans or Chinese, were to bow his body or bend his knees here in France, at home, or in a sacred place. Therefore,

since the Saints reigning with Christ in heaven are as far from us as heaven is from earth, they think it is entirely unreasonable to use such signs of honor towards them.

XXXII. Daniel Chamierus, among others, observes this. After establishing that the honor due to Saints is of the same kind as that which ought to be rendered to the living and differs from it only in intention and degree, which create various levels but do not change the species, he notes that this honor should be distinguished in its acts. Some acts are owed to the Saints, which can be rendered to any absent persons. But whatever is rendered only to those present, such as genuflections, salutations, bowings, and many similar things, should not be rendered to the Saints, and much less those things that are for the needy, such as clothes, lights, bread, and wine. (Panstratia, vol. 2, book 19, chapter 2, number 20.)

XXXIII. Moreover, part of the honor we render to those with whom we converse here, or with whom we have mutual commerce, includes asking those of whose piety we are convinced to help us with their prayers to God, and to pray with us for the goods and help we need. No one would ask a pious man living far away, with whom no epistolary commerce is possible, by voice or heart, to pray to God for him: as if someone had addressed Paul in Rome, bound, from Jerusalem long ago, and implored his prayers to God, either verbally or with silent and inward speech. Therefore, Protestants and the Reformed do not ask Saints in Christ who have died to pray for them with the same freedom as they ask the living because those in heaven enjoy beatitude and glory far from us, and there is no reason left by which we can communicate our inner feelings to them.

XXXIV. If anyone supposes that the Saints reigning with Christ in heaven can simultaneously behold all people in any part of the world, hear their prayers, know their thoughts, and even provide the help they are asked for, and perceive and acknowledge whatever is done in their honor; this, they believe, attributes something divine to the Saints, and the signs of honor we are discussing no longer pertain to human but to divine worship.

XXXV. You may ask, then, what remains, according to the doctors of the Reformed Church, by which we can honor and venerate the Saints? I respond, according to them, this honor consists in the pious and frequent commemoration of them; in holding them in high regard; in celebrating their praises when the occasion arises; in diligently recalling and remembering their virtues and notable deeds; and especially in following their example, embracing their teachings, and striving with all our strength to emulate their faith, love, zeal, courage, patience, and humility by which they have shown us the way.

XXXVI. Thus, according to Frederic Spanheim, the honor due to the Blessed Virgin Mary (from which one can judge the honor appropriate for other Saints) consists firstly in the respectful and notable remembrance of the honor with which God distinguished her above all creatures in His gracious goodness, so that she might be and be called the mother of Him who is the Father and Lord of all. Secondly, it consists in proclaiming her virtues as described to us in

the Holy Scriptures: her piety, love, humility, steadfastness, and other such virtues that shone uniquely in this excellent instrument of God and should be set as an example for all. Thirdly, it involves the commendation of the glory and blessedness she enjoys in heaven. (Dubia Evangelica, part 2, dub. 48, num. 4.)

XXXVII. Similar views on the honor we render to the Blessed Virgin are taught by Charles Drelincourt. He says, “The honor we render her consists of several things: First, we venerate her memory, speak of her with all reverence, and greatly delight in her praises. Next, with all our heart and all the strength of our souls, we praise God for the grace and benefits He has given us through her. Thirdly, we embrace the faith and religion that issued from her mouth and strive to follow the teachings that the Holy Spirit has left us through this instrument of grace. Moreover, we set her as an example for living rightly, just as for believing rightly. We strive to imitate her piety, love, zeal, purity, humility, patience, constancy, and all the Christian virtues in which she was enriched to an excellent degree. Finally, we extol her blessedness and happiness.” (Book on the Honor Due to the Blessed Virgin Mary, chapter 2.)

XXXVIII. Andreas Rivetus elaborates further on the honor owed to rational creatures, whether angels or humans: “If angels are present, we do not know when and where unless they appear to us in a visible form, as happened in the past. Otherwise, we know that some are often present with us and help us; but because we have no verbal communication with them and they are not omnipresent, nor do they scrutinize the recesses of our hearts, we do not usually exchange words with them or greet them with external signs. This we do with present humans and the patriarchs did with angels, whom they hosted at home, thinking they were men. Outside this occasion, we speak of angels (meaning the angels of light) with honor and reverence, valuing their nature, duties, and prompt obedience to God, and propose this for our imitation.”

XXXIX. Speaking of humans, he says, “If there were those who shone with great virtues, especially piety towards God and merits for the Church, their memory is sacred and venerable to us; we speak reverently of them, recall their virtues, propose them for our and others' imitation, pursue them with due praises, and if there is anything else we can render to those we do not see and who do not hear us, we offer it. This kind of honor and worship is more esteemed because it is free from all flattery and can only come from a mind persuaded of their excellence and valuing their dignity without any regard for personal gain.”

XL. He then advises that we should increase the degrees of respect and veneration according to the measure of God's gifts in such persons and their greater or lesser excellence, giving each their due measure of honor. But we do not serve as slaves those whose works we do not need and who cannot benefit from our services. For we are not servants of the deceased Saints, but co-heirs of the same inheritance and followers of their footsteps as much as we can, which they greatly desired while living, by setting an example in imitating Christ for us to follow.

XLI. He finally adds that we should particularly praise and honor the Blessed Virgin for the great gifts she received from God. He says, "If she were living with us on earth, we would consider it a great honor to receive her in our homes, render all services due to parents, converse with her reverently, greet her with respect, and receive her most holy advice. But since she does not dwell among us on earth, nor do we see or hear her, nor should we believe she is infinite or omnipresent, now that she lives in heaven after fulfilling her role in God's plan, we honor and revere the Blessed Virgin in all ways and means by which the absent can be rightly honored and glorified, except for the worship of religion, which is due only to Him who is omnipresent, omnipotent, and scrutinizes hearts and minds. We obey His will by proclaiming the Blessed and Blessed among women: and we do so for many reasons; because she believed, because it happened to her according to the Word of the Angel; because she gave birth to the Son of God, cared for and nursed Him as an infant, rendered Him the best maternal services, acknowledged Him as her Savior even as a child in the manger; because she believed His words when many contradicted, and because after an exquisitely pious and holy life in this world, she peacefully slept in the Lord and returned her most holy soul to God, enjoying in heaven the beatitude promised by God to those who honor Him, and being exalted in glory according to the measure of grace received here, as God knows. We pursue such with praises, celebrate their memory with grateful hearts, speak of them reverently, propose their virtues as an example for all Christians, especially pious women, and exhort everyone to imitate them in what is worthy of imitation." (Apology for the Blessed Virgin Mary, book 2, chapter 1.)

XLII. Likewise, John Dallaeus in his book "On the Object of Religious Worship" teaches: "For we refuse to worship the angels and other blessed spirits with adoration and religious prayers, not out of any contempt for them but from a sense of our duty to God, to whom alone we believe prayers and other religious worship should be offered. While preserving this worship for God, we nevertheless acknowledge the great excellence of the divine work in all the heavenly spirits, the exceptional wisdom, faith, love, sanctity, and blessedness of the Blessed Mary, the saints, martyrs of Christ, and faithful ministers, and often and gladly celebrate their remarkable deeds, words, and struggles in the cause of piety whenever the occasion arises, and we propose them for our imitation to ourselves and others according to our abilities, and we only use their names and memory with praise, which all show that the saints of God, both angels and humans, are honored and esteemed by us as is fitting."

XLIII. Furthermore, the honor due to both angels and saints received in heaven, according to the opinions of both divine and ecclesiastical authors, is considered to consist entirely of two things: praise and imitation. The former involves thinking and speaking well of them as the distinguished ministers of God, and the latter consists in faithfully and diligently imitating their conduct and the service they rendered to our common Lord and God.

XLIV. In this praise and imitation of the holy angels and men, the doctors of the Reformed School believe that care must be taken not to attribute to them titles and

commendations that are due only to God and Christ. They should also avoid speaking of things they have not seen, nor attribute anything to them that is not established by the word of God. Since sacred Scripture does not teach or indicate that the saints who have died in Christ preside over human affairs or are appointed by God as patrons and guardians of the living, they do not wish to celebrate them as such, nor do they attribute to them the ability to pray for individual believers, to hear and answer individual prayers simultaneously, as this is not revealed by any divine revelation.

XLV. Whether the saints at least pray in general for the Church Militant, some among the Reformed are unwilling to affirm for certain and suspend their judgment on the matter, as Charles Drelincourt frequently mentioned, who considers it uncertain whether the saints pray for the Church and places this among the hidden things of God, not revealed to us because Scripture nowhere clearly and expressly teaches it. (On the Honor Due to the Blessed Virgin, vol. 2, p. 106, num. 179, and following.)

XLVI. Similarly, Chamier, when posed with the question of whether the souls of the Saints pray for us in general, that is, universally for the Christian Church and the entire body of the faithful, declares that it is not established by any certain argument. Although he admits it has some degree of plausibility, he leaves the matter undecided so that each may follow their own judgment. (Panstratia, vol. 2, book 8, chapter 3.)

XLVII. Others, however, readily concede and consider it probable that the Saints reigning with Christ in heaven at least pray in general for the Church fighting here on earth. This seems quite consistent with the love they possess and the communion that exists between the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant. Andreas Rivetus expresses his opinion on this matter, saying, "We do not deny that the Church of the Saints reigning with Christ is concerned for the members fighting here. But that care is general, not from knowledge of individual conditions but from their general awareness that, since the whole Church is not yet received where they reign, there are always some fighting on earth, for whose preservation and completion they pray to God, always seeking the increase of His kingdom." (Summary of Controversies, second tract, question 48.)

XLVIII. Peter Moulin holds a similar view. He says, "The blessed spirits, although they do not see what is happening here, nor do they know individuals, are aware that the Church is constantly engaged in perpetual struggles against its adversaries. And since their love has been increased rather than diminished by glorification, it is consistent that they are concerned for the Church Militant." (The Treasure of Theses from Sedan, vol. 1, Theses on the Parts of the Saints, thesis 3.)

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XLIX. However, whatever the case may be, the Reformed Theologians unanimously deny that the Saints are and can rightly be called our Intercessors and Advocates. They argue that only one who can hear and perceive all prayers of everyone at all times and who has the office of presenting and commending them to God deserves the title of our intercessor with God. They believe this role belongs solely to our Lord Jesus Christ. No one would say that the faithful here on earth are our intercessors and advocates merely because we ought to pray for one another out of mutual charity.

L. They also reject the notion that the blessings we receive should be attributed to the merits of the Saints, or that anything should be asked of God through their merits. They assert that the Saints, who owed everything they were to divine grace, could not merit anything for themselves or others, strictly speaking. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that through the communion of Saints, the good and pious works performed by individual members of the Church through God's grace can somehow draw God's blessing and favor upon the entire body. Indeed, they believe that God, considering the pious and righteous, sometimes spares the wicked among whom they live and grants them time and means to repent, as the Lord professed to Abraham that He would have spared Sodom and Gomorrah if ten righteous people had been found there.

LI. Furthermore, from what has been presented in these and the preceding theses, it is clear that there is no controversy here about whether blessed humans and Angels are worthy of some honor and veneration and should be regarded with affection by us. This is freely admitted

and taught by the Reformed Theologians, and the contrary cannot be imputed to them without slander.

LII. Moreover, it is evident that the Roman School Doctors and the Reformed agree that the veneration owed to human Saints and Angels does not belong to the same univocal genus as the divine worship and therefore is not of the same species. They agree that such veneration is not religious in the proper and strict sense but only in a broader and less proper sense, according to which the honor given to Saints can be called religious, as distinguished Reformed Theologians expressly admit.

LIII. We have also shown that the Roman School Doctors acknowledge that the distinction of religious worship into Latria and Dulia is an invention of the School, and that this distinction, as used in the Roman School, is not exactly maintained in Scripture. They admit that Dulia is often restricted to the worship proper to God, while Latria is sometimes extended to human service. Conversely, the Reformed School Doctors do not strongly oppose the use of Latria for divine worship and Dulia for the veneration owed to creatures, for the sake of distinction.

LIV. Therefore, the entire difficulty and question reduce to this: In what does the honor consist that can be legitimately rendered to the holy and blessed creatures, especially the Blessed Virgin Mary? Specifically, whether sacred buildings can not only be named after Saints and Angels for the sake of designation but also constructed so that in them the Angels and Saints who have been received into heaven are publicly invoked and venerated with various rites, including bowing the knee and bending the body before them, burning incense, lighting candles, and offering various gifts? Whether it is permissible to swear by them and make vows to them, relatively to God, that is, insofar as God's truth shines in them and God dwells in them by His glory? And finally, whether we can ask them to pray for us, not simply, but to direct prayers to them, though in a different sense, yet conceived in the same words and forms as those we direct to God? This is affirmed by the Roman School Doctors and confirmed by the practice of the Roman Church, but denied by Protestants by common consent.

LV. Furthermore, it is in controversy whether it is permissible to celebrate the Saints who have died in Christ as the guardians and patrons of the human race, to whom the management of our affairs has been entrusted by God; and to regard them as such mediators and intercessors before God who can at all times hear and perceive the prayers of all men, whether conceived in the heart or spoken aloud, and present and commend them to God, and assist us by their suffrages and merits. Especially whether the Blessed Virgin should be acknowledged and proclaimed as the Queen of heaven and the entire world and the Lady of all creatures; as the one through whom the world was saved, and who alone has destroyed all heresies, and as the Mother of mercy, the Mother and fountain of grace, our life and hope of salvation. All these are approved by the practice of the Roman Church but disapproved and condemned by Protestants.

LVI. Moreover, Protestants are scandalized by many other praises heaped upon the Blessed Virgin and the Saints by certain private Doctors, but not disapproved or prohibited by the Roman Church: such as the title of goddess attributed to the Virgin Mary, the Saints being called tutelary deities, as in an inscription I remember reading a few years ago in a church dedicated to Saint Peter at Troyes, "Peter, Helena, and Mascidia, Tutelary Deities of the People of Troyes." And that the Virgin Mary is attributed dominion and authority over her own Son, and the power to dispense all the gifts of grace and nature under God and to communicate them to whom she will. She is called the illuminator of hearts and the cause of things; indeed, she is said to have founded and created the world and to preserve and govern all that is in it. Many such things, for the sake of brevity, are omitted here.

LVII. Therefore, Protestants prove that blessed spirits, whether human or angelic, should not be venerated with the type of worship given to them in the Roman Church when sacred buildings and altars are constructed and dedicated in their honor, candles are lit, incense is burned, and knees are bent before them as if they were present, vows are made to them, various offerings are given, and oaths are taken in their name; and finally, when solemn prayers are directed to them for help and aid, and hymns are publicly sung to them in thanksgiving for benefits received from God, and so forth. Nor should Angels and Saints in Christ be venerated in this way, Protestants argue first because such worship should not have been devised by humans without God's word. Otherwise, it would be offered without faith since no one could be sure it is pleasing and acceptable to God without His word. Therefore, if it is clear that such worship is not based on any command or revelation from God, it can be justly rejected among those practices condemned by the Apostle. It is clear that this entire worship has no foundation in God's word because there is no precept or example of it in the entire Scripture, whether Old or New Testament.

LVIII. As for the Old Testament, the Roman Church doctors themselves admit that the worship given to deceased Saints, as it is practiced among them, was not used in the Old Testament Church. They explain this by saying that the souls of the Saints at that time did not yet enjoy the heavenly glory and beatitude to which they were elevated after Christ's advent, but were detained in a sort of prison, which they call the Limbo of the Fathers. However, there is no reason why the worship given to Angels, if legitimate, should not have been given under the Old Testament. Indeed, if Angels were ever to be worshiped, they should have been worshiped most then, when God frequently used the ministry of Angels in governing the ancient people, and their appearances were frequent in the Jewish Church. For God often used them as messengers among the faithful. However, in the Church of the New Testament, God has spoken to us through the Son, to whom, not to Angels, He subjected the world to come, as the Apostle teaches in Hebrews 2:5. Yet, it cannot be shown from sacred Scripture or from any historical and Jewish sources that any part of public worship was given to Angels: for example, no chapel or oratory was consecrated in their honor, no festivals were celebrated, not even a single candle or grain of incense was offered or lit for them; nor were any prayers addressed to them in public assemblies

of the faithful, nor hymns sung to them, nor any form of adoration exhibited. On the contrary, it is universally agreed that nothing prevented, and it would have been most fitting, to honor Angels with such worship among the Jews, if it were permissible among us.

LIX. Under the New Testament, Christ and the Apostles made no changes in this matter; nor did they establish any new worship by which Angels and the spirits of the righteous admitted to the vision of God would be venerated. Indeed, there is no command, example, or even the slightest indication of this in the entire New Testament Scripture: nowhere are we admonished to invoke Angels or deceased Saints, seek their help, sing hymns to them publicly, or honor them with incense, sacrifices, sacred buildings, or any other external acts of adoration.

LX. Not only is there a complete silence on these matters in the New Testament writings, but nothing similar can be found in the ecclesiastical tradition of the first three centuries. There were many illustrious writers among Christians during that time whose works survive and are widely known: such as Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius, and Arnobius among the Latins; and Justin, Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and many others among the Greeks. Nowhere in their writings is there any mention of worship similar to that in the Roman Church today being given to Angels and deceased Saints, or even proposed to be given. On the contrary, there are many and very clear indications against it.

LXI. Firstly, the ecclesiastical writers of the second and third centuries after Christ were mostly of the opinion that the souls of all the faithful, even the most holy, were kept in certain places outside of heaven until the day of final judgment, and were not admitted to the celestial homeland until after the resurrection of the body. Some of them, indeed, by a special prerogative, assign a special place to the martyrs, which they call Paradise. But by that name, they do not mean the highest heaven, where the martyrs see the Lord face to face; rather, they refer to a certain sub-celestial region, the bosom of Abraham, where the souls of the rest of the righteous rest, a more pleasant and delightful place, but not capable of heavenly glory, as shown in detail by the renowned Johannes Dallaeus against Cardinals Bellarmine and Perron. Therefore, it is evident that the dogma of the veneration and invocation of Saints, as now held in the Roman Church, had not yet been received as Apostolic tradition in those early centuries of Christianity. For that worship is based on the hypothesis of the highest glory and beatitude of the Saints, which, according to the Roman School, the souls of the Saints were not admitted to before Christ's advent; hence, they admit that the Saints had not yet been solemnly venerated and invoked. (*On Penances and Satisfactions, book 5, chapters 3, 4, 5, 66, and On the Object of Religious Worship, book 3, chapter 22.)

LXII. Furthermore, it is evident from the most ancient liturgies that have survived that the early Christians offered prayers and supplications to God for all the deceased, even the most holy, the martyrs, the apostles, and indeed the Virgin Mother of God. In these liturgies, they ask God to grant them rest in the land of the living, bestow upon them the goods of His promises,

and provide them with good rest and remembrance; not simply, as Bellarmine futilely contends, offering thanksgiving for them. Indeed, since the time when the religious veneration and invocation of Saints was publicly accepted, it has been considered an oracle of Augustine's saying, "It is an insult to the martyr to pray for the martyr." And no one would ever consider using the solemn invocation that the Roman Church teaches should be given to the Saints reigning with Christ for those who need our prayers commended to God.

LXIII. Furthermore, when the wise men of the Gentiles professed to acknowledge only one supreme God, they still regarded other beings they called gods as ministers of that supreme deity, worshipped in a secondary place. When Christians were accused of neglecting these lower powers, which were nonetheless worthy of some veneration, the early Christians honestly admitted that they worshipped only one supreme God, defending this as legitimate and right. They did not concede that any part of religious worship was owed to the good and holy ministers of God, nor did they distinguish religious worship into supreme and subordinate, or absolute and relative worship. This would have been demanded by candor, charity, and prudence if they had shared the same views on the veneration of Saints and Angels as the present Roman Church.

LXIV. In response to this accusation from the pagans, they replied with Arnobius: "For the worship of Divinity, it is sufficient for us that we have God the first, the Father of things and Lord, the Creator and Governor of all. In Him, we worship all that is to be worshipped, and venerate what should be venerated. Since we hold to the head of Divinity itself, from which all Divinity of all the divine beings, whatever they are, is derived, we consider it superfluous to go through each one individually, since we do not even know who they are, what their names are, or their numbers, which we cannot comprehend, or explore." He then illustrates this with the same analogy of royal courts that the pagans used in this matter: "Just as in earthly kingdoms, we are not compelled to individually adore those established in the households of kings by necessity, but in the worship of kings themselves, whatever is connected to them is understood to be comprehended in silent honor; so too, whoever these gods are, whom you propose to us, if they are royal offspring and originate from the principal head, even if they receive no individual worship from us, they understand themselves to be honored collectively with their King and included in His veneration." (Against the Gentiles, book 3, beginning.)

LXV. This aligns with what Origen teaches on a similar topic. For Celsus argued that while one should never deviate from the worship of God and should keep the soul directed to Him in all work and thought, this does not preclude the placation and propitiation of various powers established under God, and that this redounds to the honor of the supreme deity. Origen, a distinguished doctor of the early Church, responds: "To ensure that the Angels of God are favorable to us and do everything for us, our first affection for God is sufficient, as is our disposition, as far as human nature can, imitating the judgment of the Angels who imitate God. Secondly, our grasp of the Word of God and the Son of God to the best of our ability. Also, the living God, the Lord of all, must be placated by us, and to have Him favorable, we must pray,

who is propitiated by piety and all virtue. But if anyone wishes to have others under this supreme God favorable as well, let him consider that just as with a moving body, its shadow also moves; so, when one has the supreme God favorable, it follows that all His friends, Angels, souls, and spirits, who are worthy of God's favor, are also favorable, not only being well-disposed themselves but also assisting those who want to worship God, placating Him, and praying and petitioning together with us; so that we may dare to say to men who choose and follow better things with a firm purpose of mind, that whenever they pray to God, innumerable sacred powers, uninvoked, pray together with them, presenting themselves as companions to our fragile and mortal race, and, so to speak, competing and collaborating with us in this struggle." (Against Celsus, book 5.)

LXVI. It is very noteworthy what Origen says, that innumerable sacred powers, by which he designates Angels and Blessed Spirits, wish to worship God together with us, praying indeed, but uninvoked. For he not only teaches in general that only one God is to be worshiped and religiously adored indivisibly and inseparably, but also that our prayers should be directed to Him alone, and not any form of prayer or invocation should be used towards Blessed Angels or any other creatures. "Away with this council of Celsus," he says, "which commands us to pray to demons (that is, spirits who minister to the highest God, according to the Platonic manner and usage of speech) who ought not to be heard at all. For prayers ought to be offered only to the Supreme God; and indeed, they should be offered to the only-begotten Word of God, the firstborn of all creation, who should be invoked as the High Priest, so that He may bring our prayer, which reaches Him, to His own God and our God, His Father and our Father." (Against Celsus, book 8.) In the fifth book of the same work, he says, "Every prayer and supplication, every intercession, and thanksgiving should be sent up to the Supreme God, the Lord of all, through the living Word, God, and the High Priest who is above all the angels. But we will also pray to the Word Himself, and intercede with Him, and give thanks to Him, and offer our prayers to Him, if we can understand the proper and catachrestic use of prayer. For it is unreasonable to invoke angels from us, who have not received the knowledge of their nature, which is placed above men. And even if we comprehend their nature, which is wonderful and mysterious, this very knowledge of their nature and their appointments and orders will prohibit us from daring to pray to anyone other than the Lord who is above all, and who is abundantly sufficient for all things, through our Savior, the Son of God." (Against Celsus, book 5.)

LXVII. Here it is also to be noted that Origen, like many other doctors of the Christian school of his age, believed that the sun, moon, and stars are certain rational living beings, endowed with virtue and illuminated with the light of knowledge from that wisdom which is the splendor of eternal light. Nor did he in any way disagree with Celsus, who proclaimed them as the most illustrious heralds of higher things, and truly celestial angels, being thoroughly convinced that the sun, moon, and stars offered prayers to God, the Lord of all things, through His only-begotten. Therefore, if, according to Origen's opinion, the angels of God are worthy of some religious worship, the sun, moon, and stars should be considered worthy of the same.

However, when Celsus questioned why the Jews did not worship the sun, moon, and planets, Origen not only denied in general that it was lawful to worship and adore these creatures but also affirmed that it was unlawful to supplicate them and sing hymns to them. "We judge," he said, "that it is not proper to pray to those who themselves pray. Rather, the sun and the stars themselves would want us to be directed to God, whom they themselves pray to, rather than being directed to themselves, or dividing the power of prayer we have from God and attributing a part of it to themselves. And he adds, since the Lord is with us everywhere and is near us, it is absurd to seek to pray to Him who does not reach everything, to the sun and the moon, or any other star. Finally, when Celsus writes that it would seem that we honor the great God more if we also sing hymns to the sun, moon, and stars, Origen responds that he knows the contrary: 'For we sing hymns only to God, the Lord of all, and to His only-begotten Word.'" (Against Celsus, book 5.)

LXVIII. Nor should anyone say, along with Cardinal Perron, that when Origen denies that angels are to be prayed to and invoked, he is speaking about the absolute prayer, not about what is called relative prayer, which the Roman School teaches is the only kind to be used with angels. For Celsus himself, against whom Origen argues, did not consider angels, or as he speaks with Plato, demons, to be worshipped with the highest and absolute worship, but with that which refers to the supreme God, of whom they are ministers. Therefore, since Origen denies that they are to be invoked in the manner that Celsus and other wise pagans desired, it is clear that, according to Origen, it is not lawful to use either absolute or relative invocation with them. Moreover, Origen, when he says that they pray for us uninvoked, clearly indicates that they should not even be asked to pray to God for us: which is to deny them relative prayer, not just absolute.

LXIX. Therefore, when Origen, in the eighth book against Celsus, insinuates a certain form of honor and respect due to the true ministers of God, Gabriel, Michael, and the other angels and archangels, this honor, according to Origen's teaching, can in no way consist in any form of their adoration and invocation, which he contends belongs solely and indivisibly to the one supreme God; but in the acknowledgment and celebration of their blessedness, glory, and holiness, and also in the pious imitation of their obedience and love towards God, which he admits is how we should honor the holy angels.

LXX. But to return to Holy Scripture, not only does it not contain any command or example of worshiping angels or deceased saints, but it also repeatedly teaches that only one God is to be worshipped, and that religious worship should be given to Him alone; therefore, no religious worship is to be offered to angels or saints who have died in Christ. The doctors of the Roman School respond that Scripture only prohibits giving creatures that highest and absolute worship, which belongs to someone as the first principle and ultimate end, to which they have appropriated the name Latria, but that it is not forbidden to give a lower form of religious

worship, which they call *Dulia*, to God's ministers and friends, such as angels and the spirits of the just received into heavenly glory.

LXXI. But the sacred Scripture, when it prohibits worshipping and serving creatures, does not simply forbid recognizing them as the first principle and ultimate end and worshipping them under this aspect; but it forbids exercising any acts of religious adoration towards them under any pretext, such as publicly invoking them, singing hymns to them, offering incense to them, dedicating sacred buildings and feast days to them, swearing by their name, making vows to them, and similar acts.

LXXII. This is clearly proved by the fact that the wise men of the Gentiles are accused by the Apostle of worshipping and serving the creature rather than the Creator because they religiously worshipped the sun, moon, and stars, heroes, and spirits. And yet it is certain that these wise Gentiles did not regard the sun, heroes, and spirits as the highest gods, but as ministers of the highest God, whom they called the Father of gods and men, and whom they believed to be honored in those lower gods. (Romans 1:25)

LXXIII. Thus Orosius reports that the pagans used to admit that they did not follow many gods, but revered many ministers under one great God. Similarly, the ancient writer of the *Recognitions* introduces the same pagans as saying, "We also say that there is one God who is the Lord of all. But these are gods. Just as there is one Caesar, who has many judges under him, such as prefects, consuls, tribunes, and other powers, so we believe that there is one God of all, who has arranged these [gods] in this world under Him, subject to the greater God, but also dispensing affairs in this world." (Orosius, *History*, book 6, beginning; Clement, *Recognitions*, book 5)

LXXIV. Therefore, when Celsus, in Origen's work, affirms that those who worship many gods, by worshipping one who is subordinate to the supreme God, are pleasing to the supreme God: "For no one is to be honored unless he whom the supreme God wants to be honored: therefore, whoever worships his subjects does not offend him whose subjects they all are." He wants the lower powers under the supreme God to be worshiped in such a way that God is never left out, neither by night, nor by day, neither in private nor in public, neither in any thoughts nor in works, but always with the soul intent on God, whether with or without these [powers]. (Against Celsus, book 5)

LXXV. This is consistent with what Hierocles teaches: the gods should be recognized and worshipped as distinct from their author and parent, but their dignity should not be excessively elevated; ultimately, all worship should be referred to their single creator, whom you may properly call the supreme and best. (Hierocles, *On the Golden Verses of Pythagoras*)

LXXVI. Therefore, since the wise men of the pagans worshipped the sun, moon, and spirits with a certain inferior worship, not as supreme gods, but only as ministers of the supreme

God, and referred all this worship to the honor of the supreme God, as is evident from the cited testimonies; and yet are said by the apostle to have exhibited Latria, that is, divine worship, to the creature, it is clear that those who worship angels and deceased saints with prayers and hymns, vows and oaths conceived in their name, various offerings, sacred buildings, and feast days dedicated to their honor, cannot be purged from the crime of Latria, even if they protest that they do all these things not as to supreme gods, but as to God's ministers and friends, and therefore gods only by participation; and that these acts are ultimately referred to the honor of the supreme God.

LXXVII. Nor should anyone say that the pagans are accused by the apostle of offering Latria to creatures because they offered sacrifices to them, which by all admission pertain to the worship of Latria. For the sacred Scripture condemns the Gentiles not only for sacrificing to creatures but also for worshipping them with a holy kiss. From this crime, the holy man Job declares himself to be free, saying, "If I have seen the sun when it shined, or the moon walking in brightness; and my heart hath been secretly enticed, or my mouth hath kissed my hand." (Job 31:26-27)

LXXVIII. Moreover, according to the hypothesis of the doctors of the Roman School, if it is permitted to worship creatures even with Latria, provided it is not absolute but relative, no solid reason can be given why it should not be permissible to sacrifice to them relatively. And if it is good and pious to make vows to angels and saints reigning with Christ, and to swear by them, insofar as God dwells in them by glory and divine truth shines in them, and they are gods by participation, why should it be impious and forbidden to offer sacrifices to them on this account and in this respect? Nor did the ancient doctors of the Church reserve sacrifices alone for the divine worship which it is unlawful to give to creatures; but as we have seen above, they also reserved prayers and hymns, which they teach should be directed only to God, the Lord of all.

LXXIX. But sacred Scripture not only says in general that one God is to be worshipped and that Latria is not to be given to creatures, but also specifically forbids giving any religious worship to angels. If it is not permitted to worship angels religiously, much less will it be permitted to apply such worship to deceased saints; since angels surpass humans in the excellence of their nature, and are not inferior to saints in grace and glory. The Apostle Paul expressly condemns the religious worship of angels. "Let no man beguile you of your reward in a voluntary humility and worshipping of angels, intruding into those things which he hath not seen, vainly puffed up by his fleshly mind." (Colossians 2:18) Here the Apostle simply prohibits the worship of angels. It cannot be reasonably denied that those who build sacred buildings in honor of angels, dedicate feast days to them, solemnly invoke them in religious places, seek their patronage and protection with prayers, and bow their knees and prostrate themselves before them as if they were present and looking on, do indeed worship angels religiously. Therefore, according to Paul's mind, such people are either deceived by them or vainly puffed up by their fleshly mind.

LXXX. If, according to the Apostle's judgment, any such worship was due to angels, if it was permissible to dedicate feasts and oratories to angels, to sing hymns to them in the public assemblies of the faithful, to invoke them and prostrate themselves before them, he would not have simply condemned the worship of angels; but if there was anything excessive in the religious worship of angels introduced by impostors among the Colossians, he would have distinctly noted it and separated the legitimate worship of angels from the illegitimate in some way: as the doctors of the Roman School would undoubtedly do if any sect were to arise now which, in their judgment, attributed too much to angels in this regard.

LXXXI. To this, the doctors of the Roman Church respond with various arguments and inventions; but their vanity immediately becomes apparent to anyone who weighs and considers the matter without affection and prejudice. Cardinal Perron wants to understand by the term "worship of angels" not the worship given to angels but rather that which was taught by angels; and by this term, he conjectures is meant the Jewish religion, or Mosaic rites, since in other places the law is said by Paul to have been ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator. Hence, according to his interpretation, the Apostle's goal is to recall the Colossians from Jewish worship and the ceremonies of the Mosaic law. (Against the King of Great Britain, book 5, chapter 6)

LXXXII. But this interpretation of Perron is entirely new and unheard of among Christians until his time. For not only do the ancient writers, such as Origen, Chrysostom, Hilary under the name of Ambrose, Pelagius under the name of Jerome, Theodoret, Theophylact, and Oecumenius, understand by the worship of angels that which has angels as its object; but no interpreter of the Roman Church, before Perron, ever took Paul's words in that sense. Nor could the authority of such a great Cardinal persuade the most learned men in that Church after him to approve of this interpretation. But it was explicitly rejected by them as empty, as among others by the Jesuit Petavius, a notable antiquarian. (Theological Dogmas, volume 3, book 2, chapter 9, paragraph 16)

LXXXIII. Certainly, in sacred Scripture, the Mosaic law is nowhere called the worship of angels, nor can any example of this nomenclature be found among any authors, whether profane or ecclesiastical. Nor, even if this term were used, could it be applied to this passage of Paul. For Paul, in the preceding verses, abundantly fortified the Colossians against the fraud of the Judaizing impostors, saying, "Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a holy day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbath days: which are a shadow of things to come; but the body is of Christ." What need would there be to repeat the same matter in those obscure and ambiguous words? Moreover, Paul asserts that those who introduce the worship of angels walk in things they have not seen, that is, they intrude into things they do not know and babble about unknown matters: which indeed fits well with the worshippers of angels, who utter many incomprehensible things about the nature, orders, and offices of angels; but it does not fit those who are addicted to the Mosaic law; since the Mosaic discipline is accurately explained in the sacred volumes and open to all who wish to know it.

LXXXIV. Therefore, the theologians of the Roman School resort to another solution to defend their Church's faith and practice against such clear apostolic law. The solution of many of the more learned among them is that the Apostle does not condemn the religious worship and invocation of angels or saints, but only false, superstitious, and idolatrous worship. They say that Simon Magus, Cerinthus, and their disciples taught such worship. But this is merely their invention, which has no foundation in the Apostle's words or doctrine. For the Apostle does not teach or imply that there is a kind of pious and legitimate worship of angels, but simply and in general condemns the worship of angels. Therefore, whatever errors the ancient heretics may have had concerning the nature, offices, and worship of angels, it does not prevent Paul's prohibition from also being violated by those who today worship angels with religious worship and exhibit any kind of religious worship to angels and saints. The Apostle absolutely prohibits the worship of angels, not just the kind said to have been taught by Simon or Cerinthus. It is clear that those who worship angels and saints with prayers, hymns, basilicas, oratories, feasts, donations, and all kinds of offerings, as is customary in the Roman Church, are indeed worshipping angels and saints; and consequently, what the Roman Church does in this regard is condemned by the Apostle, no less than what Simon or Cerinthus or similar heretics are said to have done.

LXXXV. The doctors of the Roman School respond that the rites and acts by which they honor angels and saints do not constitute divine worship, because they venerate angels and saints not as gods, but as ministers of God and our intercessors with God. They argue that the term "religion" or "worship" is properly applied to the worship given to God alone. However, from the Apostle's text, it can be sufficiently inferred that those he rebukes, and from whom he warns us to be cautious, did not regard angels as gods, but as messengers and ministers of the supreme God and our mediators and intercessors with God, as indicated by the very name "angel," which means messenger. Furthermore, these deceivers professed to be Christians and venerated angels under the pretext of humility, as if they were unworthy to approach God directly and therefore needed the mediation and intercession of angels. Hence, it is clear that they venerated angels with a certain subordinate worship, considering it inferior to that due to the supreme God. Therefore, according to the Apostle's mind, those who venerate angels with a certain inferior worship also fall under the prohibition of angel worship.

LXXXVI. We can gather the nature of the religion of those pseudo-Christians, who were called Angelici by the ancients, from the Council of Laodicea, which included this canon in the code of universal Church canons: "It is not right for Christians to abandon the Church of God and go to invoke angels and hold assemblies, which is forbidden." What it means to invoke angels is explained by Theodoret, who, commenting on the epistle to the Colossians, says, "Those who defended the law also led people to the worship of angels, saying that the law was given through them; and this vice continued in Phrygia and Pisidia. Therefore, the Synod convened in Laodicea in Phrygia prohibited praying to angels. Even to this day, the oratories of Saint Michael can be seen among them and their neighbors." These people, led by a sense of

humility, persuaded others that since the God of the universe could not be seen, touched, or comprehended, they should seek to gain divine favor through the mediation of angels.

LXXXVII. Therefore, according to the Fathers of the Synod of Laodicea and Theodoret's explanation of its canon, invoking angels and praying to them to gain divine favor is an illicit worship of angels and a sin against the Apostle's precept condemning the worship and religion of angels. Building oratories for angels, including Saint Michael, as part of the practice of the Roman Church, aligns with this condemned practice. Dionysius Petavius, a Jesuit, acknowledges that the Roman Church seeks the protection and patronage of angels through prayers and vows, and venerates them as mediators to God. They also build oratories and basilicas in their honor and dedicate feast days to their worship.

LXXXVIII. It is absurd, as Estius observes, to interpret Theodoret's reference to oratories dedicated to Saint Michael as places consecrated by heretics for their illicit worship of angels. He argues that these places, once polluted by the idolatry of heretics, were converted by the prudent bishops of the time into oratories dedicated to Saint Michael. It is irrational to imagine that Theodoret meant to say that the ancient heretics used to pray to angels and that the Synod of Laodicea prohibited this, and that therefore, the places where they prayed to angels were prudently converted into oratories of Saint Michael by the Orthodox. Theodoret does not hint at such conversion or the supposed prudence of the bishops. Theodoret's point is to prove that the vice of invoking angels persisted for a long time in Phrygia and Pisidia, as evidenced by the oratories dedicated to Saint Michael seen there even in his time. Such oratories were not found in other parts of the Christian world.

LXXXIX. Furthermore, the fact that sacred Scripture regards prayer and invocation as an integral part of divine worship, and as a distinguished and principal duty of our religion towards God, confirms that neither angels nor the blessed spirits of the just are to be prayed to or invoked. Therefore, the temple of God is called a "house of prayer" in Scripture, and the prayers and invocations of the faithful are proposed as a spiritual sacrifice. We are taught to invoke only Him in whom our faith rests. As the Apostle says, "How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed?" (Isaiah 56:7, Matthew 21:13, Psalms 14:1-2, Hebrews 13:15, Romans 10:14).

XC. The doctors of the Roman Church respond that the prayer proposed by Scripture as part of the worship proper to God is absolute prayer, which asks someone to be the author and giver of blessings; not relative prayer, which asks someone to pray to God for us and to obtain from Him the things we need. They claim that they invoke angels and saints not as the authors of blessings, but only as their intercessors and our advocates before God. Therefore, they argue that they do not ask angels and saints for anything other than to pray to God for us, just as we ask the faithful living on earth to assist us with their prayers to God.

XCI. However, the Roman Church, when invoking angels and saints, does not simply say to them, "Pray for us"; nor does it merely ask them to intercede with God for us. Instead, they use many prayers directed to them in the same form as those addressed to God, not only in private devotions but also in public and solemn worship. In these, the Blessed Virgin is asked, "Protect us from the enemy, and receive us at the hour of death"; "Grant us a pure life, and a safe path"; "Free us from our sins, make us meek and chaste." John the Baptist is asked, "Look upon us with pity, and wash away our sins." John the Apostle is asked, "Remove the plague, take away the ulcer, and heal the sick"; "Drive away disease, defeat the enemy, and remove scandal." Similar things are said to many other saints, as we have extensively shown in the first part of these theses.

XCII. They respond that when they pray to the saints in this manner, their intention is not that the saints themselves grant and bestow these blessings by their own power, but only that they obtain them from God by their merits and prayers. Therefore, although the words may suggest otherwise, they mean only that the saints, by their intercession, obtain what they ask from God. But certainly, nothing compels them to think and speak differently. If they ask the saints for nothing more than to pray to God for them, why do they use the words of absolute prayer to them and not simply reiterate the solemn "Pray for us"?

XCIII. Certainly, it is acknowledged by all that it is permissible to ask the saints living among us to pray to God for us. However, it would not be tolerated for someone to address a holy man living on earth as they address the Virgin Mary, saying, "Remove our troubles, grant heavenly gifts"; "Free us from sins, make us meek and chaste." Or to say to Saint Benedict, "Grant us to ascend the narrow way, giving us eternal rewards." Or as in the hymn to Saint Nicholas, "Take away the dangers of death, grant the help of life; so that after the exile of the flesh, we may be with you in glory." If any Apostle had been addressed with such a prayer, they would have rebuked it as impious and commanded that such things be asked from the Lord, not from them. Therefore, should we think that now, in heaven, they would be pleased with what they once regarded as impious and sacrilegious while living on earth?

XCIV. Moreover, in the usage of the Roman Church, there are not a few prayers directed to saints in which blessings of grace and glory are asked of them, and they are requested to bestow them on us by the power entrusted to them and by divine command and mandate. This is clearly different from obtaining such blessings for us from God through their prayers. For example, it is said to the Apostles in general, "You who close the heavens with a word, and open them, free us from all sins by your command, we beseech you." This is followed by, "Health and sickness of all, heal the sick by your power, restoring us to virtues." Likewise, "Free us from guilt, we beseech you." And specifically to the Apostle Peter, "Release the bonds of sin by the power entrusted to you, which closes and opens heaven to all."

XCV. Even if the Roman Church asks nothing else from the Saints than that they pray to God for us, this cannot be legitimately defended by the example of prayers that believers request from each other; when, for instance, they ask their brothers, when pressed by some necessity, to assist them with their prayers to God. For from the fact that Scripture admonishes us to assist each other with prayers and to seek mutual help in this way, it does not follow that someone living in Europe could, without foolishness or even impiety, verbally or mentally address a holy man living in China or America, and ask him, as if seeing and hearing, to intercede with God for him and obtain what he feels he needs. How then can we conclude that we can piously and reasonably request from Saints who have died in Christ, whether by voice or by the mere affection of the heart, to pray to God for us; when they are now received into heavenly Paradise and are as distant from us as the highest heaven is from the earth; nor do we have any means of communication with them until we enjoy a similar blessedness; and no method of mutual conception? Therefore, from the prayers that believers on earth request from each other while they are still fighting together, it no more follows that Saints who have already been received into heaven can be invoked by us, than it formerly followed, according to the doctrine of the Roman Church, that the souls of the fathers detained in Limbo could be invoked by the believers living at that time.

XCVI. The Roman School Theologians indeed suppose that the spirits of the just admitted into heaven, despite such a great distance, know and perceive what is happening on earth; and that the Saints can simultaneously hear the prayers of all who invoke them, see their needs, and observe their intimate thoughts and hidden affections, and certainly know them. However, this should not be assumed without God's word and clear reason: to pronounce this based on our conjectures and suspicions is plainly to step into things unseen.

XCVII. Nor is it our duty to prove the contrary; although many arguments could be brought from Scripture in this matter. For, to abstain from imploring the prayers and help of the deceased Saints, it is enough that we do not know whether they hear us, nor do we see this revealed in God's Word. It is incumbent on those who affirm this to prove what they say; and the knowledge of our affairs that they attribute to the souls of the Saints must be demonstrated with an invincible argument or a clear oracle of Scripture. Otherwise, this devotion to the pious souls of the Saints will be entirely shaky and will be done without faith.

XCVIII. How weak and trivial are the arguments from Scripture to support such a significant matter will become easily apparent to anyone who examines them. Firstly, they argue that the saints reigning with Christ in heaven know what happens on earth, and thus perceive the prayers of all who invoke them, and see their thoughts and hearts, by citing examples of certain individuals while alive knowing distant and future events, and even the secrets of the heart. For example, Elisha, who said to his servant Gehazi, "Was not my heart with you when the man turned from his chariot to meet you?" And Samuel, who said to Saul, "I will tell you all that is in your heart" and about the donkeys of your father which you lost. Similarly, Peter knew that

Ananias and Sapphira had deceived regarding the price of the field, even though he was absent. And Paul, seeing the heart of the lame man, knew that he had faith to be healed. But what kind of conclusion is this: the prophets and apostles knew certain hidden things, relevant to their office, revealed by God; therefore, the souls of the blessed, received into heavenly glory, know what happens on earth, see the needs of all who invoke them, and perceive prayers conceived either by voice or by heart and affection? From this, it indeed follows that God can reveal the needs, actions, and thoughts of those living here to the blessed spirits of the just, as He pleases; but whether He does this or not cannot be concluded from this in any way. 2 Kings 5, 1 Samuel 9, Acts 5, Acts 14.

XCIX. If anyone argues that the duty assigned by God to the deceased saints requires them to have knowledge of our affairs because they are appointed by God as our patrons and intercessors, they are proving an unknown by another unknown. For the word of God nowhere teaches that the saints enjoying heavenly glory are given to us by God as patrons and mediators who intercede with God for us; indeed, the contrary is sufficiently evident from sacred Scripture. Nor can it be said that it pertains to the beatitude of the saints to hear the prayers of those invoking them, as this would add to their greater glory. For if the invocation of saints in Christ who have died is a superstitious and illicit practice, devised only by men, it in no way pertains to the glory of the saints to know who is invoking them. And it should first be proven that it is pleasing and acceptable to God that the saints reigning with Him be invoked before it can be supposed with any probability that such invocation contributes to their glory.

C. Moreover, Roman School theologians argue that the saints triumphing in heaven are not ignorant of what humans do and what happens in this lower world; indeed, they assert that even the secret thoughts of humans are not hidden from them, on the grounds that such knowledge does not escape the angels. For Christ Himself testifies that the righteous in heaven will be like the angels of God (Matthew 22:30). Therefore, since they ought to be equal to angels, it is not thought that they are surpassed by angels in knowledge of our affairs. Now, it is believed that heavenly angels know what happens on earth and the inner movements and affections of human hearts because they are said to rejoice over one sinner who repents more than over ninety-nine righteous persons who do not need repentance. For if the repentance of sinners is known to them, surely they know what happens in the world, not only externally but also internally in the heart of the sinner, where true repentance and sorrow for sins occur. Luke 15:10.

CI. But it is not surprising that angels, who are "ministering spirits sent to serve those who will inherit salvation," as they are present with us and engage with us in their ministry, know what pertains to us, especially the repentance and conversion of sinners, to which they are appointed by God's command. However, as we have already said, it cannot be shown from the word of God that a similar duty has been assigned to the blessed souls of the righteous. Nor does it help to affirm that Christ said the righteous in heaven will be like the angels; for this equality

or similarity with angels should not be extended beyond Christ's purpose, which is to teach that the righteous, after the resurrection, will lead an angelic life, free from the necessities and infirmities of this life, neither marrying nor being given in marriage, as is clear from Christ's words in Matthew. Moreover, it does not follow that each angel knows the thoughts and prayers of each individual human, simply because Christ says that the angels rejoice over one sinner who repents. Just as we can truly say that there is great joy in the Church of God when one sinner turns to God; it does not follow that each member of the Church knows the thoughts, words, and deeds of all others.

THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE FIRST MAN. In which the Doctrine of the Roman
School is Expounded, & compared with the Doctrine of the Protestants.

Thesis I

The first man, before he sinned, was not subject to death, as we all are now, but in a certain sense was immortal, is a fact admitted by all Doctors of the Roman Church. For by common consent they defend against the Pelagians that the necessity of dying, which now hangs over us, arose from sin and would not have had a place if man had remained in that original integrity.

II. However, to better understand what their opinion on this matter is, they observe that the first man in a state of integrity was in some sense mortal and in some sense immortal. For someone can be called mortal in two ways, and likewise immortal in two ways. In one way, a person is mortal who necessarily has to die. In another way, a person is called mortal who can die. And again, in one way, a person is immortal who cannot die. In another way, a person who does not necessarily have to die.

III. In the first way, according to their view, Adam in the original state was not mortal, but only in the latter way. For he did not necessarily have to die: nor would he have actually died if he had persevered in original justice. But still, it could happen that he might die, as indeed happened after his fall. Through sin, both he and all his posterity became mortal in the first way because they incurred the necessity of dying. Similarly, man in a state of innocence was not immortal in the first way; for he was not such that he could simply not die. However, he was immortal in the latter way, as he could avoid dying, and if he remained faithful in the service of God, he would not have experienced death.

IV. From this, one can deduce the difference between the immortality of the first man in a state of integrity and that which will befit the righteous after the blessed resurrection. For the saints after the resurrection will be in no way mortal: they will not only be free from the necessity of dying but will be completely incapable of dying and incurring death or mortality by sinning. And thus, they will be immortal in both ways, because they will not only be able not to die but will also be incapable of dying, and death will never have any power over them.

V. However, in explaining this matter, some diversity can be noted among the Doctors of the Roman Church. In this, they all agree that Adam in a state of integrity could avoid dying and indeed, if he had not sinned, would never have died. But they dispute among themselves whether Adam, remaining innocent, should only be said to have been able not to die, or whether it can also be said that he could not die in that state.

VI. Some say that man, even in his state of innocence, could always have died, and that the immortality of the first man consisted only in that he was not subject to the necessity of dying, as we are now due to sin. For man, even while remaining in integrity, could have died if a force had been inflicted on his body by another who had forsaken the first innocence, although

such an event would not have happened because God, by his providence, would have averted all danger.

VII. Furthermore, they add that the first man and all his posterity would have eventually died by natural necessity, namely due to the conflict of the elements of which the human body is composed, unless God had transferred them to a state of immortality before that happened. And such a death, if it had occurred, would not have been penal for man any more than for beasts, but natural for both. Hence, it follows that man, although persevering in integrity, always had the possibility of dying; nor can it truly be said of him that he could not die in that state, although he could avoid dying and was not subject to the necessity of dying. Estius attributes this opinion to Scotus and some others. In book 2, sentences, distinction 19, number 2.

VIII. However, he himself, there and in the following number, testifies that he, along with many others, is of a different opinion. For he entirely believes that man, while maintaining the first innocence, could not die. Not only because it would have happened that man, persevering in the service of God, would not have died, but also because the order of things once established by God necessarily required it, nor could it have been otherwise.

IX. To understand this, he notes that man was not instituted by God as a mere servile creature, as the nature of brutes is instituted, which therefore are naturally subject to death and can be killed for the utility of man: indeed, some creatures become the food for others through death. But God made man, like the angels, by his nature free and the lord of other things, and, moreover, as a partner and friend of God himself through grace and justice. Hence it is understood that man was so constituted that nothing adverse would happen to him as long as he remained in the friendship of God: but that it would always be that these two would be joined together and follow each other: to be good and to be happy; likewise to be innocent and to be free from misery. And this law is perpetual, as divine justice demands, so that if it were taken away, the order of the universe would be deformed.

X. However, he says this should be understood according to the order once instituted. For, he says, if we speak of the absolute power of God, there is no doubt that God could have constituted human nature without any injury to it, as the Lord of all creation, so that even if man had maintained his innocence in his soul, his body would be similar to brute animals in condition, subject to death and other things no less than they are. Therefore, although Adam in the state of innocence could have sinned and by sin become subject to death, and thus it is true in a divided sense that Adam in integrity could die, he insists that it is false in a conjunct sense because he could not die as long as he maintained his innocence.

XI. However, whatever way the theologians of the Roman School explain this immortality of the first man, they all now seem to agree that it should be called supernatural, not natural, as natural is opposed to supernatural. This is especially affirmed and proven with many arguments by Bellarmine, in his book on the Grace of the First Man, chapter 9. And Becanus in his Summa of Scholastic Theology, volume 1, treatise 5, chapter 4, question 1.

XII. Indeed, there were some in the past century among the Doctors of the Roman Church who believed that the immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace, but his

natural condition. However, this opinion was condemned by Roman Popes Pius V and Gregory XIII in a singular bull, in which they condemned many articles of some recent theologians. Among those articles is this one, article 75: The immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace but his natural condition. As Bellarmine himself testifies in his book on the Grace of the First Man.

XIII. To more distinctly understand the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman School on this question, it seemed proper here to refer to what Gul. Estius accurately and clearly explained in the second book of sentences, distinction 19, number 9. There, in response to the question, Whether the immortality of the first state was natural to man, he answers through many and various distinctions. And he teaches that it was in some sense natural to him and in some sense above nature; just as death is in some sense natural to fallen man, in some sense against nature.

XIV. Firstly, he says, something is called natural that is present from the first institution of nature. And in this sense, he says that immortality was natural to the first man, but death was against nature, since man was initially instituted as immortal, that is, free from the necessity of dying.

XV. Also, it is said to be natural what each being naturally desires. And in this sense, he also concedes that immortality is natural to man and death is against nature, since all creatures by nature desire immortality, but avoid death.

XVI. Furthermore, natural can signify what is inherent from birth, whether it is good and suitable for nature and agrees with natural desire, or not. And thus, he also admits that immortality was natural to the first man, but mortality is natural to us. For he was created immortal, while we are born subject to death.

XVII. Again, he adds that natural can be said of what has a cause in nature itself. And also, he says, in this way immortality was in some sense natural to the first man. For in the best constitution of the human body as an internal cause, and in the tree of life as an external cause (both of which were natural for that effect), immortality consisted.

XVIII. However, he teaches that the same immortality was also supernatural to man in another sense: partly due to justice, from which that good constitution of the body and consequently immortality itself depended. For, he says, that justice was supernatural, as through it the soul was subjected to God and adhered to Him as its supernatural good and end. While this subjection lasted, there was a certain supernatural power in the soul by which it could preserve the body from all corruption. Partly due to the body or the matter from which man was made. Since it was earthly, it did not have the cause of immortality in itself, but rather of mortality. Therefore, although the first man had some cause of immortality in his nature, it was not full and total. Rather, if we separate supernatural gifts from him and consider only the natural, he was mortal, so that it was necessary for him to die. For he was composed of contraries, whose conflict necessarily eventually leads to the corruption of the composite itself. Thus, in this way, immortality was supernatural to the first man. However, because supernatural is properly opposed only to what is called natural in the fourth way from the modes already enumerated, and not in the first, second, or third way; according to which, however, immortality cannot simply be

called natural to the first man; because natural causes alone, as we said, were not sufficient to grant it to man; therefore, it is more correct to call immortality absolutely supernatural to an integral man rather than natural. Hence the proposition that the immortality of the first man was not a benefit of grace but a natural condition was rightly disapproved by the Apostolic See, especially if its sense is that immortality was so due to human nature that God could not have created it mortal. This is known to be utterly false.

XIX. As for the Doctors of the Reformed School, they also unanimously teach that man in a state of innocence was somewhat immortal. Nor do they explain that immortality in a dissimilar way. For like the Doctors of the Roman Church, they distinguish between the immortality by which someone cannot die and that by which someone can avoid dying and is free from the necessity of dying. In the first way, they teach that only the blessed after the resurrection will be immortal; but in the latter way, only man in a state of integrity was immortal; so that in that state there was the possibility of dying, which is not in the blessed, but there was not, as there is in us now through sin, the necessity of dying.

XX. Josué Placaeus explains this matter in his Theses on the State of Adam before the Fall, Thesis 32. He says, "Adam was not immortal in the way we will be after the blessed resurrection: for he could die, just as he could sin. Nor was he mortal as we are mortal in this state of sin: for he could avoid dying, just as he could avoid sinning."

XXI. Similarly, Paraeus says that the immortality by which man was corporeally immortal before sin was the power not to die or the negation of the act of dying based on the hypothesis of union with an originally perfect soul, even though the body of man was in itself mortal. He says, "Immortality signifies, first, the absolute and natural impotence of dying. In this way, only God has immortality. Thus, the Fathers deny, and we deny, that man was immortal by nature. Second, the impotence of dying by the grace of creation: thus, angels and human souls are immortal. Third, the impotence of dying by the grace of a gift: thus, the bodies of the blessed will have immortality. Fourth, the power not to die or the negation of the act of dying based on some hypothesis, even if it is mortal in itself. Thus, man before sin was corporeally immortal, based on the hypothesis of union with an originally perfect, immortal soul." In his book *Against Bellarmine on the Grace of the First Man*, chapter 9.

XXII. Tilenus also, in his *Disputation on the External State of the First Man*, thesis nine, says, "It is certain that the immortality of the first man was not exactly the same as the glorious immortality of the blessed. For just as it is one thing to be able not to sin and another thing not to be able to sin, so it is one thing to be able not to die and another thing not to be able to die. The former is of nature, the latter is of glory. The former immortality removes the act of dying but does not exclude the possibility; the latter abolishes and extinguishes both."

XXIII. However, they insist that the immortality which befitted man in his original integrity should rather be called natural than supernatural, and indeed that the first man was in some sense naturally immortal. This is the doctrine of the Theses of the cited *Disputation of Tilenus*, thesis eight. Where he asserts that man is truly said to be naturally immortal. However, in thesis two, explaining his mind more distinctly, he teaches that the body of the first man was

indeed corruptible by itself, being composed of contrary and conflicting qualities: but nevertheless was to be preserved incorruptible by the pact of God, if man had remained in God's service without sin.

XXIV. Thus, Josué Placaeus also pronounces on this matter in the thesis already cited. He says, "Adam's ability not to die was as natural as his ability not to sin. The dominion of death was no more natural than that of sin. Indeed, he had the possibility of dying by nature, but the necessity from sin." He gives this reason for it, that it is just for physical faculties to follow the condition of moral ones, which have dominion in man: Hence he concludes that in Adam the same was true of life and justice. And therefore, since justice was natural to him, the ability not to die must also have been natural.

XXV. However, Paraeus distinguishes between integral nature and corrupt nature. And he says that Adam's immortality, with respect to integral nature, was natural; but with respect to corrupt nature, not immortality but mortality, which is the necessity of dying, is rightly called natural. And further, he distinguishes between integral man and his body considered in itself. And he maintains that immortality was natural to man, not to the body in itself, in the ninth chapter of Bellarmine on the Grace of the First Man. However, in the fifth chapter, he teaches that whatever lay adjacent to the principles of nature for its perfection was natural to integral man; and without which nature in its principles was not at first constituted.

XXVI. Moreover, in this question, it is entirely certain, and as appears from what has been said, agreed upon by the common consensus of both the Roman and Reformed Schools, that man before sin was free from the necessity of dying, but that in him, as in the possibility of sinning, so also was the possibility of dying. And that man was immortal in no other sense than this.

XXVII. Nor do the theologians of the Roman School, as we have shown above, deny that the immortality which belonged to the first man before sin can in some respect and sense be called natural, namely, in so far as natural signifies what is inherent from the first origin and not adventitious and superadded. Also, in so far as natural is opposed to what is contrary to nature and signifies what adorns and perfects the same nature.

XXVIII. The only remaining question is whether this immortality should be called natural or supernatural with respect to integral man, speaking simply. Protestants affirm this, while the Doctors of the Roman School deny it.

XXIX. However, this question is only about the name with respect to those Protestants who define natural, as Paraeus does, as that without which nature in its principles was not originally constituted. In this sense, as we have seen, the Doctors of the Roman School admit that immortality was natural to the first man.

XXX. A real difference remains only among those Protestants who claim that, without any supernatural help, integral man could have avoided death forever, and the Roman School, which denies this by common consent.

XXXI. However, since it is established that the necessity of dying, which now hangs over us, is not from nature but from sin, and if man had persevered in his original integrity, life would

always have been joined with his justice by the most wise and equitable ordinance of God, this question does not seem to be of such great importance.

XXXII. However, to more distinctly reveal what my opinion is on this matter. I observe that in the Reformed Schools, there are two opinions concerning the perpetual life of integral man. For some think that the first man, if he had remained in the service of God according to the natural covenant made with him by God, would have indeed lived perpetually, but only an earthly and animal life, which would never have been changed into a celestial and glorious one. This is the doctrine of Moses Amyraldus in his Theses on the three divine covenants.

XXXIII. However, the more common opinion holds that if man had never fallen from his original integrity, he would have been eventually taken up to a blessed and glorious immortality in the heavens, after some period spent on earth, as seemed fit to divine wisdom. And this through a change similar to that which the pious and holy men, whom the last judgment will find alive on earth, will experience.

XXXIV. If we follow this more common and probable opinion, it is certain that man would never have lived perpetually without supernatural assistance. For that change through which man would have been taken up to celestial life would not have been natural, but supernatural.

XXXV. However, that man could have lived forever with an earthly and animal life, as the former opinion asserts, without any supernatural gift or help, seems in no way probable to me. Nor can I understand how a body composed of elements, and therefore naturally and in itself corruptible, could be preserved from corruption forever without any supernatural help. In this matter, I follow the judgment of Peter Molinaeus, who also has no doubt that man, however perfect his natural bodily constitution might have been, would need supernatural help and the continuous assistance of God to preserve this immortality. In his Theses on the State of Innocence, Thesis 50.

THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON
THE JUSTICE OF THE FIRST MAN
Whether it was Natural or Supernatural.
In which the Doctrine of the Roman School is Expounded, &
compared with the Doctrine of the Protestants.

Thesis I

The common doctrine of the Roman Church is that the first man, before he sinned under the instigation of the Devil, was endowed with true justice and holiness, by which he was pleasing and acceptable to God for eternal life. This is clearly taught by the Council of Trent itself in the fifth session, decree on Original Sin, where it pronounces anathema on anyone who does not confess that the first man Adam, after he transgressed the command of God in Paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted. Furthermore, it

condemns anyone who asserts that Adam lost the holiness and justice received from God for himself alone and not also for us.

II. Furthermore, that justice and holiness, according to the mind of the Doctors of the Roman Church, did not only consist in the fact that the mind of man was imbued with true knowledge of God, sufficient for the attainment of eternal beatitude, and his will embraced God with pure and chaste love; but also in the fact that the flesh obeyed the spirit and the body obeyed the soul without difficulty and resistance, and the sensitive appetite followed the direction of reason so that it never rebelled against it or drew man to different directions. Consequently, Adam in that state of integrity experienced no struggle between flesh and spirit, nor any rebellion of the members against the law of the mind, as we often feel in ourselves; but he was inclined to good and averted from evil without struggle and difficulty, nor did he have in himself that concupiscence with which we are now born and which persists in us until death.

III. The question arises whether that justice and holiness were natural to the first man or not. To answer this question, the Doctors of the Roman Church observe that "natural" is taken in various ways. First, natural is said of everything that is had from birth, and in this way, natural is opposed to adventitious. Second, natural is called that which is consonant with nature and which does not destroy nature but rather adorns and perfects it. In this sense, natural is opposed to what is against nature. Third, natural is called that which is either a part of nature or flows from the principles of nature or is apt to flow from them. In this sense, the body and soul, and the faculties of sensing and understanding, and the operations which are exercised by these faculties without the aid surpassing nature, are called natural. Thus, natural is opposed to supernatural.

IV. Now indeed, some among the Doctors of the Roman Church hold that the justice and holiness, which the entire Roman Church confesses were found in the first parents before sin, were natural in every way, not only in so far as natural is distinguished from adventitious or from what is against nature, but also in so far as it is opposed to supernatural. They do not consider that justice to have been a supernatural grace, but to have belonged to the natural state of man not yet corrupted and to have been a condition owed to integral nature. This is testified by Medina in 1. 2. question 18, article 2. "Some Doctors," he says, "understand by man constituted in pure natural things, man constituted in integral nature with the gift and vigor healing nature, so that he could remain and persevere in good and the duty of virtues if he wanted." This opinion without doubt seems to be Augustine's. And these are those notably learned men who, according to Bellarmine, hold that Thomas himself thought the same with other more approved authors, and that they held the opposite of what Bellarmine himself teaches.

V. However, this opinion was condemned by Roman Popes, namely, Pius V and Gregory XIII, in the last century. For among the many articles condemned in a singular Bull of these Popes, this is the twenty-first: "The elevation and exaltation of human nature into the fellowship of the divine was owed to the integrity of the first condition, and hence it should be called natural, not supernatural." The twenty-sixth is expressed in these words: "The integrity of the first condition was not an undue exaltation of human nature, but its natural condition." As Bellarmine reports in his book on the grace of the first man, chapter 1.

VI. Therefore, the common opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church is that justice and holiness can indeed be called natural in so far as natural is opposed to what is against nature and signifies what is consonant with nature and what does not destroy nature but adorns and perfects it; or also in so far as natural is opposed to adventitious and signifies what is inherent from origin or from birth. For they admit that our first parent was created in justice, and therefore they call the justice with which he was endowed in the state of integrity original. But they deny that this justice was natural in so far as natural is opposed to supernatural; because, according to their mind, it did not flow from the principles of nature but was a gratuitous gift of God which elevated man above his natural condition.

VII. However, to explain their mind more clearly in this part, they observe that something is said to be supernatural in two ways: *per se* and *per accidens*. It is called supernatural *per se*, which by its very nature is not apt to flow from the principles of nature, such as the ascent of Elijah to heaven in a fiery chariot, the strength of Samson, and other things of that kind. It is called supernatural *per accidens*, which is sometimes obtained by a divine miracle, although it usually flows from the principles of nature. Such was the sense of seeing restored to the man born blind by the Lord, the wisdom granted to Solomon by divine means, and many other things read in the Scriptures.

VIII. Now they want the gift of justice in the first man to have been supernatural not only *per accidens*, because it was granted freely and immediately and in a way surpassing nature by God, but also *per se* and in its very nature because that justice which adorned the first man neither flowed nor could flow from the principles of nature, even uncorrupted. For they do not consider that man, even if not yet infected by sin, by his own natural powers, could know and love God as much as required by justice and holiness acceptable to God for the reward of eternal life and beatitude. Nor could the body, sense, and appetite be so perfectly subjected to the soul and reason by natural powers alone and gifts that there would be no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit in man, nor any difficulty and resistance in doing good, nor any proclivity to evil, as was the case in integral man, in whom there were no disordered and rebellious movements of concupiscence against right reason.

IX. This is the doctrine of Bellarmine in his book on the grace of the first man, chapter 4. There, his fourth proposition is: "That rectitude with which Adam was created and without which after his fall all men are born was a supernatural gift." To explain this proposition, he observes that man naturally consists of flesh and spirit and therefore shares his nature partly with beasts, partly with angels: and indeed, regarding the flesh and communion with beasts, he has a certain inclination to corporeal and sensible good, to which he is drawn by sense and appetite: but regarding the spirit and communion with angels, he has an inclination to spiritual and intelligible good, to which he is drawn by intelligence and will. From these different or contrary inclinations, there arises a certain conflict in the same man, and from this conflict a great difficulty in doing good, while one inclination impedes the other.

X. Then he says that divine providence at the beginning of creation, to provide a remedy for this sickness or weakness of human nature, which arose from the condition of the material,

added to man a certain remarkable gift, namely original justice, by which, like a golden bridle, the lower part was easily subjected to the higher part and the higher part to God. Thus the flesh was so subjected to the spirit that it could not move against its will, nor become rebellious to it, unless the spirit itself became rebellious to God; but the spirit was still in the power to become rebellious to God or not. Hence, it follows that the justice of the first man was indeed natural in so far as natural is said of everything that is had from birth, and in so far as natural is said of what is consonant with nature, but it was not natural in so far as natural is distinguished from supernatural and signifies what flows from the principles of nature.

XI. The adversaries, he says, believe that the rectitude in which Adam was created was natural to him in this last sense (namely, in so far as natural is opposed to supernatural), that is, it was like a certain health due to nature, and apt to arise from nature well constituted, that is, not corrupted: and now men, who lost that rectitude in Adam, lack a certain natural good, as a beast would lack if it were born blind, or lame, or feverish. And now if that original justice were divinely restored to any man, they would say it is a supernatural gift per accidens, not per se, as we said about eyes restored to a man born blind. But we believe that the rectitude even of the lower part was also a supernatural gift, and indeed per se, not per accidens, so that it neither flowed from the principles of nature nor could it flow. And because that supernatural gift was, as we shall immediately prove, when it was removed, human nature left to itself began to experience that conflict of the lower part with the higher, which would have been natural, that is, it would have followed from the condition of the material unless God had added the gift of justice to man. Therefore, the state of man after the fall of Adam differs no more from the state of man in pure natural things than a person stripped differs from one who is naked, and human nature is not worse, if you remove the original guilt, nor does it labor under more ignorance and weakness than it would if it were constituted in pure natural things. Therefore, the corruption of nature does not arise from the lack of some natural gift, nor from the addition of some bad quality, but solely from the loss of the supernatural gift due to Adam's sin. He proves this opinion to be common among the old and recent scholastic doctors by citing many of their testimonies afterward.

XII. But although the Doctors of the Roman Church today generally agree that the justice and holiness of man in integrity and innocence was a certain supernatural gift and grace properly so called and added to nature, among them there remains a notable difference of opinions here. For some of them want the justice and holiness of the first man to have been supernatural and belonging to grace rather than to nature, yet in a certain way due to innocent nature. So that it was impossible for the first man to be constituted and created by God without such grace: because, they say, this would have been repugnant to divine goodness, justice, and wisdom. Otherwise, it would have happened that God would create man either evil or miserable, or rather both. For one who neither knows nor loves God with pure and chaste love, as befits a rational creature, and in whom bodily senses and appetites drag reason unwillingly and resistingly to lower things, and do not obey the commands and dictates of the mind but rebel and agitate

against it, cannot help but be evil and miserable. But it is contrary to divine goodness to create man evil and sinful, or at least miserable, without any fault of his own.

XIII. Therefore, they do not think that every duty is incompatible with grace, but only that which is based on good works and merits. Therefore, although God, when creating a rational creature, must, according to his goodness and wisdom, confer gifts and provide aids necessary for pursuing God with pure and chaste love and living a just, tranquil, and blessed life, those gifts and aids, according to their view, do not properly belong to nature but to grace: because such gifts and aids are not due in any way to the merits of the creature, and the creature is not sufficient by itself for those things unless it is helped by God above nature.

XIV. This is the doctrine of those who follow the teachings and views of Jansen, as can be seen in the brief Catechism they published on grace. For there, in chapter four, after asserting that the first man was created in a state of holiness and justice, knowledge, and divine love, God simultaneously forming nature and communicating grace, they teach that man could not have been created in any other state: because God can create nothing that is not ordered: and now a rational creature would be disordered unless it were created in a state of grace. They prove this from the fact that the essential order of an intellectual creature is to tend towards God as its center and origin. But it cannot tend there except by the help supplied by grace. Hence, it follows that such a creature would be outside its proper order if, not yet corrupted by sin, it were deprived of grace.

XV. These views are derived from Jansen himself, who in his posthumous book titled "Augustinus," extensively collects, proves, and amplifies the same doctrine from Augustine. Especially in the first and second books on the state of pure nature, where he confirms with many arguments and shows that man could not have been created in a state of pure nature without any grace: because by the sole powers of nature, even uncorrupted, without the aid of grace helping nature, man cannot love God with any true love, nor be blessed by any contemplation and enjoyment of God. Therefore, if God were supposed to create man in a state of pure nature without any grace, He would necessarily create him both evil and miserable: which is utterly repugnant to the goodness and wisdom of God. And he further teaches that the grace of love for God, in which the first man was created, truly retains the character of grace, although God grants it not from any debt of justice but from the fittingness of the creature's weakness, from the law of his wisdom, his kindness, and mercy, and his own rectitude. Otherwise, all sins and love flowing down to inferior things would ultimately be attributed to God, who commanded that love to be bound to Himself as its beginning and end. These are the very words of Jansen in book 1 of the state of nature, chapter 20, whose title is "How Good Will, in which a rational creature should be created, is Grace."

XVI. For as can be seen there, according to his view, even what is most properly called grace does not conflict with any duties or connaturalities, decencies, congruities, and equities arising from other sources than from the right of the creature. Therefore, although nothing is more connatural to a creature made in the image of God than to be created with the knowledge and love of God, and nothing more fitting, decent, and just with respect to God than that the

rational innocent creature, ordered to God as its natural end, should be endowed with what is necessary to attain that end, and God should in a way owe it to Himself and His attributes: nevertheless, that knowledge and love of God, without which no creature can enjoy God, deserves to be called grace even with respect to innocent creatures; both because it is not due to any merits of the creature, and because such knowledge and love surpass the natural powers of any nature unless it is helped by God above nature.

XVII. But the more common opinion of the Doctors of the Roman School differs from this. For they believe that the justice and holiness which was in the first man was not only a supernatural gift and did not pertain to nature but to grace: but also something wholly undeserved by human nature, even innocent and not yet sinful, so that nothing repugnant to divine wisdom, goodness, and justice would have been for man to be created without such justice. Hence, they posit among the possible states of man the state of pure nature, or as they call it, man in pure natural things. In this state, according to their view, man would be neither just nor unjust: neither guilty of any sin nor endowed with any grace.

XVIII. For as Jansen, already mentioned, reports and explains the mind of the Scholastics on this part, in the first book of the state of pure nature, chapter one, according to them, pure nature is called pure in a negative sense, because it has nothing superadded, either good or bad, that is not due to it: so neither does it have sin, nor the punishment accompanying sin, nor any gift of grace surpassing nature.

XIX. To easily understand what this state of nature includes, they direct us to look at fallen nature, in which whatever we find besides the guilt of sin, they profess belongs to pure nature. Indeed, their solemn rule is that pure nature differs from fallen nature as a naked person differs from one who has been stripped, who differ in no other way than that the latter has lost what the former never had: so that pure nature behaves like a negation, fallen nature like a privation.

XX. Therefore, when they teach that man can be created by God, without any preceding sin, in a state of pure nature, they mean that man in that case would be created without ordination to eternal beatitude, or the clear vision of God, and consequently without faith in the intellect and without charity loving God in the heart. Furthermore, the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, which we experience in ourselves, would be entirely natural to such a man. So much so that the merely natural order would demand that God allow those two contrary appetites to conflict with reciprocal motions, neither withdrawing his concurrence nor suppressing their mutual conflict and hostility with some superadded gift.

XXI. And therefore, with regard to the internal powers of the soul, there would be such ignorance in pure nature, such weakness in thinking, judging, and living well, and such proneness to sin, as we experience in fallen nature. But with regard to external things, it would be greater. For besides the fact that sensible objects that excite concupiscence would be the same, the evil counsel and example of wicked men would then more powerfully provoke to evil. For the knowledge of God and virtues that was communicated to Adam, the memory of God's promises and threats, the recollection of his previous state and past fall, and the promise of the

coming Christ, with the hope of His redemption, which were diffused from the head to posterity through tradition, could mitigate the ease of sinning in fallen nature; so that in this respect blindness, general corruption of morals, and proneness to sin would seem more inclined in pure nature.

XXII. This is the doctrine of Bellarmine in the seventh chapter of the book already cited. Where, responding to the seventh objection, he affirms that man, created in pure natural things, would be such as we are, regarding bodily mortality, rebellion of the members, ignorance, difficulty, and similar things. And later, in the solution to the eighth objection, he denies that the natural impulse of our flesh is more rebellious now than it would have been without grace: and that pure natural things would have been healthier before sin than they are now after sin. And in the following, he concedes that man could have been created in such a state of pure nature that there would be a propensity to vice and an impulse of sensuality in it. And he contends that nothing absurd would follow if God denied grace to a man thus created in pure natural things, which grace is necessary to remedy such evils and for man to reach eternal beatitude.

XXIII. However, Bellarmine denies there that a man created in pure natural things would therefore be under the power of the devil. In this, he departs from the opinion of Ruard Tapper. For he affirms that man can be created by God without original justice. And then not only would the aforementioned weaknesses, difficulty, and ignorance have a place in him, but also he would be afflicted by all those evils we experience, including damnation and vexation by demons. For, he says, man could be created without original justice and would be afflicted by all the evils we now experience, namely diseases, damnation, vexation by demons, and all others, which, however, would not be punishments and penalties in him, but merely torments as they are in beasts. In the explanation of the second article of the Faculty of Louvain, page 72, where he deals with original sin.

XXIV. As for the Protestants, and those who among them are called Reformed by a special name, they also, by common consent, teach that God created man in true justice and holiness: according to Ecclesiastes, God made man upright. For that rectitude could consist in nothing else but conformity with the will and law of God, in which man's justice consists. They also think that Paul alludes to this when he exhorts the faithful to put on the new man, who was created according to God in justice and holiness of truth. Where it is manifest that he alludes to the first creation, in which man is said to be created in the image and likeness of God; to which, in his view, belongs that holiness and justice which Christ works in the faithful by His Spirit.

XXV. However, they do not place that holiness and justice in which the first man was created by God solely in the fact that he acknowledged God as his Creator, as was fitting, and adhered to Him with pure and sincere love; but also in the fact that all his faculties were so well constituted and ordered that the lower faculties obeyed the higher, and the higher obeyed God without difficulty and resistance; nor was there any inclination to evil or difficulty and resistance in doing good, such as is now found in all and each individual. Therefore, according to their opinion, in the newly created man, there was nothing disordered or immoderate. Nor did any struggle or conflict of his faculties among themselves have a place in him: but all his faculties, in

the highest concord and order among themselves, conspired to the same end, namely that to which he was created by God, the author of nature.

XXVI. Moreover, they contend that this justice was natural to the first man before the fall and should be called so. Not because it constituted part of the essence of human nature, or because it necessarily flowed from the principles of human nature: but because it was something created with nature and belonging to the innate endowments of human nature not yet fallen... Therefore, according to their doctrine, that original justice was a natural gift, not a supernatural one. And it related to the soul of integral man in the same way that the just proportion and beauty of the members, vigor, and decor related to his body, which were found in him then and which regarded a certain natural, not supernatural, perfection of man: although they were not of the essence of man, nor did they necessarily flow from the principles of human nature.

XXVII. But to more clearly and certainly understand the Reformed School's opinion on this question, it will be worth briefly summarizing how some of its principal Doctors explain their views on this matter, especially since there may seem to be some diversity among them. First, therefore, Tilenus, in the first part of his "Syntagma Theologicum," in the thirty-third Disputation, Thesis fourteen, asserts that that justice can rightly be called natural, in the sense in which natural and supernatural are mutually opposed and distinguished from each other. In Thesis seventeen, he says that this original justice was as natural to the first parent as was the very nature and substantial form received through creation. Therefore, in the preceding Thesis, he affirms that this quality immediately shone forth from the original image of God in man, as accidents usually do from their subjects.

XXVIII. Amesius, in "Bellarminus Enervatus," volume four, chapter one, explaining how original justice was natural to the first man, says: "We do not say that that justice was an essential part of physical nature or flowed in a physical manner from its principles but was a moral condition owed to that nature, which was created to act justly."

XXIX. Josué de la Place, in the "Syntagma Theologorum Salmuriensium," in the Disputation on the state of Adam before the fall, Thesis eighteen, says that the original rectitude of the first man should be numbered among natural gifts, since it was nothing other than congruity with the law of nature; and a perfection that was created simultaneously with nature, and which was to be propagated through natural generation, and therefore a natural perfection corresponding to the natural faculties of man. In Thesis twenty-six, however, he concedes that original justice was indeed grace, that is, a gratuitous gift proceeding from the same three persons by whom nature itself was created: and it was not grace in the sense in which this name is opposed to nature, and signifies the effects of divine favor with which God pursues sinners in Christ.

XXX. Peter Molinaeus explains his view on this matter as follows. He contends: "We assert that Adam before the fall naturally knew and loved God. Nor do we acknowledge any proclivity to rebellion in integral nature, because there was nothing to be restrained, although there was something to be governed. Nor do we think that Adam's purity before the fall was an

extrinsic bridle or a repressive force, but a natural virtue." In his Disputation on the state of Innocence, Thesis XXV, in the "Thesaurus Theologorum Sedanensium."

XXXI. Pareus, in his book against Bellarmine on the grace of the first man, says that what is in man above the principles of nature or native endowments is supernatural for his perfection. He distinguishes nature as integral, such as it was in the state of creation before the fall, and as corrupted, such as it is in the state of sin. Hence, he observes that supernatural is said in two ways. Either it signifies what is above integral nature, or what is above corrupted nature. Now, he concedes that original justice was supernatural in the latter sense because it surpassed corrupted nature. But he denies that it was supernatural in the former sense, because it was not above the native endowments and perfections of integral nature. In chapter five, he says that original justice can be defended as natural good for the first man, no less than the faculty of seeing, feeling, etc. Because from an enlightened mind, illustrious knowledge about God and divine things flowed naturally, although through free will, just as vision flows from the eye, etc. But he adds that it is not necessary to insist on this, because for Adam, it was natural, not only what constituted his nature or flowed from the principles of constituted nature by itself: but also whatever lay adjacent to the principles of nature for its perfection, and without which nature was not primitively constituted in its principles. He affirms that our theologians mainly refer to this sense of the word natural when they contend that original justice was natural for the first man. Hence, he concludes that Bellarmine perverts the state of the question when he teaches that the question here is not whether original justice was natural for the first man in the sense that natural signifies what is present from birth, which is conceded on both sides, but whether it was natural in the sense that natural is distinguished from supernatural and signifies either what constitutes nature or what is apt to flow from the principles of nature.

XXXII. Finally, Ramburtius, in the "Syntagma Theologorum Sedanensium," in the Disputation on the image of God in man and original justice, Thesis twenty-seven, pronounces his opinion on this question: "We hold that original justice comprised the entire integrity and holiness of man, and that it was natural to man so that it was inherent in Adam's nature as soon as it existed to love and obey God, and that this gift distinguished man as soon as he was created. We do not mean by this that this holiness flowed from the powers of nature; but that this integrity was natural to man so that in the state in which he was created by God and remained, there were no disordered movements in him: just as we say that some knowledge of God is natural, in that there is nothing more natural than that which is so inherent in nature that it cannot be removed without, so to speak, destroying nature." Therefore, this justice shone in Adam as soon as he was born, and he experienced nothing contrary to this justice.

XXXIII. From this, it appears that many of the Reformed openly teach that original justice was natural to the first man because it was a perfection of the natural order, due to a rational creature not yet corrupted by sin, as it shone forth from the faculties of human nature, which is still assumed to be pure and innocent: just as health and good physical condition result from a body rightly disposed according to nature. However, others, like Pareus, seem to call that justice natural to the first man only because it was a certain perfection created with the first man

and belonged to his native and original endowments. And when they deny that it was supernatural, they only mean that it was not something superadded to the original and native endowments of man.

XXXIV. However, regardless of how it is addressed and by what reasoning it is said that original justice was natural to the first man, the common opinion of the Reformers seems to be that it is entirely repugnant to the divine goodness and wisdom for God to create a man without original justice, one who neither recognizes nor loves God as he should, and who is prone and inclined to evil, with his senses and appetites resisting reason and rebelling against the divine law. Nor do they think that such a lack of love towards God, an inclination towards evil and vice, and the rebellion of sense and appetite against the mind and divine law in a rational creature can be free from sin and guilt. Thus, they find it absurd and injurious to the Creator to say that such a rebellion of the soul's faculties and the resulting proneness to evil and resistance to good in the whole man could be a consequence of man's composition from a rational soul and an organic body, which would necessarily and naturally result unless God added something above nature that subjected reason to God and the lower part of the soul to reason.

XXXV. Therefore, they plainly consider the state of man in pure natural things, often mentioned in the Roman School, to be fictitious and impossible; in which it is supposed that man, not corrupted by sin, is yet devoid of justice and holiness, not adhering to God with pure and chaste love, but driven by his own concupiscence towards lower things, ignorant of what is necessary for true happiness, weak and impotent to do good, and prone to vice by a precipitous inclination, as can be gathered from the dissertations of Reformed Doctors who dispute against Bellarmine and other Doctors of the Roman School about original justice.

XXXVI. However, Pareus does not dare to assert that human nature could not be created without original justice. "Nor do we say," he states, "that human nature could not have been created by God without original justice. For we place no limit on divine power. We only say that God, when creating man in integrity, could not deny Himself; He could not create an integral man without integrity." In book 1, Bellarmine on the Grace of the First Man, chapter 6, response to the fourth argument.

XXXVII. Furthermore, although Reformed Doctors claim that original justice was natural to the first man, many of them do not want to affirm that the first man lacked all supernatural grace and was only adorned with natural gifts from God. This is especially seen in Peter Molinaeus, in the previously cited disputation on the state of innocence, theses 49 and 50. He says: "We do not deny that there were certain supernatural gifts in Adam. For if he derived some knowledge from revelation, or if he had anything that human nature, however pure, could not attain without a special and extraordinary gift of God, it was undoubtedly supernatural; and Adam, persevering in integrity, would not have propagated it to posterity. Moreover, just as it is undoubted that man, however perfect in natural bodily constitution, needs supernatural help and the continuous support of God to preserve this integrity, so Adam, though his nature was pure and holy, still needed continual supernatural help to preserve that purity. For even inanimate and irrational things are sustained by divine influence."

XXXVIII. Similarly, Ramburtius acknowledges supernatural gifts in Adam, in the twenty-ninth thesis of the disputation just cited. He says: "Nor do we remove supernatural gifts from Adam. For the grace of God adorned these same natural gifts, lifting them up daily: just as grace does not destroy nature but directs it and raises it higher than it can strive on its own. Therefore, the first man was not only an excellent creature but also a son of God, adopted to inherit the heavenly inheritance, that is, not only did he have reason by nature as a faithful servant, understanding the Lord's will well and executing it perfectly, but also by grace, the dignity of a son, hoping for the paternal blessing and inheritance."

XXXIX. Similar views can be read in Tilenus. He says: "The Papists criminally and slanderously assign to us the opinion of the Pelagians, as if we contend that there were no supernatural gifts in the first man, while we attribute theological virtues to him ourselves." In the thirty-eighth thesis on original justice. A little earlier, explaining more distinctly wherein the grace given to Adam consisted, he says: "As Adam's will had the ability to act justly and holy by nature, so that he would actually act and love God above all things: he was effectively moved by grace. But just as the vine does not lack its natural power to produce wine because it needs external aids, such as sun, rain, and cultivation, to actually produce, so the rectitude of will and the grace of affections in Adam were not unnatural, although they were exercised and assisted by the auxiliary grace."

XL. Therefore, that Doctor refers to supernatural grace in the first man both the actual help by which he was stirred to do good and the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity with which he was adorned. But it is difficult to understand how those virtues could have been supernatural gifts in Adam, and yet his rectitude or original justice was natural to him, or how there could be justice and rectitude acceptable and pleasing to God without faith, hope, and charity. And as in the earlier references from Ramburtius, the learned man seems to assert that the justice and holiness of the first man were natural, not supernatural, yet did not flow from the powers of nature. For how can what does not flow from the powers of nature not be supernatural? Unless we say, as Pareus does, that what is adventitious and added to native endowments is called supernatural, while original justice is called natural only in the sense that it was inherent in man from the beginning and created with him, and thus pertained to his native endowments, as he himself seems to explain. Although what he adds does not quite fit: that the justice of the first man was natural to him, just as some knowledge of God is natural to us. For the knowledge of God which he calls natural does not surpass the powers of nature.

XLI. From what has been explained so far, it is clear that the Roman School and the Reformed School agree that the first man before the fall was endowed with true justice and holiness, through which he recognized God as was fitting with his mind and loved Him with his will, and had nothing disordered in himself, nor anything that rebelled against the divine law and will, or that did not rightly submit to reason.

XLII. It is also clear that the theologians of the Roman School, at least most of them, agree with the Reformed in teaching that the first man was created in that justice and holiness, and therefore the first man never lacked it, but it was inherent in him from the beginning.

XLIII. Consequently, what follows is that most of the Doctors of the Roman Church acknowledge with the Protestants that original justice was natural to the first man, in so far as natural signifies the same as native and is opposed to what is adventitious and superadded.

XLIV. Indeed, from what we have previously mentioned, it is clear that in the Roman Church there are those who, like most of the Reformed, teach that original justice belonged to the gifts of nature, not of grace, as opposed to nature: and therefore it was natural to the first man, in so far as natural is opposed to supernatural.

XLV. Furthermore, as can be inferred from what has been said, many in the Roman Church concede to the Reformed that original justice, whatever it should be called, whether natural or supernatural, was a perfection so owed to innocent man that, consistent with divine wisdom and goodness, he could not have been created without it: and therefore the state of man in pure natural things, as described by the common view of the Roman School, and in which it is supposed that man was not a sinner but devoid of justice, prone to vice, and struggling with concupiscence against right reason, is something merely fictitious; and which the goodness, justice, and wisdom of God in the nature of things never allow to exist.

XLVI. Conversely, the Protestant Doctors concede to the Roman School that original justice was not natural to the first man, in the sense that natural signifies what constitutes nature or what necessarily, or in a physical manner, flows from the principles of human nature. Moreover, many Doctors of the Reformed School do not deny that the first man had certain supernatural gifts: and that some grace was necessary for man, even when innocent, to act rightly and justly. Indeed, some of them acknowledge that original justice did not flow from the powers of nature.

XLVII. However, there is a controversy here between the Roman School, with very few exceptions, and the Reformed School, about whether original justice was natural or supernatural to the first man. The common consensus among Reformed Doctors is that it was natural, not supernatural; on the contrary, most theologians of the Roman School insist that it was not natural but supernatural. This controversy seems to be real concerning some theologians, but verbal concerning others. It is real concerning those who believe that original justice was a perfection of the natural order corresponding to the natural faculties of man and that it belonged to nature, not grace. The theologians of the Roman School mean the opposite when they assert that this justice was supernatural. But the same controversy is verbal concerning others, who teach that this justice was natural to the first man only in the sense that it was inherent in him and should be counted among his native endowments. And when they deny that this justice was supernatural, they only mean that it was not something superadded to man's original endowments, which many theologians of the Roman Church concede.

XLVIII. Furthermore, there is a question between the Reformed School and many theologians of the Roman School about whether it is repugnant to divine wisdom and goodness for man to be created without original justice, and whether the state the Roman School calls pure nature should be numbered among the possible states of man: In which man is not corrupted by sin but is still devoid of true justice, labors under much ignorance and weakness, and is drawn to

evil by his own concupiscence, with appetites rebelling against reason, as is the case in the state of corrupted nature. This is affirmed by the common opinion of the theologians of the Roman Church, but the Reformed School unanimously denies it, with perhaps one or another exception.

XLIX. And certainly, if we hold this view, very serious absurdities will follow. Firstly, it will follow that concupiscence, through which the flesh fights against the spirit, and which the theologians of the Roman School admit to having the nature of vice and a moral evil even after original sin is remitted, which displeases and is hateful to God, and which John denies to be from the Father, could have had God Himself as its author; for, according to this hypothesis, God could have created man with it. Nor does Bellarmine's response, that this concupiscence would have arisen from the material besides God's intention, as rust from iron, whose maker, therefore, is not the blacksmith, remove the force of the argument. For the blacksmith did not create the material of the iron from which rust arises, just as God created the material of our body. And yet, without the blacksmith's fault, rust cannot be in the iron that comes from his hands.

L. For assuming that God creates a man with the same ignorance, proclivity to evil, and resistance to good with which we are now born from Adam, and does not want to help him with any supernatural grace, which the Scholastics commonly think can happen, that man will neither love God nor regulate his acts and affections according to the rule of right reason but will indulge his lust in all things and necessarily rush into various wickednesses as occasion arises, as a man born from Adam would do if he were entirely deprived of all divine grace. And therefore, God would be the author of sin; as He created a man who, through no fault of his own but as it seemed good to God to form him, cannot avoid sinning and, by a certain vice and impulse of nature, rushes headlong into various crimes and cannot love his Creator as he should. Or it must be said that a rational creature can exist which is not bound to recognize and love God and could defile itself with all filth, indulge in wrath, lust, and gluttony, ravage its kind with rape and murder, and commit other acts that the law of nature and the eternal law forbid, and yet would not be guilty of any crime and sin for this. Both of these are highly absurd and involve a certain manifest impiety.

LI. Once it is conceded, however, that man cannot be created by God without justice and holiness, the other question does not seem so important: Whether that justice and holiness in which God created the first man, and without which he could not have been created by God, belong to the endowments of nature or of grace, and whether it should be called natural or supernatural. As long as everyone agrees that it is a gratuitous gift of God, which was not due to any merits of the creature.

LII. Reason, however, seems to require us to say that it belonged to the endowments of nature and was natural rather than supernatural. For it is not supernatural but natural that pertains to the right constitution of nature and without which nature is neither healthy nor rightly constituted. Now, human nature without that holiness and justice which was inherent in integral man is not healthy but sick and cannot be said to be rightly constituted; since the rebellion of the lower faculties against reason and the proneness of the whole man to rebel against God is a disease and a certain vice of rational nature.

LIII. Furthermore, it is natural for a rational creature not corrupted to lack what is necessary to achieve its natural end. But the end of a rational creature is to recognize, love, and worship God. For this purpose, it was created by God. However, it cannot achieve this end if it is created without justice and holiness; and if it is considered as deprived of those gifts that we lost through Adam's sin.

LIV. Nor is there any natural faculty whose natural perfection does not correspond to it. Moral faculties, by which man is capable of virtue and vice, are natural to man no less than others. And what else can be the natural perfection of these but justice and holiness, which is now in question?

LV. Add that it belongs to the endowments of nature in a rational creature not corrupted but pure to conform to the law of nature and compose itself according to its rules. And therefore, whatever cannot conform to the law of nature and submit all its movements to it belongs to the endowments and order of nature. But a man destitute of all justice and holiness and subject to those weaknesses with which we are born today cannot compose himself according to the law of nature. Therefore, that holiness and justice by which such weaknesses are removed must be considered to belong to the gifts of uncorrupted nature.

LVI. Hence, it does not seem quite consistent with reason that some of the cited Reformed say that, although that justice and holiness in which the first man was created was natural to him, he nevertheless needed some supernatural help to be moved and stirred to do good. For although it is certain that without the continuous help of God man can never do anything good, not only in spiritual matters but not even in civil and human matters: therefore, even before the fall, man needed the perpetual help of God, in whom we live, move, and have our being: Nevertheless, it is not necessary that this help was of a supernatural order; but the help that did not surpass the order of nature primitively instituted by God could have been sufficient for this. For the help required for an uncorrupted and untainted creature to act according to its nature and tend to its natural end should be considered to belong to the order of nature.

LVII. However, this does not contradict what many Reformed distinctly teach, namely that there were some supernatural gifts in the first man. For God could add whatever He pleased above nature's original endowments and the aids necessary for it; but what and how much that was, we do not dare, in the absence of Scripture, to define. However, it is certain from Scripture that there was some supernatural knowledge in the first man: since God revealed Himself to him above nature and taught him His will by express word.

LVIII. Nor does it follow from the fact that man consists of a terrestrial body and a spiritual soul that there is a natural conflict of sense and appetite against reason in him: and therefore, such conflict and rebellion cannot be removed except by a supernatural gift. For man indeed has a natural twofold inclination, one towards earthly good, as he is corporeal, and the other towards spiritual good, as he is endowed with an intelligent soul: but just as the soul is far superior to its body, so it is proper for the rightly constituted nature that the movements and inclinations of the body are subjected to the commands and judgments of the soul, and thus the

appetite obeys reason. However, when things are otherwise, there appears to be a certain disorder of nature.

LIX. Nor, granted that the rectitude inherent in man was natural and not supernatural, is it as difficult as Bellarmine thinks to show how the corruption now within us, through which reason is forced to submit to the affections, invaded human nature. For that vice originated in the higher part of the soul when it began to turn away from God and direct itself toward the object of the sensitive appetite as its end. Consequently, there arose a disorder in man's moral faculties. For their original rectitude consisted in directing all their movements and affections towards God as the highest end, under the command of the mind and reason. From this end, reason cannot deviate and substitute earthly goods for it without being shamefully and contrary to its nature compelled to serve sense and appetite, whose object is now their highest end.

**THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON
THE FREE WILL OF MAN
IN GENERAL.**

In which the Doctrine of the Reformed School is Expounded.

Thesis I

Most Doctors of the Roman Church usually attribute to Calvin and others who share his religious views the notion that they take away free will from man and deprive him of all freedom in action, or at least teach that free will was entirely lost and extinguished in man through sin. This can be seen in the Jesuit Bailly's Catechesis, which Rivetus refutes in his Summa of Controversies, Tract 4, Question 4, where he disputes against the Reformed as if they simply deny free will: and in the Jesuit Martin Becanus, who says that the Lutherans and Calvinists affirm that free will was entirely abolished by the sin of the first parent. In Summa Theologica Scholastica, Tract 1, Cap. 2, Question 9.

II. However, the consistent opinion of all Reformers is that free will, simply considered, and according to its proper nature and essence, is something that cannot be separated from a rational creature: and therefore the faculty of acting freely was not entirely removed from man by sin: indeed, that a man corrupted by sin acts just as freely in what he does as he did before sin; and that if he is left to himself, he freely indulges in sin; and if he is moved and stirred by grace to strive for a better life, those acts are also free, nor is anything prejudiced against the freedom of his will by the efficacy of God's grace.

III. Among them, it is also agreed that free will, which is inseparable from man, is not an act or a habit but rather a certain faculty of the soul: and yet by this name is not meant a faculty distinct from the mind and will; but that free will belongs to man as he is endowed with intellect and will.

IV. However, not all explain in the same way wherein lies the freedom by which a man is said to be free in acting, and from which his free will is named. And first, indeed, many of the Reformed teach that the freedom by which man is said to be of free will is not simply opposed to servitude or necessity, but rather to coercion. And they usually speak as if only coercion would take away freedom, and they describe freedom as immunity from coercion.

V. Yet it is not their opinion that anything done spontaneously and without coercion is free. For they acknowledge that animals act spontaneously and yet are deprived of freedom. Therefore, they also require that one who acts is not simply driven by the impulse of nature but acts from counsel and reason. Therefore, according to their view, the full definition of freedom will be, if one says that it is immunity from coercion in him who acts from the judgment of reason.

VI. Thus, Marcus Wendelinus, in *Christian Theology*, Book 1, Chapter 5, in explanation of Thesis 18, defines free will as "an affection of the will, by which it chooses or rejects the thing shown by the intellect, by its own motion, without coercion." And a similar definition is given by Zacharias Ursinus: "Therefore, free will is the faculty or power of willing or not willing, or of choosing or rejecting the object shown by the intellect, by its own motion, without coercion." In *Catechetical Explanations*, Part 1, Question 8, number 1.

VII. From this view, it follows that freedom properly consists in the willingness with which the will follows the judgment of the intellect, not in any indifference of the will or a power to the opposite, without which the freedom of the will can still consist; although indeed the will is indifferent to many of its acts, as Wendelinus teaches in the place just cited. Where, after delivering the already mentioned definition of free will, he adds: "In general, it is sufficient for the freedom of the will that what some add, that by free will the will remains in its nature apt to choose the opposite or to suspend action, does not pertain to free will in general. Because the freedom of the will also consists without indifference to either opposite, which they call the liberty of contrariety. And therefore, there is also freedom, which is determined to one of the opposites: such as in the blessed, who act freely well, so that by confirmation in good they cannot act badly. Indeed, not even the liberty of contradiction is simply necessary for the freedom of the will: because the blessed freely praise God, who yet cannot but praise."

VIII. Therefore, although he and those who agree with him acknowledge a difference between the acts of the will; namely, that with respect to some the will is determined, but with respect to others, it remains in its nature apt to the opposites; yet they think that the will should be called free with respect to both, and that both are freely produced and elicited by the will. And therefore, they distinguish indeed between what is simply voluntary and what is out of choice: but they do not distinguish between voluntary and free. For they think both are equally extensive and that whatever is voluntary is thereby free: nor do they think that any necessity that does not overturn the nature of the voluntary overturns the nature of freedom. Therefore, although God is good by nature, they teach that He is freely good because He is not coerced but voluntarily good. As can be seen in Zacharias Ursinus in the place already cited: "Free, that is, spontaneous, which is opposed to what is involuntary and coerced: not to what is necessary. For free can consist with

necessary but not with coerced, as God and the holy angels are necessarily good: yet not coerced but most freely: because they have the principle of their goodness in themselves, a free will."

IX. Others distinctly affirm that the freedom by which man is said to be free in acting is not merely immunity from coercion, which is the necessity inflicted by the force of an external agent against the inclination of what is said to be coerced: but that this freedom is also opposed to natural necessity, or determination by nature to one. Moreover, the necessity they call natural arises from matter in their view in two ways. Either the external action does not depend on any internal action by which it is commanded: but once the faculty and the external material object are placed, the action cannot but be exercised, and indeed such and so much action. This necessity is subject to all things devoid of sense and reason. Or the external action depends on the command of the internal, so that it can be suspended and not always done in the same way, but yet the determination arises only from some material thing: as happens in animals, whose external actions depend and are commanded by sense and admit great variety, even around one and the same object, as their senses are variously affected both internally and externally; but their sense itself is always moved and determined by some material object. But man is free from both kinds of necessity. For in those acts with respect to which he is said to be of free will, he is not determined by an externally applied matter, nor even by sense alone in acting. But as an intellectual agent, he acts and desires from the judgment and command of reason.

X. In this way, they constitute the freedom of will. And because those who act from the judgment of reason have the knowledge of the end, and set it before themselves, and direct and accommodate their actions to it: and so they are in a way masters of their actions. On the contrary, inanimate things and brute animals, which are led by sense alone, do not know their end; and therefore they do not refer themselves to it, but only tend towards it like slaves, indeed doing what is commanded, but not knowing why it is commanded, nor wherefore. Nor do they act for the sake of an end, but are moved towards the end by a higher agent. Moreover, the sense and appetite of brutes are restricted to material things; but the will of men, following the guidance of the mind and reason, which has for its object not only sensible but also intelligible things, not only present but also future, deals with all kinds, modes, and degrees of goods, and is not confined within any, so to speak, limits: whence arises the greatest variety of desires, choices, and also external actions.

XI. These broader views can be seen in Joshua Placeus, a professor at the Academy of Saumur, in his treatise on the free will of man, where he concludes what he previously discussed at length. "Therefore, the natural liberty of the will consists in this, that since it is free from coercion, necessity of matter, and sensible things, it can have as its object both immaterial and material things, both intelligible and sensible, both future and present, both honest and useful or pleasant, and their opposites, all orders, degrees, and relations of goods and evils at all times and places, and can choose at will the ultimate end, intermediate ends, and means conducive to them by the practical judgment of the mind, without which it is not even rational, let alone free." And later, he repeats that in his view not every necessity is contrary to the will, that is, to the freedom of the will, but only that which arises from coercion, or from matter without sense, or from sense

without reason. "Also, freedom consists in immunity from threefold necessity, namely, coercion, determination by matter, and determination by sense."

XII. However, some think that the immunity from coercion and necessity of determination by matter or sense is not sufficient for the freedom of human actions; rather, they believe that freedom also excludes any natural necessity, even if it does not arise from matter or sense. Nor do they think it is enough for an action to be free if a person acts in any way from the judgment of reason; they also require such a judgment to be the conclusion of some deliberation and consultation, and thus only those things are done freely by us about which we can consult and deliberate. Therefore, since there are some acts of our will to which it is determined by nature, and about which no one ever consults and deliberates, such as the act by which we desire to be happy and do not want to be miserable, they do not consider the will to be free regarding these; nor do they think it acts in the manner of a free cause with respect to those motions which are suddenly excited in the will by some vehement perturbation, before our mind can collect itself and deliberate. Hence, they distinguish between the voluntary and the free, and they assert that the voluntary is broader than the free since not all voluntary actions are free.

XIII. This is the doctrine of Andreas Rivetus, formerly a professor at the Academy of Leiden, in *Summa of Controversies*, Tract 4, Question 3. He states, "We acknowledge that the notion of freedom cannot coexist not only with coercion properly so called but also with natural necessity, by which an agent is determined by nature to one thing; and it is not sufficient for freedom if a person does something spontaneously, which also pertains to natural causes, but deliberation, prior consultation, and the judgment of reason are necessary, which do not occur where there is determination by natural necessity." He adds, "We distinguish these three things in freedom, which fully explain the nature of free will: 1. That there is freedom in the subject, namely, in the will, which always acts spontaneously, without coercion, from its own internal principle; but freely, without necessity, with consultation and deliberation. Without the first freedom, the nature of the will is destroyed by coercion, which imposes necessity so that it cannot act voluntarily, as they call it, elicited. But without deliberation from the indifference of the intellect, it cannot will freely, namely, if it were determined by nature to one thing. And therefore, free will, according to Thomas, is said to be an elective power. And with Bellarmine, we acknowledge that it pertains to the essence of free will that one has the option of various things, and the choice is made with the full and perfect judgment of reason."

XIV. A similar doctrine is held by Moses Amyraut, recently a professor at the Academy of Saumur, in his treatise on the free will of man, pages 61 and following. First, he distinguishes between two motions of the will: one which is not separated from the knowledge derived from reason, but is of such a nature that the knowledge from which it arises and flourishes is not itself the result of prior consultation; the other which is not only joined with some knowledge but arises from that knowledge which has been preceded by consultation, i.e., consultation has come before it. And this latter is nothing other than a conclusion made from deliberation, considering and comparing multiple objects or one and the same object in different ways, so that the mind, weighed down by the considerations here and there, finally inclines to one side. Then he

observes that the motion of the will, which follows no consultation and deliberation of the mind, is still twofold: namely, the will is carried in one way to the end, that is, to happiness and blessedness itself; in another way, to the means which are thought to lead to that end.

XV. Afterwards, he shows that neither of these motions pertains to free will. Not the former, because free will is what Aristotle called προαίρεσις (proairesis). "Now," he says, "every προαίρεσις (proairesis) is preceded by some deliberation. But no one consults about the ultimate end, but is carried to it not only necessarily but also voluntarily." Not the latter either, because although this motion differs from the former, it is also equally sudden, arising either from some perturbation or from the presence of some great and unexpected object, so that it anticipates all consultation. Hence, he concludes that such a motion is indeed ἐκούσιον (ekousion), that is, spontaneous and voluntary, but not προαιρετικὸν (proairetikon), that is, free and elective. And therefore, it is rightly said that the first impulses of our passions are not in our power; because only those things are in our power about which we can consult, whether to undertake or omit them; and therefore, those things which precede all deliberation are not considered to be in our power. Hence he finally concludes on page 65, "It remains, therefore, that those things about which we can deliberate are thought to pertain to our free will, and we also say that those things which we have thus deliberated about are done freely by our will, in that the deliberation and consultation are followed by an inclination; in which we have often said the essence of free will consists."

XVI. But besides the necessity which is from coercion, from matter, or from sense, or from any other determination of nature, there is a necessity conceived to arise from some external cause, such as from God Himself, thus moving and impelling the very faculty to impose a true necessity of acting, that is, to take away the power of acting otherwise from the agent; although the one acting is supposed to act willingly and not unwillingly. This necessity is called motivational and impulsive by the School. However, there are some among the Reformed who think that this necessity also conflicts with human freedom and who believe that no properly so-called necessity, which in the Schools is called necessity of the consequent, as opposed to the necessity of the consequence, can coexist with it.

XVII. This is the opinion of William Ames, formerly a theologian at the University of Franeker: "We," he says, "concede that free will, in what it acts, is free from all necessity, so that it cannot properly act necessarily as to the exercise of its act, although it acts certainly and infallibly with respect to divine ordination." In Bellarmine Enervatus, Volume 4, Book 4, Chapter 1.

XVIII. The same opinion is held by Robert Baron, formerly a professor at the University of Aberdeen, in his general metaphysics adapted to theological use, where among many other things, he asserts these two points: first, that the will, in eliciting its actions, is not bound or constrained by absolute necessity, which they call the necessity of the consequent. Second, that the will, even of a fallen man, is not held by any motivational or impulsive necessity with respect to God. "He also," he says, "gave men free will, and consequently does not entirely take away

that faculty by imposing necessity, either by His eternal decree or by temporary motion and influence." Section 12, Disputation 1, on the freedom of the will, number 17.

XIX. But to make my own view clear, I think the first opinion, which defines freedom as immunity from coercion in one who acts from the judgment of reason, does not differ in reality from the second opinion, which opposes freedom not only to coercion but also to the necessity that arises from matter or sense, which others call physical necessity. For when it is stated that immunity from coercion is not worthy of the name of freedom unless it is in one who uses reason, it evidently presupposes that for freedom it is required that the agent follows the judgment of reason, not that it is determined by matter or sense. Therefore, this second opinion does not differ from the first except that it is proposed more distinctly and explicitly.

XX. However, in both, there is this inconvenience that they completely confuse the free and the voluntary and assert that all acts of the will are free. For according to the common sense of men and the usual way of speaking, only that is said to be free for us which is in our power, which can be otherwise, and about which we can consult and deliberate. Now, as we have shown above, there are some acts of the will to which it is so determined by nature that it can in no way be otherwise, and about which no deliberation can be instituted. Furthermore, all acts that proceed freely from us can be subject to some precepts and commanded or prohibited by some divine or human law. But this does not apply in any way to those acts regarding which the will is entirely immutably disposed, so that it could not, nor can ever, act otherwise in any state. Finally, since those with whom we contend acknowledge and recognize a great difference between the acts of the will, namely, that some are so in our power that we can consult and deliberate about them; and can, according to the various judgments of the practical mind, either do or omit them, or even do the opposite; but that the case is entirely different with others; why do they not want to designate things that are naturally distinct with distinct terms, and according to the usual practice in the Schools, to appropriate the name free to those and voluntary to these? Since it is the part of a wise person not to depart from the common mode of speaking without necessity.

XXI. However, among those learned men who seem to confuse free and voluntary actions, there are some who note that the freedom of the will, or free will, is understood in two ways: broadly and strictly. The freedom of the will in general, or broadly taken, according to them, is nothing other than an intellectual spontaneity, that is, a spontaneity guided by the light or judgment of the intellect. Thus, this general freedom of the will properly consists in the fact that the will has dominion over its actions to such an extent that it cannot be coerced but moves and restrains itself, acts or does not act, at its own discretion, based on certain reason, consideration, or judgment.

XXII. This is the freedom that, according to them, the will exercises in all its actions, not only when it deals with means directed to an end, or with things that contribute little or nothing to the end, but also when it deals with the end itself. Therefore, the necessity that follows the nature of the will and is in agreement with it, and by which it is determined to pursue the highest end, does not in the least overthrow or diminish this freedom of the will.

XXIII. However, more strictly used, freedom or free will is restricted, according to them, to means related to the end, or to things that contribute little or nothing to the end, and pertains to those things that are in our power, and is rightly defined by Aristotle as spontaneity arising from prior deliberation, or deliberative desire for things that are in our power. In this sense, free actions are those that are purely contingent and can be done or not done by us at our discretion. In this respect, freedom includes a certain indifference, and the will is free only to the extent that it is indifferent, namely, when it can act or not act regarding the same object, and when it can choose this or that, or its opposite. And in this sense, God does not love Himself freely, because He wills and loves Himself by a natural necessity; nor does a person freely will to be happy and not want to be miserable, because they will this by a certain natural necessity.

XXIV. This is the doctrine of John Strang, Doctor and Principal Professor of Sacred Theology at the University of Glasgow, in his treatise on the will and actions of God concerning sin, book 3, chapter 14. After explaining and elaborating on these points, he says he does not deny that the term free will can be correctly used in the stricter sense, although in another and broader sense he asserts that all actions of the will are free. Similarly, the illustrious Alexander Morus, in his Dissertation on Grace and Free Will, thesis 28, proposes two definitions: one of free will broadly taken, the other of free will strictly taken. According to the former notion, free will is described by him as the most proper gift of an intelligent nature, by which it wills or averts nothing except what it has understood to be good or evil. According to the latter notion, the will, as it chooses the means shown by the intellect after consultation.

XXV. Hence, it is clear, as Strang acknowledges in the cited passage, that the dispute is merely verbal between those who assert that all actions of the will are free and those who deny it. Those who affirm it take freedom in a broad sense, as the inclination by which the will follows the judgment of the intellect, in which sense no one denies that every action of the will is free in every respect. However, those who deny it understand freedom as the indifference and indetermination of the will by nature regarding those acts that fall under deliberation and consultation. In this sense, it is evident and agreed by all that the will is not free regarding some of its acts. But since the broader sense of freedom is less accepted and customary, as far as possible, when we speak simply, it is more appropriate to deny than to affirm that the will is free in those acts in which it exercises only the former, not the latter and stricter, sense of freedom.

XXVI. Furthermore, the third opinion seems unduly timid in not daring to assert the freedom of human actions from all properly called necessity; namely, in not prejudicing anything against the immutability of divine decrees and the efficacy of divine grace or the determination of the will by the judgment of practical reason. For the efficacy of divine providence and grace, the force and immutability of divine decrees, and thus also the rights of the divine mind over the will do not require that human free will be subjected to any properly called necessity, as the most learned men among the Reformed have shown, and we also hope to demonstrate, with God's help.

XXVII. Therefore, with Ames and Robert Baron, we are not afraid to say that human free will is opposed to any properly called necessity and that no human act, if we speak strictly and

properly, is free unless we assume in humans the true and intrinsic power to act otherwise, or at least to suspend their act and refrain from acting. For by properly called necessity, we mean that which determines the agent to a certain action in such a way that there remains no true and intrinsic power in the agent not to act or to act otherwise.

XXVIII. Therefore, human freedom in action is not ill-defined as a certain indetermination and indifference concerning its acts. However, it should be noted that by this indifference is not meant, as some seem to suspect, a precarious state of a person wavering and uncertain about which way to turn; but rather the true power to act or not to act, and to direct their action this way or that; which remains even in one who has determined himself by his own judgment and choice to these or those actions and for whom it is certain and established to do this and not another thing.

XXIX. Therefore, the common definition, according to which human freedom is established in this: that, all things necessary for action being set, a person can act or not act, do this or that, although some misuse it, can have a good and proper sense. For in all deliberate actions, which alone are properly and strictly free, a person not only before acting but also while acting, has the true and real power not to act or to act otherwise. A person cannot indeed do two opposite things at the same time, or both act and refrain from acting simultaneously; but when they do this, they retain the power to perform the opposite act or to refrain from that action. As the Scholastics say, in free will there is a simultaneity of power to opposites, but not a power of simultaneity, that is, the power to hold opposites simultaneously. The reason for this is that the power for one act is not opposed to the power for its negation or for the contrary act; but two contrary or contradictory things cannot exist simultaneously in the same subject.

XXX. Besides the authors of the fourth opinion, John Strang also acknowledges this in the aforementioned third book, chapter 15. Although he denies that this is the definition of freedom in general, he nevertheless admits that it applies to free will taken more strictly, as long as, with all prerequisites for action in place, active indifference remains, which is entirely free from any preceding necessity, whether it arises from divine predetermination, the nature of the will itself, or the certain condition of the object. Page 698. However, this stricter sense of freedom is the most customary and should therefore be considered the most appropriate. He explains this matter on page 696: "In matters relating to the end or in indifferent matters, where it is not necessary for the intellect to judge them to have a necessary connection with common good, it is true in the divided sense, both of elicited and commanded actions, that the will, not only with all prerequisites for action set, but even when the will is determined, whether by God or by itself, to act and while it acts, retains the power to act this or that way, or to act or not to act. Hence, in such matters, the will, not only before it is determined and acts, but also while it is determined and acts, remains free and acts entirely freely, because even while it acts, it retains the power by which it can refrain from acting, although hypothetically it is determined or acts, it cannot but act; because whatever is, given that it is, necessarily is, simply because it is a contingent thing. Therefore, once divine determination is set, whether by effective grace or any other reason, the necessity of the consequence is inferred, that the act of the will determined by

God follows infallibly, but there is no necessity of the consequent, as its nature remains contingent."

XXXI. Andreas Rivetus does not disapprove of defining free will as such a faculty of the will, by which, with all prerequisites for action set, one can act or not act, provided it is understood not in a composed sense but in a divided sense. That is, if someone says, with all preceding prerequisites set according to the order of reason or time for action, free will can operate or not operate, meaning that, with the same prerequisites, there simultaneously exists in free will the faculty or power by which it can act or not act if it wills, as Diego Alvarez distinguishes. For even the effective motion of God, by which the will is determined to such an act, does not take away from free will the power to perform that act or to perform the contrary act, but only ensures that, with free will being able to act or not act such an act, it infallibly, yet freely, performs it. These are the words of that very learned man in *Summa of Controversies*, tract 4, question 3. He adds that created free will, not only before it is determined to one act but even in the very instant in which it is determined by God and determines itself to the same act, simultaneously has the power by which it can produce the contrary act if it wills, but not to have the contrary act simultaneously, because two contrary acts cannot be in the same power simultaneously, but successively.

XXXII. Louis Crocius, while he lived as a Doctor and Professor of Theology at the Bremen School, gives this and no other definition of freedom: "The freedom of human will is its natural property by which, with the rational or sensitive good proposed by the intellect, and with all prerequisites for action set, it can choose to undertake an action or suspend it." In *Theological Synthesis*, book 3, chapter 37, thesis 3. There he adds that free will was called the same by the ancient Fathers. And in the explanation of the same thesis, he notes that the freedom which is the natural property of the will is opposed to necessity, whether it is from an external cause compelling or from nature intrinsically determining to one absolutely.

XXXIII. However, when freedom is constituted in a certain indifference to action, and in the fact that the one who is said to be free can act or not act, do this or that, it must be carefully noted that this should not be understood as if it pertains to the essence of freedom that one who is free can do good or evil. For the ability to do evil is not something that pertains to the perfection of freedom but rather is a certain imperfection accompanying freedom in a created person, and which is accidental to freedom. For God, who is the freest in action, cannot do evil; nor can the holy angels, since they were confirmed by God in grace. And this is also the prerogative of the Blessed Souls, who, once admitted to the vision of God, can no longer sin. Nevertheless, neither the holy angels nor the Blessed Souls have lost their freedom because of this.

XXXIV. Conversely, the ability to do good and to perform actions that are pleasing and acceptable to God is a certain perfection that can be absent from a free agent while the nature and essence of freedom remain intact. For by all consensus, freedom in action remains in demons and the angels of darkness, nor is it entirely lost in humans condemned to eternal damnation by God, and yet neither the Devil nor the condemned humans can do good or perform any action that is approved by God. Indeed, neither in this life can a person corrupted by sin and devoid of God's

grace perform anything that is truly good and pleasing to God, according to the saying of our Lord, "Without me you can do nothing," and the corresponding statement of the Apostle, "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God." Yet the hardened and utterly forsaken person retains their freedom in action. John 15:5; 2 Corinthians 3:5.

XXXV. It indeed contradicts divine goodness, justice, and wisdom to form any intelligent, rational, and therefore free creature that cannot do good and that has some necessity of doing evil implanted in it by God. For God, the Supreme Good, cannot create anything that is not good. But a creature that was produced good by God can become evil through its own fault and vice and can develop habits by acting wrongly, by which it is so determined to evil that it can no longer do good; with a will, that is, hardened in evil, and unable, without the help of divine grace, to extricate itself from the snares into which it has voluntarily fallen.

XXXVI. However, a creature that has been cast into this necessity of doing evil by its own fault still acts freely in the things it does wrong. For the bad habits by which its mind and will are hindered do not prevent it from consulting and deliberating about what it does, and the will voluntarily, without any compelling force, follows the judgment of its depraved reason. Indeed, even one who cannot do good can abstain from individual evil acts, nor is he compelled by any necessity to commit this or that sin. For instance, when the Devil, by his temptations, moves and solicits someone to rebel against God and obey the flesh, he could refrain from tempting; and when a person, by God's just judgment, blinded and hardened, commits some crime such as murder or adultery, he could refrain from defiling himself with that murder or adultery, nor can he pretend any necessity for doing so.

XXXVII. Having thus explained the nature and essence of human freedom, it remains to inquire to which faculty of a person it properly belongs. The common opinion of the Doctors of the Reformed School is that human freedom indeed originates from the mind and reason, but it properly belongs to the affection of the will. For the fact that a person can choose among various things, and now embrace this and reject that, is because they can judge variously about things and apprehend different reasons of good and evil in them: but still, no act is considered free in a person unless it is either elicited or at least commanded by the will. Therefore, only the acts of the will are considered free in themselves: acts performed by other faculties are free only to the extent that they depend on the will, and are done either with its consent or at least with its negligence and connivance. This is what the Schools mean when they say that freedom is formally in the will alone, but only radically in the intellect: Thus, Louis Crocius states on this matter in the cited passage, "Freedom, which is attributed to the will, properly belongs to the will, although its root is in the intellect and reason."

XXXVIII. However, some among the Reformed think differently on this matter. Among them is the most illustrious Moses Amyraut. To explain his view on this question, he observes that freedom is attributed to three types of acts. Firstly, to the acts of those faculties which the will commands. Secondly, to the acts of the will itself. Thirdly, to the acts of the intellect. In the first respect, according to his opinion, freedom is nothing other than the ability to live or act as

one wills. For we are considered free to the extent that we do what we want without being compelled or hindered. In the second respect, freedom is defined by him as the ability to will as we judge should be willed and as each one is determined by their own judgment to that, not by another's. For just as bodily actions are considered free because they depend on a free principle, namely the will, so he says the actions of the will are free because they similarly depend on a free principle, namely the judgment of the intellect. He states that the freedom of the intellect lies in its autonomy, that is, in the fact that the intellect acts from itself and through itself and is self-determined, that is, capable of its own operations because, namely, it is neither compelled by force nor dependent on external command for exercising them. This most learned man elaborates on this matter in his book on free will, Section 1, pages 20 and following.

XXXIX. From this doctrine, it follows that the freedom found in external actions depends on the will; but the freedom that pertains to the acts of the will depends on the intellect. The intellect is free in itself, and thus freedom primarily and chiefly belongs to the intellect and is to be placed in it as in its proper and natural seat. Therefore, freedom is not formally, as many hold, in the will alone; in the intellect, it is only causally and radically, as this most learned man argues and seeks to prove in his book, pages 30 and following. He chiefly supports this argument because, in his judgment, the intellect is naturally more autonomous than the will; since the will follows the guidance of the intellect and is subject to its governance, for which reason it is called the guide by the Greeks. He considers it absurd that freedom should be formally in that faculty which is subject to the rule of another rather than in that which is bound by the laws of no other faculty.

XL. And yet, at the end of the same section, he concludes that freedom, properly speaking, is not formally in either the intellect or the will when considered separately, but in both faculties conjointly. Because, namely, a person is not considered free simply by judging or simply by willing, but by willing from the judgment and counsel of reason. Just as humanity is not formally in the intelligent soul nor in the sensitive nature alone, but in the person composed of both natures. Therefore, according to his opinion, free will is not one of the rational faculties in a person, nor is it something in which one part belongs more to the intellect and another more to the will; but it is the disposition and inclination of both faculties, intellect and will, working together according to their nature, so that a person, insofar as he is human, is considered free. Although, just as in defining a human being, the consideration of reason far excels that of the animal nature, so in defining free will, the role of the intellect seems far superior to that of the will. For while many other things have the ability to desire, only a human being among visible creatures is considered to desire freely because he alone is endowed with intellect.

XLI. However, he does not want the intellect, considered in any way, to be the principle of freedom in a person, but only insofar as it pronounces on things to be done or desired, not only in general but also in particular; and so that it impels a person to act or restrains him from action. In this respect, it is called the practical intellect, which dictates in particular cases what should now be done or not done, desired or avoided. Nevertheless, he does not consider any judgment of the practical intellect sufficient for acting freely; he requires a judgment that is the

conclusion of consultation and deliberation. So, in his opinion, the practical intellect in any way and simply in a person is not the principle of free actions, but only insofar as it judges things to be done, that is, after prior deliberation and consultation, as seen in the cited section, pages 31 and following.

XLII. Furthermore, the very learned Josue Placeus, colleague of Amyraldus when he was alive, shares this with him: he believes that freedom is not formally in the will alone; nor that only the will but also the intellect is a free faculty. However, he differs from his colleague in that the latter distinguishes between the freedom that belongs to the intellect and the freedom that belongs to the will, assigning a specific definition to each; whereas Placeus believes that the same freedom by which the will is called free also applies to the intellect. For this freedom, in his view, consists in immunity from three types of necessity: coercion, determination by matter, and determination by sense. This immunity, he believes, equally pertains to the intellect. Moreover, his opinion is opposed to the former in that if the will and intellect are compared, freedom seems to belong more to the will. This is because he believes that command and dominion in a person belong more to the will than to the intellect, as the intellect does not move the will by its act as if by command, but by the object it proposes to it; whereas the will moves and applies the mind to understanding by its act, as if by command. Nevertheless, this learned man believes that certain acts of our mind are free and therefore morally good or bad, which are not done by the command of the will nor depend on its consent as a principle, such as faith and the heresy opposed to it. This can be seen in his posthumous works, *Treatise on Free Will*, pages 163 and 164.

XLIII. The renowned Alexander Morus agrees with these learned men, considering that the intellect and will share free will between them; and that free will is nothing other than the intellect and will insofar as these two faculties concur and are bound together by some bond or union. As for in which faculty it rather resides, he leaves it undecided. For, as he says, the judgment of the intellect terminates in the will, and the freedom of the will has its root in the intellect. So, in his opinion, free will can be said to be the intellect insofar as it moves and affects the will, or the will insofar as it is moved by the intellect. Or, in the words of Aristotle, "the intellect commanding, and the will choosing."

XLIV. As for my opinion, I believe no act of any faculty, even of the mind itself in a person, is free unless it somehow depends on the will, and is done by its command or consent, so to speak, as if a person could not have omitted it if they had wished. For who would call an act free which a person could not have done otherwise, even if they most wished, and to which the will is in no way supposed to have concurred directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately? And since every free action can fall under a precept and assume the character of virtue or vice, it must proceed from the will in some way. For so far it is commonly accepted in the Schools, according to Augustine's opinion, that sin does not have the nature of sin if it is not voluntary, that is, if the will is not in some way its principle and cause, as the common sense of the faithful interprets this saying.

XLV. Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that freedom is said to be formally in the will alone. For just as every free action owes its origin in some way to the will, so every free

action arises from some consultation and deliberation of the mind. And just as the intellect elicits no action freely which the will could not have impeded, so no act of the will is free about which the mind could not have consulted and deliberated. Hence it follows that free actions are to be referred equally to the mind and the will, and therefore, if it is concluded that freedom is formally in the will, it can also be concluded that it is formally in the intellect.

XLVI. But I think it should rather be said that freedom is formally in neither the intellect nor the will but in the person insofar as they act through the intellect and will. Since freedom, properly speaking, is not an affection of this or that faculty but something arising from the mutual relation and concurrence of multiple faculties; and therefore, it cannot be properly attributed to any specific faculty, but only to the suppositum in which those faculties are found. Thus, if we speak precisely, neither the mind nor the will should be called free, but the person himself, insofar as he uses those faculties in a certain way. When the will is called free, it is not a formal statement, as the Schools say, but a causal one: because, namely, the will joined to the intellect is the cause of actions in respect to which the person is said to act freely. This observation is not entirely without merit, as will be seen in the following. For it helps to solve certain difficulties into which many fall while seeking the whole concept of freedom in the will and not simply in the person.

XLVII. Whether the intellect contributes more to human freedom than the will, or the will more than the intellect, is a matter that theologians do not need to define, and which even the prince of modern philosophers, Aristotle, neglected to investigate more closely. Therefore, we, like certain most learned theologians, leave it undecided.

XLVIII. However, no matter how the Doctors of the Reformed School vary in explaining the nature of freedom and to which faculties it belongs or does not belong, they nevertheless easily accept the definition of free will given by Bellarmine, *On Grace and Free Will*, book 3, chapter 3. Namely, that free will is the free power to choose one thing over another among those things that lead to some end, or to reject or accept one and the same thing at our discretion, attributed or granted to intelligent nature for the great glory of God. This can be seen in Robert Baron's *General Metaphysics*, section 12, *Disputation on the Freedom of the Will*, where he not only approves this definition but also explains it accurately in parts. The same definition is not disapproved by Pareus, who, although he makes some remarks on it, admits that regarding free will considered absolutely, there is no controversy between us and Bellarmine, writing in the place already mentioned of Bellarmine. Nor does the definition that he substitutes as plainer and fuller differ much from Bellarmine's; namely, that it is the power of willing, not willing, choosing, rejecting the object shown by the intellect, by a spontaneous and deliberate motion without coercion, and the aptitude of the will to will or not will the opposite. Similarly, Ames confesses that this definition can have such a meaning that there is no cause for contention about it, in Bellarmine *Enervatus*, volume 4, book 4, chapter 1.

**Theological Theses on the Free Will of Man, Considered Absolutely and in Itself,
in which the Doctrine of the Roman School is Explained**

Thesis I

The nature and essence of free will raise many questions and debates among the Doctors of the Roman School. These matters, however, pertain more to metaphysicians than theologians. It is not my intention to list and examine all these issues but only to briefly touch upon those relevant to the current controversies and debates among the Christian Schools.

II. Therefore, we will omit discussions about the kind of free will—whether it is an act, habit, or power, and to which of the things in the soul it should be referred. Although some ancient scholars taught that free will is neither a certain power nor a certain habit, but rather a certain act, a view attributed by Bellarmine to Hervaeus Natalis, others believed that free will is not an act or a power but a certain natural habit arising from the intellect and will. This view was held by Cardinal Bonaventure, a celebrated Doctor in the Roman School. Nevertheless, the entire Roman School now agrees that free will is a certain power and faculty.

III. Again, assuming that free will is a certain power, the question arises as to what that power is. Thomas and Bonaventure, according to Bellarmine, report that some have felt that free will is not a single and particular power of the soul but rather a certain universal power that encompasses, as species under it, all the powers of the soul, both sensing and understanding, which produce any free acts. Others, like the notable Scholastic Alexander of Hales, a teacher of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventure, said that free will is indeed a certain particular power but one distinct from the intellect and will. However, this question can also be passed over since now all Schools agree that free will is not something distinct in reality from the intellect and will.

IV. But further, it is questioned whether free will consists of both faculties and pertains to both, or if it should be restricted solely to the will. Some, like the highly regarded Doctor Durandus of the Roman School, have believed that free will encompasses both faculties, namely the mind and the will, and that not only the will but also reason is formally free. Indeed, they think that liberty belongs first and more to reason than to the will.

V. To this opinion adheres the very celebrated Peter Gassendi, a provost of the Diocese of Digne in Provence, in his treatise on Liberty, Fortune, and Fate, which is found at the end of the second volume of his works. He says that he believes that liberty is primarily and perfectly in the intellect and secondarily and dependently in the will. His foundation is that, according to the commoner sense of the Roman School, liberty is situated in a certain free indifference and indetermination of power. Reason is indifferent in judging about things to be done and can judge about them in this or that way. Thus, whatever indifference there is in the will concerning things to be desired arises from this indifference in reason. For the will can reject or embrace one and the same object and choose this or that among various objects because reason can pass various judgments about these objects as diverse aspects of good or evil present themselves.

VI. Moreover, he does not want the mind to be free in every respect but only insofar as it is indifferent to many objects and is flexible enough by nature that, considering something as true, it can judge now one way, now another about anything, and now hold one judgment, now another about it as true. However, it cannot dissent from what appears true nor assent to what

seems false, nor change its judgment about anything unless a greater or lesser appearance of truth or falsehood presents itself on the part of the object. So he compares the human mind to a balance that tilts now this way, now that way, as weight is added or taken away from one or the other scale. Once one scale is depressed, it cannot be lifted unless weight is added to the opposite scale, as he explains more extensively in the cited volume, page 82.

VII. However, this opinion is generally rejected in the Roman School. For most of its Doctors think that the intellect is not formally free but that liberty is formally and solely in the will. Therefore, they teach that free will is not a power different from the will nor anything other than the will itself, but considered in a certain respect and manner, so that although the will and free will are the same power in reality, free will is distinct from the will in reason.

VIII. Indeed, from their perspective, the will extends more widely than free will, both regarding objects and actions. For whatever is done by free will is also done by the will, but not vice versa. And whatever is an object of free will is also an object of the will, but not everything that is an object of the will is also an object of free will. For example, the highest end, that is, happiness, is an object of the will but not of free will, to which only the means to the end pertain. Hence, those acts by which we wish to be happy and not to be miserable are actions of the will but not of free will because the will is directed towards the ultimate end not freely but naturally.

IX. Moreover, although Scholastic theologians generally hold that the intellect is not free per se and formally, they acknowledge that in it lies the root and, at least sine qua non, cause of that liberty which is in the will. This arises from the fact that the human intellect not only proposes various objects to the will but also compares them and perceives various aspects of good and evil in the same object and somehow demonstrates them to the will. Hence, the will can reject or embrace one and the same object and choose this or that among various objects, in which the exercise of liberty is situated.

X. They are chiefly moved to deny that the intellect is formally free by the fact that to act morally well or badly is proper to that faculty which is formally and per se free. But virtue and vice properly belong to the will alone, and no action deserves praise or blame, reward or punishment unless it proceeds from the will. Therefore, the operations of the intellect do not have the nature of sin or merit unless they are voluntary and, in a certain way, commanded by the will.

XI. What seems to be most important in this question is what properly constitutes the liberty by which the will is called free and in which the nature of free will consists. On this point, there is no complete agreement among the theologians of the Roman Church. But to better understand their differing opinions, it is first necessary to note what the usual acceptations and distinctions of liberty are in the Schools.

XII. Therefore, liberty is opposed to 1. Servitude, 2. Coercion, 3. Necessity. Further, servitude, and thus the liberty opposed to it, is either proper or metaphorical. Properly speaking, servitude is that condition in which those who are servants among men are under the power of their masters. Metaphorical servitude occurs when dominion over men is figuratively attributed to certain things. Thus, those who indulge in sins are said in Scripture to be servants of sin, and

those who, by the just sentence of God, are doomed to destruction and death are similarly called servants of death and corruption. The servitude opposed to that by which men are enslaved to sin is another servitude, namely, the servitude of righteousness, which is liberty from sin, or as it is called in the Schools, the liberty of grace. And to the servitude of misery, or death and corruption, Scripture opposes the liberty called the glory of the children of God.

XIII. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman Church note that the liberty discussed here, from which free will is named, is not that liberty which is opposed to servitude, whether proper or metaphorical. This is because men who are servants by condition do not therefore lack free will, nor have those whom Scripture calls servants of sin been deprived of it through sin.

XIV. There is no doubt that the liberty discussed here primarily excludes coercion; but the question is whether it opposes only coercion and not necessity, and whether it suffices for a rational agent to have immunity from coercion alone. Indeed, not a few of the older Scholastics seemed to hold the opinion that liberty of the will, considered in general, is opposed not simply to necessity but only to coercion.

XV. Thus, without a doubt, Bonaventure held this view. He states in the second book of his Sentences, distinction 7, question 2: "Regarding what is said, that to will freely and necessarily are opposed, it must be said that there are two kinds of necessity: one from an external cause, like the necessity of coercion, and this is opposed to willing freely. But there is another necessity from an internal disposition, and this is not opposed; indeed, it coexists with liberty. Such is the case in the free will of demons, who are so glued to evil that they in no way wish to separate from it." And in distinction 25, question 2, he says: "Free will can be considered in two ways: either as it is free or as it is deliberative. If we speak of it as it is free, then I concede that it can exist not only in relation to the contingent but also to the necessary, as is evident in God, in Christ, and in angels and blessed men. For since there are two types of necessity, namely, coercion and immutability, the necessity of coercion is repugnant to the liberty of the will, but the necessity of immutability is not; because the will is called free not because it wills this in such a way that it could will the opposite, but because it wills whatever it wills by its own command. For it wills something in such a way that it wills to will it, and therefore in the act of willing it moves itself and governs itself, and is thus called free, even though it is immutably ordered to it." And a little further, he states: "The act of free will, as it is free, can not only be about the necessary but can also be necessary in itself."

XVI. Bonaventure derived this doctrine from his teacher, Alexander of Hales. In several places, Alexander establishes the essential liberty of free will in freedom from coercion. His words are particularly noteworthy: "There are two kinds of necessity: inevitability and coercion. The necessity of coercion removes free will, but not the necessity of inevitability. Therefore, although there is the necessity of inevitability in angels, they nonetheless have free will" (*Summa Theologica*, Part 2, Question 72, Member 3, Article 3).

XVII. This doctrine was also followed by another disciple of Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas. He writes: "The natural necessity according to which the will is said to necessarily will something, such as happiness, does not contradict liberty, as Augustine teaches

in the first book of 'The City of God.' For the liberty of the will is opposed to violence or coercion. However, there is no violence or coercion in the fact that something moves according to the order of its nature; rather, coercion is in the prevention of natural motion, just as when a heavy object is prevented from descending to the center. Hence, the will freely desires happiness, although it necessarily desires it. Thus, God, by His will, freely loves Himself, although He necessarily loves Himself" (*Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei*, Question 10, Article 2, Response 1).

XVIII. Hence, he teaches that a work can be worthy of praise or blame, merit or demerit, because it is spontaneous, not coerced, and voluntary, even if the will is determined to one thing regarding it. In his commentary on the third book of Sentences, he writes: "The necessity of coercion, which is opposed to the voluntary, removes the nature of merit and demerit, but the necessity that arises from the perfection of goodness or evil does not remove it, but rather establishes the will confirmed to one thing." And in the same book, to explain how Christ could merit by free will determined to one specific act, namely, the love of God, he says: "It must be said that even if it were determined to one specific thing, like the love of God, which He could not not love, nonetheless, from this, He does not lose liberty or the nature of merit, because He tends to it not out of coercion but spontaneously, and thus is the master of His own act."

XIX. Scotus's doctrine is not different in this respect. For he clearly and openly teaches three things about the liberty of the will: 1. That the liberty of the will can coexist entirely with necessity. These are his words: "Liberty stands with necessity to will in the will. For in it is the liberty of willing because it elicits the act delectably and electively and remains in the act." 2. That the will, whether it acts necessarily or contingently, always acts freely, never naturally. He writes: "The will always has its proper mode of causing, namely, freely." And again: "The will, as the will, is a principle of its acts freely. Therefore, the will cannot be naturally active, just as nature, as a principle distinct from the will, cannot be freely active." 3. That this holds not only in creatures but also in God Himself, who loves Himself most freely, although by a necessary will. He writes: "The divine will necessarily wills its own goodness, and yet it is free in willing it" (*Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, Question 16, as cited by Jansen in his *Augustine, 'De Gratia Christi Salvatoris,'* Book 6, Chapter 25).

XX. Moreover, in the following centuries, other Scholastics followed these luminaries in great numbers, such as Thomas de Argentina, who held that "the necessity of coercion removes the nature of merit, but the necessity of immutability arising from the perfection of virtues does not remove it but increases it." Marsilius of Inghen, according to whom "the necessary and inevitable, not by nature but by grace, does not remove the nature of what is praiseworthy." Gabriel Biel, according to whom "the act of beatitude is freely elicited, thus contingent although immutable and perpetual. I say freely and not contradictorily, which liberty suffices for the nature of merit." Nicholas of Orbellis, whose words are taken from Bonaventure: "Free will is said simply not because it wills this as it could will the opposite, but because it wills whatever it wills by its own command, because it wills something in such a way that it wills to will it, and therefore in the act of willing it moves itself and governs itself, and therefore it is called free,

although it is immutably ordered to it." Finally, Stephen Brulefer, who teaches that "the act of free will, even as it deliberates, can be about the necessary and is always contingent. The act of free will, as it is free, can not only be about the necessary but also be necessary in itself." All these and many other places are extensively cited by Jansen in his aforementioned book, 'De Gratia Salvatoris,' Book 6, Chapter 29 and following.

XXI. Indeed, some theologians in the Roman School in the last century still retained this opinion, such as Alphonsus de Castro of the Order of Friars Minor, in his book on heresies under the word "Liberty." He states, "There is still another liberty that opposes necessity or, more correctly, coercion." And he adds, "When we say that human will is free, this should be understood of this liberty." Alphonsus's words were later adopted and made his own by Joseph Angles, Bishop-designate of Bossanen, also of the Order of Friars Minor, writing on the second book of Sentences. After discussing the liberty of grace and the liberty of glory, he says, "Thirdly, there is liberty that opposes necessity, or more correctly, coercion. And this is the liberty of nature, which we are discussing presently." And later, when he distinguished three kinds of liberty—one from coercion, another from sin, and a third from misery—his conclusion is, "Regarding the first kind of liberty, which is free will in man and angel: The reason is that neither the will of evil angels, nor of good ones, nor of evil humans can be coerced." In the following, after posing the question of whether the acts of free will are only of contingencies or also of necessities, he observes from Bonaventure that free will can be considered in two ways: either as it is free or as it is deliberating. Then he adds two conclusions: 1. The act of free will can be, and is, of necessities. The reason is that in God, angels, and blessed humans, there is free will, which indeed immutably and necessarily proceeds to its act because God by nature, and the angel and blessed human by glory, are immutable. 2. If free will is understood in the second way, its acts are of contingencies. The reason is that we do not deliberate or consult about necessities and impossibilities, but about contingencies, which it is in our power to do or not to do (On the Distinction 24 and 25, Question 1, Articles 1, 2, and 34).

XXII. However, it can easily be inferred from those very things that have been cited so far that when these doctors affirm that the liberty of the will is opposed not simply to necessity but rather to coercion, they do not mean that the nature and essence of liberty consist in being immune from coercion, as those who dispute against them seem to assume. For they admit that many things act not under coercion, yet not freely. Indeed, nothing is free for them unless it acts from the judgment of the intellect. But they only mean that in one who acts from the judgment of reason, only coercion destroys liberty, not necessity. And it is indeed impossible for someone to act under coercion and yet freely simultaneously; but it is possible for someone to act freely, even if necessarily.

XXIII. Furthermore, their opinion is not that liberty is always accompanied by necessity, nor that free will, especially in humans, is indifferent and undetermined regarding most of its acts. They acknowledge that humans, as long as they are alive, not only act freely but are also so disposed that they are bound by no natural or properly so-called necessity in their actions but can act and refrain from acting, do this or that, and exercise contrary acts regarding the same object.

But they think that liberty, simply considered, does not consist in such indifference and indetermination to act, nor always have it as a companion; rather, it can remain and be preserved without it, and sometimes even be found in one who is not indifferent to act but acts inevitably and immutably.

XXIV. For besides that liberty which in the schools is called the liberty of contrariety or specification, by which one can do this or that or even perform contrary acts, and the liberty of contradiction or exercise, by which one can at least refrain from acting and suspend action, they posit a kind of liberty of complacency, found in one who is not driven by any external force or any blind and brute impulse but moves to some action by his own judgment, even though because of the evident light by which he is led, he cannot persuade himself to elicit a contrary act or even desist from that action. This distinction is not only given by Gabriel Biel in the words cited earlier but also by Johannes Viguerius, Doctor and Professor of Theology in the University of Toulouse. He says, "Speaking of the indetermination or liberty of the will concerning the ultimate object of the end, in the homeland it is entirely determined, nor is it free, either regarding specification or exercise: it is not free, either regarding specification or exercise: it is not free by the liberty of contradiction or contrariety; it is, however, free by the liberty of complacency, because it is pleased and delighted in that object" (Theological Institutions, Chapter 3, §3, Verse 1).

XXV. They think that he who acts from a certain judgment of reason, whether necessarily or contingently, acts freely because he always acts and desires by his own command, and so he wills something in such a way that he wills to will it, approving his own will as he tacitly or expressly reflects upon it, and thus in the act of willing, he moves and governs himself, as Bonaventure says in the place cited above. Or, as Scotus puts it, "The will, because of the firmness of its liberty, imposes necessity on itself in eliciting the act and in persevering or fixing itself in the act" (Quodlibet 26).

XXVI. And Cornelius Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, attempted to renew and illustrate this opinion of the old Scholastics in this century, as can be seen in his book titled 'Augustinus,' especially in the sixth book on the Grace of Christ the Savior. There he extensively teaches that liberty is opposed not to any necessity but only to that which comes from an external force contrary to the agent's inclination, which we call coercion. And this is because in one who acts from the judgment of reason, only coercion destroys liberty, not the necessity of inevitability and immutability. Thus, a free agent is not opposed to a necessary agent, just as a natural agent is not opposed to a contingent agent, but a free agent is opposed only to a natural agent, just as a contingent agent is opposed only to a necessary agent. Hence, it is no more contradictory for someone who acts freely to act necessarily than it is contradictory for something that acts by nature to act contingently; because just as a natural cause can be hindered from acting by another cause, so a free cause can be determined to one thing in acting immovably and immutably.

XXVII. Moreover, according to him, one acts freely who acts from the judgment of reason; and therefore, since the will is a rational appetite, he thinks that the will and nature are entirely opposed, and the will can no more act by the mode of nature than nature can act by the

mode of a free cause. Thus, just as no action of a natural cause can be free, so also no action of the will can be natural and not free: hence, the free is as extensive as the voluntary, and whatever is voluntary is therefore free; because the will always and essentially preserves its own mode of operating distinct from nature.

XXVIII. Nevertheless, he acknowledges that some motions arise in the will that are not free for that reason: namely, those sudden motions that prevent the full judgment of reason and are commonly called first motions. For although they flow from the will without violence, they lack what is essential to liberty in his opinion because they are not within a person's control and occur without full rational awareness, and in a way against and contrary to the will, because when the will reflects upon those motions, it does not consent to them and would altogether wish they were not present (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, Book 6, Chapter 37).

XXIX. Therefore, according to that man's principles, it must be said that the voluntary can be understood in two ways. 1. In a broader and less proper sense, as it encompasses all motions that arise in the will in any way whatsoever, and in this sense, the voluntary is more extensive than the free; because in this sense, first motions are voluntary, but not free. 2. Strictly and properly. And thus, all those and only those acts of the will are voluntary, which occur with rational awareness and with a judgment formed after consideration. And in this way, the voluntary and the free are coextensive and do not differ in extent. Hence, since the will is directed to the ultimate end with full and certain rational judgment, it is as free in regard to that as when it desires the means that seem to lead to that end. Not only those living in this life, when they will to be happy and do not will to be miserable, perform a free act of the will; but even the blessed in heaven, when they adhere to God, whom they see clearly, with their entire will, since in both cases the will follows the fixed, certain, and evidently constant judgment of the intellect in this matter, and when it reflects on itself, it approves its own act as much as possible.

XXX. Indeed, he does not consider a certain indifference and indetermination of the will regarding the act that is called free, by which the will can act contrary, or at least omit or suspend that act, to pertain to the common notion and proper essence of liberty. In his view, liberty solely consists in the fact that the free agent governs itself and its act, and moves itself, not being acted upon and moved by another, which he argues applies even to those acts to which the will is determined necessarily and immutably.

XXXI. For, as expressed by Scotus, the necessity found in the will is not prior to the will in such a way that the will is understood to fall under necessity as if it were being impelled into action and fixed in the act, for if that were the case, the will would be acting and not acting, and liberty would not stand in such an act. Rather, it is a concomitant necessity, so that the will is understood to fall under it in such a way that, because of the firmness of its liberty, it imposes necessity on itself in eliciting the act and in persevering or fixing itself in the act (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, Book 6, Chapter 37).

XXXII. And to show more clearly that a rational agent, in all that it wills and desires, acts and moves itself in a certain way, even if its act of will is necessary and immutable, he observes that the power of acting and moving itself, which is proper to a free agent, lies in the fact that

both reason and will, to which the faculties of liberty pertain, can reflect on their own acts; so that reason can judge its own judgment, whether it has judged rightly; and similarly, the will can not only will and desire but also will its own volition and desire. And because in every rational motion, whether necessary or not, such self-reflection is always present, either tacitly or expressly, the rational agent always moves and governs itself in all its movements, thus exercising its own liberty.

XXXIII. For, according to him, the true signs of liberty are doing what is pleasing, what appears to be good. Hence, he concludes that the blessed in heaven, in loving God whom they see clearly, move themselves perfectly and have perfect control over their acts, and thus are most free, because they judge with the fullest and most tranquil judgment that they ought to love God, and they judge themselves to judge most rightly in this matter; their will, in loving, wishes to follow reason, and wishes to will this, and does not wish to cease. The necessity that appears in that act arises from the will itself and from the perfection of its dominion and liberty, because it makes itself necessary, not by the movement of nature, but by the perfect movement of liberty, moving and determining itself.

XXXIV. Although that doctor does not consider it essential to liberty that the will be indifferent to its acts in such a way that it can act or not act, or even act contrary, he nevertheless openly admits, with the old Scholastics, that such indifference exists in the will of wayfarers; for their liberty is not only free from coercion but also from immutable voluntary necessity, that is, it is indifferent to either. He only denies that liberty in general human free will is situated in that indifference. Indeed, he considers this indifference a certain sign of liberty in a rational creature, but not the cause or reason of liberty. Therefore, it can be present or absent in the will's decision without the loss of liberty. (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, Book 6, Chapter 34). These followers of Augustine, who are called Jansenists by their opponents, state in their book titled "*Manuale Catholicorum*," Thesis Apologetica & Dogmatica Viginti Prima, that the essence of liberty does not at all consist in indifference. For, according to the holy fathers, "Where there is will, there is liberty." Indeed, from Saint Prosper, "Free will is a spontaneous appetite for what is pleasing to oneself." And from Saint Damascene, "The liberty of the will is nothing else than the will." And shortly thereafter, "What is done voluntarily, even if done necessarily, is still done freely. For God necessarily loves Himself and yet freely."

XXXVI. In that writing called the "three columns," where they distinguish the various senses of the five famous propositions condemned by the Roman Pontiffs Innocent X and Alexander VII, they attribute the following sense to the third proposition as good and approved by them: "For meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from the necessity of infallibility is not required in man, but liberty from coercion with the judgment of reason suffices if the essence of liberty and merit is considered precisely, although in the state of fallen nature, the indifference of power is always found, which the will, even under proximate necessary grace and effective grace, can not will, but not such that it would ever not will with the same grace." There they acknowledge that in the state of fallen nature, indifference is always attached to liberty. Therefore, in those articles presented to the bishop of Convenarum, they do not hesitate

to say, "That for meriting and demeriting in the state of fallen nature, liberty from coercion is not sufficient; but liberty from necessity is required. Although, they say, grace that is per se efficacious determines the will infallibly and insuperably to act and thus the will never dissents from that act; it does not introduce necessity because it does not take away the power to dissent."

XXXVII. However, the opinion that sets the liberty of the will opposed not to necessity, but only to coercion, has been condemned by the Roman Pontiffs. For Bellarmine mentions a decree of Pius V, which was later renewed by Gregory XIII, in which, among many other propositions, these are also marked for censure: "What is done voluntarily, even if done by necessity, is still done freely." And, "Only violence opposes the natural liberty of man."

XXXVIII. Therefore, the common doctrine of the Roman School today is that liberty of will does not suffice solely in immunity from coercion, but also requires immunity from necessity, at least absolute and natural, by which things are determined by nature to one thing and simply cannot act otherwise than they do. In this regard, both those who are called the more recent Thomists and those who are called Molinists agree.

XXXIX. Therefore, they do not want what is voluntary to be considered free if the will is necessarily determined to it, as is the will of the blessed spirits to love God, whom they see clearly. Consequently, they conceive of the voluntary as a kind of genus that encompasses under it two species, namely, the free, which is done with choice and preselection, and the voluntary strictly and properly so-called, which is done willingly but not freely, because it is done necessarily and immutably. They make spontaneity a genus of the voluntary, for things that act willingly not only include those endowed with intellect and will, but also brute animals that lack reason, and even inanimate objects like a stone tending downward. For to act willingly is to act by the impulse of nature.

XL. Therefore, they distinguish between willingness or complacency and liberty: they do not want any liberty to be properly so-called except that which is either of contrariety or specification, by which one can elicit contrary acts concerning the same object or desire contrary or disparate objects; or at least of contradiction or exercise, by which one can act and suspend or inhibit the action.

XLI. They do not consider liberty to exist without a certain indifference and indetermination of the free agent to act; they consider only those acts to be free whose contrary one can do, or at least omit them and cease from them: according to the common description of liberty, which is said to consist in the fact that a free agent, all prerequisites for action being given, can act or not act, do this or that.

XLII. Some more recent Thomists, however, observe that indifference to act or not act is indeed a property of human liberty that cannot be separated from it; but they do not consider the essence of liberty to consist in it; rather, it consists in independence and eminence above finite goods, and in the power of ruling, or in a certain dominion, by which one refers oneself and one's own to the ultimate end. This can be seen in a recent writer, Vincent Baronius, a Dominican, in the third part of his Dogmatic Theology, concerning the principles of human liberty and the knowledge of God against Theophilus Raynaud, S.J., Disp. 1, Art. 3, §. 1. But according to the

more common modern doctrines of the school, the very essence of liberty is to be constituted in that indifference to act or not act.

XLIII. Moreover, the doctors of the Roman Church, by that indifference which either constitutes the essence of liberty or at least necessarily follows it, do not mean a state of the will in which it wavers between two opposites, inclining to neither more than the other, but rather suspended in some sort of equilibrium, slightly impelled now this way, now that way. They acknowledge that liberty is found in one who is not indifferent to act in that sense; but whose will, strongly inclined to certain actions due to deeply impressed habits, and who has a firm resolve to act in a certain way and not otherwise, from which he can scarcely be diverted. However, the indifference in which, according to their view, the liberty of choice is situated, is nothing other than the true power of acting and not acting, which remains even in one who is determined to act by a fixed and constant purpose of mind and will.

XLIV. Furthermore, it is to be observed, according to the common sense of the doctors of the Roman Church, that liberty does not require indetermination and indifference to acting well or badly. The necessity of liberty lies in the ability to act well, and even less in the ability to act badly. For they acknowledge that God is the freest agent, who nevertheless cannot act badly: just as Christ as a man could not either: nor can the angels and celestial spirits, who, by a singular favor of God, are immutably confirmed in good, yet they are no less free. Conversely, as they admit, the demons and the spirits of the damned in hell can do nothing good, yet they act freely, and free will remains in them. For, although they are determined to act well, and the latter to act badly, they can nevertheless abstain from these and those acts, and choose among many good or bad options. As seen in Puteanus in 1. 2. quest. 10, art. 1, 2, 3, 4. dubit. 3. And in William Estius in 2. sent. dist. 14. § 5.

XLV. However, the description where liberty is said to be that by which, all prerequisites for acting being given, the free agent can act, not act, do this and that, is not explained in the same sense by all theologians of the Roman School. To understand this, it should be noted that those words can have multiple meanings. Firstly, those words can be taken as if they signify that the free agent can act and not act simultaneously and at the same time exercise contrary acts. This sense is manifestly false and is rejected by all. For they all admit that in a free agent, act and cessation from act, or one act and its contrary, cannot coexist; and therefore, those words mean nothing other than that the free agent simultaneously has the power to perform contrary acts, and that in it is found the power of acting and the power of not acting, which in the schools is expressed by saying that it attributes the simultaneity of power to the free agent, not the power of simultaneity.

XLVI. Secondly, the sense of this description can be that, given all the prerequisites for an act of free will, whether from the side of the object, or from God and the intellect itself, that act can both follow or not follow, and a contrary act can be substituted for it: so that although an act and its privation, or a contrary act, cannot be composed and joined together; nevertheless, with all the prerequisites for some act of the human will, for example, conversion and love of God, its privation and even a contrary act can be joined and often in fact are joined: and so,

notwithstanding any light of the object and even attraction, any dictate and judgment of the intellect, and finally any divine motion that impels to conversion, and yet precedes the actual determination of the will, conversion can in fact not follow; and it often happens in fact that these same conditions being present, in one person conversion is joined, but not in another, because the will has so determined itself in one and otherwise in another.

XLVII. And this sense is proved and admitted by those who are called Molinists in the Roman School. For they do not want to assert that anything that prepares, moves, and impels the human will to consent, whether from God or the intellect, cannot coexist with the dissent of the will. They hold that any judgment of reason and any divine motion can be combined, not only with the act to which they pre-move and direct the will but also with the absence of that act, indeed with a contrary act: so that the same divine grace in one produces conversion to God, and in another not, because one voluntarily chose to follow the guidance of divine grace, and the other did not. Thus, they say, a free agent, given all the prerequisites for acting, can, in a composite sense, act and not act, do this and that. For if one understands that in a free agent act and cessation from act, one act and its opposite, can be combined, they admit that the composite sense is false, and only the divided sense, which opposes it, is true. If one contends that not indeed with the act itself, but with all the prerequisites for acting, the privation of the act and its opposite can be combined, that composite sense, according to them, is true.

XLVIII. However, those who are called recent Thomists think differently. According to their doctrine, both of those composite senses are false. They think that not only the privation of an act or its opposite act cannot be joined with the act itself, but neither can the negation of the act coexist with those things required for acting, among which there is a certain divine premotion. This is because, given the prerequisites for some act, that act follows certainly and infallibly; it can never happen that it does not follow. Nevertheless, they concede that, given all the prerequisites for acting, a free agent can act and not act, do this and that: because, although the negation or suspension of the act cannot coexist with these prerequisites, the power of not acting or even acting in a contrary manner can perfectly well coexist with them. Just as the dissent of the will cannot coexist with the actual consent of the will, but the power of dissenting remains: and the act of sitting cannot coexist with the act of walking, although the power of walking, which is not taken away by the act of sitting, does not contradict it. Therefore, the prerequisites for acting, whether from the part of God or our intellect, necessarily bring the act itself with them by consequence, and yet they do not take away the power of not acting. Because they indeed make the will act, but they make it act in such a way that it can not act and does not lose the power of acting otherwise.

XLIX. Diego Alvarez, Archbishop of Trani and Salpi, a principal recent Thomist, explains his view on this matter: "It must be said that for the liberty of the will to necessarily require that, given all the antecedent prerequisites according to the order of reason or time for the act, it can operate or not operate, so that with the same prerequisites there stands simultaneously in free will the faculty and power by which it can operate or not operate if it wills. And this is proven, for if any of the prerequisites for operating were to take away from free will the faculty

or power of not operating or of operating in a contrary manner, it would be the effect of the efficacious motion of God, by which it is predetermined to such an act: but such a motion does not take away from free will the faculty of not operating that act or of operating in a contrary manner, but only makes it so that, although free will can operate and not operate such an act, it infallibly and freely operates it... However, it is not of the essence or definition of free will that, given all the antecedent prerequisites according to the order of causality for the operation of such an act, it can not operate the same act in a composite sense if a composition is made between such prerequisites and the lack of such an act or the contrary act. Therefore, these two are incompatible, that is, that in free will, for any instant of time, all the antecedent prerequisites according to the order of causality for the production of such an act should be present, and yet it does not produce it but produces the contrary act. Nevertheless, this impossibility simultaneously stands with the liberty of the will." In sum, from his work on the helps of Divine grace, book 4, chapter 4, numbers 5 and 6. Therefore, to avoid all equivocation, this is, according to him, the legitimate definition of free will: free will is the faculty of will and reason for acting or not acting, and for acting one way or another.

**THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON
THE FREE WILL OF MAN
Absolutely and in itself considered.**

PART THREE

In which the state and the significance of the questions concerning this matter are collected and examined as they are debated in the Roman and Reformed Schools.

Thesis I

In the previous theses, we briefly and clearly, as far as we could, presented the doctrine of free will in humans, considered absolutely and in itself. First, according to the Doctors of the Reformed School, and then according to the minds of the Doctors of the Roman School. And above all, we have made it clear that there is no controversy about the free will of humans concerning the question of whether it exists. For all the Reformed admit that not only was man endowed with free will when first created by God, but that the same free will remained in fallen man, neither completely extinguished nor lost, although it was greatly weakened by man's fall and reduced to the servitude of sin until it is brought into freedom by the grace of Christ.

II. Secondly, it is evident from what we have previously explained that both Schools agree that free will is not an act or habit, but pertains to the faculties of the soul. Nor is it a faculty distinct from the intellect and will. The significant questions about the nature of free will in humans today can be summarized as follows: Which faculty does free will refer to? And in what does the freedom, by which our will is said to be free, consist?

III. As for the remaining contention around these questions, as can be seen from the preceding theses, it is not properly between one School and another but between private Doctors who have various opinions and philosophies about these matters within each School. Indeed, almost no opinion in one School about these issues does not have some supporters in the other School. And there is no opinion rejected by the Doctors of one School that is not also opposed by some within their own School.

IV. To start with, when it is asked to which faculty free will pertains, a large part of the Theologians of both Schools believe that the freedom of human will, although it somehow originates from reason and has its foundation in a certain independence of practical judgment, nonetheless belongs solely to the will as its subject. The Schools say that freedom is only in the intellect radically, or as a necessary condition, but formally in the will alone. So free will is nothing other than the will, either simply as it follows the judgment and dictates of reason or as it chooses one among several means suggested by reason, accepting or rejecting this or that.

V. However, just as some Reformed Doctors deviate from this common opinion, so too in the Roman School it has had its opponents, both in the past, such as Durandus, and more recently, such as Gassendi, who believe that freedom is not only in the will but also in the intellect, and even more in the intellect than in the will. Although it must be admitted that Reformed Doctors deal with this question more freely and with greater diversity of opinions, some make freedom common to both will and intellect, though they hold that it pertains more to the will according to some, like Joshua Placeus, and more to the intellect according to others, like Moses Amyraldus. Others assert that freedom is not an attribute of this or that faculty but arises from the mutual relation and concurrence of multiple faculties in a person. Therefore, the subject of freedom is not this or that faculty but simply the person, insofar as he uses his intellect and will in a certain way. We also adhere to this opinion, considering that a person is free not simply insofar as he wills, nor simply insofar as he judges, but insofar as he desires and wills based on a deliberate judgment of the mind and a certain counsel of reason.

VI. As for the nature of freedom, as is also clear from what has been explained in previous discussions, there is no less variety of opinions in both Schools. First, we abundantly proved that in both Schools there are those who, against others' objections, teach that the freedom of the will is opposed not to necessity simply, but only to coercion. However, we also made it clear that this controversy is either merely verbal or at least not of great importance. Those who affirm that freedom in general is opposed not to necessity but only to coercion concede to those of a different opinion that mere immunity from coercion is not sufficient for freedom, nor does freedom properly consist in it, but rather in that a free agent moves and acts of itself, by a certain reason proper to an intellectual agent, which is not found in inanimate things or brutes.

VII. Moreover, although they believe that only coercion hinders freedom in a rational agent, not necessity, they nonetheless acknowledge that free agents in most of their actions are not only free from coercion but are not determined to one thing by any necessity. Therefore, they consider some acts of a free creature to be necessary, but most to be contingent.

VIII. Thus, they note a threefold liberty in free agents. The first is what is called in the Schools the liberty of contrariety or specification, by which someone can do this or its contrary or something different. The second is called the liberty of contradiction, by which someone, although unable to do this and its contrary, can nonetheless act or refrain from action. Both these kinds of liberty are opposed to necessity and determination to one thing and are accompanied by a certain contingency of actions. Finally, they add a third liberty, called simple or complacency, by which the will and intellect of a free agent, while reflecting on themselves, either tacitly or expressly, approve their own actions and somehow command themselves; thus, by a certain peculiar reason, they move and act of themselves, as the intellect judges that it judges rightly and ought to judge as it does, and the will wants to will and fixes and confirms itself in its own act. This liberty can exist without the liberty of contrariety or contradiction and is consistent with a necessary and immutable determination to one thing.

IX. However, when liberty is extended to necessary and immutable actions, they admit that it is taken in a broader sense; liberty strictly understood pertains only to contingent matters, which can be so or otherwise.

X. Those who maintain that liberty is opposed not only to coercion but also to necessity concede to theologians of a different opinion that the will, or a free agent, acts necessarily concerning some of its actions, while concerning most others it acts contingently. Moreover, although they believe that the will is free only concerning those actions that are not necessarily but contingently elicited by it, they nonetheless acknowledge in those very actions to which the will is immutably and necessarily determined, there is a certain liberty and complacency of the will, which consists in this, that while the will reflects on its act, it approves it and commands it to itself, insofar as it not only wills simply but also wills to will and acquiesces in its own act.

XI. Hence, as I said, the contention here is verbal, not real. Both sides agree on how things are in themselves. That is, the will, concerning some actions, acts necessarily, while concerning most others, it acts contingently. The will enjoys the liberty of contrariety or contradiction concerning some actions but is determined to one thing concerning others, that is, it cannot do the contrary or refrain from acting. And yet, in those actions that the will elicits necessarily, it pleases itself, wills its own actions most strongly, and approves them.

XII. The only remaining question is whether those acts that the will elicits necessarily and inevitably, and in respect to which it is entirely determined to one outcome, can be called free. Some deny this, stating that such acts cannot be called free but only voluntary, as there is no liberty in them except that which pertains to contrariety or contradiction. Others, however, concede that while these acts are not free in the stricter sense (where one could equally will or not will, or will something different or contrary, or at least could suspend willing), they can and should still be called free in a broader sense, which includes simple liberty or complacency. Thus, the question reduces to whether simple complacency, which pertains to the will in all its acts, whether necessary or contingent, deserves to be called liberty in a broader sense—a question that seems to be merely about terminology.

XIII. Indeed, among those who teach that liberty in general is opposed not to necessity but to coercion, Strangius, a Doctor of the Reformed School, expressly affirms this. After teaching extensively that the will is free not only when it deals with means but also when it deals with the end, and that God freely loves Himself and men freely desire happiness because the liberty of the will in general is nothing other than intellectual spontaneity, he later acknowledges that liberty is also used more strictly to refer to things within our power and is restricted to means related to the end, or to things that contribute little or nothing to the end, in which case liberty includes a certain indifference and free acts are merely contingent. He also notes that in this sense, many deny that God loves Himself freely and that the blessed in heaven love God freely. He concludes with these words: "It does not seem to us to be worth disputing about this matter, for otherwise it would only be a matter of terminology. For we do not deny that the term free will is rightly used in this way, although we have said that these actions are free in another sense." (*De voluntate Dei lib. cap. 14. pag. 687.*)

XIV. Among those who teach that liberty is opposed not only to coercion but also to necessity, Guilielmus Estius, a theologian of the Roman School, acknowledges the same. For in response to certain objections raised against Bonaventure's view, he replies: "Bonaventure teaches that free will can be considered in two ways: either as free or as deliberating. And indeed, insofar as it is free, he says it can apply to what is necessary, as is evident in God and the blessed; for although they have the necessity of immutability, they do not have coercion. However, insofar as it is deliberating, it only pertains to the contingent, for no one deliberates about what is necessary and impossible." From this distinction, it is clear in what sense he said that free will, insofar as it is free, also pertains to necessary acts and can have a necessary act. For 'insofar as it is free' means no more than 'insofar as it is voluntary and uncoerced.' Thus, it is the same as saying that the will, insofar as it is free from coercion, pertains to actions that are necessary. However, 'insofar as it is deliberating,' that is, as he explains, insofar as it consults whether to choose this or that, pertains to the liberty proper to free will as such. Therefore, Bonaventure does not differ in substance from others but speaks less conveniently, beyond common usage.

XV. The controversy that remains in the Reformed School among theologians who agree that the liberty of the will is opposed not only to coercion but also to necessity seems to be of little importance. While some simply teach that all properly called necessity is opposed to liberty, others concede that liberty is opposed to natural necessity, yet contend that various forms of necessity can coexist with the same liberty of the will: namely, that a free agent can be imposed with a certain necessity to act by the efficacy of grace and divine providence, or even by the practical judgment of the mind, which does not harm liberty.

XVI. Those who maintain that all properly called necessity is opposed to liberty understand by necessity only that which not only determines the agent to act but also takes away from it the power not to act or to act otherwise, or which places the agent in a state where it not only acts certainly and infallibly but also truly cannot not act. And this not only in a composite sense but also in a divided sense, and therefore makes it so that the agent, whether it is acting or

prepared to act, does not have the power not to act or to act otherwise, like the power of a sitting person to walk even while sitting, and vice versa, the power of a walking person to sit even while walking.

XVII. Therefore, they concede that the motion of divine grace and the efficacy of divine providence, or even the final judgment of practical reason, can so determine a person to act and will that the action follows necessarily, which is called free, and it is impossible that, given the motion and efficacy of divine grace and providence, the act does not occur to which God, whether through the motion of grace or the efficacy of common providence, prepares, moves, and determines the person. But they do not consider this necessity to be properly called such, because with it there remains a true power not to act. For God moves a person whom He calls according to His purpose to believe in God and to love God and neighbor, so that although faith and love infallibly follow and, given such motion, it is impossible for a person not to believe and love, this does not take away the power not to believe and love. For with divine motion, the contrary act cannot coexist, but the power for the contrary act can. Just as it is necessary for a sitting person to sit while sitting, and for a walking person to walk while walking, and it is impossible for a sitting person not to sit and for a walking person not to walk, and yet the true power of walking remains in the sitting person and the power of sitting in the walking person, not in a composite sense as if they could walk and sit at the same time, but in a divided sense, because any act, although it excludes the contrary act, does not exclude the power for it.

XVIII. Therefore, according to this doctrine, a person effectively moved by God to do this or that, or impelled by his own practical judgment, indeed acts necessarily with a certain necessity of infallibility, yet at the same time retains the true power not to act. And although he can indeed not act, he will certainly act, and it is impossible for the absence of action to be joined with such judgment or such divine motion.

XIX. Those who teach that various forms of necessity can coexist with liberty and that he whom grace moves or his own judgment impels to act cannot not act mean nothing more than that it is impossible for a person moved by God to a certain act, by that grace which is said to work willing and doing in humans, or at least by the efficacy of common providence, or even by the judgment of his own reason, not to elicit the act to which he is thus supposed to be moved and excited. Therefore, from the supposition of such grace and aid and such judgment, it necessarily follows that the person will act in this or that way.

XX. However, they readily concede that a person moved by grace, for example, to pray and give alms to the poor, is not thereby entirely deprived of the power not to pray and not to give alms; indeed, with the act of praying and giving alms, the power to refrain from those acts or even to perform contrary acts can coexist as the power to be silent coexists with the act of speaking, and the power not to sit or even to walk coexists with the act of sitting.

XXI. Both sides, therefore, agree that he whom divine grace or the efficacy of divine providence and the judgment of his own reason move and impel to act, must act, since his action cannot be separated from that motion of God and the determination of his judgment. Yet, with

such action, and therefore with the motion of God to such an act, the power to refrain from it or even to perform a contrary act can coexist, as has been repeatedly explained and stated.

XXII. Thus, when some assert that he whom God moves to this or that act must act, while others contend that no properly called necessity impels him to act, they differ in words but agree in substance. The former say that such a person acts necessarily because it is impossible for his action to be separated from divine motion, which the latter do not deny. According to the latter, no properly called necessity binds him to act because with his act, and much more with the motion to the act, the power for the contrary act or at least for the absence of the act, can coexist, which the former readily concede.

XXIII. Therefore, it also appears that the remaining disagreement among the Doctors of the Reformed School can be easily reconciled. Some affirm that the liberty of the will includes a certain indifference of the free agent, whereby, given all the prerequisites for acting, it can act or not act, do this or that; others deny that such indifference is included in liberty or pertains to liberty at all.

XXIV. For those who believe that liberty cannot exist without some indifference of the free agent, they do not understand this indifference as a state in which the agent does not incline more to one side than the other but stands in an equal balance to be pushed this way or that, which those who disagree strongly oppose. There is not one among those who support this indifference who does not believe it can also be found in someone who firmly and certainly decides that this and no other action should be taken, and whose will, with deeply rooted habits that can be hardly shaken, is vehemently inclined in one direction or the other. Thus, by the term indifference in this context, they mean nothing other than a true and intrinsic power not only to act but also to cease from action, not only to do this but also to do something different or opposite. This power is found not only in someone who is uncertain and hesitant about whether to act or not but also in someone who no way hesitates or doubts what should or should not be done, and who is determined with a fixed and unmovable purpose to act in this and no other manner.

XXV. Moreover, when they say that a free agent, given all the prerequisites for action, can act or not act, do this or that, they do not mean that, given all that is required for a particular act of will (among which is the motion of divine grace and the practical judgment of the mind), the will can refrain from acting and that the absence of action can be joined with all those things by which the will is moved and disposed to act. For they admit that it is impossible for God to move a person with His effective grace to an act of piety, and yet the act not be performed, or for someone, having considered all things, to judge that he should act or desire this here and now, and yet not to do and desire the same. What they mean is only that the one who is moved by reason to act, although he will infallibly and certainly act and it is impossible that he does not act, nonetheless retains within himself the true power not to act and to act otherwise, which remains not only in someone who is immediately prepared and disposed to act but even in the one who is currently acting. For although the absence of the act or a contrary act cannot coexist

with a particular act, the power for that contrary act can indeed coexist, as has been repeatedly emphasized.

XXVI. On the other hand, those who argue against the need for some indifference in the agent to have free will seem to signify by indifference a state in which the will does not incline more to one side than the other and is equally flexible in either direction, which no theologian in Christian schools has ever considered liberty to consist in.

XXVII. Similarly, when they say it is false that a free agent, given all that is required for action, can act and not act, do this and that, they do not mean that the factors that prepare and impel to act take away from the free agent the faculty to act otherwise or to suspend action. For they acknowledge that this faculty is not taken away by the act itself, much less by the factors that impel to act. Nor do they deny that one who pities a needy person by God's grace always retains the power not to pity, and one who despises the pleasures of this world retains the faculty to seek and embrace them, which is not taken away by divine grace. Thus, they intend nothing more than this: given all that is required for action, it cannot happen that a free agent does not act, although otherwise he retains the faculty by which he could not act or act differently. For example, it cannot happen that, given all that is necessary from God for producing faith and conversion in a person, that person is converted and believes, although the faculty remains in him always, even when he believes and is converted, by which he could not believe and not be converted.

XXVIII. It is clear, then, that when these theologians deny that liberty consists in some indifference of the agent, they have two things in mind: one, that liberty does not consist in the state of someone who is in doubt about whether to act or not, and the other, that given the motion and efficacy of divine grace and providence, and even the practical judgment of one's own reason, it cannot happen that a free agent does not act according to the effective motion of God and his own judgment, which those among the Reformed who teach that liberty includes some indifference to act readily concede. Furthermore, from what has been said, it is no less evident that those doctors who support this indifference only mean that the motion of God and the practical judgment of the mind move a person to act in such a way that, on the one hand, he acts certainly and infallibly, but on the other hand, the power not to act or to act otherwise is not taken away from him. Just as when a person actually acts, the same power is not taken away from him by the act to which he is moved and impelled.

XXIX. From all these things, it is clear that the doctrine of the Reformers on this matter, rightly explained and understood, and in the sense intended by those who propose it, does not differ in substance from the opinion of those who are called the more established Thomists in the Roman School. Although they contend that liberty is opposed not only to coercion but also to natural and properly called necessity, they nonetheless acknowledge that given all the prerequisites for action, the act of a free creature follows necessarily with a certain necessity of infallibility. For although a free agent always retains the power not to act even when he actually acts, and more so when he is immediately ready to act, given all that is required for action, both from God and from the intellect, the will acts certainly and infallibly, and it is impossible for the

action not to follow. According to their doctrine, all the prerequisites for action can indeed coexist and be consistent with the power not to act or to act otherwise, but not with the absence of action, and much less with a contrary act.

XXX. Thus, by indifference to act or not to act, in which, according to their view, liberty is to be constituted or which at least is necessarily joined to liberty, they do not mean anything other than what has already been described. That is, they neither conceive of a free cause as doubtful and uncertain whether it will act or not, nor do they mean that given all the prerequisites for action, it can happen that a free agent both acts and does not act, but rather that there is a true power not to act and to act otherwise, which remains in a free cause when given all the prerequisites for action, not only is it immediately ready to act, but it will certainly and infallibly act, as Alvarez very clearly and distinctly explains his opinion on this matter in the sum of his work on the aids of divine grace, book 4, chapter 14, from which the words quoted from the same Alvarez in the previous dispute are taken.

XXXI. Indeed, the same opinion is held by Diego Alvarez and others who are called recent Thomists, as is by the Doctors of the Reformed Church. This is confirmed by the testimony of the learned man, Andreas Rivetus, who was a professor at the University of Leiden some years ago. He expressed his opinion on human free will using words taken directly from Alvarez. In the summary of controversies, tract 4, question 3, he admits that the definition of free will, saying it is the faculty of the will by which, given all prerequisites for action, it can act or not act, can be tolerated as long as it is understood in a divided sense, not a composite sense. He states, "If someone says that, given all the prerequisites for action according to the order of reason or time, free will can act or not act, so that the faculty and power to act or not act remain in free will with those same prerequisites, as Diego Alvarez distinguishes, because even the effective motion of God, by which the will is determined to a particular act, does not take away the faculty of free will to act or act contrary but only ensures that, while free will can act or not act, it infallibly acts freely." This means that, in a contingent and free cause, there is the power for either opposite but not the power to hold both opposites simultaneously. This is because the power for one act does not conflict with the power for the contrary act, nor do they conflict in the same subject, so created free will, not only before it is determined to one act but even at the instant it is determined by God and itself to the same act, simultaneously has the power to produce the contrary act if it wills but not to hold both contrary acts at the same time. All these words are either explicitly quoted or at least borrowed from Diego Alvarez, including the conclusion that Rivetus agrees with: it is not the essence or definition of free will that, given all prerequisites for a particular act, it can not act in a composite sense if the composition is made between such prerequisites and the lack of that act or its contrary. That is, with the help of God's effective aid, it cannot happen that free will does not produce an act of love or elicits an act contrary to the love of God.

XXXII. Thus, there remains no real or significant controversy for the Reformed except with those who are called Molinists in the Roman School, named after the famous Jesuit Louis Molina, who wrote and taught about a hundred years ago. They understand the indifference to

act or not act, in which free will consists, and the common definition that it is that by which, given all prerequisites for action, the will can act or not act, very differently from the recent Thomists, as we have demonstrated in the previous dispute.

XXXIII. They do admit with others that by indifference, they do not mean a state in which the will does not incline more to one side than the other but hangs between two opposites as if suspended in balance. They acknowledge that liberty is not prejudiced by habits that strongly incline the will to this or that action and are difficult to change. Moreover, they do not deny that in a certain composite sense it is false to say that the will can act and not act, do this and that. That is, if someone thinks this means that the act and its lack or two contrary acts can exist simultaneously in the will. They also admit that indifference, in which the essence of liberty consists, does not mean the power to do good or evil. They acknowledge that free will remains even in one who cannot do good, as in the damned spirits, and even more so in those who cannot do evil, as in the saints who see the face of God and reign with Him in heaven.

XXXIV. However, they strongly defend that the will is so undetermined and indifferent that, given all prerequisites for action, whether on the part of God, the object, or the intellect, it can happen and often does happen that the will does not act. Thus, none of the things that antecedently move and incite the will to act can ensure that the action of the will follows, and it often does not follow. Therefore, with all those things that precede the action of the will and are required for it, the power to not act or act otherwise can be genuinely joined and composed, but also the absence of action and even the contrary act. As is clear from what has been said, not only the Reformed but also those recent Thomists deny this. They believe that with the prerequisites necessary for action, either on God's part or the intellect, the power not to act or act contrary can indeed coexist in the will, but given these, the will always acts, and it cannot happen otherwise. Because from this hypothesis, the will acts certainly and infallibly, although it retains the power not to act.

XXXV. Moreover, since this issue has often been raised and discussed among the Roman Pontiffs and the assembly of Cardinals appointed for this purpose, they have not yet defined it, and they have allowed their members to hold and defend either opinion at will. However, just as the Roman Pontiffs Paul V and Clement VIII seemed to favor the Thomists' opinion at the beginning of this century and the end of the previous one, their successors Innocent X and Alexander VII have seemed more favorable to the opposing doctrine in recent years. Thus, it has become much more common in the Roman School and is held by the majority of theologians.

XXXVI. Moreover, just as some Roman Catholic doctors, such as those called Jansenists and even recent Thomists, attack the Molinists with common weapons along with those Reformed who subscribe to the Synod of Dort, so do those from the Reformed, who are called Remonstrants or Arminians in Belgium and others who do not follow the Synod of Dort, strongly defend the doctrine of the Molinists in this matter.

XXXVII. Their opinion is mainly rejected by the Doctors of the Reformed School because it diminishes the efficacy of divine grace and attributes more to free will than is proper in the matter of salvation. For Scripture teaches that whatever good is in us should be entirely

attributed to divine grace, according to the Apostle's words, "What do you have that you did not receive?" But from this doctrine, it follows that man can believe and love God, should indeed be attributed to the aids of grace that move and incite man to faith and love, but that man consents to the moving grace and determines himself to believe and love God, depends so much on free will that it is not properly an effect of divine grace, since the grace being present, that consent often does not follow. Thus, divine grace can be said to be only its condition or a cause without which it does not happen.

XXXVIII. Moreover, Scripture teaches that divine grace makes the difference among men, that is, between those who are converted and those who are not, between believers and unbelievers, between those who obey God's call and those who resist, according to Paul's words, "Who makes you different?" But from the doctrine of those we are now discussing, it follows that it is not divine grace, but simply the human will that makes this difference among men. It supposes that with equal grace offered to many, this one believes, that one does not; this one is converted, that one is not. Consequently, it should not be attributed to any efficacy of grace that this one believes and is converted rather than that one but only to the free determination of the human will, because this one chose to consent to the moving and prevenient grace, while that one did not.

XXXIX. Additionally, if divine grace only moves, prepares, and incites people to will and perform what God commands, so that the willing and performing can still not follow and often does not follow, then grace indeed produces in man the necessary powers or dispositions to will and perform good but not the willing and performing itself. But the Apostle testifies to the contrary, saying that God works in us both to will and to act according to His good pleasure (Phil. 2:13).

XL. Finally, if, given all the prerequisites for action, even on God's part, not excluding any efficacy of grace, it can always happen that the will does not act, then there is no divine grace, at least ordinary grace, by which human conversion infallibly and certainly follows, and by which all who are given it, without exception, come to Christ. But Christ Himself teaches that there is a certain grace of God that no one receives without coming to Him. For He says, "Everyone who listens to the Father and learns from Him comes to me" (John 6:45).

XLI. Indeed, if many of those drawn by the Father's grace and taught inwardly by God still do not believe in Christ or come to Him, how could Christ offer this as a reason why not all who hear the Gospel come to Him, that is, that it is necessary for those who come to Him to be drawn and taught by the Father? He says, "Do not murmur among yourselves. No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. It is written in the Prophets, 'And they shall all be taught by God.' Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me" (John 6:44-45). Certainly, if those who do not believe the Gospel are drawn by the Father's grace, it would be absurd to say, "Do not be surprised that those to whom the Gospel was preached did not believe the Gospel, because it is necessary for those who believe in the Gospel to be drawn by divine grace."

XLII. Since there exists a certain divine grace, indeed common to all the elect, by whose motion and impulse the conversion of man infallibly and certainly follows; and yet, by the consent of all, the conversion of man to God is a free act of the will: it is clear that liberty is poorly constituted if, given all the prerequisites for action and the ordinary motion of grace, the will can always either act or not act, not only in a divided sense but also in a composite sense, so that the lack of action to which grace moves a person can coexist with that motion of grace.

XLIII. Therefore, the common description of Free Will, which is defined as the faculty by which, given all prerequisites for action, one can act or not act, do this or that, is less safe than the one proposed by Alvarez: "Free will is the faculty of the will and reason to act or not act, and to do one thing or another." Or even that of Bellarmine: "Free will is the free power of choosing one thing over another from those that lead to some end, or of rejecting or accepting one and the same thing according to our judgment, attributed or granted to us for the great glory of God."

THEOLOGICAL THESES
In which it is examined,
How Divine Concurrence and Cooperation
WITH
THE FREEDOM OF HUMAN WILL
can be reconciled.
And various views of the Schools on this matter are presented.

Thesis I

Durandus, a celebrated figure among ancient Scholastic theologians, believed and taught that God concurs with secondary causes remotely and mediately only; namely, because He gave all things their own nature and essence and conferred upon them the power to act, and continuously preserves both by His power: with the condition that each creature, having once received its power from God and continuously preserved, performs its own motions independently without God immediately and directly influencing their acts and effects. From this follows that God is only a remote cause of the acts of creatures, while the creature itself is the proximate and immediate cause.

II. Among more recent theologians, a certain Louis of Dole from the Capuchin order, whose book was published with many approvals from Doctors, aligns with Durandus' view. He says that for God to concur with man in action is nothing other than creating free will for natural acts or giving the power or habit of acting in supernatural ones, by which the will itself does everything in every supernatural act without any other immediate divine concurrence promoting the action. As reported by Samuel Rutherford, Professor of Theology at the University of St Andrews, in his Scholastic Disputation on Divine Providence, chapter 25.

III. According to these Doctors, there is no difficulty in reconciling divine concurrence with the freedom of human acts since God does not immediately concur with them but mediately only through the free will that He created once and continuously preserves.

IV. However, this opinion is generally rejected in the Roman School. Except for very few, the Doctors of the Roman Church, both ancient and recent, agree that God cooperates with secondary causes in such a way that there is no action of a secondary cause that does not proceed directly from God as well as from the secondary cause, and that no action can be exercised by a creature unless God confers being on that action directly and immediately.

V. They derive this from certain Scripture passages. The principal one is found in Acts 17:28: "In Him we live and move and have our being." For when the Apostle says that we live in God, that is, by Him, and have our being, he sufficiently teaches that God is the one who gave us our nature and all faculties initially and continuously preserves them; therefore, when he adds that we also move in God, he seems to clearly teach that all our movements and actions, like nature itself, proceed immediately from God and are done by His power.

VI. They also refer to what Christ says in John 5:17: "My Father is working until now, and I am working." For that continuous operation attributed to God there cannot be more conveniently explained than by the continuous influence by which God concurs in all actions of created things and produces them together with them; especially since it is clear that Christ understands there an operation similar to what He had just performed in healing the lame man.

VII. They also infer this from all those places where Scripture singularly attributes to God things that are done daily in nature through secondary causes. For example, when it is said in Psalm 104 that God waters the mountains from His upper chambers, makes grass grow for the cattle and plants for people to use, and in Psalm 135 that He brings forth the wind from His storehouses, and in the New Testament that He clothes the grass of the field and gives each seed its own body, Matthew 6:30, 1 Corinthians 15:38. It seems that Scripture would not have used such language if in these matters no singular and immediate action of God intervened and they had no other proximate and immediate cause than nature itself created by God.

VIII. To these testimonies from sacred Scripture, they also add an argument derived from natural reason. For they reason that no created substance can remain in nature unless God preserves them immediately by His influence; much more, therefore, similar influence is needed for the motions and actions of substances: for how could it be true that accidents depend less on God for their preservation than substances themselves? Since what is necessary for the preservation of a thing is more reasonably necessary for its first production, it follows that nothing at all can be produced by secondary causes unless the actual and immediate influence of the primary cause intervenes simultaneously.

IX. From these and similar reasons, the Doctors of the Roman Church conclude almost unanimously that God concurs and cooperates with all secondary causes, whether necessary, free, or contingent, in each of their actions, and indeed directly and immediately. However, when asked what this cooperation of the primary cause with the secondary cause is and in what it consists, there is great variety of opinions among Scholastic Doctors.

X. Thomas and most of his followers, especially Dominicans, teach that to explain divine concurrence, it is not enough to simply say that God influences various acts and effects of secondary causes and grants and preserves their being as He created and preserves the secondary causes and their powers: but they also contend that it is required that God moves and applies the secondary causes to work, without which they would do nothing at all. This, they say, is required by the dependence of secondary causes on God as the first mover. For according to them, God is called the first mover because He moves and applies all other causes to their operations antecedently, and therefore produces all the effects of secondary causes first in nature, though not in time. As Estius expresses it in the Second Sentences, distinction 24, paragraph 14.

XI. This seems to be the doctrine of the Roman Catechism itself, published by the order of the Council of Trent, whose words at the end of the explanation of the first article of the Creed are: "God not only sustains and governs all things by His providence but also impels to motion and action with His intimate power those things that move and act, in such a way that while He does not hinder the efficiency of secondary causes, He nevertheless prevents it; since His most hidden power extends to each thing and, as the wise man testifies, reaches from one end to the other mightily."

XII. Therefore, they assert that God excites and applies the secondary cause to act, and that before the creature operates, it is effectively moved by God in all its actions, and that God is the one who acts and makes the creature act and do whatever it does and acts: so that without this divine pre-motion, the creature can do nothing at all, and given this pre-motion, it is impossible in the composite sense for the secondary cause not to do and act what it is pre-moved by the first cause to do.

XIII. However, according to their view, this divine pre-motion applies no less to free agents than to necessary ones, which raises a considerable difficulty regarding how this can be consistent with the freedom of creatures. If our will cannot act without being first moved and applied to action by God, how can it be considered the master of its own act and indifferent to acting or not acting, since it does not have in its power that divine motion and application required for each of its acts? And again, when God moves and applies the will to action, how can it be said that the will acts freely when it cannot help but act and cannot resist the divine motion?

XIV. To solve this difficulty, Bellarmine says that the influence or power of God, by which the will is moved and applied to action, is received in secondary causes according to their disposition. That disposition, according to which the motion of God is received in the will, is, for Bellarmine, nothing other than a certain preceding negative determination, both of God's influence and of the elicited act of the will. Specifically, in his view, this consists in whether the will allows itself to be moved by the object presented by reason, or does not allow itself to be moved. He calls this determination negative because it does not consist of a positive act but in the negation of an act; yet the will is no less free to act than not to act. Thus, he believes that the will is truly free and determines itself even if God moves and applies it to action because the divine motion itself is in its power. For, he says, if the will allows itself to be moved by the proposed object, God applies and moves it to elicit the act; if it does not allow itself, God does

not apply or move it, since God freely bound Himself when He created the free will. (On Free Will, Book 4, Chapter 16).

XV. Therefore, according to Bellarmine's view, although the will requires a preceding divine motion and application to act, it always remains the master of its act because it somewhat has that motion in its power, as previously explained. And although, given God's motion, it is impossible for the will not to be moved, the will is always free in acting because it was in its power not to be moved by God by not disposing itself through that negative determination to receive God's motion, which was within the power of the will.

XVI. However, this solution of Bellarmine does not please many who agree with Thomas, that the will, like all other secondary causes, requires a certain previous divine motion and application to act. They assert that God moves the will according to His will, without any consideration of such a preceding negative determination in the created will. And they assert that He not only moves it simply but effectively impels it to act in a certain way, so that the will is determined by God to act or will this and not another, prior to its own determination.

XVII. And this is what they call predetermination, which they also call physical, not as physical opposed to supernatural but as physical opposed to moral. They mean that God predetermines created wills to act not merely by proposing, persuading, or attracting, which are proper to a moral cause, but by immediately moving the will itself and exerting a true, real, and properly said action on it, which is proper to what is called a physical cause.

XVIII. They assert that such predetermination applies not only to the good acts of free causes but also to the evil ones. For since they believe it is the dependence of the secondary cause on the first so that it can do nothing at all unless moved and applied to act by the first as its instrument, they teach consistently with this doctrine that even for those acts accompanied by some malice and wickedness, the created will is so pre-moved and predetermined by God that given God's motion, it must act and do this or that.

XIX. Nevertheless, they deny that this results in making God the author of sin, because God does nothing more in the act of sin than what is positive in it and thus good; and consequently, He moves and determines to nothing else. The wickedness and moral fault attached to such an act are not something positive requiring a properly efficient cause but only a privation of the due rectitude that arises from the defect of the created will.

XX. This doctrine is accurately and distinctly presented by Didacus Alvares in his comprehensive work on the aids of divine grace, Book Two. Indeed, in the seventh chapter of that book, he titles, "That God by a previous motion inherent in the created will moves, applies, or predetermines it to all its particular good acts, while preserving its liberty." And in that chapter, these are his words, "By this motion and application, God truly transforms the will from one state to another and makes it willing from unwilling." He further states, "God, by this actual efficacious motion in the manner of a physical cause, that is, truly efficiently, predetermines the will of man to good free acts so that the will moved by God through such aid freely and infallibly determines itself to produce a second free act."

XXI. The ninth chapter bears the title, "That God by a previous motion truly efficiently moves free will to the act of sin, as far as it is an act and as it is a being." The chapter begins with these words, "What has been said about the predetermination of the will to good acts must be extended to the act of sin, as far as it is an act and a being. Hence, whatever entity is found in any act of sin, even if otherwise it is intrinsically evil, must be traced back to God as the first cause pre-moving and predetermining the created will to such an act as it is an act and as it is a being." He then shows how it does not follow from this that God is the cause of moral evil present in such acts, stating that the deformity of sin or moral evil does not follow intrinsically and by nature from the act of blasphemy or hatred of God as an act, nor as a being in the general nature, even in the individual, but as it proceeds from the defective will of the creature. Therefore, the moral evil and defect of sin should be referred to the deficient will, not to God.

XXII. And these points are consistent with what is read in Estius in the above-cited passage, where he expounds the same doctrine and brings many confirmations to it. He concludes thus and objects to the freedom of human will: "Since, therefore, it is clear from what has been said that our will is effectively moved and determined by God as the first cause, the first mover, and therefore is preceded and predetermined by Him, it remains to be explained how this effective motion and determination, or rather divine pre-motion and predetermination, is consistent with the freedom of our will. For it does not seem that what is effectively moved and determined in one direction by a prior cause can be free to do otherwise."

XXIII. To this, he responds, "Regarding the nature of free will; it suffices that from the previous judgment of the practical intellect, it chooses one of the opposites, while still being able to choose the other from a different judgment of the same intellect; because, namely, the root and foundation of free will lie in the intellect, insofar as it can consider various aspects of good in opposites and propose them to the will. But the nature of free will does not include that while the free agent chooses from previous judgment, it is not moved by a superior cause to judge and choose so. Therefore, since the divine motion predetermining the will does not hinder a person from having full and perfect judgment of reason and judging that one means is contingent and the other is necessarily connected to the end, and could also choose otherwise from a different judgment, it follows that such a motion does not harm the freedom of our will. For it is proper to the uncreated will to have its choice from no prior cause."

XXIV. Alvares attempts to reconcile the physical predetermination of the human will to its acts by the impulse of the moving God with the free choice of the same will in another way. After proposing this objection to himself, "If the prior divine influence is necessary for the cause so that the will may act, it follows that without it, the will cannot act, thus its freedom will perish," he responds, "This prior motion or immediate influence on the cause is not necessary for the will to be able to act if it wishes; for it has that by its own power or through supernatural habits; but it is necessary only for it to act actually. Hence, from the fact that the will is not moved by God with that prior motion, it does not follow that it cannot will or act; but it only follows that it will not actually act."

XXV. In the same book, chapter 6, in response to the second argument, from the fact that God predetermines someone to will this or that, he denies that it follows, absolutely speaking, that it is not in their power to will otherwise. Although given the divine predetermination, it is impossible in a composite sense for them to will a different object. In one word, he distinguishes between willing and acting, and the ability to will and act; and he concedes that without that predetermining influence, the will never acts, but with it, the will never does not act. Yet, he maintains that with that influence, the will has the power not to act, and conversely, without it, the will has the power to act, namely in a divided sense. In his view, with that predetermining influence, the will's power to not act or act differently remains, but the opposite act or cessation of the act does not. Conversely, without that influence, the power to act remains in the will, although it is never brought into action. He concludes that someone omitting an act that is commanded does so freely and sins because they could have fulfilled the command with sufficient aid from God. However, due to their own fault, they impeded themselves from receiving that necessary motion from God.

XXVI. But the majority of the doctors of the Roman Church today reject that opinion and assert that the pre-moving and predetermining influence of God on the human will to its individual acts completely undermines the freedom of human choice. Furthermore, they argue that it follows that God is the author of sin since, according to this view, He predetermines people even to intrinsically evil acts and imposes a certain necessity of doing evil upon them.

XXVII. Therefore, they philosophize very differently about the concurrence of God. First, they establish that when God concurs and cooperates with secondary causes, He does not do anything or imprint on the faculty itself that acts, for example, on our will. Instead, He only immediately influences and acts on the action and effect of the secondary cause, producing it at the very moment it is produced by the secondary cause.

XXVIII. Then they consequently teach that the action of the first cause concurring with the secondary cause is not an action really distinct from the action of the secondary cause but the same action insofar as it receives its being from the first cause. Thus, when God, for example, concurs with the will in the act of willing or not willing, He does not exert an action in the will distinct from the action of the will itself but only confers being on the action of the will together with the will and preserves that action. Consequently, divine cooperation in this respect is not something different from our volition but our very volition insofar as it immediately depends on God for its production and preservation.

XXIX. Furthermore, as also clearly follows from what has been said, they deny that the secondary cause is moved by the first cause to act or determined by the same in acting to produce such an action. Therefore, according to their opinion, the secondary cause, and consequently the will, does not act because God moves it and applies it to action. Rather, God cooperates with it because it disposes itself to act. The divine concurrence and influence is something indifferent in itself, which is determined by secondary causes to various kinds of actions.

XXX. These and many similar points are elaborated at length by Luis de Molina in his "Concord of Free Will with the Gifts of Grace," question 14, disputation 26. He first asserts that

God concurs with secondary causes in their operations and effects in such a way that just as the secondary cause immediately elicits its operation and produces its term or effect, so God immediately influences with it in the same operation and produces the term or effect through that operation or action. Secondly, he asserts that when God concurs with secondary causes, He influences as a universal cause with an indifferent influence towards various actions and effects. This general influence is determined to specific kinds of actions and effects by the particular influence of the secondary causes, which varies according to the nature of each in acting. Just as the influence of the sun, which is also universal, is determined by the influence of a man to produce a human being, and by the influence of a horse to produce a horse. If the cause is free, it is in its power to influence in such a way that this action rather than that one is produced, such as willing rather than not willing or walking rather than sitting, and this effect rather than that one, namely this artifact rather than another. Or it may even suspend its influence entirely so that there is no action at all. Thirdly, he asserts that the influence of God through universal concurrence is not sufficient for the production of any effect without the particular influence of the secondary cause by which it is determined, nor is the particular influence of the secondary cause sufficient without the influence of God through universal concurrence by which it is assisted, which, according to the ordinary law, He never denies. These two influences mutually depend on each other to exist in nature. Indeed, there are not two actions but one numerically, which as it comes from God influencing in this way is called universal concurrence, but as it comes from the secondary cause, for example from fire causing heat, is called the concurrence or influence of the fire. This action is specified not because it is from God through universal concurrence but because it is from the fire with God cooperating through its particular power.

XXXI. The doctors who hold this explanation of divine concurrence think they can easily show how such concurrence can be reconciled with the freedom of human actions. For since two kinds of freedom are usually attributed to the will—one concerning the exercise of the act and the other concerning its specification—this divine concurrence, as explained, prejudices neither. Not the former, which concerns the exercise, since this concurrence does not impose the necessity of acting on the will. For the will does not act because God acts but rather conversely, God acts because the will acts, although they both begin to act at the same moment in time and nature. Scholastic terms express this by saying that the will acts prior in nature to God, not by priority of the instant in which but of the order from which.

XXXII. Although the will can do nothing at all without God concurring, according to the law established by God when He created it free, that concurrence is always available to it because God willed and decreed from eternity to concur with every work of the free will when it determines itself to act. Nevertheless, the will is equally free concerning the specification of its act. For that the will acts well or badly, avoids or seeks this rather than that, does not proceed from any power of divine concurrence but from the proper determination of the will, which freely uses the divine concurrence, indifferent in itself, to produce an action of this rather than that kind.

XXXIII. As for the Reformed theologians known as Remonstrants or Arminians in Belgium, they recognize no other divine concurrence with secondary causes than that general and indifferent one, which is determined by the concurrence of the secondary cause. This can be seen in Jacobus Arminius, from whom all others derive their name. In his dispute against Perkins, he not only affirms that this divine concurrence is indifferent in itself but also that it contributes nothing to the will of the creature by which it might be inclined, helped, or strengthened to act. He asserts that the created will has God's concurrence in its power, ready and available, before it acts (In Anti-Perkins, p. 733). Similar teachings are found in Grevinchovius against Amesius (sect. 32, p. 368) and Corvinus against Tilenus (cap. 9, p. 354).

XXXIV. Some of the Reformed theologians who subscribed to the Synod of Dordrecht also seem to share the same view with the Molinists and Remonstrants in this matter. They acknowledge no other divine concurrence with secondary causes than a simultaneous and indifferent one, whereby God does not influence the cause itself but acts together with it in its effects and actions, which do not determine the secondary cause to this or that specific kind of action but are variably modified by the nature or even the liberty of the secondary cause.

XXXV. This is certainly the opinion of Robert Baronius, a Scotsman who, during his lifetime, was a professor of theology at the University of Aberdeen. This can be seen in his "Metaphysics adapted to the use of Theology," where he discusses the divine concurrence and its harmony with our free will. He professes to hold the same view as Fonseca and Suarez, namely, that this concurrence is indifferent in itself and is determined by the secondary cause to a specific type of action. He asserts that there is no need for God to pre-move secondary causes but that it suffices for Him to influence their effects and actions simultaneously with them. Therefore, the divine concurrence and influence are really nothing other than the action of the secondary cause insofar as it receives its being from the first cause and depends on it (Section 8, Disputation 3, "On the concurrence or cooperation of God").

XXXVI. John Strangius, also a Scotsman and professor at the University of Glasgow, seems to be not far from this opinion. Although he considers that the action to which God and the creature simultaneously concur is by nature prior from God than from the creature, and that God's influence on that action is by nature prior to the creature's influence, he denies that God concurs only with a general influence, as He concurs in the same way with the generation of a human and a horse. He asserts that God's influence is special for special effects, not morally but physically. He contends and proves, with many arguments, that for all and each of the actions of creatures, the pre-motion and pre-determination of God, as defended by the Thomistic school, are not necessary (De voluntate et actionibus Dei circa peccatum, lib. 2, cap. 3).

XXXVII. By pre-motion and pre-determination, he means the action of God by which He excites and applies the secondary cause to act. Hence, prior in nature and reason to the creature's operation, He moves it really and effectively to all its actions, making the creature act and do whatever it does. Thus, without this pre-motion of God, the creature can do nothing at all, and once it is given, it is impossible in a composite sense for the secondary cause not to do what it is pre-moved to by the first cause. He acknowledges this pre-motion and pre-determination of God

for the works of grace and many other operations of the will whenever it pleases and is necessary. However, he denies that it pertains to the general concurrence of God or is universally applied to all actions of creatures, especially those necessarily accompanied by sin (Lib. 1, cap. 4, sub finem).

XXXVIII. He testifies that he is mainly moved to this view because he considers that if God necessarily determines devils and wicked humans to all sinful actions, it follows that our sins could justly be imputed to God. This is also the reason Robert Baronius mentioned above felt greatly compelled.

XXXIX. Moreover, both believe that this pre-determination should be rejected because it offends the freedom of the will and seems irreconcilable with it. Strangius, however, distinguishes between liberty broadly accepted, which is essential to the will and found in every act that is spontaneous and rational, and liberty in a stricter sense, which consists in a certain indifference of the agent and pertains to the will concerning most of its acts. According to him, the former liberty is not overturned by divine pre-motion and pre-determination, by which God gently moves humans as is fitting for an intelligent creature. However, it cannot coexist with the latter liberty, which is based on indifference and with which any preceding determination, not in the will's power, conflicts. How the simultaneous concurrence of God, which is always available to the created will, does not harm that liberty has been explained above. These theologians do not reconcile it with the strictly defined liberty of the will any differently than the doctors of the Roman school (Strangius, *De Voluntate Dei circa peccatum*, lib. 2, cap. 8).

XL. However, many Reformed theologians agree with the Thomistic school that God not only concurs and cooperates with each act of creatures simultaneously but also pre-moves and pre-determines creatures to these and those acts effectively. This applies to both necessary and free causes and to both good and evil acts, although God does not move or pre-determine to the malice and wickedness of the act but only to what is positive and naturally good in it. Just as, according to their view, the secondary cause can do nothing and act without such pre-determination, so also, once it is given, it is impossible for it not to act and operate.

XLI. William Ames acknowledges that such pre-motion and pre-determination of secondary causes, especially human will, must be admitted. Otherwise, in his judgment, the subordination of the first cause and secondary causes in their operations would be abolished. All operations of the human will would be removed from the dominion, providence, and effective governance of God. Man would be not a subject but a partner of God. Indeed, God would depend on the nod of man even in matters of the greatest importance in the administration of the entire world. Man would not say, "If God wills, I will do this or that," but rather God would have to say, "If man wills, I will do this or that" (In Bellarmino Enervato, vol. 4, lib. 4, cap. 2).

XLII. Samuel Rutherford, a Scot, and professor of theology at St. Andrews University a few years ago, holds the same view. He refutes with many arguments the concept of God's general and indifferent concurrence, which is determined by the concurrence of the secondary cause, as a fabrication and impious. In his view, such concurrence is injurious to God because it takes away God's freedom in deciding and introduces an abhorrent dependence of God on the

fickle will of His creature. It presupposes that God is determined by the creature and not vice versa. Furthermore, it nullifies the use of prayers in which we ask God to bend our hearts and those of others as our salvation requires, since this cannot be done without an operation by which God determines human wills. For the same reason, it would be pointless to give thanks to God for goods procured through free agents. Nor would the riches that come to humans through free acts of commerce be from God. Finally, it would deny the particular providence of God, which Scripture often commends (*De divina Providentia*, cap. 25).

XLIII. In his Apologetic Exercises on divine grace, he asserts that God, in all acts of both nature and grace, determines the will through a truly real impulse in the manner of a physical cause. He adds that the main question is not whether this pre-determination should be called physical but whether God determines free acts in such a way that the will cannot be moved without being moved by it. He argues from Scripture that the necessity of the will is caused by God's motion, by which it is inevitably moved. If someone concedes this, he says he is ready to abandon the term "physical pre-determination," even though God determines the will in the manner of a physical cause (*Exercit. 3*, cap. 1).

XLIV. The English theologian distinguished God's concurrence from His pre-determination, although he considers both necessary for all actions of the creature. He acknowledges that concurrence is simultaneous in nature and time with the creature's operation but insists that a prior motion in the will itself is also necessary. "We admit," he says, "a simultaneous concurrence in nature and time with the act; but we say that this concurrence includes a prior motion in the will itself, not in time but in nature" (*Vindiciae*, lib. 2, part. 3). In the same book, he rejects the Jesuit's concept of indifferent and undetermined concurrence with these words: "I indeed consider that concurrence is as evidently wrongly established as the noonday sun shines."

XLV. From the reasons given by Amesius and Rutherford, it is clear that they primarily want to deny and abhor as a major error the idea that God's operation and efficacy concerning the creature is merely a concurrence that is indifferent and indefinite in itself. Certainly, not all who assert a general concurrence of God necessary for each act of creatures intend to affirm that it is indifferent in itself and variously determined by secondary causes. Besides this general concurrence of God, they acknowledge a great force and efficacy of divine providence in procuring, promoting, moderating, and directing various events, especially concerning human wills and the acts freely elicited by them, as Strangius diligently notes in many places.

XLVI. As for reconciling this pre-determining concurrence with the liberty of the will, according to Amesius, it must be said with Didacus Alvarez that the pre-determination of God does not prevent the will from acting freely, since it indeed ensures that the will acts certainly and infallibly, but it does not take away the power to act otherwise. Similarly, Twisse says that God moves the human wills to act in such a way that whatever is done is done in accordance with their free condition. Hence, at the very moment they act, they can choose not to act, namely in a divided sense. For in a composite sense, it is utterly impossible.

XLVII. According to Rutherford, liberty involves a twofold indifference: one objective, when the intellect proposes to the will something eligible as a means to the supreme good that is not absolutely necessary, and another internal, vital, elective, whereby the will can choose to will or not will, preserving both the essence of liberty and its natural mode of action. Neither indifference is prejudiced by God's pre-determination. Not the objective, because it does not prevent the intellect from proposing an eligible object to the will as suitable for achieving an end but not necessarily connected to it. Nor the internal, because even when God determines the will to choose this or that, He does not prevent it from having the natural power to choose otherwise. Finally, all these theologians agree that God's pre-motion and pre-determination indeed impose a certain necessity on the acts of the will, but only a hypothetical necessity, which does not conflict with liberty, as only necessity from external force or natural determination does.

XLVIII. There are also some Reformed theologians who appear to share the same view with Durandus and Ludovicus à Dola of the Roman School concerning God's general concurrence necessary for all acts of creatures. The distinguished Moses Amyraldus does not seem to acknowledge any other general concurrence of God, whereby He concurs with all secondary causes, except for the continuous efficacy by which He sustains and maintains the nature of each thing and the powers given to it by nature. From this, he concludes that this concurrence has nothing to do with liberty. "For," he says, "let nature and its powers remain without the help of such concurrence; they will certainly operate freely. Therefore, let the concurrence come, which does nothing other than maintaining their natural state and preserving them from falling away. Liberty will suffer no detriment from this" (*De libero Arbitrio*, cap. 4, sub finem). These words sufficiently indicate that in this matter, the distinguished man shares the same opinion with Durandus, the old Scholastic.

XLIX. However, besides this general concurrence, he acknowledges the great efficacy of divine providence, whereby the acts of our will, whether good, evil, or indifferent, are determined in time according to His eternal decree. But he reduces all the efficacy of divine providence, which exerts itself in good, to two actions: the proposal of the object, which manifestly does not violate liberty, and the internal disposition of the subject, which consists in liberating the faculties from impediments that have been added to their natural constitution or even elevating them in some way above their natural state. In this, it is equally evident that nothing prejudices human liberty.

L. Similarly, concerning evil acts, he teaches that there is a twofold providence: one external and the other internal. The external, he says, is occupied with two things. Either, he says, it deals with the proposal of objects that are suitable to move the faculties, or it consists in God's action of allowing and permitting the devil to exert his power, so that the effectiveness of the objects is aided. The internal act of God, which intervenes in the evil deeds of humans, consists, according to him, in God either obscuring or completely removing from the mind one of the many objects inducing to evil that the man meditates upon or procuring that one object is presented in such a way that it is most apt and suitable to move. In all these, nothing can hinder human liberty.

LI. Finally, concerning indifferent acts, he similarly attributes God's efficacy to the proposal of objects, the administration of causes that can aid the objects, and the internal operation that makes one object prevail over another and presents itself to the mind in a way suitable to move it. Yet, through these operations, which everyone confesses do not harm liberty, he wishes all human acts to be effectively determined by God, and the eternal decrees of God concerning them to be certainly fulfilled. This is because the human faculties, namely the mind and will, are determined to certain actions by the objects presented to them, which are congruent and suitable to their affection and disposition. Hence arises a certain necessity in their operations, which agrees perfectly with liberty and suffices to ensure that whatever God has most certainly determined and ordained in His eternal counsel will also certainly and inevitably be carried out by humans.

LII. The learned and subtle theologian Joshua Placeus agrees with other theologians that the will in its actions depends on God as the first cause, as do all secondary causes in their actions. However, he modestly refrains from defining the extent and degree of that dependence, nor does he want to impose his judgment on the various questions about God's concurrence and cooperation with all secondary causes that are commonly debated in the schools. His words are: "The will depends on God as the first cause, upon whom all secondary causes depend in their actions. But the extent of this dependence of secondary causes on the first cause is hotly disputed among the Pontificians. It is agreed by all that God concurs with every cause so that it operates according to its faculties. But most contend that this concurrence is immediate, proximate, and identical with the very action of secondary causes, while some disagree. The Dominicans and Jesuits fight vehemently over this immediate concurrence, the former for what they call physical pre-determination, the latter strongly against it. As for me, moved by reverence for the infinite majesty of God, I do not dare to define the extent of the dependence of the secondary cause on the first. It suffices for me, as long as it does not attribute any stain of our sins, however slight, to God, that it cannot be too great" (*Tractatus de libero Arbitrio*, p. 174).

LIII. He then reconciles this dependence of the will on the first cause with its liberty after a few intervening points. "However the will depends on God, and whatever God works in it, it always retains the liberty which we said consists in immunity from the threefold necessity of coercion, determination by matter, and determination by sense."

LIV. Pareus' view is not much different. He condemns the temerity of scholastic doctors who raise and determine various questions about God's concurrence. "Because," he says, "they have dared to investigate and define with reckless curiosity what cannot be known and explained sufficiently." He judges the opinion of Cajetan, who seems to find the concord of free will with divine providence inexplicable and unintelligible in this life, to be the safest because the judgments of God are inscrutable, and His ways unsearchable. In general, he wants this to be held as certain: the human will is governed by the nod of God and inclined where He wills. To reconcile this with our liberty, he says that something is not free if it is governed by another without its own deliberation and choice. But that which God governs by presenting an object to the intellect and effectively moving and influencing the will to choose this or that spontaneously

is nonetheless freely chosen, even if inclined by the nod of God to where He wills. He compares it to a beginner learning to write letters freely, though his hand is guided by a tutor. He adds and often repeats that God indeed determines the human will by His concurrence but not by a physical, brute, or violent determination, but by a spontaneous one, joined with its own judgment and choice (*Animadversionibus in Bellarmini librum quartum de libero Arbitrio*, cap. 14).

LV. As for me, I greatly commend the modesty of these learned men. It seems to me reckless and overly bold to definitively determine the mode of divine concurrence by which the first cause cooperates with secondary causes when our limited understanding cannot penetrate and scrutinize the abyss of divine power and wisdom. Nor is this matter sufficiently grasped by reason or clearly revealed in Holy Scripture.

LVI. Above all, I cannot perceive how it can be stated that God physically pre-moves and pre-determines free causes to acts that are intrinsically evil without making God the author of sin. For who can grasp, for example, that God, by some prior influence on every movement of the human will, imposed a necessity on the first man to desire the forbidden fruit and to eat it, or that He daily pre-determines men to blaspheme and hate Him, yet the guilt inseparably connected with these acts is not to be attributed to God Himself?

LVII. But as long as God is not considered the author of sin, I agree with the very learned Placeus that the dependence of secondary causes on the first cause in their actions cannot be stated to be too great. And it seems most probable to me, according to the common opinion of the schools, that God immediately concurs in all and each act of creatures.

LVIII. Above all, I am most certain of this, which I think all theologians would agree with: the power and efficacy of divine providence, even concerning evil acts, should not be restricted to a general and indifferent concurrence. Instead, God, in His infinite wisdom, procures, promotes, directs, and moderates various events, even those involving human wickedness, in many ways known to Him.

LIX. It is equally certain to me that, however God acts and operates in free causes, He always acts in accordance with their nature and does not prejudice their liberty in any way. Therefore, when He effectively moves human wills to this or that act, He does not take away their power to act otherwise.

THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON THE
CONCORD
of Human Liberty with Divine Foreknowledge

Thesis I

Socinus and his followers, unable to understand how future contingencies, which do not have a necessary and determined cause, can be certainly foreknown, deny that such certain foreknowledge of these future events exists in God.

II. But it is surprising that people who attribute divine authority to Scripture could entertain this notion. Nothing is more evident from Scripture than that God knows all future events, as demonstrated by the prophecies recorded in Scripture. As Tertullian aptly put it, the foreknowledge of God has as many witnesses as there are prophets created by God. Prophets, inspired by God, could not have predicted events that occurred many centuries later and were freely performed by humans unless these events were known to the eternal God.

III. Moreover, it can be proven from countless examples in Scripture that God predicted many things to be freely done by humans centuries in advance. For instance, in Genesis chapter fifteen, God predicted that the Egyptians would afflict Abraham's descendants for four hundred years, and by doing so, they would grievously sin and provoke God's wrath. "Know for certain," God said to Abraham, "that your descendants will be strangers in a land not their own, and they will be enslaved and oppressed for four hundred years. But I will judge the nation they serve as slaves."

IV. Similarly, in Deuteronomy chapter thirty-one, God is recorded as saying to Moses, "Behold, you will rest with your fathers, and this people will rise and play the harlot with the gods of the foreigners of the land, where they go to be among them, and they will forsake me and break my covenant which I have made with them." These predictions were certain and infallible, as the events that followed clearly showed.

V. Likewise, the prophets, in many places, foretold the future unbelief of the Jews at the time of the Messiah and the subsequent rejection of this people because of their unbelief. This is especially noted in Isaiah chapter fifty-three. "Who has believed our report? And to whom has the arm of the Lord been revealed?" It is also foretold that their unbelief would be so great that they would despise their own King, the Messiah, and even wound Him, subjecting Him to the most bitter and shameful death and numbering Him among transgressors and sinners. Jesus Christ our Lord, while on earth, predicted all these crimes and atrocities in detail, adding that all these things must be fulfilled as written by the prophets concerning the Son of Man.

VI. A notable prediction by Christ is that of Judas, who would betray Him, long before Satan had entered Judas's heart. In fact, centuries before Christ's advent, God had predicted this betrayal through the prophets. Christ testifies that David's words in Psalm forty-one, "He who eats my bread has lifted up his heel against me," refer to Judas (John 13). Peter also, reflecting on what is written in Psalm one hundred nine, says that the Scripture had to be fulfilled, which the Holy Spirit spoke by the mouth of David concerning Judas (Acts 1).

VII. Additionally, one could point to the prophecies of Daniel about the impiety, arrogance, lust, and cruelty of Antiochus Epiphanes against the Jews and the profanation of God's temple. Similarly, Paul speaks of the coming of that son of perdition who would sit in the temple of God, exalting himself above all that is called God, and leading many into error with false signs (2 Thessalonians 2). All these actions, though to be freely committed by humans, could not have been predicted clearly and distinctly by the Spirit of God in Scripture unless God had certain and distinct knowledge of all future events, no matter how contingent.

VIII. Indeed, if God does not know all future events, especially those to be freely done by creatures, He cannot be considered omniscient. He could not truly be said to know all things if some things escape His knowledge.

IX. Consequently, it would also follow that God is not free from all change. For if God knows things as they happen, then, before these events, He did not know them, and He learns something new when these events occur. This implies a change in God from not knowing to knowing, which cannot be conceived without some mutation in God. Hence, it would follow that God's knowledge is not perfect, for according to this hypothesis, it increases and grows daily with new knowledge.

X. The objections raised by Socinians against this clear truth have no real force. They argue that Scripture depicts God as being affected by grief and repentance due to human sins. For example, "The Lord saw how great the wickedness of the human race had become on the earth, and that every inclination of the thoughts of the human heart was only evil all the time. The Lord regretted that he had made human beings on the earth, and his heart was deeply troubled. So the Lord said, 'I will wipe from the face of the earth the human race I have created'" (Genesis 6). From this, they conclude that God did not know for certain the extent of human wickedness before it happened. Otherwise, it seems unreasonable to say that He was grieved and regretted making humans after seeing their wickedness. No one regrets their actions unless they gain some new knowledge or something unexpected and unforeseen happens.

XI. Indeed, it seems clear that God learns something new regarding human free actions from His own words to Abraham in Genesis chapter twenty-two. After Abraham showed his readiness to sacrifice his son at God's command, the Lord said, "Now I know that you fear God, because you have not withheld from me your son, your only son."

XII. Moreover, Scripture appears to teach that some events happen differently from what God expected, as it affirms that some things are done by humans contrary to what He hoped for. For example, God laments the disobedience and rebellion of the Jewish people, saying, "What more could I have done for my vineyard that I have not done for it? When I looked for good grapes, why did it yield only bad?" (Isaiah 5:4).

XIII. It must be stated, however, that Scripture often attributes human features and emotions to God in a figurative and metaphorical sense, not in a literal or proper sense. Consequently, many things said about God must be understood in a way that is befitting of Him. Therefore, when Scripture says that God was grieved or repented, it does not need to be taken literally, any more than when it is said elsewhere that God's heart was moved or smoke ascended into His nostrils. Indeed, when Scripture takes repentance in a proper sense, it expressly removes it from God. For instance, when Samuel says to Saul, "The Strength of Israel will not lie nor relent. For He is not a man, that He should relent" (1 Sam. 15:29). Thus, repentance in God signifies not an emotion but an effect. When Scripture says that God repented, it means that God did something that a man who repents of his deed would do; that is, He decided to destroy humans from the earth because of their wickedness, just as a man destroys his work of which he repents.

XIV. Similarly, God is said to be grieved because of human sins, not because He feels any emotion similar to our sorrow, but simply to signify that human sins are greatly displeasing and unacceptable to Him. These sins are such that they would cause sorrow to God if He were like us. Thus, in this case, sorrow is taken for what in a capable subject would generate sorrow.

XV. Likewise, in Isaiah, the Lord is said to have expected grapes from His vineyard, but it produced wild grapes—not because God was uncertain or doubtful about what the people of Judah, represented by the vineyard, would do after so many means were applied to lead them to true piety, but because He had done what ought to have led them to righteousness. If one human had done this for another, he could legitimately expect and hope that their heart would be softened and turned towards love and willing obedience.

XVI. When God says to Abraham, "Now I know that you fear God, because you have not withheld your only son from Me" (Gen. 22:12), He does not mean that He was previously uncertain about Abraham's piety or that Abraham was not sufficiently known to Him. Rather, it signifies that Abraham, by being ready to sacrifice his own son at God's command, gave a certain and undeniable proof of his love and fear of God—evidence that could convince anyone who had previously doubted or been unsure.

XVII. Nor does the argument taken from Numbers 14 have greater weight. There, God is said to have sworn to bring His people into the land of Canaan, yet, because of their sin and unbelief, He later swore that He would no longer do so: "As surely as I live," says the Lord, "I will do to you the very things I heard you say. In this wilderness, your bodies will fall—every one of you twenty years old or more who was counted in the census and who has grumbled against Me. Not one of you will enter the land I swore with uplifted hand to make your home, except Caleb son of Jephunneh and Joshua son of Nun" (Num. 14:28-30). For who among humans would be so foolish as to swear seriously to do something that they already knew they would not do? Or what could be more unworthy of God than to swear to do something only with words, not with intention?

XVIII. But it is true that God often swore to give the land of Canaan to the descendants of Abraham, and the words we cited above refer to those numerous oaths. However, this oath specifically concerned those Israelites who were rebellious in the desert, as proven by the words, "Not one of you will enter the land I swore with uplifted hand to make your home" (Num. 14:30). Here, the word "you" indefinitely designates the Israelite nation, not specifically the individuals constituting it at that time. Nor would it be absurd to say that God had specifically promised entry into the land of Canaan under oath to those individuals, not unconditionally but on the condition that they would fulfill their duty, even though He foresaw that they would not fulfill it. And it would not be foolish for a man to swear to someone that he would do this or that, provided he remains within the bounds of a good man's duty, even if he is certain that the other person will not fulfill their duty.

XIX. But those who today argue that there is no certain foreknowledge of future contingencies in God are primarily motivated by the belief that if God certainly foresees what humans will freely do, and indeed from eternity, then humans cannot be seriously admonished,

encouraged, and entreated to repent and convert. For why should someone be diligently urged and compelled to do what you already know for certain they will do? Or what is the use of soliciting and entreating someone whom you know for certain will not do what you ask?

XX. However, far from hindering God's serious admonitions, exhortations, and entreaties, the foreknowledge of human obstinacy or obedience necessitates that God seriously intends to act with humans in this manner. For divine admonitions, exhortations, and entreaties are means by which human obedience is procured, and they presuppose certain conditions without which humans cannot be said to be rebellious and contumacious against God.

XXI. Furthermore, it does not discredit divine wisdom for God to admonish, exhort, and invite to repentance those whom He knows will not heed His commands and invitations. Even the opponents admit that some, through divine judgment for their obstinate malice, are so blinded and hardened that they cannot repent. Yet they cannot deny that God uses admonitions and entreaties with these individuals, as He does with others, as shown by the example of Pharaoh. Therefore, if divine admonitions, threats, and entreaties can apply to these individuals without violating God's justice or diminishing His wisdom, why should the same not apply to others whom God, from eternity, knows will not obey from their own free will and purpose?

XXII. Therefore, any arguments derived from Scripture against the eternal foreknowledge of God, by which He certainly and distinctly knows all future events to be freely done by creatures, are futile. It follows now to see how the liberty of creatures in acting can coexist with this eternal foreknowledge of God. This matter is not without difficulty and has long exercised the minds of scholars. Since it is impossible for divine foreknowledge to be mistaken, it is impossible for events foreseen by God not to happen. Therefore, everything happens necessarily, and it is impossible for human will not to produce and elicit the acts foreknown by God from eternity, which seems to utterly destroy human freedom in action. For how can that be called free which cannot fail to happen or be otherwise?

XXIII. Many theologians of Christian schools respond to this, rightly in my judgment, that divine foreknowledge imposes no necessity on things, for it is not the cause of things, but rather the things themselves can be said to be the cause of divine foreknowledge in a certain manner. In other words, things are not future because God foresees them as future; rather, God foresees them as future because they truly will be.

XXIV. Regarding the objection that it is impossible for things foreseen by God from eternity not to happen, and therefore everything happens necessarily since God foresees all future events, it must be said, according to the common opinion of the schools, that it is indeed impossible for foreseen events not to happen, but only in a composite sense, not in a divided sense. These terms imply that it is not possible for something to be foreseen by God as future and yet not happen simultaneously. Nonetheless, simply and absolutely speaking, the thing foreseen can fail to happen if considered in its nature and without reference to God's foreknowledge. For example, Judas, whom God foreknew would betray Christ, could have chosen not to betray Christ if he had so willed. God's foreknowledge did not impose necessity on him to betray Christ. Nor does it follow that divine foreknowledge could be mistaken because if Judas had not

betrayed Christ, the betrayal would not have been foreseen; instead, God would have foreseen that Judas did not betray Christ.

XXV. Therefore, it is indeed necessary for all those things that God foresees to happen, once that foreknowledge is assumed, just as it is necessary for all those things that we ourselves see happening, once our vision is assumed. But just as our vision does not change the nature of things nor make it necessary in itself what is by its nature free or contingent—though from the hypothesis that we see something happening, it cannot but be happening—so the foreknowledge of God changes nothing in future events nor takes away their freedom or contingency, though what is foreseen by God as future, and thus assumed to be future, cannot but be future. For just as from the hypothesis that something is actually happening, it is impossible for it not to be happening, in the same way, from the hypothesis that something is future, it cannot but be future.

XXVI. In a word, just as from the vision of present things a certain necessity is induced, but only hypothetical, and what is called in the schools consequent necessity, which is fully consistent with their freedom or contingency, so from the foreknowledge of future things it follows that they will necessarily occur, but with a necessity only from the hypothesis and what is usually called infallibility, which does not prevent them from being in themselves absolutely free and contingent. For if there is a necessity that removes contingency and freedom, it is only that which is called antecedent and absolute, not merely consequent or consequential.

XXVII. Others, however, attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom in a different way. They believe this proposition is false: "Things are known by God because they are future"; and this one is true: "Things are future because God foresees them." For according to them, God's knowledge is the cause of things. Yet they do not believe this prejudices human freedom, because God from eternity not only foresees that humans will do this or that but also foresees the manner in which they will act, namely, freely and contingently. Therefore, given God's foreknowledge, it indeed follows necessarily, for instance, that Peter will speak, and this divine knowledge is in some way the cause that Peter will speak; but that he will speak not just in any way, but contingently and freely. Hence, they say, from God's foreknowledge the actual exercise of human freedom is rather inferred than destroyed. For such foreknowledge does not take away from Peter's will, speaking freely, the power by which he can choose not to speak if he wishes; rather, it presupposes such power in him. This is the doctrine of those who are called the modern Thomists, as can be seen in Diego Alvarez's *Summa of the Work of Divine Grace* book 1, chapter 11.

XXVIII. Some Reformed theologians, more simply and somewhat confusingly, respond to this difficulty by saying that divine foreknowledge does indeed introduce some necessity to all future things, but not all necessity conflicts with freedom, but only that which is from coercion or physical determination.

XXIX. Thus Christian theologians, in various ways, try to show how human freedom can stand alongside the foreknowledge of all future events by God. But there is no less difficulty in explaining how, given the freedom by which creatures can act or not act, their future actions can

be foreseen by God certainly and infallibly. For how can something be known for certain that in itself and in its causes has no certain existence but can equally not be as well as be?

XXX. To extricate themselves from this difficulty, Scholastic doctors work hard and try in various ways to explain how God foreknows future contingent and free events. Firstly, those who are now called the modern Thomists lay two foundations for that certainty by which God foreknows all future contingencies from eternity. One is that all future things are present to God in eternity, not only in objective existence, or in known existence, but also in real existence and according to their proper existences. For they say, God stands in relation to future contingencies as one on a high watchtower, from which he sees the entire road concerning those passing along it; for even though one goes after another and the later does not see the former, he who is on the watchtower sees all at once and has them present before him. So likewise, God has present to Himself in the watchtower of eternity all things past and future, though these follow those. These are the words of Diego Alvarez in book 1, chapter 8, where he further proves this presence of future things in eternity from the fact that eternity is an indivisible duration, wholly existing at once; hence, whatever coexists at any time with eternity, coexists with it wholly and consequently is wholly present to it.

XXXI. At the beginning of the next chapter, he concludes from this that the actual existence of things in eternity, considered from the perspective of divine eternity, is the proper reason why God certainly knows all future things, even contingent ones. And this is because, though they are contingent in themselves, as they are present to the knower, they are considered as determined and determinately true in relation to that measure in which they are present and in relation to the knowledge by which they are known as present.

XXXII. The other foundation they think supports the certainty of divine knowledge concerning future contingent things is the absolute decree of the divine will. For, as Alvarez says in the same place, the certainty of divine knowledge can also be derived from another principle, namely, the comparison of future contingencies with the absolute and effective decree of the divine will, predetermining all future things, even free ones, with all their circumstances, if they are good, or permitting them if they are evil. And to explain more clearly what that effective decree of the divine will permitting evils is, he observes in the following passages that two decrees are presupposed on the part of God for infallible foreknowledge of sins. One is the absolute decree of producing the act of sin as far as it is an act and a being; the other is the decree of not giving the effective help to avoid sin or the decree of permitting its malice, which is attributed only to the created and defective will. And in these two decrees, he asserts that all future sins are certainly known, for when God does not support and does not help the sinner to avoid falling, it is infallibly certain that he will sin.

XXXIII. However, there are other doctors in the Roman school who reject as vain and fictional the presence of future things in eternity according to their proper existences and affirm that all future contingencies, whether they result from free secondary causes or from other natural causes, are certainly and infallibly known in the sole divine decree by which He has determined them to happen. This opinion is often attributed to many ancient scholastics, such as

Scotus, Richard, Hervaeus, John Major, and many others. Many theologians among the Reformed also embrace this opinion, teaching with Calvin that God foresees future things in no other way than because He has decreed that they will happen. Especially William Twisse, a celebrated English theologian, explains, defends, and illustrates this doctrine of Calvin in detail, almost throughout his dissertation on middle knowledge against Penot and Suarez.

XXXIV. But neither of these views is approved by most of the more recent theologians of the Roman School. For not only do they reject the supposed real presence of future events in eternity, according to their own real existence, but they also do not acknowledge any effective decree of God by which the acts of free causes are predetermined, antecedent to their own determination. Therefore, to provide some account of divine foreknowledge concerning future contingents, they resort to another explanation. First, some believe that things which will happen contingently and freely are known by God in their proximate cause, that is, in the will, not taken in a bare sense, but as it is applied here and now, with this judgment, this object, this inclination, and finally with all other things that can either hinder or determine it to will.

XXXV. Bellarmine leans toward this view. "It seems probable to us," he says, "that God sees future free actions only in the human will." And shortly afterward, he adds, "God, therefore, who perfectly knows all the inclinations and the whole nature of our soul, and again does not ignore everything that may occur in each deliberation, and finally has a clear view of what is more suitable and appropriate to move such a soul, endowed with such inclination and nature, infallibly concludes in which direction the soul will be inclined." He adds that in the contingent cause itself, precisely considered, there is no determination; but if one combines with the contingent or free cause all that can occur and hinder, and sees the inclinations and aptitudes both of the cause itself and of all objects and circumstances, which only God can do, then some determination arises, and for that reason, it will be true to say, "this will happen at such a time." On *Grace and Free Will*, book 4, chapter 15, response to the sixth argument.

XXXVI. Others simply say that God certainly knows future contingents because whatever will be at any time, whether contingently or necessarily, before it happens, it was true that it would happen: but whatever is true is certainly known by the divine intellect, for no truth can be hidden from the infinite intellect, which is divine. Therefore, according to them, the certainty of divine foreknowledge must be sought from two sources: first, from the infinite power and perspicacity of the divine intellect; second, from the determined truth of future contingents. These are the words of Becanus, a Jesuit, in his *Summa Theologiae*, volume 1, treatise 1, chapter 10, question 11, first conclusion.

XXXVII. But each of these opinions seems to suffer from significant difficulty. Firstly, concerning that real presence of future events in eternity, insofar as they are thought to coexist with eternity itself from eternity according to their real existence, it seems to be a mere invention. For, in order for one thing to coexist with another, both must exist. What does not exist cannot coexist. Therefore, since contingent things have not existed from eternity, they could not coexist with eternity from eternity. Nor does the presumed indivisibility of eternity help here. For to that which admits no division or succession in itself, things that happen in time can coexist

successively. Just as a pole fixed and immobile in water is not always surrounded by the same water, but perpetually by new and different water. Nor is it necessary that what once exists in God's eternity should always coexist with it, any more than it is necessary that what coexists with His immensity in one place should coexist with Him everywhere.

XXXVIII. Furthermore, since among those things that God foresees will happen, there are many sins and moral evils, it is extremely difficult to understand how God could foreknow future events of any kind in an absolute decree of His will. For indeed, God can effect and determine good things without any prejudice to His goodness and wisdom; but it is contrary to divine goodness to move and predetermine the wills of creatures to things that are evil in themselves. For who can say that God absolutely and effectively determined, by some decree, the will of the angels who fell, to exalt themselves against God in pride, or the will of the first parents to desire the forbidden fruit, without thereby making God the author of sin? Or who can believe that the wills of men were singularly determined by an eternal decree of God, antecedent to any foreseen determination of the created will, to acts of blasphemy and hatred against God, without making God the cause of these sins?

XXXIX. Nor do I understand how the future acts of a free cause can be certainly foreknown in it, considered in those circumstances in which it is proximally disposed to act, unless we assume that a certain necessity of acting is imposed on it by the proposal of the object in such circumstances, which also carries significant difficulty. For it follows that Adam, as he was affected and disposed before the fall, had a necessity of sinning imposed on him by the temptation presented to him and the circumstances accompanying it; which can hardly be admitted without seeming to excuse him from guilt.

XL. As for the fourth opinion, which seeks the certainty of divine foreknowledge in the infinity of the divine intellect and in the determined truth of future contingents, it states nothing that is not certain and indubitable. For since it is evident that divine predictions of future contingents exist in the Scriptures, it is manifest that true propositions about them can be formed: for God affirms nothing but what is true. And every true proposition must have truth in reality corresponding to it. And thus, since it can be determinately and truly said that these or those things will happen freely and contingently, it follows that their truth is determined. Nor is it less evident that, given the truth of future contingents, it is perceived and known by the divine intellect, which is infinite. For since truth is the object of the intellect, the infinite intellect extends to all truth; otherwise, it would not be infinite but would have limits and an end, for it could not grasp some truth.

XLI. But though this opinion contains nothing but truth, it does not fully address the question, nor does it remove the chief difficulty. For what is most difficult to understand here is how contingent things, which can either happen or not happen, derive their future status from mere possibilities and pass into the nature of future things from eternity, so as to be perceived by God under that aspect. For nothing existed outside God from eternity to which this change could be attributed, except by referring it to the divine will's decree.

XLII. Furthermore, it is difficult to understand how something supposed to depend on a cause that is in itself indeterminate, and which can equally produce or not produce it, can be certainly known by the divine intellect, since in itself and in its cause it has no certain existence. For the divine intellect, no matter how infinite, cannot see what does not exist, nor change the nature of its object. Nor would its perception and apprehension be true if, as some say, it knew more in the cause than actually happens in the thing itself. Becanus, volume 1, treatise 1, chapter 10, question 7.

XLIII. Therefore, since darkness surrounds us on all sides when we scrutinize this matter, and we encounter obstacles and entanglements from which we cannot extricate ourselves sufficiently, I consider it safer and more honest to openly profess our ignorance here and seriously employ David's words: "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me, too lofty for me to attain." Although I do not wish to measure others' minds by my own limitations and do not condemn modest inquiry into this matter, I am easily led to believe that this mystery belongs to those of which the wise man speaks: "Do not seek what is too difficult for you, and do not investigate what is beyond your power." Nor should it seem surprising if our mind, defined by such narrow limits, cannot perceive how the divine intellect, which has no boundaries, knows and comprehends things far beyond our understanding.

XLIV. Nor does this in any way affect the certainty we should have both about God's foreknowledge and human freedom, both of which have a firm and unshakeable foundation in Scripture, supported by the light of reason and, concerning human freedom, by our own experience. For there are many things, not only in divine matters but even in nature, indeed within ourselves, whose existence we cannot doubt, yet the manner and reason for which our mind cannot investigate and scrutinize without ensnaring itself in difficulties from which it cannot free itself. What is clearer than light and vision? But what is more difficult than to penetrate and explain what the nature of light is and how vision occurs? What is more evident than that the body's members are moved in countless ways by the mere will? Yet how hard it is to grasp and explain how this happens! Or what is more confirmed by daily experience than that pregnant women, by the mere power of imagination, produce many wonders in their offspring, yet what have philosophers proposed on this matter that satisfies a prudent person in the least? Therefore, if in human affairs the thing itself is certain, although the manner of the thing is uncertain or entirely unknown to us, how much more should this apply in divine matters, which are far removed from the senses and vastly exceed our mental grasp?

THEOLOGICAL THESES
On the Concord
Of Human Freedom with Divine Decrees
PART ONE

Concerning the Knowledge Attributed to God of Contingent Future Events

Not Absolutely, but Conditionally, Which Is Called in the Schools Middle Knowledge, or Conditional Knowledge.

Thesis I

Among the ideas developed in the Schools to reconcile human freedom with the certainty and immutability of divine decrees concerning human actions, the concept of conditional knowledge has become particularly prominent. This notion was initially proposed by the Jesuits Luis de Molina and Francisco Suárez, and later adopted by many others, both within the Roman School and among Protestants. Therefore, intending to discuss the concord of human freedom with divine decrees and to present various scholarly opinions on the matter, we have decided, with God's help, to begin with this concept of conditional knowledge.

II. Thus, the majority of Roman School scholars hold the view that God not only foreknows what will happen freely and contingently but also those things that, although they will never happen, would occur freely if certain conditions were met. For example, God not only knows what each individual will do until the end of their life, given the various circumstances determined by His providence, but also what each would do if the state of affairs were entirely different and different opportunities for action were presented.

III. Moreover, since the foreknowledge of things that are absolutely future necessarily follows from a decree of the divine will, which has decided to create these agents and place them in this or that state of affairs and to cooperate with them as necessary for action, they claim that this knowledge of things that are not simply future but would be future under certain conditions precedes every free decree of the divine will. Namely, according to our way of understanding, God, before considering any decree about any matter, certainly and distinctly knows what any possible creature would freely do if He chose to create it and not withhold His cooperation and to present it with certain objects under those circumstances.

IV. Although this knowledge precedes any free decree in God, it is clear from what has been said that the condition under which the thing is said to be future includes a decree—not one that is actually conceived in God, but one that would necessarily have to be made by God for the thing to be possible. Therefore, that conditional futurity, which is the object of this knowledge, does not depend on a decree already made by God, but on one that is supposed to be made by God for the thing to be truly future. In other words, according to our way of understanding, God is conceived as thinking thus: If I were to decide to create this angel or human and not withhold my cooperation in this state of affairs, this would happen and not otherwise, although it could act otherwise.

V. Gabriel Vázquez observes this in the first part of Thomas's work: "Nevertheless," he says, "we must say that God knows future events under a condition, in such a way that the condition also includes God's decree to cooperate with free will, thus: God knows well that if I were to give Peter this or that vocation in this situation and cooperate with it as required and not miraculously withhold my cooperation, such a work would be done; however, I could withhold it

if I wished: but whether God would withhold or grant cooperation in this case, He has not yet decreed." (Tom. 1. disp. 67. cap. 4.)

VI. Francisco Suárez writes similarly: "Moreover," he says, "the whole effect simply depends on the will of God, whether it be done or not, and consequently, even in those conditionals, the antecedent must include the divine will, namely, if He wills such an effect, or at least wills to permit and cooperate with it; and in this way, even that knowledge has a relation to the divine will under the supposed condition." (Book 2 on the knowledge that God has of future contingents proposed conditionally, chapter 6.)

VII. Furthermore, they do not think it necessary that, to act in time, free causes must be pre-moved and pre-determined by God to this or that act, nor do they think that the divine decree on which the absolute or conditional futurity of free acts depends is a decree to pre-move and pre-determine free causes. Without such a decree, either simply posited or at least supposed, they believe that God certainly foreknows whatever free agents will do, either absolutely or conditionally. To this end, it suffices to assume or suppose a decree in God to provide cooperation, which they consider necessary for action and which is, in their view, always available to free agents, neither applying nor pre-determining them to act.

VIII. They call this knowledge "middle knowledge" because it holds a middle ground between the knowledge called in the Schools "knowledge of vision" and that called "simple intelligence." By the knowledge of vision, they mean the knowledge by which God knows things that exist outside Himself at different times, namely past, present, or future things. All of these God knows from eternity as clearly, certainly, and distinctly as if they were present to Him in actuality, just as we see things directly in front of us. Therefore, it is called the knowledge of vision, in analogy to bodily vision, by which we see objects presented to our eyes. This knowledge is also called "free knowledge" because it follows from the free decree of the divine will to create and preserve things, without which nothing could exist or be seen as present or foreseen as future. Hence, if God had decreed to create nothing, such knowledge could not be attributed to Him.

IX. By simple intelligence, they mean the knowledge by which God knows and understands all possible things and all their essences and connections, whether necessary or possible in any way. This knowledge is called "natural," not free, because, according to our way of conceiving, it precedes every decree of God regarding the creation of things and could not fail to be in God even if He had decreed to create nothing outside Himself.

X. The knowledge they attribute to God of future contingents under some condition is called "middle" by them because it does not entirely coincide with the knowledge of vision, nor with the knowledge of simple intelligence but partakes of both. It is not about merely possible things and abstracted from all consideration of existence, as is the knowledge of simple intelligence, nor is it about things absolutely future at some different time due to God's decree, as is the knowledge of vision. Instead, it partly resembles free knowledge because it is about things that would freely be future if the condition were met, and it is within God's freedom to establish

that condition; it partly resembles natural knowledge because it precedes every decree of God and God could not lack it even if He had not decreed to create the world or anything.

XI. Nevertheless, some do not call this knowledge of future contingents conditional simply "middle," but conditional simply, because they believe it can be easily referred either to the knowledge of vision, according to some, or, according to many others, to the knowledge of simple intelligence. Among these are Vázquez and Gregory of Valencia. Vázquez observes, however, that it does no harm if, for the sake of doctrine and clarity, a third member is constituted between the two kinds of divine knowledge. This disagreement is one of words, not things, and it does not matter much if people speak differently in this matter. (Tom. 1. disp. 67. sub finem.)

XII. Furthermore, they believe that such knowledge in God, by which He certainly foreknows future contingents under certain conditions, can be proved by scriptural testimony and arguments based on reason. First, they cite various examples from Scripture of predictions concerning events that did not actually occur but would have happened given certain conditions. For example, in 1 Samuel 23:11-12, when David asked the Lord if Saul would come to capture him if he stayed in the city of Keilah, and if the inhabitants of Keilah would hand him over to Saul if Saul did come, the answer was that Saul would come and the inhabitants of Keilah would hand him over, provided he stayed in the city. Therefore, God certainly foreknew both outcomes, which depended on the free will of Saul and the inhabitants of Keilah, under the condition that did not materialize because David fled, and thus neither event actually occurred.

XIII. A similar example is when God forbade the Israelites from marrying the daughters or sons of people who were outside the covenant of God, giving the reason that otherwise, these external nations would seduce and incline the hearts of the Israelites toward their gods. "You shall not intermarry with them, giving your daughters to their sons or taking their daughters for your sons, for they would turn away your sons from following me to serve other gods" (1 Kings 11:2). Hence, it is evident that God certainly foreknew that the hearts of the Israelites would be seduced if they engaged in such illegitimate marriages. This was fulfilled in Solomon due to the condition being met, but not in most other Israelites because that antecedent condition did not occur in them.

XIV. From the New Testament, they strongly emphasize Christ's words in Matthew 11:21: "Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes." Here, Christ affirms that the Tyrians and Sidonians would have repented if God had applied the same means to them as He did to the Jews. Thus, God knew from eternity that their repentance would have occurred under that condition. They also emphasize that the Lord, in a certain rapture of Paul, commanded him to leave Jerusalem quickly because they would not accept his testimony about Him. God foresaw that if Paul preached Christ to the Jews, they would not believe his testimony (Acts 22:18).

XV. Additionally, they think that many arguments based on reason can prove that such knowledge exists in God. First, because propositions about future contingents under certain

conditions are either true or false, just like propositions about things that are absolutely future, they are also the object of divine knowledge, since no truth can be hidden from an infinite intellect, such as the divine. That propositions about future contingents under certain conditions are determinately true or false is evident because a contradiction can be true between them, just as between propositions about absolutely future things. For example, these statements are completely contradictory: "If Peter is placed in such circumstances, he will sin" and "If Peter is placed in such circumstances, he will not sin." In all contradictions, one part must be true, and the other false.

XVI. Furthermore, if it is true that Peter, placed in such circumstances, will sin, then it was true not only before he was placed in those circumstances but also before he was decreed by God to be placed in them, that if he were placed in them, he would sin. Therefore, God knew before His decree that this would be future under such a condition. And it is logically prior that something is conditionally future before it is absolutely future.

XVII. Moreover, a wise person, before deciding anything, should have in mind what will follow from the things they decide to do. Since God has decreed everything most wisely, He must have known, logically prior to decreeing to create this or that being and presenting them with certain objects, and cooperating with them in this or that way, what would follow from all these things and what the creature would freely do or omit under those conditions, which is the knowledge we are discussing.

XVIII. Additionally, unless we attribute such knowledge to God, infinite questions could be posed to Him, similar to those David proposed, to which God could not respond with certainty and clarity unless it was a matter that could not be known, which seems to detract from divine omniscience. For example, one might ask what someone who died peacefully in Christ would have done if they had been offered martyrdom. Or if a certain man had sought to marry a particular woman who married another, would he have gained her consent? Or if a certain person were chosen as king of Poland, how would he have conducted himself in that kingdom? And countless other such questions. Since wise and experienced men can conjecture about such things, it is not plausible that God simply does not know them. It seems unworthy of God not to know with certainty what humans can infer with probable conjecture. If someone says that God knows such things and can respond distinctly and clearly about them but that such knowledge presupposes a free decree about the future of these things in such cases, it would follow that there are infinite decrees in God about things that will never actually occur, which seems very absurd.

XIX. However, many Doctors of the Roman School, especially those called the more recent Thomists, deny the existence of any middle knowledge in God, besides the natural knowledge, called the knowledge of simple intelligence, and the free knowledge, called the knowledge of vision. They argue that God does not have any middle knowledge through which, before any act of His will, He would know those things that are neither simply possible nor absolutely future but would be future under this or that condition and would be freely done by intelligent creatures if this or that circumstance were given.

XX. They believe that nothing is in any way future, whether absolutely or conditionally, except by virtue of some decree that actually precedes in God and by which God has determined to effect or at least permit what is said to be future. Therefore, before the decree of the divine will predetermining the will to one part of a contradiction or contrariety, it is not knowable what a man will do in particular or what he would do if placed in such circumstances, but only what he could do. This is because, before such a decree, the thing is neither future nor not future but merely possible and indifferent to being future or not future.

XXI. Thus, they do not deny that some things are contingently and freely future under certain conditions and that these are certainly known and predicted by God, as when God predicted to David that Saul would come to seize him if he stayed in the city of Keilah, and that the inhabitants would hand him over to Saul if Saul came to the city. However, they maintain that this certain foreknowledge of God follows from a free decree in God, by which He has determined that these things will happen if this or that condition is fulfilled. For example, God foreknew that Saul would come and the inhabitants would hand David over because, given that condition, God had decreed to permit both and to predetermine the will of Saul and the inhabitants of Keilah to the substance of those acts. This is explained in detail by Didacus Alvarez in his work on the aids of divine grace, Book 1, Chapter 6, titled "That besides natural knowledge, which is called the knowledge of simple intelligence, and free knowledge, which is called the knowledge of vision, there is no middle knowledge, even in God." In the following chapter, he also dissolves the objections of different doctrines of the Doctors.

XXII. Concerning the Protestants, their opinions on this matter are also varied. First, those called the Remonstrants in Belgium seem to unanimously accept and acknowledge that middle knowledge as described thus far, believing that God foresees not only what is absolutely future but also whatever would be freely future, in any order of things God may choose to place free agents.

XXIII. Initially, Simon Episcopus refers to the traditional distinction of three kinds of knowledge in God, dating back to Molina's time, as convenient: "It should be noted," he says, "that three kinds of knowledge are usually attributed to God. One, which is necessary and practical, and is called simple intelligence, which by its nature precedes every act of free will, by which God knows Himself and all possible things. The second is free knowledge, called vision, which follows the act of free will, by which God knows everything He has decreed to do or permit in the same order as He decreed to do or permit it to happen. The third is middle knowledge, by which God knows what men or angels would freely do under certain conditions, if placed in this or that state or order. We will not examine whether this distinction of divine knowledge is correctly made, but we do not doubt that it can be done conveniently and for the sake of clarity." (*Institutiones Theologicae*, Book 4, Chapter 19, On the order and mode of divine knowledge.)

XXIV. Nicolaus Grevinchovius extensively disputes this knowledge in his response to the Dissertation on General Redemption and Election from Foreseen Faith, on pages 393 and following. William Ames examines this response in his book titled "Scholastic and Brief Reply

to Nicolaus Grevinchovius's Response." Similarly, Curcellaeus sufficiently demonstrates his approval of this middle or conditional knowledge, which is attributed to God in the schools, when he praises Gomarus for acknowledging such knowledge in his later theses on the Eternal Decree of God and Predestination, having been taught by Arminius; in his opinion, this greatly removes the immense obstacle that would make God the author of the first sin of man and, consequently, of all other sins flowing from it. This is noted in the preface to the book titled "Examination of the Theses of Franciscus Gomarus on Predestination" by Jacobus Arminius.

XXV. Among the Reformed who subscribed to the Synod of Dordrecht, some acknowledge this conditional knowledge in God, by which He knows, before any decree of His will, what any free cause would do in any given order of things, according to its inherent liberty. Among these, Franciscus Gomarus, previously cited by Curcellaeus, should be noted. Writing on Matthew 11:21, after observing that the repentance of the Tyrians would have been the same kind as that of the Ninevites, which is common to both the elect and the reprobate, believers and unbelievers, he adds these words: "That Christ asserts the future repentance of the Tyrians under the condition of witnessing His miracles, rests on the indefinite foreknowledge of His divine nature, by which He knows what would have followed any given antecedent, even if neither occurred. For given the condition, it is well known that either they would have repented, or they would not have repented, according to the principle that two opposites cannot both be true at the same time. But which of these would have been, since the matter was contingent, only He foresaw who sees all things with His infinite knowledge, and not only predicts necessary things but also future contingents with certainty." A similar passage is found in Ezekiel 3:6-7, as Baldwin Walaëus notes in his commentary on the historical books of the New Testament regarding the cited passage from Matthew.

XXVI. Robert Baronius also explicitly supports the view of Fonseca, who posits a certain conditional knowledge in God, preceding His free decree, which precedes the absolute foreknowledge of future events. For example, God first knew only conditionally what would happen if Eve, seduced by the serpent, tempted Adam; but after He decreed to permit Adam to yield to his wife's persuasion, He then absolutely foreknew Adam would fall.

XXVII. And so he explains his and Fonseca's view on the matter. Just as those who wisely undertake a great work first consider what will result from it before they absolutely and determinately decide to do it, so, understanding God in our manner, He, before He determined by His absolute and determinate will to create the world, considered what would happen if He arranged heaven and earth and everything in them in the order and manner He eventually did; and by a certain hypothetical knowledge, He knew what would happen if everything were arranged in that way and order. Furthermore, God not only knew what would happen if natural causes were arranged in that order and manner, but also what would happen if free causes had the opportunities to act or not act as they have now or had previously. For God, whose judgments are incomprehensible, certainly knew what would happen if such and such occasions were presented to humans or angels; for example, God knew by this conditional knowledge what would happen if Adam's wife, seduced by the serpent, persuaded Adam to eat the fruit. This is

discussed in his "General Metaphysics for Theological Use," section 12, dispute 2, numbers 55 and 56, and in many other places in the same dispute.

XXVIII. Especially noteworthy is Antonius Walaeus, a professor at the University of Leiden, who acknowledges in God the middle knowledge, by which future events are known hypothetically, even if they are not absolutely future or have not yet occurred. He believes, for example, that God foreknew Adam would abuse his freedom if God created him with such freedom, endowed him with such gifts, and allowed him to be tempted. He also holds that this is the case for other events dependent on the free will of angels or humans. He supports this view with scriptural passages cited above and many others, such as Matthew 24: "Unless those days had been shortened, no flesh would be saved; but for the sake of the elect those days will be shortened," and "if possible, even the elect would be deceived," meaning that without special grace, they would not be preserved. From these and similar passages, he says it is clear that such knowledge exists in God before any of His decrees about what will certainly occur. (Commonplaces, on the knowledge of God, p. 160, quarto edition).

XXIX. However, he also notes that it is not necessary to establish this hypothetical knowledge as a third kind of knowledge because it belongs to the knowledge of simple intelligence. He says: "It is absolutely necessary that God has foreseen from eternity all possible modes of secondary causes, whether acting alone or with others, and therefore what would certainly happen or not happen if He produced those causes, preserved them, and cooperated with them in this or that way, or disposed or allowed them to be disposed of in this or that way. No Christian will deny this."

XXX. But he warns that this knowledge should not be abused to consider the decree of election based on the good use of human free will, as those do who claim that before choosing a person, God foresaw how they would respond to this or that prevenient and concurrent grace offered in this or that order of things or state, so that free will determines the grace of God, not the other way around. Nor should it be used to deny all effective divine operation in converting human will beyond moral instruction, because, as he hopes to demonstrate later, God acts not only morally but also physically in the human will when He converts it.

XXXI. Paul Ferris, a celebrated minister of the Word of God in Metz, also admits this conditional knowledge in God, which precedes His free decree. He writes: "God foresaw by His so-called conditional knowledge what a person would do in any given situation; therefore, if He created him with free will and allowed him to be tempted, and left him to himself, given his own innate liberty and the weakness of his nature, he would fall, and everyone would perish unless He chose to save some to demonstrate His justice in them and His grace in others." Later, explaining the divine providence regarding human fall, he states: "First, God foresaw that man would fall if created with free will and allowed to be tempted. Then, because He saw it was expedient, He willed it to be so, not forcing man, but creating him that way, allowing the temptation, and permitting him to be left to himself." He adds a little later: "God decreed nothing concerning man's fall without first foreseeing, given man's liberty and temptation, that he would infallibly fall." (In "Vindiciae pro Scholastica Orthodo", pp. 203, 209, and 210).

XXXII. However, many other Reformed theologians reject this middle and conditional knowledge in God as vain and superfluous, though not all for the same reasons or on the same grounds. First, some concede that all propositions that affirm or deny something contingent under any condition are determinately true or false and therefore can also be known by God; there is no doubt that God certainly knows and apprehends all truth. Consequently, they affirm that there is no question about future contingent and conditional events, imaginable by human or angelic intellect, to which God cannot respond clearly, given this or that condition, that the matter would be so. Nevertheless, they deny that it follows from this that there is any conditional knowledge in God that precedes His free decree. They argue that God indeed knows these things, but from His free will's decree, which not only predestined the modes and connections of things future in time but also of those never to be future, only possible, with this distinction: that He willed these to happen and those not to happen. These are the words of Matthias Nethenus, quoted by the famous Gilbert Voetius, and approved by Voetius himself, in the first part of "Theological Disputations," in the theses on conditional or middle knowledge in God, section three, number 18.

XXXIII. To explain their view more clearly, these learned men assert that they consider two states in the object of divine knowledge: possibility and futurity, but three moments. The first moment is when God, by contemplating His omnipotence, saw what could be done by Him without contradiction. The second is when He, by an absolute decree, predestined all possible things, their modes, connections, and concatenations, in Himself, that is, what would be cause, what effect, what means, what end, what before, what simultaneous, what after, or not, but with this caution: if He willed them to be future. The third moment is when, among those things predestined under such a condition, He made a distinction, leaving some under that condition and adding such a decree, "I do not will them to be future," and removing the condition from others and substituting such a decree, "I will them to be future." In the third moment, the matter is finally extracted from the state of possibility into the state of futurity; in the first two, it remains in the state of possibility, but with this distinction: that in the first, God knows them through nature and before any act of will; in the second, after the act of will. These are also their words in the third section, number 13. From these words, it is clear that they do not regard future contingents under a condition as truly future but as merely possible, and yet they want their knowledge to pertain not to God's natural but to His free knowledge.

XXXIV. Furthermore, they acknowledge that they derived their doctrine from Samuel Rutherford, the Scot, from whom they take this as a most certain foundation: that the will of God is not indeterminate, dubious, or suspended concerning any entities, whether actual or potential, whether ever to be actualized or never to be actualized, as it is found in created will, but is determined by the eminence of its act concerning every entity from eternity. Hence, they conclude that God necessarily wills or does not will all possible concatenations and connections of entities, and thus in all conditional propositions about future contingents, it is true from the definite and certain will of God that if such a condition were met, this would follow and not otherwise.

XXXV. Indeed, that same Rutherford, recently a professor of theology at the University of St. Andrews, a learned and subtle man, using the same principle, affirms that God knew that the inhabitants of Keilah would deliver David into Saul's hands if he stayed among them, and that the Tyrians would repent if they saw the signs, and other similar things, by free knowledge in the predetermining decree, by which He absolutely predestined the concatenation of all possible entities. He says this pertains to the admirable providence of God, whose will is not indeterminate and suspended concerning any entities, whether actual or possible. (In "Apologetic Exercises for Divine Grace," chapter 5, on middle knowledge.)

XXXVI. Others believe that many or rather countless propositions about future contingents under some condition can be made and imagined, which do not fall under divine knowledge and do not express anything that can be known and understood by God, not because they think God ignores any truth or that there is something truly future that God does not know will be future, but because they believe these propositions do not signify anything determinately true or false; and what is denied or affirmed in them as future under a certain condition is not more future than not future, but indifferent to both.

XXXVII. For example, someone might affirm that if God created another world and certain angels in it, in these or those circumstances, those angels would persevere in their duty and love for God. According to their view, what is affirmed in this conditional proposition is neither true nor false, and therefore cannot be known as such by God; rather, the matter is in itself merely possible and indifferent to either happening or not happening. God knows it to be so; therefore, if it is said that such a proposition contains no truth knowable by God, nothing is thereby detracted from divine omniscience.

XXXVIII. They consider the view of those who attribute to God infinite decrees about contingent connections of any possible with another possible, even in those where no order, subordination, or coherence appears, to be absurd. As if God had decreed whatever would be in infinite worlds to be created by Him, given infinite different conditions. This is the view already reported by Samuel Rutherford and in the theses of Voetius, which is expressly rejected by John Strangius in his treatise "On the Will and Actions of God concerning Sin," book 1, chapter 5, and book 3, chapter 13, and also by Turretin in his dissertation on middle knowledge, book 3, page 472.

XXXIX. Nevertheless, they do not deny all knowledge in God of what would or would have been contingently future under some condition that never was or will be. They acknowledge that some such things are predicted in Scripture and therefore were known and foreseen by God. But they contend that this knowledge did not precede the free decree of God's will. Not that they admit certain conditional decrees in God, by which He wills something to happen under a condition that will never be fulfilled, or even explicit and formal decrees about the connection of two events, neither of which will actually exist, but because from some absolute decrees of God about things actually to be, it follows that given such a condition, this and that would have been future.

XL. For example, God knew that Saul would come to the city of Keilah and the inhabitants of Keilah would deliver David into Saul's hands if David stayed in that city because He had decreed to deliver David from Saul's hands, not by some miracle or extraordinary change of mind either in Saul or in the inhabitants of Keilah, but through David's retreat and flight. Hence it follows that David would have been delivered into Saul's hands if he had stayed in Keilah, although we do not posit such an explicit decree in God as "I will that the inhabitants of Keilah deliver David if he stays among them."

XLI. This is how William Ames explains the matter in his response to Grevinchovius's "Response," chapter 15. He says: "It is worth careful contemplation: the decree of God can be conceived either as formal, established, and explicit or as implicit and virtual, which is included by virtue of another decree. The latter exists only in future conditionals that never occur because they would exist by virtue of an actual decree if this or that were supposed. God decreed to deliver David from the hands of the men of Keilah by means of flight, not by changing their minds beyond the usual order. From this actual flows that conditional contingent: if David does not flee, he will be delivered. And in this sense, every future conditional rests on a free decree and is understood by the knowledge of vision, which is not only about things that are absolutely future but also about those that would follow from an actual decree already made, given this or that condition."

XLII. Furthermore, the main foundation on which Turretin, Rutherford, Voetius, Ames, and others rely, while denying the existence of conditional knowledge of contingently future events in God before His free decree, is this: in their view, nothing is future before God has decreed it to be future. Therefore, they conclude that before the decree of God, nothing can be conceived and known as future. They prove that nothing is either absolutely or conditionally future before God decrees it to be future by asserting that no cause can be imagined or thought of by which something possible from eternity becomes future, except by God's decree. For nothing temporal can be the cause of what is eternal; thus, the futurity of things that occur in time, which is from eternity, must be attributed to some eternal cause, which can only be the free decree of God, as Turretin repeats multiple times in his dissertation on middle knowledge.

XLIII. Voetius, or Nethenus speaking for him, after many disputations against middle knowledge, concludes thus: From what has been argued so far against middle knowledge, it is clear that the entire difficulty of the present controversy falls on this point: Whether conditionally free future events, by their nature indifferent to futurity and non-futurity, could have passed into the state of being future from eternity other than through the divine decree, which is the cause of all futurity. This is the foundation of foundations on which the entire structure rests; this is the postulate that we cannot concede to our opponents, nor can they prove to us.

XLIV. Strangius, who does not agree with the aforementioned theologians that the futurity of any event from eternity depends solely on God's free decree, contends by another argument, which he considers invincible, that free contingents cannot be known by God as future under any hypothesis unless the determination of the created will is necessarily inferred. His

argument is as follows: Conditionals whose consequent does not have a necessary connection with the antecedent cannot be certainly known, and therefore cannot be known by God, whose knowledge is most certain and completely infallible. But such are the conditionals posited as the object of middle knowledge. He proves the major premise by saying: Unless the object is certainly true, it cannot be certainly known; for as long as the matter is uncertain, it cannot be certainly known. Nothing is certainly true that is not necessarily true, necessarily either absolutely or hypothetically. Therefore, for conditional knowledge to be certain and infallible, its object must be a necessary conditional proposition; however, no conditional proposition is necessary in which the inference is not necessary (Treatise on the Will of God concerning Sin, book 3, chapter 11).

XLV. To briefly explain my own view: First, it is certain, and, as evident from the preceding, conceded by all, that nothing can be freely future under any condition or be known as such unless the condition under which it is said to be future includes God's decree not to withhold the concurrence necessary for the creature to act. Namely, all propositions about future conditionals must be explained and understood thus: This or that creature, placed in such and such an order of things, will do this or that, provided God wills to concur with it as He usually does, and that He concurs is necessary for the creature to be able to elicit its action.

XLVI. Second, I also believe it should be conceded that all propositions about free and contingent future conditionals, in which such a condition is understood, are determinately true or false. At least, the recent Thomists and others who agree with them on this matter, and who otherwise vehemently oppose middle knowledge, cannot deny this. For, according to their view, in order for the creature to act, it is necessary for God to pre-move and pre-determine it. Given God's pre-determination, the creature's action necessarily follows; according to their hypotheses, this conditional is infallible and necessary: If God wills to place such a creature in this or that state and denies it nothing necessary for action, it will do this or that, since that condition includes God's decree to pre-determine it to act.

XLVII. And indeed, the reasons that suggest that absolute propositions about future contingents have determined truth or falsehood also seem applicable to these conditionals. Namely, it cannot be otherwise than that of two contradictories, one is true, the other false. Likewise, in any true disjunction, at least one part must be true. For example, this disjunction is true: If Peter is placed in such a circumstance, and God does not deny him His usual concurrence, he will sin or he will not sin. These two also mutually contradict each other: Peter, if placed in that order of things, and God does not deny him concurrence to act, will do this; and Peter, if placed in that order of things, and God does not deny him concurrence to act, will not do this.

XLVIII. If someone says nothing is future except dependently on God's decree, and thus before God's decree, the thing is no more future than not future, but indifferent to being future or not future, and therefore neither can be truly affirmed of it, I respond: For a thing to be absolutely future, a certain decree of God is indeed required, on which its futurity depends. But for a thing not to be simply future but only future under some condition, a decree that actually

exists in God is not required; it suffices that a decree, according to the hypothesis, would be posited in God.

XLIX. Furthermore, it is certain and conceded by all that no truth, of whatever kind, escapes the divine intellect; hence, since propositions about freely future contingents under the often-mentioned condition have determined truth, they are also the object of divine knowledge. Therefore, God knows what each possible creature would do if He willed to place them in this or that state and deny them nothing necessary for action.

L. This proposition, which follows from the previous one, cannot be denied by those who think no action can be elicited by creatures without God's prior and pre-determining concurrence. For it is evident that God cannot fail to know what each possible creature would do if He willed not only to create them but also to apply and pre-determine them to act. Turretin acknowledges this, who, after observing that Suarez teaches that conditional propositions about future contingents, which are the object of divine knowledge, include in the antecedent the divine will, namely, if He wills such an effect, or at least wills to permit it and concur with it, adds: According to this sense, we concede those conditionals which the Jesuits imagine ("Dissertation on Middle Knowledge," book 3, page 465).

LI. It is equally evident, according to the principles of the same doctors, that such knowledge by which God knows what any possible creature would do in this or that state, if He willed to supply the necessary concurrence for action, exists in God before He has decreed anything about things. For, before we conceive of God as decreeing anything, it is true that if God willed to move and pre-determine any creature by His concurrence to act, it would undoubtedly do that to which it was moved and determined. And the truth of this proposition does not depend on any preceding decree of God, by which the connection of that possible decree with the event that would follow from it is determined.

LII. Indeed, it seems entirely fictitious and not only repugnant to wisdom but also to divine goodness, that decree by which some assert, as we mentioned above, that God predestined all possible connections and concatenations of events before He decreed anything to be future. For if it were so, it would be necessary for God, before deciding to create this world, to have conceived such decrees within Himself: if I will to create Adam, I will that his fall necessarily follows from his temptation; if I will to create David and have him see Bathsheba, I will that the concupiscence of this woman necessarily follows from that sight. Similarly, I will that such occasions of sin result in such sins, if I decide that such occasions will exist. Indeed, I will that in infinite worlds to be created by me, these and those contingently possible events will have an inseparable connection with these and those events of the same nature. Certainly, these decrees are not only utterly idle, frivolous, and useless but also highly unworthy of the goodness and justice of Him who is God unwilling of iniquity.

LIII. Therefore, it cannot be reasonably denied, and must be conceded by all, that there is in God a certain knowledge of what would be freely and contingently future under a certain condition before we conceive any actual decree in God about future things. The entire difficulty lies in whether the condition under which something is said to be future must include a decree to

pre-move and pre-determine the secondary cause to act, or whether it suffices that the decree, which according to that condition would be posited in God, is only about providing a certain concurrence that is indifferent in itself and which is determined by the secondary cause to a certain kind of action.

LIV. All those theologians who believe that nothing happens without God's concurrence applying and pre-determining the secondary cause to act, assert that no proposition about contingent and conditional futures has any truth, and therefore can be known as true, unless the condition supposes a decree about pre-moving and pre-determining the free agent. They argue that the futurity of any action depends on such a decree, indeed, according to some, as its sole and solitary cause, and without such a decree, no action of a secondary cause can be future. However, I hold the opinion that secondary causes perform many actions in time that are not pre-determined by God. For we cannot see how God would not be the author of sin if He pre-determined free causes to acts that are inherently sinful and intrinsically evil, for example, blasphemy and hatred of God. If some action of a free cause can exist without God's pre-motion and pre-determination, then it is not necessary to posit or suppose in God a decree to pre-move and pre-determine the creature to act for any action to be future or to have been future; but it suffices to decree the providing of a certain concurrence without which the creature cannot act and which is truly necessary for its action.

LV. In particular, I cannot in any way accept what William Twisse asserts in many places, that God's decree and His will are the sole and unique cause of the futurity of any event. For example, is God's decree the sole cause of why Adam was to become disobedient to God? And similarly, why those angels who fell were to elevate themselves in pride against God? Who can bear to hear someone say this? Or who can say this without making God manifestly the author of sin?

LVI. But, says that learned man, the futurity that existed from eternity cannot have a cause that is not also eternal. For nothing temporal can be the cause of what is eternal. But nothing existed from eternity except God Himself, who operates externally only by His free will. I respond that this argument assumes futurity to be something real, distinct from the future thing itself, and that it requires some cause other than the future thing itself. But this is utterly false. For futurity is nothing other than a certain rational relation and an external denomination of the thing that is said to be future; it is not some entity distinct from the future thing and requiring a different cause from the future thing's own cause. This is evident from the argument itself. For the argument rightly assumes that nothing existed from eternity except God; hence, the futurity that is said to have existed from eternity was either nothing real or was God Himself.

LVII. Therefore, what is the cause of a thing's existence in time is also the cause of its being future from eternity. Just as what causes a thing to have existed at some time causes it to be called past forever. No more is an eternally existing cause required for a thing to be future from eternity than an eternally enduring cause is required for a thing to be past forever. A future cause suffices for a future effect, just as a past cause suffices for a past effect.

LVIII. Therefore, since God is not the cause of sin in time, it is so far from the truth to say that God's will is the sole cause of the futurity of sin, that I simply and plainly believe it should be denied that it is the cause of this futurity, whether solely or along with a secondary cause. It is true indeed that man does not sin without depending on God's will. For he could not sin unless God permitted him to sin. And thus, the futurity of sin depends on God's decree to permit the sin. But just as God's will is not therefore to be called the proper cause of man's actual sinning, so it does not follow that God's decree is the proper cause of the futurity of sin.

LIX. But there are also some who assert that certain free acts are absolutely future, and as such are foreknown by God without any decree to pre-determine free causes to those acts, like the most learned Strangius; however, they deny that future free contingents can be known by God from any hypothesis that does not necessarily infer the determination of the created will, and therefore that does not include an absolute decree about their futurity, as can be seen in Strangius's work on the Will of God concerning sin, book 3, chapter 11.

LX. His reasoning is, as we mentioned earlier, that nothing can be known for certain that is not certainly true: nothing is certainly true that is not necessary either absolutely or hypothetically. Hence, he concludes that conditional future events cannot be the object of divine knowledge, which is infallible and most certain, unless the condition includes something from which the stated future necessarily follows. But if this reasoning were valid, God could not foreknow any contingent as absolutely future unless He had first decreed it to be absolutely future; which Strangius does not admit, as he acknowledges that men perform many actions freely to which they are not pre-determined by God.

LXI. But, says that learned man, whatever God foresees as absolutely future, no matter how contingent it is in itself and could simply not be, is nonetheless necessary hypothetically, not indeed from the hypothesis of some divine decree pre-determining it, but from this hypothesis itself, that it is future. For just as whatever is, while it is, is necessarily, so also whatever is future, from the hypothesis that it is supposed to be future, is necessarily future, and thus can be certainly known by God.

LXII. But what the most learned man thinks should be said about absolutely future things can be applied with no less reason to conditionally future things. For I would say in the same way that God certainly foresees what would be freely future under some condition; because although the free cause could act otherwise, and that condition would not impose a necessity to act, nonetheless it would actually act so. From the hypothesis that it would act so, it is necessary that it acts so when the condition is posed, and thus it is something that can be certainly known by God.

LXIII. Therefore, I see no reason to deny that God has knowledge of what would be freely future under a certain condition, even if that condition does not include a decree to pre-determine the free cause to this or that action. And if there are any arguments that seem to overturn this knowledge, such as the incomprehensibility of how God infallibly knows something future that might not be, those arguments also conflict with the foreknowledge of

contingents that are absolutely future; which, however, the word of God places beyond all doubt in God.

LXIV. But certainly, we should not presume so much of ourselves as to dare to limit divine knowledge and deny that God knows something because we cannot comprehend how He knows it. For the divine intellect, being altogether infinite, undoubtedly knows more than we can grasp and attain. At least the one who thinks that God knows things that perhaps are not knowable errs less dangerously than the one who denies that God knows what He truly knows and what is within the object of divine omniscience.

LXV. I add that this knowledge of conditional futures, as we have described it, has no necessary connection with the various errors that many use it to defend and bolster. Especially, we maintain that it in no way conflicts with efficacious grace, nor is it necessary to use it to reconcile the efficacy of divine grace with the freedom of human will, as we will show in the following, with God's favor.

THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON THE HARMONY
Between Human Liberty and Divine Decrees

PART TWO
IN WHICH
The Opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church is Explained.

Thesis I

The common and accepted doctrine of theologians, drawn from clear scriptural evidence, is that the eternal will of God is the cause of all things, and that everything, including human actions, is subject to the immutable decrees of divine providence. Nothing happens without the eternal preordination and determination of God, whether it is caused by inanimate objects, humans, or angels.

II. However, this seemingly eliminates liberty in both angels and humans. No one can resist God's will. Thus, if God wills angels and humans to do what they do, they cannot act otherwise, and so they do not act freely and are not masters of their own actions. Furthermore, if human actions are determined by the immutable decrees of God, it appears to nullify the indeterminacy and indifference of will in action, which is the basis of freedom.

III. This difficulty has seemed so great to some scholastics that they have openly confessed their ignorance in this matter, believing it to be a concept beyond the grasp of the human mind as long as it is burdened by the mortal body. Among these is Cardinal Cajetan, a very celebrated scholastic. For as acute and subtle as he was, he could never satisfy himself in this matter and thought that the harmony between free will and divine providence is inexplicable

and incomprehensible in this life, as seen in his commentaries on the first part of Thomas, Question 22, Article 4.

IV. Nevertheless, other theologians of the Roman School are confident that they can resolve this knot and therefore contrive various explanations. They do not all hold the same views, whether regarding divine decrees or the nature of human liberty.

V. Firstly, the more recent Thomists teach that everything that happens in the world, including free acts of will, is specifically pre-determined and pre-defined by God with an absolute and effective will, prior in reason to any foresight of the determination of the created will, whether absolutely or conditionally future. This is explicitly stated by, among others, Diego Alvarez, Archbishop of Trani and Salpa, in his "Summa of the Work on the Aids of Divine Grace," Book 2, Chapter 5, which begins with these words: "From divine scriptures, if they are attentively considered, we have that God by his absolute and effective will has pre-determined all acts, even free ones, in particular, as future in time, prior in reason, to the divine intellect knowing those acts to be future, even on the hypothesis that the created will would be placed in such an order of things and in such circumstances."

VI. The same doctrine is taught by Matthew de Rispolis in his treatise titled "The Status of the Controversy of Predeterminations and Predefinitions with Free Will." In Book 1, Question 1, he teaches and endeavors to prove at length that in God there are eternal predefinitions and pre-determinations of acts of will, and this in particular, by an absolute decree that presupposes no conditional knowledge of the future determination of the will itself, if it were placed in such a state of affairs. This view is also supported by William Estius, as is evident from what is read in his comments on the 39th distinction of the first book of Sentences and on the 24th of the second book.

VII. These authors do not exempt even evil acts of the will from this eternal predetermination by God. They hold that such acts are also pre-defined by an absolute and effective decree, at least as far as what is real and positive in those acts is concerned. They acknowledge that the malice itself, which is nothing other than the privation of due rectitude, is not efficaciously decreed by God but merely permitted. This is especially evident in Diego Alvarez's cited "Summa of the Work on the Aids of Divine Grace," Book 2, Chapter 9, which begins: "What has been said about the predetermination of the will to good acts should also be extended to acts of sin, as far as the act and being is concerned. Therefore, whatever entity is found in any act of sin, even if it is otherwise intrinsically evil, should be reduced to God as the primary cause, moving and predetermining the created will to such an act as far as it is an act and insofar as it is being."

VIII. Although, in their view, God has pre-determined by His eternal decree everything that happens in time by any causes whatsoever, they assert that this does not prevent many things from happening not necessarily but contingently and freely. For the eternal providence of God has not prepared necessary causes for all events and effects but some free or contingent causes. He has not only determined that this or that will happen but also the manner in which each thing will happen. Therefore, He willed that some things happen necessarily and others contingently

and freely. Thus, far from the eternal providence of God removing human freedom, it means that whatever there is of liberty and contingency in things must be referred to God as the first cause because God not only willed things to be but also determined the manner and mode in which each should exist by His will.

IX. Therefore, according to these Doctors, the fact that God decreed from eternity that humans should do this or that, and that their wills should be inclined to these or those objects, does not affect human liberty. For God did not simply decree that they should do this or that but also that they should do it freely, that is, that they should choose this or that as most suitable and beneficial to themselves from their own rational judgment, and indeed in such a way that from a different judgment they could choose the opposite. This, in their view, is where human liberty properly consists, and hence it is not overturned by the determination of the divine decree.

X. They believe, as they say, that it is irrelevant to free will whether its choice is impressed upon it by a prior cause or not, provided that choice is made from the judgment of the practical intellect, which can consider different reasons for good among opposites and present them to the will.

XI. If someone says that the name "free will" designates a cause independent of any prior cause with respect to its free action, they respond that this is a false and undeserved assumption, and such free will belongs only to God, who is entirely independent of any superior cause. Created beings, however, are no less dependent on the First Cause in their free actions than necessary causes are in their necessary actions.

XII. To the objection that, given the divine decree concerning a human will's action, the human will cannot act otherwise and thus loses its indifference in action, which is the basis of freedom, they respond that it is not possible for God's decree to coexist with the will not acting or acting differently. However, God's decree does not prevent the will from retaining the ability to act otherwise. The decree determines the act, but the faculty remains flexible towards the opposite. Thus, when a person acts according to God's decree, it can truly be said that he can act otherwise because God has decreed that he should act in such a way that he remains able to act otherwise. Hence, while in a composite sense it is not true that, given God's decree, the will can act or not act, it is true in a divided sense: the act opposite does not coexist with the divine decree, but the faculty for the opposite act does.

XIII. If someone argues that given the divine decree about an action, it is impossible to say that a person can act otherwise, as this would imply that God's decrees could be frustrated and invalidated, which is simply impossible, they deny this consequence. They argue that if a person acted otherwise, which is assumed to be possible, God would have decreed otherwise. They do not believe that this conflicts with the immutability of divine decrees because a person retains the power to act otherwise while executing them. This only conflicts if it is said that a person can do the opposite of what God has decreed, which these theologians do not claim.

XIV. Similar points can be found in William Estius' cited works and in Diego Alvarez's "Summa on the Aids of Divine Grace," Book 2, Chapter 6, where he dissolves objections against the predetermination of the will from an extrinsic divine decree. To the objection that, according

to his view, a person cannot will anything other than what God wills him to will by an effective decree and can only perform predetermined acts by God, and thus we do not freely will what we will but out of absolute necessity because we cannot do otherwise if God wills us to do it, and by the same reasoning, we do not freely omit acts commanded, he responds that just as it is one thing to be able to run and another to actually run, so it is one thing to be able to will or produce an act in particular and another to actually produce it. Therefore, for a person to be truly able to will something, it is not required that from eternity there be an absolute and effective decree in God predetermining his free will to will the same object, although such a decree is required for him to actually will it. Hence, the absence of such a decree in God does not imply that a person cannot will such an object in absolute terms, but only that he does not actually will it. Nor does it follow that if God predetermined me to will this particular thing, it is not in my power to will otherwise, although from the supposition of the divine effective will, it is impossible in a composite sense for me to will another object.

XV. To the objection that predetermination by the divine decree to this or that act removes the indifference to acting, which is the essence of liberty, he responds that the indifference which opposes determination to one thing necessarily is of the essence of liberty, and that free will retains this indifference even in the instant in which it is efficaciously predetermined by God to act. In the very instant in which it acts, free will does not lose its indifference, understood as the potentiality and privation of the second act, as opposed to determination to either side by way of liberty, which consists in the faculty to do either.

XVI. If someone insists that it is of the nature of a free power that, given all the prerequisites for acting, it can act or not act, but given the effective decree of God predetermining our free will to act in this particular instance, the will cannot fail to act because no one can resist God's will, he responds that it is of the nature of a free power that, given all the prerequisites for acting, it can act or not act in absolute and simple terms. However, it is not inappropriate that from the supposition of the divine effective will, it cannot, in a composite sense, fail to act in the way it is predetermined by God.

XVII. Finally, if someone says that necessity opposes liberty and that if God predetermines us by His effective will to act, every action of ours will be necessary because whatever God wills to happen must necessarily happen, he responds that all acts predetermined by God necessarily happen with the necessity of consequence and from the supposition of the same decree, but not with absolute necessity that would overthrow liberty. In fact, from the same predetermination follows the actual exercise of our liberty because God not only predetermined the will to will such an object but also predetermined that it should will it freely.

XVIII. Again, if someone insists that the necessity induced by the divine decree removes the liberty of the created will because what is necessary from the supposition becomes simply necessary concerning something when it is not within its power to remove or establish the supposition from which the act necessarily follows, and it is not within the power of the created will to remove or establish the supposition of the divine effective decree predetermining created free will to act since that decree is from God alone and in no way depends on the free operation

of our will, even foreseen by middle knowledge, and therefore acts of the will that are said to be necessary from the supposition of the same divine decree are absolutely and simply necessary and thus not free, he responds that when the antecedent supposition of some act is on the part of the first and most universal cause, namely God, it can be that something is necessary from the supposition concerning the created will and yet free to it simply, even though it is not within its power to establish or remove the supposition from which that necessarily follows with the necessity of infallibility. It is different when the antecedent supposition is on the part of some created cause that is extrinsic to the will. This is because only God, who is the author of the created will, by his infinity and omnipotence, can immutably conform it to his nature and efficaciously move and apply it to produce an act in particular, not only according to its substance but also according to the mode of liberty, which no created cause can do because it is limited and finite and inferior to the will itself.

XIX. However, this way of reconciling human liberty with the decrees of divine providence does not satisfy many doctors of the Roman School. Therefore, among them are some who, to resolve this knot, deny that any free acts, whether of the natural or supernatural order, are predetermined by God from eternity. According to their view, no such acts are predetermined by God in time either, because they believe that predetermination, like predefinition, is incompatible with liberty. John Strangius mentions that Suarez, in his third book on Aids, Chapter 17, Numbers 1 and 2, refers to them.

XX. Gabriel Vasquez, in his first volume on Thomas, Disputation 99, Chapter 5, attributes a similar opinion to some of his contemporaries. He says that some, oppressed by this difficulty, say that God did not will our works individually from eternity but only in general and universally determined that He would cooperate with each one according to his determination. He adds that they embrace this opinion to defend that God's predefinition imposes no necessity on our will against its liberty. Moreover, if it were necessary for God to predefine and will the works of grace individually from eternity, it would follow that those who do not work or consent to the call would lack something necessary for acting, namely that decree, and thus it is no wonder they do not work since they cannot do so without it.

XXI. Some theologians, while admitting that God has eternally foreordained individual human acts, argue that this foreordination follows the foreknowledge of the future determination of the human will. They believe that no human actions, including supernaturally good ones, are individually foreordained by an absolute decree of God before the foreseen determination of our will, not only conditionally but also absolutely future. This is the doctrine of Leonard Lessius, a Jesuit, in his treatise on Predestination.

XXII. Gabriel Vasquez, in the previously cited work, attributes the same opinion to Ambrosius Catharinus, Antonio de Corduba, Julio Sirenius, Osorius, and several others. He asserts that they teach that God has not foreordained our actions, whether good or evil, in their substance before the foreseen determination of our will. Instead, the determination to one part rather than the other, whether in good or evil actions concerning their substance, is indeed from us and from God, but the primary root and cause of it is free will. From this, they infer that our

determination precedes God's predestination and foreordination. They also assign the same order in works of grace regarding consent and cooperation, although they admit that preceding and accompanying grace, that is, vocation, precedes our cooperation with God. For, as Vasquez reports, they distinguish three instances: the first in which our will is prevented by grace; the second in which it determines itself to consent or resist the calling; the third in which God cooperates with it. Therefore, according to their view, God knows to what the will is going to determine itself, both in works of grace and in natural works, before He decides to cooperate with it in this or that act, and thus before He foreordains any of our actions.

XXIII. These theologians easily reconcile our free will with divine decrees since, according to them, divine decrees follow the foreknowledge of the determination that will arise from our will as its first root and cause. Hence, no necessity precedes our actions from divine decrees any more than from God's foreknowledge, but only a subsequent necessity that does not abolish but presupposes our freedom.

XXIV. Others here use a double distinction. First, between the absolute foreknowledge of future events and the conditional foreknowledge of future events. Absolute foreknowledge is where God foresees something as simply and truly future. Conditional foreknowledge is where God foresees not what is simply and absolutely future but what would be future if certain conditions were met. For example, what Adam's will would be inclined and disposed to do if created in a certain state and presented with certain objects. This is the knowledge called "middle knowledge" in the schools, which we discussed extensively in previous theses.

XXV. Given this, they concede that God's decrees concerning human acts, whether to permit or to cause them, precede, in God, according to our way of conceiving, the foreknowledge of the determination of the human will that is absolutely future. For example, they believe that God decreed to permit Adam to desire the forbidden fruit and to cooperate with him in that act before He absolutely foresaw that Adam's will would determine itself in that direction. Similarly, He decreed to prevent Paul with His grace and cooperate with him in the act of conversion before He absolutely foresaw that Paul's will would determine itself to this.

XXVI. However, they insist that God did not decree or determine anything about human free actions before He foresaw in which direction the human will would incline and determine itself, given that it would be placed in this or that state of affairs. God did not absolutely will that the same will elicit these actions rather than those until He foresaw what each person would do and will if such or such occasions for acting were presented to them.

XXVII. This, they say, is their doctrine: that God, before any decree about creating and causing things, eternally foresaw what would happen given any condition and foresaw the infinite forms, dispositions, and modes of things, knowing what would result from each. Specifically, they teach that God could not be ignorant of what would happen if He created free causes, namely humans and angels, and ensured that the occasions for acting that were later offered and will be offered were presented to them, and placed them in the circumstances in which they were later placed and will be placed, as well as what would happen if these

circumstances were varied in infinite ways, and entirely different occasions for acting were presented.

XXVIII. After God foresaw and considered what would happen if humans and angels were placed in these or those circumstances and stirred to act by these or those objects, and what good He could elicit from them, and how He could direct these or those to the manifestation of His glory, then, according to these doctors, God decided to create humans and angels in the state in which they were later created and to ensure that these occasions for acting, rather than others, were presented to them, and to cooperate with them in the actions to which He foresaw their wills would determine themselves, provided He did not deny His cooperation. This decree was followed by absolute foreknowledge, by which He foresaw that they would act in this or that way.

XXIX. Thus, they believe that God ordained and foreordained human actions only because He willed to create them in that state and provide them with those motives, aids, and occasions for acting from which He foresaw they would act in such a way and elicit these rather than those volitions, while always leaving it within their power to act either way without imposing any necessity on them to act in this way rather than another.

XXX. In this way, it might seem there is no obstacle to saying that God has foreordained all free actions, whatever they might be. However, the authors of this opinion distinguish between good and evil acts. They indeed concede that good acts can rightly be said to be foreordained by God's eternal decree. But they think otherwise about evil acts. For although God decreed to place humans in the state where He foresaw through middle knowledge that they would act evilly, He neither wills nor approves their evil acts. The foreordination of God includes or presupposes the approval of the Divine will. But although evil acts are not foreordained by God, their permission is foreordained because their permission is good.

XXXI. This is the doctrine of Fonseca, among others. He states that before any foreknowledge of free acts, none of them were foreordained from eternity because otherwise, the freedom of the created will would be abolished. But after the foreknowledge of future free acts in a conditioned state, only good acts are foreordained by God because He alone approves them. Although evil acts are not foreordained, their permission is foreordained, which God approves. (In 6. Metaph., chap. 2, question 5, section 7)

XXXII. These doctors believe that reconciling providential decrees with our free will is not difficult if their hypothesis is admitted. For according to them, Divine Providence allows our wills to act according to their own inclinations, and God has decreed to lead and variously influence human minds only by presenting internal and external objects and other reasons that do not take away the power to act either way but allow, as the schools say, the specification of their action. Hence, the certainty of God's decrees rests on the infallibility of His middle knowledge, through which they claim God knows, before any decree of His will, which way the created will would incline and tend if these or those occasions for acting were presented to it, not through any force or efficacy that necessarily moves the will to act in this way.

XXXIII. However, Gabriel Vasquez is not satisfied with this solution to the difficulty. He agrees that the authors of the previously explained opinion assert that God, before establishing His decrees concerning free acts, foresees through a kind of conditional knowledge where the will would incline and to what it would determine itself if certain circumstances are set. Yet, he cannot accept their concession that God's decrees concerning free acts in God are, according to our way of conceiving, prior to the absolute foreknowledge of the determination of that same will. For if it is granted that God has foreordained acts of our will in any manner before He absolutely foresees what the will's inclination and determination will be, he believes it gives rise to a certain antecedent necessity that contradicts the freedom of future acts.

XXXIV. He does not, however, side with those who believe that God absolutely foresees to what the will is going to determine itself before He decides to cooperate with it in this or that act and foreordains its act in any way. This is because he judges it impossible for our will to act or determine itself in nature before God works with it. Hence, he concludes that it cannot be understood in eternity that the will's determination exists without God's decree to cooperate with it. Moreover, he finds that this opinion seems to detract from the cooperating grace of God. Since, he argues, our will not only needs God's excitation to act but also His cooperation to consent to this excitation, it equally needs it to determine itself to consent. Thus, how can the will be understood to be determined in any prior manner without the cooperation of grace?

XXXV. Therefore, Vasquez proposes a different concept: God's foreordination of our specific works does not precede the determination of our will in the order of cause nor follow it but accompanies it. Hence, he concludes that the necessity which follows the position of God's decree is not an antecedent but a concomitant necessity to our freedom and determination. Therefore, our freedom is neither hindered nor harmed by this necessity, as only antecedent necessity prejudices freedom, not the one that either follows or accompanies freedom itself.

XXXVI. The foundation of his opinion is that no operation on God's part, which precedes the consent of our will, imposes necessity on the will to consent. The divine cooperation through which God brings about the very consent of our will in no way precedes the determination of our will but exists simultaneously with it in time, nature, and reason. Consequently, God's decree to effect that consent cannot be prior to the foreknowledge of the determination of the human will. For things that are entirely simultaneous in time cannot have an order of precedence and subsequence in divine foreknowledge and decrees. From this, he concludes that no free act of our will was foreordained by God before the foreseen free determination of our will. Instead, the foreknowledge of that determination and God's decree foreordaining the act of our will must be conceived as simultaneous in God.

THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON THE HARMONY
Between Human Liberty and Divine Decrees

PART THREE

IN WHICH The Doctrine of the Reformed School is Explained.

Thesis I

Jacob Arminius and those who follow his teachings in the Netherlands, known as the Remonstrants, agree with Molina and his disciples in explaining the nature of human liberty. They seem to reconcile it with the decrees of Divine Providence in the same manner. At least, this is the aim of Arminius in his response to Article 7, found on page 143 of his works. Here, he does not deny that God has predetermined future contingencies with His eternal decree. However, he distinguishes between two types of divine determination by which He decrees something to happen: one where, given any divine action, motion, or impulse, the secondary cause remains free in terms of its power and use of power to act or not to act, so that it can suspend its action if it chooses; the other where, given such divine action, motion, or impulse, the secondary cause does not remain free, at least not in the use of its power to suspend its action, as it necessarily inclines to one side before the act is determined and produced by the free creature. If the term "determination" is understood in the first sense, Arminius does not deny such divine determination concerning future free and contingent events. But if the term "determination" is taken in the second sense, he entirely denies that God has determined future contingencies to one side with His decree.

II. Moreover, Arminius does not distinctly explain how it can simultaneously be true that a certain action is determined by God's eternal decree and yet the will always remains indifferent to that action, always being able to either produce or not produce it. However, from what he adds, it can be inferred that the matter stands thus: God, in executing His decrees concerning human actions, moves the human will only by presenting and administering objects and arguments that indeed induce them to will but always leave it within their power not to be moved by those objects. Arminius' disciples, like Nicholas Grevinchovius among others, explicitly employ the concept of middle knowledge to solve this issue, much like many Jesuits, as was explained in the preceding theses.

III. Among those Reformed theologians who otherwise seem to be opposed to Arminian doctrine and subscribe to the Synod of Dordrecht, some also follow this approach to reconcile the decrees of Divine Providence with human free will. Among these is Robert Baron, formerly a professor of theology at Aberdeen in Scotland. In his "Metaphysics adapted to the use of Theology," he praises and openly subscribes to Fonseca's doctrine on this point (Section 12, Disputation 2, Number 65).

IV. In that passage, he proposes two conclusions of Fonseca that he finds very useful for establishing the harmony of Divine Providence and human free will. The first is that no free acts were predestined from eternity before the foreknowledge of those acts. He explains this as meaning that before God foreknew or foresaw in which direction human wills would incline if certain occasions were offered to them, He did not absolutely will that the will elicit these actions rather than others, nor did He decree to concur in eliciting these actions rather than

others. The second conclusion is that after God, according to our way of understanding, foresaw in which direction our wills would incline when certain occasions were offered, He decreed from eternity to concur with our wills in eliciting, at this or that time, these or those actions He foresaw they would incline to. For example, God from eternity foresaw that Adam, if tempted by his wife, would desire the forbidden fruit, and therefore decreed to concur with Adam in eliciting the desire for the fruit.

V. Thus, Baron believes the order of the Divine Decree regarding the first sin can be explained as follows: First, God has conditional foreknowledge, by which He foresees that Adam would desire the fruit if such an occasion were presented; He also has foreknowledge by which He knows He can direct that action of Adam to His glory. Second, because He foresaw He could bring great good out of Adam's evil action, which Adam would perform if such an occasion were presented, namely, the manifestation of His glory, He willed that the occasion be presented to Adam—that is, He willed to permit Eve, seduced by the serpent, to tempt Adam. Third, according to absolute foreknowledge (not conditional), He foresaw that Adam's will would incline to desire the fruit at the time Adam would be tempted. Fourth, partly to not deprive Adam of the use of his free will, partly to manifest His glory, He decreed to concur with Adam's will in eliciting that volition. Hence, it is evident that Adam did not fall or desire the fruit because God decreed to concur with his will in eliciting that desire; rather, God decreed to concur in eliciting that action rather than another because He foresaw Adam's will would incline to it when such an occasion was presented.

VI. From this, Baron concludes that God's decrees of Providence do not impose necessity on us to will this or that. Furthermore, God's decrees are not the causes of why we elicit this or that volition at this or that time, and consequently, from the infallibility of the divine decrees, it does not follow that all our free actions occur by causal necessity. Rather, from the infallibility of the decrees, it only follows that our free actions occur necessarily by a necessity of consequence, which is not causal or motivational. Hence, the decrees of Divine Providence no more take away the freedom of our will and the contingency of our actions than God's foreknowledge does. Just as a thing does not occur because it is foreknown, so we do not perform this or that action because God decreed to concur with us in eliciting these actions; rather, God decreed to concur in such actions because He foresaw we would act thus.

VII. John Strangius, a Scottish theologian renowned among his contemporaries, philosophizes uniquely here. He concedes that God's eternal decrees encompass all human acts, but not in the same manner. Regarding evil acts, he argues they fall under divine decrees not because God decreed them to occur but because He decreed to permit them and to bring good out of them and to direct them to various ends. He denies, however, that this permission makes them happen necessarily.

VIII. Concerning acts that are not inherently evil, he believes all these acts can be said to be decreed and predestined by God but not all in the same way. Some, he says, God decreed absolutely, while others He decreed conditionally, allowing us free choice among options that are all permissible.

IX. He believes that God has absolutely decreed and predestined all truly good acts and those that contribute to eternal salvation, to which He has determined our will from eternity and effectively determines it in time. Besides good human works, he also considers many other acts that are not inherently evil, to which human will is determined in time by God and thus were absolutely decreed and predestined by God from eternity, such as the heroic deeds of Cyrus and those of Pharaoh towards Joseph, and countless others of the same kind.

X. However, he thinks that for many acts, even those not inherently evil, God does not absolutely predetermine the human will but permits free choice among several permissible options. He also believes that not all acts of the will, even those that are not sinful, were absolutely predestined by God in His eternal decrees but only conditionally, taking into account the determination of the created will.

XI. For example, he says, the three options God permitted to David in the twenty-fourth chapter of the second book of Samuel were all permissible, that is, David could lawfully choose any of them. God's permission concerning these acts was not only physical but also moral. God permitted David free choice to choose any of the three punishments and did not restrict him to one. Hence, God did not decree that David should choose only one, but foresaw his future choice. Therefore, it can rightly be said that God simply decreed the plague and the death of seventy thousand men. God decreed to bring about what David would choose, and God foresaw that David would choose this.

XII. He illustrates this with a similar example among humans. If a king grants his servant the option to choose this or that reward or favor, he certainly did not decree to restrict him to one but decreed to give him whatever reward or favor he would choose. Much more can this be said of God. For while a king grants his servant a choice, perhaps unaware or uncertain of what he will choose, God, who can hide nothing, knew from eternity what David would choose.

XIII. Towards the end of the chapter, he explains the same matter more precisely with these words: "Whenever God permits the choice and option of created will to two or more options, whether to act or not to act, it should not be thought that God restricts it to only one part. But if we combine the decree of permission with God's foreknowledge of the future event, it can be said that God has predestined every licit act that occurs because He grants this freedom to the will and cooperates with it, and the same has been decreed from eternity. Not that God first foresaw the future event and then decreed that it would happen—that would be absurd, namely, to decree the future which He had already foreseen to be future before the decree—nor that God first and absolutely decrees and then foresees it as future. For in that case, He would neither permit nor decree to permit the free choice of will to act or not to act. But in the same instant, He foresees and decrees (or predestines). Certainly, in eternity, nothing is before or after; thus, since foreknowledge and predestination are from eternity, neither is prior or later. We indeed, in our way of understanding, distinguish different rational moments in the eternal actions of God. But even according to these rational moments, we do not say one is before or after the other."

XIV. To reconcile divine decrees with human will's freedom, he distinguishes between two kinds of freedom of the will. One, taken more broadly and commonly, is essential to the will

and consists in the will being moved by its own motion and the judgment of reason. The other, taken in a stricter sense, consists in a certain indifference of the will to two or more opposites. He acknowledges that divine decrees, by which the acts of the will are absolutely predestined, remove this latter kind of freedom because they predetermine the will to one action and do not leave it indifferent to act or not act. However, he believes they do not deprive the will of the former kind of freedom, as it is perfectly consistent for the will to follow the judgment of reason and be moved by its own natural motion, and yet be predestined by God to act in a certain way and be predetermined in time because God moves the will gently and in a manner that is congruent and suitable to its nature.

XV. On the other hand, the divine decrees, by which He permits evil or has only relatively predestined certain acts of the will, according to him, leave the will free not only in the former and broader sense but also in the latter and stricter sense, because they do not take away from it the indifference to act or not act before the determination of the will itself. For God's permission leaves the will in a state where it can act or not act as permitted. The acts that are relatively decreed by God are not predestined before and apart from considering the determination of the will itself. This is more extensively explained by the same Strangius in Book 2, Chapter 8.

XVI. Therefore, according to this man's doctrine, although a person in many actions performed in this life enjoys that freedom which lies in the power of determining themselves to opposites, concerning many other acts that are absolutely predestined by God's decree, they do not retain this freedom but only that which consists in acting willingly and according to their own reason's judgment. He particularly thinks this applies in a person's conversion to God and in works of grace. For, he says, without God's predetermination, a person cannot convert or act piously; and with God's predetermination, they cannot fail to convert or act piously. Hence, in these works, although we acknowledge that the essential freedom of the will remains, we deny that the liberty, in the stricter sense used here, has any place.

XVII. Here also, the distinguished and celebrated Moses Amyraut seems to follow a unique approach. He believes that whatever is done by humans, whether good, evil, or indifferent, is designated and predestined by God's eternal decrees and that these decrees are executed most certainly and inevitably. Yet, he maintains that neither human liberty is violated nor is God made the author of sin.

XVIII. To explain how these can coexist, he supposes that human faculties, such as intellect and will, are determined by their objects. The will necessarily follows the judgment of the intellect and cannot will otherwise than what it judges should be willed. If the intellect, being disposed in a certain way, is presented with an object under such light—that is, equipped and armed with these or those reasons—such that there is proportion and suitability between the object and the intellect as it stands, the intellect must be determined to assent or dissent, and to make a determinate judgment about the object presented, as the proportion or suitability between the intellect and the object demands.

XIX. He does not think that this necessity or determination, which he says arises from the suitability of the object with the faculty, conflicts with liberty because he does not define liberty as consisting in the indetermination and indifference of the free faculty and its immunity from all necessity but thinks it only conflicts with the necessity imposed by an external force, matter, or sense, which can be called physical or brute necessity, or at least that which removes all deliberation and consultation.

XX. Furthermore, he states that the effectiveness of Divine Providence, by which divine decrees are executed concerning human actions in general, consists in God preserving human faculties and in various ways offering or removing objects to them. Hence, the actions designated by God's decrees arise necessarily and infallibly, yet in a manner consistent with the nature and disposition of the free faculties and the conditions of the objects presented to them, and therefore remain free because no force is applied to the faculties, and the offering and presenting of any objects do not violate their liberty in any way.

XXI. Specifically, regarding good actions, besides what has already been said, he attributes nothing more to God than that He purges the faculties themselves of innate vices, endows them with new strengths, and elevates them above their native and original condition, by which actions it is clear that their liberty is in no way harmed but rather helped.

XXII. Concerning evil actions, no matter how much they fall under divine decrees, he believes it can be easily shown from his principles that God can in no way be called their author because God does not incline human minds and wills to evil, nor does He corrupt them in any way, but only permits them to exercise their own movements voluntarily. Divine providence, concerning them, only deals with the fact that these rather than other objects, and for this rather than that reason, are offered to them or permitted. From this, however, these or those actions necessarily result, as the relation of proportion and suitability between such objects and faculties disposed in a certain way demands. Thus, divine decrees about them and concerning them are executed infallibly, and yet the faculties themselves move freely because no force is applied to them, and they act according to their nature and disposition.

XXIII. Therefore, since God does nothing concerning human faculties, whether directed towards good or evil, that conflicts with their native liberty, and yet these or those acts follow infallibly from God's operation, whether good or evil, and since God decrees nothing from eternity other than what He executes in time, he concludes that these things are perfectly consistent: humans act freely, and while they act freely, they inevitably accomplish what has been constituted and designated by God's eternal decrees. These matters are discussed in greater detail by that most learned man in his disputation on free will, Chapter 4."

XXIV. However, to address this difficulty, many theologians from the Reformed School take a somewhat different approach. They not only teach that everything done by humans is predestined by God's eternal decrees, but they also believe that these decrees have their effect not only, as that most learned man thinks, through some change in free faculties—consisting of their restoration or the addition of new strengths—but also through the proposal of various

objects, both internal and external, and additionally through physical and real efficacy, by which the faculties themselves are pre-moved and predetermined to these or those free acts.

XXV. Namely, this is their doctrine: By the absolute and energetic, as they call it, decree of God, everything done by causes, even free and contingent ones, is decreed and ordered. This decree can never be invalid, but it is absolutely necessary for those things decreed by God to be fulfilled. Hence, even those things done by contingent and free causes necessarily happen with respect to this decree and cannot happen otherwise.

XXVI. Furthermore, they contend that this kind of decree applies not only to good actions of free causes but also to evil ones. For both, according to God's decree and will, occur. However, they distinguish this absolute and energetic decree into an effective decree by which God determines to effect something and a permissive decree by which God determines to permit something. They subject not only good actions of creatures but also evil ones to this effective decree, considering them in themselves and in what is positive in them, as distinct from the malice that denominates them. For they believe that both good and evil actions are determined by God not only by decreeing but also by moving and applying secondary causes to act this way or that. However, they teach that the malice of evil actions is not effected by God but only permitted.

XXVII. Nonetheless, they believe that the decree by which God determines to permit evil, though not effective, is still efficacious. Therefore, they attribute everything that happens, both good and evil, to God's decree, which they call by the Greek term "energetic," which they then subdivide into effective and efficacious. According to them, it is just as necessary for evil to occur by God permitting it as it is for good to occur by God approving and effecting it. Hence, they insist that it can and should be truly said that God wills evil to happen by permitting it, because God's will is directed not only to the permission of evil but also to the occurrence of the evil action itself.

XXVIII. Yet, they do not believe that this implies God is the author of sin. For although evil occurs by God's decree, it is not done by God's action but by the creature failing with God's permission. And although the positive aspect of any evil action is referred to God as the efficient cause, this does not make God the cause of evil, because the entity of any action, however evil, is good, while the malice formally consists in a certain deprivation of rectitude.

XXIX. If anyone objects that God seems to be the author of what He wills to be and to occur, because God's will is the cause of things, they respond that willing something per se is different from willing something as to its occurrence. Moreover, they argue that God primarily and properly wills not to prevent sin and only consequently wills the occurrence of sin because it occurs since God does not prevent it.

XXX. They also distinguish between two kinds of God's will: general and special. Special will, according to them, is that by which God simultaneously approves and effects something. The object of this will depends on it and follows it as an effect follows its cause. By this will, they teach that God wills good and does not will evil as evil, according to the saying, "God is not willing iniquity." General will, in their view, is that by which God wills something

not to be and also wills not to prohibit certain things for certain reasons, and consequently, wills their occurrence, which He does not simply approve. This will is understood as God's decree by which He wills something not in terms of approval and effecting by Himself but only in terms of a certain permitted effecting by others. Thus, they say, the thing to be done does not depend on God's will but only on the will of the deficient creature. By this will, they say that God wills sin, such as the fall of Adam, not simply but only because He wills it to occur.

XXXI. To reconcile the necessity imposed by God's decree on any events with their contingency and freedom, they first distinguish between absolute necessity and necessity that arises from a hypothesis. Absolute necessity is that by which something simply cannot be otherwise. Necessity from hypothesis is that by which something that can simply be otherwise cannot be otherwise once a certain condition is set. Furthermore, they distinguish between necessity of coercion and necessity of infallibility. Necessity of coercion is imposed by an external cause that forces things to act in this or that way. Necessity of infallibility is that by which something is certain and immutably future, yet if we consider the cause of the thing itself, it could either occur or not occur or occur differently. This kind of necessity is meant by the axiom, "Everything that is, while it is, necessarily is."

XXXII. With these distinctions established, they say that what happens by free and contingent causes happens necessarily with respect to the divine decree, but not absolutely, only based on the hypothesis of that decree. Moreover, they assert that this necessity is not of coercion but only of infallibility because God has preordained that these things happen. However, this kind of necessity does not remove the freedom of secondary causes but rather establishes it, since freedom and necessity do not mutually exclude each other, but freedom and coercion do. For, they say, it is not only necessary according to God's decree that a contingent and free cause acts but also that it acts contingently and freely. Because God, by His decree, not only determines the individual events but also their manner and way.

XXXIII. They add that God moves free causes in a way that is suitable and congruent to their nature, namely by gently bending the will and inclining it through the objects presented by the intellect, not otherwise than that a person consults and deliberates with themselves about what they are going to do and chooses what seems to them best according to their own judgment. Indeed, a free cause is thus determined by God's decree and the motion following the decree to act this or that way while retaining the power not to act or to act differently, not in a composite sense but in a divided sense. Because, although the opposite act or cessation from the same act is not consistent with divine preordination, the power to perform the contrary act or to suspend the act is perfectly consistent with it. This doctrine is found in the little book by William Perkins on the manner and order of predestination and its vindicator, Twisse, and many other distinguished men among the Reformed, as can be seen at length in the second book of Twisse's vindications of this little book by Perkins.

XXXIV. Although I respect the intellect and learning of all these men, I cannot fully agree with any of the aforementioned views. They do not remove all scruples. None of their views, in my opinion, are free from significant difficulty.

XXXV. The opinion that establishes a conditional foreknowledge of the future inclination and tendency of the will in this or that direction if such an occasion for action is presented and that states God preordained human actions only because He willed to create them in that state and present those occasions for action, from which He foresaw they would act in such a manner and elicit these rather than those volitions—not from any necessity imposed by the objects themselves or by any action of God, but because they would determine themselves in such a way while it was in their power to do otherwise—although it avoids many inconveniences urged against other opinions, it is difficult to reconcile with the victorious and inherently efficacious grace that subjects free will to itself and is not to be subjected to free will, as taught by the orthodox school.

XXXVI. Furthermore, even if God foresees what the will would do before deciding anything about us, based on the hypothesis that it is placed in certain circumstances and certain motives are present, yet if God predetermines something to be simply future before the absolute foreknowledge of our will's determination, a certain antecedent necessity arises. Since what God predetermines must necessarily happen, this necessity seems just as contrary to freedom as if no such conditional knowledge preceded it, as that knowledge does not make such a decree of God within our power.

XXXVII. In John Strangius's opinion, it seems entirely implausible to me that among those things done deliberately and considerably by humans, he distinguishes some as having one kind of freedom that consists in indifference and the ability to act or not act or to do this or that, while others have only a simple freedom that does not require the indetermination of the will but only that a person acts willingly and with judgment. He thinks this kind of freedom applies not only to all good actions but also to many actions that are neither good nor bad in themselves. Since we experience using our reason and judgment in the same way and have the power to choose in all civil actions and good actions, why should we think that some are freer than others or that not the same kind of freedom applies to all?

XXXVIII. Moreover, what compels us to say that when God moves us to good works, He takes away from us the power to act otherwise by His grace, when the efficacy of divine grace can be established without this? Divine wisdom certainly has reasons to ensure that we act in this way, and that we do so certainly and infallibly, without taking away from us the power to perform the opposite act or to suspend our own actions.

XXXIX. This is also unsatisfactory in the opinion of Moses Amyraldus, which supposes that the mind and will in all its actions are determined by objects in such a way that if these or those are presented to them in this manner and with this reasoning, they necessarily act in this or that way and cannot act otherwise or refrain from action. For if rational faculties, no less than brute ones, are determined to a certain action by their objects, what distinction will there be between the spontaneous movements of brutes and the free actions of rational creatures? And how can they be called free agents, masters of their own actions, and have their own actions in their power, if objects impose the necessity of acting on them no less than on other agents?

XL. Especially if we conceive that the first man was imposed with the necessity of eating from the forbidden fruit, through objects which, according to God's decree, and with divine providence arranging and managing, were presented to him; and that Adam could not abstain from it, considering both the strengths he had received from God and the inducements by which he was led to this act. I do not see what fault could be imputed to him that would be worthy of punishment, and how God would not be the author of his sin, since this illicit act necessarily followed from the proportion of the strengths that God had granted him, along with the temptations and various objects presented to him, not by his fault but by God's ordering and arranging.

XLI. Finally, we cannot approve in the opinion of many distinguished doctors what they say that God wills evil to happen, although He does not effect it but only permits it. For we do not think it is correct to say that God wills what He does not approve. And it cannot be said that evils happen with God's approval. Nor do we understand the sense of the distinction they make between evil and the occurrence of evil, saying that God does not will evil itself, but nevertheless wills the occurrence of evil; and that God does not will the evil itself but wills that evils happen; or, what is the same, wills the existence of evils. How can the existence of a thing be distinguished from the thing itself, and how can someone not will a thing and simultaneously will that the thing exists?

XLII. It is equally harsh to say that the very actions to which malice is necessarily annexed are predestined by God's effective decree. For how will God not be the author of sin if He predestined by His eternal decree that action by which someone hates God Himself and blasphemes His name, and according to His decree, moves and predetermines a person in time to that type of action?

XLIII. It seems manifestly absurd to follow from what they say that evil, even as evil, is preordained by God's decree, which although not effective is nevertheless efficacious and such that it necessarily follows from it. What shall we say then, that by God's decree it was necessary for the first man to rebel against God and to transgress the commandment received from Him? And how could he be justly punished for sin when he was imposed with the necessity of sinning without any preceding fault? And should not the guilt of this transgression rather be referred back to Him from whose decree such harsh necessity is supposed to have arisen?

XLIV. I know that those great men who use such expressions do not admit these consequences, and reduce their words as much as possible to a good and acceptable sense. But however much such harsh expressions are softened by kind interpretation, they cannot but offend the ears of the Christian people and inject various scruples into the minds of the listeners without any necessity. Why then insist on these modes of speaking, which are neither explicitly expressed in scripture nor used by the ancient doctors of the Church?

XLV. But someone may say, why do you criticize the opinions of others? If you have something better, bring it forth, or accept what is given. I respond that some things in this matter are certain and indisputable to me, while others are unknown. It is clear from scripture, and reason itself also supports it, that all things are governed by God's providence and are subject to

divine decrees so that nothing happens without God's knowledge or will. Whatever is done well should be referred to Him as the author of all good things, but the blame for all evil rests solely with the creature. Yet no evil happens unless God permits it by His certain counsel and does not prevent it; and God moderates the evil actions of men and uses them in such a way as to draw many goods from them and direct them to various and excellent ends.

XLVI. It is no less certain by reason and experience, and also confirmed by the authority of scripture, that men act freely, whether they act well or ill, and are so moved that they are rightly deemed worthy of praise or blame, punishment or reward, as they have acted well or ill.

XLVII. From these it follows that human liberty should be acknowledged in such a way that nothing is taken away from divine providence; and conversely, the force and efficacy of divine providence should be so extolled that the liberty of the creature is also asserted. However, as long as the liberty of the rational creature in acting is preserved, and care is taken not to transfer the creature's fault to God as if He were the cause or author of sin, nothing too much can be attributed to the decrees and efficacy of divine providence.

XLVIII. But to explain in detail what the nature of divine decrees is and how God governs and moves rational creatures in such a way that they always act freely according to their nature, I confess is beyond my comprehension. I do not doubt that divine wisdom and power, both of which are infinite, abundantly provide reasons by which this effect is achieved; but I do not think it is within my narrow understanding to grasp them. For in what I have read or been able to devise, I have found nothing that fully satisfies me, and in which my mind could rest as a known and understood thing. Therefore, I prefer to frankly admit my ignorance in this part rather than to claim to know what I am aware I do not know and to present to others as true what I am not fully persuaded of myself.

XLIX. Nor am I ashamed of this ignorance of mine. For it is safely ignored what God has not openly revealed in His word and what human reason cannot investigate by itself. Now, sacred scripture clearly teaches that all things are governed by divine providence and that nothing happens without His will or permission and that all His works are known and determined by God from eternity. But the manner in which God moves secondary causes, what the nature of His decrees is, and how He executes them and brings all things to their destined end, sacred scripture does not reveal, nor does it strive to satisfy human curiosity on this matter.

L. Indeed, it sufficiently indicates that this is a matter which God willed to be hidden and inaccessible to human intellects and into whose depth the eye of our mind cannot penetrate. This pertains to the saying of God in Isaiah: "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, declares the Lord. For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts." And also the saying of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Romans: "Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and his ways past finding out! For who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor?"

LI. Nevertheless, I do not disparage the efforts of learned men who strive to shed some light on these matters and to see how far our mind can rise in such a great matter, provided it is

done with due modesty and a true and serious recognition of our weakness, and that everyone presents the conjectures and thoughts of their own mind in such a way that they also listen to the reasons of others and do not think that they alone are wise, contending and wrangling bitterly with those who do not immediately subject themselves to their dictates. But these things, however they may be, should be reserved for the schools and not easily brought before the common people, lest they raise difficulties that infuse scruples into minds, which the added solutions cannot clearly and effectively dispel.

THEOLOGICAL THESES
In Which It Is Explained
How the Free Will of Man Stands in the State of Fallen Nature, With Respect to
Spiritual and Salvific Good.

CONCERNING WHICH
The Doctrine of the Roman Church Is Compared with the Doctrine of the
Protestants.

Thesis I

In the previously published theses, we demonstrated that the doctors of the Roman school agree with the Protestants, at least in words, that in the state of fallen nature, the free will of man can do absolutely nothing without the grace of Christ in matters pertaining to true piety and leading to eternal salvation. And yet, when the free will of fallen man is considered with respect to salvific and spiritual good, the doctors of the Roman school do not speak of it in the same manner as the Protestants.

II. Firstly, the theologians of the Roman school, although they recognize the necessity of divine grace for works of piety, nevertheless assert that man, even before receiving grace, possesses free will in divine and spiritual matters. Not that he can do anything in that regard without grace, but because, with the help of grace, he can freely embrace spiritual good and thus has the true ability to reject and turn away from it.

III. Bellarmine presents and reports this doctrine, common to the entire Roman school, in several places in his sixth book on Free Will. Especially in chapter fifteen, where his first statement is: Man, before any grace, has free will not only for natural and moral works but also for works of piety and supernatural works. The sense in which he affirms this becomes clear in chapter nine of the same book. There, he proposes the question in these words: Is man, after the fall of the first man, truly free in matters pertaining to salvation, so that although he can do nothing without the help of grace, yet being excited and assisted by preventing grace from God, he can act in such a way that he is also able not to act.

IV. And this pertains to the fourth canon of the Council of Trent, sixth session. If anyone says that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, cooperates in no way by assenting to God exciting and calling him, so that he prepares and disposes himself to obtain the grace of

justification, and that he cannot dissent if he wishes but, like something inanimate, does nothing at all and is merely passive, let him be anathema.

V. Furthermore, the doctors of the Roman school greatly differ among themselves concerning the manner in which divine grace is efficacious. While some claim that grace not only bestows new strength to free will, invites and encourages man to do good, and even assists in doing well, which all admit, but also that its efficacy is such that it infallibly and irresistibly inclines and determines the will to act well, others deny this, as we have shown elsewhere. Nevertheless, all agree that however efficacious divine grace may be, it does not take away the power of free will to reject the good to which it moves and attracts man. Therefore, even those who maintain that grace is efficacious by itself and infallibly operates the act of conversion in man, agree, according to the Tridentine canon, that the power to dissent from grace and resist it always remains in man. Hence, all agree that free will, when prevented and excited by grace, can do good in such a way that the contrary remains within its ability.

VI. They thus assert that free will, with respect to salvific good itself, is not extinguished and lost through sin, but only weakened, wounded, and diminished. In this, they follow the doctrine of the Synod of Trent, whose fifth canon, sixth session, states: If anyone says that the free will of man was lost and extinguished after Adam's sin, or that it is a matter of name only, indeed a title without reality, a figment introduced by Satan into the Church, let him be anathema.

VII. They maintain that free will, even in spiritual matters, is not entirely lost and extinguished, but only weakened and diminished because, after sin, there remains in man, even before grace, a certain remote and imperfect power to perform works of piety. Although he does not have perfect and proximate power for the same works and can do absolutely nothing by himself in this regard. This can be seen in Bellarmine's fifth book on free will, chapter fifteen, where his second statement is: Man, before any grace, has remote and imperfect power to perform works of piety. His third statement is: Man, before any grace, does not have proximate and perfect power for works of piety, and therefore he can do nothing by himself in this regard.

VIII. Bellarmine's words, in which he asserts that in matters pertaining to salvation and piety, man can do absolutely nothing by himself, explain in what sense he attributes to man, a sinner and deprived of God's grace, a certain imperfect power for spiritual and salvific good. He does not believe that man can indeed perform anything in this regard without grace, even weakly and imperfectly, but only that there remains in man, after sin, a certain power which, with new strength received through grace, can freely move towards spiritual good, regarding which he could do absolutely nothing by himself before. Bellarmine himself notes this while responding to this dilemma of Chemnitz: Either man has some strength by himself, however weak, or none at all. If he has some, then he can do something without God's grace. If none, then free will is extinguished. He responds that man only has remote power and imperfect strength, and therefore can do nothing by himself. But if that power is perfected and strength is added, he can accomplish many things.

IX. However, to show how man has free will even in spiritual matters before grace, even though he cannot do good before grace, he says that in that state man's free will is free in that respect, but his freedom is as if bound and impeded. It is loosed and set free when proximate power to act is conferred by preventing grace from God. To illustrate this, he says, we experience something similar in the power of seeing. For in the absence of a sensible species, man has the power and freedom to see; for that species is not the cause of freedom or the power of seeing, but the power is remote and freedom bound until the species is received, the power is perfected, and it can act.

X. Furthermore, it should be noted that when Bellarmine says that man's freedom with respect to spiritual good was bound, not extinguished, by sin, he does not mean that free will, loosed by grace and consenting to and pursuing good, does so by the strength it already had, not by the strength newly supplied by grace. Just as a man whose bonds are loosed, when he walks, does so by the strength he already had and which was not newly added, but only hindered by some impediment. Chemnitz accuses Catholic doctors of fraud and deception in this matter. He writes that Catholics hold that free will, excited by grace, exerts the strength it had even before it was excited and consents to divine calling by its own strength. But Catholics do not hold this. They recognize that free will exists in man even before divine grace prevents it, for free will is a natural thing not lost through sin, but they do not say or think that free will has any, even proximate, power for acts of piety, but that it receives that power from God through preventing grace. Chapter 13, Response to the first argument.

XI. Therefore, Bellarmine teaches in the same place that free will of a sinner does not have by itself the ability to cooperate in its own conversion, but receives the power to cooperate from grace. As a stone, he says, does not have by itself the ability to cooperate if it is turned into flesh, so free will does not have by itself the ability to cooperate in its own conversion. However, it can receive the ability to act through preventing grace from God, which a stone cannot.

XII. This is the doctrine of Luis de Molina himself. He teaches that the consent which our will gives to God through preventing grace, calling us, is from God not only as one who allures, invites, and excites but also as one who cooperates through the aid of grace. Thus, in that consent, there is nothing that is not truly supernatural, and therefore the adult has nothing in those things necessary for justification about which he can boast, and which he has not received from God through grace. For he reasons as follows from the preceding premises: Since the consent of free will to God exciting and calling through preventing grace is in reality nothing that is not supernatural, and simultaneously emanates from God not only as one who allures, excites, and invites our will but also as one who cooperates through the aid of grace, it follows that the adult has nothing in those things necessary for justification and which distinguish him from the unjustified, about which he can boast, as if he had not received it from God; even if in many things necessary for justification he cooperates freely and influences, so that it is within his power either to cooperate or not to influence, and thus prevent them from existing in nature. Disputation 40, on article 3, question 14.

XIII. Therefore, he immediately declares anathema those who affirm that the consent we give to God exciting us through preventing grace is natural or can be elicited without the help and cooperation of that same preventing grace. He says, therefore, according to our opinion, anathema should be declared on those who affirm that the consent of our will to God exciting and calling through the aid of preventing grace is a natural act or can be elicited without the help and cooperation of that same preventing grace. But it should also be declared anathema on those who say that the same consent is not within the power of our free will in the manner explained and that the free cooperation of our will is not necessary for the supernatural acts by which we are disposed to grace and which distinguish us from those who are not justified.

XIV. Although the doctors of the Roman school, together with the Council of Trent, assert that the free will of man cooperates with God calling and exciting, and that the human will is not only active but also free with respect to the first acts by which we are converted to God, so that it can not only consent to the alluring and drawing grace but also dissent from it, they nevertheless acknowledge that the beginning of our justification and conversion is from God alone, not from our free will, and in that respect, man is entirely passive. This can be seen in Josephus Angles, Bishop of Bosanen, whose conclusion is, The beginning of our justification is not from our free will but from God alone, while we are entirely passive. He later proves this with many scriptural passages: Not you have chosen me, and, Without me, you can do nothing, and, No one can come to me unless my Father draws him. In the *Flowers of Theological Questions*, Treatise on Free Will, single question, article 3, difficulty 7, conclusion 1.

XV. To illustrate this, in the same article, he distinguishes three types of works that pertain to our justification. For he says that some works precede our justification, some are final, and some are intermediate. According to him, the first kind includes predestination itself, interior calling through inspiration, and exterior through the preacher, calling through scourges, the terror of punishments, the desire for glory, etc. The second kind includes the infusion of supernatural qualities, such as the infusion of faith and grace making one pleasing or justifying. The third kind includes intermediate works that follow preventing aids and precede justifying grace: such are acts of faith, hope, love, and penitence, disposing us to grace.

XVI. He teaches that these three types of works differ concerning their efficient cause in that works of the first and second kind, as preventing aids and habitual grace, are from God without us, just as Peter and Paul were entirely passive and did not cooperate when they were called by Christ; and also just as air is passively receptive to light from the sun: in this way, infused virtues, which are supernatural qualities, are bestowed on us without our acting in any way. But concerning works of the third kind, which are intermediate dispositions to grace, man to be justified is not entirely passive, but also active: because in this respect he freely cooperates with God, while the will elicits the act of penitence and love, and the intellect produces the act of faith. Seventh difficulty on article 7.

XVII. Moreover, Jansen acknowledges that after sin there remains in man what is called free will, by which we rightly or wrongly will and act, which, just as it is prone to evil by itself, so can it be inclined to good by grace, and freely embrace it: but he asserts, according to

Augustine and the truth of the matter, that the liberty of will with respect to true and salvific good is lost and ruined in man through sin. Not that sin has deprived man of that liberty which is essential to the will and which is opposed to coercion and determination by nature: but because the liberty to do good, which is opposed to servitude, has completely perished in man through sin until the will is freed by the grace of Christ the Savior. According to his opinion, man has become such through sin that he can only sin. Although he can abstain from particular sins, yet when he abstains from one sin, he falls into another, and he does not exchange sin for acts of true virtue. Because his affection is turned away from God and seeks its good in creatures, as long as he is lifted up, he always and everywhere deviates from the true end, and therefore whatever he does cannot be free from sin, as can be extensively seen in that author's book on the grace of the first man, chapters 6 and 7, and in the book on the state of fallen nature, book 2, chapters 6 and 7, and many other places.

XVIII. As for the Protestants, both those of the Augsburg Confession and those specifically called Reformed, they commonly teach that man in the state of sin, before the grace of Christ, is destitute of all strength in matters pertaining to works of piety that by themselves lead to salvation and are referred to internal and spiritual acts of Christian and theological virtues. They do not think it sufficient to say that our free will is languishing and weakened, broken and diminished in this respect, but they claim it is entirely extinguished and lost: thus man before grace is to be compared not to a sick and captive man, but to a dead man, according to the custom of Scripture, which often inculcates that men are dead in sins and without grace. Hence, they do not allow it to be said that man has free will to perform works of piety and supernatural works before grace, but they claim that he is thus stripped of his liberty.

XIX. Similar things are frequently repeated and strongly urged not only by the doctors of the Reformed school but also by the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, especially in the book of Concord among them. They say, We believe that, as a dead body cannot bring itself to life and restore its own bodily life, so man, who is spiritually dead because of sin, cannot have any power to bring himself to spiritual life. Therefore, they condemn as erroneous those who teach that although man not yet regenerated is weaker in respect of free will than to be able to make a beginning of his conversion and turn himself to God by his own strength, and obey the law of God with all his heart, yet if the Holy Spirit, through the preaching of the Word, makes a beginning and offers his grace to man, then man's will, by its own natural strength, can somewhat assist in his conversion and cooperate, and apply itself to grace, prepare for it, seize it, embrace it, and believe in the Gospel. In the Epitome of Articles on which controversy has arisen among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, article 2.

XX. And in the solid declaration and repetition of the same articles, which is inserted in the same book of Concord, they condemn the dogma of the Synergists, who imagine that man in spiritual matters is not entirely dead to good but only gravely wounded and half-dead. And although free will is too weak to make a beginning and turn itself to God by its own strength and obey the law of God with all its heart, yet if the Holy Spirit makes a beginning and calls us through the Gospel, offers his grace, the forgiveness of sins, and eternal salvation, then free will

can, by its own natural strength, come to God, and in some way (at least a little, although weakly) contribute to its conversion, assist it, cooperate, prepare and apply itself to grace, seize it, embrace it, believe in the Gospel, and in the continuation and preservation of this work, cooperate with the Holy Spirit by its own strength. Article 2, in the rejection of errors, number 4.

XXI. Therefore, the same doctors of the Augsburg Confession, along with the Reformed, teach that in the conversion of man, his will is purely passive, that is, does nothing, but only receives the movement and action of the Holy Spirit in itself, which among others was the opinion of Luther himself. As the same doctors acknowledge in the place already cited.

XXII. Nevertheless, Protestants do not deny that when a sinner omits acts of faith, hope, charity, and other virtues prescribed to him in the Gospel, such omission is free and thus deserving of punishment. According to the Reformed, since man, though deprived of grace, knowingly and willingly omits acts prescribed by God, he is not prevented by any external force or physical impediment from performing them, but only by the depraved disposition of his own will, which does not nullify his natural freedom of action. To this, it can be added, according to the doctors of the Augsburg Confession, that the grace of God necessary for doing good is in some way available to all men, and God is ready to confer it on all and each one if they do what is within them.

XXIII. Moreover, although Protestants deny that man in the state of sin has liberty with respect to divine and spiritual acts, they nonetheless admit that his will, however corrupted by sin, can in various ways be called free with respect to those acts. According to them, the corruption induced by sin does not prevent the will of man from being free with respect to any acts, not only from external force and coercion but also from any physical necessity and brute determination. They only mean that the will of corrupted man, before being liberated by the grace of God, is not free from the servitude of sin or the necessity of sinning due to vice. And hence it lacks the liberty that is opposed to servitude concerning spiritual good.

XXIV. This is how David Paræus explains the Protestant doctrine. When faced with the question posed by Bellarmine, whether man, after the fall of the first man, is truly free in matters pertaining to salvation, he says that the question is slippery and sophistical because, he says, it is unclear what kind of liberty of will he refers to concerning divine actions: whether from coercion, physical necessity, or brute determination, which liberty we grant outright; or from the servitude of sin or the necessity of sinning due to vice, or from dependence on divine motion, which cannot be arrogated to man in the state of sin without blasphemy. In book 6 of Bellarmine's "De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," chapter 8.

XXV. Consistent with these are the teachings of Joshua Placeus in his treatise on the free will of man, chapter four, concerning free will in the state of sin. He says that in the descendants of Adam there is a faculty of willing and choosing free from threefold necessity: coercion, such as our body may suffer; determination of matter, especially as seen in stones and sticks; and sense, as fits brute animals, by which man is subject to virtue or vice and bound to God's law. He then adds, What liberty of will did Adam lose? He lost the absolute ability not to sin, situated in original righteousness, which consisted partly in the integrity, perfection, and rectitude of natural

moral faculties without any vice, error, or defect, and partly in the appetite for the true ultimate end, and from that appetite, habits of living well, which would have gradually grown to the highest degree of perfection according to natural order. In place of this liberty, the servitude of sin succeeded, situated in the depravity and obliquity of moral faculties, especially the will. This depravity consists in aversion from the true ultimate end and conversion to a falsely apparent ultimate end. Hence it follows that, since everything that is desired is either the ultimate end or a means to it, nothing sound remains in our moral faculties. And not only that, but as long as we are affected in this way, it is impossible for us not to sin.

XXVI. It should also be observed here that the doctors of the Reformed school in this question distinguish between proximate and active power and remote and passive power. They concede that man in the state of sin and before grace indeed has a certain remote and passive power for spiritual and supernatural acts, but they deny that man so considered has any proximate and active power for the same acts. This distinction is used by Paræus in book 6 of Bellarmine's "*De Libero Arbitrio*," chapter 15.

XXVII. The theologians of Leyden also apply the same distinction in their synopsis of pure theology. In the state of corruption, they say, or in man naturally generated and bound by original sin, although he has not lost, as in the intellect, the natural liberty of choice in the will, but retains the natural faculties of the soul, which are the principles of actions and remote and passive power of receiving contrary things: yet he has lost, both in the intellect and the will, rectitude and goodness, and has instead received a contrary vicious habit. Therefore, free will, by proximate and active power, under the instigation of the Devil, in whose power and dominion it is, can no longer choose the good which is truly good, but only the evil, however seemingly good, with the choice remaining in kinds and degrees of evil, necessarily in respect of the proximate principle, yet freely, willingly, and gladly. For he chooses evil and rejects good. Disputation on Free Will, Theses 18 and 19.

XXVIII. This is also found in Alexander More's "*De Victoria Gratia*," disputation three, thesis 15. He concedes that it can be said that man before grace has a certain remote and imperfect power for works of piety and supernatural works, provided that by this is meant the natural power of willing and not willing, which gives man a proportion and capacity, which you do not find in stones or brutes. This means that man, however corrupted by sin, has certain natural faculties that can be moved to works of piety by God's grace, which faculties are lacking in brutes and inanimate things. And this is what others mean by remote and passive power. That is, they signify by this that man is naturally capable of receiving the aids of divine grace, by which his faculties, taking on new strength, are moved to spiritual and salvific works.

XXIX. Joshua Placeus seems to say something more, yet which amounts to the same thing in essence. He teaches that, however great man's corruption may be, he can choose not to sin if he wills, and if his will were properly disposed to not sinning. Hence, the ability not to sin in man, if he seriously wills it as he ought, is not to be attributed to grace but to nature. He affirms that this ability exists even in corrupted man, so that he can not only sin if he wills, but also not sin, provided his will, as it ought, abhors sin. Therefore, he says, those do not seem to

have well considered the nature of things who attribute the ability not to sin, provided the will is rightly disposed to not sinning, to grace, when it should rather be ascribed to nature, by which it is that the reasons for willing and for sinning are in conflict. Hence, he concludes that it is futile to object to us with those passages of Scripture that attribute to man the ability to do good if he wills, namely, as he ought to will. Treatise on Free Will, chapter 4.

XXX. And to clarify his thought, this learned man distinguishes between the ability not to sin and to do salvific good conditionally and absolutely. He calls the conditional ability not to sin and to do good, by which man can not sin and do good if he wills, and provided he wills rightly, as he ought: but the absolute ability, by which man simply can not sin and do good.

XXXI. Again, he distinguishes this absolute ability into the first and second. The first he calls the natural faculty itself, by which man is capable of doing good and evil, which does not apply to brutes. The second absolute ability to do good consists in habits that determine or incline the natural ability to do good.

XXXII. Since in moral action the matter or substance of the action can be distinguished from the form, that is, moral goodness or badness, he says the first ability is the material principle of moral actions, but the second is the formal principle. Because the will, which is the natural ability by which we can do good or evil, is the willing itself: but from habits inclining or determining the will, comes willing well or poorly.

XXXIII. From this, he affirms that in us corrupted by sin, the first ability, or material principle of doing good and evil, remains, but the second ability, or formal principle of doing good, is lost through Adam's sin and not only lost but turned into a contrary ability so that a universal repugnance to that which is truly doing good according to God exists in all our moral faculties, more tenacious because it is innate from birth and confirmed by continuous practice, almost as if it were a second nature.

XXXIV. This is related to another distinction used by Placeus and many others. They distinguish between physical and moral power or impotence. Physical impotence for doing good exists when the natural power of understanding and willing, without which no one can act well or poorly, is lacking or is not in control. Moral impotence, on the other hand, is when the mind and will are present and in control but are determined by certain habits to act poorly. Or, as Placeus explains the same thing in other words, physical impotence is what lies outside the will, meaning you cannot do something no matter how much you will and strive. But moral impotence is what lies within the will itself, meaning you cannot do something because you do not will it, and the will is firmly and deeply determined by an opposite habit. Such impotence is seen in demons concerning love for God. For they cannot love God, not because they lack any natural faculty necessary to love God, but because they are utterly hardened in hatred for God by their own free will.

XXXV. Indeed, those theologians teach that even a man corrupted by sin, without any inherent or subjective grace, has a certain physical or natural power to perform works of piety, insofar as he lacks no natural faculty necessary to perform such works, nor is he hindered by any physical impediment from doing them. However, he is morally completely impotent concerning

those works because his natural faculties, namely the mind and will, are so obstructed and impeded by vicious habits that he can do nothing in this regard without healing and liberating grace.

XXXVI. There are some among the Reformed who seem to disapprove of this distinction, such as Alexander Morus. He considers human impotence for good to be physical and should be called so because it is innate in us and propagated in us with our very nature. He thinks it is mistakenly called moral because, in common usage, we say something is morally impossible, not because it cannot simply be done, but because it is only exceedingly difficult and rarely done. Therefore, he prefers that, regarding this question, human impotence be distinguished into that which is involuntary and externally acquired or derived from infirmity and that which is internal and voluntary and proceeds from malignity, not from infirmity. He refers the latter type to the impotence attributed to man concerning salvific good. In "De Victoria Gratia," disputation 6, thesis 13.

XXXVII. But those who speak differently on this matter do not mean anything else. For they call human impotence concerning spiritual good moral because it is voluntary and stems from vice, not because they think that in this regard man can do anything by himself, even if very rarely and with extreme difficulty. They also concede that such impotence is innate in man from his first origin and therefore do not want it to be called merely physical because it does not arise from the lack of any natural power or faculty but only from its vicious and culpable corruption, which others do not deny. Hence, this is merely a terminological dispute among the Reformed.

XXXVIII. Nevertheless, although Protestants generally teach that man in his first conversion is purely passive, they do not mean that the first acts by which man is converted to God, beginning to hate and detest sin, and to love God, believe in Him, and trust Him, are not vital acts elicited by man's faculties and therefore actively proceeding from him. They only mean that the grace of God precedes our will and that our will is purely passive concerning those first aids by which God begins to move our will to good and those new strengths which God gratuitously infuses into it and without which it can neither begin nor attempt any good nor cooperate with divine grace.

XXXIX. Perkins carefully warns about this. He says, "In the first conversion of a sinner, free will concurs with grace in a certain manner as a companion and cooperator. For three things are required for conversion: the word, the Holy Spirit, and the will of man. For the will of man is not entirely and completely passive, but there is also some operation of it, even in the first conversion of the soul. For when someone is converted, it is indeed by God, but not by compelling him unwillingly, but by inclining his will so that the man himself also wills his conversion. For when a man is converted, he also wills his conversion from the grace of God." And after adding some things, he says, "We must remember that even in the very first moment of conversion, the operation of the grace of the Holy Spirit and the will of man desiring it are present in man simultaneously: with this difference, however, that the operation of the Holy Spirit, as far as order and cause are concerned, is prior and moves and excites the will: this, being

moved and excited to act by grace, then moves and acts itself." In "Catholico Reformato," controversy 1, chapter 1, conclusion 5.

XL. The same doctrine is also held by the theologians of the Augsburg Confession. They say, "What Luther wrote, that the human will in conversion is purely passive, must be rightly and accurately understood, namely, with respect to divine grace in kindling new movements: this is to be understood, when the Spirit of God, through the hearing of the word or the use of the sacraments, approaches the will of man and works conversion and regeneration in him. For after the Holy Spirit has worked and effected this, and has changed and renewed man's will solely by his divine power and operation, then indeed the new will of man is the instrument and organ of the Holy Spirit, so that it not only apprehends grace but also cooperates with the Holy Spirit in subsequent works." In the "Epitome of Articles on which Controversies have Arisen among the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession," article 2, which is about free will.

XLI. They later confirm the same in the solid and clear repetition and declaration of certain articles of the Augsburg Confession, which have been disputed for some time among certain theologians devoted to the same, inserted into the Book of Concord. They say, "When Luther affirms that man in his conversion is purely passive, that is, does absolutely nothing, but only suffers what God works in him, he certainly does not mean that conversion takes place without the preaching and hearing of the word of God, nor did he mean it to be understood that in conversion by the Holy Spirit, no new movements are kindled in us, nor any spiritual operation is begun in us, but this is what Luther meant: that man by himself or by his natural powers can contribute nothing or bring any aid to his conversion, and that man's conversion is not partially but entirely the operation, gift, and work of the Holy Spirit alone.

XLII. And yet, despite this, those same theologians consider man's conversion to be so free that man can resist the Holy Spirit, who undertakes the work of conversion in us, and place obstacles, and indeed sometimes does resist and place obstacles. They say there is no efficacy of the Holy Spirit that man cannot frustrate by his obstinacy and stubbornness. This is what the theologians of Rinteln affirm in their colloquy with those of Marburg, held at Kassel by the authority of the Landgrave of Hesse. For when asked whether the grace of conversion is such that man can equally render obedience to the gospel in the power of grace or resist it and place obstacles by innate malice, they respond affirmatively, while the theologians of Marburg deny it.

XLIII. Although the Reformed deny that the grace by which God converts men is such that man can sometimes place obstacles to it and impede its effect and assert that it never happens that man resists God undertaking the work of conversion so as to remain unconverted, because the efficacy of divine grace in a sinner is such that it infallibly and irresistibly works his conversion, they nevertheless admit that this efficacy does not prevent man's conversion from being a truly free work, proceeding actively and freely from man, because, they say, however efficacious divine grace may be by itself, it does not move man except in a way congruent and agreeable to a rational and free creature. That is, it infallibly ensures not only that man does and wills, but that he does and wills freely and that in the good works to which grace moves him, he acts no less from his own judgment, choice, and deliberation than if he acted without grace.

XLIV. Moreover, although they assert that once grace is present by which God converts men, conversion necessarily follows, and the movement and impulse of converting grace and such resistance of human will, which would impede the act of conversion, cannot coexist, they also acknowledge that with the efficacy of grace, there remains the power for the opposite act and the negation of the act to which grace impels man. That is, man, although infallibly converted, always retains the true power not to be converted and to elicit the contrary act.

XLV. Amesius explicitly teaches this in "Bellarminus Enervatus." Explaining in what sense a man, excited by preventing grace and assisted by God, can act in such a way that he can also not act, he observes that this ability to act and not act can be understood in two ways: first, that the power to not act is simultaneously in the same subject with grace and the aid required to act, and he says this sense is the truest. Secondly, the words can be understood to mean that grace and the aid given for a particular action, and the absence of such an act, or a contrary act, are or can be in the same subject at the same time, and he says this sense is false.

XLVI. Therefore, to the question of whether men act through free will in works of piety, he responds that if the phrase "to act through free will" means that free will acts in these works as the principal cause, he admits it. But if it means that natural liberty is the principal cause of the spiritual action and not that it receives and can act and will its own from grace, he rejects it as Pelagian. Book 4, "De Libero Arbitrio," chapter 3, on the powers of free will.

XLVII. From what has been explained so far, it is evident that Protestants do not deny that after sin and before grace, man has a certain remote and imperfect power for works of piety and supernatural works. By this term, they designate the natural faculty of willing and not willing, which, with respect to those works, gives man a certain proportion and capacity that is not found in stones or brute animals.

XLVIII. Furthermore, they admit that this power in man, remaining after sin with respect to those works, is free not only from coercion but also from any physical necessity and brute determination. Hence, many of them are not afraid to say that man before grace has the physical power to do salvific good, and he can do good if he wills, although he is morally impotent for this due to his will being hardened in evil by vicious habits.

XLIX. From the aforementioned, it is also clear that Protestants acknowledge that free will, which remains in man after sin, is the principal cause, or as others say, the material principle of pious and spiritual actions, although before grace it lacks the liberty that is the principal cause or formal principle of those actions. They affirm that free will, having recovered the liberty to do good through the aids of grace supplied by God, cooperates with divine grace not only in the acts following the first conversion of man but also in those in which the first conversion itself consists. Therefore, Protestants do not deny that all good works of man, which are attributed to grace, proceed actively and freely from the will of man, which grace moves and excites. Hence, man uses his innate and essential liberty both when he omits the acts prescribed to him in the Gospel, impelled by his own malice, and when he performs them with the help of grace.

L. We have made it equally clear that the doctors of the Augsburg Confession attribute to man that liberty by which he can not only impede the effect of divine grace but often does so in fact. The Reformed teach that grace moves and determines the free will of man to do good infallibly and irresistibly, but nevertheless does not take away from him the true power of acting otherwise and ceasing from action: so that man, having received grace, cannot dissent from it, as the School puts it in a composite sense, but he can in a divided sense.

LI. From all these things, it evidently follows that Bellarmine and other doctors of the Roman School argue in vain against Protestants as if they simply denied that man cooperates with divine grace in his conversion and that conversion itself is a free work, and that man freely elicits it with divine grace moving and exciting him. And it is clearly false and baseless to posit the state of controversy, which Bellarmine establishes between all Protestants and the Roman Church, whether man after sin is so free in those things which pertain to salvation, that although he can do nothing without the aid of grace, yet being excited by preventing grace and assisted by God, he can act in such a way that he can also not act.

LII. For among Protestants collectively considered and the Roman School also collectively considered, there is no controversy on this matter, although in each school, theologians dispute in what sense a man, having received grace, can act and not act. For there are many in the Roman School who, having posited any aids of grace, want man to be able to act and not act in such a way that it is true even in a composite sense, not only in a divided sense: that is, who claim that there are no aids of grace whose effect man cannot sometimes impede and frustrate by his obstinacy: and among Protestants, many also think and profess the same, namely all theologians of the Augsburg Confession, and also those called Remonstrants. And as they differ from those specifically called Reformed, whose doctrine is that all aids of grace necessary and prerequisite for actual conversion of man never lack their effect but infallibly overcome all obstinacy and resistance of the human heart, so too, in the Roman School, there are not a few who agree with the Reformed in this part regarding the essence of the matter and differ from the other theologians of the Roman School. They teach that divine grace is so efficacious by itself that it determines the free will of sinful man to good unerringly and irresistibly, although it does not take away from him the power of dissenting and acting otherwise. Among these are not only Jansen and his disciples but also the recent Thomists, such as Didacus Alvarez and William Estius.

LIII. On the other hand, we have made it manifest that the theologians of the Roman School, together with the Protestants, acknowledge that free will before grace is such a slave to sin that it can do nothing in matters where true and salvific piety towards God consists. Indeed, the first beginning of our justification and conversion is from God alone, not from our free will, and in that respect, man is entirely passive.

LIV. It is equally clear from what has been said that the doctors of the Roman Church, such as Bellarmine and Molina himself, do not attribute the cooperation of free will with grace to the natural powers but to the new powers that our will receives through the aid of grace. Nor is it their view that free will, when it consents to grace and follows its guidance, does so through

powers it already had, whose use was merely impeded before being freed by grace, which Bellarmine falsely complains is imposed on them, but through powers that God has added to it above nature: so that the consent which the human will gives to the grace calling and exciting it is not a natural work, but a supernatural one.

LV. Therefore, it must be admitted that there is not here the controversy between the Protestants and the Roman Church that Perkins posits. Namely, whether man's will has a natural power of cooperating with divine grace in spiritual matters, which he says is affirmed by the doctors of the Roman Church but denied by ours; because according to us, the will's cooperation is from grace, but according to the doctors of the Roman School, it is from itself. They say, he notes, that man's will concurs and cooperates with the grace of God in the first conversion of the sinner by itself and by its natural power, and is only aided by the Holy Spirit. But we say that man's will indeed cooperates with grace in the first conversion; but it is not moved by itself but by grace: by which it must first be moved and raised up before it can move itself or will anything good. In this matter, Perkins is manifestly mistaken from what we have previously reported: for the doctors of the Roman School expressly teach that the human will cooperates with grace, not by its own powers, but by those newly supplied by grace. In "Catholico Reformato," controversy 1, chapter 2.

LVI. But, you may say, what then is the issue of contention between the Protestants and the Roman School when the latter affirms that man before grace has the liberty of his will not only for natural and moral works but also for works of piety and supernatural works, while the former deny it. I answer, many of the doctors of the Roman Church indeed attribute too much to free will in various ways, as we have shown in previous disputations: but concerning this precise question, the contention seems to be about words.

LVII. For when Protestants deny that man before grace has his liberty with respect to spiritual and supernatural works, they do not mean to deny that man before grace is endowed with that liberty which is essential to the will, and which is opposed to physical necessity and brute determination, even concerning spiritual and supernatural matters: therefore, man in that state can freely omit the supernatural acts prescribed in the Gospel; and when moved by grace, he can freely perform the same acts, and thus he has the true power to act or not to act, at least in a divided sense. They only mean that in that state, man is not free from the servitude of sin and the dependence on divine motion through supernatural aid; and without such aid, he can do nothing at all in the matter of salvation. On the other hand, the Roman School, when it affirms that man before grace is free in spiritual matters and those pertaining to piety, does not intend to deny that man before grace is a slave to sin and can do absolutely nothing without grace in matters where true piety towards God consists. But its view is solely that man by nature is such and endowed with essential liberty, that with the help of grace, he can freely turn towards good and always has the true power to do or not to do it.

LVIII. Similarly, when Protestants say that free will in man is extinguished and lost through sin, and not merely wounded and diminished with respect to salvific and spiritual good, they only mean that no powers remain in man after sin by which he can turn to good by himself,

but whatever he can do and operates in the matter of eternal salvation should not be attributed to the powers of free will but solely to those newly supplied to him by the grace of Christ. However, when the theologians of the Roman School contend that the free will of man is not entirely lost but only captivated, bound, and wounded even in matters promoting eternal salvation, they do not mean to teach that the free will of sinful man can do anything, even with difficulty, without grace in pious and salvific works: indeed, they do not intend to teach that man, excited and assisted by grace and as if freed from bonds, cooperates with it by his own powers, but by the new powers that grace adds. They only mean that man's natural liberty concerning no object is lost through sin, but only that man's mind and will are hindered by the vicious qualities induced by sin from being properly directed towards true and salvific good: so there is no need to give those faculties anew or create a new free will in us, but only to heal the mind and will from the wounds of sin and aid them with new strengths provided by grace so that we can do good.

LIX. The doctrine of the Reformers previously explained does not differ from this, according to which they all agree that all physical powers necessary for doing good, which are nothing other than free will considered absolutely, remain in man through sin, and that only a certain moral impotence induced by sin exists, consisting entirely of vicious habits obstructing the mind and will so that they can neither recognize nor love the salvific good nor promote themselves towards it in the least until they are freed from these by the grace of Christ. From all this, it is clear that Protestants indeed verbally contradict the Roman School but do not deny in reality what the Roman School intends to affirm, and thus, as we have said, the contention here is not about the matter itself but about words.

LX. Nevertheless, the manner of speaking used by Protestants when they say that man has lost the liberty of will for true and salvific good through sin is not universally disapproved in the Roman School; indeed, eminent and learned men in it acknowledge that it is derived from Augustine and consistent with the style of Scripture and the ancient Church, which Jansen and his disciples honestly admit, as we have shown above.

THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON THE NECESSITY OF GRACE,
AND

the Powers of Human Free Will concerning Moral Good in the State of Fallen Nature.

PART ONE
IN WHICH
The Doctrine of the Roman School is Explained.

Thesis I

On the necessity of grace, and on the powers of free will in human nature corrupted by sin, concerning moral good, there is great variety of opinions in the Roman School. For

understanding this, it should be noted that in the Schools, moral good is sometimes taken more broadly, sometimes more narrowly. Moral good, broadly taken, signifies everything that depends on the will and reason, and affects both in such a way that therefore some reward or praise is due to man, and in respect of which man can simply be called good. Therefore, this entire good is situated in virtue and actions according to virtue, whether that virtue is acquired, infused, natural, or supernatural.

II. The opposite of this good is the evil that deserves punishment and blame, which is usually called the evil of guilt, and includes all vices and sins. This good is distinct from what is called physical or natural good, which does not depend on our will, and perfects nature in such a way that no reward or praise is due to us for it, nor can we simply be called good because of it.

III. This physical good pertains both to nature itself and its faculties, and to any benefits and gifts that perfect it outside the realm of virtue, whatever their kind, whether they arise from the principles of nature or are granted by God above nature. Therefore, this good is not called physical or natural to be opposed to supernatural good, but only to be opposed to moral good as just described.

IV. This sense of moral good is frequently used by Protestants, as can be especially seen in the theses of the Saumur School. In this disputation, however, the theologians of the Roman School take moral good somewhat more narrowly. For they oppose moral good not only to natural or physical good but also to supernatural good. Therefore, under moral good, they do not include the theological virtues, whether infused, and the acts arising from them, which are of a supernatural order; but only everything that is in accordance with right reason and the natural law, and yet does not rise above nature. Therefore, this entire good is situated in the observance of that law which is naturally inscribed in the human heart, which God has summarized in the Decalogue, and which is nothing other than the dictate of right reason.

V. Furthermore, the precepts of this law can be observed in two ways. First, only according to the substance of the works. Secondly, concerning the manner in which they are directed to eternal salvation and the promised beatitude. One observes the precept of the law concerning the substance of the works who voluntarily abstains from what is prohibited by some precept of the law, for example, from theft and murder, and who voluntarily performs something commanded by the law, such as honoring one's parents, taking care of one's own, and assisting the needy from one's own resources. But for these to benefit us for eternal salvation, it is further required that they be done out of charity and out of that love for God which the Gospel commends, and that they be directed to the glory of God. Therefore, observing the precepts of the law in this latter way means not only performing the work commanded by the law, whether external or also internal, but also doing it out of charity.

VI. Again, the doctors of the Roman Church observe that those who observe the precepts of the law concerning the substance of the works and yet do not do so out of charity can be in a twofold difference. For they say that some precepts of the law can be observed concerning the substance of the work even with sin, and in such a way that the action should not be considered praiseworthy or honorable. For example, someone acts out of wrongful desire and with an evil

end, such as someone returning a deposit to a friend or giving something to the needy, but for the sake of pleasing a prostitute and serving an impure affection. But although someone is not led by the love of God, they can observe some precept concerning the substance of the work, not out of wrongful desire, but out of a natural affection that is not evil, and without intending an evil end: or because they consider it their duty and reasonable. So that in this, they do not incur new sin, but the work they perform has a certain moral honesty. And in such an observation of the law's commandments consists the good that the Scholastics call moral, and which they oppose not only to natural good but also to supernatural good.

VII. Furthermore, the doctors of the Roman Church by common consent acknowledge that no one can observe the divine precepts, either wholly or partly, concerning the manner in which they are directed to life and eternal salvation, without the aid of special grace: namely, so that this observation is something that promotes his salvation by itself and merits grace or glory for him.

VIII. None of them also denies that grace is not necessary for observing some precepts of the law concerning the substance of the work: but in such a way that the action is not morally good and honest, as it is tainted by an evil end and wrongful desire. This is known and manifest by itself.

IX. But among them, it is questioned whether without special grace, by the benefit of general aid alone, the divine precepts can be observed in such a way that, although it is not done out of charity and is not meritorious for eternal life, yet sin is avoided in it, and the action is morally good and honest? On this matter, their opinions are varied and discrepant.

X. Firstly, indeed, many of the old Scholastics argue that man in the state of corrupted nature can, by his own powers, without the aid of special grace, observe all and each of the precepts of the natural law concerning the substance of the works and thus accomplish the whole moral good as they call it. This is the opinion of Durandus in the second book of Sentences, distinction twenty-eight, question four. There he affirms and contends to prove by several arguments that someone can fulfill the divine precepts, which are, namely, of natural law, but not of supernatural law, without grace. Therefore, he concedes that it is possible that without grace someone can be free from all sin, both of omission and commission, although original sin remains in him, for which he would be excluded from salvation.

XI. For after he has argued against his own opinion, "No one is condemned except for the sin of commission or omission: but he who fulfills the precepts of the law omits nothing: and he who avoids all evil commits nothing: if, therefore, man can fulfill the precepts of the law without grace, then man can avoid sin without grace, then man can avoid damnation without grace: but he who is not damned is in glory: therefore, man not having grace could be in glory." He answers that without the sin of omission and commission, man would be condemned for original sin alone, unless he were freed by grace.

XII. Vasquez indeed contends that Durandus is speaking not of any grace, but only of habitual and justifying grace, and does not believe there is any Catholic doctor who taught that a man can avoid all temptation against natural law, and consequently observe the entire natural

law, not only for a short time but also for a long time, without any aid of grace through Christ. For Durandus and other ancient Scholastics, when disputing about the victory over temptations and the observance of natural precepts, do not understand by grace the aid of moving grace, but habitual grace, by which we are made just. In "Prima," book 2, Disputation 189, chapter 2.

XIII. But to the one reading and considering Durandus, it is clear that Vasquez is mistaken, and that Durandus's opinion is that man can fulfill the divine precepts by natural powers and without any aid of grace through Christ. For he proves his opinion with this argument: "What man does naturally, he can do without grace by himself: but the Gentiles, who do not have the law, naturally do what the law requires, as it is said in Romans 2. Therefore, the precepts of the law can be fulfilled without grace." Hence, it is evident to Durandus that to act without grace is the same as to act naturally and by oneself. But he who does something by any aid of grace through Christ cannot be said to act naturally and by himself, even if he otherwise lacks habitual and justifying grace. Add that Durandus, writing in the same distinction, question two, objects to himself the words of Christ, "Without me, you can do nothing." To which he responds that these words are to be understood of the general influence of God, by which he preserves the principles of things in being, without which nothing would be or happen.

XIV. The same opinion as Durandus was embraced by Scotus and Gabriel Biel. For they believe with him that man, even corrupted by sin, can observe all moral precepts or natural law according to the substance of the works by his own powers, without grace, though not in order to a supernatural end, as Estius testifies in "Secundum Sententiarum," Distinction 26, paragraph 40, proposition 8. However, this opinion is commonly rejected in the Roman School today. And in Estius's judgment, it is clear that it pertains to the heresy of Pelagius and is contrary to the Catholic faith.

XV. But in the Roman School, not only were there once found, but there are still found today, those who indeed admit that all precepts cannot be observed, and all temptation cannot be universally overcome, and, as it is commonly said, collectively by man in the state he is now in: but still, that any natural precept, however difficult, and any temptation, however vehement, can be individually observed without any aid of grace through Christ. Vasquez, in the second chapter of the above-cited Disputation, attributes this opinion to Ruard Tapper, a theologian of Louvain, in his seventh article of the Louvain Academy, paragraph "Hac confirmantur." And certainly, in that place, that doctor, speaking of works which by their nature do not exceed the powers of our nature, such as all those commanded by the natural law, says that these individual works, although we are infirm and deprived of grace, are in our power. For he says, "There is no one who cannot will and even avoid homicide and any other sin, even venial. For no passion, no fear of death can induce the necessity of following, so that it is not in our power to will and not to will, as long as judgment of reason remains free." He immediately adds, "Therefore, the necessity of sinning, which is from our infirmity, opposes inevitability concerning all, not concerning individual things, nor is it necessary for any specific sin to be committed." Vasquez testifies that this opinion was retained by some more recent theologians in his time, as he notes in

the second chapter of the cited Disputation. He also adds that twenty years before, it was quite common in Spain.

XVI. But in the Roman School, a third opinion is much more common. This opinion states that man, in the state of corruption, cannot observe the precepts of natural law without the special aid of divine grace, neither all collectively nor even individually: because among them are precepts that surpass the powers of corrupt nature, such as the precept "Thou shalt not covet," and the command to love God with all one's heart as the author of nature. Indeed, when severe temptation arises, those in this opinion admit that no command of the moral law can be observed, nor any moral good performed. But when no severe temptation occurs, they contend that with only general concurrence of God and without the special aid of grace, the easier works of the moral law can be observed concerning the substance of the work, so that all new sin is avoided. For example, someone not preempted by any interior grace from God can honor their parents, assist the needy, respond truthfully when questioned, and return a deposit to a friend; not out of wrongful desire, in which case those actions would not be without vice, but out of a certain natural inclination that is not evil; nor for an evil end, but simply because they judge it reasonable and part of their duty. From this, they consider such an action to include no sin in itself, but to be truly morally good and honest, although it does not profit for eternal salvation and is in no way meritorious of grace or glory.

XVII. Bellarmine and Estius, along with many others, broadly defend and explain this opinion. However, although they admit that some of the more difficult precepts of the moral law cannot be observed without grace, they nevertheless concede that a man in the state of corrupted nature can for a brief time observe all the precepts of natural law that need to be observed during that time without grace: because, as they say, affirmative precepts of the law do not always oblige, nor do all need to be observed at the same time; but negative precepts are observed even by doing nothing, as with "Thou shalt not kill." A man can, for a time, concerning such precepts, conduct himself negatively, with no temptation arising to violate the negative precepts. This can be seen in Estius in "Secundum Sententiarum," Distinction 26, paragraph 40.

XVIII. Similar things are also read in Bellarmine. Explaining in what sense he denied that all moral precepts can be observed by the sole powers of nature according to the substance of the work, he says, "We do not mean that someone cannot observe all for a very short time: for it may happen that sometimes no affirmative precept occurs, and no temptation is present to violate negative precepts. Therefore, the meaning of that proposition is that they cannot for any long period, during which various precepts present themselves to be observed, fulfill all solely by the powers of nature, so that all sin is avoided in every respect." In "De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio," book 5, chapter 5.

XIX. However, in the Roman School, there are not a few who affirm that no moral work can be entirely good in every circumstance without the aid of grace. This is the opinion of Gabriel Vasquez in "Prima Secundae," tome 2, disputation 190. There he cites many from the Scholastics, both ancient and recent, in support of his view, including Alphonsus a Castro, who presents this assertion as Catholic: "The free will of man by its own power, even with that

common and general concurrence of God added, cannot do any good without some special aid of God, because there always precedes some admonition, attraction, inspiration, or some added gift of nature, which God grants purely by his grace to whom he pleases." In book 7 "Against Heresies," under the word "Grace," heresy 1, assertion 3.

XX. Similar teachings are found in John of Rochester, Bishop in England. He says, "I preferred to follow the opinion of the Fathers rather than the Scholastics, since in this matter they mutually contradict each other. For the Fathers assert that no one can will any good without the special aid of God, nor is that general influence sufficient. Some Scholastics, on the contrary, contend that this general influence is sufficient, so that one can without that special aid morally do good, not only in kind, but also adorned with all due circumstances." In article 36 "Against Luther," paragraph "Neither indeed can."

XXI. Therefore, according to the opinions of these Doctors, a man in a state of sin, without the grace of God, cannot do anything that is truly a work of virtue and deserves to be simply called good and honest. Because in that state, whatever works are done by man, however specious and outwardly honest they may seem, they are rendered vicious by the defect of some circumstance and contract a certain nature of sin. Vasquez carefully explains which grace is necessary for a corrupted man to be able to do good and render true obedience to the moral law in the above-cited disputation. Indeed, at the beginning of the first chapter, he notes that the question here is not whether habitual grace, which justifies and sanctifies, and which, according to him, consists in charity, is necessary for someone to act according to the moral law. Nor is it questioned whether all the works of one who is in sin are sins. Indeed, it is not even questioned whether faith itself is necessary for doing good, but only whether a man can act according to virtue without some aid of grace. Hence, he says, the controversy will not be whether an infidel can do any good, nor will it be disputed whether any good can be done without charity; nor whether all the works of one who is in sin are sins, whether he can do any good; but the controversy now is whether a man can do any good work according to virtue without the aid of the grace of God, which is indeed a very different question.

XXII. Therefore, he concedes that neither the charity which the Holy Spirit pours into the hearts of the faithful nor faith itself is necessary for someone to do good and render true obedience to the moral and natural law. But a man, not only lying in sin but even still an infidel, can perform a morally good work. He only denies that a sinner, deprived of all divine grace, can do good and act according to natural virtue and honesty.

XXIII. The grace he considers necessary for this, he further explains in the twelfth chapter of the same disputation. There he distinguishes between two types of aid from the grace of Christ: one which is of a supernatural order by its nature, and the other which is of a natural order. And he does not consider the former necessary for any work of moral virtue, but only the latter, which is of a natural order. For his opinion is that a man can indeed perform individual works of moral virtue without the aid of grace through Christ, which by its nature is of a supernatural order, such as is necessary for the works of infused virtues; but he cannot perform any moral work entirely good according to virtue without some aid of grace through Christ,

which by its nature is of a natural order and is prepared for us by the eternal mercy of God through natural causes.

XXIV. Although this aid, according to him, is of a natural order, he nevertheless asserts that it is distinct from the gift of creation and the common influx with which God concurs with all natural causes. He particularly establishes it in a certain holy thought by which he considers it necessary for us to be preempted by God for individual good works. For he proves the necessity of grace for individual good works from the preparation of thought by which we are preempted for individual works. For he says that although we have free will and our will freely inclines to either side, yet it cannot move without thought, and this first thought must be applied by an external principle rather than the opposite; it is thus that whenever a thought is excited to good, it could not have been excited, and a particular grace is received from God distinct from the grace and gift of creation. For as it was free for God not to direct us to this or that good thought, he grants us a particular benefit in this: whether this application is directly from God himself or through other external causes. For in whatever way it is done, it is ultimately referred to God: because all causes for exciting this thought are so ordained by divine providence and foreknowledge that they could be ordered otherwise or differently disposed. Therefore, he attributes this special grace of God, by which we perform all good works, even moral ones, to the good thought prepared for us by the liberal will of God.

XXV. Therefore, that Doctor establishes that not every holy thought is either faith itself or begins after faith or from faith: but he wants holy thoughts to be inspired to men by God through natural causes, even before they believe and conceive faith. And yet he observes that this kind of aid, which is of a natural order, since it consists of good thoughts that do not transcend the light of nature, can in some way be said to be above our nature, insofar as it is above our industry and diligence, without which God has prepared and granted us such a thought, since he could have instilled the opposite. And also because these aids, which God grants us to live rightly in any kind of virtue and to overcome temptations and concupiscences, are given to us by God with the intention of our beatitude, which is our supernatural end. In "Prima Secunda," Disputation 189, chapter 16.

XXVI. Hence, the same aid necessary for any good moral work, although in substance it is of a natural order, he contends nevertheless pertains to the grace of Christ. Because, namely, morally good works, which are done by such aid, even by infidels, in some way dispose towards justification and consequently towards eternal salvation and are impetratory of justifying grace. "As Christ died for the ungodly to be justified, so also to live rightly: for by good works and a right life, even according to moral virtue, we obtain from God the spirit of compunction and justification." Therefore, he considers it sufficiently proven that this aid, distinct from the gift of creation, is necessary for each good moral work through Christ. In the aforementioned disputation 190, chapter 12.

XXVII. Therefore, although that Doctor considers some aid of the grace of Christ necessary for one to morally operate well, he nevertheless agrees with the vast majority of the Roman School that such grace can fall on one who lacks faith. And by faith, he does not only

mean true faith in Christ but also any knowledge of the one true God, such as can be found not only in heretics but also in many infidels and Gentiles. For his opinion is that in any kind of infidels, even Gentiles who do not know the one true God, there can be some works of moral virtues, and sometimes there are, although this rarely happens. In "Disputation 191," chapter 2.

XXVIII. Estius embraces this opinion in "Secundum Sententiarum," Distinction 40, paragraph 3. For there he asserts that some actions of infidels are not only not sins but are also morally good, though imperfect. And he notes that by infidel he does not mean a Jew or a heretic, although such a one does not have faith, because faith is a comprehensive name of virtue, but a pagan or heathen who does not have even the knowledge of the one God to whom he can refer his actions. For he considers that such an infidel sometimes acts from a natural affection that tends towards good and directs some actions not to an evil end but to good and the ultimate end generally and confusedly known; which, in his judgment, suffices that they do not have the nature of sin. For just as the righteous in this life do not refer all their actions to God, whom they have as their ultimate end, particularly in those in which they daily offend: so he does not think it necessary that the unrighteous, though infidels, refer all their actions to that which they set as their highest love with a perverse will. Just as concupiscence sometimes steals into the righteous some movements of the will that are not referred to God as the ultimate end, and indeed cannot be referred: so, in his view, a natural instinct towards good sometimes elicits some actions in infidels that are not referred to what they particularly love as the highest good, but to good and the ultimate end, at least in general, even if who that end is in particular and distinctly is unknown.

XXIX. Similar is what Vasquez teaches, namely that for our works to be good and honest, they should indeed be referred to God as the ultimate end, but not by any preceding will by which they are said to be referred habitually, but by the nature of the work alone, without any other motion of the will. Hence, he thinks it sufficient that an infidel does a good work if he knows it to be good and loves it for the sake of the honesty of virtue itself: for by this alone such work is sufficiently referred to God. In the recently cited disputation, chapters 2 and 3.

XXX. However, this opinion of William Estius and Gabriel Vasquez is confirmed by the judgment of the Roman Pontiffs. For the opposite doctrine seems to have been condemned in the Bull issued by Pius V and confirmed by Gregory XIII. For among other propositions condemned in that Bull against a certain Doctor of Louvain, one is worded as follows: "All the works of infidels are sins, and the virtues of the philosophers are vices." As Vasquez testifies in the place already cited.

XXXI. Nevertheless, there are some in the Roman School who, contrary to what is decreed in the cited Bull, affirm that no work of infidels is morally good. This is because, for a work to be according to virtue and morally good, it must not only do what is right, but also be done when, as much, and for whose sake it is right. The end for which every work must be done is God, loved by the agent, to whom all other things should be referred. Since God alone is to be loved for His own sake, any affection that does not tend towards God as its end is evil. Hence,

they conclude that no work of infidels is good, because they do not have the knowledge of the true God, and therefore none of their actions are referred to the true God as the ultimate end.

XXXII. This opinion, Vasquez, in the frequently cited 191st disputation, attributes to Gregory of Rimini, a renowned Doctor among the Scholastics, whom he notes understands by infidels those who are simply infidels, that is, Gentiles who do not have knowledge of the one true God, not schismatics and heretics, or those infidels who believe in and know the one God to some extent. Therefore, this Doctor believes that for one to do good, supernatural infused faith is not necessary, but any faith and knowledge of the one true God suffices. However, there are those in the Roman School who require not just any faith, but the faith of Christ himself, among whom is a certain Lincolnian, as reported by Vasquez.

XXXIII. Particularly, this latter opinion is embraced by Jansenists and their followers. They all believe that grace, not just any grace, but one of a supernatural order, by which faith is first created in men, is necessary for a moral good work. And not just any faith, but Christian and infused faith, which we apply to God speaking in His Word with a pious affection. They believe that every good will begins with such faith, without which it is impossible to have any good work. Hence, all works, not only of Gentiles but of all who are devoid of faith in Christ, such as heretics, are true and mere sins, however laudable and good they may appear to men.

XXXIV. Jansen outlines and accurately explains this doctrine, which he attributes to Augustine, in his book titled "Augustinus, De Statu Naturæ Lapsæ," Book III. In chapter fourteen, he argues that Augustine and his disciples, and consequently the Catholic Church, which embraced their doctrine against the Pelagians, believed that the will of man, after the Fall, is so captive and stripped of the liberty of doing good that whatever is done before grace, that is, before faith, from which freedom from sin begins, not only does not contribute to piety and salvation but is not even morally good, as it is a true and properly termed sin. And there, he proposes this as the indubitable opinion of Augustine and his disciples, that no good work, not even morally, can be done by human will unless it is freed by the grace of faith. Hence, before faith, it is not free for him to abstain from sin when he meditates on doing it here and now, but wherever he turns, he is held by a certain necessity of sinning, insoluble by human powers. Thus, through Adam's fall, man lost the liberty to do good to such an extent that he not only cannot fulfill the entire moral law of justice before grace but cannot even perform a single good deed. Therefore, the necessity of sinning is induced, not only in some acts but in all acts. Before grace, man not only cannot live without sin, because he necessarily falls at some time, but every act of his, before he believes, is sin, whether he appears to flee or embrace the temptation of sin.

XXXV. In the first chapter of the following book, he expressly and particularly attempts to prove, according to Augustine and the truth itself, that all works done before faith, from which the Christian religion begins, are nothing but sins and that attributing moral goodness to them is false and erroneous. Consequently, in chapter eight, he shows that the virtues of the philosophers were not true virtues but vices.

XXXVI. Moreover, he does not consider inert and idle faith sufficient for one to morally operate well but believes that active faith, which works through love, is required. He does not

believe that any work is morally good and escapes the nature of sin unless it proceeds from the love of God and a certain heavenly charity. This is especially evident in chapter sixteen of the third book, already cited, "De Statu Naturæ Lapsæ." There, he attempts to teach from Augustine that no good work, that is, without sin, can be done by man unless the very act of doing good is loved: that is, unless the justice of the precept itself delights the mind. But to be delighted with the justice of the precept itself is nothing else, according to him, than to do good from heavenly charity, because God is justice, and justice is loved only by charity. Hence, to do good by loving the justice of the law is nothing else than to do good by loving God himself with the charity of the Holy Spirit, because God is justice and truth. Thus, in Augustine's words, he affirms that no good fruit is produced except from the root of charity. And only then, and not otherwise, does someone begin to delight in the justice of the law when faith, which works through love, is present. Moreover, in chapter sixteen of the following book, he teaches that faith is necessary for a good work because it is what obtains the aid to love God. There, he also asserts that no good work and no good will exist unless from the intention of good faith, that is, faith that works through love.

XXXVII. And as, according to him, every good work must proceed from sincere love of God, so too must it be necessarily referred to God as the end. However good in substance what someone does may be, unless he does it for the sake of God and with respect to God, he cannot avoid sin in it. He attempts to prove this in chapter seventeen of the third book often cited, "De Statu Naturæ Lapsæ," where he states that "no good work, that is, without sin, can be done unless it is referred to the end to which true wisdom directs, that is, to God loved for His own sake: otherwise, it is neither rightly done nor a good work, but polluted with the contamination of true sin." Hence, throughout that book and the following one, he frequently insists on the necessity of faith for doing good because it is what directs the intention to that end in acting.

XXXVIII. Thus, he does not at all approve of what most Roman School Theologians assume and state as certain: namely, that for a good moral work, it is enough that it proceeds from a natural affection that is not evil and that the one acting does not intend an evil end, even if he does not think of God, nor even has the knowledge and faith of the one true God. When someone, among those who do not know God, is moved by some natural compassion, helps the needy, honors parents, or returns a loan or deposit to a friend because he judges it to be just and right and in accordance with reason: yet he does not refer it by habit or act to the glory of God but rests solely in the honesty of the action, seeking virtue not for anything else but for itself.

XXXIX. For he does not think that any affection is not evil which does not flow from sincere and pure love of God. For he believes that every affection of man pertains either to charity and the love of God or to concupiscence and evil desire, and that nothing lies between these two. Since it is absolutely necessary that all our affection and love tend either towards God and ultimately rest in God or rest and terminate in some creature, whatever it may be: if it belongs to the former kind, it pertains to charity and is therefore good; if it belongs to the latter, it pertains to concupiscence and is therefore evil.

XL. This is especially evident in the nineteenth chapter of that frequently cited third book, "On the State of Fallen Nature," whose title is "There Is No Middle Ground Between Charity and Blameworthy Lust." Here, he proves that there is no middle ground between the love of God and the love of a creature. For he says, all the affections of the soul revolve around the love of some thing as their pivot: since this love can only be either of the Creator or the creature; and the former is good, the latter blameworthy, as called by the Apostle "the love of the world" and according to Augustine, the very essence of sin, which dominates in all kinds of wrongdoing: it is clear that all love, other than this charity, is blameworthy lust.

XLI. And in the preceding chapter, he extensively proves that all love of the world and creatures is blameworthy, when, specifically, any creature is loved for its own sake and not for God's. From this, he concludes that all works that are not referred to God for the possession of eternal life are evil because in them men love the world, not God; and thus they serve the creature, not the Creator, and obey concupiscence or lust planted by the Devil in man, not charity, which is from God. For, he says, nothing can be imagined between the Creator and the creature, between the world and God, in acting: nor between lust and charity a middle way by which they are morally impelled in their good actions. Serving the creature with lust rather than the Creator, loving the world while acting and not God, only an impious person would deny to be a sin. Therefore, in those works, however good, philosophical, and free from sin they may appear, if they are done without faith in God, a Christian cannot doubt that those who lack faith directing their intention serve the creature, not the Creator: for it is impossible that they do not serve something while acting. Man serves what he looks to as the end of his work and loves, whether it is his own work, the object of his work, or himself who seems to perform a morally good work. By this very fact, if he aims at the vain splendor of his work, like the Stoics, or honor, wealth, pleasure, or his curiosity, as other philosophers aimed, he certainly seeks everything as the ultimate end for himself, not for God, whom he does not know at all: and thus he cannot excuse himself by any tergiversation from serving the creature in his work, not the Creator.

XLII. Therefore, according to him, it is especially blameworthy to seek virtue for its own sake and to perform virtuous duties merely for the honesty and beauty that recommend themselves to our mind. For he who does not rise higher and does not intend to serve and please God in doing so, considers his own excellence as the highest end and thinks only of serving and pleasing himself, which is undoubtedly the highest pride and greatest deviation from the true end, and thus a very grave sin before God, however such actions may shine in the eyes of men. Nor can those who pursue virtue for this reason be excused, that virtue by its nature can be referred to God, even if it is not aimed at by one who seems to act virtuously: since all other goods of human life, which are only viciously sought for their own sake, can also be referred to God when viewed in themselves.

XLIII. This the learned man elaborates extensively in the eleventh chapter and several following chapters of the fourth book, "On the State of Fallen Nature." He says, therefore, that it was the particular evil of philosophical virtue, even when it was most defective, that they sought

it, delighted with a certain lofty ruinousness of virtue, so that they might excel in their own eyes, please themselves, and be pleased with themselves, who should have sought to please God, or as Augustine says, the truth, by virtue. This evil of pleasing oneself so closely adheres to those who desire to please neither God nor men that it is altogether impossible for them not to fall into it. For, as he adds shortly after, "He who does not lift his eyes to God, to please Him with the beauty of virtue, but uniquely admires it as the end of good, as the most beautiful and lofty, cannot help but either be pleased with himself because of it or seek to be pleased with himself by seeking it." For since it is absolutely necessary for the human mind to delight in something, what else can the mind that is alienated from God and despises all other vile creatures, as we suppose, be delighted with, than what it believes to be the most excellent in created things? This is the mind itself adorned with virtue, which it considers the most beautiful ornament of all. Therefore, he who does not desire to please God or other men through virtue necessarily pleases himself with virtue. Hence, he concludes that only the will to please God through virtue can avoid that virtue, not only the philosophical virtue of the Gentiles but also Christian virtue, becomes a vice by being proud of itself and ceases to be virtue.

XLIV. Furthermore, since, according to Jansen's view, there is no good work that does not flow from a certain heavenly charity and is not referred to God for possession in eternal life, it follows that there is no good work that does not pertain to the worship of God and piety and in its way contributes to the salvation of the soul. Thus, it is futile for the Scholastics to distinguish good works into those that are only morally good and cannot be counted among acts of piety and religion and therefore do nothing for eternal life, and those in which piety and religion consist and which in some way contribute to the salvation of the soul and eternal life.

XLV. This corollary Jansen himself draws from his doctrine in the second chapter of the fourth book "On the State of Fallen Nature," where these are his words: "It can by no means be that a work which is born of faith and the love of God is not also by this very fact a work of piety, justice, the worship of God, meritorious, and beatifying. For what more excellent piety, justice, and worship of God than the love of God from faith? What more meritorious and beatifying, that is, contributing something to beatitude, than the love of God from faith?" And afterward, he declares that he agrees with Augustine that there is no good work at all, nor can there be, which does not, by this very fact, as it requires faith and the love of God as its principle, be also a work of piety and the worship of God and in some way meritorious of eternal life. And in chapter fifteen, he criticizes the division of virtues and affections used by Julian the Pelagian, saying that some make us barrenly good, while others make us fruitfully good, that is, those that contribute or do not contribute to the attainment of eternal life, as the Scholastics teach. "For," he says, "since no virtue either is or can be, which does not perform a work from faith and the love of the true God, to whom every work of virtue must be referred, and if not referred, by the very wrong end, it is a sin: it is impossible for any virtue to be barren. For faith and the love of God can by no means be barren: but if it is barren, it must now be a vice, not a virtue."

XLVI. Although that man acknowledges no good work unless it proceeds in some way from charity and faith working through love, he does not deny that sinners, that is, those in a

state of mortal sin and not yet justified and having obtained the remission of their sins, can do some good works. And in this, he subscribes to the Council of Trent, which pronounces anathema on those who affirm that all works done before justification are true sins. "If anyone says," he says, "that all works done before justification, however they are done, are true sins or deserve the hatred of God, let him be anathema." Canon VII, Session VI.

XLVII. This can be seen in Jansen's "On the State of Fallen Nature," book four, chapter four. For, he says, "although it is most true that all the works of sinners, indeed even of the just, which are not referred to the end to which they ought to be referred, that is, to God, but cling to creatures, are true sins: it is false, however, that the same should be said of faithful sinners as of infidels. For by this very fact that they are imbued with faith, although they are devoid of that perfect charity by which God is loved above all, that is, justification, they can still do many good things from that faith; such as, first of all, believing itself, and willing to work, and if they still lack the strength, groaning over their weakness, obtaining justification or strength for working from faith, such works as Augustine always attributes to sinners." And later, wanting to prove that the faithful, however bound by many sins, are not devoid of some imperfect love of God, which is nevertheless sincere and the beginning of true piety, such love of God as infidels completely lack, he says: "By this very fact that they remain faithful, they cannot but have some affection of true piety and love, from which they believe in God, hope for happiness from Him, pray for the obtaining of perfect charity and justice; from which they also perform some other good things with a sincere view of God, although they do not yet love Him so as to prefer Him to all earthly loves and delights."

XLVIII. He distinguishes between charity properly so-called, by which God is loved above all, and a certain imperfect charity, by which God is indeed loved freely and for His own sake, but not above all things. According to his view, the former charity is our very righteousness and can only be found in those who are justified and therefore no longer entangled in sin. The latter, however, can be found even in sinners who have not yet been freed by God's grace from the guilt of their sins, in whom certain acts of faith and love are stirred by the aids provided by Christ, by which sinners are disposed to receive righteousness from God and the remission of their sins.

XLIX. And yet, according to him, this imperfect love is not merely, as some recent Scholastics think, a kind of implicit love of God, and involved in the intention of some moral honesty, but a true and formal love of God; without which love of the Creator, no one, according to Augustine, makes good use of creatures, whether he is faithful or unfaithful, just or a sinner: and which love the faithful, even sinners, do not lack in some works. Therefore, according to this man's view, the charity or love we are now discussing, and which the faithful, even while lying in sin, are not entirely devoid of, is an imperfect love of God, or a certain imperfect delight in God, which precedes the commonly known charity and the love of God above all things and initiates all righteousness. As can be seen more extensively in his work, in chapter 4 of book 4, "On the State of Fallen Nature."

L. Moreover, although many Roman Scholastic Theologians believe that no morally good work can be performed without the grace of Christ, and although most Doctors of that School think that at least the more difficult precepts of the moral law cannot be observed without the help of this grace, indeed that not even the easier ones can be observed if a severe temptation urges without the help of Christ, yet they all agree that man, even in the state of fallen nature, has freedom regarding moral matters, and should be said to have free will not only in civil and natural matters but also in moral ones.

LI. This can be seen in Bellarmine. "There is a controversy," he says, "among all Catholics on one side, and all Heretics of this time (for there is no variety of opinions in this matter among either our side or the adversaries), whether man in the state of fallen nature has free will in choosing moral good and avoiding evil, or what is the same, in observing or transgressing the precepts of morality. And indeed all Catholics, both ancient and recent, preach the affirmative part of this as a dogma of Catholic faith." On Free Will, book 5, chapter 13.

LII. Therefore, among them, it is a Catholic dogma that man, even corrupted by sin, when he acts morally well, uses his freedom; nor is he less free when transgressing the precepts of the moral law, either by committing what they forbid or by omitting what they command: whether the grace necessary for moral action is presupposed or not. This question is different from this, and on which, as we have seen, the Doctors of the Roman School do not hold the same opinions: although none of them deny that fallen man has free will regarding moral good.

LIII. Bellarmine himself explains the sense of this question in this way, "For we do not dispute here whether the law can be fulfilled by natural powers alone, nor do we ignore that the help of grace is necessary in every way, since the law alone does not justify, but rather, justified by grace, we fulfill the law. But our question is whether, given the help of grace, man is truly free to either fulfill the law or to transgress it if he chooses. As if someone were to ask whether man can freely see or not see; it should not be objected, 'what if the light is absent?' for the question is understood to be with all necessary things being presupposed. We therefore say that, given the necessary help, whatever it may be, man is truly and properly free in moral matters." On Grace and Free Will, book 5, chapter 18.

THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON THE NECESSITY OF GRACE,
AND

The Powers of Human Free Will regarding Moral Good in the State of Fallen Nature.

PART TWO.
IN WHICH

The Doctrine of the Protestants is Explained and Compared with the Doctrine of the
Roman School.

Thesis I

The precepts of the moral and natural law, according to the common doctrine of Protestants, can be observed in two ways. First, absolutely, with respect to the matter of the work itself, or concerning the affection of the work considered in itself. Then, in the manner necessary for the action to be truly good and honest in the eyes of God. To observe the law with respect to the matter of the work is to do what the law generally commands or to abstain from what it prohibits: as in assisting the needy, honoring parents, abstaining from murder, theft, and adultery, without regard to the principle from which it flows or the end to which such work is referred. But for an action to be truly good and honest, it is further required that it be done from a due principle and referred to the end that God requires. If these circumstances are lacking, the action is considered vicious before God and takes on the nature of sin.

II. Firstly, among Protestants, it is questioned whether a man corrupted by sin can, without the grace of God and by his own free will, fulfill the precepts of the moral law, at least with respect to the matter of the work. To which they respond by common consent that there are some precepts of the moral law that, not even according to the matter of the work, as the Roman School speaks of its substance, can be observed by a fallen man without grace. Such is the precept not to covet and to love God with all one's strength and above all.

III. Nor do they less agree that certain precepts of the law can be observed by a corrupted man, at least absolutely and with respect to the matter of the work, without the saving grace of Christ. This can be seen in Amesius in Bellarmine enervated. "We also concede," he says, "that a man without faith, with special assistance and even without it, can perform some moral good if it is taken as the affection of the work itself considered in itself, without respect to the principle from which it flows and the end to which it should be referred," book 4, on Free Will, chapter 3. Similar things are taught by Melancthon in the Apology of the Augsburg Confession. "The human will," he says, "can in some way achieve civil justice, or the justice of works. It can speak of God, render certain worship to God by external work, obey magistrates, parents in the selection of external work. It can restrain the hands from murder, adultery, theft."

IV. Nor does this differ from what Alexander Morus teaches, that moral goods considered absolutely can be perfected by a man in a state of sin. "For anyone," he says, "can live chastely and soberly with respect to external acts, abstain from theft and murder, regulate locomotion, attend church assemblies, listen willingly to the Gospel, and not block their ears like a deaf adder: all of which are honest and civil, and less displeasing to God when they are at least superficially practiced than when they are omitted with profane contempt." On the Victory of Grace, second disputation, Thesis 41.

V. And certainly, it is clear from experience that even a pagan man, imbued with no saving knowledge of God, can return a deposit and a loan, honor relatives, honor parents, give alms to the poor, live temperately and soberly, and do many such things: and thus do many things among men, who are ignorant of inner things, which are splendid and praiseworthy: and from which arises a certain civil justice and honesty: such as was in Socrates, Epaminondas, Phocion, Scipio, Cato, and many others among the praised Gentiles, whose examples should put many Christians to shame.

VI. Although, however, according to the sense of Protestants, such civil justice and honesty do not require the grace of Christ; many of them still observe that it should be attributed to some special assistance of God. For men entirely left to themselves could not even achieve such civil justice, and those among the Gentiles who are praised for their virtue did not perform any laudable actions without God's special help restraining their natural corruption: without which it would have been that they would have rushed into detestable crimes no less than many others.

VII. This is the opinion of Moses Amyraldus in the disputation on Free Will. "In my opinion," he says, "if God allowed all men to follow their natural corruption and withdrew all efficacy of His Providence, both in moderating the temperament of the body and in governing or restraining or inciting to some kind of virtue, no one would refrain from injustice, lust, cruelty, avarice, and all kinds of vices, but would equal or surpass Nero, Caligula, Sardanapalus, and any others among the most desperate, page 173."

VIII. These teachings are consistent with what Alexander Morus teaches in the cited disputation. "Moreover," he says, "the liberty by which they make laws, regulate the Republic, consult for the common good, achieve victories, and excel in various virtues, even those who are in a state of sin, does not belong to them as if it were inherently from their nature. For it is from God, the Father of lights, from whom every good gift descends, as they themselves have recognized when they write that no notable man arises without divine inspiration: and reason itself persuades: for why do the children of heroes degenerate, why are those born from the same womb so different? Why do those who have received the best education become savage beasts?" Thesis forty-six. In the following thesis, he adds, "Indeed, God's provident hand sows certain seeds of a good disposition in their very birth, and then presents opportunities for cultivation, which would, however, be of little use unless God restrained the wickedness of men with the reins of His spirit: for as He wills human society to be maintained by legitimate order, He does not allow the ferocity of all to break out but restrains some with fear of punishment, others with the love of reward: otherwise, there would be utmost confusion if everyone inclined to all kinds of evils were allowed to rush into them as they are prone."

IX. Therefore, according to these doctors, if human nature is considered in itself, all men are born equal, and one is neither better nor worse than another: but the difference observed among them in this respect is to be attributed to God's secret dispensation, through which the affections of men are not indeed purified internally, but are restrained lest they boil over too violently. Although there lies in the breasts of each person a certain Lerna of all kinds of evils, yet God allows some to indulge their vices and to be agitated as if by furies: while He touches others with shame, reverence for laws, love of good reputation, and the desire for immortal fame, and keeps them somewhat in line: so that we should not attribute the fact that not all Emperors were Caligulas, or that all other men are not like Timon, to nature which is mother to some and stepmother to others, but recognize that God allows some to their own desires while restraining and curbing others in various ways.

X. Therefore, according to Protestants, many things that are civilly good and honest can be done by a man in a state of sin and without the grace of Christ, which deserve to be attributed to a special efficacy of divine providence. And these things are such that they make those in whom they are found less evil and can be considered praiseworthy among men. Indeed, God sometimes rewards such things with some temporal reward. Thus, says Alexander Morus, God signifies how much He approves of truly good things when He does not allow even the shadow of goodness to go unrewarded. He also arranges it as an example to invite others to better conduct. And just as if all the godly flourished in this world, men would scarcely expect a future judgment: so when they sometimes see that those touched by some concern for piety fare better, they are reminded of God's providence. Finally, according to the degree of goodness that shines in the work, God measures out a temporal reward: and the short-lived and superficial good He repays to external virtue, which He reserves for a heavenly and eternal course in the spiritual realm. Already cited disputation, thesis 45.

XI. But by common consent, Protestants hold that no moral good can be perfected by man in this state of corrupt nature, without the grace of Christ, so that the action may be considered truly good and just before God, nor can it be free from sin. And therefore, whatever is done by men without the grace of Christ, even if it has the appearance of virtue and some external goodness and honesty, cannot escape the nature of sin in God's judgment; and thus the most splendid and illustrious deeds of heroes are splendid sins, masks, and semblances of virtues: as frequently said by Augustine and often cited by the aforementioned Morus, thesis 42. Bellarmine, he says, by moral works which are pleasing to God and which God requires, means: in which sense we indeed believe that a man can do nothing, and therefore the most splendid and illustrious deeds are splendid sins, masks, and semblances of virtues according to Augustine. What is read in David Pareus, he says, "We say that the moral virtues of the unregenerate, however excellent, done without faith with the impurity of the heart, although they may be most honest, just, laudable, and worthy of rewards before the world, are still sins before God, not indeed in their kind, but by accident." In book 5, Bellar. on Grace and Free Will, chapter 4. He also says that such virtues are sins by accident, because although they are good in their kind, they lack in some essential aspects: namely, because they do not arise from a due principle, nor are they referred to a legitimate end.

XII. The reason that the actions of a sinner without the grace of Christ, although good in their kind and according to the matter of the work, are considered sins according to Protestant doctrine, is that they do not proceed from the love of God, nor are they directed to the glory of God. Both are considered absolutely necessary for any work to be truly good and deemed such by God: neither of which they believe can exist in a fallen man without the saving grace of Christ.

XIII. And indeed, they prove that no work can be truly good according to the law of nature unless it flows from the love of God, by the fact that the law of nature requires man to love his Creator, from whose goodness he has whatever he is and can do, with all his strength and above all. But he who is moved to act from the love of creatures alone, and not from the love

of God, shows that he does not love God above all creatures, but prefers the love of the creature to divine love, and therefore acts viciously.

XIV. Furthermore, it is in vain for some to distinguish between a certain virtual and implicit love of God, and a formal and explicit love of God: as if someone who does not formally love God, indeed does not know God, could still be considered to implicitly love Him when he loves certain actions commanded by God, which are to be deemed pleasing to God for that very reason. For he who does not know God, or does not act from the love of God, whether actual or habitual, undoubtedly acts from self-love, and loves himself above all: nor does he love an honest action except to enjoy it and to please himself. Any self-love that is not subordinated to divine love is vicious and sinful. And to have a certain implicit praiseworthy love of God in some vicious love is completely contrary to reason.

XV. Similarly, the same law of nature requires that a rational creature direct all its actions to the glory of God: since the glory of God is the natural end of all things: for the Lord has worked all things for His own sake. And from Him, through Him, and to Him are all things. And so, the command of Paul pertains to the law of nature: Do everything for the glory of God. And therefore no action that is not referred to the glory of God can be truly good and just: since the goodness of actions is chiefly measured by their legitimate end. Prov. 16:4. Rom. 11:36. 1 Cor. 10:31.

XVI. Nor is it valid to say that actions done for a non-evil end, even if the agent does not think of it, are in some way referred to the glory of God. For example, when someone who does not know the true God gives money to the needy to help them, this action is referred to the glory of God: because all the goodness that is in created things pertains to and refers to God by itself. Nor is it sufficient for an action to be considered done for the glory of God that its end is a naturally good thing, and thus can be referred to God by its nature. Otherwise, one who labors for no other end than to acquire wealth could be said to labor for the glory of God, since wealth is in itself a good, not an evil thing. And yet such labor is undoubtedly an improper labor, and pertains to vice, not to virtue.

XVII. Indeed, to love God above all and to refer one's actions to His glory is something that pertains chiefly to the spiritual worship and piety towards God. And consequently, it must be certain that the saving grace of Jesus Christ is absolutely necessary for this, without which, as the whole Roman School admits, the free will of fallen man is entirely worthless for willing and performing spiritual good. From all these things, Protestants rightly conclude that a man without the grace of Christ, and in the simple state of fallen nature, can do nothing that obtains the true nature of moral good and is considered truly just and honest before God: Since men left entirely to themselves both err from the true end in acting and operate from an evil principle, namely, self-love.

XVIII. This is consistent with what is read in Joshua Placeus' treatise on Free Will. After teaching that Adam lost the absolute liberty not to sin and that the slavery of sin succeeded in its place, consisting in the depravity and obliquity of moral faculties, especially the will; and that this depravity consists in aversion to the true ultimate end and conversion to a falsely apparent

ultimate end: from which it follows that since whatever is desired is either the ultimate end or a means to it, nothing healthy remains in our moral faculties, and as long as we are so affected, we cannot help but sin. He gives the reason for this in these words: "For whether we desire the ultimate end or means, we always stray from the true scope, however much the unregenerate man may seem to shine with the splendor of virtues, because whatever he desires, whatever he speaks and acts, he aims at a scope that falsely appears to him to be the scope, when it is very far from the true scope, and by that very fact he sins and cannot help but sin as long as he judges wrongly about the scope." page 199.

XIX. Similarly, Alexander Morus observes that the sinner lacking the grace of God fails in various ways in any works, however excellent they may seem, so that before God, who judges according to the truth of the matter, they are really considered not good but evil, because good is from an entire cause, evil from the defect of even one circumstance. He notes four defects in such works concerning principle, subject, manner, and end. For their principle is not the Spirit but the flesh, that is, a carnal affection, and the fruits of the flesh cannot please God. The subject is a man deprived of that grace by which we render a worship pleasing to God. The manner is sought from some generosity, not from faith, without which no one can please God. And finally, the end is completely lacking, the salvation of the neighbor, the glory of God. In *Victory of Grace Disput.* 2, thesis 43.

XX. It is indeed true that even the works of the pious and just, done by the grace of God, also have their blemishes and defects; but these defects are only accidental, which do not destroy the essence of a good work. But the defects that vitiate the works of those who are deprived of the grace of Christ are essential defects, with which the nature and essence of a good work cannot remain intact. Since the goodness of a work chiefly depends on the end to which it tends and the principle from which it arises. But the works of a man who lacks the grace of Christ, as we have shown above, both stray from the true end, which is the glory of God; and arise from an evil principle, namely, earthly desire: by which a work otherwise good in its kind is utterly vitiated. The works of the pious and just proceed from the love of God and tend to His glory, and fail only in that the glory of God is not sought as purely in them, nor does the love of God from which they flow have as much fervor as it should. Therefore, the works of the pious are imperfect but truly good; however, the works of those who lack the grace of Christ, whatever they may be in the eyes of men, are truly evil before God and do not retain the nature of a good work: although some are less evil than others.

XXI. This is observed by Alexander Morus in the frequently cited Disputation, thesis 44. "The works of the unbelievers," he says, "are not good, but some are less evil than others. The works of the faithful, although stained with blemishes and variously mutilated and imperfectly good, are nonetheless truly good - they proceed sluggishly, but on the way of salvation; and with weak movement, but aiming at the goal: others are carried with swift course, but off the way, and they vigorously draw the bow, but not aimed at the true target."

XXII. But from the aforementioned it is easy to conclude, according to the Protestants, that there is no work truly good in the genre of morals which is not also directed towards eternal

salvation and does not form a part of worship and piety towards God. For they do not consider anything as a good work that does not aim at the glory of God and originate from the love of Him. Therefore, they do not acknowledge the distinction of good works found in the Roman School, where some are merely naturally and morally good but still truly good even in the eyes of God, although they do not contribute to eternal salvation; while others are beneficial for salvation and possess supernatural goodness. Indeed, according to them, all works that are truly good have their origin from a supernatural principle, namely the grace of Christ, and also contribute somewhat to eternal life. If they sometimes attribute some goodness to the works of those who are outside the moral grace of Christ, they designate only an external and civil goodness by that name, which does not render the work pleasing and acceptable to God, nor does it prevent it from being a sin in reality and deserving to be called such.

XXIII. However, in this matter, they do not dignify with the name of the grace of Christ those aids of the natural order that God does not deny even to the infidels remaining in their infidelity. Instead, they call the grace of Christ that which begins from faith, and not just any faith, but Christian and divinely infused faith, which is neither inert nor dead, but begins to work through love.

XXIV. Therefore, they count all the works of infidels, however splendid, among sins. And they consider as infidels not only those who are utterly ignorant of the true God but also all those who lack true faith in Christ and do not know the one true God and Jesus Christ whom He has sent. They consider the works of all such people, however excellent and honest they may seem, not as acts of true virtue, but as sins disguised with the color of virtue, as is sufficiently evident from what has already been said. For nothing can please God without faith, and whatever is done without faith is sin, not only those things that are contrary to a wavering conscience but also those that inform the conscience from the word of God as it ought and make it certain and even able to justify a man. This is the doctrine of David Pareus. He says, "We say that for a moral work to be good, done according to the law, pleasing and acceptable to God, not only special help from the singular providence of God is required, nor only special grace of singular divine motion, but also special grace of justifying faith." In Bellarm. book 5 on Grace and Free Will, chapter 4.

XXV. Nor do Protestants simply assert that the grace by which faith is engendered is necessary for any good work, and that no one without it can render true and acceptable obedience to the natural law to God; but they also clearly teach that this grace, without which no one can work well or perform even a single truly good work, is the very regenerating and justifying grace. This is especially evident in Joshua Placeus, who denies that man can avoid sin without the grace of regeneration. These are his words: "As for moral actions, which the law either commands or prohibits, Bellarmine multiplies questions without any necessity. We reduce whatever controversy we have with the Papists about Free Will in the state of sin to this one. Can an unregenerate man avoid sin without the grace of regeneration? The Papists affirm, we deny." Treatise on Free Will, page 201. This is consistent with what is read in Amesius in Bellarmine Enervated: "First," he says, "our people teach that man can do no spiritual good before he is

regenerated; but Bellarmine requires only the help of persuading and assisting grace. Secondly, our people require that help for spiritual good, which is proper to the effectively called: but Bellarmine understands general help, which at place and time is not lacking to anyone." Book 4 on Free Will, chapter 3. By the name of spiritual good, he includes whatever is truly good in the genre of morals: for, as shown above, Protestants in this genre consider nothing truly good that does not proceed from sincere love of God, and therefore pertains in some way to piety and spiritual worship of God.

XXVI. That before justification, according to the sense of Protestants, no one can do any truly good work is evident from the fact that they note with their censure the seventh canon of the Council of Trent, which is the seventh of the sixth session: "If anyone says that all the works done before justification, in whatever way they are done, are truly sins or merit the hatred of God, or that the more one strives to dispose himself for grace, the more he sins, let him be anathema." Moreover, they frequently praise and approve what Augustine says, that good works follow the justified, do not precede the one to be justified. This is especially evident in Calvin in the Antidote to the Council of Trent on the cited Canon. And in Chemnitz in the examination of the same Council, where he deals with the preparation for justification.

XXVII. However, in this part, the doctrine of the Protestants seems not to lack difficulty. For those among them who philosophize more accurately about theological matters recognize that faith, and indeed living and active faith, is a prerequisite condition for the justification of man. Now to believe in God is a truly good work, nor is living faith without some love of God, which itself is also a good work; and thus some works that precede justification are truly good.

XXVIII. They also admit that repentance, or penance, is a condition under which the remission of sins, in which the justification of the sinner consists, is offered in the Gospel. So teaches the most famous Maresius: "The remission of sins is given to repentance conditionally, as it is offered to us under the condition of repentance and faith in the Gospel," Disputation on Repentance and Christian Liberty, Thesis 32. Similarly, Amesius in Bellarmine Enervated, book five on justifying faith, chapter three, concedes that penance precedes justification as a disposition required in order, but not as a cause. The same is seen in Chemnitz himself in the place just cited. Now in penance and repentance, many good works are involved, such as the purpose of a new life, the detestation of sin, and even some love of God, which arises from the hope of obtaining pardon from God. Therefore, not a few good works precede justification. Moreover, Amesius in the place already cited explicitly acknowledges that some love of God precedes the remission of sins, or justification, as a required disposition, although no love precedes remission as a causing disposition.

XXIX. Hence, it is that Davenant does not hesitate to assert that some good works are necessary for justification, as concurrent or preparatory conditions, although they are not necessary as efficient or meritorious causes. Among these good works, he numbers those internal ones which are of great importance before God, although they do not come into the sight of men; such as sorrow for sin, detestation of sin, humble submission to God, fleeing to God's mercy, placing hope in Christ the Mediator, forming a purpose of a new life, and other similar things.

For divine mercy does not justify, he says, logs, that is, those who do nothing; nor horses and mules, that is, those who kick back and obstinately cling to their lusts; but men, and those who are pricked and contrite, and follow the guidance of the divine word and spirit. On actual righteousness, chapter 31.

XXX. If therefore some good works precede the justification of man, then regeneration must also precede it: for indeed, according to the common doctrine of Protestants, regeneration is naturally subsequent to justification. Moreover, regeneration and sanctification of man are in fact one and the same. And therefore, the spirit by which man is regenerated is not different from that by which man is sanctified. But the spirit of sanctification, as expressly taught by the most learned and famous among the Protestants, is not promised to us in the Gospel except under the condition of faith, and that living and effective faith, which cannot exist without many good works. Nor is that spirit given except to those who seriously desire to emerge from vices and thirst and hunger for true righteousness, who request it from God with constant prayers made in faith. According to the word of the Lord Jesus, "How much more will your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to those who ask Him?" Luke 11:13. Now to pray to God in faith is undoubtedly a truly good work.

XXXI. And this is also consistent with the fact that among the Protestants, men of great renown recognize that there are certain dispositions to sanctification, which are aroused by the power of the spirit of God in men to be sanctified and regenerated; such as various acts of faith, fear, and love, as seen in Pareus in book 1. Bellarmine on Justification, chapter 3. Acts of faith and love cannot but be certain good works; and since they are supposed to be certain dispositions to sanctification or regeneration, they must also precede it in some way.

XXXII. If therefore, some good works, according to the very doctrine and confession of the Protestants, precede the regeneration and justification of man, how can they assert that the grace by which we are regenerated and justified is necessary for any good work, and condemn the canon of the Council of Trent, which pronounces anathema on those who say that all works done before

XXXIII. To resolve this difficulty, it must be noted that among Protestants, the grace of regeneration and justification is sometimes taken more broadly, sometimes more strictly. According to the Protestant sense, justification strictly and precisely understood is nothing other than the absolution of a sinner because of the satisfaction of Christ, which is freely given and imputed to him, and is thus conceived as a benefit distinct from the faith by which we become participants in it, and which is therefore called justifying faith. Under the grace of justification, if taken more broadly, is included the very faith by which we are justified. In this sense, Protestants take justification when they deny that any truly good works precede it. For them, to precede justification is the same as to precede justifying faith. And nothing precedes justification in this sense that does not also precede faith. Therefore, when they say that all things done before justification are not good works but sins, they mean nothing other than that before faith no good work can exist in man, but all the works of infidels are sins.

XXXIV. This is evident in Calvin and Chemnitz, where they note with their censure the aforementioned canon of the Council of Trent. For Chemnitz, condemning that canon, supposes it to pronounce anathema on those who deny that infidels can dispose themselves to grace through their works. For, he says, "In the seventh canon, they pronounce anathema on those who deny that infidels dispose themselves to grace through their works." In the first part of the Examination, page 157, column a. In the preceding parts, understanding justification in a stricter sense, he admits that repentance, faith, contrition, and the purpose of not continuing in sin are certain preparations for justification according to Scripture. "For God," he says, "wills us to begin with the knowledge and assent of His word. And before justification, contrition must precede, that is, a serious acknowledgment of sins, the terrors of conscience recognizing God's wrath against our sins, sorrow for sin, in which contrition the purpose of continuing in wickedness is not retained but cast away. To this must be added faith, which with the recognition and trust in the mercy of God promised because of the Mediator, again raises and consoles the soul, lest overwhelmed with despair we rush into eternal ruin: but faith approaches God, seeks, desires, asks, apprehends, and receives the remission of sins." Page 155.

XXXV. Similarly, Calvin refuting the same canon of the Council of Trent uses no other arguments than those proving that nothing good can be done without faith. For example, "God does not regard external appearances, but inspects the faith of the heart. It is not until faith that hearts are purified. Whatever infidels do, they do not refer their deeds to God. Finally, according to Augustine, if any good fruit is praised in a man, the root must be sought in faith. And our religion distinguishes the just from the unjust, not by works, but by the law of faith itself: without which the works that seem good turn into sins." In the antidote to the seventh canon of the sixth session. Hence, it is clear that for Calvin to do something before justification is the same as to do it before faith and in infidelity. Nor does he mean anything other than that all works before faith are not good but evil. Accordingly, justification accepted as the remission of sins, or as the absolution of a sinner, presupposes certain acts not only of faith but also of fear, hope, and love, and the purpose of a new life, which are good and acceptable to God.

XXXVI. In the same way, regeneration or sanctification is sometimes taken strictly, for a certain habitual change in man through the infused habits of righteousness and holiness; sometimes more broadly for all those effects of divine grace in us, by which we are transferred from the state of sin to the state of righteousness and sons of God. Thus, the grace of regeneration, or sanctification, includes the beginning, progress, and completion of that effective grace by which God abolishes the dominion of sin in us and makes us servants of righteousness, or, as Scripture says, causes us to put off the old man and put on the new man, who is created according to God in righteousness and true holiness. Amesius says that regeneration is sometimes taken for the whole series of aids by which we are moved towards it. Theological Disputation on the Preparation of a Sinner for Conversion, Thesis 11.

XXXVII. Regeneration taken in that first and stricter sense presupposes many acts of faith, hope, fear, sorrow for sin, love, and imploring divine help, which are undoubtedly good works and acceptable to God, by which man is prepared according to God's institution to receive

the gift of the sanctifying and regenerating Spirit. Therefore, the grace of regeneration taken in that strict sense is not necessary for doing these. But without the grace of regeneration accepted in the latter and broader sense, no one can do any good work. For it is impossible for a man to act well before God begins to work in him by His grace, to free him from the bonds of sin and bring him into the liberty of the sons of God. The first beginnings of this grace, as we have said, are referred to regeneration taken in a broader sense.

XXXVIII. And although grace is absolutely necessary for a corrupted man to do any good work, and without grace he cannot act well and in conformity with the divine law: this nevertheless does not prevent, according to the Protestant sense, that man, while acting badly, whether by committing what the law prohibits or omitting what it commands, does so freely and exercises the native power of his free will.

XXXIX. For although without grace man is a slave to sin, as Scripture says, and whatever he does he cannot help but sin: yet this necessity of doing evil does not take away his natural liberty of will. For that liberty, which is essential to every agent endowed with intellect and will, does not consist in being indifferent to doing good or evil, and having an equal capacity for both. Otherwise, neither the demons in hell nor the angels in heaven would act freely, since the former are determined to do evil, the latter to do good. Rather, this natural liberty of will consists in acting not by compulsion nor by the brute impulse of nature, but by the prior judgment and deliberation of the mind choosing what it pleases and seems fit to it. Therefore, that liberty is opposed to compulsion and natural or brute determination, but not to the slavery of sin, which does not prevent man from acting deliberately and from the dictate of his own reason, without any compulsion or natural or brute determination.

XL. Moreover, a man in the state of sin, left to himself, is indeed determined in general to do evil, but not to each particular evil action, but he can abstain from this or that: just as a man confined in prison can freely walk about within the prison. William Perkins uses such a similitude to illustrate this matter. For, he says, there are certain things which are both necessary and free at the same time, which I will show by an example. Let someone be thrown into prison, who must necessarily stay there, and cannot go out wherever he wishes. Yet such a one can move about and freely walk within the prison itself. Similarly, it is with the human will, which, although bound by the chains of sin, naturally does nothing but sin and thus sins necessarily: yet the same sins by its own free will. In the Catholic Reformed, First Controversy on Free Will, Conclusion Four.

XLI. Similarly, the presence and efficacy of grace, in the mind of the Protestants, does not in any way prejudice human liberty. Nor are the actions done with the movement and assistance of grace any less free than if they were supposed to be done without grace. For grace does not exert any force on the human will but moves it in a manner congruent with free capacity, namely with the prior and intervening deliberate judgment of the mind, and thus as not to take away from the will the power to act otherwise. Therefore, any good works are the effect of divine grace, while also being the acts of free will liberated by grace and acting not from its own strength but from those which grace supplies.

XLII. Nor is man's free will in this life so liberated by grace that he cannot act both well and badly: as Paraeus freely admits against Bellarmine. "What Christian," he says, "has ever doubted that a man endowed with grace has free will liberated and free to choose good, to perform it by the power of grace: but also to choose and do evil from the weakness of nature, which in this life is neither regenerated nor perfectly governed by grace: whence the regenerated use the liberty of the will to act both well and badly in this life?" Therefore, there can be no question whether, given the aid of grace, a man truly has free will. In book V. Bellarmine on Grace and Free Will, chapter XIII. Which is consistent with what the same author repeats in the same book, chapter XXVIII. "In the state of grace, the renewed will chooses good so freely that while it is effectively moved by grace to choose it, it can indeed choose the opposite by the defect of nature, but does not want to because of the efficacy of grace."

XLIII. If anyone asks whether a man in the state of fallen nature is free to choose moral good and keep the commandments of God without grace, the Protestants answer negatively: therefore, most of them deny that free will with respect to moral good remained in man after the fall. By this, however, they mean nothing other than that man, by his fall, has become a slave and captive to sin, and his will has been deprived of that freedom which is opposed to the slavery of sin: although he retains that freedom which is essential to an intellectual agent, and from which human will, absolutely considered, is called free.

XLIV. Therefore, to the question proposed by Bellarmine, whether a man in the state of fallen nature has free will in choosing moral good and avoiding evil, or, which is the same, in keeping or transgressing the moral precepts, they respond with a distinction: namely, that in that state, man before grace has free will in violating and transgressing the moral precepts. However, with grace given, he can use his free will both to observe the moral precepts and to transgress them. Without grace, however, he does not have free will to keep these precepts; because, in the absence of grace, he can do nothing good, not due to a defect of any physical faculty, for he is always endowed with mind and will, which are never stripped of essential freedom, and apart from which no natural faculty is required to do good; but because his will is obstinately inclined towards evil until it is liberated by grace from God and freed from the slavery of sin, which can coexist with that former freedom.

XLV. Thus they complain that Bellarmine and others unjustly accuse them of teaching that man is never free in moral matters, whether with or without grace. As Pareus says, "Whoever said that we teach that man never has free will without grievous slander? In the state of sin, he has free will only to evil, because he is captive to good; in the state of grace, he is free to both. Does he therefore never have free will?" In Book V of Bellarmine on Grace and Free Will, chapter 28.

XLVI. Moreover, from what has been more fully explained both in this and the preceding disputation, it is clear that the Roman School agrees with the Protestants in that the precepts of the moral law cannot be observed by fallen man without grace in the manner they are ordered to heavenly beatitude, and so that their observance merits eternal life and promotes eternal salvation. Conversely, the Protestants acknowledge with the Roman School that a fallen man,

without the grace of Christ, can keep certain precepts of the moral law, at least as to the external work, or absolutely, and as to the matter or affection of the work itself, as the Protestants say. What the Roman School calls according to the substance of the work. These indeed come to the same thing, although some Protestants disapprove of the latter manner of speaking: because the substance of a thing comprehends both matter and form. Here, however, the question is not about the form of the moral work, which depends on the end and principle, but only about the matter.

XLVII. This is seen in the frequently cited David Pareus. Therefore, Bellarmine is mistaken and misleads by taking the external act of the work and the substance of the work for the same, which differ as part and whole. For the substance of a work requires both matter and form, no less than the substance of man requires body and soul. The external act commanded by the law is for matter: internal conformity and purity, which is had from faith, is for the form of the work, to which a legitimate end is also required. For the philosopher himself does not praise an act of virtue unless it is done for the end. Therefore, one who performs the external act of the work has not performed the substance of the work. In Bellarm. Book V on Grace and Free Will, chapter 28.

XLVIII. However, there is no one among the Protestants who does not condemn what some in the Roman School have taught, namely, that all and each of the precepts of the moral law, as to the substance of the work or the matter, can be kept without the grace of Christ. For the Protestants exclude from this number, as we have seen above, certain precepts which pertain to internal acts of the soul, such as the precept not to covet and to love God above all.

XLIX. Furthermore, it is clear from what we have said that the common opinion of the Protestants disapproves what the vast majority of the Roman School teaches, namely, that the easier precepts of the moral law can be kept by a corrupted man without the grace of Christ in such a way that the act is truly good and sin is avoided, although it does not benefit eternal salvation: and much more the opinion of those who in that school held that the entire law of nature can be fulfilled without grace by a fallen man, or if not all its precepts collectively, at least each individually, as many in Spain believed at the end of the last century, according to Gabriel Vasquez.

L. Indeed, it is easily gathered from what has been said that Gabriel Vasquez himself, who confesses that no morally good work can be perfected without the grace of Christ, nevertheless differs greatly from the Protestants in this: because he understands by the grace of Christ certain aids of the natural order, which can happen even to infidels who remain such. And consequently, he teaches with many theologians of the Roman School that any infidels can, by such aids, perform some truly morally good works. But the Protestants understand by the grace of Christ only that which begins with faith in Christ, and that living and effective; and therefore they deny that all infidels, that is, those who are not imbued with true faith in Christ, can perform any work truly good and acceptable before God, and which does not have the nature of sin, even if it appears honest and praiseworthy in the eyes of men.

LI. It also appears from what we have reported above that the contrary opinion, which states that faith in Christ is not necessary for someone to act morally well, is not so certain and

defined in the Roman Church that it is not permissible to hold the opposite; since Jansenius and many notable men who follow him openly teach the same in this part with the Protestants, and yet Jansenius's book has not been publicly censured for this reason, although for many other things it has been.

LII. Indeed, it does not seem that in this whole question of the powers of free will in fallen man and the necessity of grace regarding moral good, there is any real and true difference between the doctrine of the Protestants and that of Jansenius. For Jansenius not only acknowledges with them that the grace of Christ and faith in Him, effective and active, are necessary for any morally good work, but also, as a consequence, that no work is truly good unless it proceeds from some sincere love of God and tends to His glory: and thus it is in vain that the Scholastics distinguish good works into those which pertain to piety and promote eternal salvation, and those which neither pertain to piety nor profit eternal salvation.

LIII. It is true, however, that Jansenius nevertheless states, with the Council of Trent, that some good works can be done by man before he is justified, and that not all works done before justification are sins and displeasing to God. The Protestants seem commonly to assert the contrary, censuring the canon of the Council of Trent, which pronounces anathema on anyone who says that all works done before justification, in whatever way they are done, are sins.

LIV. But it is clear from what has been explained above that when Protestants teach that whatever is done before justification is not a good work but a sin, and when they say with Augustine that good works do not precede the one to be justified but follow the justified, they mean nothing other than that nothing at all good can be done before justifying faith, and they include under justification the very faith by which we are justified: and thus they consider it the same thing for good works to be done before justification and to be done by one who is still an unbeliever. However, if one distinguishes justification from justifying faith itself and takes it strictly for the absolution of the sinner and the remission of his sins, the same Protestants do not deny that certain good acts and works pleasing to God precede our justification. Such is, in the first place, the very act of faith which justifies the ungodly, the sinner's refuge in God's mercy, sorrow for past sins and their detestation, the purpose of a new life, the imploring of divine grace, the hope of obtaining forgiveness, and similar acts, which naturally exist in man before his sins are forgiven and before he can be considered justified.

LV. According to the sense of Jansen, the Council of Trent does not define that good works are done before faith, but only before justification, and it does not pronounce anathema on those who say that all works done before faith are sins, but only on those who say that all works done before justification are sins. Nor does Bellarmine himself interpret the canon of the Council of Trent otherwise. He says, "The Council does not define that the works of unbelievers are not sins, but that not all works preceding justification are sins. For justification is also preceded by those works done by the faithful after they have fallen into sin. For the Council does not follow the rules of Luther, who wanted faith to be lost by every mortal sin, but the rules of the Lord, who in Luke 18 approved the prayer of the Publican, who prayed with faith for the remission of sins. Nor does the Council define that the works of faithful sinners are absolutely not sins, but

only adds, 'in whatever way they are done.' To understand this, we must understand that the Council defines only that certain works of faithful sinners are not sins, namely those done with the special help of God. For the Council intended to speak about justification and those works that dispose to justification; but only those works that begin with God's preventing grace dispose to justification, as it is held in the same Council." From these considerations, it can be concluded that there is only a verbal contention between the Protestants who deny, and Jansen who affirms, that certain good works are done before justification; indeed, there is no real controversy between the Protestants and the frequently cited canon of the Council of Trent, as Jansen and Bellarmine interpret it.

LVI. Furthermore, we have made it sufficiently clear that the Protestants teach that in the state of fallen nature, man without grace is a slave and captive to sin: but that this slavery of sin, according to them, does not prevent him from freely rushing into sin and turning away from and omitting the good commanded by the law; and in this, he fully exercises his free will; for he does this not under compulsion but by the deliberate judgment of his corrupted reason, and when he commits this or that sin, he has the power to abstain from it.

LVII. We have also seen that they readily concede to the doctors of the Roman School that divine grace, without which man can do nothing good, moves the human will in such a way that it does not in any way prejudice its liberty. And that the good works done by man through grace are also acts of free will, not indeed acting by its own strength, but moved and excited by grace. Indeed, the same Protestants do not deny that, given grace, man can act both well and badly, and even those among them who are the most rigid assertors of grace, such as those specifically called Reformed, attribute to grace such efficacy that it bends and determines the will to good, but nevertheless does not take away all power of acting otherwise.

LVIII. Therefore, the controversy, which Bellarmine calls the most important and imagines to exist between all Protestants on one side and all the doctors of the Roman School on the other, namely, whether, given the necessary aid for acting, whatever it may be, man is truly and properly free in moral matters; or whether, given the aid of grace, man is truly free in such a way that he can either keep or violate the precepts of the law, is vain and null. For the Protestants do not deny any of these things, but willingly affirm both with the theologians of the Roman School.

LIX. Nor is it contradictory to what is often read among them, that man after the fall and before grace does not have free will with respect to moral good. For by this, as we have said, they mean nothing other than that the human will before grace is a slave to sin and has no strength of its own for good, although it always retains that freedom which is essential to the will, and which, as even the Roman School admits, the slavery of sin does not take away, as is evident from the example of the demons.

Theological Theses
In which are explained
Various distinctions and acceptances of Grace, which are in use among
Doctors of the Roman School.

Thesis I

To understand and elucidate many questions that are debated with great fervor concerning grace and free will, it is highly beneficial to know the various distinctions and acceptances of grace that are commonly used in Christian schools. Therefore, it significantly contributes to our goal, which is to shed some light on those controversies that exercise and divide Christian schools if we briefly and clearly explain these acceptances and distinctions as much as possible.

II. To begin with the Roman School, their theologians, such as Bellarmine and William Estius, observe that the term "grace" is generally understood in two ways. First, it denotes God's love and benevolence through which He wishes and does good for people; secondly, it refers to any gratuitous benefit from God and all that is graciously granted to us by God. This twofold notion of grace is recognized to be customary both in divine scripture and among ecclesiastical and scholastic writers. They call the former eternal and uncreated grace, while the latter is referred to as temporal and created grace. The same applies to what others, with Estius, say: grace can be understood either from God's side or from our side.

III. Furthermore, since not only things that surpass nature are gratuitously granted to us by God, but also the very goods of nature, which we possess without any of our own merits, from God's gratuitous benevolence, grace taken in its broadest sense, as those same doctors observe, does not oppose nature but includes nature itself, which is sometimes designated by the name of grace because it is a gratuitous benefit from God, freely bestowed upon us by God. However, this acceptance of grace is indeed frequent in common usage, in which we are accustomed to ascribe the gifts and advantages of nature to divine grace, but in scriptures and schools, it is very rare and little used. For the most part, grace is restricted there to those benefits of God that exceed the order of nature and do not flow from nature or are necessary to establish and preserve it, but are superadded to it by God's gratuitous benevolence.

IV. In this sense, grace is opposed to nature. Because those gifts that are bestowed upon us by God beyond nature are uniquely gratuitous, since they not only fall outside the merit of the person but are also not owed to nature. Although God absolutely owes nothing to anyone and is obligated to nothing, nevertheless, hypothetically, if He wishes the creature to exist and operate, He must somehow provide those things without which it can neither exist nor operate.

V. Furthermore, the grace opposed to nature is diligently distinguished by some doctors of the Roman School into that which was bestowed upon man before the Fall and that which is conferred upon fallen man through the merit of Christ. They call the former grace the grace of Adam, and the latter the grace of Christ. The former is called the grace of health, while the latter

is called medicinal grace. The former was granted to an undeserving man, while the latter is also given to the unworthy.

VI. This distinction is frequently emphasized and insisted upon by Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, in his book titled "Augustinus," where he extensively gathers and explains the difference between these two types of grace from Augustine. He establishes that the grace given to man before the Fall was an assistance without which the first man could not will the good, but it did not make him actually will the good. However, the grace that Christ bestows upon fallen man causes man to actually will, and it is an aid not merely without which but by which the very willing of the good is produced in man.

VII. For he observes that the aids to the will are of two kinds. One aid is such that without it the will cannot will, yet the willing or not willing, using or not using the aid, is left to its free choice. The other aid is such that it determinately causes the will to will. And he contends that the grace of an upright man was an aid of the first kind, but the grace by which Christ heals corrupted man is an aid of the second kind. In this way, the difference between the grace of health and the medicinal grace lies in this: the aid of the former integrity assisted the will so that it operated together with it if it wanted to; now, however, the aid itself causes the will to will. This means that the aid before the Fall was such that the influence of the aid and the will in action depended on the free will's nod, so that the flexibility of freedom to choose either direction remained intact. But after the Fall, the aid is such that it makes the will assent and influence, and will.

VIII. In accordance with these principles, the entire work teaches that the main difference between the grace of the first Adam and the second Adam is that the former enabled one to do good if he wanted to; the latter additionally makes one want to. The former was subject to the will's nod and its own dominion; the latter subjects the will to its own nod and dominion. The former followed the will's lead with obedient submission; the latter draws the will as if with authoritative command. The former accompanied the preceding will in a conquerable and avoidable manner; the latter leads and drives the following will in an unconquerable and unavoidable manner.

IX. However, although Jansen has many followers in this part, those who particularly call themselves disciples of Augustine, his doctrine is nonetheless rejected by the majority of the Roman School, and it is openly opposed by both those who follow the Jesuit Molina's method and doctrine, and those who are called recent Thomists. For the former want the grace of Christ to be in the power of the will no less than the grace bestowed upon the first man before the Fall, so that by innate freedom, it can either use or not use it, and indeed often does not use it, and thus depends on free will, so that the grace of Christ is effective or not effective, and achieves its effect in man's conversion, or does not achieve it.

X. On the other hand, the recent Thomists believe that the grace that predetermines and effectively applies the will to the good was not alien to the state of innocence. And if Adam did any good before sin, as he certainly did, he did it by the power of some grace that physically predetermined his will, not only granting him the capacity for good but also effectively moving

him to good; without which effective divine pre-motion, according to their principles, the human will in no state can be inclined to good.

XI. Furthermore, the grace that is conferred upon fallen man through Christ is commonly distinguished in the Roman School into grace called freely given and grace that makes one acceptable. This division, according to the mind of the doctors of that school, is not to be understood as if there were any grace not freely given; for they acknowledge that the grace that makes one acceptable is also gratuitously given: but, as often happens elsewhere, they leave the name of the genus to one species that lacks its own proper name, as Bellarmine notes in the place cited above.

XII. Therefore, according to them, freely given grace is a supernatural gift bestowed without any debt, primarily for the spiritual salvation of others. But grace that makes one acceptable is a supernatural gift given without any debt, primarily for the spiritual salvation of each individual. Although it is common to both freely given grace and grace that makes one acceptable that they contribute to both one's own and others' salvation, yet the difference is that grace that makes one acceptable is given primarily for the personal salvation of the recipient; secondarily for the salvation of others: that is, so that we ourselves may first become holy and righteous, and then others may see our good works and glorify our Father in heaven. On the other hand, freely given grace primarily concerns the salvation of others. It consists of those gifts that directly and in themselves do not contribute to the salvation of the one who possesses them but greatly help in leading others to repentance and faith.

XIII. Therefore, freely given grace includes the word of knowledge, the word of wisdom, the gift of prophecy, the discernment of spirits, various kinds of tongues, the working of miracles, the grace of healings, and many other such gifts enumerated by the Apostle in the twelfth chapter of the first letter to the Corinthians, among which some gifts result in physical benefits, such as good health from the grace of healings; but since the primary and ultimate end of all freely given grace is the eternal salvation of the soul, therefore it is said in the above definition that all such grace is conferred for the spiritual salvation of others.

XIV. Under grace that makes one pleasing (*gratum facientem*) are comprehended all those things in which some part or the beginning of salvation and justice consists; and which make a person either pleasing and amiable to God or dispose them to reconciliation and friendship with God and are directed to this end. In this category are faith, hope, good will, indeed any beginning of faith and good will, repentance, forgiveness of sins, charity, justice, good works, virtues and their increases, perseverance, and finally eternal life, to which, as to consummated grace, those previous benefits of God are destined. And about which the Apostle says in Romans 6: Grace of God is eternal life. As can be seen in Estius in 2 Sentent. Dist. 26, paragraph 1.

XV. Furthermore, they call that grace *gratum facientem* because it places something in a person that pleases God and is approved by Him, and makes the person, to some extent at least and in some respect, pleasing and acceptable to God. However, it is not their intention to suggest that the grace which they place in a person and call *gratum facientem* precedes every act of divine love toward us and is properly the cause of the love by which God pursues a person. For

they teach that this grace is simultaneously the effect and object of divine love. It proceeds from that love by which God wishes well to a person, since it is the greatest good that God can confer on a person, and to that extent it is posterior to divine love. But at the same time, it is something most pleasing to God, and in respect to which a person cannot fail to be pleasing to God; and to that extent it precedes divine love and divine affection towards us in some way.

XVI. Moreover, the Roman School divides *gratum facientem* grace into actual grace and habitual grace, or, which comes to nearly the same thing, into permanent grace and special assistance grace, as Bellarmine prefers to speak in Book 1 of *Grace and Free Will*, Chapter 2. And indeed some distinction can be noted between actual grace and that grace of special assistance. For by the grace that is called special assistance, not our good actions themselves but rather a certain principle of them is signified: our good works, however, are a certain actual grace and are comprehended under it.

XVII. However, this division, although commonly accepted, has nevertheless been disapproved by some. For it has never been doubted among the theologians of the Roman Church that there is some actual grace of God in a person. But it is otherwise concerning habitual grace. For scholastic doctors acknowledge that in the Roman Church this matter was not so certain before and seems only to have been defined at the Council of Vienne under Clement V and in the Council of Trent in the last century: before then, it was somewhat doubtful and problematic whether there was any habitual grace.

XVIII. Indeed, Albertus Pighius, a doctor not undistinguished, a little before the time of the Council of Trent, dared to oppose the common opinion of the Roman School on this point. For, as reported by Bellarmine, these are his words in the fifth book on *Free Will*: We will seek various acceptance of grace not from the schools but from divine scriptures: Since in those they almost imagine some uncreated quality of our soul from God; either the same with the habit of charity or distinct from it. All of which I consider fictitious, nor does it have any authority from scriptures.

XIX. And although today no one after the Council of Trent follows Pighius; and his opinion is generally condemned as very rash: nevertheless, Roman School theologians still dispute among themselves whether it is of faith to grant habitual grace, and whether those councils intended to define that matter as of faith. After the Council of Trent, Dominicus Soto, a distinguished doctor who was present at the council, denied it. Although others commonly think it is more probable that this doctrine is of faith.

XX. Now, under habitual grace, they comprehend all infused habits of virtues, and especially that grace in which they wish justice to consist formally before God by which we are justified: which they call justifying grace, and generally grace simply and without addition: and to which in common use, the name of *gratum facientis* grace is usually restricted.

XXI. For it must be known that among the writers of the Roman Church, *gratum facientem* grace is ordinarily taken in a much stricter sense than in the division just mentioned. According to which it is opposed to freely given grace and comprehends under itself every internal gift which per se helps and directs the salvation of the recipient. For by *gratum*

facientem grace they understand a habit and certain quality by which a person is properly and formally constituted just, and thus simply pleasing and amiable to God. About which grace many questions are debated among themselves, the principal of which is whether this grace is a habit distinct from charity or whether it is entirely the same with charity.

XXII. And indeed Thomas, the prince of the Roman School, and many others teach that justifying and gratum facientem grace is a quality really distinct from charity and all other habits of virtues. For they want the subject of grace to be the very substance of the soul, in which it has its immediate seat: whereas the subject of charity and other virtues is the powers of the soul, namely the mind and will. They consider that grace stands in relation to infused virtues as the soul does to its powers. And just as the soul gives natural being to the body, from it the powers flow, which are the instruments of the soul: so too grace, about which the question is now, gives the soul a certain supernatural being: from it, in a way, flow the habits of infused virtues, which are the proximate principles of supernatural operation.

XXIII. Some, on the contrary, like Durandus, wish there to be no difference at all between grace and charity: and they affirm that they are distinguished only by name, not in reality or reason. They consider charity and grace no more distinct than being dear and pleasing. For grace is called such because by it a person becomes pleasing to God: charity, however, because by it a person is made dear to God.

XXIV. But others in great number take a somewhat middle way. They say that grace and charity are neither entirely indistinct, nor really distinct, but only distinguished by reason. Namely, this is their opinion, that one and the same habit, inasmuch as it regards the subject and adorns the person in whom it resides, making them pleasing and amiable to God, is called grace: inasmuch as it regards the work and makes the will prompt to love God above all things, it is properly called charity. This is the opinion of Bellarmine in Book 1 of Grace and Free Will, Chapter 6.

XXV. As regards actual grace, or as Bellarmine calls it, the grace of special assistance, in order to understand what is meant by that name, it should be noted first that the aids by which God helps a person in acting are usually distinguished in schools into internal and external. External aids are occasions and opportunities for acting, examples, counsels, precepts, exhortations, and many things which it would take long to enumerate: internal aids consist in certain motions of the soul. External aids do not pertain to that grace about which the question is now, but it is restricted to internal aids.

XXVI. Again, the Roman School distinguishes that internal aid by which people need assistance in acting into general and special. They call general aid that by which God cooperates with all creatures and assists them in acting, whether they act well or even badly: whether the things they do are within the powers and manner of nature or somewhat surpass nature. For according to the common sense of the Roman School, what is positive in bad acts is good and can only be done with God's cooperation. Special aid, however, is that which is given by God only for good acts and those which exceed the powers of nature. And so the grace of special

assistance is defined by Bellarmine as the motion of God by which a person is helped to perform actions that in some way surpass their nature.

XXVII. He observes, moreover, that some operations can surpass the powers of nature in three ways. First, simply and absolutely. As if an operation by its very nature is of a higher order than natural things. Such are the acts of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, which are not acquired by repeated and frequent acts but are divinely infused into the soul. Secondly, not simply, but by reason of the state of sin; because a person weakened by sin cannot easily perform many things without such aid. Thirdly, by reason of mode, place, time, or any other circumstance: because it can happen that what neither by its nature nor by reason of the state surpasses the powers of nature, nevertheless surpasses them by reason of the circumstance. Thus, he says, a just person can easily fulfill some commandment of the Decalogue if no diabolical temptation intervenes. But if such a temptation intervenes, they cannot do it without special aid.

XXVIII. Therefore, according to the doctors of the Roman School, all good and salutary movements that God excites in our souls pertain to actual grace. These movements are both of God, because they proceed from Him, and ours too, because they are vital actions elicited by our faculties, with God moving them in a special way.

XXIX. Those good movements pertain either to the intellect, such as internal illuminations and pious thoughts inspired by God, and in a word, all illustrations and inspirations by which the mind is led to the knowledge of saving truth; or to the will, such as pious desires and salutary movements and affections, which immediately affect the will.

XXX. Furthermore, Gregorius de Valentia, for the sake of clearer doctrine, distinguishes the movements that are reduced to actual grace into two kinds. One, he says, consists of those movements by which God excites, calls, and invites our minds to turn to Him through acts of faith, hope, charity, repentance, and similar actions. The other consists of those movements or actions by which we respond to God's excitation, calling, and invitation, and open the door of our mind when we turn to Him. Tom. 2. Disput. 8. Question 3. Point 2.

XXXI. The movements of the first kind, according to him, are indeliberate and are elicited by our faculties only physically, not freely; while those of the latter kind are free and deliberated. The first kind includes pious thoughts and desires immediately inspired by God without our consent; the latter includes all acts of Christian virtues, which we elicit with the help of God's grace.

XXXII. Additionally, the grace of special assistance, or as it is otherwise called, actual grace, is usually divided into exciting grace and assisting grace; or, as Bellarmine speaks, into exciting aid and assisting aid. This distinction is not explained in the same way by theologians of the Roman School. Bellarmine, and all the Jesuits and many others with him, say that exciting grace, also called calling grace, pertains to divine illuminations and inspirations by which God knocks at our heart to wake us from the sleep of sin or negligence in good works. Assisting grace, or assisting aid, pertains to divine cooperation, direction, and protection, by which we are helped both to choose and to do what God has previously inspired. According to Revelation 3:

"Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come into him," etc. These are the words of Bellarmine in Book 1 of Free Will, Chapter 2.

XXXIII. And the same interpretation is given by Gregorius de Valentia. For theologians, he says, call exciting or calling grace certain divine inspirations or movements divinely excited in the mind of a person, by which God allures and invites a person to Himself and moves them to pious and salutary actions, so that they may turn to acts of faith, hope, charity, and repentance. Assisting grace, however, they call the gifts and benefits of God by which He helps the person consenting to divine calling and excitation, both in that very act of consenting and converting, and in other pious actions by which one strives towards beatitude. Therefore, to this assisting grace primarily pertains the special cooperation of God with a person in conversion, that is, to believe, hope, love, repent, etc. Also, that God by particular care and providence guards, protects from evil, directs, and assists a person in various inspirations to overcome temptations and to keep the commandments. Tom. 2. Disput. 8. Question 3. Point 3.

XXXIV. Therefore, according to these doctors, exciting grace consists in a certain illumination of the mind and some pious thoughts, affections, and desires, immediately excited by God in the souls of people without waiting for their consent. To these, therefore, the mind and will of a person physically concur since they are vital acts flowing from those faculties, but not freely since they are indeliberate acts that precede the consultation of the mind and the choice of the will.

XXXV. Assisting grace, according to the same doctors, chiefly consists in a certain gift and assistance of a supernatural order by which the will is elevated and helped to elicit acts that surpass its natural powers. This assistance moves the will physically and effectively, but it does not concur in the supernatural work prior to the nature of free will, nor does it properly act as a total cause in respect of the supernatural act, but only as a partial cause.

XXXVI. Those who more distinctly enumerate what constitutes that exciting grace refer to it first as a certain internal hearing and preconception of the truths of faith that precedes assent. Secondly, as certain divine flashes by which our mind is suddenly struck so that we experience a new and unusual light in understanding and contemplating the greatness and dignity of divine things, or even the foulness of sins and the insignificance of human things, and other similar matters, which, when attentively considered, strongly move a person to fully turn to God.

XXXVII. In this category, they also place a certain inner delight in the will, usually following such illuminations. Furthermore, various movements are divinely excited in the appetite, such as love, fear, hope, sorrow, and confusion, and similar affections, by which the higher reason is sometimes drawn and inclined to follow virtue and avoid vices.

XXXVIII. Indeed, although that special assistance, divided into exciting and assisting, properly consists in the internal movements of the soul as mentioned, many, however, also refer to exciting grace some external matters: such as occasions and opportunities, which divine providence provides to a person, so that such movements are excited in them both in the intellect and in the appetite. Such are sickness, dangers, good companions, adversities, and various other events, as can be seen in Gregorius de Valentia in the place just cited. Similarly, Alvarés notes

that exciting grace comprehends excitation both external, which is through creatures and sensible signs; and internal, which is immediately from God when He inspires pious thoughts and proposes those things that can induce free will to the act of faith and charity and other supernatural operations. *De auxiliis divina gratia*, Book 8, Dispute 75.

XXXIX. However, other theologians of the Roman School explain and understand the distinction of grace into exciting and assisting in quite a different way. For it is clear from the aforementioned that, according to the former, exciting grace is that by which a person is excited and urged to good, even if they do not yet will it; assisting grace is that by which a person is helped to will and then do it. They refer to Revelation, "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if anyone hears my voice and opens the door, I will come into him," etc. But these later theologians of whom we now speak consider that passage should not be explained of exciting grace. For they say that knocking and exciting are not the same. For many are knocked upon through the external ministry of preaching, exhortation, and reproof, and through internal illuminations and inspirations, who are not yet awakened from the sleep of sin or negligence but remain slumbering, and therefore cannot yet be said to have exciting grace. Just as it happens with those who are held in bodily sleep, that although they are knocked upon, they do not immediately wake up.

XL. Therefore, by exciting grace, they understand that by which a thought, desire, and will for good work is so infused into a sinful person or one ceasing from good work and as if oppressed by a certain slumber, that they can now truly be said to be awakened from the sleep of sin or negligence of good works. Assisting grace, however, they call that by which the one who is already awakened is helped to will more perfectly what they have begun to will and to accomplish what they have willed. For grace excites, they say, that we may will; it assists that we may do. The grace of exciting is to will; the grace of assisting is to do and accomplish. This interpretation is that of William Estius in Book 2 of *Sentences*, Distinction 26, Paragraph 11.

XLI. Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, explains this partition of grace into exciting and assisting in the same way in the fourth book, Chapter 16, of his work *On the Grace of Christ the Savior*. As, he says, that grace is properly called exciting, which excites the good movement of the will in the potential of the will, where there was nothing but bad, or which excites the dead and asleep potential of the will to God, so that, receiving the good movement of willing well, it begins to live and wake; so that grace is properly called assisting, which, having already excited and received the good movement of the will, helps the person now willing and striving to either accomplish what they have willed or to will more strongly what they have begun to will and overcome the carnal desire most persistently resisting the received will. To make this clearer, he teaches in the preceding sections that in this division, the excitation of grace is not so much any provocation or incitement to act as the first awakening, excitation, or emission of the slumbering, dead, and extinguished good will.

XLII. In the Roman Schools, there is also a well-known and famous division of grace into operating and cooperating. This is taken from the words of Augustine in the book *On Grace and Free Will*, Chapter 17. He, says, works that we may will, beginning; who cooperates with

those willing, perfecting. And shortly after, he says, He works that we may will without us. But when we will, and so will that we may do, He cooperates with us. Thus, according to a common and confused notion, operating grace is called that which works alone without us. Cooperating grace, however, is that which does not work without us but with which we cooperate.

XLIII. However, theologians of the Roman Church do not agree on what that grace is which works without us: and also on what that grace is which cooperates with us, and how, and to what extent, we cooperate with it. The older Scholastics, according to Bellarmine, call operative grace the very habit of grace, as it formally makes us just and pleasing to God. That indeed God does in us, without us. They want cooperating grace to be the same habit, as it is the principle of meritorious work. For when we do good works, it is not only grace that works in us, but we ourselves truly cooperate.

XLIV. However, most modern theologians of the Roman Church understand operative grace as that by which those movements of the soul are produced in us that are indeliberate and do not depend on the free consent of our will. Such are pious thoughts, and illuminations of the mind, and also certain pious desires, by which we are moved and solicited by God to faith and conversion.

XLV. And they note that this grace is rightly said to work in us, without us, not because our mind and will are merely passive in regard to those movements which it produces in us. For since they are vital movements, they must proceed efficiently from a vital power. But because through it God works in us without our moral, that is, free, concurrence; although not without our physical action. For they say that those actions are not usually attributed to us which are done without freedom, and which are called human actions, but only those to which we freely determine ourselves and which are properly called human actions.

XLVI. Consequently, by cooperating grace they understand that which produces in us the free consent of the will by which we obey the divine calling and subsequently the other acts of our will, by which we proceed in good and are more and more converted to God. They call it cooperating, not operative, because we freely concur with it; nor do those acts which are attributed to it proceed solely from grace, but also from our free will.

XLVII. Therefore, what Augustine says that grace works in us without us so that we will, they understand of the indeliberate act of the will and of a certain imperfect desire. But what he adds, When we will, He cooperates with us, they understand of the consummated act of the will and of perfect and deliberated choice. And thus the Jesuits and many theologians of the Roman Church, who side with them against the Dominicans and more recent Thomists, commonly explain operative and cooperating grace. As can be seen in Becanus's booklet on the Aids of Grace according to Catholics, which is among his works. And Peter of Saint Joseph in the Idea of Speculative Theology, Book 4, Chapter 6, Resolution 4.

XLVIII. Gabriel Vasquez teaches in a similar manner that operative grace is the holy thought that comes before consent, and in the same way the sudden movement of the will, arising from that pious thought without our freedom, by which we are deterred from evil and provoked to good: but that cooperating grace is in free consent, in which some merit is already found,

whether deserving of eternal life or obtaining some gift. For God works in us without us the holy thought and the first indeliberate movement of the will, which are the beginning of our good operation and salvation; but He works the consent itself, which we give to this calling, with us. In 1. Thom, Tom. 1, Dispute 88, Chapter 6, Number 20.

XLIX. However, Andreas Vega, among those doctors who were present at the Council of Trent and were not insignificant, refers to the same things as the aforementioned doctors to operative grace, namely, the holy thought and the first movement of the will, by which a person is suddenly moved to good. But he thinks that for another reason God is said to work these in us without us. Namely, because for the production of that movement and holy thought, God alone works physically, while a person is entirely passive. For in that, a person not only does not act freely but also does not elicit any physical action. What led that doctor to think so was that he, with those Scholastics who are called Nominalists, thought that in a person a certain intellection and volition could be produced by God alone, while the intellect and will are entirely passive, not acting in any way, even if a person is said to understand and will by that quality: because although those are grammatically expressed as actions of a person, in that case, they are not really actions and productions of the mind and will, but only qualities that formally make a person intelligent and willing. On this matter, see Vasquez in the cited Dispute, Chapter 3.

L. But there are others who think that by operative grace is meant that which causes in a person the first act of the deliberated will, such as conversion, whether from infidelity to faith or from other sins to repentance. But by cooperating grace they understand that which causes subsequent acts of the will: such as the will to pray, the will to do good works, and other similar acts. So that operative grace is nothing else but special effective assistance in respect to the first act of the will; and cooperating grace is special effective assistance also in respect to subsequent acts.

LI. This is the opinion of Bellarmine, who contends that it can rightly be said that God works in us without us the first deliberated will, by which we are converted to God, although it is elicited not only physically but also freely by our will. For, he says, if we consider the efficient cause of that act, it is not only God through special assistance; but also the will through free will; and in this way, God works it not without us. But if we consider the moral cause of the same act, that is, the cause by persuading, exhorting, and advising, it is only God. For the will does not persuade and exhort itself to will what it does not will; but God through His inspirations speaking within the soul persuades and convinces it to will. Therefore, according to him, operative grace is that which precedes our effort and industry, and works that we may will what we previously did not will, without us working that we may will; but not without us freely consenting when we will.

LII. The grace, however, that is required for the remaining acts of the will after the first, according to his opinion, is called cooperating, because after we begin to be converted to God, we ourselves not only produce the remaining acts by free will, with God's help, but we also incite and urge ourselves, with God cooperating, to those acts. Thus, he says, operative grace is that by which God makes us will to believe; because that happens in us without us seeking, much less

striving and exerting; and cooperating grace is that which makes us will to pray, fast, and give alms; because that does not happen without our effort and industry cooperating. Hence, he concludes that God does not work our will without us; but only works that we may will without us: because we cooperate with God by willing, that is, by freely producing the act of willing; but we do not cooperate by making ourselves will. Because we do not move and incite ourselves to will; but He alone by His internal inspiration moves and incites us.

LIII. The same is taught by Estius, who commonly says that operative grace is said to work in us without us because the first act of conversion, or the first good movement of the will, which is the effect of that grace, is from the will as an active and free principle; but nevertheless, God works it by His grace without any prior movement of our will by which we strive, aspire, or command ourselves to that first movement. For a good affection of the will is sometimes inspired in a person, even strongly resisting, as happened with Paul. His conversion, as far as it pertains to that change from evil to good made by operative grace, is the form and example of the conversion of all sinners. Because through God's grace, they are converted from being averse and made willing from unwilling. However, the remaining acts of the will, which follow that first one and by which we continue to adhere to God, are indeed also worked in us by God's grace; but our will, already converted to God, not only freely produces them but also commands them to itself by previous acts. And thus in a singular way, it cooperates with divine grace, which is therefore called cooperating in this respect. In 2. Sentences, Dist. 26, Sect. 11.

LIV. Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, explains operative and cooperative grace in a similar manner. He says that operative grace is that which, without any preceding study, prayer, or merit of the person, works the will, or willing, by which the will is made good from bad, and just from unjust. Cooperative grace, however, cooperates with a person already willing and striving, by increasing and strengthening that will so that it may accomplish and perfect what it has willed and attempted. In the same place, he teaches from Augustine that operative grace is that by which, when we did not will, it is made that we will; cooperative grace is that by which, when we already will in act, it is made that we will more strongly, so that by overcoming any obstacles, we may indeed accomplish. The former works that we may have a good will, or willing of good in some way; the latter works that the good will may be increased and strengthened. Hence, he concludes that cooperative grace is never said in respect of the first good will, when the potential of the will bursts into it, because that first good will, or good volition, is the effect of operative grace alone, but only in respect of the good will after a person has already begun to will, so that the will may persevere, be increased, and be enriched with good works as with fruits.

LV. Therefore, he carefully observes that operative grace alone produces the first good will in a person, not because a person does not simultaneously influence that will, that is, the movement and consent of the will, but because that movement is worked by grace, without us contributing anything to it by seeking, desiring, studying, meditating, and thus asserting no merit at all in respect of that will. For it is impossible that the first good will, to which one is converted from a bad will, can be achieved without grace. Conversely, cooperating grace is so called

because it works something in us not alone, but with us simultaneously cooperating; not only by a simultaneous influence, in which we also cooperate with operative grace, but previously to the effect of that grace, by willing, believing, desiring, seeking, knocking, striving, and thus also by meriting; so that the effect of that cooperating grace is the entire increase of that first good will, up to the pinnacle of human perfection. In *The Grace of Christ the Savior*, Book 4, Chapter 15.

LVI. The opinion of Didacus Alvares differs from all of these. He believes that for any pious operation, whether it be internal or external, whether it be the first act by which we are converted to God, or any other following it, operative grace and cooperative grace always concur. And indeed, he believes that operative grace is that by which God physically predetermines our will to consent to any good work; but cooperative grace is that by which God works any pious action with us. He believes both are necessary, that God predetermines our free will physically and effectively to any supernatural act, and that He concurs with the same free will, which being previously moved by God, moves itself to the good work. Operative grace is said to act in order to the first effect, in respect to which our will behaves only as moved; cooperative grace, however, in order to the second, in which the will moves itself being moved. For our will, in respect to the previous motion by which it is moved by God to supernatural acts, behaves passively, since such motion is not actively produced by our free will, but only by God, from whom comes that help of operative grace. And again, the will moved by God actively and freely produces supernatural operations, with God's grace concurring. Hence, God's grace works without us in the first respect; in the latter, we cooperate with it. In *De Auxiliis divina gratia*, Book 9, Dispute 81.

LVII. Here, however, Roman Church doctors ask how operative grace is distinguished from exciting grace, and cooperative grace from assisting grace. But from what has already been said, it can easily be gathered how to answer this question according to each person's preference. For those who, with Vasquez, Molina, and most Jesuits, understand exciting grace only as knocking and soliciting grace, and indeed often in vain; but assisting grace as that by which God concurs with special help with free will, when it consents to grace and obeys it. And in turn, they understand operative grace as that which produces pious thoughts and indeliberate movements in us, to which we indeed physically but not freely concur; and cooperating grace as that which produces in us free acts of the will, by which we respond to God's calling and invitation. These believe that operative grace is the same as exciting grace, and assisting grace is the same as cooperating grace. According to them, the same grace is called exciting, inasmuch as it solicits and excites us to good through holy thoughts and pious desires inspired in us; and operative, inasmuch as it works these in us without our free concurrence and consent. And similarly, the same grace is called assisting, inasmuch as it helps us when we consent to the inviting grace; and cooperating, inasmuch as it does not work without our freely giving our consent.

LVIII. In the same way, exciting grace is the same as operative grace, and assisting grace the same as cooperating grace, for all those who, with Jansen and Estius, understand exciting grace as that which truly awakens the sinner from the sleep of sin, and assisting grace as that by which a person is helped to perfect the good which they have already begun to will; and

operative grace as that which produces in us the first act of conversion, and cooperating grace as that which produces the subsequent acts, to which we not only cooperate with a certain free influence of the will but also with some previous study and effort on our part.

LIX. But those who, with Jansen and Estius, indeed want operative grace to be called that by which the first conversion is worked in us; and cooperating grace, that which moves us to the good works that follow: but contend with the Jesuits that exciting grace is that by which we are knocked upon so that we may wake up from the sleep of sins, even if by our fault we often remain asleep; but assisting grace is that which strengthens and helps us while we shake off that sleep. These, like Bellarmine, distinguish exciting grace from operative grace, and consequently assisting grace from cooperating grace: for exciting grace, according to them, extends more widely than operative grace. Therefore, they divide exciting grace into sufficient and effective; and again, effective into operative and cooperating, as can be seen in the same Bellarmine's book 1, often cited on Grace.

LX. Similarly, Alvares distinguishes exciting grace from operative grace: because to him, exciting grace is a grace that morally only attracts and allures the will to good. Operative grace, however, is grace that not only morally but also physically moves and predetermines the will to good. Hence, according to him, exciting grace is the same as sufficient grace. Operative and cooperating grace pertain to effective grace.

LXI. But among the theologians of the Roman School, the main controversy here is about the manner in which God's grace cooperates with our will. For the Jesuits and many other theologians of the Roman School deny that assisting or cooperating grace concurs naturally prior to the supernatural work with free will; and they do not admit that grace predetermines free will. Therefore, in their judgment, the liberty of the will would perish; since according to that hypothesis, divine grace would impose some necessity of acting, which could not consist with liberty. Thus, among others, thinks and reasons Peter of Saint Joseph, in the *Idea of Speculative Theology*, Book 4, Chapter 6, where his third Resolution begins: Assisting grace does not concur naturally prior to the supernatural work with free will.

LXII. On the other hand, others contend that assisting and cooperating grace, in the order of causality, precedes free will and acts before it; and although grace and free will simultaneously influence the pious operation in time, the influx of grace is somehow naturally prior and not simultaneous in the order of causality with the influx of free will. This is the opinion of Didacus Alvares in the *Epitome of the Aids of Divine Grace*, Book 3, Chapter 19, which has this lemma: That cooperating grace, as cooperating, is prevenient or pre-moving free will to consent, and not only influences the pious operation simultaneously with it. The same chapter begins with these words: From the above, it is clear that cooperating grace, as distinguished from exciting grace, is prevenient to the free cooperation of created will, not indeed by priority of time, but by that of reason and causality.

LXIII. They do not think, however, that this prejudices the liberty of the human will; for God's grace thus moves and determines free will to act that it does not remove the power to act

otherwise: so that, given the grace, it acts infallibly, but always remains able in a divided sense not to act or to act otherwise.

LXIV. Furthermore, those who follow Molina's Jesuit method and doctrine teach that assisting or cooperating grace does not properly act as the total cause of the supernatural act but only as a partial cause. And this because, according to their opinion, assisting grace does not produce the supernatural act except dependently on free will.

XV. They indeed admit that the entire supernatural act depends on grace; however, they add that it does not depend on it entirely, but only partially: because grace, namely, cannot produce it except dependently on the concurrence of the will. Therefore, grace can indeed be called the total cause of a good act in terms of the effect's totality, but not in terms of the totality of the cause, which is being discussed here: because the whole effect depends on grace, yet as on a cause that does not produce it without another concurrent cause, and acts together with it. Hence, they compare grace and free will to two horses pulling the same carriage together, neither acting before the other, nor moving the other to act, and which are partial causes of that pulling: although the entire pulling can be said to depend on each horse individually because each contributes something to the entire pulling.

LXVI. Therefore, in their view, assisting grace, considered in itself and precisely, does not move a person to act, but helps them in actual operation. Exciting grace, however, although it moves a person to act, does not impose a necessity of acting; but leaves it to the person to determine themselves to the pious work, since otherwise they can abstain from it if they wish and determine themselves otherwise. Hence, it should not be called the total, or adequate cause of good operation, as can be seen in the same Peter of St. Joseph in the previously cited place.

LXVII. On the other hand, Estius and the more recent Thomists teach that God's grace is the total cause of the good work in such a way that everything good in the work is entirely done by it, and the entire work is ascribed to divine grace as the total cause, not just as a partial cause.

LXVIII. But although they absolutely and properly assert that the entire good work is from God's grace, they nevertheless teach that the same good work is also entirely from free will. Because nothing prevents something from being entirely from two causes, one of which is subordinate to the other: just as the lower cause receives all its operating power and movement from the higher cause. And they teach that this is always the case with the first cause and the second cause; whatever the second cause may be, whether it acts freely or naturally, because it is necessary that whatever is done by the second cause is referred to the first cause. In these cases, no partition of works can be admitted: that something in any part of it is done by the second cause, which is not also entirely and in every part done by the first cause applying the second cause to all its operation.

LXIX. They say, therefore, that the entire good work is done by grace and free will together and in one indivisible operation: nor is there a distinction between what is from free will and what is from grace; because there is no distinction between what is from the first cause and what is from the second cause. But they teach this difference between the two agents, that free will, as it has its being from God, so it has this entire good operation from God's grace working

in it and through it: but not the other way around, either entirely or partially, that God, in what He works, depends on the free will of man. For God makes man do, but man does not make God do. The same reasoning applies in every work or action done by any second cause. Hence, according to these doctors, divine grace and free will do not cooperate as partial causes that depend on each other in acting, but as total and subordinate causes, of which the lower depends and is moved by the higher, not the other way around. As can be seen more extensively in the same Estius in 2 Sentent., Dist. 26, Paragraph 29.

LXX. Furthermore, some other divisions of grace coincide with the ones already mentioned, which differ little or not at all from them. As when grace is divided into prevenient grace and subsequent grace, and into leading and accompanying grace. For by leading and prevenient grace, theologians understand the same as what they call exciting and operative grace: and by accompanying or subsequent grace, what is otherwise called assisting or cooperating grace. For the grace that excites us to good and thus works in us without us is the same that also precedes us: but the grace that assists us in actual operation and cooperates with us is the same that accompanies our wills in doing good and follows the former grace. Some, however, seek certain subtle distinctions between these divisions of grace, but mentioning and recounting them does not contribute much to our purpose. What remains to be considered here is the famous division of grace into sufficient and efficacious grace: but because a thorough exposition of it is a matter of longer discussion, it seems best to defer it to the next dispute.

THEOLOGICAL THESES

In which are explained

Various distinctions and acceptances of Grace, which are customary in Reformed Schools.

Thesis I

According to the common sense of the Doctors of the Reformed School, Grace generally designates God's love and favor with which He pursues us undeserving, but sometimes also refers to certain of His gifts and created effects. Thus, Tilenus in his theses on the various names of the divine will in the first disputation, thesis 20, teaches that the grace of God is taken actively and passively. The former, he says, signifies the benign and propense will of God, liberally and freely bestowing everything, not from our merit or His obligation. The latter declares some gift freely given.

II. Similarly, Peter Martyr in his commonplaces says, The name grace in sacred scripture is taken in two ways. First and chiefly, it signifies God's goodwill and gratuitous favor towards men, with which He pursues the Elect. Secondly, because God endows His Elect with excellent gifts, grace sometimes also signifies those gifts which are freely given to us by God. Class 3, place 2, paragraph 7.

III. Likewise, Aretius in his commonplaces, place twenty-five, teaches that when the sacred writings speak of grace, they first mean by this term the gratuitous mercy of God which

manifests itself in the reconciliation and justification of man. Secondly, by grace they also mean the gifts of the Holy Spirit; these gifts, he acknowledges, can rightly be called infused grace. And the same is found in the distinction of Polanus. The grace of God, he says, as it is spoken of in two ways, is either inherent in God or given by God. In the *Syntagma of Christian Theology*, part 1, book 2, chapter 21.

IV. Although Reformed theologians acknowledge that by God's grace in sacred scripture, the gifts and effects of divine favor and love towards us are sometimes designated, they believe that grace in this sense is to be taken in only a few places. For they contend that all those passages where we are said to be elected, called, justified, and saved by God's grace, should not be explained as some gift inherent in us, but only as the gratuitous love and favor of God. As is especially seen in Polanus. Grace, he says, that makes us pleasing and acceptable to God, and thus saving grace by which we are elected in Christ to eternal salvation, effectively called, justified, regenerated, and by which we are finally saved, is not a quality infused in us, not something created and inherent in us, not the charity by which we love God, nor any other virtue in us. *Syntagma Theologica*, book 2, chapter 21, as cited.

V. Furthermore, when grace is taken for the gifts and effects of divine favor, Tilenus notes that in a general sense it encompasses nature itself, its qualities, and endowments. Yet, it is properly restricted to certain supernatural gifts bestowed upon men by God. These gifts, he further categorizes into two kinds. Some properly and directly pertain to the salvation of the recipient, as effects of that active grace by which God justifies us: such as faith, charity, and hope. Others, however, do not so much pertain to the peculiar salvation of those to whom they are given but to the common use and edification of the whole Church: such as the gift of prophecy, tongues, miracles, and similar things.

VI. This aligns with what Zanchius teaches in book four of *On the Nature of God*, chapter 2, question 1. That is, the gifts of God which are sometimes signified by the name grace either pertain to eternal life, such as faith, hope, and charity, and the virtues connected with them; or they do not pertain to eternal life, such as the gift of tongues, miracles, and others mentioned by Paul in 1 Corinthians 12. Similar views can be read in Polanus in the previously cited place.

VII. Nor does the distinction of Cameron differ much, in volume one of his lectures, digression on grace, where he says that some gifts of grace are such that they only fall to those who are saved: others, however, also fall to those who are not saved. Additionally, God's gifts are divided into those which benefit others only, not ourselves, such as all God's gifts bestowed on the impious: and those gifts which often benefit others, sometimes do not benefit them, but always benefit those to whom they are given, such as faith, hope, and charity.

VIII. These divisions of the gifts of grace received among the Reformed differ little or not at all from the solemn division of grace among the Scholastics into grace freely given and grace making one acceptable. As Tilenus acknowledges in the previously cited first disputation on the various names of the divine will, thesis 22. Nevertheless, most Reformed theologians criticize and censure this distinction of the Roman School. First of all, they dislike the fact that some gifts of God are specifically called grace freely given: because there is no grace that is not

freely given. The gifts of hope, faith, and charity are no less gratuitous than the gift of prophecy, healing, and the like.

IX. Secondly, they do not approve that anything created and inherent in us should be called grace making one acceptable and pleasing to God, as seen in Polanus, Aretius, and Peter Martyr in the places cited above. Not that they deny that God's gifts, which the Doctors of the Roman School designate by the term grace making one acceptable, are something pleasing to God, in which He delights, and which is acceptable to Him: But because these gifts do not first reconcile God's favor to men; since they are the effects of divine favor and love and proceed from God who favors us and loves us even before we receive them: according to John's saying, Not that we loved God, but that He first loved us.

X. This is evident from their words. For Peter Martyr in his commonplaces, Class three, place two, number eight, speaking of the Scholastics' infused grace, says, It is no small error that they want us to be made pleasing to God by this habit or creature. For it is necessary that when He has endowed us with such a gift, He has first loved us. For God's love precedes all His gifts. And in number thirteen, he says, No less are those who babble in the schools, saying that there is one grace freely given, another making one acceptable. For all grace must be freely given. Otherwise, as Paul says, it would not be grace. And since they understand by grace making one acceptable a habit, as we have taught above, they wrongly state that men are made acceptable to God by such gifts. For we are received into God's favor by His mercy alone, and because of Christ.

XI. Similarly, Cameron in the above-mentioned digression on grace says, It must be noted that God's gifts are never called grace in this sense, as if God's favor is reconciled by them, and those gifts make us acceptable and pleasing to God. But if God's gifts are sometimes called grace in this sense, it is considering the human perspective, by which men are led into love by those gifts, not God's perspective. To understand this, it must be understood that human love, which is reconciled by those gifts, does not make those gifts but finds them. Divine love finds and makes those gifts: just as a painter who delights in his work, rejoices in the beauty of his work, and is the author of that beauty. Therefore, it should not be called grace making one acceptable properly speaking, but rather it should be called the grace of the One making one acceptable.

XII. Hence it is clear that Reformed Doctors do not deny that faith, hope, charity, and similar gifts of the Holy Spirit are things pleasing to God, and by which a person in whom they are found is pleasing and acceptable to God: but only that these gifts do not precede God's favor and goodwill towards us, but are its effects and gifts.

XIII. Furthermore, Tilenus seems to criticize the Scholastics in this respect only for confusing those gifts which they call grace making one acceptable with justifying and saving grace, which according to the Reformed theologians is not something inherent in us, but only the active and external grace of God. Speaking of hope, faith, and charity, he says, This grace, called by the Scholastics grace making one acceptable, they perilously confuse with the same. Thesis 22 of the often-cited disputation on the various names of the divine will.

XIV. Some Doctors of the Reformed School also accept the distinction of grace into *gratis data* (freely given) and *gratum faciens* (making one acceptable), but in a different sense than that received among Scholastic Doctors. For Testardus, in the *Irenicon*, understands by *gratis data* grace that by which God invites a person to salvation, and by *gratum faciens*, he means that grace by which God effectively changes, converts, and sanctifies a person. Or *gratis data* grace to him is a kind of genus; *gratum faciens* grace is a species of that genus, through which faith is engendered, sins are forgiven, and holiness is infused. As seen in thesis three hundred, he says, "The distinction of grace into *gratis data* and *gratum faciens* can be accepted in this way, that *gratis data* is said to be that which only prevents, inviting on the part of God, such as general grace: *gratum faciens*, which is also freely given, but effectively changing a person, making them from abhorrent to pleasing and acceptable to God. Or that *gratis data* grace is the most general kind of grace and signifies all grace; *gratum faciens* grace is the species of *gratis data* grace, which engenders faith, forgives sins, sanctifies, and in one word, prepares the subject."

XV. Rivera, however, in his *summa* of controversies, treatise four, question two, understands by *gratis data* grace all the gifts of grace; by *gratum faciens* grace, which he also calls *gratis dantem* (freely giving), he wants to be understood as God's favor itself, from which those gifts proceed. In this sense, Paulus Ferrius in his *Specimen of Scholastic Orthodox*, chapter thirty, uses the same distinction. For by *gratum faciens* grace he signifies grace immanent to God, which does not place anything around the one receiving grace, but is the love of God itself: under *gratis data* grace, he includes all the benefits of vocation, justification, etc., flowing into us from *gratis dantem* grace, as from the most abundant source.

XVI. Furthermore, among most Reformed Doctors, there is no explicit distinction between actual and habitual grace. Indeed, some of the older Reformers seem to reject this. For Peter Martyr, in the above-cited place, explicitly refutes the Scholastic opinion that grace is a habit infused into the soul. But more recent Doctors of the Reformed School, and also most of the older ones, acknowledge that there is a certain habitual grace. For they speak of the theological virtues as habits divinely infused. And Robert Baronius Scotus, a professor of Theology at the University of Aberdeen, testifies to the unanimous consent of Modern Theologians, as he calls them, in this regard. William Ames also extensively defends this opinion on habitual grace against Grevinchovius in his response to Grevinchovius's reply, chapter ten.

XVII. Indeed, I believe that those older Reformers who seem to dissent actually do not. For when they contend against the Scholastics that grace is not a habit infused into the soul, they clearly speak of justifying grace. Therefore, their intention is not to deny that any habits of virtues are infused by God through the Holy Spirit into the souls of the faithful, or that such habits are not designated by the name of grace anywhere: but only that the grace by which we are said to be saved and justified in the scriptures does not consist in those holy habits in any way: but by that grace, God's mercy and goodwill alone are signified. The proof of this is that they sometimes deny that the grace by which we are saved, justified, and even regenerated is a habit and an infused quality, or anything created and inherent in us, as we reported about Polanus

above. And yet the same Polanus in the same chapter acknowledges that there is an inherent grace, which he says is both faith and the grace of conversion and regeneration, which they call the grace of Christ the Redeemer, and also Christian grace. Therefore, when he denies that regenerating grace is anything created and inherent in us, he speaks only of the efficient and impelling cause of our regeneration, not of the formal cause as the Scholastics call it.

XVIII. Whether besides the habits of virtues, there is some habitual grace immediately penetrating and affecting the very essence of the soul, as many Scholastics think, is a matter on which most Reformed School doctors do not explicitly discuss, but from which they do not seem far removed, acknowledging that new and supernatural habitual renovation of all faculties, which they recognize is bestowed upon man in regeneration. However, Paulus Ferrius, a pastor of the Church of Metz recently deceased in the Lord, explicitly admits such a grace. He believes that before the very act of conversion, God infuses a certain habitual grace into the very substance of the soul, which penetrates the whole soul like a certain spiritual light and insinuates itself from the substance of the soul into all its faculties: and thus prepares them to follow the guidance of effective grace and to obey it easily and willingly, as seen in the homily he publicly published on Hebrews 12:28. But I know that this opinion is not pleasing to many.

XIX. The distinction of grace into exciting and assisting is not as frequent in the Reformed School as in the Roman School. However, the learned Ferrius mentions it and seems to approve of it in the previously cited homily. The British theologians also use it in the Synod of Dort.

XX. However, the Doctors of the Reformed School do not disapprove of the Scholastic distinction of grace into operative and cooperative. But like the more recent Thomists, they want operative grace to be understood as that by which someone is first converted to God, and cooperative grace as that by which someone already converted to God is moved to act well. Thus, Aretius, in the above-cited place, says, "Grace is sometimes operative, sometimes cooperative. The former is said to heal and improve our will. The latter confirms the changed will and makes it act rightly."

XXI. Similarly, Peter Martyr in the often-cited place says that operative grace is that which initially heals and changes our will: cooperative grace is that which makes the changed and healed will act rightly. He adds that operative and cooperative grace is one grace, not two. He explains the reason for this varied denomination, that when the will is first healed, it concurs passively with grace: for, he says, it is said to be changed, and we are said to be regenerated. But later, it behaves actively and passively. For being impelled by God, it also wills and chooses.

XXII. Nevertheless, neither he nor other Reformed theologians deny that the first act of conversion is a vital act and an action elicited by that faculty which we call the will in us: indeed, they do not deny it is a free action, and one of those actions which are called human in the schools. They only mean this; when God converts a person, the first thing that grace works in us is something that wholly precedes the free movement of a person to good. Therefore, the Reformed in this part do not seem to differ from the sounder Scholastics, although they express their minds in different words.

XXIII. The Doctors of the Reformed School also admit the distinction of grace into prevenient and subsequent, but not all in the same sense. Aretius wants prevenient grace to be the same as operative grace; and subsequent grace to be the same as cooperative, which is also the opinion of many Scholastics. For, he says, prevenient grace is so called because it precedes the will, so that the beginning of conversion is not from us, but from God having mercy: subsequent, because new movements and good works follow conversion, all of which we cannot accomplish without grace.

XXIV. Martyr, however, wants grace to be called sometimes prevenient, sometimes subsequent, because there are many and diverse gifts with which the mercy of God adorns us in a certain order. So that all grace which is prior can be called prevenient in respect to what follows. For, he says, the will is first healed; once healed, it begins to will well: from willing well, it begins to execute: then it perseveres in doing well: finally, it is crowned. Grace prevents our will by healing it, the same follows by making those things that are right pleasing. It prevents so that we may will, it follows by impelling us to accomplish what we have willed. It prevents by moving us to good works, it follows by granting perseverance. It prevents by bestowing perseverance, it follows by crowning it.

XXV. But besides those solemn divisions of grace commonly used in the Roman School, many have been devised by Reformed Doctors. Thus, Tilenus distinguishes the grace of God into decreeing and executing. The former, he says, denotes the eternal purpose of God to elect us before the foundation of the world was laid: the latter encompasses the entire economy of this wonderful mystery, according to the variety of times and stages. From the names of the divine will, disputation 1, thesis 24.

XXVI. Moreover, many Reformed School theologians usually distinguish grace into universal and particular grace, but not all in the same sense. Polanus, in book 2, chapter 21 of his Syntagma, after initially distinguishing grace into that which resides in God and that which is given by God, says at the end, "The grace given to men by God is either universal, such as natural grace given to all and every human being, and supernatural grace before the fall; or particular, such as supernatural grace after the fall, which is given only to a part of the human race."

XXVII. For earlier, he distinguished grace into natural and supernatural. By natural grace, he means nature itself and all the gifts of both integral nature and those that remain in corrupted nature. By supernatural grace, he means whatever gifts are beyond nature given to humans by God. Therefore, he again distinguishes supernatural grace into supernatural grace before the fall of man, by which he designates the gifts beyond nature given to man in his integrity: and into supernatural grace after the fall of man, under which name he includes all gifts beyond nature given to sinful man.

XXVIII. Thus, by universal grace, he signifies the gifts both natural and supernatural given to the first parents before sin, because they pertained to the whole human race, which consisted of them alone and were to be propagated to all their posterity if they had persisted in obedience to God. Moreover, after the corruption of the human race, he also wishes the benefits

and gifts of nature which remain after sin and are common to all men to be designated by the name of universal grace. But after sin, he does not want any supernatural gift or benefit to be universal. And therefore, after the fall, he says all supernatural grace is particular. And for this reason, he distinguishes the grace he calls particular into that which is common to both the elect and the reprobate, given by God for the salvation of others, such as charismata which the Scholastics call *gratis datae* graces: and into that which is peculiar to the elect and destined for the salvation of those to whom it is given, such as faith, regeneration, repentance, charity, hope of eternal life, the gift of perseverance, which the Scholastics refer to as *gratum faciens* grace.

XXIX. However, Paulus Testardus, a few years ago the pastor of the Church of Blésois, in the synopsis of his doctrine on nature and grace, thesis 300, uses the distinction of grace into Particular and Universal in a very different sense. For he says, "Grace towards sinners is twofold, General and Particular. General is that which is given to the whole world, the offering and opportunity of salvation. Particular is that of the Elect only, the application of salvation. Its immediate foundation is free election: the means are effectual calling, justification, preservation, and glorification." And immediately he says that particular grace is either prevenient, such as Election and Calling: or mercifully rewarding, such as justification, preservation, and glorification.

XXX. Therefore, in his mind, universal or general grace is that benefit of God by which salvation is offered to all men, and made possible for each and every one of them, so that they can be saved if they are willing, and it depends only on themselves whether they obtain salvation or not. For he believes that God has prepared Christ the Redeemer for all, and that by His death the sins of all men were so expiated that nothing more on God's part hinders anyone who turns from sin and comes to God from being saved and delivered from perdition: since the vindictive justice of God for the sins of all men has been abundantly satisfied by Christ's death. Not only that, but God calls all men to participate in the salvation in Christ; some indeed by the explicit word of the Gospel, others by the voice of creation and various testimonies of divine goodness and patience, which shine forth in the works of nature and providence, inviting men to repentance, and consequently to salvation.

XXXI. By particular grace, however, he understands that by which God makes certain men truly partakers of salvation, not simply offering them the benefit of Christ, but effectively and actually applying it to them. He calls this particular grace, because it does not extend to all as the former does, but is peculiar to a few, namely the elect, as it consists in the election itself and the benefits flowing from it: such as internal and effectual calling, justification, the gift of perseverance, and glorification.

XXXII. In the same way, this division of grace into particular and universal is used and explained by the distinguished Moses Amyraut in those two treatises he entitled, *On Universal and Particular Grace*. He is also agreed with and supported by all those in France who follow Cameron's Method and doctrine, and by many in Germany and Poland who seek and pursue peace and concord with the Lutherans. However, most of the Reformed in Belgium, and many in

France and England, disapprove and oppose this distinction and do not admit any universal grace of Christ.

XXXIII. From what has been said, it is clear enough that these theologians by the name of universal grace do not understand any grace inherent in men, but only some external benefit of God, by which He gave His Son to death, so that divine justice would be satisfied for the sins of all men, and by which His justice being thus pacified, He externally calls men to the fellowship of salvation, which Christ has obtained for them by His death. And conversely, by particular grace, they chiefly designate the gifts and helps of God, by which He acts inwardly in men, working conversion and faith in them, and finally making them actually partakers of eternal salvation.

XXXIV. Hence arises another distinction of grace, namely into Objective and Subjective, which the distinguished Moses Amyraut sets forth at the beginning of his dissertation on Particular Grace. For he teaches there that two kinds of grace are necessary to engender faith in the minds of men. One which acts as an object, the mercy of God offering satisfaction in Christ extrinsically: the other which affects and illuminates the mind intrinsically, so that the object is received. The former he calls objective, because it is external and places nothing in man; but is only proposed to him as an object, which he must embrace by faith. The latter he calls subjective, because it changes the man inwardly and is received in him as in a subject. And he contends that the former objective grace is universal and pertains to all men absolutely: but he teaches that subjective grace is particular and specially destined for the elect.

XXXV. Furthermore, those who are called Remonstrants or Arminians in Belgium, philosophize about grace almost in the same way as those Doctors of the Roman School who are today called Molinists. For they use distinctions of grace into exciting and assisting, prevenient and subsequent, operative and cooperative in the same sense as those, as can be seen in the declaration of the Remonstrant's opinion on the third and fourth articles, which is contained in their Synod.

XXXVI. For there they say that by exciting grace they mean the gracious and unmerited operation of God and the Holy Spirit, which first imbues and enlightens the mind with the knowledge of saving things, and thus makes it assent to divine truth, and secondly acts on the will itself through the same illumination and the senses comprehended by the word.

XXXVII. However, they add that they do not deny that the Holy Spirit acts immediately on the will, by infusing into it supernatural power to believe, by which power the will is not necessitated and irresistibly determined. And they note that this grace is called exciting because it draws, entices, invites, and incites the will to free assent, and, with man not placing an obstacle, makes him actually willing. And the same grace is also called prevenient because it precedes our will: and finally operative because it is also the cause of the volition itself.

XXXVIII. They point out that the necessity of this grace arises from the fact that supernatural acts, such as those involved in human conversion, far exceed the innate and inherent power of the will, and therefore require supernatural powers and special grace preceding the very

act of the will to elicit it; whereas for other natural acts proportionate to the power of the will, there is no such need.

XXXIX. For them, assisting grace is that which aids the will and effectively concurs with it to produce the act; and this not merely morally, but also physically, or rather more than morally: because the term 'physically' seems very inconvenient to them in this matter, due to the supernatural nature of the acts in question: nor does any other proper term occur to them by which they can positively express this. And they observe that this grace is also called cooperating, because it operates with the will; and subsequent with respect to prevenient and exciting grace.

XL. As for the distinction of grace into actual and habitual, it is rejected by them as a scholastic fiction without foundation in Scripture. However, it is understood by habitual grace that such an infusion of faith, hope, and charity into the will occurs without any intervening act of the will, and they concede that by frequent acts of faith, hope, and charity arising from special divine grace, faith, charity, and habitual hope are ultimately produced in us: just as habits of justice and liberality are produced in us by repeated acts of justice and liberality. They believe that it is the opinion of those who wish that all these habits, which they consider too laborious to acquire by frequent acts, should be immediately infused by God without any proper human operation.

XLI. However, if by habitual grace they mean a certain supernatural power granted to the will so that it can believe and do good, they willingly admit it. Hence, it is evident that although they deny habitual grace, they still recognize a certain permanent quality and supernatural power infused by grace. This almost comes down to the same thing and differs little or not at all from the opinion of those who speak differently.

XLII. Moreover, from what we have so far expounded about the various divisions and conceptions of grace, both in the Roman and Reformed Schools, it is clear that the theologians of the Roman Church readily teach and concede that grace in sacred Scripture is not always taken to mean certain inherent gifts and aids from God, but that grace sometimes means the very favor of God, from which these gifts and aids proceed. Conversely, Reformed doctors do not deny that the name of grace in Scripture is often attributed to the gifts and effects of divine favor. Therefore, it is in vain that some Reformed criticize the Doctors of the Roman School, as if they never wanted grace to mean anything other than some supernatural gift infused in us. And conversely, the Roman School's Doctors unjustly attack and complain about the Reformed, as if they did not recognize any grace inherent in us.

XLIII. Furthermore, it is evident from what has been said regarding the distinction of grace into *gratis data* and *gratum faciens*, that it is only a contention about words. For what the Reformed contend that there is no grace that is not given freely, and that all grace is therefore called grace because it is given freely, is admitted by the Doctors of the Roman School, who point out that a certain species of grace is singularly called *gratis data*: not because another species of grace is not also given freely; but because it seemed convenient to the School to call that species by the name of the genus, as it lacks a proper name.

XLIV. The same Doctors do not call the other species of grace *gratum faciens* because it precedes every act of divine love towards us and is the cause by which God is first moved to favor us; which the Reformed rightly judge to be false and absurd: since God loves us first before we love Him.

XLV. Nor does the Reformed School deny that what the Roman School means by the name *gratum faciens* grace, namely faith, hope, and charity, is something by which man is in a particular way acceptable and pleasing to God, to which Paul refers in Hebrews, saying, "Without faith, it is impossible to please God." This is what the theologians of the Roman Church refer to when they call it *gratum faciens* grace.

XLVI. Thus, both sides will easily agree that there is a certain act of divine love that precedes those gifts and virtues, which the Scholastics designate by the name of *gratum faciens* grace: because, namely, God favors us before we have those things: and at the same time, there is a certain act of the same love which those gifts precede, namely, because without them we cannot please or be approved by God. Such gifts and virtues formally constitute a man adorned with them as acceptable and pleasing to God. As Peter said in Acts 10, "In truth, I perceive that God shows no partiality, but in every nation, whoever fears Him and works righteousness is accepted by Him."

XLVII. Furthermore, it is clear from what has been previously explained that the Doctors of the Reformed School admit certain divinely infused virtues and certain gifts of saving grace that are in the soul as habits and permanent qualities: and thus, it is unjustly imputed to them by Roman communion theologians that they deny any habitual grace or quality inherent in the soul; since this is denied by few, if any, Doctors of the Reformed Church.

XLVIII. The only question is whether in those places in Scripture where we are said to be saved and justified by the grace of God, grace signifies the external favor and benevolence of God: or rather some grace inherent in us, whether actual or habitual. The former is affirmed by the Reformed School, the latter by the Roman.

XLIX. Therefore, the simple question is not whether there is any saving grace inherent in us in the form of either acts or habits: but only this, whether those places in Scripture where our salvation and justification are attributed to the grace of God are to be understood as referring to such grace, which is affirmed by the Doctors of the Roman Church, and denied by the Reformed. How important this question is, has been discussed by us elsewhere at greater length.

THEOLOGICAL THESES

In which is expounded

The Doctrine of the Roman School concerning the division of Grace into sufficient and efficacious, and the harmony of human liberty with the efficacy of Grace.

Thesis I

Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, and those who follow his doctrine, call that grace sufficient alone, beyond which nothing else is necessary on God's part as a principle for a man to will and act. Efficacious grace, however, is only that which not only gives the created nature the ability to will but also operates the very will within it, bending and determining the will to will by itself. Accordingly, according to their principles, no grace is truly sufficient unless it is also efficacious, unless it gives the creature the ability to will in such a way that no further divine assistance is required for willing; and yet it is so subject to the creature's liberty that it remains within its free will to use or not use that grace. Conversely, only that grace is truly efficacious, not which in any manner is followed by an act of will, but which subjects the will of the creature to itself, and effectively moves it to will, producing the act of willing infallibly by its power.

II. They assert that the grace, which in the aforementioned sense is sufficient, was granted to angels and men in their creation. To both, according to their sense, God gave the necessary aids for doing good, but left it in their free will to use or not use those aids. In that first state of integral creation, efficacious grace had no place, as it was not necessary for either men or angels before the fall. Therefore, although the perseverance in good followed the grace accepted by the blessed angels, they should not be said to have had efficacious grace, but only sufficient grace. Conversely, neither the apostate angels nor the first humans lacked any necessary assistance from God's grace to persevere in good.

III. After man fell into sin, according to these doctors, it is impossible for him to turn to God or, having turned, to move towards any good work without some prior assistance of grace, which not only simply invites and solicits him to good or assists him in good work but bends and determines his will towards good and effectively produces a good act of will in it. This, they say, is demanded by the weakness of the will, which, due to the inordinate concupiscence inherent in man after sin, is continuously inclined towards earthly things and therefore needs actual and efficacious assistance from God to be elevated upwards at every impulse of heavenly love.

IV. Hence it follows that for all who are not actually converted and doing good, some divine assistance necessary and requisite for acting is lacking; and thus they should not be said to have sufficient grace to convert themselves and do good, since only that which comprises all necessary things should be called sufficient. Whoever has all necessary and prior aids for any good work is infallibly and certainly going to act well; and thus every grace that can be truly called sufficient is also efficacious: and hence it is futile to distinguish in the schools the salvific grace of Christ the Redeemer, which is necessary for fallen man, into efficacious and sufficient.

V. Therefore, according to their view, all true and specifically so-called grace of Christ, provided for healing the sick man and necessary for each impulse and movement of pious will, is per se efficacious grace and such that it is never rejected by any hard heart; for it always gives the will and removes the hardness of the heart, according to the measure of the divine gift. And although man can resist it if he wills, it always ensures that man does not will to resist it.

VI. Nevertheless, they do not mean that this particular grace of Christ always actually and really converts a man and produces true and serious repentance in him. This is because a man moved by this grace does not always will or act efficaciously and perfectly as he ought to will

and act; and it often happens that a sinner remains stuck in ineffective desires formed by grace and does not bring them to the effect of action due to his own weakness and fault; he even rejects these desires and, with concupiscence resisting and prevailing, does not repent of sin, does not perform repentance as he ought and as much as is necessary to rise from sin and obtain forgiveness from God.

VII. Nevertheless, they believe that even this grace of Christ is efficacious in such a man, achieving the effect for which it was precisely and proximally given, and which was intended by God, which is none other than the movement of a good and incipient desire. That this desire lacked the ultimate and perfect effect of the action to which it impelled and excited is solely the man's fault, not God's, and the cause is in man, not in God. But if God wished to bestow as much grace as is sufficient and necessary for this man to repent properly, rise from his sin, and attain justifying grace from God, the man would certainly repent, rise from sin, and attain God's justifying grace. But God shows mercy as He wills, as much as He wills, and to whom He wills. This is evident in the true and Catholic exposition of the five propositions on grace, which is included in the book titled, *Journal de Saint Amour*.

VIII. And Jansen also explains his view on this matter in the book *On the Grace of Christ the Savior*, Book 2, Chapter 27. After teaching extensively that no grace of Christ lacks effect and thus no grace is sufficient yet not efficacious, he addresses this concern at the beginning of that chapter in these words. Let no one be disturbed that it is known that many are enlightened by divine grace in their minds and even moved by divine grace in their wills, who yet dissent from its internal persuasion and inclination, so that they might think it false that grace always works its intended effect in the one to whom it is given. It should be considered that there are many effects of divine grace, just as there are many effects of the will. There is a perfect will, which Augustine calls power; and there is an imperfect will, which they commonly call will. This will itself has various degrees until it reaches the very first and most tenuous complacency in good. Thus the first effect of heavenly dew, which God pours out, achieves, as the least, a certain faint pleasure in the will, moderately adapted to the contemplation of the offered good, and swiftly and almost secretly leads it after itself. Therefore, although this grace is by no means sufficient for man to keep God's commandments, love God above all, hope, pray, and believe, yet it does accomplish something, as it excites certain free inclinations towards those heavenly things, which no human power can achieve without divine infusion. For not every grace suffices to produce every effect, as some imagine, but the power of operations must be tempered to the difficulty.

IX. From these considerations, it is clear that the proposition falsely attributed to Jansen, 'Interior grace in the state of fallen nature is never resisted,' is false. This is the second of the five infamous propositions, condemned as heretical by the Roman Pontiffs Innocent X and Alexander VII in their constitutions on the matter. For besides the fact that the words of this proposition are found nowhere in the works of that man, he explicitly teaches the contrary in the place just cited, where he distinctly affirms that many are enlightened by divine grace in their minds and even moved by divine grace in their wills, who yet dissent from its internal persuasion and inclination.

X. Furthermore, when these theologians teach that no good work can be done by man after the fall without such efficacious divine assistance that bends and determines the will to good, they understand this of proximate and complete power: nor do they mean anything else by this than that a man is not proximate and completely capable of doing any good work as long as efficacious grace, necessary due to the infirmity and illness of his will, is absent. For since this grace, being per se efficacious, simultaneously gives the will and proximate and complete power, whoever lacks this grace lacks the proximate will and power which it bestows.

XI. However, they freely acknowledge and admit that it is true that humans, even in the absence of efficacious grace of Christ, can in many ways be said to be able to keep God's commandments and do good works. This is extensively discussed by Jansen, Bishop of Ypres, in the book *On the Grace of Christ the Savior*, Book 3, Chapter 15. He observes that in matters pertaining to good life or piety, a man can be said to be able to do something in many ways. First, in the remotest sense, through the mere flexible faculty of free will towards good and evil. This power is established in the naked nature of free will as long as it has not yet hardened to do evil through the punishment of eternal damnation. Therefore, only demons and the damned should be said not to be able to believe, love, and do good in this sense; because they are not in a state to be inclined to good by God's grace. Conversely, all men while they live this mortal life on earth can rightly be said to be able to believe and love God because they are flexible to those things by God's grace.

XII. Secondly, according to the same doctor, we are said to be able to live well, resist all temptations, and avoid sins through faith, even though we lack the love of God, actual assistance from God, and internal strength of will. For although this faith itself can by no means do all things, since it is, however, the seed of prayer, through which we usually obtain love and assisting grace and the strength of will, therefore we are said to be able to do those things through faith.

XIII. Thirdly, according to the same Doctor's opinion, we are said to be much more fully and closely able to do what pertains to true piety through charity, by which a man is justified. This is because that charity or love is nothing else than good will or volition, which, as long as it is lacking, it is impossible to live well; but when it is present, we are said to be able. However, charity, through which the power to do good is given, has various degrees and increments; according to these, that power is either greater or smaller: and initially being weak and insufficient for all good works, it gradually grows until it reaches such maturity of strength that it can overcome all enticements, threats, and sufferings.

XIV. He also notes that what is said about the ability given through faith and charity must be understood mainly about those habitual gifts: because through these, the just are said to be able to pray, love, live well, and overcome temptations, even when they do none of those things. Since these are virtues that remain in the soul, they themselves make the soul robust for certain works, although, if they are still imperfect, they are not sufficient for higher-order works.

XV. However, he contends that we should not be said to be completely able to do good and perform duties of piety unless the will is so prepared by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit that

it not only can but also wills. Accordingly, according to his doctrine, this complete ability is never possessed unless it is also being acted upon, and it is the proper effect not of faith or charity, or habitual good will, but of that actual grace which Christ brought to humans through His cross. By this grace, not only the ability but also the actual doing is assisted: as it gives not only the ability if you will but also the will to do what you can. And therefore, no matter how much faith and charity, or habitual good will someone has, even if very robust, unless in a temptation, however slight, they are fortified by such an inspiration of the spirit or actual grace, they will undoubtedly succumb: because without it, the habitual will or charity after the fall of the first man cannot come into action. This is because the flame of innate concupiscence always presses the languishing soul downward; and always provokes it with visible objects offered from within and without, unless the movements arising from the gift of the Holy Spirit either prevent them from arising or suppress them when they have arisen.

XVI. From these, as from what has been previously stated, it is manifestly clear in what sense Jansen asserted this proposition. "Some of God's commandments are impossible for just men who are willing and trying, given the current powers they have, also lacking the grace by which they would be possible." This is the first of the five propositions, which the Roman Pontiffs condemned a few years ago, attributing them to Jansen, and indeed, as they say, in the sense in which Jansen asserted them; although they do not explain or determine that sense which they intend to condemn.

XVII. However, whatever they might think about that sense, it is certain from what has been expounded that Jansen meant by those words nothing other than that it sometimes happens, by God's hidden but just judgment, that some faithful and just people do not receive grace by itself efficacious for praying, overcoming temptation, and observing some commandment: and then, although they have some will to fulfill the commandment, but a small, weak, and imperfect one, insufficient for fully and properly observing that commandment, they are not, according to the present powers they have at that moment, proximally and completely able to pray as they should, overcome temptation, and observe the commandment as they should. And thus, this inability is nothing other than that which arises from the weakness of the will and the lack of efficacious assistance, which simultaneously gives the nearest and most complete ability and the will.

XVIII. Moreover, that Doctor, and those who agree with him, assert that this inability to do good, found in all those who are deprived of Christ's grace necessary for these or those good works, does not remove the obligation by which they are bound to do them, nor excuse them from fulfilling their duty in this part. To show this, they note that the inability to fulfill a command is twofold. One, they say, arises from the lack of something that cannot be supplied by any amount of will, that is, no matter how strongly one wills. Such is the inability of someone who lacks the means to give alms or the knowledge to teach someone perishing from lack of instruction, and similar countless other things. Concerning such inability, it is absolutely true that God does not command impossibilities. For the very reason that such impossibility arises, the commandment either ceases, or certainly the person to whom it is commanded is no longer

obligated to fulfill it. In such impossibilities, the will is considered as the act. For it is not the fault of the will that it is not done, but pure lack of ability.

XIX. The other inability arises from the lack of will or volition itself, which if it were present, as it should be, the command would be easily fulfilled. For it is only fulfilled by willing strongly; hence, if he wills strongly, it is already fulfilled, and it cannot be unfulfilled. Such a will, just as it brings full willingness, so it brings the power to do what it wills. This inability to act in no way excuses the one who does not fulfill what is commanded. For he could fulfill it if he willed. But if he is unwilling, and therefore unable, who would not blame him for the very perverse and obstinate will?

XX. To apply this to the present matter, they say that the inability to fulfill divine commandments found in sinners is such that they do not cease to be able to fulfill them if they will. For if they will, and fully will, as soon as they will, they will be fulfilled: but if they are unwilling, and therefore unable, who does not blame them for the hardness of their unjust will and the consequent lack of ability? For indeed, such a lack of ability is nothing other than the hardness of an evil will, which having been assumed, cannot be receded from; it is nothing other than a tenacious unwillingness. Thus, Jansen, the Bishop of Ypres, philosophizes about this matter in the book *On the Grace of Christ the Savior*, Book 3, Chapter 15.

XXI. He adds that the grace denied to them is justly denied by God, because by their own fault they have made themselves unworthy of it, whence it follows that their lack of it cannot excuse their inability to do good. It would be otherwise if God deprived a sinless creature of the necessary aids to do good: for then, there would be no fault in the creature, as it would follow God's institution and could not be said to have departed from it.

XXII. He does not think it more difficult to reconcile that inability which arises from the absence of grace with the freedom of human will. For that inability, according to him, is nothing other than the obstinacy of the will in evil and its inflexibility to good, originating from a free first choice. Thus, just as voluntary firmness does not take away God's freedom when it cannot recede from a once-assumed volition; so, the immobility of sinful humans or angels, by which they cannot receive a good will, in no way infringes upon their liberty. Nor is there any necessity here that contradicts liberty and absolves the guilt of a deviating will. For whatever necessity is found in it arises entirely from the hardness and obstinacy of willing, which neither takes away nor diminishes the guilt of the stubbornly willing, but rather increases and accumulates it because through it the will adheres more firmly to evil.

XXIII. However, towards the end of the previous century, and many years before Jansen wrote, the Doctors of Louvain also acknowledged no grace sufficient for the conversion of man except that which actually and effectively converts him. For they affirm that the assistance sometimes administered to those who neither believe nor convert to the Lord is not sufficient for faith and conversion, because the grace sufficient for conversion itself converts; that which does not convert is not sufficient. This is discussed in the justification of the censure against the Jesuits of Louvain, Chapter 16.

XXIV. But except for those who adhere to Jansen and call themselves disciples of Augustine, the entire Roman school today admits this division of the grace of Jesus Christ into sufficient and efficacious: and for it, both those who are called recent Thomists and those who follow Molina's method and principles contend. However, they do not all explain and understand it in the same sense.

XXV. For those who are called recent Thomists call that grace sufficient which gives the ability to act, even if a new assistance on God's part is required for the actual good operation to follow: but efficacious grace is that which not simply gives the ability to act but effectively moves man to do good, and thus gives the ability with effect. Accordingly, according to them, efficacious grace is really distinct in essence from sufficient grace; because, namely, efficacious grace adds to sufficient grace a certain divine assistance that is prior and necessary for good action.

XXVI. Although the grace they distinguish from efficacious grace does not include that final prerequisite for doing good, they nevertheless insist that it should rightly be called sufficient. Because, even though it does not suffice for someone to act, it does give the strength to do good, and this suffices for someone to be able to do good. Indeed, through such sufficient grace, they say not only the power to do good is simply given, but such a power that deserves to be called proximate and complete; although they admit that new divine assistance must necessarily precede the good action. Just as a healthy person whose eyes are well-constituted, even if they are in darkness, has, according to their sense, the proximate and complete power to see, although, for vision to occur, it is necessarily required that there be light to illuminate the present objects.

XXVII. They contend that grace sufficient in this manner for doing good is given to those who indeed fail in good works. For God gives them aids through which they can do good, and which provide them with the proximate and complete power to do good, that is, as the schools say, in the first act: even if they lack another assistance which is required for the actual good work and which, when given, infallibly moves them to such work, and is kindly also granted to all those who actually do good. Therefore, they are said to have grace for doing good, not only sufficient but also efficacious.

XXVIII. On the other hand, the grace given to others is rightly, according to them, called sufficient because, although it does not suffice to give the ability with effect, it truly suffices to give the ability simply. For no other assistance is necessary for those who have received it to be truly said to be able to do the works for which it is called sufficient: although new assistance is necessary for the action to follow. That new assistance does not add some new virtue to the power, which gives it the ability in the first act, as stated: but its function is to move and apply the power, which is already suitable for action, to the act.

XXIX. Indeed, as Alvarez notes, there is a twofold assistance sufficient for some operation. One is completely sufficient, namely, beyond which no other assistance is absolutely necessary for that operation to be produced in actuality. The other is not completely sufficient, but nevertheless truly sufficient, which, namely, gives the ability concerning that operation: so

that no other assistance is absolutely necessary for a man to be truly said to be able to produce that operation: just as to say a man is able to see, nothing else is required than that he has the visual power: although beyond the visual power, many other things are required for someone to actually see. And in this sense, he asserts that by the aids of grace, which he calls sufficient, a man is truly able to perform that act concerning which it is called sufficient: even if he will never perform it unless God, through efficacious assistance, brings it into actual operation. And thus, sufficient assistance to believe is that by which a man can believe: and sufficient assistance to persevere is that by which a man can persevere if he wills: although efficacious assistance is required for him to will. Epitome of the Aids of Divine Grace, Book 3, Chapter 17.

XXX. Indeed, according to these doctors' hypotheses, this division of divine grace into sufficient and efficacious should have a place even in an integral nature. For according to their doctrine, for any creature to act, it is not enough that it has the power to act given by the creator, but it is also necessary that the first cause applies and pre-moves it to act. Accordingly, for an integral creature to actually do good, it not only needed assistance giving it the power to do good; but also another assistance whereby God would effectively move and pre-determine its faculties to do good. Hence it follows that the apostate angels had indeed sufficient assistance to persevere, but lacked the efficacious assistance necessary to actually persevere: while the good angels were given assistance to persevere, not only sufficient but also efficacious by itself.

XXXI. Furthermore, they acknowledge that grace, which in one respect is only sufficient, is in another respect efficacious. Namely, the grace that is sufficient in relation to some perfect act, to which it disposes and ordains a person, is efficacious in respect to the imperfect acts through which a person is usually disposed to that perfect act. Indeed, according to their view, all sufficient grace, which is inefficacious for the full work for which it is said to be sufficient, is nevertheless fully and abundantly efficacious for the proximate and immediate act for which it is given and destined by God.

XXXII. Diego Alvarez explicitly teaches this among others in the third chapter of the previously cited book. He says, "Every sufficient assistance, in comparison to one act, is always efficacious in respect to another, to which it is destined by the absolute decree of the divine will. For example, sufficient assistance for an act of faith effectively produces pious thoughts and knowledge of things to be believed, or pious desires to have faith, and other such imperfect acts which regularly precede the assent of faith. Similarly, sufficient assistance for an act of contrition effectively produces in a person consideration of the punishments of hell, or attrition, or other such imperfect acts which regularly precede perfect contrition."

XXXIII. Moreover, since the grace called sufficient is so named relative to various works for which it disposes a person and in respect to which it gives them the ability, as various works are considered, that grace must be established in various ways. For the same grace does not make a person sufficient for all things. Thus, in a just man, sufficient grace for the works of true piety and those worthy of eternal life consists both in the habitual grace itself and the gifts of the Holy Spirit with which he is already endowed, and in the various illuminations and enlightenment by which he is invited and solicited to these and those works. In a faithful person not yet justified,

faith together with such movements of the Holy Spirit is sufficient assistance to pray and ask for and obtain from God justifying grace and the gift of the Holy Spirit. And in someone who is not yet faithful, sufficient grace for an act of faith includes, as Alvarez already said, the knowledge of things to be believed, pious thoughts, and pious desires to have faith, and such things.

XXXIV. But whatever it may be, that Doctor wants no grace to be sufficient for any good work and pious operation except that which not only illuminates the intellect within but also in some way moves and affects the will. He says, "Exciting grace, by which only the intellect is illuminated or moved, is not the same as sufficient grace, speaking simply; but only in a certain respect; because not only the intellect but also the will needs divine motion and prevenient grace to be able to exercise works of piety, since the will is more corrupted by sin than the intellect."

XXXV. He proves this from the fact that, "For salvation, it is necessary not only that the intellect knows what is to be done and what is to be avoided; but also that the will should will to embrace good and avoid evil, and love God above all things: but by exciting grace received only in the intellect, the will cannot will anything that leads to salvation, nor love God above all things: Because grace existing in the intellect is external to the will and consequently does not provide it with a sufficient principle by which it can exercise works of piety. Hence he concludes that grace received only in the intellect is not sufficient grace for salvation." Epitome of the Aids of Divine Grace, Book 3, Chapter 16.

XXXVI. However, the proper assistance of efficacious grace, those recent Thomists constitute in the gratuitous and benign operation of God, which properly operates the conversion itself or any other act of true piety in a person's free will. Namely, by effectively touching the movement of the will itself, that is, by applying and determining the will itself to will and choose. This operation is called physical, that is, properly said. Which operation is indeed recognized in God towards any other effects proceeding from Him. And since it cannot happen that God determines the will and the will is not determined and acts towards what it is applied to by God as a secondary cause; it follows that this grace cannot fail to have its effect. Hence, according to this view, divine grace is said to be efficacious by a physical and properly said efficacy, not a moral one. These are the words of Estius in the 2nd Book of Sentences, Distinction 28, Paragraph 2.

XXXVII. Therefore, they say that this grace is efficacious by itself, that is, such that by its own power it moves and determines the free will: and this, as they say, infallibly, irresistibly, unavoidably: because it cannot happen that the human will frustrates its effect and opposes so as not to produce that for which it is properly given by God; because this divine grace overcomes all human resistance, and its power lies in making a willing person out of an unwilling one.

XXXVIII. For this reason, they also say that the efficacy of this grace is absolute concerning good action and does not depend on the consent of free will: because to follow the good action, it does not wait for the consent of free will but powerfully causes it; as it subjects free will to itself and is by no means subject to its power.

XXXIX. Nevertheless, they do not think that the efficacy of this grace in any way removes or diminishes human free will; and thus, human actions that depend on this grace as

their cause are no less free. This is because God, through His grace, not only makes us perform good works and conform to His will, but also makes us perform them in a manner suitable to human nature, and thus freely. Indeed, that efficacious divine grace moves us so that, based on the practical judgment of the intellect, we freely choose the good and, moreover, could choose the opposite based on the different judgment of the same intellect, which is sufficient for the full notion of freedom. For although grace certainly and infallibly ensures that we direct our will towards this or that good based on the prior judgment of the practical mind, it does not prevent the intellect from retaining the power to judge otherwise, and the will from having the power to choose otherwise, in which the essence of freedom lies. Simply put, one is entirely free who, while acting, retains the power not to act or to act differently.

XL. Even though grace effectively works so that free will consents to the moving grace and follows its guidance, it does not take away the power to dissent. The efficacious aid of Christ indeed ensures that the human will always and certainly embraces the good it is moved toward; but it does not prevent the will from having the power to not do that good, and even to do the opposite evil. According to these doctors, the actual created will's dissent cannot coexist with the actual motion of efficacious grace; but the power to dissent can coexist perfectly with the same motion. This is what Alvarez means when he says that free will, moved by God with efficacious assistance, cannot dissent from it in a composed sense but can in a divided sense.

XLI. Moreover, Jansen and his followers teach the same as the recent Thomists regarding the manner in which the medicinal and efficacious grace of Christ operates in human wills and moves them to act. Like the Thomists, they assert that the efficacy of this grace is absolute and does not depend on the consent of free will, nor does it wait for it to achieve its effect. They claim it is the conqueror of the human heart and such that no one can resist it. It inseparably carries with it the effect for which it is given by God: and is never rejected by any heart, no matter how hardened, because it is given precisely to remove the hardness of the heart. It does not leave the will in equilibrium but most powerfully takes it with it: and thus it inseparably and irresistibly dominates the human will. Similar things can be read in the aforementioned Jansen's eight books on the grace of Christ the Savior, especially in the third book.

XLII. Indeed, the same author asserts, along with the Thomists, that this help of Christ truly involves the function of physically pre-determining the will. For it is such that it leads the will to act, not if it wills, but by most effectively making it will. For it does not wait for the will to cooperate with it but makes the will cooperate, applying it to willing and doing whatever God has determined it to will and do through it. For as earthly desires determine the will not to will, or even to resist, it removes this depression and determination towards the contrary and reflects it towards good, not only as it seems to free will and wants but by making it seem so and want by its ineffable light and sweetness. Thus, according to him, God makes those who are unwilling and resistant to be willing and consenting; by inclining, applying, determining, and, since it precedes the very determination of the will, also pre-determining the will; not only morally but by true, real, and physical determination. For moral pre-determination is called that which only relates to the object and in the manner of enticing, flattering, asking, advising, etc., whether

externally or internally; but this operates in the very power of the will, which it applies to willing by the greatness of its own sweetness, and by applying it, determines it, as it causes in it the very act of determining itself, and therefore pre-determines.

XLIII. Likewise, with the Thomists, this bishop and those who adhere to his doctrine teach that the efficacy of Christ's grace, as described, can be reconciled with human free will in this state. Namely, because that grace of Christ, which determines the will to act, does not take away from it the power to act otherwise, even if it infallibly makes it act. That agent should be considered free which acts in such a way that it retains the power not to act or to act otherwise. Nor is it necessary for freedom that, with all the requirements for action being present, the will should be simultaneously able not to act; but only that it can refrain from acting. Therefore, according to their hypotheses, given the motion of divine grace, the mind must indeed follow it in a composite sense, and the will cannot resist the moving God or dissent from what God wants to accomplish through it; thus the power of divine grace in this respect is rightly called unavoidable and irresistible: but in a divided sense, it is true that the will, even when moved by grace, can resist God, dissent from grace, and turn elsewhere than where God leads it: because while it consents to grace, it does not lose the power to dissent, and while it follows God's guidance, it retains the power to resist and follow where concupiscence draws. This can be seen in Jansen's work on the grace of Christ the Savior, book 8, chapter 4. "Therefore," he says, "in a composite sense, such phrases are true, by which the will, moved by divine grace, is said to be unable to resist God, unable to dissent from what God wants to work through it, unable to decline, unable to overcome: yet, on the contrary, in a divided sense, it is true to say that it can decline, can dissent, can overcome."

XLIV. He repeats and emphasizes similar things in the twentieth chapter of the same book. "We say," he says, "that free will, however much it is prevented and determined by the efficacious delight of grace to do good, can still not only refrain from doing good but also do evil. This is true not in a composite sense as it is commonly said, but in a divided sense. Namely, because at the same time, the free will, placed under the delight of grace effectively moving it, or even doing the good deed itself, has within itself the power not to do it, and even to sin; not that the cessation of the act which it then elicits, or the actual sin, can coexist with the influx of the delightful grace, which the composite sense would require) but because the power to cease and sin can simultaneously coexist with the same grace in the same will. For although two opposite acts cannot coexist, and in the same will at the same time, the powers for opposites are not opposed to each other, nor to the opposite acts, and coexist in the same subject, whether acting or at rest. Thus, the will, however much it is captivated by the sweetness of grace, can refrain from doing what it is drawn to, because it retains the true power of not doing, even while being drawn by grace." He summarizes this in fewer words in the following chapter: "For," he says, "the power of dissenting does not conflict with the actual motion and consent of grace; although it cannot happen that actual dissent is joined with the actual motion of God."

XLV. Although Jansen and those who share his view acknowledge that divine grace's efficacy is reconciled with indifference, or the power to choose between good and evil, to act or

not to act, which they do not deny exists in all those living in this mortal body, and in which many seem to place the very essence of liberty: nevertheless, they contend that this does not provide the true and genuine harmony of divine grace with free will. Because Augustine and his first disciples establish this harmony differently. Specifically, they say that grace does not destroy free will because it makes free will not idle like a stone and do nothing, nor be forced unwillingly to do good, but also to will and act itself. They defined free as what is within our power, and this was said to be within our power when we will, or what someone does if they will, and does not do if they do not will. Given these points, it follows that every rational will or volition is free: because just as it is impossible for something to not happen when we will, and to happen when we do not will, so consequently it is impossible for it not to be in our power, and thus not free. Therefore, since grace only provides that we elicit a good volition from the right judgment of reason, it thereby makes us act freely and does not destroy but rather establishes our freedom. Jansen considers this the best and most genuine way of reconciling human liberty with the infallible efficacy of divine grace in his book on the Grace of Christ the Savior, book 8, chapter 19. This is because, according to him, the essence of liberty in general does not consist in indifference, whereby someone can will or not will, this or the contrary: but rather in being moved to will and act not by any external force or brute necessity but by one's own judgment of reason, and to that extent being the master of one's own act.

XLVI. However, although Jansen and the recent Thomists agree that the grace of Christ, by which men are converted and do good, is an intrinsically efficacious grace that subdues free will to itself and does not depend on free will; and that to produce its effect, it does not await the human will's consent but infallibly and powerfully brings about that consent; they nonetheless disagree among themselves about the nature and substance of this grace and do not explain in the same way what it consists of and where it is situated. While the mode of operation of this grace is the same for both, its essence is different.

XLVII. It is indeed agreed among both parties that this grace, without which no one turns to God and does good, and by which all who receive it are certainly and infallibly converted and do good, is some kind of aid that moves and directly affects the will itself, and not merely the intellect; nor should it be constituted in any permanent habit. But what this grace actually is, is not entirely agreed upon among them, not even among the Thomists themselves.

XLVIII. For although all these Thomists denote this efficacious aid by the term physical predetermination and say it is a gratuitous and prior motion of God that moves and applies the created will to do good; there are some who say that this divine pre-motion, by which human wills are moved to do good, acts in the manner of a non-permanent, transient quality, accompanying the operation of the will itself. Others say that the actual motion by which God moves and applies the will to act is actually the will's own operation, as it proceeds from God, who effectively applies and pre-moves the will to act. Finally, others maintain that this prior motion is neither a quality received in the will nor identical with the will's operation itself but is something that has an incomplete existence, in the manner in which colors are in the air and the power of art is in the artist's tool, which can be properly and fittingly called a virtuous motion.

This last opinion is defended as true and his own by Didacus Alvarez in his book *De Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae*, disputation 19.

XLIX. From this, Alvarez infers that this divine aid, which precedes and is necessary for the action of the created will, is produced in it effectively by God alone and in no way depends efficiently on the influence of the will itself; and thus the will, in relation to this prior aid of God, is passive: although the same will is active and free in relation to the free act to which it is moved by that prior aid. This is explained in the cited disputation, number six.

L. Furthermore, these doctors acknowledge that this divine motion, which precedes and is necessary for every good work, is not within the power of man; because it is given and withheld according to divine good pleasure. Nevertheless, they affirm that it is within the power of our will to prevent itself from receiving this motion. Hence, they conclude that if someone fails to perform the commanded act, it will be imputed to them as a fault because their own fault prevented them from receiving the efficacious aid necessary to actually perform the virtuous act commanded. Just as if God were to impose a command to fly on a person and, as far as lies in Him, offered wings and the necessary aid to fly, but the person by their own free will responded, "Lord, I neither wish to receive wings nor to fly": they would rightly be considered guilty and a transgressor of the command, even if they could not fly without wings, because it was their own fault that prevented the wings from being given to them by God. These are the words of Alvarez in the same book, disputation 18, number 20, where he confirms his doctrine with the saying of Augustine: "That men are not aided by the grace of God is due to themselves, not to God."

LI. Moreover, the necessity of this aid, which effectively moves and pre-determines the will for every pious operation, is not simply derived from the corruption and weakness of the human will; but generally from the dependence of every secondary cause on the First Cause, without whose impulse and prior motion no cause can act at all, according to their hypotheses. Additionally, from the indifference of free will, which is not apt to act unless determined by a higher agent.

LII. Although they constitute this efficacious aid in a certain motion that physically pre-determines the will, they nonetheless acknowledge that it presupposes a moral motion, which occurs through the proposition of a suitable object, by which that object appears desirable and fitting to the will. For they maintain that the will can desire nothing unless it is first proposed to it by the intellect as fitting. Therefore, no one can be physically determined to pursue good by the aid of grace unless their mind is illuminated with the knowledge of that good, and their will is invited and morally inclined by the internal persuasions and suggestions of the Holy Spirit. Yet, according to their doctrine, this never results in the consent of the will unless that other aid is added, which effectively and physically moves the will to that consent.

LIII. Jansen, however, maintains that the grace of Christ, which effectively and certainly determines a person who is already enlightened with the knowledge of good and in various ways urged, attracted, and solicited to embrace good, to actually pursue it, is nothing other than a certain heavenly and ineffable sweetness, or spiritual delight, by which the will is anticipated and bent to will and do whatever God has determined it to will and do. He asserts that there is no

kind of good action or will, nor any effect of efficacious grace, that should not be attributed to this heavenly delight as the true grace of Christ and the true cause. It is by this that we begin to desire the good that is preached to us; by this that we accept and embrace the good thought with pious will. Without this divinely infused delight, no prayer pleasing to God can be made, nor can God be purely and chastely loved, nor can the temptations of our desires be resisted, nor any good work be done. This is extensively argued by Jansen with references to Augustine. (*De Gratia Christi Salvatoris*, book 4, chapter 1 and following).

LIV. To explain what this heavenly sweetness and delight is, which he considers to be the true grace of Christ according to his and Augustine's views, Jansen distinguishes three acts concerning good in the appetite and will. The first is simple love, or complacency, which is like a certain adaptation of the appetite to the good as fitting to itself. The second is a consequent motion, called desire, by which the appetite tends towards the good as fitting and suitable to itself. The third is rest in the good that someone has already attained. This act is properly called joy and delight, through which the soul rests with a certain satisfaction and enjoyment in the present good.

LV. Although delight properly consists in that third act, he nevertheless observes that there is a certain delight in the previous acts of simple love and desire; for since every love tends towards delight as its rest and center through desire, it cannot happen that the very motion itself does not participate in that sweetness. For as soon as the motion begins, it participates in rest to some extent, as even the first moment of motion has its partial end.

LVI. This holds much more in the love and desire of spiritual things, such as wisdom, truth, holiness, justice, and charity. For whoever loves earthly things does not, by the very fact of loving them, also possess them, nor does he rest in them as if attained, nor delight in them as if enjoying them. But whoever loves justice, truth, wisdom, charity, by that very act of love attains, has, and possesses those goods; and thus also enjoys them with delight and delights in them with enjoyment. Therefore, whoever loves God, who is eternal wisdom, truth, charity, and justice itself, enjoys and delights in God by the very act of love, as having his object. Hence, even the acts of love and desire, especially when they concern God as divine things, are rightly attributed the name of delight and sweetness, as Augustine often does.

LVII. Furthermore, it should be noted that the acts of love and desire that affect the will can be either deliberate and free, which are elicited after prior deliberation from a certain judgment of reason; or non-deliberate and thus not free, which arise suddenly in the will at the proposition of some object, before the mind can consult and deliberate.

LVIII. Having noted these things, Jansen observes that the heavenly delight, in which he places the efficacious aid of Christ necessary for every pious operation and good act of will, is not that properly called delight, through which the will rests in the present good and enjoys it, which is the terminus of desire by which the will tends towards the good; nor is it any free and deliberate motion of the will: but rather a certain indeliberate act divinely infused into the will, by which either the proposed good simply pleases the will or even moves it to desire the good.

This divinely infused act, although the will does not freely elicit it, nevertheless proceeds actively from it and is a certain vital motion of it.

LIX. According to the principles of that doctor, it is clear that this delight does not consist in any love or free desire. Since to desire and love God, and any true and spiritual good, by a free movement of the will is necessary: because such acts of desire and love are good acts, which cannot proceed from the will without the grace of delight. Jansen treats this at length in the fourth book of "The Grace of Christ the Savior," chapter eleven, titled "That Heavenly Delight, according to Augustine's view, is a vital and indeliberate act of the soul: indeed preceding the consent of love and desire, and that delight which is called the rest of the soul and joy."

LX. This divine infused delight, according to the author's view, is necessary for any good act of the will because, according to Augustine's explicit statement, the will cannot be moved in any way unless something occurs that delights and invites the mind. For the will embraces nothing unless it is first affected by some sense of delight towards it. This applies not only to good things but also to evil things. For the will is not inclined to evil unless it is prepared and driven by a preceding delight, which flatters it under the false appearance of good.

LXI. Since it often happens that a man's mind is affected simultaneously by some sense of delight about opposites; and especially in believers, as long as they carry this mortal body, there is a struggle of two delights, one earthly, the other heavenly, one harmful, the other beneficial, whichever one prevails, draws the mind prone and consenting to itself. And it can never happen otherwise, than that the greater delight will carry the will into that which delights more. And wherever the mind, situated between justice and sin, is drawn in different directions, it must necessarily act according to what delights it more.

LXII. Jansen illustrates his view with these words of Augustine, taken from his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, where Augustine, discussing the fruits of the Spirit, which are joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faith, gentleness, self-control, says: "These spiritual fruits reign in a person in whom sins do not reign. These goods reign if they so delight that they hold the mind in temptations so that it does not rush into the consent of sin. For whatever delights us more, we must necessarily act according to it. For example, a beautiful woman's form appears and moves towards the delight of fornication: but if the inner beauty and sincere form of chastity delight more, through the grace which is in the faith of Christ, we live according to this, we act according to this; so that sin not reigning in us, to obey its desires, but justice reigning through charity, we do with great delight whatever we know pleases God. And what I said about chastity and fornication, I want to be understood about other things."

LXIII. Therefore, he does not place the effective aid of divine grace in any delight about good but in such delight which, in the person to whom it is given, is greater than and surpasses any opposed delight; and which, therefore, he calls with Augustine, "Victorious Delight." For if the delight of the flesh is greater, then the delight infused by the Spirit will never obtain the consent of the will. For the lesser delight cannot overcome the greater: but the mind follows that which, by affecting it more with sweetness, holds it. "On the Grace of Christ the Savior," book 4, chapter 6.

LXIV. Although that victorious delight, in which the medicinal and effective grace of Christ consists, infallibly drives the will towards good and certainly makes it consent to the good which is thus pleasant: nevertheless, what is victorious in one person, because a lesser delight of the flesh opposes it, and therefore induces the will to consent, will be conquered in another by a greater and stronger delight of the flesh, and the will will not be moved by it but will be taken captive by a more powerful and stronger earthly delight.

LXV. Furthermore, he derives the necessity of this victorious delight, which must be infused from heaven to overcome temptations and accomplish works of justice, from the weakness of the will, which makes it incapable of embracing any good unless it delights. Because the will by itself, and by its mere freedom to will, cannot overcome internal obstacles of pleasure or pain. Nor is man sufficient by himself, as the Pelagians thought, to give laws to his inherent motions. Since earthly delights, arising from the innate concupiscence in man, so depress the will and call it away from true good, that it cannot lift itself up and burst forth into actions worthy of heaven, unless God sends down a certain heavenly delight and sweetness, greater and more powerful than those earthly ones, by which it is freed from the snare of carnal desires and brought into freedom from that captivity. Without which the will cannot so strongly and intensely desire the good as to overcome the opposing temptation. Nor is it in its power to delight freely in heavenly things, according to Augustine's saying to Simplicianus: "Who has the power to so bind his mind with such a vision that his will is moved to faith? But who embraces something with his mind that does not delight him? Or who has the power that either something that can delight him occurs or that it delights him when it occurs? Therefore, when we are delighted by things by which we progress to God, this is inspired and given by the grace of God, not by our own will and industry, nor is it obtained by merits of work."

LXVI. From these and many other similar points, Jansen derives this conclusion: "Thus, this weakness of the will, which arises from the delights of earthly things depressing the will downwards to love created and carnal things, is the true cause why the delight of justice or of the good work commanded is necessary, by which the soul is lifted up to be able either to strongly will what it now weakly wills or even to will what it does not will. Without the sweetness of this delight, God never will be able to make the will fulfill the justice of the commandment, either by doing or willing: but if it seems to exercise any acts concerning the commandment, they will end only in the fruits of earthly concupiscences and delights or of one's own pride. For this heavenly sweetness smooths the way so that the will can emerge from the snare of carnal things and fix itself on loving justice. Consequently, if it is lacking, the will, as if torpid and dead, cannot embrace any good at all; just as conversely, it cannot pursue anything in carnal things except what has delighted it. "On the Grace of Christ the Savior," book 4, chapter 7.

LXVII. However, he carefully notes that this necessity of heavenly delight for willing and acting, and our will's weakness, which makes it impossible for it to be moved to good unless something delights it, nor to choose between two delights anything other than what has delighted it more, comes not from the essence and nature of the will but from its punishment. For he does not think that this is the nature of the human will considered absolutely, that it cannot freely

pursue a good object unless it first delights; much less does he consider it necessary that, upon seeing a good object, the will must be touched by some delight.

LXVIII. Therefore, he attributes the entire matter to a certain weakness contracted by the will through sin, and which must be numbered among the punishments of sin. For before sin, according to his hypotheses, no delight dominated the will or bent and determined it to either side, effectively eliciting its consent. Before man had fallen from his original integrity through sin, no delight in earthly things solicited and elicited his will to evil; and this because all such delight arises from concupiscence, which is the fruit of sin. Therefore, the first sin of the first man was committed without preceding delight. For the first delight followed the perverse will, not the will delight. For every repugnance of good will is a punishment for evil; which God does not inflict on rational creatures without merit.

LXIX. As for good actions, indeed the first man was endowed with grace to be able to perform them and to carry them out duly and perfectly: but that grace was not such as to make him will and act; because it was subject to his free will, and it was in his power to use or not to use that grace. Therefore, in him, there was no place for that victorious delight which subjects free will to itself and effectively and infallibly moves the will to good. Whence it clearly follows that the necessity of that victorious delight, now prevailing for doing good, does not arise from the nature of the will itself. For otherwise, it would have had to be perpetual in man: whereas in the integral man it had no place and was not necessary for him.

LXX. Therefore, according to this doctor, what makes that heavenly delight necessary for good actions is nothing other than the corruption and depravity of the human will. Because, through the sin of the first man, the will was plunged into the dominion of lusts. As a result, in all actions before grace, it is provoked by some preceding and titillating libidinous delight, to which it sins by consenting, and if left to itself, it cannot but consent. To cure this evil, God sends the delight of good or justice, as the only medicine for the ailing will, by which, as it is directly opposed to the disease by which it is afflicted, its consent to the good, which God demands from it, is extorted; and thus the will is bent upwards, fixed and as if suspended from God by the delightful and attractive Spirit, no longer to be dragged back into the old servitude of lust. Jansen explains this in more detail in chapter 9 of the frequently cited book.

LXXI. From all this, it is easy to see how Jansen's opinion aligns with and differs from the Thomists' regarding sufficient grace and efficacious grace. Jansen agrees with them that those who do not convert and do not perform good works receive multiple graces from God; not only is their intellect enlightened, but their will is also moved by various graces. He does not deny that, with such aids of grace, a person can be said to be able to convert and perform good works. Conversely, Thomists admit that those who do not convert and do not perform good works lack some necessary aid to actually convert and perform good works.

LXXII. However, the distinction lies in that the Thomists say that grace, which is not followed by a good action, is still sufficient and provides the proximate and complete power to perform good works. Jansen and his followers deny this. In this matter, it appears to be a mere logomachy and a question of terminology. Jansen denies that such grace is sufficient and

provides the proximate power to perform good works for no other reason than that it lacks some aid necessary for the good action, which the Thomists concede.

LXXIII. Regarding efficacious grace, Thomists and Jansen agree that there is no grace of Christ that is not efficacious in some respect, that is, which does not certainly and infallibly produce some effect for which it was precisely given by God and destined by God's absolute decree. Jansen, like them, acknowledges that the grace of Christ not only morally but also physically determines the will. Both agree and assert with equal conviction that divine grace is efficacious in itself and by itself: its efficacy does not depend on the consent of free will but is absolute: and that grace dominates free will, not the other way around.

LXXIV. However, they differ greatly concerning the nature of efficacious grace, as Jansen extensively notes and reports in the first chapter of the eighth book of "The Grace of Christ the Savior." According to the more recent Thomists, the grace that physically predetermines the will, as explained above, is a kind of virtuous motion, which has an incomplete effect: and in the will, it exists in the manner that colors are in the air and impetus in the object being pushed. But to Jansen, that grace is a real and true affection of the will, consisting in a love and desire for some heavenly and spiritual good, by which the human mind is sweetly and with great delight lifted upwards. Thus, to the Thomists, that efficacious aid is received passively in the will, but to Jansen, it is something that proceeds actively from it and is a vital motion of it.

LXXV. Then, according to the Thomist view, the physically pre-determining aid is such that, in whatever circumstances the will is placed, it always makes it act and produces its effect, overcoming all resistance. Namely, if the same aid that moves and determines this or that person to act well were given to everyone else, it would similarly move all, even those agitated by the same impulses of concupiscence. But according to Jansen's sense, the effective aid of Christ operates differently. For the victorious delight, in which he places that aid, is relative. It is victorious when it is greater than the opposing delight. If it happens that the other is more intense, the mind will stick only in ineffective desires and will never effectively will what should be willed. Therefore, what is victorious in one person, due to weaker concupiscence movements, will be overcome and ineffective in another due to stronger movements of the same concupiscence. And what suffices in one person to overcome a present temptation will not suffice at another time if a stronger and harsher temptation urges.

LXXVI. Moreover, the recent Thomists think that a physical predetermination to act well is necessary for the human will because, like all other secondary causes, it needs to be pre-moved by God, the primary cause, to act. They also derive this necessity from the indifference of the will, which must be determined to act by a superior cause. But Jansen thinks that the effective aid of divine grace is necessary for the human will only because of the wound inflicted by sin and the weakness contracted from concupiscence adhering to fallen man.

LXXVII. Therefore, according to the Thomist hypotheses, physically pre-determining aid was necessary even for the integral man, apart from any consideration of sin. But according to Jansen, effective aid, by which a person wills and acts, had no place in the state of innocence;

only aid without which a person could not act well, and with which it was easy to act well, but also easy not to act well, as it was subject to free will and did not subject the free will to itself.

LXXVIII. However, the doctrine of the famous Jesuit Louis Molina and several others who follow him differs significantly from the views of Jansen of Ypres and even the recent Thomists. To make this clearer, the summary of his opinion concerning efficacious and sufficient grace must be briefly repeated from his writings. He does not want any aid of grace to be called sufficient except that which, once given, requires nothing more from God for the action to actually follow. And he teaches that sufficient aid of grace is granted by God to both those who do not act well and do not convert to God and to those who convert and act well.

LXXIX. Thus, he divides sufficient aid into efficacious and inefficacious aid. Efficacious aid is what follows with the effect, that is, the good work to which it moves a person. Inefficacious aid is what lacks the effect and through which a person does not actually convert nor act well.

LXXX. According to him, for the aid to be efficacious, it does not depend on a particular motion of God, which, once given, the free will always consents to and cooperates with, and once removed, never consents or cooperates. Indeed, he thinks those who believe this are in error regarding faith. After referring to the opinion of those who say that it is the divine aid itself or God moving effectively or ineffectively through it that determines whether free will consents or not, he adds, "Certainly, I would not hesitate to call this opinion, explained in this way, an error in faith." His reason is that in this way, the liberty of free will seems to be destroyed because, namely, a person's conversion and perseverance would not depend on their innate and proper liberty but on the quality of the divine aid and motion. For if, he says, our free will derives from the efficacy of divine aid that it consents or does not consent to God's call, and cooperates or does not cooperate for salvation, and perseveres or does not persevere in grace, certainly it does not depend on its innate and proper liberty but on the quality of the aid and divine motion; and thus there is no reason for it to be credited for praise and merit, but rather the liberty of free will is wholly destroyed. "On the Concord of Free Will with the Gifts of Grace," question 23, article 4 & 5, disputation 1, member 6.

LXXXI. Therefore, according to his view, the division of sufficient aid into efficacious and inefficacious is taken from the effect, which depends on the liberty of free will. Hence, it is up to human free will and in its power whether the aid of grace, which is sufficient in itself, becomes efficacious or remains inefficacious. And that sufficient aid is called efficacious when free will, according to its liberty, converts with it, although, nothing hindering from the aid itself, it could have not converted, and that in the composite sense, not only in the divided sense; and it is called inefficacious when free will, according to the same liberty, does not convert with it, although it could have converted and could actually and in fact elicit the act of conversion without any other aid of God's grace. He states, "We assert that the aids of prevenient and assisting grace, which are granted to travelers by ordinary law, whether they are efficacious or inefficacious for conversion or justification, depend on the free consent and cooperation of our free will with them, and thus it is in our free power to render them efficacious by consenting and

cooperating with them for the acts by which we are disposed to justification, or to render them inefficacious by withholding our consent and cooperation or even by eliciting a contrary dissent." "On the Concord of Free Will with the Gifts of Grace," question 14, article 13, disputation 40.

LXXXII. Therefore, according to his hypotheses, efficacious aid and inefficacious aid are named from the outcome: and efficacious aid has nothing more in itself than inefficacious aid. Thus, it can and often does happen that, out of two people equally prevented by the grace of God, one converts and the other does not. Indeed, it sometimes happens that the one who received greater aids of grace remains unrepentant or neglects to act well: while the one to whom God granted fewer and lesser aids performs true repentance and strives for good works; because the former did not wish to use the greater grace granted to him by God, while the latter, using the lesser grace well by his own liberty, benefited from it. It also sometimes happens that, out of two people in whom grace is efficacious, the one who is helped by lesser grace works more fervently and zealously; while the one who received greater grace works more languidly and remissly.

LXXXIII. This is the explicit doctrine of Molina in question 14, article 13, disputation 12. He states, "It can happen that out of two people, equally called inwardly by God with the same aid, one converts by his own free will, and the other remains in unbelief: It often also happens that with the same aid by which one does not convert, another does convert. Indeed, it can happen that someone prevented and called by much greater aid does not convert by his own free will, while another converts with much lesser aid. For God often calls, and sinners resist and despise all the counsel of God."

LXXXIV. Hence it is clear that Molina does not need to reconcile the efficacy of divine grace with the liberty of human free will. Since he subjects God's grace to human free will, he does not want any aid of His to be so efficacious as to determine free will to act by itself; but supposes that whatever aid from God precedes a good action, the dissent of the human will can always stand with it, and it remains in the power of a person to use it or not use it as they please.

LXXXV. Nevertheless, he maintains that the act of free will by which it consents to divine grace is not merely natural but supernatural; and it should be attributed to God's grace; not only insofar as it is called prevenient and entices and invites a person to good, and in a way provides new strengths: but also insofar as through the same grace, God influences the act of human free will, in which respect it is called cooperating grace. Namely, according to him, that grace of God by which He prevents a person helps the will in acting and cooperates with it, in the same way that an inherent habit of power, together with it, concurs in its act. And therefore, the cooperation of that grace depends on free will and should not be conceived as moving the will and preceding its action: just as the influx of a habit into an act depends on the power, and does not move the power to act, but influences the act of the power at the same time as the power moves itself to act.

LXXXVI. Thus, Molina philosophizes about this matter in various places. Especially in disputation 40, article 13, question 14, he asserts, "We maintain, thirdly, that the prevenient grace, by which the will of an adult is prevented, excited, enticed, and invited to the

aforementioned acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting, is an instrument of the Holy Spirit, by which He further effectively concurs and influences the will itself to produce those acts, when the will itself consents to that prevenient grace, and with it influences and cooperates in those acts. Therefore, such acts are effectively from the will itself by its influence on them, and from God, who with a new influx or action influences those same acts through prevenient grace, as through an instrument. Just as habits, both natural and supernatural virtues, because they incline powers to acts and thereby make them suitable for them, effectively concur with them in the acts, influencing them by their partial and proper influx: so when prevenient grace entices, invites, and inclines the powers to elicit those supernatural acts, when the powers consent to the exciting grace and influence the acts to which grace entices and invites, that grace itself also influences and cooperates with the powers in those acts. Moreover, just as the existence of the influx of habits into the acts of virtues, which the powers elicit, depends on the influx of the powers themselves into those acts; because a habit is not a sufficient cause without the concurrence of the powers to produce such acts: so the existence of the new influx of prevenient grace into the acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting depends on the cooperation and influx of our free will into those same acts through the intellect and will; because similarly, prevenient grace is not a sufficient cause of the same acts without the cooperation and influx of our free will into them."

LXXXVII. Hence he argues that the consent of free will to God exciting and calling by prevenient grace is nothing in reality that is not supernatural, and which does not simultaneously come from God, not only as enticing, exciting, and inviting the will to it, but also as cooperating through the aid of grace. Therefore, according to him, anathema should be considered for anyone who affirms that the consent of our free will to God exciting and calling by the aid of prevenient grace is a natural act or can be elicited without the aid and cooperation of the same prevenient grace. Although he also pronounces anathema for anyone who says that the same consent is not in the power of our free will as explained by him: namely, so that it is up to free will to render such prevenient grace of the Holy Spirit either void or not void: as are his words in the same disputation.

LXXXVIII. However, he explains more distinctly what are the parts of grace and free will concerning those good acts, in which a person's conversion consists, in disputation 37 on the same article. Where, after supposing that three things concur for any good act; first, the general concurrence of God as the first agent; second, the particular influx of divine grace; and finally, human free will: he teaches that any good act, for example, an act of believing, hoping, repenting, has from the general concurrence of God that it is any act at all, but not that it is this particular act rather than another: from free will, it has that it is this specific act rather than another; and finally, from grace, that it is a supernatural act. For, he says, "From God's influence through general concurrence alone, it emanates as a universal cause, which does not determine that it should be the assent of faith, or sorrow for sins, rather than any other act of the same power. From the influence of free will, together with the necessary knowledge and other conditions, it has, as from a particular cause, that it is specifically an act of faith or sorrow for

sins rather than some other different act. From prevenient grace, or from God influencing through it as His instrument together with free will in the same act, it has that it is a supernatural act, specifically different from a purely natural act of believing or sorrowing for sins, which free will would elicit by its own strength alone, if prevenient grace did not also influence it."

LXXXIX. Therefore, according to him, God's grace and human free will are two parts of one integral cause of the act of believing, hoping, or repenting, as necessary for salvation; and each such act depends on the influx of both free will and divine grace: and from free will, they have that, as to their substance, they are acts of believing, hoping, repenting; from the influx of grace, they are supernatural and necessary for salvation. Thus, every one of those acts is wholly from free will and wholly from grace: but from neither is it as from a total and integral cause, but as from a part of an integral cause. As that author explains his view at the beginning of the already frequently cited disputation.

XC. Moreover, when this doctor says that if two people are given equal aids from God, it can happen that one converts by his liberty, and the other does not, he clarifies that he means prevenient aids of grace, as prevenient. For if it concerns the aids of the same grace as cooperating, that is, as God influences through it in the act which a person freely elicits, it is no longer true that, given equal aid, one converts, and the other does not. For it is impossible for someone not to convert, and yet for God to effectively produce the act of conversion in him with his free will. But since prevenient and cooperating grace are actually one and the same, and the cooperation of grace depends on the cooperation of our free will, just as the influx and influence of any habit depend on the operation of the power in which it resides: he thinks it should simply and absolutely be said that one converts and is saved with equal or even lesser aids, while another does not convert and is not saved. Although, if we speak with the utmost rigor, it should not be said that one converts with equal aids of grace, while the other does not convert: because in the one who converts, there is a certain influx of grace which is not in the other; namely, that which depends on the consent of our free will.

XCI. Similarly, according to this doctor, it should not be affirmed that, with equal prevenient aids of grace existing in two adults, the one who converts does so by his liberty alone. For although that conversion depends on liberty and is done by the will according to its liberty, it is not done solely by its liberty but with the cooperating aid of prevenient grace through an influx by which it takes on the nature of cooperating grace: although when this aid is present, prevenient grace follows from the cooperation of the will, requiring only the free cooperation of our will. This is discussed in Disputation 40, Article 13, Question 14, paragraph "to the second."

XCII. From this, it follows, according to his hypotheses, that with any given prevenient aids of grace, as prevenient, a person can fail to convert, both in the composite sense and in the divided sense. But given the aid of the same grace, as cooperating, a person indeed can fail to convert in the divided sense; however, this is false in the composite sense, because it cannot be that the influx of cooperating grace, as it cooperates in conversion, is present without the sinner converting by his own will; which does not, however, hinder the liberty of the will, because the

influx of cooperating grace depends, as often said, on the consent of the human will. This is also evident in the same disputation, paragraph "hence it is clear."

XCIII. Molina extensively explains the nature of that divine grace, which is both prevenient and cooperating, and which human free will renders efficacious or inefficacious, in Disputation 45, Article 13, Question 14. First, he generally describes this grace as consisting in some illumination of the mind and certain movements of the will.

XCIV. That illumination of the mind, for him, is nothing other than certain knowledges acquired from an external preacher or elsewhere and assisted by God's particular and supernatural influx so that they are somewhat adapted to salvation. He observes that God, in the ordinary way, does not infuse new species and ideas by which those knowledges are formed, through which their minds are illuminated; but those knowledges are made through species acquired in a human manner, and excited by preachers or some other way, in which God inserts Himself through His influx, so that those knowledges are more or less adapted to salvation, according to the degree of greater or lesser influx. Therefore, according to his opinion, God's illumination is nothing other than assisting those knowledges by His influx so that the will is excited by them.

XCV. The movements of the will, in which prevenient grace consists, according to his opinion, are certain affections by which, with prior knowledge, the will is raised and invited, both to elicit hope and to love God or to grieve for sins, before the act of hope or love or sorrow is elicited from the love of God. For such movements and affections, the will does not cooperate as free will but only as will and as a certain nature. For, whether it wants to or not, with the presence of knowledge, they naturally arise in it. However, they do not have the nature of grace unless God simultaneously influences them in a special way so that they become supernatural and, in some way, adapted to salvation.

XCVI. To understand this more fully, he observes that from the contemplation of something very lovable and greatly desirable, a certain movement naturally arises in the will, by which the will is affected toward that thing: this movement is not volition but an affection of the will toward that thing, touched as it were by its goodness and invited to will it. And this movement, according to him, usually precedes volition, not only in humans but also in angels; and this in both the state of integral nature and the state of corrupt nature. For it was earlier in time or nature for Lucifer to be affected by the will toward what he wanted to obtain through pride, than to freely will it. Just as it was also earlier for Eve to be affected by the forbidden fruit, than to will to eat it against God's law.

XCVII. Moreover, after such a movement in the will has arisen from the contemplation of a thing, it is in the power of the will to will or not to will the thing simply. But this movement, by which it is affected toward the thing, arises not freely but merely naturally in the will, given the contemplation of the thing. However, the will can indirectly impede such a movement in itself, namely by keeping away from the thought and turning to other things, and by seeking to have the mind present other things to the will which usually entice it to entirely contrary things.

XCVIII. If, however, with the affection for something which the mind perceives as desirable and offers to the will, the mind encounters a way and means by which it is believed to be obtainable, a certain movement of elevation toward hope naturally arises in the will, which in time or nature precedes the free act of hope. Therefore, that movement is produced by the knowledge of the goodness of the object and the knowledge of the way by which it is believed to be obtainable, cooperating with the will not as free but as a certain nature; and it naturally arises in the will, the greater as the knowledge of the goodness of the object and the way by which it can be obtained is greater and more probable, just as it happens with that affection of the will toward the object known simply as good.

XCIX. But that doctor does not attribute anything else to grace than to perfect nature and to assist it in its movements, so that each one, by supernatural aid and grace, is such as is necessary for salvation. Therefore, to recognize and explain the movements of grace, he wants attention to be given to the progress and order that nature itself, the knowing and appetitive powers, would observe if they produced those same acts, attributed to grace, by their own strength alone as to the substance of the act, which he thinks is possible. Thus, it may be understood in what way God, through the aids and gifts of grace, inserts Himself and cooperates with nature and assists it, so that it produces those acts above its own powers which are necessary for salvation.

C. Thus, he considers those movements, in which prevenient grace consists, to be vital operations proceeding actively from our faculties but not freely elicited by them, nor should they be called acts of free will, strictly speaking, although they depend much on free will. This is because free will can in various ways aid or hinder those acts, and desire and seek them from God, and somehow fit and dispose itself so that, according to the common course and order of divine providence, they may be more easily granted to it by God.

CI. For example, those knowledges of things to be believed, which begin to illuminate our minds for salvation with a certain supernatural influx, can be acquired freely by giving ear to preachers and reading pious books, or in some similar way: and one can freely turn away from them and thus put an obstacle to divine illumination. Although that knowledge holds the nature of prevenient grace only from the supernatural influx of God, not from human free will. Similarly, those pious affections, which naturally and necessarily result in the will from God's illumination and hold the nature of prevenient grace from the part of the will if a certain special divine influx is added to them, can be hindered by human free will if one freely ceases from pious thought or brings and seeks reasons that entice the will to the opposite; and conversely, they can be aided if one keeps the mind willingly in that pious thought.

CII. But to make Molina's opinion clearer, it will not be out of place to explain in his own words the order and nature of the movements of prevenient grace by which we are called to faith, hope, love, and contrition, in which a person's conversion consists. Thus, in the aforementioned disputation, he philosophizes about it as follows. "When a person, not yet supernaturally called inwardly to faith, thinks and considers the things to be believed, through knowledges acquired by the ministry of a preacher or elsewhere, God influences those same knowledges with a certain

particular and supernatural influx, which assists that knowledge, both so that the matters are better and more clearly considered and penetrated, and also so that that knowledge now reaches the limits of supernatural knowledge and, in its order and degree, is adapted to a supernatural end. From the consideration and penetration of those things which pertain to faith, namely when it is considered how worthy they are to be believed, and how advantageous it is to do so, a natural movement of affection toward those things so known arises in the will, by which it is enticed and as it were invited to command the intellect to assent to them. With this movement, therefore, God also inserts Himself, influencing it through a particular aid and, as it were, sharpening it so that it urges and entices more, making it supernatural, so that in its order and degree it is also adapted to salvation."

CIII. Furthermore, free will, aided and excited by these two movements of prevenient grace, still has the free power to command or not to command the assent of faith. If the will wishes to embrace faith and commands the intellect to believe, influenced simultaneously by the movement of prevenient grace it has, it elicits in itself a supernatural act by which it wishes to embrace faith and commands the intellect to assent: and simultaneously, the intellect, moved by that supernatural command of the will and aided by divine illumination, elicits the supernatural act of assenting to the revealed truths, and by these two supernatural acts of the intellect and will, the person rightly disposed receives the supernatural habit of faith, infused solely by God, by which he can subsequently produce similar supernatural acts whenever he wills.

CIV. As for the movement of grace by which we are excited to the act of hope, he explains his view as follows. When the intellect, now illuminated by the light of supernatural faith, thinks about the eternal happiness prepared by God for man, the goodness and excellence of it, along with many other and remarkable works of God and benefits bestowed upon man, including the incarnation and passion of Christ, and considers the other means abundantly provided for attaining eternal life, a natural affection for happiness arises in the will, by which it is enticed and invited to desire it with a love of concupiscence. Additionally, a movement of elevation arises by which it is attracted and invited to hope for it from God. Although this movement depends on free will if it ceases from the thought from which the movement arises, nonetheless, with obstacles removed, it naturally arises, and God, as it were, inserts Himself by a special influence, sharpening and making it supernatural, so that in its order and degree it is necessary for salvation; through it, He supernaturally elevates and, as it were, invites the will to elicit the supernatural act of hoping for eternal happiness and the means necessary to obtain it. Therefore, by such grace, our free will, prevented and excited by God, elicits, if it wills, the first free act of supernatural hope, by which rightly disposed it receives from God the habit of supernatural hope, through which it can subsequently elicit other similar supernatural acts whenever it wills.

CV. He also discusses in a similar manner the grace necessary for the act of loving God and for contrition for sins. He continues, "When the intellect, illuminated by the light of faith and with a preexisting act of supernatural hope in the will, considers the goodness of God, both in itself and towards us, and the many and great benefits with which He has so kindly prevented us,

a natural motion of the love of friendship towards God is excited in the will, by which that power is enticed and invited to love God. To this movement, too, God inserts Himself, sharpening and kindling it with His supernatural influence, and also making it supernatural and necessary for salvation in its order and degree."

CVI. If, at the same time, the knowledge of the greatness, multitude, and ingratitude of the sins by which we have offended God is present, free will, prevented by the same grace, can elicit an act of the supernatural love of God, and similarly can elicit an act of true sorrow for sins, for God's sake, from the affection of supernatural love, which is true contrition and the ultimate disposition for sanctifying grace, which follows contrition in the same instant, though later in nature.

CVII. Furthermore, this author distinguishes between the aid of prevenient grace and prevenient grace itself. By prevenient grace, he understands those cognitions of the mind and affections of the will, which God sharpens and assists with a certain particular influence, so that they become supernatural and necessary for salvation in their order and degree. By the aid of prevenient grace, he understands that supernatural influx by which God sharpens, assists, and kindles those cognitions, mostly acquired by human reason, and affections naturally arising in the will after such cognition, as previously described, so that they become supernatural and suitable for man's eternal salvation.

CVIII. Moreover, from what has been said, it is easy to gather that the doctrine of the recent Thomists, as expounded by Didacus Alvarez, is diametrically opposed to the doctrine of Molina regarding that grace which is called efficacious and to which man's conversion is attributed. They are completely opposed to each other, whether considering the manner in which grace moves a person to the acts by which they convert to God, or the nature and essence of grace, and what it consists of.

CIX. As for the manner in which grace operates, the recent Thomists, like Didacus Alvarez, hold that the grace by which a person is converted is efficacious in itself and not made so by the consent of free will, but rather it powerfully and infallibly determines free will to consent, as previously explained. On the contrary, Molina and his followers maintain that the grace which converts a person is so subject to free will that its efficacy depends on the consent of free will and it is in a person's free power to make it efficacious or inefficacious, both of which frequently happen in fact.

CX. Regarding the essence of grace by which the will is moved to acts of conversion and which actually effects conversion, the recent Thomists place it, as stated above, in a certain virtuous motion which has an incomplete being and is in the will in the manner that colors are in the air and impetus in an object that is pushed. Molina, however, places the grace that effectively moves a person to conversion, with the consent of free will, in certain affections of the will arising from prior illumination of the mind, by which God, through His influence, entices the will to will and grants the power to will, and also concurs with the will if it wills.

CXI. In this respect, Jansen is closer to Molina than to the recent Thomists. Although Jansen agrees entirely with them regarding the manner in which efficacious grace operates,

contending that the efficacy of saving grace in Christ in no way depends on the consent of human free will but produces that consent by itself, infallibly and irresistibly; nonetheless, regarding the nature and substance of the grace called efficacious, his view is closer to Molina's than to the Thomists'. For, as is evident from the above, he considers that efficacious grace, to which, according to him, man's conversion and all the good works of the faithful are entirely attributed, consists in certain affections of love and desire which proceed actively from the will of a person, not freely but actively, and are vital acts of it, by which the will is carried and induced to embrace the good freely. He understands such affections by the name of heavenly sweetness and delight, in which he places efficacious grace.

CXII. However, he differs from Molina in that such affections, according to Molina's doctrine, arise naturally in the will, given the illumination of the mind: and God does nothing else but insert Himself by a particular influence into those affections and make them supernatural. According to Jansen, however, given any illumination of the mind, such affections do not arise naturally in the will of a corrupt person, but it is necessary that they be entirely infused from heaven, not merely sharpened and intensified by a certain divine motion to make them supernatural.

CXXIII. However, although they agree with Molina on the matters of efficacious grace, they do not explain in the same way what its efficacy consists of. As was extensively explained above, Molina considers grace to be called efficacious because it results in human cooperation; thus, according to his hypothesis, the efficacy of grace simply depends on human free will, which has the power to make grace, which is in itself only sufficient, either efficacious or inefficacious. Consequently, according to Molina's principles, the efficacy of grace consists in the assent and cooperation of human will. This, however, is explicitly denied by the Doctors whose opinion we are expounding. They argue that the grace which is called efficacious is efficacious in itself before the consent of the will; it is not properly said to be efficacious because the will consents, but rather the will consents because the grace is efficacious.

CXXIV. This is the explicit doctrine of Bellarmine in the first book on Grace and Free Will, chapter 12, where, after recounting the opinion of those who place the efficacy of grace in human assent and cooperation, so that grace is called efficacious from the outcome because human will cooperates, and who think that it is in man's power to make grace efficacious, which otherwise would only be sufficient, he adds, "This opinion is entirely alien to the sentiment of Blessed Augustine and, as I believe, to the sentiment of the divine scriptures." Similarly, Peter of St. Joseph states this assertion, "The efficacy of grace does not consist in the cooperation of the will." In "On Divine Grace," disputation 7, section 9, number 61. He proves that the efficacy of grace does not consist in that cooperation of the will because grace is not efficacious because the will works; rather, the will works because grace is efficacious. Therefore, the efficacy of grace cannot formally come from the cooperation of the will, since it is the cause of it and precedes it. In "Idea Theologiae Speculativae," book 4, chapter 7, to the 7th resolution.

CXXV. Thus, according to them, the efficacy of grace consists in a certain congruence and fittingness of the divine calling with free will, which, being present, according to God's

foreknowledge, the effect follows infallibly. These are the words of Peter of St. Joseph in book four, chapter seven of "Idea Theologiae Speculativae," resolution 7. In "On Divine Grace," he observes that this congruence should not be taken simply from place or time, as if grace is efficacious because it is given at a suitable place and time. Although it is certain that congruent and efficacious grace is only given at a suitable time, its congruence and efficacy should not primarily be taken from the time, but rather something in the calling itself must be assigned for which it will have its effect at such a time and place. For another calling, even if sufficient, would have no effect at the same time. Therefore, according to his view, that congruence of grace is nothing other than a certain portion and accommodation between grace itself and the will so affected that the operation follows infallibly. Disputation 7, section 9, number 66.

CXXVI. He explains this further in the next paragraph. "God," he says, "through His infinite knowledge, certainly knows what each person will do, given this or that state of affairs: whether he will give consent or not; and what mode of calling is suitable, not only to persuade a person but also to make him convinced: for an ambitious person is moved differently from a greedy one, and so on. For an ambitious person, it is useful to propose the instability of human affairs, where many have been suddenly cast down from the height of honors. For a greedy person, it is useful to consider the brevity of life and the uncertainty of the hour of death, and so on. And since among the ambitious there are different temperaments, likewise among the greedy, examples must be proposed to one, philosophical or theological arguments to another, and analogies drawn from more familiar things to yet another; thus, one person is led to repentance in this way, another in that. Indeed, even the same person at different days, hours, and moments is different from himself. Now he is affected by anger, now by joy, now by sorrow, hence he needs to be moved and excited differently today than yesterday: and the reasons that would effectively persuade him at one hour might be useless at another; it is indeed true that everything is received according to the mode of the receiver, and not everything always appears the same to us, but as each person is affected, so does he see his goal. Therefore, sometimes, due to the circumstances of place or time, and the various passions by which he is agitated, a person is so disposed that such a thought or illumination of the intellect and such an affection or movement of the will are duly suited and tempered for his conversion: thus, in such a fitting of the aid and the will so disposed, the efficacious grace must be placed.

CXXVII. Therefore, the authors of this opinion suppose that God, from eternity, foresees through what the Schools call middle or conditional knowledge what each person will do if he is called in this or that manner, and if such illuminations and inspirations, and other similar means, both external and internal, are applied to convert him. For example, if Peter is called in this manner, he will follow, but not if called in another manner. Although whether he is called in this or that manner, he can follow if he wills, or not follow.

CXXVIII. Then, based on this, they say that God decreed to call and excite certain people, such as the Tyrians and Sidonians, to conversion, by means and in a manner which indeed gave them the power to convert if they wished, but which He certainly foresaw would have no effect on them; not by the means which He foresaw would convert them if applied. On

the contrary, He willed to call the Ephesians, for instance, not in a manner that they would reject, but in a manner which He certainly foresaw would lead them to faith. Hence, it follows that God decreed to give some people the grace by which they could convert if they willed; but to others, the grace by which they would actually convert.

CXXIX. The former grace is called sufficient; the latter is called efficacious. Those who are called by the former manner are said to be called in a non-congruent manner; those by the latter, in a congruent manner. The latter calling originates from the decree by which the conversion of those who are called is predestined; the former does not. And yet the grace conferred by the former calling, which is called sufficient, according to these Doctors' understanding, is not really distinguished, either in physical entity or acting power, from efficacious grace; but only morally or in the order of the subsequent operation. For although someone does not have efficacious aid by which he actually converts, he can actually convert with what is called sufficient aid if he wills, without any new aid, which he has as the principle of good work.

CXXX. However, although those theologians consider that the aid called efficacious does not differ physically and in real entity or acting power but only morally and in the order of the subsequent operation from what is called merely sufficient; nevertheless, they think that the person who receives efficacious aid receives much greater grace from God than the one to whom merely sufficient grace is granted. And this because the excellence and magnitude of some gift or grace must be measured primarily by the intention of the giver and also by the utility and fruit which returns to the recipient. Now, efficacious aid is given by God with a certain purpose of converting a person: sufficient aid, however, cannot be referred to such a purpose. Moreover, the conversion worked by efficacious aid is the greatest good that returns to the one to whom God grants such aid. Sufficient aid, however great in itself, remains entirely useless to the one who receives it, assuming it is not suited and congruent to the disposition of the one who receives it; indeed, it even incidentally increases his condemnation.

CXXXI. Therefore, those Doctors, unlike Molina, do not say that it is possible for one of two people equally prevented by grace to convert while the other does not. For the one who converts has always received greater grace from God than the one who does not convert. But assuming entirely equal grace in many respects, either all will convert, or none will convert. According to their opinion, it is indeed possible that in the one who converts, there is not, from the part of divine aid by which he is prevented, greater illumination of the mind and stronger movement of the will than in the one who does not convert. Indeed, they admit it is possible that in the one who remains rebellious, the mind is more clearly illuminated by the divine spirit and the will more strongly and vividly moved than in the one who is actually led to conversion and faith by efficacious grace. But in the one who converts, any divine motion, whether greater or lesser, always has the reason of greater grace, according to them, because it is suited and tempered to the disposition of the one who receives it; therefore, it proceeds from a more remarkable benevolence of God towards him and results in his greater utility.

CXXXII. Thus Bellarmine teaches, comparing his opinion with that of Molina and Lessius, though without naming them. The first opinion, he says, holds that the efficacy of grace depends on human will, while ours holds that it depends on the will of God. And if the question is posed whether, if two men have exactly the same exciting and aiding grace in the first act, and hear the same preacher and see the same signs, it is possible for one to believe and the other not to believe, the first opinion will answer that it is possible because free will remains, and can follow or resist grace as it chooses. But our opinion will answer that it is indeed possible for two men, receiving the same internal motion, to hear the same preacher and see the same signs, and for one to believe and the other not to believe; however, it is not possible that if two men receive exactly the same exciting grace, one believes and the other does not. For grace not only includes internal motion or excitation but also the circumstances of place, time, person, etc. If, receiving the same motion, one believes and the other does not, without a doubt, one received the motion in a manner, place, and time that God foresaw would suit his disposition, while the other did not receive it in such a manner. Therefore, the one who believes received much greater grace from God than the one who does not believe. The one who did not believe had the grace to believe if he willed, while the one who believed had the grace to believe and to will. For God works in us to will when He calls in such a way that He foresees we will follow. Thus, a believer cannot truly boast against an unbeliever or be arrogant because what principally distinguishes him from the unbeliever is not his own free will but God's efficacious grace, which He gave to him and not to the other. (*De gratia et libero arbitrio*, book 1, chapter 13, towards the end).

CXXXIII. Peter of St. Joseph, in the conclusion of the seventh disputation of his treatise on Divine Grace, teaches similar things. He states, "Divine aid can be considered in two ways: either in the category of being or in the category of benefit. If considered in the former way, it is possible that one person, with equal or even greater aid, does not convert, while another with lesser aid does convert. The reason is that since grace does not determine the will, if equal aid is given to two people in terms of being, each remains indifferent to consenting or not consenting. Therefore, one of them can freely consent even if the other does not. But if the aid is considered as a gift or benefit, it is not possible for one to convert and the other not with equal aid because aids are called equal in the category of benefit when they are equally effective. Thus, if one aid is effective in achieving its effect while the other is not, they are not equal in the category of benefit."

CXXXIV. However, although the authors of this opinion believe the efficacy of grace to be something in divine aid that precedes the operation of the will, and therefore not dependent on its consent and cooperation in such a way that it is within man's power to make grace efficacious or inefficacious as Molina and his followers hold, they do not deny that the efficacy of grace in some way depends on free will. According to them, the efficacy of grace can be considered in two ways: either in the first act or in the second act. When considered in the first act, it is nothing other than the power to effect, which is not distinct from the aid itself; and in this way, the efficacy of grace does not depend on free will but on God. When considered in the second act, the efficacy of grace is taken as the actual efficiency or actual influence of grace in the

supernatural work. And in this way too, the efficacy of grace depends on God. For just as the influence of an instrument in a work depends on the principal agent that uses such an instrument, so the influence of grace in a supernatural work depends on God as the primary agent who works through grace as His instrument. However, because this actual efficiency of grace depends not only on God but also on free will as a partial cause, without whose operation grace would not work, they say that in this respect, that is, in the second act, the efficacy of grace also depends on free will. As Peter of St. Joseph explains in his treatise on Divine Grace, disputation 7, number 62.

CXXXV. Nevertheless, they consider that the efficacy of grace is such that, being present in the first act, the effect infallibly follows, that is, the consent and cooperation of free will. For efficacious aid is said to be that which efficaciously and infallibly moves the will to elicit consent and makes it act. As Peter of St. Joseph says in the cited disputation, number 61. Therefore, supposing the efficacy of that divine aid, which it has from God alone and antecedent to the consent of the will, it can never happen that man does not do what he is moved to do by such aid. On the other hand, removing such efficacy, however sufficient the grace may be supposed, it is entirely impossible for the good operation, to which it is said to be sufficient, to follow. In this matter too, they differ from Molina, according to whose hypotheses, whatever grace of God is supposed antecedent to the actual consent of the will, it can happen that the effect, to which grace is ordained, either follows or does not follow: and in either direction, the event is not infallible.

CXXXVI. They do not think it difficult to reconcile this infallibility of the event, depending on the presence or removal of the aid called efficacious, with the freedom of human will. Although it never happens that the will denies its consent to the motions in which efficacious grace consists, that is, those which according to God's foreknowledge are so congruent and tempered to the will that they will bend it, nevertheless the will, being prevented and excited by those motions, is not predetermined by them; rather, it determines itself to act in such a way that it can refrain from acting and suspend its consent, or even determine itself to dissent if the nature of those motions is considered in itself.

CXXXVII. Although they admit that it is in some sense necessary for the one who receives efficacious grace to consent to it and perform what the grace moves him to, since it is repugnant for some grace to be efficacious and yet for the effect not to follow; they think that necessity does not harm liberty, because according to their doctrine, the necessity is consequent, not antecedent. For to them, grace is efficacious when it consists of aids that are so suited to the will in place and time that God foresaw from eternity that the will would freely allow itself to be moved by them if they are presented to it, although it could also resist. Therefore, in the congruence by which grace is called efficacious, the future free consent of the will, foreseen by God through conditional knowledge from eternity, is included. Hence, it in no way harms human freedom to say that it is necessary to consent to efficacious grace since that grace is called efficacious only because it is supposed that the will would freely consent if God applies it to a

person: thus, that necessity is not antecedent but follows the foreseen conditional consent of the will.

CXXXVIII. They add that the efficacy of grace, in producing its effect, is infallible not absolutely and metaphysically but rather morally because, being most suited and proportionate to the disposition of the will, it infallibly moves the will in a very gentle manner, and in a way that fits the disposition of the will. Just as a man suffering from extreme poverty and need, although he could physically refuse a hundred gold coins offered to him, yet morally speaking, given the circumstances as they are, considering his state, condition, and calamity, will infallibly accept them because they are very suitable for relieving his misery.

CXXXIX. Finally, those who hold this opinion boast that their explanation of the efficacy of grace not only fits well with the liberty of human will but also with the certainty of divine predestination. For according to their view, predestination achieves its effect through aids that are indeed rejectable in themselves, yet so suited to the disposition of the will that according to God's foreknowledge, they will infallibly have their effect.

CXL. Thus we have briefly explained as clearly as possible the four opinions, most solemn and accepted in the Roman School, regarding the sufficiency and efficacy of divine grace. Besides these, other opinions could also be mentioned, but since they seem highly improbable, have less clear authors, and fewer followers, and since it would be too lengthy and tedious to note the finer distinctions by which individual doctors somewhat differ from one another, we can be content with these. It does not seem worth the effort to inquire more scrupulously into those minutiae.

CXLI. However, lest some pages remain empty here, we will briefly add, as an example, the opinion of the quite notable Jesuit Gregory of Valencia, which many learned men report and refute. He thus considers efficacious grace to consist in some gift that a man, already prevented by calling and exciting grace, can acquire with God's help through the pious use of his free will. This gift, he believes, in one kind of cause, namely efficient, is naturally prior to the very conversion of free will; and in another, namely in the kind of material and dispositive cause, is posterior.

CXLII. This gift, he asserts, consists in the infusion of the habits of grace and virtues, inasmuch as through these habits the mind of man is strengthened to elicit the act of conversion. Therefore, according to his opinion, efficacious grace is either habitual grace when it is infused or the infusion itself: inasmuch as by that infused grace, free will elicits its own conversion, with God simultaneously cooperating in it.

CXLIII. For someone to be considered to have sufficient grace for a pious action, according to his view, it is necessary either to have all the gifts and aids required for the action as its principles or beginnings, or to have some of these gifts or aids such that, being already prevented and excited by them, he can, with some use of his free faculty and with God's help, acquire all the remaining such gifts or aids. As can be seen in the already mentioned Gregory, volume 2, disputation 8, question 3, point 4.

CXLIV. Hence, it is clear that this Doctor does not wish to make the real entity of sufficient grace the same as that of efficacious grace; rather, he believes that efficacious grace adds a new aid to the sufficient one, which prevents the conversion of man: in this matter, he aligns with more recent Thomists and disagrees with Molina and the proponents of congruent grace. Yet, he does not want the efficacy of divine grace to be absolute, but to depend on the use of our free will, in which matter he departs from the Thomists and aligns with these later theologians.

CXLV. However, a particular inconvenience arises in his opinion: what he says about efficacious grace might apply only to the conversion of a sinner to God, not to the good works of a person already converted, for which no new infusion of habitual grace is required, and to which efficacious grace nevertheless extends. Moreover, it is not clear to me how the infusion of habitual grace could be prior to a person's conversion in the kind of efficient cause and yet simultaneously posterior in the kind of dispositive cause.

THEOLOGICAL THESES

In which the Doctrine of Protestants is explained regarding the distinction between sufficient and efficacious Grace, and the harmony of human freedom with the efficacy of divine grace.

Thesis I

The theologians of the Augsburg Confession, who are called Lutherans, do not accept the common division of grace into sufficient and efficacious. This is because the same grace of God operates in believers and is rejected by unbelievers. Therefore, according to them, the same grace that is spurned and trampled upon by unbelievers and the unrepentant is in itself efficacious and should not merely be called sufficient in contrast to some efficacious grace.

II. Indeed, they teach that God, as much as it is within Him, wants to convert all those to whom the word is preached, and offers the same grace to all and each individually. However, many resist the divine grace and the Holy Spirit who initiates the work of conversion, and thus the grace does not achieve its effect in them. Others, however, accept divine grace and do not put up an impediment to it, which is why grace is effective in them and actually brings about their conversion. But since, on God's part, it is the same grace that converts Simon Peter and does not convert Simon Magus, because the latter resisted it while the former did not, they do not think it should be distinguished from one another.

III. This can be seen in the writings of Johann Gerhard, a theologian of Jena, in the second volume of his treatise on free will, chapter six, section one. He states, "We concede that many resist the Holy Spirit, who initiates the work of conversion, despise God's counsel against themselves, judge themselves unworthy of eternal life, and thus by their own fault repel the grace of conversion from themselves. But we deny that the grace itself should be divided into insufficient and efficacious, since it is the same grace of God that works in believers and is repelled by unbelievers."

IV. However, to explain whence the efficacy of divine grace is derived, he notes that first two extremes must be avoided. Neither should the efficacy of grace for conversion be attributed to the cooperation of human will, nor should it be attributed to the absolute decree of God choosing certain individuals. Rather, one should take a middle path: that many are converted and saved should be attributed solely to divine grace, and that many do not convert and perish should be recognized as solely the fault of the perishing. And in this pious simplicity, the Christian mind can safely rest, even if it cannot extricate itself from all difficulties.

V. He then tries to show how these ideas are consistent: that the efficacy of divine grace should not be attributed to the cooperation of human will, and yet that the efficacy of the same grace should not be attributed to a certain physical action of God by which He determines the will to will and choose the good inspired by grace. Thus, he explains his position on this matter: "In the work of conversion, the Holy Spirit finds a subject that has no strength to cooperate, since the mind of unregenerate man is blind, and his will is turned away and hostile to God. Therefore, divine grace does everything to make him who is to be converted, willing from being unwilling, obedient from being an enemy. But this is not done as if converting a man without his thought or knowledge, or even against his will, by applying force. Rather, the Holy Spirit gives new strengths by which he can assent to the call; yet, at the same time, He does not immediately take away the old freedom, or rather the miserable bondage, by which he can reject the offered grace."

VI. The same doctrine is also distinctly explained by George Calixtus, formerly a professor of theology at the University of Helmstedt, in his *Epitome Theologiae* based on his dictations. In his treatise on the ministry of the word, page 241, he teaches that when the minister of the word proposes the legal and evangelical doctrine to men, God, through this medium and instrument, is effective and excites in human hearts contrition for sins committed, trust in Christ's merit, hatred of sin, and the pursuit of a new life, unless men themselves, through their stubbornness and obstinacy, love darkness more than light.

VII. According to his view, there is no doubt that a man can spurn, reject the offered grace, and resist the Holy Spirit who works faith. For God does not draw and convert men by His absolute power, but does so according to the order and manner He has established. On the contrary, it is certain that a man can be concerned for his own salvation, can take care of the means to it, according to the saying, "Many will seek to enter and will not be able." For a man can hear the word of God, indeed, receive and study it with all eagerness, and strive to learn and understand the truth.

VIII. According to this Doctor's view, those who do this are given greater helps by God, so that they understand the word, recognize their sins, and have faith in the promises of the Gospel. Not that such works are of such great dignity or merit, but because God wants His word to be honored, this order to be observed, and this to be done by man before He provides greater and more special, and in their kind, supernatural helps.

IX. He distinguishes between actions that are by their nature supernatural, that is, that by their nature surpass human strengths and are not within human control, and therefore are

attributed to the Holy Spirit, such as believing, fearing, and loving God, and similar ones, which constitute true conversion to God; and between certain acts that are within human power, which God wants man to perform before progressing to supernatural helps and gifts, at least in the ordinary way. Such acts include hearing the word of God, examining it, paying attention to it, and taking some care about the means to salvation.

X. He says, "Believing is an action of its kind supernatural, or by its nature above human strengths, therefore we attribute it to the Holy Spirit, for He excites the human mind to believe, and makes man believe, love, fear God, indeed to want to believe, fear, and love. And thus we attribute to God the supernatural acts that constitute true conversion and deny that they are within human control: yet we do not deny that there are certain acts within human power that God wants man to perform before progressing to supernatural helps and gifts, at least in the ordinary way."

XI. He states similarly elsewhere: "It must be observed that, assuming that God has revealed the Gospel and makes it generally preached among men through men, it is not above human strengths for someone to hear the Gospel, understand, consider, and compare it with what others, such as Jews or Muslims, present as divinely revealed. In the judgment on theological controversies debated between Lutherans and the Reformed, no. 33.

XII. According to him, whoever hears the word and does not spurn the counsel of God in themselves, and does not choke the word of God with cares, riches, or pleasures of this life, will experience God's help and operation, and will be led to faith and life by His free benevolence. Those who do otherwise must attribute their lack of faith to their own negligence and stubbornness.

XIII. Although the word of God is the instrument God usually employs in the conversion of men, he does not believe that those to whom the word is not preached are deprived of all means necessary for salvation. Rather, he asserts that God behaves in such a way towards them that if they perish, it is their own fault and not due to a lack of necessary assistance. For, if they use the faculties and strengths left in their corrupt nature correctly, God is ready to provide them with means by which they may be led to a fuller knowledge, and ultimately to true and saving faith.

XIV. Having posed the question of how those who neither live among Christians nor have ever received anything from Christians (from whom alone the word can be heard) might come to faith, he responds that all men possess certain intellectual and volitional strengths and natural insights. If they use these correctly, care about their salvation, and work towards it as much as they can, God will provide them with the means to lead them to fuller and more perfect knowledge, and eventually to a knowledge based on divine revelation. He believes we have examples of this in Cornelius the Centurion and the Eunuch of Queen Candace.

XV. However, if others, unlike these, neglect the means and assistance available to them, extinguish the innate sparks, and hold the truth in unrighteousness, as Paul says, they are certainly kept from greater light not by some fate or divine decree, but by their own fault. This is stated in the cited Epitome of Theology, page 244.

XVI. From the above, it is clear that the theologians of the Augsburg Confession do not accept the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace as commonly used in the Roman School. However, they do affirm what many doctors of that school signify by sufficient grace: that those who are not converted by the preaching of the Gospel lack no assistance on God's part that is necessary for their conversion and without which they could not be converted. Therefore, even the unbelievers who reject the word of God are offered grace that is abundantly sufficient to lead them to repentance and faith if they do not refuse to use it.

XVII. It is also evident that these theologians, according to the principles they have established, do not labor much to reconcile the efficacy of grace with human free will. Since they assert that the will is not physically predetermined to good by grace, nor is any necessity to act rightly imposed by grace upon the will, they maintain that man can freely either accept the efficacy of divine grace by performing those things which divine wisdom requires of him for grace to exert its efficacy in him, or place obstacles and impediments to that grace by neglecting those things through which grace usually operates in man, such as hearing, studying, and meditating on the word of God.

XVIII. This is the doctrine of George Calixtus in the cited judgment on controversies debated between Lutherans and the Reformed, number 32. After establishing that the Gospel is a divine instrument destined to impart faith and salvation to men, along with which, when heard, divine supernatural grace is also infused, enabling a person who previously could not assent and have faith to now be able to do so, he adds, "Thus, man acquires the ability to believe, which he lacked before, yet is under no necessity to do so, for if he gives rein to his own nature and depravity, he can resist and oppose the Holy Spirit and reject the word of God. Therefore, that a man hearing and considering the Gospel believes, indeed can believe, is to be attributed not to natural strengths, but to the grace connected with and supplied through the Gospel. But that this grace can be resisted is to be attributed to the inherent depravity and nature. For although God is effective and operates by His grace, He does not do so by absolute power but admits conditions and order, thus His grace can be frustrated in success and outcome."

XIX. This does not contradict what the same theologians say, that man's conversion is solely the work of the Holy Spirit, and that the will of man is purely passive in conversion. They do not mean to deny that the acts of faith, hope, fear, and love, in which true conversion to God consists, are vital acts freely elicited by the human will, but rather that for eliciting these acts and similar ones, the natural powers of the will are utterly insufficient, and that the will, by its natural strengths, cannot cooperate with the divine grace that converts a man, nor contribute anything from itself when the Holy Spirit, through the heard word, undertakes to change and renew it and supply it with new strengths.

XX. This is also the content of what is found in the Book of Concord, in the epitome of the articles about which controversies have arisen among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, at the end of the chapter on free will: "What Luther wrote, that man's will in conversion behaves purely passively, is to be understood correctly and dexterously, namely, with respect to divine grace in arousing new motions. This means it is to be understood when the

Spirit of God through the heard word or the use of the sacraments addresses man's will and works conversion and regeneration in man. After the Holy Spirit has worked and achieved this, and has changed and renewed man's will solely by His divine power and operation, then indeed the new will of man is the instrument and organ of the Holy Spirit, so that it not only apprehends grace but also cooperates with the Holy Spirit in the subsequent works. Therefore, before man's conversion, there are only two effective causes of conversion: namely, the Holy Spirit and the word of God, which is the instrument of the Holy Spirit by which He works man's conversion. Man certainly must hear this word, but that he actually embraces it with true faith, he can achieve only by the grace and operation of the Holy Spirit."

XXI. The Remonstrants, or Arminians, in the Netherlands, highly approve of and strictly adhere to the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace, believing it to be supported by many scriptural passages and necessary to defend divine justice. Thus, they deny that sufficient grace is anything other than what is efficacious, meaning what actually converts a man. Although, they say, the sufficiency of grace for working conversion in a man is very powerful and effective, it does not always have an effect due to the fault and guilt of man, so that the love and desires of conversion are not always achieved. This is stated in their Synod in the declaration of the Remonstrants' position on the third and fourth articles, page 15.

XXII. They further explain the nature of this sufficient grace in the beginning of the aforementioned declaration, thesis six: "Although, by God's most free will, there is a great disparity in divine grace, the Holy Spirit confers or is ready to confer sufficient grace to all and each one to whom the word is preached, sufficient to promote the conversion of men in its stages. Therefore, sufficient grace for faith and conversion is not only given to those whom God is said to will to save according to His absolute decree of election, but also to those who do not actually convert."

XXIII. However, they do not want the efficacy of grace to be based on some omnipotent power of acting and an inevitable determination of the will to good, or even on the congruence of the calling, as some Scholastics do. Rather, they see it as such an operation of grace that certainly achieves its effect when man does not oppose it with new stubbornness and rebellion, which he could have opposed from himself. These are their words on the same page 15 of the cited declaration.

XXIV. On the next page, to explain the acts of divine grace individually, they observe that in corrupted man three aspects need correction and regeneration: the mind, the will, and the affections. They then match the triple act of divine grace to this triple subject. First, as they express their view, "God enlightens the mind with His word and the illumination of the Holy Spirit, making it certain of His saving will, and enables it to assent to the truth of the word. Although man can, either through negligence or malice of will, reject, despise, and not deeply admit this illumination and revelation when it is first externally or even internally presented to the mind, resulting in affected ignorance, it is not possible that if the truth is clearly and perspicuously presented by the Holy Spirit to the mind, the intellect does not assent, or suspend

judgment, but is determined to assent by the object thus presented and insinuated by the Spirit, and the intellect cannot resist this illumination when determined by its object."

XXV. God also inclines the will to His obedience and to acts of faith and obedience through His Holy Spirit using the word, so that the will, by that operation, not only can obey but also does obey whenever it does; not from itself, or by itself, or from itself.

XXVI. They also add to further emphasize grace in every way, that even a supernatural power is conferred upon the will, and thus God acts immediately upon the will, provided that action does not necessitate the will antecedently and does not take away its freedom and ability to will.

XXVII. They further add that with the mind illuminated and supernatural power granted to the will, partly through illumination and partly through the immediate infusion of strengths, God also corrects our affections and the sensitive part, affecting it with good desires, whose objects are shown by the intellect and commanded by the will. As these affections are increasingly corrected, disciplined, and brought into order, the will is subsequently made more prompt and easier, and less impeded, to perform acts of piety, not so much as before with the affections resisting and the law in the members warring against it.

XXVIII. Moreover, to explain the roles of both the word of God and the Holy Spirit using the word in this efficacy and operation of grace, they say that the word persuades, but the spirit using the word persuades more effectively. Furthermore, it is always safer to assert that the action of the Spirit, when it acts upon the will, has subordinated to it the action of the word, rather than to say that the action of the Spirit is collateral to the action of the word in the will and operates according to the word, not through the word, lest we seem to grant to Enthusiasts the principles of their doctrine and some secret motions, impulses, and attractions which anyone might easily imagine for themselves.

XXIX. However, to further clarify their view on the power and efficacy of divine grace, they raise many questions to which they respond briefly and distinctly. "If asked," they say, "whether the action of God in converting is only moral, by persuading, proposing, and inviting, we answer that it is more than moral. If we consider exciting grace, we say that supernatural power is also infused into the will itself, distinct from illumination. If we consider cooperating grace, we say that it can be called physical and has a real and proper efficiency."

XXX. "If asked whether there is no immediate action of the Spirit upon the will, we do not deny that there is. If asked whether the mode of operation concerning the efficacy of grace is the same in the vivification of the intellect, the affections, and the will, we respond that it is not, but the mode of acting on the will is resistible." They do not seem to simply deny that some movements might be produced irresistibly in the will by grace, but according to their hypotheses, this seems to be restricted to that efficacy by which the will is simply made good from evil.

XXXI. "If asked whether grace, besides the illumination of the mind, the excitation of the affections, and the invitation of the will, does anything by way of principle or antecedent to conversion, we respond that it does." What grace further does, according to their view, seems to be the infusion of those new strengths of which they spoke earlier.

XXXII. "If asked whether, with all the operations by which God works to effect conversion in men being set in place, conversion often or never follows, we respond that it often does not follow with antecedent and prevenient grace, but never does not follow with cooperating grace."

XXXIII. "If asked whether conversion is contingent and uncertain, or whether it follows infallibly with the necessity of cause or event in the one who is converted, we respond that conversion is contingent because it is free; yet it is not uncertain to God, for it is foreknown. It does not follow with the necessity of the cause or consequent, because man could resist, but it follows with the necessity of the consequent, that is, with infallible certainty in the one whom God has foreseen will be converted."

XXXIV. "If asked why one person is converted and another is not, we respond that the one is converted because God converts him who does not oppose new stubbornness; the other is not converted because he opposes new stubbornness. If asked why this person opposes new stubbornness and the other does not, we respond that this person opposes because he wants to oppose; the other does not oppose because he is moved by grace not to want to oppose. If asked whether the one who does not oppose new stubbornness, and consequently is converted, has greater grace than the one who opposes and consequently is not converted, we respond that antecedent and prevenient grace can be equal, but the first has cooperating grace, the latter does not."

XXXV. From this, it is clear that the Remonstrants, according to their own principles, can easily reconcile the liberty of the will with the efficacy of grace. They assume that grace which moves the will to conversion acts in a resistible manner, meaning in such a way that the will can yield to grace and accept its operation, and also can place obstacles to grace and hinder its operation. This they explain in these words on page seventeen of the often-cited declaration: "To this conversion to which man is moved by grace, he can, from his inherent depravity and affection for worldly things, place a free obstacle and often does place it, whether the will neglects and disregards the external preaching of the Gospel when it is available to him, or whether, having heard the word, he treats it perfunctorily, being more attentive to worldly matters, or whether he otherwise prevents the truth, necessity, and utility of the doctrine of the Gospel from being persuaded to him by the Holy Spirit. Either he assents to the word and its truth but is unwilling to conform his will according to the prescription of that word and obey it, or, giving rein to the flesh, he extinguishes the Spirit, resists the Spirit, and voluntarily suppresses and exterminates the good desires and thoughts often infused and presented to him. Therefore, we say that the human will is not necessitated to will good but that man can resist of himself, that is, not will, and often does not will and resists the operations of sufficient grace."

XXXVI. Besides the Remonstrants, some Reformed theologians who subscribe to the Synod of Dordrecht also distinguish between sufficient and efficacious grace, but in a somewhat different sense. Paul Testard, when he lived as pastor of the Church of Blois, used this distinction in his *Irenicum*, thesis 300, and in his book on Nature and Grace in various places. But by

sufficient grace, he understands what he calls universal grace, and by efficacious grace, he means particular grace.

XXXVII. Therefore, according to his view, this sufficient grace is not some subjective grace which inwardly disposes a man to faith and repentance, but only an objective grace, consisting in making salvation possible for man, both through the satisfaction of Christ, which removed the obstacle that divine justice placed against men obtaining forgiveness of sins, and through the external calling and invitation of God to faith and repentance, either by the preaching of the word or by the works of nature and providence.

XXXVIII. He calls this grace sufficient because it gives man the possibility to be saved if he wills, so that if a man does not become a partaker of salvation, it is solely due to his own wickedness and malignity, and he cannot complain against God as if He had denied him anything without which he absolutely could not be saved. Since he has the object presented to him in sufficient light, and the mind and will which can and ought to embrace and accept it, the only thing that prevents this from happening is his own perversity, for which he himself is responsible, and for which he has no reason to complain against God.

XXXIX. He acknowledges, however, that it never happens that anyone is saved by this sufficient grace alone unless something else is added, due to the inherent depravity and wickedness of man, which prevents him from rightly using those means proposed by God, which are otherwise sufficient for salvation. Thus, faith and repentance, to which man is sufficiently equipped by his physical faculties, are made morally impossible for him. Hence arises the necessity for some particular grace that corrects man's depravity and inwardly disposes and affects the mind and will, so that, casting off bad habits, he embraces the salvation offered externally, and flees to divine mercy through faith and repentance. This particular grace he therefore calls efficacious.

XL. However, other Reformed theologians generally reject the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace. They believe that no grace can be truly sufficient and can be called so unless it is also efficacious. This is because, for a man to be truly converted, such divine assistance is required that not only simply moves and attracts him to good, but also bends and determines his will to will and adhere to good, without which the will would never be so inclined, due to the inherent depravity of man.

XLI. Indeed, it is the common opinion of all Reformed theologians who follow the Synod of Dordrecht that the grace of God, to which the conversion of man and all subsequent good works are attributed, is efficacious in itself, and its efficacy in no way depends on the cooperation or consent of the human will, as it is the infallible cause of this consent or cooperation. This is consistent with the decrees of that Synod. In the rejection of errors concerning the third and fourth articles, Canon 8 condemns those who teach that in man's regeneration God does not use those powers of His omnipotence by which He might powerfully and infallibly bend man's will to faith and conversion, but that man can indeed often resist and actually does often resist the regeneration intended by God and the Holy Spirit, and thus it remains within man's power to be regenerated or not. Canon 9 also condemns those who teach

that grace and free will are partial causes concurring together for the initiation of conversion, and that grace does not precede the efficiency of the human will in order of causality. That is, God does not first efficaciously aid man's will to conversion before the will itself moves and determines itself.

XLII. However, as to how God works true conversion in the elect, the same Synod explains it thus: Not only, it says, does He ensure that the gospel is externally preached to them, and their minds powerfully illuminated by the Holy Spirit so that they rightly understand and discern the things of the Spirit of God, but also the same Spirit, by the efficacy of regeneration, penetrates the innermost parts of man, opens the closed heart, softens the hard one, circumcises the uncircumcised one, infuses new qualities into the will, making it from dead alive, from evil good, from unwilling willing, from rebellious compliant, and acts upon and strengthens it so that it, like a good tree, can produce the fruits of good works. This is in the chapter on the doctrine of man's corruption and conversion, in its eleventh article.

XLIII. In the following article, it adds that this operation of God is wholly supernatural, most powerful and most gentle at the same time, wonderful, mysterious, and ineffable, in its virtue neither inferior to nor lesser than creation or the resurrection of the dead. Thus, all those in whose hearts God operates in this admirable way are certainly, infallibly, and effectively regenerated and come to believe.

XLIV. Therefore, since this operation of God does not manifest itself in those who do not truly believe and repent, the theologians who subscribe to this Synod deny that sufficient grace is given to them, however much they may be invited to repentance and faith by the external preaching of the word, and even though they may be struck by some internal movements of the Holy Spirit.

XLV. It is to be noted that the Reformed who deny that all those who are not converted have sufficient grace for conversion do not deny that in many who harden themselves in sin and do not approach God through faith and repentance, some grace of God operates. For there are, in their view, certain things that precede conversion or regeneration, which are common to both the elect and the reprobate, and which are aroused by the power of the word and the Holy Spirit in both groups. Such things are the knowledge of God's will, a sense of sin, fear of punishment, thoughts of deliverance, some hope of pardon, and other similar motions.

XLVI. They acknowledge that many whom God calls to faith and conversion in this way do not wish to follow the calling God gives and resist the Holy Spirit who suggests what is necessary for their salvation. Eventually, they utterly extinguish those motions aroused in them by the word and the Holy Spirit and thus perish eternally by their own fault.

XLVII. This is the doctrine of the British theologians, included in the acts of the Synod of Dordrecht. In explaining their view on the third and fourth articles, and discussing the prerequisites for conversion, they state in their second thesis and the following ones: There are certain internal effects that precede conversion or regeneration, which are aroused in the hearts of the unjustified by the power of the word and the Spirit. These include knowledge of the divine will, a sense of sin, fear of punishment, thoughts of deliverance, and some hope of pardon. Those

whom God thus affects, He truly and seriously calls and invites to faith and conversion. Those thus affected by God are not abandoned or ceased from being promoted towards true conversion until they abandon it through voluntary neglect or rejection of this initial grace.

XLVIII. These preceding effects, produced in the minds of people by the power of the word and the Spirit, can be suffocated and utterly extinguished by the rebellious will and often are, to the extent that some people in whose minds there was a slight knowledge of divine truth, some sorrow for their sins, some desire and concern for deliverance, completely turn to the opposite. They reject and hate the truth, abandon themselves to their lusts, become hardened in their sins, and rot in them without any desire or concern for deliverance.

XLIX. They add that even the elect themselves never conduct themselves in these preceding acts of regeneration in such a way that, because of their negligence and resistance, they could justly be abandoned and forsaken by God. But God's special mercy towards them ensures that even though they may repel or suffocate this awakening and illuminating grace for a while, God repeatedly urges them and does not cease to promote them until He has completely subdued them to His grace and placed them in the state of regenerated children.

L. Moreover, although the doctors of the Reformed School agree that grace exerts its efficacy not only on the mind of man but also on the will, powerfully and infallibly inclining and determining it to the good, they nevertheless differ somewhat on the manner in which grace moves our will so that it is inclined towards God and consents to the good.

LI. For Paul Testard, Moses Amyrald, and others who follow Cameron's method and doctrine in the matter of grace, teach that the efficacy of divine grace, which converts man to God, engenders faith in Christ, and inflames his heart with the love of God, consists in this: that the saving truth proposed in the Gospel is presented to the mind in such a way, and the mind is internally disposed by the secret power of the Spirit, so that man forms the firmest and most efficacious persuasion of that truth. He concludes that there is nothing better or more conducive to obtaining true happiness than adhering to Christ and obeying His Gospel. Consequently, the will, which according to their hypothesis necessarily follows the direction and judgment of the practical intellect, embraces the saving good offered by the Gospel and indicated by the intellect, and eagerly accepts it. It thus turns entirely to God, being averted from vain and earthly things, in which its renewal and sanctification consist.

LII. Therefore, they assert that the efficacy of divine grace is primarily and immediately exerted on the mind alone and only secondarily and consequentially on the affections and the will. Thus, the renewal of the will and affections does not occur except through the renewal of the intellect, as the fruits and outcomes of the renewed mind extend to those faculties subject to the intellect's guidance. This can be seen in Paul Testard's "Irenico" thesis 224 and following.

LIII. From the aforementioned, it is clear that their view significantly differs from that of those who believe that the entire efficacy of grace lies in a certain moral persuasion, which leaves the will in indifference and can be rejected or accepted by it. For in those who are converted by God's grace, they not only acknowledge a certain persuasion by the Spirit of God through the word but also a very strong and forceful persuasion, which seizes the will and most

efficaciously moves it, gently yet certainly and infallibly determining it to the good and extracting consent from it, not merely expecting it as from a doubtful and indifferent source.

LIV. However, other theologians of the Reformed School assert that the immediate operation of grace affects not only the mind by illuminating it and flooding it with new light but also the will itself, in which it physically and really works the consent it gives to divine admonitions.

LV. This view is taught and explained by Amesius in "Bellarminus Enervatus" book three, chapter three on Grace. He says, "We assert that with moral persuasion is also joined a real efficiency of God, whereby a new principle of spiritual life is effectively implanted in the heart of man called by grace, and man is simultaneously stirred to elicit the acts of this life."

LVI. He also fully supports and recognizes as his own the view of Didacus Alvarus, which is that God, through the help of efficacious grace, physically, or in the manner of a physical cause, predetermines the created will so that it infallibly consents and cooperates with God calling and stirring it. Using Alvarus's words, he says that to physically predetermine means nothing other than to truly, effectively, or really cause the will to infallibly cooperate with God. And that the help of grace, effective in itself, as it comes from God before the free cooperation of the will, and physical predetermining aid signify the same thing.

LVII. However much these and other doctors of the Reformed School may extol the efficacy of divine grace, they do not wish it to prejudice human will's liberty in any way. They hold that all good works done by man through God's grace are done freely, and thus the very first act of conversion is no less free than those that follow it, being not only a vital operation of our will but freely elicited by it.

LVIII. However, how these things agree among themselves, not all attempt to show in the same way. Indeed, the previously cited Amesius, following Didacus Alvarus, tries to reconcile the immediate and efficacious operation and determination of divine grace on the will with the liberty of the will itself in acting and obeying grace. He says that a person who acts freely retains the power not to act. Now grace, though it moves and determines the will to act, does not remove the power not to act. For the power not to act exists in the same subject along with the grace and aid required to act and makes someone act, even though grace and aid to act in a particular operation and the absence of such an act are never and cannot be together in the same subject. Others say that grace determines the act but does not remove all indifference and indetermination from the faculty.

LIX. However, those earlier followers of Cameron, based on their hypothesis, do not find it difficult to show how the certain and infallible operation of grace, not dependent on the consent of our will, fits well with human liberty. According to their doctrine, that operation is certain and infallible because a rightly disposed mind, behaving in accordance with nature, cannot fail to embrace and judge as good the truth presented and recognized as such. When there is a fitting approach and application of the object to the faculty, which is in a proper state, a nature-conforming operation necessarily follows. Similarly, the will cannot help but will and follow what the intellect, after considering everything, judges should be willed and followed.

LX. However, this does not detract from liberty, whether on the part of the intellect or the will. Not on the part of the intellect, because this grace bestows only these two things: first, that the evangelical truth is presented to it in a suitable light; and second, that it is restored to a fitting state or even somewhat elevated above its natural condition. Although the intellect cannot fail to give assent to the recognized truth, no force is applied to it by the truth presented, and it acts most congruently with its nature when it assents to the truth. Hence, if any species of liberty is attributed to it, it is not harmed in this matter. And much less can the internal operation of grace, which either restores lost powers to the intellect or even supplies new ones, prejudice the liberty of the intellect if it is considered to have any.

LXI. On the part of the will, although the operation of grace described necessarily elicits its consent, it does not in any way take away its liberty. For grace does not move and determine the will except through the judgment of the practical intellect. But according to the opinion of those learned men, the necessity and determination of the acts of the will arising from the judgment of the practical intellect do not prevent them from proceeding freely from the will. Since the liberty of the will is not opposed to every kind of necessity but only to that which arises from external force, from matter, or from sense. This is more extensively discussed by Moses Amyraut in his treatise on free will, especially in Section Four, and similarly in the posthumous book by Joshua Placeus on the same subject.

LXII. However, the older theologians of the Reformed School more simply respond that grace does not take away liberty from the will, although it imposes some necessity on it, because not all necessity is opposed to liberty, but only that which arises from external force or natural determination. Grace, however, does not compel the will, nor does it apply any force to it, but gently bends it and does so in a manner consistent with its nature.

LXIII. Furthermore, the Reformed School theologians admit that the man who is converted by God's grace freely elicits the very first act of conversion, which at first glance does not seem to agree with what they commonly teach, and with the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, namely, that man in the work of his regeneration and conversion is purely passive. How can the human will freely elicit the act of conversion and yet be purely passive in its own conversion? Does the will that is supposed to operate freely behave purely passively?

LXIV. This difficulty is resolved by the British theologians in their explanation of their view on the third and fourth articles, included in the acts of the Synod of Dordrecht. They observe that conversion can be understood in two senses. First, it denotes the immediate work of God regenerating a man. Second, it denotes the action of a man converting himself to God through faith and repentance. In the work of conversion or regeneration taken in the first sense, man is passive and it is not within the power of the human will to prevent God from thus immediately converting and regenerating. However, in conversion taken in the second sense, the will, having been acted upon by God, acts and elicits the acts which constitute our conversion to God.

LXV. Moreover, they say that conversion, as it designates the immediate work of God, involves God regenerating the souls of His elect, who have been previously aroused and

prepared by various acts of His grace, with a certain intimate and marvelous operation, and as if creating them anew. This is done by infusing a vivifying spirit and endowing all the faculties of the soul with new qualities. According to their view, this conversion is followed, not in time but in nature, by our actual conversion, whereby God causes the very act of believing and converting to arise from the changed will. Thus acted upon by God, the will itself acts by converting to God and believing, that is, by eliciting its own vital act. They add that this divine action does not harm the liberty of the will but rather strengthens it; it does not eradicate the deeply rooted potential for resistance but effectively and gently gives man a firm will to obey.

LXVI. The same is taught by the Hessian theologians in their exposition of their view on the third and fourth articles, also included in the acts of the same synod. Their sixth thesis on man in a state of grace reads as follows: Therefore, the will of man in receiving supernatural qualities, faculties, and powers, as well as new inclinations, behaves purely passively. Thus, the action of the Holy Spirit infusing those supernatural powers into the will and effectively and powerfully bending and inclining it to conversion and faith does not depend on human will, nor on its cooperation or consent. However, the acts of faith, charity, hope, and other virtues, as well as good movements, are not purely passive but both passive and active. With the grace of God preceding and moving, and with subsequent assistance, the will also acts and produces the acts of faith, charity, hope, and other virtues. Hence, we are said to believe, hope, and love not only by God in us or through us but by ourselves through the grace of God.

LXVII. From what has been set forth so far, it is easy to infer that the Remonstrants and the theologians of the Augsburg Confession differ somewhat in method and terminology regarding the doctrine of sufficient and efficacious grace, but they agree on the substance of the matter. Namely, the theologians of the Augsburg Confession deny that grace should rightly be divided into efficacious and sufficient, while the Remonstrants affirm this distinction and highly approve of it. However, the intent of the theologians of the Augsburg Confession is not to imply that those who hear the Word of God and do not convert lack any aid from God necessary for their conversion, or that the grace given and offered to them is not sufficient to produce faith and repentance in them. On the contrary, they assert that the grace offered to unbelievers and impenitent people merits not only the name of sufficient but also efficacious because it is efficacious in itself to lead them to repentance and faith unless they themselves persist in placing obstacles in its way.

LXVIII. On the other hand, the Remonstrants do not distinguish grace into sufficient and efficacious because they think that the grace received by those who remain unbelieving and persist in their sins lacks the necessary and requisite power and efficacy to bring about conversion in them and thus deserves only the name of sufficient and not also efficacious. They acknowledge that those who reject the Gospel preached to them lack no necessary aid for conceiving faith. But they deny the name of efficacious to the grace they participate in only because it does not produce the intended effect in them due to the obstacles those people place, not because the grace itself lacks the necessary efficacy.

LXIX. Both parties thus agree and teach that the grace given to those who refuse to obey the Gospel has sufficient power to convert them and that it fails to achieve its effect in them solely because they resist its movements and voluntarily place obstacles in its way. Conversely, they also agree that the faithful and those who seriously convert to God could, if they wished, place an obstacle to the grace that is efficacious in them and hinder its effect by their contumacy, and that no necessity was imposed on them by that grace to believe and convert to God.

LXX. Therefore, the Remonstrants are no worse off in this respect than those called Lutherans. Consequently, since the Reformed do not avoid their communion but instead invite them to brotherly peace and concord, the Remonstrants should not repel them from their communion for this doctrinal point if they do not err more gravely but should consider their view tolerable and not pernicious to piety.

LXXI. If anyone compares what we have previously recounted in the theses about Molina with the doctrine of the Remonstrants set forth in these theses, it will clearly appear that the Remonstrants, regarding the efficacy and sufficiency of grace, indeed hold the same view as many doctors of the Roman School who follow Molina today. Both parties agree that out of two people prevenient by equal grace, one can convert while the other does not because one freely places an obstacle to grace while the other does not. They also agree that those who do not convert receive from God aids of grace abundantly sufficient for their conversion so that nothing more is required on God's part for their actual conversion to follow.

LXXII. Nor have we less clearly demonstrated that those who subscribe to the Synod of Dordrecht, together with the more recent Thomists and also those who adhere to Jansenism, essentially hold and teach the same doctrine concerning efficacious and sufficient grace. And if they seem to differ in some respects, the contention is either verbal or not very significant.

LXXIII. Indeed, the Reformed who approve of that Synod, together with those doctors of the Roman School, agree and acknowledge that those who are converted by God's grace freely elicit the acts of conversion and that divine grace infallibly ensures that they believe and repent, yet in a manner that is consistent with a rational and free nature, and so that it does not simply take away the power to act otherwise and to omit those pious acts.

LXXIV. They also readily concede that those who hear the Gospel and do not convert or renounce sin, besides the external grace of preaching, receive many internal aids of grace and that God in various ways knocks at their heart and enlightens their mind to turn away from sin and give the proper faith to the Gospel. Thus, they perish only by their own fault, and it stands solely because of their perversity and contumacy that they do not become partakers of salvation.

LXXV. In turn, both those who are called Jansenists and the more recent Thomists acknowledge that the efficacy of grace is such that it not only invites and solicits the will to good but also powerfully bends and determines it; nor is its efficacy to be suspended on the consent of free will, since it infallibly and irresistibly brings about that consent in those whom it converts.

LXXVI. They also openly admit that all those who refuse to believe or are hardened in their sins lack some necessary and prerequisite aid from God in order to actually conceive faith and truly repent of their sins.

LXXVII. Therefore, the assertion of the more recent Thomists that those in whom grace is not efficacious for conversion nevertheless have sufficient grace for conversion, which the Reformed and Jansenists deny, is a mere verbal dispute. For the Thomists do not intend to assert by this that those who do not convert lack any antecedent aid from God necessary for their conversion, which is the only thing the Jansenists and the Reformed deny when they say those do not have sufficient grace. The Thomists would easily concede that the grace given to such persons could be called sufficient in a certain respect and in its own kind.

LXXVIII. This is particularly evident in the judgment of the theologians of Nassau-Wetteravia regarding the third and fourth articles, which is found in the acts of the Synod of Dordrecht. There, explaining their thesis on the intention of God in man's calling, they say that the grace of preaching and illumination, which is common to both hypocrites and the pious, is sufficient for conversion in a certain respect, that is, in the order of secondary causes or means, as no other means of conversion, whether external preaching or internal illumination, are required besides these. But it is not sufficient for conversion simply, that is, without the grace of internal drawing; without which Scripture declares that it is impossible for anyone to convert and come to Christ.

LXXIX. The difference between the Thomists and Jansenists and the Reformed School doctors in explaining the nature of efficacious grace and defining in what it consists—when the Thomists place it in a certain virtuous motion in the will, as an impetus in the thing impelled, Jansenists in the affections of love and desire for celestial and spiritual good, by which the human soul is gently drawn upward, the disciples of Cameron in the most powerful illumination and persuasion of the mind which carries the will and affections with it, and others in the omnipotent and most efficacious operation of God, whereby a new principle of spiritual life is introduced into the heart of the called person, and he is simultaneously excited to elicit the acts of this life—is a matter that pertains merely to scholastic dispute. Learned men may speak and think about it in various ways, and the statements made by most learned men appear to be reconcilable rather than opposed.

LXXX. Nevertheless, the great variety of opinions and doctrines concerning the nature and essence of efficacious grace and the manner and way in which it operates in the minds of men, which have occupied Christian schools for so many centuries, indicate that the matter is complex, obscure, and fraught with many difficulties on all sides. There is no hope of ending the disputes unless a limit is set on curiosity and arduous and unnecessary questions are abandoned. Indeed, it would be far wiser and more conducive to Christian peace and piety to abstain altogether from such questions than to endlessly quarrel over matters that overwhelm the human mind with their difficulty and in which hardly anyone can satisfy himself.

LXXXI. Especially since such questions are proposed to the Christian populace in sermons and homilies, not only without benefit but often with great harm, as various scruples are instilled in the minds of the simple which the skill and eloquence of the disputants cannot afterwards satisfactorily resolve. Therefore, it would be safest and most suitable to Christian prudence and sobriety, especially when speaking to the people about these matters, to stick to

what Christian teachers agree upon and what is sufficient for instructing piety and faith. Such as, all the good that is in us and that we do is owed to divine grace. It is God who works every good thing in us. Without Christ and the help of His Spirit, we can do nothing that promotes our eternal salvation. There is nothing we have that we did not receive from God for free and about which we can boast over another. Therefore, in all things, we are bound to implore God's grace and, if we have done anything good and right, to give thanks to Him.

LXXXII. Nevertheless, God, who is the author and creator of our nature and knows best how the human mind should be moved by reason, works in us through His grace in such a way that nothing is taken away from our liberty, and He moves us to do good not as if we were blocks of wood or stones but as befits rational creatures. Hence, the necessity and efficacy of divine grace do not in any way nullify our care and diligence in doing good works, nor do they exempt us from laboring and watching, just because we need God's help in everything. However great the necessity of grace may be, the impious who act wickedly and refuse to obey God's word have no reason to complain against God. For God invites them to repentance and provides them with the means of salvation in such a way that they fall into perdition solely by their own fault, and it is to be attributed solely to their contumacy and rebellion that they do not attain eternal salvation.

LXXXIII. These things, which no one doubts, should suffice for all Christians, in my opinion, without further and more curious investigation into both the inner nature of human liberty and the manner in which grace operates in us and how its efficacy is to be reconciled with our free will, about which there are no explicit, clear, and express oracles in Scripture. If anyone, however, insists on philosophizing further and more accurately about these matters in the schools, it should at least be hoped that it is done with the utmost moderation of mind and a sincere acknowledgment of our own darkness and ignorance in such difficult matters, which would remove all bitterness from disputes about such a grave and difficult subject and mold minds towards mutual Christian and fraternal tolerance, which God, through His same grace, may grant to those who preside over Christian schools.

LXXXIV. By way of appendix, it seems fitting to briefly state what the present-day Socinians attribute to the aids of divine grace in the conversion of man and in the business of piety. They suppose that the will of man is not so bound by nature to sin that he cannot will or not will to do something in matters pertaining to religion and eternal salvation and further, when he has received the doctrine of the Gospel in his ears, can actually believe and obey God's precepts. For they say that God willed that our will, from which the piety of life proceeds and is judged, should be placed in our choice and power, although He customarily promotes, hinders, or permits its external act according to His will. Hence they conclude that the good will that is in us is ours, not God's.

LXXXV. If anyone objects that if this is the case, much will be detracted from God's governance, which is seen in ruling the world, they respond that the internal act of our will, which God has placed ordinarily in our power alone, has no impact on the governance of the world, but its external effect, which is so placed in God's power that nothing can happen without His decree, aid, or permission. However, free will extends its force so that with God's aid or His

mere permission, man can not only entertain the thought of accomplishing something but also complete it in execution.

LXXXVI. Specifically regarding good actions commanded by the will, which God wants us to perform, they acknowledge that they can very often not be done without God's help. However, they do not think this prevents them from being in our power in their own way. This is because God denies His help to no one who sincerely comes to Him. Therefore, if anyone, lacking divine aid, does not obey His commands, he should attribute the blame to himself and has no excuse for his sin because he did not sincerely implore God's help or did not want to embrace the aids that God supplied for cultivating piety. This evil flows solely from the person's own wickedness, for it happens that he does not adapt his will to those things which are approved by God. If he did so, there would be no doubt that he would try every way and means to accomplish them and, as a result, would always resort to divine aid and thus, being surrounded by it, would easily attain knowledge of divine matters and focus his whole mind on the study of God.

LXXXVII. They say, moreover, that God assists human endeavors in a twofold manner: one is external, consisting either in threatening or promising, although promises have greater power to inflame men with zeal for God; the other is internal help, which God affords when He imprints more deeply in our souls the promises made and confirmed by external testimonies through divine power, or instructs us with a fuller knowledge of His will.

LXXXVIII. If anyone says that our willing, no less than our external work, in matters of saving good is attributed to God in Scripture, as in Paul's words to the Philippians, "For it is God who works in us both to will and to work for His good pleasure," they respond that these words and similar ones, which attribute human conversion to God, do not mean that God absolutely and necessarily brings about in humans what the words imply. Rather, God omits nothing that pertains to achieving this, while preserving the liberty of our will. Specifically, because God allures and invites us to will good by the magnitude of His benefits and the certainty and supreme excellence and amplitude of His promises, He makes it so that we not only can will, which is naturally within us, but actually do will. However, He accomplishes this in such a way that it is always within our power to resist the efficacy of this divine grace. This is more extensively discussed by the Socinian Volkeliuſ in the fifth book, eighteenth chapter of "De Vera Religione."

THEOLOGICAL THESES

In which it is explained

Whether and to what extent a person can fulfill the LAW through the grace of CHRIST and keep God's commandments.

Thesis I

Man was created by God in such a state that he could provide complete and perfect obedience to the law given by God without any flaw or fault. Indeed, it would not have been fair for God to demand from His innocent creature something for which He had not given sufficient power or means to accomplish. Scripture confirms this by teaching that God made man upright. A person who could not conform to God's law, which is the standard of uprightness, could not be considered upright.

II. However, man, having voluntarily transgressed God's law, lost the gifts and aids by which he could keep God's law. Thus, having become a slave to sin, he could not, of himself, satisfy the law in any part, nor offer obedience pleasing and acceptable to God. Far from being able to fully keep the law, it is necessary for anyone who seeks to attain life through the law to do so. Sacred Scripture clearly teaches this, affirming that humans, apart from the grace of Christ, are dead in sins, and that without Him, they can do nothing. They are not sufficient to think anything of themselves, as if from themselves; the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, is not subject to God's law, nor indeed can it be.

III. But God, having mercy on humanity lost by its own fault, sent His Son Christ into the world, who not only freed people from the penalties justly deserved for their sins but also delivered them from the bondage of sin. He conferred grace through which they could again serve God in true righteousness and holiness and begin new obedience to His commandments.

IV. This grace, pertaining to the new covenant in Christ, was frequently promised by God through the prophets. Thus, God speaks through Ezekiel (chapter 11): "I will give them one heart, and put a new spirit within them; and I will remove the heart of stone from their flesh and give them a heart of flesh, that they may walk in My statutes and keep My ordinances and do them. Then they will be My people, and I shall be their God." And again in chapter 36: "I will sprinkle clean water on you, and you will be clean; I will cleanse you from all your impurities and from all your idols. I will give you a new heart and put a new spirit within you; I will remove from you your heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. And I will put My Spirit within you and cause you to walk in My statutes, and you will be careful to observe My ordinances."

V. Similar words are found in Jeremiah (chapter 31): "Behold, the days are coming," declares the Lord, "when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with the house of Judah, not like the covenant which I made with their fathers in the day I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, My covenant which they broke, although I was a husband to them," declares the Lord. "But this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel after those days," declares the Lord, "I will put My law within them and on their heart I will write it; and I will be their God, and they shall be My people." And in the following chapter: "I will give them one heart and one way, that they may fear Me always, for their own good and for the good of their children after them. I will make an everlasting covenant with them: I will never stop doing good to them, and I will inspire them to fear Me, so that they will never turn away from Me."

VI. Moses had also foretold similar things, saying in Deuteronomy (chapter 30): "The Lord your God will circumcise your heart and the heart of your descendants, to love the Lord

your God with all your heart and with all your soul, so that you may live." And shortly after: "You shall again obey the Lord, and observe all His commandments which I command you today. Then the Lord your God will prosper you abundantly in all the work of your hand."

VII. Indeed, unless God granted such grace to people by which they could offer true and sincere obedience to His commandments, none of them could be saved. None could rightly trust that God would show them the beneficence and mercy He offers and grants in Christ. For God promises to deal mercifully and kindly only with those who keep His covenant and do His commandments, as seen in Psalm 103: "But the mercy of the Lord is from everlasting to everlasting upon them that fear Him, and His righteousness unto children's children; to such as keep His covenant, and to those that remember His commandments to do them." This is consistent with what is read in Ezekiel (chapter 18): "But if a wicked person turns away from all his sins which he has committed and keeps all My statutes and does what is lawful and right, he shall surely live; he shall not die. None of the transgressions which he has committed shall be remembered against him; because of his righteousness that he has done, he shall live."

VIII. This also aligns with what Christ declares in Revelation, pronouncing blessed those who keep God's commandments and excluding from the city of God all who indulge in vices, love, and practice falsehood: "Blessed are those who do His commandments, that they may have the right to the tree of life, and may enter through the gates into the city. But outside are dogs and sorcerers and sexually immoral and murderers and idolaters, and whoever loves and practices a lie," (Revelation 22).

IX. No one can be considered truly in communion with Christ or to truly know and love Him who does not keep God's commandments. As John says: "By this, we know that we have come to know Him if we keep His commandments. The one who says, 'I have come to know Him,' and does not keep His commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him," (1 John 2). Similarly, "The one who keeps His commandments abides in Him, and He in him," (1 John 3). And in chapter 5: "For this is the love of God, that we keep His commandments." Hence, Paul teaches that the only thing of any importance in Christ is the keeping of God's commandments: "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but what matters is the keeping of the commandments of God," (1 Corinthians 7).

X. However, the fact that the faithful can keep God's commandments through divine grace is most evidently proven by experience itself. For, according to Scripture, many holy and pious people have indeed kept God's commandments. David does not hesitate to affirm this about himself in Psalm 119: "I hastened and did not delay to keep Your commandments." Also, "My soul has kept Your testimonies, and I love them exceedingly. I have kept Your commandments and Your testimonies, for all my ways are before You." Luke the Evangelist gives the same testimony about Zacharias and his wife Elizabeth: "They were both righteous before God, walking blamelessly in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord." Indeed, all the pious and faithful are frequently described in Scripture as those who keep God's commandments, as David says in the cited Psalm: "I am a companion of all who fear You and of those who keep Your precepts."

XI. Thus, with good reason, John in his first epistle, chapter 5, affirms that God's commandments are not burdensome. For not only do they demand nothing from us that is not very agreeable to nature and reason, and most beneficial to us, but God also provides the strength by which His commandments can be performed, and through His grace enables the pious and faithful to observe them.

XII. Furthermore, since the faithful, in whom divine grace operates, are said in Scripture to keep God's commandments, there is no doubt that in some sense they can also be said to fulfill God's law. For God's commandments are the same as God's law. To keep God's commandments and to fulfill the same law signify one and the same thing. Indeed, it cannot be denied that true and sincere charity, that is, the love of God and neighbor, is found in those who are regenerated by the Spirit of God. For those who believe in Christ and are born again by His Spirit have passed from death to life. As the Apostle John testifies, "He who does not love remains in death" (1 John 3:14). Therefore, anyone who lives a spiritual life necessarily loves God and their neighbor. Moreover, "love is the fulfillment of the law," and "he who loves has fulfilled the law," as Paul explicitly teaches in Romans 13.

XIII. Additionally, the fulfillment of the righteousness of the law in us and our fulfillment of the law and its righteousness seem to be the same thing. The Apostle teaches that Christ came into the world so that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who do not walk according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit. For, he says, "what the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God did by sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin condemned sin in the flesh, that the righteous requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us who do not walk according to the flesh but according to the Spirit" (Romans 8:3-4).

XIV. Although the faithful, who are led by the Spirit of God, can, in a true and proper sense, be said to fulfill God's law and keep His commandments according to the style and custom of Scripture, they are far from being able to perfectly fulfill the law and offer exact and absolutely complete obedience to God's precepts.

XV. To perfectly fulfill the law means to satisfy it in every part, according to its entire rigor, without failing in any of the things that the law precisely demands from a person, so that one might attain life by the law, according to the clause "Do this and live," and claim the happiness promised by the law as a right, without any fear of the penalties that the law threatens against transgressors. However, no one fulfills the law in this sense and respect, except one who is entirely free from sin and has never transgressed the law. For all who have sinned even once are judged and condemned by the law, strictly interpreted, and are subject to its curse, according to this terrible clause: "Cursed is everyone who does not continue in all things which are written in the book of the law, to do them." The law justifies and absolves no one freely, but only from a debt, according to Paul's doctrine in Romans 4. Every sinner, whoever he may be, needs God's grace and mercy, and cannot be justified except freely.

XVI. Now, there is no one among humans who has not at some time transgressed the law. For all are born in sin, and by nature are slaves to sin, indeed dead in sins, and would remain

perpetually in that death and slavery unless they were raised and freed from it by the grace of Christ. As we briefly showed above, and as Scripture inculcates so often and so clearly that it seems superfluous to heap up testimonies about it here. Paul especially urges and insists on this doctrine in his epistles, particularly in the first four chapters of Romans, where he convincingly argues that all have sinned and are under sin, both Jews and Greeks, according to these Scriptures: "There is none righteous, no, not one; there is none who understands; there is none who seeks after God. They have all turned aside; they have together become unprofitable; there is none who does good, no, not one." Hence he concludes that no one will be justified in God's sight by the works of the law, but all are justified freely by God's grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. From this, it follows that no one perfectly fulfills God's law in every respect, for if anyone fulfilled the law in that way, he would undoubtedly be justified by the works of the law, and that from a debt, not from grace.

XVII. However, not only are humans naturally immersed in sin and convicted by the law of sin, but even after they are reborn through grace, they are far from rendering perfect obedience to the law. Even the most holy among them daily fall into many sins, according to James' statement, "We all stumble in many ways" (James 3:2). And John, in his first epistle, chapter 1, says, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." This aligns with the wise statement in Ecclesiastes, chapter 7, "There is no one on earth who is righteous, no one who does what is right and never sins."

XVIII. Moreover, not only are those regenerated by Christ's grace subject to minor and small sins, but hardly any of them avoid falling into serious sins at times, by which they incur anew the guilt of eternal death and lose their present fitness for the heavenly kingdom until they are raised up by God's special grace through singular repentance. This is clearly demonstrated by the frequent lapses of saints mentioned in Scripture, such as David, who fell into adultery and murder, and Peter, who denied Christ three times with an oath. This is also confirmed too often by the daily experience of the faithful.

XIX. Indeed, even the obedience that the faithful render to the law is not without its defects and blemishes. Even in those works they perform in conformity to the law, they do not fully achieve the highest standard of the law, always leaving room for progress and something to strive for. This is evident from Paul's example. For it will hardly be found that anyone was granted as much measure of grace as Christ did to him. Yet, he confesses that he is not yet perfect and that he continually strives for further progress. He says in Philippians 3, "Not that I have already obtained all this, or have already been made perfect, but I press on to take hold of that for which Christ Jesus took hold of me. Brothers and sisters, I do not consider myself yet to have taken hold of it. But one thing I do: Forgetting what is behind and straining toward what is ahead, I press on toward the goal to win the prize for which God has called me heavenward in Christ Jesus."

XX. But, you might say, the Apostle himself implies that some are perfect, and includes himself among them. For he adds, "All of us, then, who are mature should take such a view of things" (Philippians 3:15). And in 1 Corinthians 2, he says, "We do, however, speak a message

of wisdom among the mature." Many holy men in Scripture are also testified to be perfect. Thus, it is said of Noah, "Noah was a righteous man, blameless among the people of his time, and he walked faithfully with God" (Genesis 6:9). And God Himself, speaking to Satan about Job, says, "Have you considered my servant Job? There is no one on earth like him; he is blameless and upright, a man who fears God and shuns evil" (Job 1:8). Indeed, David in Psalm 18 does not hesitate to attribute such perfection to himself. He says, "I have been blameless before him and have kept myself from sin. The LORD has rewarded me according to my righteousness, according to the cleanness of my hands in his sight."

XXI. To solve this difficulty, it is necessary to observe a twofold distinction of perfection. There is an absolute perfection, and there is a relative and comparative perfection. Absolute perfection is that in which nothing is lacking in its own kind. Relatively perfect things, however, are those which, although they fall short of the highest perfection, surpass many others of the same kind with which they are compared. When we say that no one in this life is perfect, or can render perfect obedience to the divine will, we mean absolute perfection, which reaches the highest level and to which nothing can be added. In this sense, Paul acknowledges that he is not yet perfect because he has not yet reached that level of love and obedience to God which the blessed spirits reigning with Christ have attained. Their knowledge and obedience can no longer increase since they are wholly devoted to God with all their strength and will. However, this does not prevent the faithful, who excel in virtue and who have made greater progress in the knowledge of divine truth and in the pursuit of piety and justice, from being called perfect, not absolutely, but in relation to those who fall far short of them. These are, as Paul says, infants in Christ and somewhat carnal compared to those who are uniquely spiritual, as seen in 1 Corinthians 3. These are the more mature Christians, if I may say so, of greater age and stature, whom Paul calls perfect in the aforementioned passages, "We speak a message of wisdom among the mature," and "All of us, then, who are mature should take such a view of things."

XXII. A related distinction is often made between the perfection of parts and the perfection of degrees. Perfect obedience in terms of degrees is that which has reached the highest degree of perfection and by which one so perfectly conforms to and obeys the law that nothing is lacking in it, and it cannot be improved. In this respect, we contend, and it is evident in itself, that no one perfectly fulfills the law in this life. However, obedience that falls far short of the highest degree of perfection can still be and is called perfect according to parts; because, with respect to its essential and integral parts, it lacks none of the necessary elements to be true and acceptable obedience to God. In this sense, the obedience of the pious in this life is perfect. In this respect, the faithful, who are renewed by Christ's grace and led by His Spirit, can perfectly fulfill God's law, that is, render true and sincere obedience acceptable to God according to His commandments. For such essential perfection is nothing else but the truth and sincerity of the thing itself.

XXIII. To make this clearer, it must be observed that three main things are required for our obedience to be true and sincere. First, it must be rendered not only in body and outward action but also with the inward affection of the heart. For it is of no benefit to do what the law

commands unless it is done out of love for God and with the intent of fulfilling His will and promoting His glory. Moreover, it is not enough to have a certain affection to obey God if His commandments are not also fulfilled in action when required. Secondly, true obedience is not achieved by keeping some of God's commandments while neglecting others; rather, we must seriously subject ourselves to all the precepts of divine law and strive to fulfill them whenever the opportunity presents itself. Lastly, our obedience must be constant and persevering. It is not sufficient to obey God temporarily, but we must persevere in His service to the end, through both adversity and prosperity.

XXIV. In all these respects, there is nothing lacking in the obedience of those who are truly pious and regenerated by the Spirit of God. They do not serve God merely with their bodies, but they also subject their minds and affections to His will. They not only perform outward actions prescribed by the law, but they do so with the intent of glorifying God and out of love for Him. They strive not only to obey some of His commands while neglecting others, but they endeavor to conform themselves to the entire law of God and all its precepts. This obedience is not temporary or only when things go well but continues even when faced with temptations and persecutions, holding God's commandments before their eyes until their last breath and aligning their actions to His norms.

XXV. Therefore, their obedience rightly deserves to be attributed with the perfection that is often called "perfection of parts" in scholarly terms. They strive to observe the whole law and all its precepts, with both the acts of the body and the affections of the mind, consistently and perseveringly. Certainly, if this were not so, Scripture would not attribute true righteousness and holiness to the faithful, as it does when it says that they are clothed with the new self, created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness (Ephesians 4:24). True righteousness cannot be considered such if it lacks essential parts. This is the perfection attributed to Job and Noah, and which David does not hesitate to claim for himself. For in these instances, perfection merely signifies the integrity and sincerity of these holy men. The Hebrew word "Tham" or "thamin," which is translated as "perfect," properly means "complete" and "sincere."

XXVI. Thus, we deny that the faithful can perfectly fulfill God's law if we speak of absolute perfection and degrees. This is because, first, like all other men, they are naturally sinners; second, even after receiving grace, they continue to offend in many ways and remain susceptible to serious lapses; and finally, even in their good works, they do not reach the highest standard of perfection that the law in its rigor demands. Yet, in agreement with Scripture, we assert and teach that the faithful keep God's commandments through Christ's grace and in some way fulfill the law, providing true and God-approved obedience to the divine law according to all its precepts. This obedience, although far from the highest perfection, can still be called perfect in the scriptural sense because it is true and sincere, lacking nothing that is necessarily required for true and acceptable obedience to God.

XXVII. This explanation of the orthodox view must be carefully noted, especially in light of the teachings of Roman Church doctors who, in this question as in many others, either do not understand or deliberately misrepresent the doctrine of the Reformed Schools. They attribute to

Protestant theologians the claim that Christ's faithful cannot keep God's commandments and fulfill the law in such a way that some of their works can be called just. Indeed, they argue that the law is utterly impossible for a person justified by Christ's grace to keep, so that no good works can be done, nor any actual righteousness exists in them. This is evident in the writings of Bellarmine (*De Justificatione*, lib. 4, cap. 10) and Becanus in his *Summa Theologiae Scholasticae* (tom. 2, tract. 4, cap. 4), titled "*De merito bonorum operum ex sententia Calvinistarum*."

XXVIII. Based on this false hypothesis, they pose a state of controversy between us and themselves that does not actually exist, namely, whether justified men, aided by the grace of the Lord, can so fulfill the divine law that their works are not only not to be called sins but also truly and properly deserve to be called just. These are the words of Bellarmine in the cited chapter 10. Similar statements are found in Gabriel Vasquez (tom. 2 in 1-2, disp. 212) under the title, "*An justi homines possint ita adimplere legem, ut opera ipsorum, non modo non sint peccata, sed etiam justa dicenda sint*."

XXIX. But it was never the intention of Protestants to deny any of these points. They do not teach that the law of God is utterly impossible for the justified. They do not deny that the faithful render true obedience to God's commandments and that the law of God is so fulfilled by the pious through Christ's grace that they perform good works. Nor do they claim that the works of those striving to conform to the law under the guidance of the divine Spirit are to be called sins or are inherently sinful. Instead, they acknowledge that such works can and should be called holy and just. The only thing they consistently deny is that the faithful can perfectly fulfill the law because their obedience, while true and sincere, always falls far short of the highest perfection.

XXX. To prevent any misrepresentation, we will provide some testimonies from Protestant theologians, though reviewing every single one would be excessive and unnecessary. Moreover, the matter is sufficiently clear to any attentive observer. Therefore, Paraeus writes in his commentary on Bellarmine (lib. 4, de Justif., cap. 10): "The question is whether the justified can fulfill the divine law. The adversary absolutely affirms this, but we grant imperfect and initiated fulfillment and deny perfect fulfillment." He later explains what it means to fulfill the law: "To fulfill the law of God absolutely means to render perfect obedience to the divine law without any defect, which we admit the justified cannot do." He adds that it is impossible for a justified man to perfectly fulfill the law in every aspect, though they can initiate new obedience to the law according to all its precepts.

XXXI. Similarly, William Ames writes in *Bellarminus Enervatus* (tom. 4, lib. 6, c. 7), "We do not teach that the law is utterly impossible for man to keep, for instance, for Adam before the fall, later for Christ, and also for those perfectly sanctified in Christ. But for others who have only initiated sanctification through ordinary grace in this life, we say it is not possible to perfectly and exactly observe the divine law." He further concedes that the saints praised in Scripture observed the commandments with purpose and effort, though not completely, with

respect to essence but not to completion, to the quality of sincerity but not to the quantity of intensity or extension.

XXXII. John Davenant also addresses this in his discourse on actual righteousness (c. 47). Critiquing the Tridentine Canon, he observes the Papist art in fabricating the canon. He notes that Protestants do not deny the diligent observation of divine precepts by the regenerate but deny the perfect and complete observation which fully satisfies the law. The Canon falsely anathematizes Protestants, who do not claim that the regenerate cannot observe God's commandments but assert that it is impossible to meet the full righteousness of the law, which would escape all transgression.

XXXIII. Lastly, Robert Baron of the University of Aberdeen authored a brief treatise on the possibility of fulfilling God's law according to the evangelical measure. He distinguishes between the obedience required by the law in its strict sense and the obedience required by the gospel or the covenant of grace for salvation. Although the gospel offers hope of salvation to the greatest sinners and transgressors condemned and excluded by the law, it does not permit anyone to hope for eternal life without sincere obedience to divine law. Declaring that without holiness, no one will see the Lord, he maintains that while the obedience demanded by the covenant of works is impossible for any, even the regenerate, the obedience required by the gospel for salvation is possible through ordinary grace.

XXXIV. It is unnecessary to enumerate private testimonies since the confessions and declarations of our churches clearly state the Reformed position. The Reformed confession in the Kingdom of Poland, presented at the Thorne Colloquy, states: "We are falsely accused of teaching that Christ's precepts cannot be kept by the faithful. We teach that they can be kept by the grace of the Holy Spirit, not only can but must be kept by all, not merely in intention or ineffective purpose but also in true, sincere, and lifelong diligent effort." The same doctrine is expressed differently in the Anglican confession of 1645, which states that the Spirit of Christ so tames and bends the will of man that he does with joy what the will of God requires in His law.

XXXV. From these examples, it is evident that Reformed Church doctors do not deny that the faithful, by Christ's grace, can in some way and sense fulfill the law and keep God's commandments by rendering true obedience. When they occasionally state that it is impossible for the faithful to fulfill God's law and observe His commandments, they mean it is impossible in terms of perfect and absolute fulfillment. This is carefully noted when they explain the nature of the question. They observe, with Chemnitz, in his Examination of the Sixth Session of the Council of Trent, that the question is not simply whether the law can be fulfilled by the grace of God but whether it can be perfectly fulfilled. Protestant theologians freely concede the initiated and imperfect fulfillment of the law by the regenerate.

XXXVI. From what has been presented, it is clear that when Protestants affirm that the divine law's commands are observed by the faithful in an initiated and imperfect manner, rather than absolutely and consummately, they do not intend to deny that the obedience they render to the law is complete and sincere. They also do not deny that through this obedience they submit themselves to the whole divine law and its individual precepts, and that this constitutes a

righteousness that pleases and is approved by God, who will graciously reward it in the future. This is contrary to what Roman Church doctors often attribute to them. Therefore, Protestants do not deny the obedience of the regenerate the perfection we have called the perfection of parts, but only the perfection of degrees. This distinction is often used by them, as can be seen in John Davenant's treatise on actual righteousness, chapter 51. "We have never denied," he says, "that the regenerate, imbued with the spirit of charity, can love even their enemies and perform other acts commanded in the Decalogue. But in performing these works, they achieve only what theologians call the perfection of parts, not the perfection of degrees."

XXXVII. This is consistent with what is found in Paraeus in Bellarmine, book 4, on Justification, chapter 11, page 1077. "In the places cited," he says, "where perfection is attributed to some or required of all, perfection is understood not in degrees, which the law in its rigor requires, but in parts, or integrity opposed to hypocrisy. That is, a true and not feigned affection and effort to obey God, resisting desires, and the initiation of obedience according to all God's commands." In this, Paraeus is followed by Wendelin in his Christian Theology, book 1, chapter 26, in the explanation of thesis 10, section 3. "The perfection attributed to the saints," he says, "is not in degrees but in parts, not absolute but limited, which we call sincerity." Indeed, it might seem superfluous to cite testimonies from the Reformers on this matter, since this distinction between perfection is so frequently used by them that it can hardly be found lacking in their works.

XXXVIII. Thus, in this question, Protestants only intend to deny that the faithful, renewed by the Spirit of Christ, can fulfill the law according to the entire perfection required by the law when rigidly taken. The law is rigidly taken when considered in its original institution and viewed as it was given to the first man, containing the initial covenant made with man, by the observation of which he could expect perpetual and blessed life from the goodness and justice of God. The law, thus considered, required from man perpetual obedience, uninterrupted by any sins, unblemished by any defects or flaws, and through which man would submit himself with utmost alacrity, without any struggle or resistance of internal affections, in all things whatsoever, without exception, to the divine will. Such obedience, indeed, could be rendered by our first parents in the state of innocence and was required of them to remain in that blessed state and ultimately enjoy eternal happiness with God.

XXXIX. However, such obedience can no longer be rendered by Christ's faithful, even those endowed with the abundant gifts of His Spirit. For in all of them, the flesh struggles against the spirit, constantly stirring up many impulses rebellious to right reason and therefore contrary to the divine law. Consequently, they experience a great inclination to do evil and not a small difficulty in doing good. Hence, they offend daily in many ways, as James says, and among them, few or none are found who do not sometimes fall into grave sins.

XL. The reality of this situation and the inability of the faithful in this state of natural corruption and weakness to reach the described perfection is so evident from the very experience, common sense of the faithful, and internal testimony of conscience that even the doctors of the Roman Church cannot deny it and are forced to admit the truth in this matter. This

can be abundantly evidenced by Stapleton alone, a man of considerable authority among his peers and a fierce opponent of Protestants, as well as a staunch defender of Papal doctrine, who wrote twelve whole books on justification and related questions, dedicating the entire sixth book to this very question of fulfilling the law. To make this clearer, it seems appropriate here to briefly summarize what this doctor has extensively discussed in the mentioned book.

XLI. Therefore, in chapter 2, after stating that according to Catholic doctrine, it is certain that justified men, through good works done in God, fully satisfy the divine law as far as this life's state allows, he explains this doctrine in many propositions. The first of these, which he endeavors to prove in that chapter, is this: "The renewed and justified in Christ receive the grace of the Holy Spirit by which they fulfill the law." In the third chapter, his second proposition is: "However, this fulfillment of the law does not necessarily and precisely mean in all the commandments of the law, throughout the entire course of human justice; but he is considered to fulfill the law, satisfy the law, and be regarded as just in the sight of God who, having the will and affection to fulfill all the commandments of the law, fulfills it as far as human frailty, assisted by the grace of Christ, can and usually does in this life." He then concludes from Scripture, which asserts that no one in this life is without sin, and yet testifies that many just men have walked in all God's commandments, that there is some way of doing all the commandments or fulfilling the whole law, even if it is not universal and complete. At the end of the chapter, he observes that it is very different to require for righteousness that the whole law be perpetually fulfilled by a just man throughout his entire life, or at least after his first conversion, which he condemns as Pelagian, than to say that a justified person in Christ can do some good works which so fulfill the law or satisfy the law that these works are truly good, praiseworthy, and just in the sight and judgment of God, and the person doing them is considered just because of them, which he asserts to be the orthodox view.

XLII. In chapter 4, his third proposition is this: "He who observes the commandments of the law, even if he offends in many things, can still be just in the sight of God if he has more virtues than vices." He notes that no one is just who does not have more venial sins than virtuous works, but here compares the works of virtues with grave sins, to which many small sins are not equivalent. Thus, the sense is that one is considered just who, after the first conversion, in the whole course of their justice, in the entire conflict of the present life, has more notable virtues than grave and deadly sins, or who more frequently and diligently engages in works of piety and charity than falls into serious sin, and finally, who more often overcomes than is overcome.

XLIII. In chapter 5, he teaches that the fulfillment of the commandments in this life is not such that it is completely without sin, but it is such and so great that it can and should be completely free from those grave and deadly sins. Just men indeed sometimes sin mortally, but they are not just while in such sin, nor do they fulfill the law; nor can true justice consist with such sin unless it is removed by repentance, although true justice in this life consists with other lighter sins committed daily.

XLIV. In chapter 6, his fifth proposition is: "Although the justice of this life is not entirely free from sin and therefore not perfect in that regard, it is still perfect in its own way

because it always strives to be free from sin, progressing day by day." He later explains in what sense he calls it perfect in its own way, namely, because it is true justice and true obedience. Here, he considers perfect and full as synonymous. He understands perfect and full to mean that nothing is lacking for the true nature and essence of justice and obedience, as he indicates in the paragraph "In this therefore" and chapter 7, paragraph 1, where he says, "Perfect charity and justice are said to be true," just as perfect hatred is said to be true.

XLV. This thesis summarizes the seventh chapter: Although the righteousness of this life does not fulfill all commandments completely, often offending, and being more in progress than in perfection—that is, perfect operation or possession of virtues—yet, in the observance or fulfillment of the commandments which the righteous perform, they do not sin, even if the commandment itself is not fulfilled in the most perfect way, in terms of the manner or degree of fulfillment. Furthermore, it should be diligently noted that the Catholic Church does not teach that the most perfect obedience to the commandments is necessary for righteousness and salvation, but rather true obedience, and such as the divine law requires us to have in this life. For it is one thing to truly and fully satisfy the mandate of the law, so that you are not its transgressor, and to keep it truly and fully, so that neither the law itself nor God, because of the law, can justly condemn anything in your work; and another thing to satisfy the divine law most fully and perfectly, so that neither the law nor God because of the law desires anything more in your work. For the former is true in every just work. The latter is thirsted and hungered for in this life, but not comprehended, not possessed.

XLVI. In the eighth chapter, the seventh proposition is undertaken to be proven and illustrated. The righteousness of good works in faith is true righteousness before God, even if mixed with sins and imperfect, both in terms of fulfilling all the commandments and in the manner of fulfillment, and it truly and plainly satisfies God's law: not only because it closely approaches full and perfect righteousness or because it at least lacks more serious crimes, or even because it progresses daily towards completely avoiding all sin and fully satisfying, but further because whatever it lacks for full and perfect fulfillment of the commandments by omission and frequently venial sinning, or because of imperfection in the manner and reason of fulfillment, Christ's mercy and grace indulges and forgives; and by indulging, it makes us just before God, as if we had fulfilled all the commandments to the utmost and most perfectly.

XLVII. Finally, in chapter 15, it is explained in what sense the reborn fulfill the law and satisfy it, according to the teaching of the Roman Church. For whenever the Catholic Church teaches that the law is fulfilled by the reborn or that the reborn fully satisfy the divine law, it means the mode of fulfillment that is opposed to transgression of the law, which is aversion from the whole breadth of the law, either by commission or omission. It understands true observance and execution of the commandments. But by the term fulfillment or fully satisfying, it does not understand the full measure or the most complete manner by which the entire law can be fulfilled, so that, namely, the entire law in its full breadth is always and most perfectly observed. For this belongs to the full and perfect righteousness of another life. That pertains to the legitimate contest of the present life, the right course. Consequently, in the same chapter, it is

explained how the righteousness of the faithful in this life is perfect in a certain respect and not perfect. It is necessary, he says, to recall that our righteousness in this life is imperfect in some sense and that there is a certain newness begun in us; but it is imperfect because it is not perfect in every way and in every part; likewise, it is begun because it is not full, such as it will be in another life, where it will be so great that nothing can be added to it; yet it is true righteousness in name, according to the capacity of this life, according to the reason of the present righteousness, which consists in conflict, not in victory, where death and the law of sin are absorbed, in the stadium and course, not in the reward and prize, finally on the way, not in the homeland.

XLVIII. Similar things are found in Andradius, a renowned Roman theologian of considerable repute among those who attended the Council of Trent. For in the defense of the faith of Trent, book 5, folio 330, he acknowledges that the celestial law prescribes a certain angelic integrity and righteousness, most free and secret from all taint of crimes, from which Paul himself confessed to be far distant. And afterward, he adds, using the words of Augustine, that the admirable law of God so institutes the life of men and so moderates their affections, not only prescribing duties which cannot be neglected without crime but also those which should be sought with all effort, although they cannot be perfectly performed by mortals burdened with the weight of the flesh. For who, he says, would be so insane as to think that he could fulfill all the numbers of love which God the Almighty has encompassed in that prayer, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your strength," when he understands that even the happy minds, free from all care, enjoying the blessed vision of the divine presence eternally, do not by any means exceed these limits of love? But since God wished to present to the eyes of mortals the most perfect image of love and righteousness, He did not prescribe only those things which could be performed by them, but also those which should be pursued with love and desire. To this also pertain all those precepts that utterly forbid nefarious desires: for although mortals cannot completely avoid them, in whom the sparks of vices have not yet settled, they are nevertheless so prohibited from obeying desires by those precepts, as to plainly show to what all the studies and cognitions of the pious should be referred.

XLIX. The same thing concerning the imperfection of the faithful in this life regarding the fulfillment of the law is also taught by Ruardus Tapperus, a professor at Louvain, in the defense of the second article, page 76. There he affirms, after that holy Doctor, that indeed here is health, newness, and righteousness, but not full or perfect, except in a certain manner: just as here love is not full. And the law, whose fullness is love, will only then be fully fulfilled so that nothing is lacking when the love of God is perfect. But the love of God will not be perfect until we see God.

L. Finally, since Protestants consider the obedience that the faithful render to the law through the grace of Christ to be especially imperfect because it is constantly obscured by daily incursions of sins, which the Catholics call venial, and is also frequently interrupted by more serious ones, which they call mortal, both of these are acknowledged and supposed by the very Councils of the Roman Church, and notably by the Council of Trent. For in session six, chapter

eleven, it affirms that all in this mortal life, however holy and just they may be, sometimes fall into light and daily sins, which are called venial. And in the same session, canon 23, it anathematizes those who teach that a person once justified can avoid all sins, even venial, in their entire life, except by a special privilege of God. And in session 14, chapter 5, it proves and confirms the constitution of the Lateran Council, by which all the faithful are commanded, after reaching the age of discretion, to confess their sins to a priest at least once a year: although the same council, in the same chapter, teaches that it is not necessary to confess venial sins, but only mortal ones. Hence it is manifest that this council supposes that all the faithful do not go through a whole year without committing some grave sin, which can only be expiated by solemn penance.

LI. From all these things, it is easy to conclude that in the obedience which the reborn render to the law through the grace of Christ, Protestants readily acknowledge that essential perfection, which consists in its truth and sincerity, for which the Doctors of the Roman Church contend. And in turn, the Doctors of the Roman Church, when they say that the faithful can perfectly fulfill the law, do not mean to attribute to their obedience the perfection called of degrees, which the Protestants remove from it, and which consists in the most exact and absolute conformity with the law, considered according to that rigor by which it could and should have been observed by man when he was first created by God. Therefore, the Doctors of the Roman Church unjustly malign the doctrine of our churches in this part, as if it nullified the efficacy of the grace of Christ and greatly diminished the zeal of piety in the faithful, when in truth the Protestants here teach nothing that the very Doctors of the Roman Church, according to their own tenets, are not compelled to admit.

Theological Theses on the Truth of Good Works Done by the Regenerate through the Grace of Christ

Thesis I

Christ declares in more than one place that a bad tree cannot produce good fruit. Furthermore, all men by nature are bad trees, for they are born and conceived in sin, and the inclination of the human heart is prone to evil from youth, as God Himself testifies in Genesis 6. Consequently, from humans, if left to themselves, no truly good and God-pleasing work, nor one that has any significance for salvation, can proceed. But whatever men think or do without God's grace and by the strength of nature alone, however outwardly splendid it may appear, always has something rotten inside, rendering it simply defective.

II. However, those who by nature are rotten and bad trees, Christ by the efficacy of His grace makes into good trees. He purifies and sanctifies men through His Spirit from the corruption of sin, making them put off the old man and put on the new man, becoming new creatures who no longer serve sin but righteousness.

III. That those who are thus renewed by the Spirit of Christ and made good trees, and, as scripture sometimes speaks, trees of righteousness, can do good, holy, and just works and indeed

produce such good fruits that are pleasing and acceptable to God, is so certain and evident that no one can doubt it without rejecting the common sense of Christians and denying all authority to the word of God.

IV. For Christ Himself, who denies that a bad tree can produce good fruit, conversely affirms that a good tree produces good fruit. The Apostle teaches that we are God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand that we should walk in them. And that Christ gave Himself for us to redeem us from all iniquity and purify for Himself a peculiar people, zealous for good works. These certainly would be said without any reason if the faithful, redeemed by Christ and newly created in Him, could do no truly good works.

V. Moreover, how could the faithful be said to walk according to the Spirit and not according to the flesh, and to sow to the Spirit and not to the flesh, and to have put on the new man who is created according to God in true righteousness and holiness, and to be servants of righteousness who offer their members as instruments of righteousness to God, if no truly holy and just works proceed from them? Or what else but works of righteousness and holiness can we understand by the fruit about which the Lord says, "He who abides in Me, and I in him, bears much fruit"? (John 15).

VI. There can be no doubt that what is truly good and just is what is rightly done and judged so by God, and what God Himself imputes to righteousness. The faithful, whom God's grace has renewed, do what is right in God's judgment, and what they do under the impulse of the divine Spirit is imputed to them as righteousness by God. Thus in 1 Kings 15, David is said to have done what was right in the eyes of the Lord. And God Himself, in the same book, chapter 14, rebuking King Jeroboam through a prophet, says to him, "You have not been like My servant David, who kept My commandments and followed Me with all his heart, doing only what was right in My eyes." And in Psalm 106, it is said that Phinehas, in his zeal to appease God's wrath, was counted to him as righteousness. "Phinehas stood up and executed judgment, and it was accounted to him for righteousness to all generations forever."

VII. Indeed, who would dare to deny that to seek and love God with all one's heart and soul is a truly good, holy, and God-pleasing work? But God's grace enables His people to love Him in that manner, as Moses says in Deuteronomy 30, "The Lord your God will circumcise your heart and the heart of your descendants, to love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul, that you may live." And God exercised this power of His grace in David, who acknowledging and celebrating this benefit of God, testifies of himself in Psalm 119, "With my whole heart I have sought You." Similarly, in 2 Kings 23, it is written of Josiah, "There was no king like him before him, who turned to the Lord with all his heart, with all his soul, and with all his might."

VIII. Indeed, those who contend that no truly good, just, and holy works are found in the faithful would thereby exclude them from salvation and consign them to the eternal fires of hell. For without holiness no one will see the Lord. And Christ says, "Unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven."

Moreover, the Lord declares that every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire (Matthew 7). Similarly, every branch that does not bear fruit in Him is taken away, gathered, and thrown into the fire, and burned (John 15).

IX. Therefore, the works that are done by the faithful through God's grace, being truly good and just, are neither in reality nor should be called sins. Who would dare to count among sins Abraham's obedience in offering his son, Joseph's chastity, Elijah's zeal and fervor, and Paul's constancy and eagerness in executing the task entrusted to him by Christ amidst so many adversities and dangers, and other excellent deeds of holy men, which the Holy Spirit praises in Scripture and sets forth as examples for others?

X. So far from numbering these and similar pious works, which are performed by God's grace and help, among sins, we willingly acknowledge that they differ entirely in kind from sins. For sins are forbidden by divine law; but the works that the faithful do by God's grace are commanded by the law. Sins displease God and are hateful and abominable to Him; but God loves and delights in the works of the pious. He severely punishes sins, but He rewards these according to His goodness. Sins obstruct a person's salvation; but these works have a place among the means of salvation and are a path to salvation prepared by God. Sins have God as their author, but these works are ascribed to God and are done under His moving Spirit. Finally, through sins, God's name is profaned and blasphemed; but through these works, it is sanctified and glorified.

XI. Not only do the good works of the faithful differ from manifest sins, that is, actions that are evil in themselves and forbidden by law, but they also differ from the excellent deeds of unbelievers, which have the appearance of virtue and are civically good and laudable. For in such actions of unbelievers, wherein they seem to exercise some virtue, such as kindness, justice, and temperance, the substance of the action is indeed good, yet the action is simply evil because it does not proceed from the principle from which all truly good and holy actions should flow, namely, the love of God, nor does it tend toward the end to which the same actions should be directed, that is, the glory of God. But the works of the faithful done by God's grace tend to the glory of God and proceed from charity. Therefore, these actions of unbelievers, though they may seem specious in human judgment, are not pleasing or acceptable to God and do not profit their authors for eternal salvation. But the works of the faithful are pleasing and acceptable to God and receive the reward of eternal salvation from Him.

XII. But however good the works of the faithful are, they are by no means perfect. Here it must be observed that there is a difference between a truly good and holy work and a work that is perfectly and entirely good. We affirm that the works of the faithful done by God's grace are indeed truly good. However, we deny that they are perfectly good and so complete that they lack nothing at all.

XIII. There is a double imperfection in them. First, lighter sins frequently cling to good works, which somewhat taint them with their contamination, like dust sprinkled on them, obscuring their brilliance. Thus, while praying, the mind is often distracted. In hearing the word of God, foreign thoughts frequently intrude. In giving alms, feelings of doubt arise, and some

tickling of vain glory. Similarly, when it comes to suffering for Christ, the zeal for divine glory mingles with some desire for human approval. These are like certain blemishes attached to such good works, which detract from and diminish their worth.

XIV. Besides, the good acts themselves, considered in themselves, even in men who are in the highest state of mortal and frail life, fall far short of the highest perfection. We do not merely mean that pious men in doing good do not attain that perfection to which blessed souls in heaven arrive, but that they also fall far below the degree of perfection that the law strictly taken requires of a man, and to which a man was obliged according to the original law of creation.

XV. For that law demanded of the first man that he obey God with all alacrity and readiness, without any sluggishness or resistance, and indeed the first man, as long as he remained intact, could exhibit such obedience to God: nor could he have departed the slightest bit from that perfection without vice and fault, for which he would have held himself guilty in God's judgment. How far those who are regenerated by the grace of Christ are now from that perfection is attested by the sense and conscience of each one of them. For when they obey the divine law and do good works, they do not do so without great difficulty. The evil desire that remains in them after receiving God's grace injects much languor and sluggishness when they have to attend to divine worship and other acts commanded by the law: and when they have to avoid evil, it excites a propensity and inclination towards it. Hence it is that in good things they follow the guidance of the Holy Spirit with difficulty, and in evil things, they are reluctantly drawn away from the allurements of sins. Therefore, they neither flee from evil nor pursue good with such ardor and pure zeal for God's glory as a man, remaining intact, could have performed according to the law's demand. And so their good works indeed conform to the law, but not according to that exact measure which the law, in its original institution, estimated and required, and according to which a man, not yet corrupted by sin, could and ought to conform his works to the law.

XVI. But, someone might say, the works of the regenerated, since they fall short of due perfection, should simply be called bad, not good. For an action cannot be good and be called simply such unless it contains everything required for the moral goodness of the action. As it is commonly stated in the schools, "Good is from the whole cause; evil is from any defect." To solve this difficulty, theologians observe that in works, otherwise good in their kind and substance, two kinds of defects can be noted and occur. The first is when something required for the moral goodness of the action is entirely lacking, or in no degree present. For example, when a work does not proceed from the proper principle, namely from faith and love of God, or is not referred to the proper end, namely to the glory of God. The second is when everything required for moral goodness is present in the action according to its kind and in some degree, but not in that degree, nor according to that perfection which the law strictly considered requires. For example, when the action proceeds from the proper principle, but less perfectly, that is, when it proceeds indeed from faith and charity, but from faith somewhat weak, and from charity lacking the fervor that the law demands. And when it is indeed referred to the proper end, but not with such purity of intention as the law in its rigorous justice requires.

XVII. A defect of the first kind is specific and essential and deprives the action of some essential perfection. But a defect of the latter kind is gradual and accidental and only removes accidental and individual perfection from the action. Therefore, an act that lacks something in the first way is so bad that it cannot be simply called good: but if it lacks something only in the latter way, it does not cease to be truly and properly good, although it only has imperfect goodness.

XVIII. To the first kind belong the acts of unbelievers that seem honest and proceed from virtue. For they do not arise from faith and love of God, nor are they directed to the glory of God, as we have said above, and therefore they cannot be numbered among good and holy works, and simply called such. But the actions of the faithful, done with the help of the Holy Spirit and through the grace of Christ, must be referred to the latter kind: for they are not only good in respect to their object and substance, but also in respect to their principle and end, since they are done from charity and tend to the glory of God. Therefore, such works of the faithful are approved and accepted by God as truly and properly good and should be simply and absolutely called such, although they fall far short of supreme perfection.

XIX. Although this defect, by which the works of pious and holy men labor, does not entirely vitiate the good action and make it simply bad, it is nonetheless of itself blameworthy and defective. As Augustine openly teaches in epistle 29, which is to Jerome, where he affirms that what is lacking in our charity, as long as we live in this body, is due to vice. "Perfect charity," he says, "which can no longer be increased, while one lives in this mortal life, is in no one. As long as it can be increased, surely that which is less is from vice. From which vice there is no just man on earth who does good and does not sin. From which vice no living person will be justified in the sight of God. For this reason, however much we have advanced, it is necessary for us to say, 'Forgive us our debts.'" This is akin to what the same Doctor writes in the book on the perfection of righteousness. "It is a sin when there is either no charity where there ought to be or when it is less than it ought to be."

XX. And certainly, who can deny that it is culpable and defective to depart from the perfection prescribed by the law? But what is lacking in the present state to the charity of the faithful causes it not to equal that love which the law originally given to man at creation required of him, and with which he indeed embraced his Creator before he voluntarily fell away from Him. Therefore, our charity and the good works that proceed from it contract some blemish from this, for which they are not entirely pure in the eyes of God, nor can they bear the strict judgment of God if He wishes to deal with us completely severely and not relax anything of the original rigor of the law. This is the doctrine of Gregory the First, Bishop of Rome, drawn and collected from the words of Job. For in book nine of *Moralia* on Job, he says, "The holy man, seeing that all the merit of our virtue is vitiated if judged strictly by internal judgment, rightly adds, 'If he wishes to contend with him, he cannot answer him one in a thousand.'" And in the same book, chapter 14, explaining these words, "If I have any righteousness, I will not answer, but I will plead with my judge," he says, "All human righteousness is convicted of injustice if judged strictly. Therefore, after righteousness, prayer is needed so that what could fall under judgment may prevail by the judge's mercy alone." This is similar to what is read in the last chapter of the

same book, "If we are judged strictly by God, where is the place of salvation, since our evils are pure evils, and the good that we believe we have are by no means pure goods."

XXI. Indeed, God does not impute this defect to the faithful once they have been received into grace. Nor, because they do not conform to the law as perfectly and precisely as a pure and whole man could while doing good, are they therefore involved in a new guilt of death, which would require a new and special remission, as when the faithful, overcome by temptation, commit acts that are inherently evil and which the Apostle calls the works of the flesh. Nor, as we have said, does what is lacking in their good works hinder them from being pleasing and acceptable to God, and from being praised and approved in His future judgment, so as to receive the reward of eternal life and glory from Him. But this is to be attributed to God's kindness, who, looking upon us in His Son, deals with us paternally and mercifully: He does not call us to strict judgment, wherein He would use rigid and severe justice against us, but to a judgment tempered with much mercy: in which He does not weigh our works solely by their own worth, nor does He scrutinize them rigidly, but considers them as voluntary obedience from children, and as works sprinkled and tinged with the blood of Christ. Hence, they are so greatly pleasing to Him and are so magnificently crowned by Him.

XXII. Scripture sufficiently indicates this when it teaches that our spiritual sacrifices are acceptable to God through Jesus Christ. Peter says, "You are a holy priesthood to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus Christ" (1 Peter 2:5). For by those spiritual sacrifices are meant the good works of the faithful, which are said to be acceptable through Jesus Christ because they could not be so pleasing to God and accepted by Him for eternal life if God considered them simply in themselves and estimated them solely by their own value, setting aside the merit and intercession of Christ, who, as our Priest and Advocate, offers and commends them to the Father. This commendation of Christ, and the merit and intercession added from Him, is signified by the incense that the angel offers with the prayers of the saints to God in the golden censer (Revelation 8).

XXIII. Having explained these things, it remains to repel various accusations with which the Doctors of the Roman Church attempt to create hostility against Protestant doctrine in this matter. For they very odiously accuse them as if they assert that the faithful cannot perform any works that are truly good and just, and that the actions of the faithful, even those that seem most holy and excellent, are by their nature sins, and indeed mortal sins, which induce new guilt of eternal death in the faithful. This can be seen in Bellarmine, Book 4 of *De Justificatione*, chapter 10, where he speaks of Protestants, whom he calls heretics. "They teach," he says, "that the divine law is utterly impossible for man, even for the just, and they infer from this that there is no true actual righteousness in us, but that all the works of the just are by their nature mortal sins." Similarly, Becanus in the summary of Scholastic Theology, volume 2, tract 4, chapter 4, whose title is *On the Merit of Good Works according to the Calvinists*, attributes to the Calvinists that they teach that the just cannot do any good works, but that all the works of the just are damnable or mortal sins.

XXIV. But it is easy to show from the writings of the Protestants that they by no means deny that the regenerated by the grace of Christ can perform works that are truly good and just and are considered such by God, and that we have thus far faithfully explained their opinion. Among others, John Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, who attended the Synod of Dort and whose writings are highly esteemed among the Reformed, can be a reliable witness of this. For that Doctor, in his book on Habitual and Actual Righteousness, chapter 33, whose title is On the Truth of Good Works, and in some subsequent chapters, explains the doctrine we have delivered above more copiously and accurately than others. And this is his first thesis in that chapter: "The good works of the regenerate have in themselves a supernatural goodness, pleasing and acceptable to God in the supernatural order, and ordained by His promise to receive gracious rewards." And he notes that the good works of the regenerate are distinguished by this threefold difference from the works of civil justice, which are sometimes performed by impious, unbelieving, and unregenerate men. For, he says, however those works may seem to shine, they are not truly good in this theological sense: for they neither proceed from the supernatural goodness of the agent, nor are they truly pleasing to God, nor are they rightly ordained to rewards by the promise of God. After proving and explaining these three points in more detail, he summarizes them at the end of the chapter: First, that the good works of the faithful have in themselves a truly supernatural goodness; since they are done under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, by supernatural grace, and in order to a supernatural end. Secondly, that such works are pleasing and truly acceptable to God; because they always flow from a person reconciled through the Mediator; because they proceed from a heart purified by faith and conformed to the image of divine holiness; and finally, because in the practice of good works, the regenerate act according to the strength and measure of the grace received. Lastly, that these works have an ordination to divine rewards, because of God's preceding promise, because of the condition or state of the worker, and finally because of the quality of the works themselves.

XXV. Robert Baron, a few years ago a professor of theology at the University of Aberdeen in Scotland, teaches consistent things in his appendix on the possibility of fulfilling God's law, which is attached to the disputation on mortal and venial sin. In that appendix, section 2, number 3, he affirms, "All the good works of the regenerate have everything that is essentially required for the moral goodness of an action. For," he says, "they are good first as to the object, because they deal with lawful things and are prescribed by divine law. Secondly, as to the principle, because they are done from faith and true love of God. Thirdly, as to the end, because they are referred to the glory of God. And fourthly, as to the circumstances, because the due circumstances are observed in doing them." Even Luther, whom the Doctors of the Roman Church particularly attack here, expressly teaches that the faithful, through the spirit obtained by faith, perform works that are truly good. "Faith alone," he says, "justifies, and alone fulfills the law. For faith, through the merit of Christ, obtains the Holy Spirit. This Spirit renews, cheers, excites, and inflames the heart to freely do what the law requires. And then at last, from faith thus effectively acting and living in the heart, truly good works spontaneously flow. This is what the Apostle means in the third chapter. For when he utterly condemns the works of the law, and

it might seem that he would destroy the law through the doctrine of faith, he anticipates this objection, saying, 'We do not destroy the law, but establish it.' That is, we teach how the law is truly fulfilled by believing, through faith." Preface to the Epistle to the Romans, found in volume 5 of the Wittenberg edition, page 97. The same doctrine is also delivered in the Augsburg Confession, article 20: "Because," it says, "through faith the Holy Spirit is received, now hearts are renewed and put on new affections so that they can produce good works."

XXVI. Protestants also expressly deny that the works of the faithful, done through the grace of Christ, are by their nature sins, especially mortal sins. For they complain that this is falsely imputed to them by the Doctors of the Roman Church. Thus Paraeus, writing against Bellarmine in *De Justificatione*, Book 4, chapter 10, says, "It is a gross calumny to say that we teach all the works of the just to be mortal sins by their nature." Rivetus also, in his *Summa of Controversies*, tract 4, question 17, says, "We have often declared in its proper place that our opinion of the imperfection of works is not such as they falsely attribute to us, who say that we do not call good works sins; for that would be a ridiculous contradiction in terms; but that sins are mingled with them and that they are not purely or perfectly good." Similarly, Ames in *Bellarmino Enervatus*, volume 4, Book 6, chapter 8, says, "Bellarmine proposes this question as if the good works (according to our opinion) were by their nature mortal sins, which is most false; but he himself shows sufficiently in the conclusion of his first argument that he was not ignorant of what we teach on this matter: namely, that the good works of the just, while they are still in a state of imperfection, are imperfect and stained with some sin." Similar things are written by John Davenant in his book on *Habitual and Actual Righteousness*, chapter 35, where he argues against the Doctors of the Roman Church, who vociferate that we abolish good works and place no distinction between them and the mortal sins called peccata. "Because our theologians assert that every work of the regenerate suffers from some defect and is tainted with some stain of sin, this thesis is established: 'The works of the regenerate, though imperfect and tainted with the stain of indwelling sin, are not to be considered as mortal sins, nor are they so considered by Protestants.'"

XXVII. Therefore, Protestants indeed teach that the good works of the regenerate are in some measure infected and stained by sin, because they always have some defective element adhering to them, which, if measured by the strictness of the law, ought to be considered and counted as sin; yet they do not concede that it follows from this that those good works are simply and absolutely to be called sins. If they sometimes call them sins, the expression is, in their mind, improper and abusive, by which they do not deny that such works are in themselves and truly good and holy, and entirely different from sins; but they only mean that some sin is mixed in and adheres to them. For, according to their opinion, the works of the regenerate, done from faith and charity, are in themselves, simply, and absolutely good, but only incidentally, in some respect, and relatively, they are evil and defective: and therefore, if we are to speak properly, it should not be said that they are sins, but only that they are sprinkled with and tainted by sin, as is rightly and accurately explained by Robert Baron in the cited appendix on the possibility of fulfilling God's law, section 2. The good works of the regenerate, according to the opinion of our

theologians, are not, he says, simply and absolutely speaking, sins, but only in some respect and relatively. The reason is: because they have all things, although not perfectly and in the highest degree, that are essentially required for the moral goodness of an action. They are said to be evil and tainted by sin in some respect and relatively, because some of these requirements are not present in them in the degree of perfection in which, according to the strictness of the law, they ought to be present. For example, although they are done from faith and charity, they are not done from faith simply and absolutely firm, nor from charity with the fervor that the law requires.

XXVIII. Furthermore, it should be carefully noted that the Reformed School's doctors teach indeed that in the good works of the faithful there is a certain defective element that can be considered a sin and may bring guilt in God's judgment, if God chooses to act without mercy and severely and to use the full rigor of the law given to the first man against them: because their works are not up to the highest and strictest measure of the law, nor do they equal the entire perfection that God demanded of a whole man and according to which a whole man could indeed obey God. But they also acknowledge that God does not deal so strictly with the faithful, nor demand from them precisely and under the penalty of eternal damnation that they keep His law in the exact and most perfect manner in which a man before the fall could and should have kept it in order to become a partaker of eternal happiness: because we are freed from that rigor of the law through Christ: and now God does not necessarily and precisely require from us another kind of obedience for us to enter into eternal life than true and sincere, such as we can perform in the infirmity of this life, according to the measure of grace granted. Hence it happens that God accepts our good works, however imperfect they are, for eternal life, and does not impute to us what is lacking in them. Therefore, because of the defects that occur in them, we are not bound by a new guilt of death, as when we fall into those sins about which it is said, "Those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God." The reason is that all these defects pertain somewhat to original sin, and are necessary and inevitable as long as we live here, as its consequences. Therefore, once original sin is forgiven to the pious, such defects are considered to be pardoned and forgiven along with it, and cannot be imputed to the faithful anymore, nor make them guilty before God, and consequently, they need no new remission. However, the remission of graver sins, which the Apostle calls the works of the flesh, is not included in the remission of original sin in the same way, so that the faithful who fall into them incur a new guilt of death, from which they cannot be freed unless those sins are forgiven them by new and special grace from God.

XXIX. This is carefully noted by the aforementioned Davenant in his book on Habitual and Actual Righteousness, chapter 35. He says, "The sin that adheres to the good works of the regenerate, although according to the strictness of the law it could condemn a man outside of Christ; yet it does not condemn the regenerate and engrafted into Christ, nor does it involve them in any new guilt. For since each of the regenerate has within himself, as it were, two men, the new and the old Adam; whatever the old Adam may struggle and resist the law, it is not imputed to the regenerate man and the new, following the norm of the law, and resisting and curbing the

rebellion of concupiscence as much as he can. This is what Augustine noted in epistle 200 to Asellicus: 'Although there are desires of sin within us as long as we are in the body of this death; if we do not give assent to them, there would be no reason to say, forgive us our debts.'

Augustine does not mean that indwelling concupiscence is not sin by its nature, nor does he deny that its motions or desires, which impede and stain our good actions, are sins according to the strict judgment of the law: but he means that the regenerate man is so freed from the guilt of original sin through Christ, that he cannot be made guilty because of the disordered motions of it, as long as they are repressed and subdued by the spiritual man. Hence he concludes that we are far from considering such defective elements, with which innate concupiscence stains the good works of the faithful, as mortal sins, since mortal sins in a specific sense are called those that induce a new deadly guilt, and do not allow the sinner to have a part in the kingdom of God until he repents and withdraws from them. This does not apply to these defects, whatever they may be. Therefore," he says, "although indwelling concupiscence breathes its poison into the good actions of the regenerate; yet such actions are not reckoned as mortal sins, because this stain that arises from the old Adam is not imputable to him who is engrafted into the new, provided that he does not allow his will to be diverted from doing good or impelled to commit evil by it."

XXX. Similar things are taught by Robert Baron, often cited already, in the said appendix on the possibility of fulfilling God's law, section 2, where this is his first assertion. "Although the good works of the regenerate, simply and absolutely, according to the opinion of our theologians, would be sins, yet it would not follow from this, what the adversaries infer from our doctrine, namely that all the good works of the regenerate are mortal sins. And the reason is," he says, "because although our theologians teach that all sins, by themselves and by their nature, are mortal, they do not teach that all sins, according to the administration of divine providence in punishing them under the grace of the covenant, are mortal; but on the contrary, they affirm that the lighter offenses of the regenerate are sins that, by the grace and mercy of God, are venial."

XXXI. It has indeed been said by Luther and some others among the Protestants, "Every work of the just is damnable, and a mortal sin if judged by God's judgment. And all the works of men, however praiseworthy, are sins deserving death. Also, every good work, if considered with exact strictness, is rather worthy of eternal damnation than the reward of life." But, to answer in the words of Davenant, "They meant nothing else by this than to signify that the regenerate in their best works do not fulfill the perfection of the law, but mix in some defect, which has the nature of sin, and consequently would induce the guilt of death before a strict judge, if the acting person were excluded from the benefit of the Mediator and mercy. Therefore, although their expression in this matter has something harsh and inconvenient, they nonetheless meant nothing contrary to the things previously explained by us. But they intended only to teach that the merit of any, even the slightest sin, is death and damnation according to God's strict judgment, and what would be instituted according to the utmost rigor of the law: and at the same time that the best actions of the regenerate are not free from some curvature of sin, if examined by that rigor. By no means did they intend by this to confuse the defects found in good works with graver sins, which are specifically called mortal in the schools, because they hold the regenerate themselves,

whenever they fall into those, and persist in them for a while, bound by a new guilt of eternal death until they renounce them through a new and special act of repentance."

XXXII. However, whatever the Protestants may say, their entire doctrine on this question can be summarized in these points. First, there is no sin, however slight it may seem, for which God could not justly exclude a person from the heavenly kingdom and punish them with eternal torment if He chose to act strictly, without any grace and mercy. Second, all the works of the regenerate suffer from some imperfection; both because some lighter faults frequently adhere to their good works, which somewhat vitiate and obscure them: and because, while doing good, they do not achieve that perfection which the law demanded from an integral man, according to which the divine law could be obeyed, should be obeyed, and indeed could be obeyed. Third, that this defect, which adheres to the good works of the regenerate, could be imputed to the person as guilt if God chose to use His full right against the person and did not judge them according to the covenant of grace and deal kindly with them for Christ's sake. Now the Protestants, in these points, have the support of famous men and leading doctors even within the Roman Church itself.

XXXIII. Firstly, some theologians of the Roman School, and indeed not of the lowest rank, teach that all sins, in themselves and by their nature, deserve eternal death in God's just judgment: that certain sins are only punished with temporal penalties and do not bring the guilt of eternal death upon the sinner, and are therefore distinguished from mortal sins, must be attributed to God's indulgence and clemency, who does not wish to use His full right against humans in this matter. This is the opinion of John Gerson, who was the Chancellor of the University of Paris about 250 years ago, and one of the most celebrated theologians of the Sorbonne, which he elaborates and defends at length in his treatise *On Spiritual Life*, first lecture. Where, discussing the nature and quantification of sins, as he speaks, he concludes: "Every sin, as it is an offense to God and against His eternal law, is in its condition and worthiness mortiferous, according to the rigor of justice, and separates from the life of glory." From which he later deduces, among many other things, this corollary: "No offense to God is venial in itself, except only in respect to divine mercy, which does not wish to actually impute any offense to death, although it could most justly do so."

XXXIV. John Fisher, Bishop of Rochester in England, who was a martyr for the Pope and wrote against Luther, teaches similar things in his *Refutation of the Lutheran Assertion on article 32*. After citing Luther, saying that venial sin is such only by God's mercy, he adds, "That venial sin is venial solely by God's mercy, in this I agree with you. But since we also believe that even mortal sin can, by God's mercy, become venial, I would like you to explain to us more clearly what you think the difference should be between mortal and venial sin."

XXXV. Moreover, although the common doctrine of the Roman School is that lighter sins are venial by themselves and by their nature, not mortal, because they do not bring death to the soul and do not extinguish spiritual life, whose principle is grace and charity infused by the Holy Spirit, as graver sins do, which are therefore called mortal: nonetheless, Scholastic theologians generally teach that those very sins, which they call venial, unless forgiven by God's

grace, exclude a person forever from the heavenly kingdom and are punished with eternal penalties. And so, all those who die outside of Christ are punished with eternal torments in hell even for venial sins. In this, they follow Thomas Aquinas, who in 1.2, question 8, article 5, in the 3rd argument, says, "Venial sin deserves eternal punishment if found in someone damned with mortal sin, because there can be no remission in the damned." When the Protestants say that all sin is by its nature mortal, they mean nothing other than this: any sin, even the slightest, if God does not pardon it and does not show some clemency and mercy to the sinner, can be justly punished by God with eternal penalties and perpetual exclusion from His kingdom.

XXXVI. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman Church admit and recognize that in any good works of the faithful there is some defect and imperfection, not only because they arise from charity, which needs to grow daily and has not yet reached that perfection with which blessed souls love God clearly seen, and are carried towards Him with their whole heart and fullest affection: but also because the faithful are far from doing God's will with the promptitude, alacrity, and cheerfulness with which an integral man, not yet corrupted by sin, obeyed God. This is due to the innate and perpetually inherent concupiscence in them, which retards them in doing good and, with its evil motions, which impel and solicit them to evil while they engage in good works, greatly impedes and disturbs them.

XXXVII. This doctrine, contradicted by none in the Roman Church, is elaborately taught by Thomas Stapleton, especially in Book 6, chapters 10 and 11, of his work on Justification. Among other things, he observes that our corrupt nature cannot be restored to its original perfection, which it had before the sin of the first parent, in this mortality until death is swallowed up in victory, and all evil concupiscence is utterly extinguished. For, as Augustine teaches, the righteousness of the first man was to obey God and not have the law of concupiscence, and also his love was undisturbed in God. That is, he was wholly carried towards God without any distraction or perturbation. He adds that this original righteousness of man had to be commanded by the law because the law was given to restore almost extinct natural law in men. However, the law was commanded to teach us from what we have fallen and to what we must progress in this life and arrive at in the next; but not to obligate us to that original perfection in such a broken and weakened state under the penalty of transgression and sin. Indeed, human nature is exempt from such an obligation due to the corruption that is certainly in it, but which is no longer imputed to the regenerate through Christ. Hence, according to the very doctrine of the Roman School, the good works of the regenerate do not have that perfection which the original law of nature commanded and to which man before the fall was bound by the very law of creation.

XXXVIII. The theologians of the Roman School also concede that lighter sins are often mixed with the good works of the just, which in some way vitiate and taint them. This is clear from the writings of the Jesuit Costerus in the *Enchiridion of Controversies*, chapter 6. "We must admit," he says, "that some works of the just do not shine with such purity that they do not contract at least slight stains or are sprinkled with the dust of venial sins. For we are distracted in prayers, vain glory creeps into the act of giving alms, and many things are performed negligently

and carelessly." Similar things are read in Estius, in the second book of Sentences, distinction 41, paragraph 4. Referring to the opinion of some of his own, he says, "It is one thing for a man to sin in some work, another thing for the work itself to be a sin. For even the just often sin in those works that are undoubtedly good, while they admit some defect of concupiscence, negligence, or some lighter circumstance required for the integrity of the good work; as happens in prolonged prayer to God, in preaching to the people, in the study of sacred literature, and the like." Gregory seems to have referred to this when he says at the end of his *Moralia*, "The good that we believe we have can by no means be pure good." Nor do the strictest among the Papists, like Bellarmine and Suarez, deny this. For Bellarmine, in Book 4 of *De Justificatione*, chapter 10, towards the end, explaining Gregory's words just cited, says, "It cannot be that there is not sometimes something that vitiates some good works." Suarez, in Volume 3, Disputation 74, says, "In the judgment of heretics, all our works, however good, are in some way tainted and unclean, which, although not universally true, is often the case."

XXXIX. Finally, although according to the understanding of the doctors of the Roman Church, that defect which is present in the good works of the regenerate is not imputed to the faithful and pious as guilt, nor do they contract any guilt from it, they do not deny that, if God wished to deal strictly and rigorously with the pious, He could attribute such a defect to them as guilt and thus make them guilty before Him, although He does not do this out of a certain kindness. This is evident from what Andreas Vega teaches in Book 11 of his commentary on the Council of Trent, chapter 40. He says, "Many works which are now good, just, and meritorious, if elevated to the holiness and purity with which we ought to serve God and which God could strictly demand from us, both because of His goodness and because of His extraordinary benefits to us, would truly be vices, evil works, and unrighteousness. For it is true not only that the life of any just person is continually soiled and defiled by many venial sins, but even the works of the most perfect fall far short of the goodness with which we should serve, praise, and honor God. They are joined with many imperfections as long as we live here; nor are they as pure, holy, and fervent as the greatness of divine goodness and beneficence towards us would require. And although God, out of His extraordinary sweetness and kindness towards us, does not even impute those defects and imperfections to us as venial guilt, He could still attribute them to us as guilt if He wished to act strictly and beyond His kindness and benevolence towards us." And further on, he says, "Therefore, Gregory affirms that all the merit of our virtue is a vice because none of our works are done so purely, so holily, so fervently, and so perfectly in every respect as would be fitting, considering the magnitude of God's goodness and benefits towards us, and as God could demand from us if He wished to judge strictly. Finally, in the last words of that chapter, he concludes that many works which are now good and without any stain of sin would be, if God wished to deal strictly with us, unrighteousness and evil and would not be approved as good." This is what Robert Baron reports in the said appendix on the possibility of fulfilling God's law, section 3, number 9. For I do not have Vega's books at hand. Moreover, the doctors of the Roman Church admit that the good works of the faithful are imperfect not only in the manner of fulfilling the law, because they do not satisfy the divine law fully and perfectly, but always in

them the law and God, because of the law, desire something, as Stapleton says in *De Justificatione*, book 1, chapter 6, chapter 7. They also admit that what is lacking in the good works of the just to the highest perfection, in which nothing would be lacking according to the rigor of the law, is, I say, forgiven and pardoned to them by the grace and mercy of Christ. This clearly supposes that this imperfection has something defective and culpable by its nature and that it could be imputed to us as guilt if God did not deal with us kindly. For otherwise, such imperfection would not need God's indulgence and grace through Christ. This can be seen in the same Stapleton in *De Justificatione*, book 6, chapter 8, where his seventh proposition is: "The righteousness of good works in faith is true righteousness before God, although mixed with sins and imperfect, both as to fulfilling all the commandments and as to the manner of fulfilling them, and truly and fully satisfies God's law: not only because it approaches as closely as possible to full and perfect righteousness, or because it at least avoids more grievous crimes, or because it works by progressing day by day to be entirely free from all sin and fully satisfy, but also because whatever is lacking in it to full and perfect fulfillment, by omitting commandments and frequently sinning venially, whether because of imperfection in the manner and reason of fulfilling them, all this is pardoned and forgiven by the mercy and grace of Christ; and by pardoning, He makes us just before God, as if we had fulfilled all the commandments most perfectly and to the utmost." By these words, that doctor clearly acknowledges that God's grace and mercy pardon and forgive us not only for what is lacking in the righteousness of our good works because of the more serious omitted commandments and venial sins which we frequently incur, but also for what is lacking in perfect fulfillment of the law because of imperfection in the manner and reason of fulfilling it: and thus it is due to that divine indulgence that we are just before God as if we had perfectly fulfilled all the commandments to the utmost, although in reality, we have performed neither. Hence, it is inferred that, according to the mind of the doctors of the Roman Church, God's mercy and indulgence are exercised towards us in two ways. First, by not imputing to us as guilt those things which, if God wished, He could justly impute, so that we are held by no guilt for those things which could otherwise make us guilty before Him. Second, by removing and erasing those sins for which we have indeed become guilty in God's judgment and liable to punishment. The former kind of indulgence is that by which God does not impute to us the defects of good works: the latter is that by which He forgives sins committed against the law.

XL. This is also related to what is read in John Gerson, in his book *On the Spiritual Life of the Soul*, lecture 1, corollary 3, where he dares to say, "Perhaps all our righteousness could be imputed to us for eternal punishment because, as they are in themselves, they are like a polluted garment. We are obligated," he says, "to gratitude and thanksgiving to God because He does not impute our venial sins to death, just as we are for the remission of mortal sins, since in both cases, God's mercy not imputing them concurs, except for temporal punishment, which by its worthiness is imputable to death, one by possibility, the other by established law. Indeed, perhaps it could be said of all our righteousness, that, as they are in themselves, they are like a polluted garment, especially after sin, or without grace."

XLI. And perhaps this is why the ancient Scholastics, and many of the more recent ones, thought that the righteousness, whether actual or habitual, which is in the faithful, does not in itself have the true nature of righteousness and holiness, which by its nature necessarily pleases God and makes us pleasing and acceptable to Him for eternal life: but that this is added by a certain special favor, through which it is completed in the nature of righteousness, which can justify us, that is, truly make us just and holy before God. Gabriel Vasquez explains this in 1.2, volume 2, Disputation 204, chapters 1 and 2, where he tries to refute this doctrine and contends that inherent righteousness makes us truly just and holy without any new favor and acceptance from God.

XLII. From all these things, it is easy to infer that the doctors of the Roman School do not correctly understand the Protestants' opinion on this question, as in many other matters. For when Protestants say that the defect which is present in all the good works of the regenerate is by its nature defective and culpable, and has some nature of sin, they do not mean to suggest, as their adversaries suppose and think, that this defect is actually and really imputed to the faithful by God as guilt, and therefore the faithful, whenever they do good, contract a new guilt of eternal death, which needs a new and special remission, which we heard above that Davenant expressly and clearly denied in the name of the Protestants: but they only mean that the faithful, while engaged in good works, do not do so perfectly, but somewhat deviate from the original law of nature, and thus God, if He wished to act strictly and remit nothing of His right, could impute this to them as guilt and make them guilty before Him for this reason, although He does not do this, kindly looking upon the faithful in Christ. This, certainly, the doctors of the Roman Church dare not deny but are forced to admit, as is evident from the testimonies cited.

**Theological Theses,
In Which It Is Explained Whether and To What Extent the Faithful Are Obligated to
Keep God's Law and Perform Good Works.**

Thesis I

The doctors of the Roman Church are accustomed to accuse Protestants of teaching that the faithful are not obliged to observe the divine law, and thus it is not necessary for them to perform good works: for Christ has freed them from the subjection to the law and divine commandments; and that Christian liberty consists in the faithful being subject to no law before God and in conscience.

II. Bellarmine attributes this to them in his work *De Justificatione*, book 4, chapter 1, paragraph "Fourthly, we prove." He says, "They place Christian liberty in this, that a justified person is free from the debt of fulfilling the law before God, and by this, all works are now indifferent to him, that is, neither commanded nor forbidden." From this, he concludes in the same chapter, "Protestants, as it seems to him, entirely consider that a person can be saved even if he does no good works nor keeps the divine commandments." And in the fifth chapter of the same book: "The adversaries," he says, "place Christian liberty in this, that they are subject to no

law in conscience and before God, and having Christ as a Redeemer, not as a lawgiver, Moses with his Decalogue does not pertain to them."

III. Similarly, the Jesuit Becan imputes to the Reformers, whom he calls Calvinists, in his *Summa Theologiae Scholasticae*, volume 2, tract 3, chapter 5, question 2. He asserts that the Calvinists teach that the moral precepts or the Decalogue cannot be kept by us, and therefore Christ has freed us from their observation, and that Christian or Evangelical liberty consists in this, that we are free from observing the Law. And in the same volume, tract 4, chapter 4, question 2, he raises this question, as if it were a controversy between the Calvinists and the Roman Church, "Whether the just are bound to do any good works and keep the law." And number 2, he says, "Calvinists teach that works are not necessary for salvation, or that the faithful are not bound to observe the law."

IV. To refute such an atrocious slander, we propose to briefly explain whether and to what extent the faithful are bound to observe the law and strive for good works, according to the common doctrine of the Reformed Church. To better understand this, we must first establish as a foundation that the law, which we call moral, was given and imposed on a whole and newly created man in such a way that he was bound to render perpetual and exact obedience to it in every respect, under the peril and penalty of death and damnation, nor could he otherwise obtain eternal life and happiness than by diligently and assiduously avoiding all transgressions of the law and persevering constantly in obedience to it without any lapse or defect. This is what we call the legal covenant or covenant of works, by which life and happiness are proposed to be obtained through entirely perfect and complete obedience; while death and a curse are severely threatened to any transgression, with no hope of remission made to transgressors by that covenant.

V. This law, which was gradually fading from the minds of men and greatly obscured by the darkness brought by sin, God had once again promulgated through Moses, and specifically repeated to the people of Israel, and handed down in writing, adding many positive precepts concerning the external rites of divine worship and the form of judgments and the administration of the Republic among the said people. All of which He sanctioned with two solemn clauses, one being, "Do this and live." The other, "Cursed is everyone who does not continue in all things that are written in the book of the law, to do them."

VI. Since the law, considered in this way, demands entirely perfect obedience from man if he wants to be a partaker of blessedness, and does not offer any hope of mercy and pardon to those who sin against it but simply threatens them with a curse and wrath, it is impossible for a man once guilty of sin to attain salvation and life through it: nor does the law have any other function for him but to convict him of sin and subject him to condemnation and death. In this respect, the law is said by Paul to work wrath, and it is called the letter that kills, and the ministry of the law, the ministry of death and condemnation, 2 Cor. 3. And this is what the same apostle says in Romans 3, "Therefore by the deeds of the law no flesh will be justified in His sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin."

VII. Therefore, since all men fell into sin through the fault of the first parent, all were destined to perish if God had wished to deal with them strictly according to the law first given. But God, having mercy on the human race, substituted the covenant of grace for the legal covenant, through which sinners can be saved and delivered from the death and perdition into which they had fallen, and made partakers of blessed and immortal life. Indeed, through this covenant, God offers forgiveness of sins to any transgressors of the law, provided they repent and embrace Christ the Redeemer with a living faith; and He promises them eternal and glorious life in heaven, provided they henceforth render true and sincere obedience to the law and earnestly strive to conform to His commandments; even if their works are not exacted to the utmost rigor of the law, nor equal to the entire perfection which the former covenant strictly required from an integral man. Moreover, this latter covenant also has an added efficacy of the spirit, by which it inclines the hearts of men to believe in God speaking and to conceive His love in their hearts, and thus voluntarily lead themselves in obedience to Him. According to what God says through the prophet, "This is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days," declares the Lord. "I will put my law in their minds and write it on their hearts." Hence, this covenant, in opposition to the old law, is called the law of the Spirit of life, and its ministry is the ministry of righteousness and the ministry of the Spirit, 2 Cor. 3.

VIII. Moreover, as soon as man fell into sin, certain rudiments of this covenant were proposed to him in the promises of grace: and by it, all who have attained salvation from the foundation of the world were saved: but it was finally clearly explained and solemnly promulgated through the Son of God manifested in the flesh.

IX. However, in the meantime, the legal covenant was once again repeated and promulgated through Moses for the purpose of serving this covenant of grace and leading people to Christ through faith in His name to be justified. For the law, convicting people of sin and their own inability to keep God's commandments, while simultaneously threatening and denouncing wrath and a curse upon them, drove them to seek divine mercy, from which they might obtain forgiveness of past sins and the grace of the Holy Spirit, through which they could be liberated from the bondage of sin and begin to offer and exhibit new obedience to the law. Moreover, in its shadows and figures, it showed them Christ the Redeemer, in whom and through whom God's grace and mercy were to be exercised towards men. Hence, the law is called a pedagogue to bring us to Christ, that we might be justified by faith, Gal. 3. Christ, however, is called by Paul the end of the law for righteousness to everyone who believes, Rom. 10.

X. Furthermore, it is certain and evident from sacred scripture that this new covenant founded in Christ and entered into through Christ requires a new obedience to be rendered to the divine law by those who are to be saved, as a necessary duty and condition without which they cannot attain eternal life and avoid perdition. For this is the voice of Christ speaking in the Gospel, "If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments." And in Revelation 22, only those who keep God's commandments are pronounced blessed by the same Christ. "Blessed are those who do His commandments, that they may have the right to the tree of life, and may enter

through the gates into the city. But outside are dogs and sorcerers and sexually immoral and murderers and idolaters, and whoever loves and practices a lie."

XI. This does not pertain to the legal covenant, which does not promise the forgiveness of sins to the repentant, which scripture proposes as a peculiar benefit of the new covenant, Jer. 31, but to the covenant of grace, which is read in Ezekiel 18, "But if a wicked person turns away from all his sins that he has committed and keeps all my statutes and does what is just and right, he shall surely live; he shall not die. None of the transgressions that he has committed shall be remembered against him; for the righteousness that he has done he shall live. Have I any pleasure in the death of the wicked, declares the Lord God, and not rather that he should turn from his way and live? But when a righteous person turns away from his righteousness and does injustice and does the same abominations that the wicked person does, shall he live? None of the righteous deeds that he has done shall be remembered; for the treachery of which he is guilty and the sin he has committed, for them he shall die." Where God explicitly and clearly requires from all those who wish to avoid the death due to their sins and obtain life to repent of all their sins and henceforth keep His commandments.

XII. And for this reason, Paul declares that without this, everything else in Christ is nothing and contributes nothing to salvation. In 1 Corinthians 7, he says, "Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping of the commandments of God." Finally, how necessary it is, even under the Gospel and the covenant of grace, to keep the divine commandments is clearly taught by the New Testament scripture, which declares that those who do not keep God's commandments neither love nor know God. John says, "By this we know that we know Him, if we keep His commandments. He who says, 'I know Him,' and does not keep His commandments, is a liar, and the truth is not in him," 1 John 2. And in chapter 5, "For this is the love of God, that we keep His commandments."

XIII. It is no less evident from the same sacred scripture that the same covenant of grace does not precisely require from the faithful, once they have been received into grace, perfect obedience under the penalty and peril of eternal damnation, nor obedience that is exacted to the utmost rigor of the law, such as that which an unfallen man was required and able to render according to the law's prescription. For if that were the case, none of the faithful could attain life and be saved by the covenant of grace: since what scripture says applies even to the most holy men, "We all stumble in many things," James 3. And "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us," 1 John 1. Nor is there any of the faithful who ought not to say with Paul, "Not that I have already attained, or am already perfected," Philippians 3. For in all, there are remnants of native corruption, which even oppose the faithful while they are doing good and prevent them from rendering such prompt and fervent obedience to God as the rigor and breadth of the law require: and cause them to stumble and fall frequently.

XIV. Therefore, God, dealing with the faithful through the gracious covenant, indeed requires from them that they strive to conform themselves to the divine precepts contained in the law if they wish to be crowned with eternal glory, nor does He admit to the possession of eternal life those who indulge in sins and serve the desires of the flesh contrary to the divine law's

commandments, but still, He does not scrutinize their obedience to the utmost rigor of the law. And although they fall short of the highest perfection in many things, as long as their obedience is true and sincere and such as is brought forth by the measure of grace granted to them, He accepts it as deserving of the rewards of heavenly life and glory. For God treats the faithful with that clemency and mercy which the pious King Hezekiah hoped for from God: "The Lord is good and will pardon everyone who sets his heart on seeking God, the Lord, the God of their fathers, even if they are not clean according to the rules of the sanctuary," 2 Chronicles 30. And this is related to the promise by which God comforts those who fear Him and think upon His name in the Prophet Malachi chapter 3, "They shall be mine, says the Lord of hosts, in that day when I make up my jewels; and I will spare them as a man spares his own son who serves him."

XV. Although God no longer requires from the faithful, under the penalty of eternal damnation, perfectly complete obedience in every respect, such as the integral man was bound to render according to the legal covenant to live and obtain eternal happiness, yet the law, insofar as it commands such perfection, should not be considered abrogated by Christ. For Christ did not change anything in the moral law but rather renewed and confirmed it and vindicated it from various corruptions of men. Christ Himself teaches this in Matthew, "Do not think that I came to destroy the Law or the Prophets. I did not come to destroy but to fulfill." And Paul concurs in Romans, "Do we then make void the law through faith? Certainly not! On the contrary, we establish the law."

XVI. Indeed, if the law, insofar as it absolutely demands perfect obedience from man, had been entirely nullified and no longer had any binding force, there would no longer be any defect in the faithful, nor any imperfection because they do not attain such perfection, nor would they need to flee to divine mercy and humbly implore God's strict judgment. Just as now the faithful in no way need divine clemency, nor are they less perfect, because they do not observe various rituals and ceremonies of the law, which Christ has removed and abrogated. Yet the common sense of Christians acknowledges that those various infirmities with which the faithful struggle and which prevent them from entirely and perfectly obeying the law are a perpetual matter of humiliation before God for them, and for that reason, they are compelled to say with David, "Do not enter into judgment with Your servant, for in Your sight no one living is righteous."

XVII. Therefore, even today, the law commands entirely perfect obedience from the faithful. For it proposes to us the entire perfection of righteousness both to strive for and to attain as far as we are able; it commands us to strive for it with all our might: although it does not precisely demand it from us under the penalty of eternal death. Under that penalty, it obliges us to a certain measure of obedience, namely, that which is possible through ordinary grace, requiring that we actually and truly possess it if we desire to be saved. To a further measure, which we cannot attain with the strength of ordinary grace, it obliges us less strictly, requiring that we at least desire and strive to have it. For God strictly and precisely requires from us, even under the covenant of grace, that we strive to keep all the commandments of the law with heart and deed, in which consists that essential perfection of our obedience, which is the same as its

truth and sincerity and is called the perfection of parts in the schools. For unless we render such obedience to God, we cannot attain eternal life. But that absolute perfection, which excludes all defect and is called the perfection of degrees, He does not so precisely and strictly demand but only requires that we strive and endeavor to attain it with the strength of grace granted to us.

XVIII. Thus the faithful are exempted from the curse, guilt, and rigor of the law through Christ; for those who flee to Christ with faith and repentance no longer need to fear the curse of the law for past sins or even for those lapses and defects to which they remain subject while in communion with Christ. This is what Paul refers to in the Epistle to the Galatians, "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, having become a curse for us," Gal. 3:13.

XIX. Nevertheless, those who are partakers of the grace of Christ remain always debtors to the law, that is, they are obliged to render true and sincere obedience to the law, without which they can neither escape eternal death nor attain heavenly life and glory.

XX. Indeed, the faithful are not simply and entirely released from the obligation to render perfect and exact obedience to the divine law as the strictness of the law requires. For as we have already said, they are bound to strive for it as much as lies within them, and if they fall short of it, to acknowledge and lament their imperfection in this respect, and therefore continually implore divine clemency and mercy.

XXI. Nor should anyone object that the faithful are no longer subject to the law, but entirely freed from it, because, as Paul teaches, they are no longer under the law. "For sin shall not have dominion over you, for you are not under law but under grace," Rom. 6:14. For the faithful are said to be no longer under the law because they are freed from the curse and rigor of the law, as has already been explained: and further because Christ has entirely freed them from that yoke of ceremonies which was imposed on the Jewish people by the Mosaic law. For since all those ceremonies were only shadows and figures of future good things, after Christ brought the body and the truth, they were no longer of any use and therefore were entirely abolished by Christ. But this does not prevent the faithful from being obliged to keep the moral law, which Christ did not abrogate but rather renewed and illustrated.

XXII. Similarly, when Paul writes to Timothy that the law is not made for a righteous person but for the lawless and insubordinate, for the ungodly and for sinners, for the unholy and profane, for those who kill their fathers or mothers, for murderers, fornicators, and similar criminals, he does not mean by this that the faithful are no longer subject to any law. Rather, he simply means that the person who is justified in Christ and seriously strives for holiness and righteousness, even if he stumbles in many things due to weakness, no longer needs to fear the threats and curse of the law, which will only fall upon those who, despising the grace of Christ, indulge in wickedness and, as scripture says, practice iniquity. And Paul refers to the same thing in the Epistle to the Galatians, where after enumerating the various fruits that the Holy Spirit produces in the regenerate, he adds, "Against such there is no law." This means that the law no longer has the power to condemn and make guilty those who bear such fruits of the Spirit, whether for the sins they previously indulged in or the defects to which they are always subject

in this life; or for neglecting the Mosaic rituals, from the observance of which Christ has released his followers.

XXIII. Moreover, the doctrine I have expounded thus far, concerning the subjection of the faithful to the law and their obligation to render true obedience, is commonly accepted among Protestants. This is known to all who have even lightly touched upon their writings. This can be attested particularly by the Book of Concord, published with the common consent of the theologians of the Augsburg Confession in Germany. It states in the Solid Declaration of certain articles of the Augsburg Confession, concerning which there had been some disputes among the theologians adhering to the same confession, in Article VI, which deals with the third use of the law: "The law of God is like a clear mirror in which the will of God and what pleases Him are set before our eyes. Therefore, it must always be urged diligently and continually upon believers. Although the law is not made for a righteous person, as the Apostle testifies, but for the unrighteous, this should not be understood in such a way as if it were permissible for the righteous to live without the law. For the divine law is written in their hearts. Thus, the true and genuine meaning of Paul's words is that the law cannot condemn those who are reconciled to God through Christ and that it cannot be oppressive to the regenerate since they delight in the law of God according to the inner man." And towards the end of the same article, it states that the faithful are not without the law and, although they are not under the law, they are still in the law.

XXIV. This is consistent with the doctrine of the Anglican Confession of 1645, chapter 19, number 5: "The moral law binds all men to obedience, both those who are justified and others; neither only with regard to the matter contained in it but also with regard to the authority of God the Creator who gave it. Nor does Christ in the Gospel in any way diminish this obligation but rather confirms it."

XXV. The same doctrine is also subscribed to by the theologians of Leyden in the Synopsis of Purer Theology, published with their common consent. In Disputation 35, Thesis 14, after teaching in the preceding thesis that we are freed by Christ from the yoke of that most severe exaction by which the law severely demanded the most exact observance of its commandments under the penalty of a curse, with no hope of salvation proposed to the sinner, they add these words: "We do not therefore teach that the law is superfluous but rather that its doctrine is immutable and its obedience necessary for all. And we recognize that true liberty is only when we serve God according to His law." In Thesis 16, they say, "Therefore, we reject the madness of the Antinomians who think that the moral law should be expelled and eliminated from the Church. We justly complain about the atrocious slander of Bellarmine, who falsely claims that we place Christian liberty in the idea that a man justified by faith is not subject to any law in conscience, is free from the obligation of keeping the law, and considers all things as indifferent, neither commanded nor prohibited."

XXVI. Furthermore, since the whole divine law is concerned with commanding good works and prohibiting evil deeds, it is clear from this that the faithful are obligated to strive for good works and avoid sins, or evil deeds, simply because they are bound to obey the law and

keep its commandments. This is what scripture calls living according to the Spirit and not according to the flesh. This is what Paul teaches in the Epistle to the Romans: "Therefore, brethren, we are debtors—not to the flesh, to live according to the flesh" (implying but to the Spirit, to live according to the Spirit), Romans 8:12.

XXVII. Moreover, since we have previously proven that God demands true obedience to His law from the faithful under the penalty of eternal damnation and exclusion from the kingdom of heaven, it follows that they are bound under the same penalty to avoid vices and pursue good works, and that those who indulge in vices and neglect good works can by no means attain eternal life. For as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews states, "Without holiness, no one will see the Lord," Hebrews 12:14. And Christ Himself pronounces, "Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire," Matthew 7:19. This aligns with Paul's statement in the Epistle to the Romans, "If you live according to the flesh, you will die; but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live," Romans 8:13. And in the Epistle to the Galatians 6:7, "Do not be deceived: God is not mocked, for whatever a man sows, that he will also reap. For he who sows to his flesh will of the flesh reap corruption, but he who sows to the Spirit will of the Spirit reap everlasting life." Furthermore, in the same epistle, after listing various sins which he calls works of the flesh, he repeats that "those who practice such things will not inherit the kingdom of God." Similar to this is what he writes to the Corinthians: "Do not be deceived: Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor homosexuals, nor sodomites, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners will inherit the kingdom of God," 1 Corinthians 6:9-10.

XXVIII. An infinite number of other passages could be gathered from scripture to confirm this doctrine, but it is unnecessary to dwell on this matter here, as it is so certain and evident that it is not disputed by anyone who even bears the name of Christian. Especially since it is far from the belief of Protestants that good works are not necessary for the faithful and that they can obtain eternal life even if they persist in sins until the end and are overtaken by death without engaging in good works. Their public and private writings attest to this, and they repeatedly emphasize that the faith to which justification and salvation are ascribed is a living faith, one that works through love. They teach everywhere that without good works, faith is dead and useless for salvation, and true faith cannot coexist with reigning sin and contempt for good works.

XXIX. But to repel this calumny more strongly, it seems appropriate to quote some passages from the public writings of those who are most suspect to their adversaries on this matter. Thus, the already cited Book of Concord, to which most of the theologians of the Augsburg Confession in Germany have subscribed, states in the Solid Declaration of certain articles concerning which there had been some controversies among the same theologians, in Article IV, which is on good works, page 702: "As for the necessity or freedom of good works, it cannot be denied that these words are often used and repeated in the Augsburg Confession and its Apology: Good works are necessary, and it is necessary to do good works, because faith and reconciliation with God must necessarily follow, and the works which God has commanded must

necessarily be done by us. Sacred scripture uses the words necessity, necessary, duty, we must, ought, etc., whenever it speaks of matters we are bound to perform by reason of divine command, ordination, and will. Therefore, the propositions 'Good works are necessary' and 'It is necessary to do good works' are rightly retained and insisted upon to refute and reject the Epicurean opinion of security, by which many take a dead faith, or some vain persuasion without repentance and good works, for true faith, as if true faith and the evil intention of persisting and progressing in sins could exist simultaneously in the same heart, which is utterly impossible; or as if someone could have and retain true faith, righteousness, and salvation even if he remains a rotten and unfruitful tree, and brings forth no good fruit, indeed, even if he persists in sins against his conscience, or relapses into former crimes with deliberate malice. These things are false and impious. However, this distinction must also be observed, that the word necessity should be understood as the necessity of order, command, and will of Christ, and our duty, not as the necessity of coercion."

XXX. Similar statements are found in the Saxon Confession, Article 6, where it affirms that if anyone rushes against his conscience, he forfeits the good things received from God. In support of this, it cites Paul's statement in Galatians 5, "Those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God." From this, it concludes that care must be taken to avoid such lapses. It further states, "This clear necessity, proposed with the utmost penalty, namely, the loss of eternal life, if it does not move some to good works, they are already among those of whom it is said, 'He who commits sin is of the devil.'" There are several reasons for this necessity: obligation, that is, the immutable order for creatures to obey God; also, the avoidance of present punishments, etc.

XXXI. Although all Protestants agree that good works are necessary for those justified and to be saved, and that no one can be saved who neglects good works and does not care to avoid sins, some of them do not approve of saying that good works are necessary for salvation and that it is impossible to be saved without good works. This is not because they simply deny that these phrases can be explained in any proper sense, but because they consider them dangerous and prone to lead to the conclusion that our salvation is not entirely gratuitous and that our works have some merit and efficiency in obtaining salvation. This is the opinion of those who composed the often-cited Book of Concord and subscribed to it, for it states in the Epitome of the articles about which controversies have arisen among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, in Title IV, which deals with Good Works. In the Negative Part, number 1, page 590, it says: "We reject and condemn the following phrases when it is taught: Good works are necessary for salvation; no one is ever saved without good works; it is impossible to be saved without good works." And in the Solid Declaration of the same fourth article, which we just cited, it states, "Nevertheless, it must be diligently observed in this matter that good works are not mixed into the article of justification and our salvation. Therefore, these propositions are rightly rejected: Good works are necessary for salvation in such a way that it is impossible to be saved without good works." And later, they add, "It must be firmly, certainly, and definitively established that such phrases or propositions about the necessity of good works for salvation are

not to be taught, defended, or presented, but rather should be excluded and rejected from the Church as false and insincere."

XXXII. But we plainly believe that these propositions, that good works are necessary for salvation and that it is impossible to be saved without good works, should not only be taught and retained in the Church but should be constantly urged and inculcated among the faithful. For they contain the very doctrine of Christ and the Apostles, clearly and expressly delivered in the places already cited. For what else does it mean that "without holiness no one will see the Lord," but that no one will be saved without good works? For what is holiness without good works, and what is salvation without seeing the Lord? Similarly, when Christ says to His disciples, "Unless your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will by no means enter the kingdom of heaven," what else does He mean but that no one can be admitted into the heavenly kingdom without striving for works of piety and righteousness, which the Gospel commends?

XXXIII. Moreover, since those very people with whom we contend continually urge that without good works faith is dead and useless for salvation and that a living faith that works through love and is effective through good works is absolutely necessary for salvation, it is evident, according to their own doctrine, that good works are something without which no one can have true faith and consequently, no one can attain salvation and righteousness. Why then are they reluctant to say that good works are necessary for salvation when everything necessary for salvation must be present without which salvation cannot be secured, nor can one be a partaker of it?

XXXIV. Similarly, since they willingly teach, as we have previously reported, that no one can have or retain righteousness and salvation who is and remains an unfruitful tree, bearing no good fruit, why do they not want to say that it is impossible to be saved without good works? For when someone lacks that which is essential for salvation, is it not impossible to be saved without it?

XXXV. Furthermore, should it not be said that it is impossible to be saved without that to which we are bound and obligated by divine command and precept, and indeed under the penalty of losing eternal life? But those with whom we now contend acknowledge that the faithful are bound under such a penalty to abstain from works of the flesh and to live according to the Spirit, which is evident from scripture, as is clear from the words of the Saxon Confession cited above, and from the very often cited Book of Concord, in that fourth article on Good Works, in the Solid Declaration, page 706. After condemning, as false and Epicurean, the opinion that faith, the grace of God, righteousness, and salvation can be had and retained even if a person indulges in their evil desires, resists the Holy Spirit, and plans atrocious crimes against their conscience, they add the following words: "Against this most pestilential persuasion, the divine threats, punishments, and admonitions, immovably true, must be diligently and frequently repeated and inculcated to Christians justified by faith: 'Do not be deceived: Neither fornicators, nor adulterers, nor covetous... will inherit the kingdom of God.' And elsewhere, 'Those who do such things will not inherit the kingdom of God.' And to the Romans, 'If you live according to the

flesh, you will die.' And 'Because of such things, the wrath of God comes upon the sons of disobedience.'"

XXXVI. Nor should anyone object that many infants attain eternal life and are admitted to the kingdom of heaven; and yet all infants are devoid of good works. The answer is clear in itself, namely, when it is said that good works are necessary for salvation and that no one is saved without good works, this is understood concerning those who, by age, are capable of good or evil works, to which infants do not belong; who, just as they lack good works, are also not guilty of evil works; and who, just as they are tainted with no actual sin, can also, by God's grace, be purified and cleansed from the sin in which they were born and conceived without any of their own works.

XXXVII. But you may say, are not many adults converted in the very act of dying, when life is failing and there is no time left to do good works, who nevertheless are also delivered from eternal death and admitted to the enjoyment of heavenly blessedness and glory? Just as the other thief who was hanging on the cross with Christ heard that kind voice, "Today you will be with Me in Paradise." I answer that those who seriously and wholeheartedly turn to God in the very act of dying are undoubtedly not excluded from salvation; but neither are they entirely without good works: for necessarily found in them are a serious confession and detestation of their sins before God, a vehement desire for His grace, heartfelt prayers to God, hope and trust in His forgiveness, sincere love for God, and a firm resolution to obey His commandments in the future and abstain from the sins they have indulged in, if life were to be prolonged for them by God.

XXXVIII. Scripture indeed everywhere proclaims that we are saved by grace and not by works; but by this, it means to signify that our salvation is entirely gratuitous and not to be attributed to the merits of our good works but to the goodness and mercy of God, which prevents us when we are lying in sins, awakens and quickens us so that, having obtained the remission of our sins through Christ, we may henceforth walk in newness of life and finally attain eternal life. From this, it follows that good works are not the price by which salvation is purchased for us, and our trust for salvation is not to be placed in them. However, it cannot be concluded from this that good works are not something without which our salvation is not completed and the way prepared by God by which, and not by another, we must reach eternal life, which is what we intend to affirm when we say that good works are necessary for salvation and that it is impossible to be saved without good works.

XXXIX. Therefore, these formulas contain nothing that could detract from the doctrine of gratuitous salvation or that is not entirely consistent with the form of sound words. Consequently, they have been approved by the unanimous consent of Christians and used without scruple up to these recent times. They cannot be condemned and rejected without causing great offense to pious souls and giving occasion for people, who are already more than prone to evil and negligent in doing good, to flatter themselves in their sins and to diminish their zeal for good works. For who among the people, hearing it preached that good works are not necessary for salvation and that it is not impossible to be saved without good works, will not conclude from this that they can safely indulge in vices and still be partakers of salvation even if

they do not care about works of piety? I know that the theologians with whom we contend have a different intention, and this debate, like many others, ultimately reduces to a mere logomachy. For although they do not want to say that good works are necessary for salvation and that it is impossible to be saved without good works, they nonetheless teach and assert that no one can be saved who remains in sins and neglects good works. But these statements seem to contradict each other: after one has asserted that good works are not necessary for salvation and that it is not impossible to be saved without good works, what is subsequently stated cannot remove the scandal of such a dangerous expression, which is so abhorrent to the common sense of Christians and which by itself, and as the words sound, opens such a wide window to a licentious life.

XL. Therefore, other Protestants, especially those who are called Reformed, whose opinion we defend and expound here, believe that the praise of our salvation should indeed be entirely attributed to divine grace and the merit of Christ. Nevertheless, they also believe that the Christian people should be diligently taught that good works are necessary for salvation, not indeed as meritorious or efficient causes of salvation, but as the way that alone leads to salvation and as the means ordained by God through which the possession of eternal life is to be obtained and without which one cannot hope to be a partaker of it. It would be a great injustice to attribute the opposite view to us, as they so frequently complain in their sermons and writings, and it would be too lengthy and superfluous to gather their testimonies on this matter.

XLI. Therefore, omitting private testimonies, it will suffice to refer here to what is read in the public confession presented in the name of the Reformed Churches at the Colloquium of Thorn in 1645. They state, "We are falsely accused as if by this doctrine we abolish the study of good works and deny their necessity; yet it is manifest from what has already been said that neither justifying faith nor justification itself can exist in adults without sanctification and the study of good works. In this sense, we acknowledge that they are absolutely necessary for salvation, although not as meritorious causes of justification or salvation," Chapter 4 on Grace, Section 2, Number 9.

**Theological Theses,
ON
THE RELATION
OF GOOD WORKS
TO
Eternal Life.**

**PART ONE.
In which the Doctrine of the Reformed Church is Expounded.**

Thesis I

The Doctors of the Roman Schools are accustomed to attribute to the Doctors of the Reformed Church that they teach that the good works of the faithful have no relation to salvation

and eternal life, as if they are not only not merits or causes of it, but also not conditions or something similar. This can be seen in Bellarmine's book on Justification, book 4, chapter 7. The adversaries, he says, agree that good works are not necessary for salvation, except by necessity of presence. The meaning of this proposition is that good works ought to be done because otherwise, faith would not be alive or true unless it produces good fruits, just as fire is not fire unless it gives heat; yet good works have no relation to salvation as if they are merits, causes, conditions, etc. In which they say faith is distinguished from works because faith has a relation to salvation because it apprehends it, and therefore is said to be necessary for salvation; but works have no relation at all, and therefore are indeed necessary but not for salvation.

II. However, those who wrote against Bellarmine, such as Paræus in the cited book, complain that Bellarmine either did not understand or did not faithfully report the doctrine of the Protestants in this part. It is false, he says, that we say works are necessary only by necessity of presence. And that good works have no relation at all to salvation, not even as conditions, this, I say, is false. Even if they do not have a causal relation, they have or can have a relation of order, such as the means to the end, the antecedent to the consequent, a condition without which the effect cannot happen, the presence of which indeed does not produce but the absence of which can impede salvation. For example, a battle is necessary for victory: victory for the crown: yet the battle itself does not necessarily produce victory (since both sides fight) nor victory the crown (since it is given freely, according to the promise), but the absence of the battle can impede victory and the crown.

III. Similarly, Amesius in Bellarmine Enervatus, book 6, chapter 6, says the same words of Bellarmine: We do not deny that good works have any relation to salvation: for they have the relation of an adjunct, consequent, and effect to salvation, as they say, achieved; and of an antecedent and disposing adjunct to be achieved salvation; and also of an argument confirming confidence and hope of salvation: but we deny that our works can be the meritorious cause of justification and salvation.

IV. But to make it clearer what the doctrine of the Reformed School is in this part, and, if possible, to cut off all occasion for future calumny, we thought it worthwhile to explain a little more distinctly and broadly what the Reformed think about the relation of good works to salvation according to the doctrine of Scripture. V. First of all, it is certain that good works are a condition without which celestial glory cannot be obtained and eternal destruction cannot be avoided. For without holiness, no one will see the Lord. And unless, says Christ, your righteousness exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees, you will not enter the kingdom of heaven. Also, every tree that does not produce good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire.

VI. Good works are not simply a condition assumed in those who are to obtain eternal life; but they are the way that leads to it, and the means ordained by God through which one certainly and effectively arrives at eternal happiness. For, as the Apostle says in Romans 2, there will be tribulation and distress for every human being who does evil, but glory, honor, and peace for everyone who does good. And to those who by patience in well-doing seek glory and honor and immortality, he will give eternal life; but for those who are self-seeking and do not obey the

truth but obey unrighteousness, there will be wrath and fury. This relates to what the same Apostle says in Romans 8, If you live according to the flesh, you will die; but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will live. Hence it is said that by good works our calling and election are made sure, and an entrance into the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ is provided for us. Strive, says Peter, to make your calling and election sure by good works. For if you do these things, you will never fall. Thus, an abundant entrance will be provided for you into the eternal kingdom of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, 2 Peter 1. And it also pertains to what James says in his epistle, chapter 1. Whoever looks into the perfect law of liberty and continues in it, not being a forgetful hearer but a doer of the work, this one will be blessed in what he does.

VII. And this is why the faithful, being diligent in good works, are said to work out their own salvation, Philippians 2. Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, says Paul. Wherefore, writing to the Corinthians about the afflictions they patiently endure for Christ, he attributes to them that they work for us an eternal weight of glory. For this slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison, as we look not to the things that are seen but to the things that are unseen, 2 Corinthians 4.

VIII. For although the good works of the faithful do not by themselves and properly produce their eternal salvation and glory, they are rightly said to work it because they are means tending and leading to it, and which by God's ordination and promise are infallibly and necessarily followed by eternal life and glory. And so, although the Reformed Theologians rightly deny that good works are properly called causes of salvation, because they do not immediately and by themselves attain the effect of salvation, they can yet in a broader and improper sense be called efficient causes of salvation, namely, inasmuch as an efficient cause is called anything that in any way works and concurs to some effect, as the opinion of the Protestants is explained by John Davenant in his work on habitual and actual justice, chapter 32. Bellarmine, he says, in his declaration of his opinion affirms that good works are necessary for salvation by reason of efficiency, it is true if he takes efficiency broadly, for anything that in any way works and concurs to the effect of salvation; false if he understands efficiency as meritorious, which alone is in the justice of Christ, or apprehensive, which alone pertains to the virtue of faith, or properly efficient, that is, which reaches the effect of salvation itself; in which sense only God is the efficient cause of our salvation. And later, We do not deny all efficiency to good works in relation to salvation, but meritorious efficiency; or efficiency properly taken; namely, which reaches or produces the effect of salvation itself. Efficiency broadly taken, which works something preceding the effect of salvation, we gladly concede to good works.

IX. But to better understand what the relation is between good works and eternal life, it is necessary to consider the various similitudes by which sacred Scripture explains it. First of all, it compares good works to seed, and eternal life to the harvest or fruit gathered from it. For whatever a man sows, that he will also reap. For he who sows to his own flesh will from the flesh reap corruption, but he who sows to the Spirit will from the Spirit reap eternal life, Galatians 6. It is similar to what is read in Psalm 126. Those who sow in tears shall reap with shouts of joy. And Psalm 58. Truly there is a reward for the righteous. For just as he who commits seeds to the earth

gathers a suitable fruit in the time appointed by God and nature, so those who pursue piety and justice do not labor in vain, but after patiently waiting for the fulfillment of the divine promise, a very abundant harvest of happiness and glory finally springs up for them in the future life.

X. Moreover, eternal life is often compared to a prize and a crown, and good works to the race and contest. So when Paul writes to Timothy, he says, I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, will award to me on that day. And in the first epistle to the Corinthians, Do you not know that in a race all the runners run, but only one receives the prize? So run that you may obtain it. Every athlete exercises self-control in all things. They do it to receive a perishable wreath, but we an imperishable. For just as he who competes in a contest is not crowned unless he competes according to the rules, so also no one ought to promise himself a blessed and immortal life from God unless he strives against his own desires and brings his flesh into the service of God. Moreover, just as those who surpassed others in the stadium or in the wrestling school had certain rewards appointed by those who instituted the games, so also eternal life and glory is a reward that according to God's law and promise certainly remains for all those who seriously and sincerely exercise themselves in good works.

XI. Especially, however, Scripture speaks of good works as a task and labor imposed on us by God: and of life and eternal glory as a reward promised by God, and repaid by God for that labor. Thus Christ, addressing those who suffer persecution for righteousness' sake, says, "Rejoice and be glad, for your reward is great in heaven," Matthew 5. And the Psalmist refers to this reward when he says there is great reward in keeping God's judgments, Psalm 19. And Solomon also in Proverbs says, "The one who sows righteousness gets a sure reward." Therefore, Paul, writing to the Corinthians, says, "Each will receive his own reward according to his own labor," 1 Corinthians 3.

XII. Furthermore, when sacred Scripture calls eternal life the reward of good works, it takes the term "reward" not strictly and properly, but in a broader and somewhat improper sense, as it signifies anything that, according to any agreement, is repaid to some labor and work. For the understanding of this matter, it should be noted that for a reward properly so-called, two things are altogether required. First, that there be a proportion between the labor and the reward, not just any proportion, but a certain proportion of equality. Secondly, that the reward is due to the labor strictly by right and from proper justice. Neither of these applies here.

XIII. For as to the first, eternal life and glory is such a great reward that it far exceeds the price and value of our good works if they are estimated by themselves. For it is a good entirely perfect. However, our good works suffer from many defects and are not exact to the rigor and perfection of the divine law. Even if we take those good works of the faithful which are the most eminent and seem the most excellent, none will be found which can be preferred to the sufferings patiently endured for Christ out of love for God. And yet, speaking of these, the Apostle says in Romans 8, "I consider that the sufferings of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us." This is similar to what we just cited from the same Apostle,

"For this slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison," 2 Corinthians 4.

XIV. Certainly, that God attributes to our works, which are done out of love for Him, a reward much more abundant and richer than they could by themselves demand, is sufficiently indicated by Christ in Luke 6, where He says that God measures back to us not only a good measure, but a measure pressed down, shaken together, and running over. "Give," He says, "and it will be given to you. Good measure, pressed down, shaken together, running over, will be put into your lap." By these words, He exaggerates the amplitude of divine reward beyond what we can perform.

XV. Although there is no proportion of equivalence, that is, equality of price and value, between the good works of the faithful and the heavenly and immortal life which God rewards them with, nevertheless, as is evident from what has been said, there is a multiple relationship and a certain proportion, so to speak, of congruence between them. Such congruence can be noted between the seed and the harvest, between the seed and the fruit that arises from it, between the contest and the crown appointed for the winner, which are the similes used by Scripture in this matter. Likewise, between the means and the end, between the way and the terminus to which that way leads, between moral good, that is, virtue and holiness, and the physical good corresponding to it, that is, happiness and blessedness, between the beginning of a thing and its consummation, or between an initiated thing and the same thing completed. Finally, between things of the same order, which proceed from the same principle, and have some connection by nature. For good works pertain to grace, which is glory begun, while glory is grace consummated. Then, good works have the nature of moral good, while eternal life has the nature of physical good. Moreover, both are of the supernatural order and have the same Holy Spirit as their author.

XVI. Hence Scripture says that God will repay each, both good and evil, according to their works, that is, as is fitting and appropriate to their works. For it is fitting, and altogether in accordance with divine wisdom, that it should be well with the good and ill with the wicked. And that those who have conducted themselves well and laudably in this world, and indeed beyond the common measure of nature, should be well and happily in the other world beyond the common measure of nature.

XVII. Therefore, also those who live piously and justly in this world and suffer for Christ, are in sacred Scripture declared worthy of heavenly life and glory. As in Revelation 3:4, "They will walk with me in white, for they are worthy." And 2 Thessalonians 1, where the Apostle teaches that the faith and patience of the pious are proven through many persecutions and tribulations, so that they may be considered worthy of the kingdom of God, for which they also suffer. Although the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the future glory that will be revealed in us, as we cited above from the same Apostle, because, namely, the light and momentary affliction bears no proportion of equality to the eternal weight of glory; nevertheless, those who constantly bear adversities for Christ's name and fight against their own desires, following the motions of the divine spirit, are worthy of the kingdom of God

and the crown of glory, because it is fitting for God to grant to those who have legitimately contended at His command, the prizes which befit His goodness and munificence, and to bestow those rewards which correspond not to the meagerness of the duty performed, but to the majesty and greatness of the rewarder.

XVIII. Moreover, such a congruence and appropriateness of nature between eternal life and the good works of the pious is acknowledged by the Reformed Doctors, as can be evidenced by the renowned men, John Davenant and Moses Amyraldus. For the former, explaining how the good works of the regenerate relate to and are ordered towards the reward of eternal life, not only observes that they are ordered towards the reward because God freely, according to the good pleasure of His will, promises rewards of this life and the future to the good works of the faithful and regenerate; but also affirms that those good works have a certain ordination, or at least aptitude, to be ordered towards divine rewards for three reasons, as if from three causes. First, from the condition of the worker himself. Second, from the condition of the works themselves. Third, from the difficulty of performing good works. First, I say, from the condition of the worker himself. For, he says, since the worker is supposed to be faithful and justified, he is also presumed to be admitted into divine grace and friendship. The law of friendship requires that whatever services a friend offers to his great friend be valued not according to the meagerness of the service performed, but according to the dignity and munificence of the one to whom it is offered. Since, therefore, the regenerate are counted among the friends of God, according to Christ's saying, "You are my friends if you do what I command you," when they endeavor this with pious will, they can expect from a benevolent and friendly God those rewards with which He is accustomed to honor His friends. Secondly, from the condition of the works themselves. For, he says, these works which are called good must always spring from the love of God and aim at the honor of God. Such a work, although it does not have the condignity for a heavenly reward, nevertheless has, so to speak, an ordainability. For doing something out of charity for God provokes God's love towards the doer, which, though situated in affection, not in effect, must bring with it some conferment of good. Thus referring our works to the honor of God, as it were, excites Him to honor us and bestow divine rewards upon us, as the sacred Scriptures teach, "Those who honor me I will honor." "Whoever gives you a cup of water in my name because you belong to Christ will by no means lose his reward." As if to say, there is no work so small that if it is done out of love and in my honor, it does not acquire a splendid reward for the doer. Finally, he says that the very difficulty of doing good works, which arises from the Devil and the opposing world, and the flesh resisting and urging to the contrary, gives them a certain congruence to divine rewards. For, he says, it is always decided that some reward should be conferred on those who contend legitimately at the judge's command. Since, therefore, good works are not done without adversaries and struggle (for the flesh lusts against the spirit, to say nothing of the Devil and the world, which as it were declare war on those who do well), they have from this difficulty a certain ordination to rewards. Therefore, whoever has sweat and fought in the arena of good works can say with the Apostle, "I have fought the good fight, I have

finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord will award to me," 2 Timothy 4:7-8.

XIX. Similarly, the notable scholar M. Amyraldus elaborates and meticulously explains the congruence between good works and eternal life in his French treatise "On the Merit of Works" against Theoph. Brachetium Milleterium, page 50. Where, giving reasons why God is said to render to the just according to their works, he notes that the particle "κατά," that is, "according to," generally signifies any relation or congruence between two things, and that there are very clear and explicit congruences between the good works of the just and eternal life. First, good works are a kind of moral good, while life and glory are a physical good, as they say: the former consisting in virtue, the latter in joy and gladness: and thus these two agree in that both are a kind of good, though not of the same kind. Secondly, good works reflect the image of God as He is good and holy; life and glory reflect the image of God as He is happy and blessed: and thus these two agree in that the image of God shines forth in both in a special way. Thirdly, God delights in holiness and good works because they partake in something of His excellent nature, just as, on the contrary, God hates sin because it is contrary to the purity of His nature. Fourthly, this is why God has promised happiness to holiness and good works, just as, conversely, He has threatened punishment to sin.

XX. And then on page 60 and following, explaining how the faithful who are diligent in good works are worthy of the kingdom of God, he first teaches that they are pronounced worthy of the heavenly kingdom on account of the holiness that is in them, not absolutely if God were to examine them strictly; but comparatively to the impious, who are immersed in the filth of sin. Then, he notes that there are two kinds of dignity. One which consists in a certain relation of justice. In this sense, the worker is said to be worthy of his wage. The other which consists only in a certain natural congruence: as when it is said, "Produce fruits worthy of repentance," that is, fruits that are congruent and consistent with repentance. And in this latter sense, he affirms that the pious are worthy of eternal glory and happiness, because just as happiness and the state of sin are naturally opposed and cannot be compared, so there is a certain natural congruence between happiness and holiness produced by true repentance. Moreover, since the promise of reward made to the good works of the pious has been established, they are worthy of the reward because they are in the state required by the promise and have the disposition that the promise demands.

XXI. Furthermore, although there is a certain congruence between the good works of the faithful and the eternal life and glory that God rewards them with, for which the faithful are said to be worthy of eternal life in Scripture, it should not be thought that eternal life is due to their good works in themselves and by strict right. For, as we have shown from Scripture, for a reward to be due to work and labor by strict right, it is not enough that there is a simple congruence between the work and the reward; but it is required that the work be equivalent in price and value to the reward, and that there be that proportion of equality between the two, which is not found here.

XXII. Indeed, if eternal life were strictly due to the good works of the just, there would be no reason for them to fear and deprecate the strict and severe judgment of God. For what

could they fear from God if they could demand eternal life and glory from Him as their right? And yet we see even the most holy men, who were most illustrious for their good works, deprecate such severe judgment. Witness David, a man after God's own heart, whose voice is this, Psalm 143: "Do not enter into judgment with your servant, for no one living is righteous before you." And Job, a man blameless and upright, who feared God and shunned evil, who speaks thus to his friends in chapter 9: "Truly I know that it is so, but how can a man be in the right before God? If one wished to contend with Him, one could not answer Him once in a thousand times."

XXIII. Moreover, whatever we are and can do, we have from God; He can take nothing from us, nor does He need our good works. As it is often repeated in Scripture, "Who has given to Him, that He should repay him?" By a double right, namely, of creation and redemption, He is our Lord and Master; we, on the other hand, are His servants and slaves who owe Him all our service entirely. Therefore, whatever good we accomplish, since it is owed to Him on so many accounts and is yet completely useless to Him, cannot by itself oblige Him to reward, let alone such a great and magnificent one. This is what Christ teaches in the parable in Luke 17. "Will any one of you who has a servant plowing or keeping sheep say to him when he has come in from the field, 'Come at once and recline at table'? Will he not rather say to him, 'Prepare supper for me, and dress properly, and serve me while I eat and drink, and afterward you will eat and drink'? Does he thank the servant because he did what was commanded? So you also, when you have done all that you were commanded, say, 'We are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty.'"

XXIV. Therefore, if we have any right to eternal life through our good works, it is founded on the gratuitous promise of God, who in His immense goodness has declared in His word that He wills to reward our services, however weak and meager, with eternal life and glory: even though without any injustice He could neither give nor promise such a great and magnificent reward to our works.

XXV. And therefore, sacred Scripture calls eternal life a reward in such a way that it also signifies it as a free gift that befalls us by the mercy of God. To this pertains what Peter commands in the first chapter of his first epistle, urging the faithful to "set your hope fully on the grace that will be brought to you at the revelation of Jesus Christ." For by the revelation of Jesus Christ is understood the final appearance of Christ, in which the grace to be offered to us is nothing other than eternal life and glory of body and soul, which by the gratuitous promise for Christ's sake, all the faithful will then be endowed with by God. Hence also Paul, wishing eternal happiness and salvation for Onesiphorus, whose love had refreshed him, prays to the Lord to "grant him to find mercy from the Lord on that day," 2 Timothy 1:18. Clearly indicating that God, when He crowns the works of the pious with glory on the last day, will use mercy towards them. And moreover, theologians often cite in this regard what is read in Psalm 103: "Who crowns you with steadfast love and mercy." And what is read in Paul, Romans 6: "The wages of sin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord."

XXVI. And certainly, with the greatest right, eternal life should be called grace; not only because God has promised it out of sheer generosity, without being bound by any right, and led by no necessity, to the good works of the faithful: but also because the good works of the faithful themselves proceed from God's grace and are the free gift of the Holy Spirit. Add to this that our services, for which God has promised such ample remuneration, suffer from many defects and are interrupted by frequent lapses: and therefore require much forgiveness and great clemency and kindness to be accepted by God for eternal life.

XXVII. Furthermore, since the strictness of justice excludes mercy and grace, it is certain that eternal life, which must be attributed to divine grace and mercy, is not rendered to our works from strict justice. For that is strictly and properly called justice which gives each one his due without grace and favor, and by which someone maintains, as required by law, equality of thing with thing, and compensates the accepted debt with an equal reward; otherwise, he would be unjust and unfair, and would defraud another of what is due to him against justice and right. This kind of justice can have no place in God in relation to men, since God has given all things to everyone, and owes absolutely nothing to anyone.

XXVIII. However, it must not be denied that God so rewards the good works of the regenerate out of grace and mercy, that He also maintains some measure of justice in this and can thus be called just in a broader sense. Firstly, to keep and fulfill promises pertains in some way to justice, and one who refuses to keep promises sins against justice to some extent. God, when He rewards eternal life and glory to the good works of the pious, confirms His promise and keeps what He has promised gratuitously. This pertains to what the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "For God is not unjust so as to overlook your work and the love that you have shown for His name in serving the saints, as you still do" (Hebrews 6:10). For he says that if God were to forget the charity of the faithful, He would be unjust because He would then deny them the rewards He has promised, which would be contrary to His justice, that is, His faithfulness.

XXIX. Moreover, when God crowns with happiness and glory those who are devoted to piety and charity, He exercises justice in some way because He does what is fitting to His goodness and equity, which seem to demand that He should benefit the good and that He should reward true holiness and justice, which He, being just, cannot but love, with the highest remuneration according to His greatness. Sacred Scripture often calls justice in God the propriety of His goodness, as the Scholastics speak; and calls God just when He does things that are congruent with His wisdom, equity, and kindness. This can be referred to what the Apostle says in 2 Thessalonians 1:6-7, "For it is just with God to repay with affliction those who afflict you, and to grant relief to you who are afflicted as well as to us when the Lord Jesus is revealed from heaven." He says that it is just with God to give relief to those who are unjustly afflicted for Christ, because this is altogether congruent with divine wisdom and equity.

XXX. Add that He exercises a kind of justice when, in distributing rewards, He accepts no person's status but gives each one what is rationally congruent and what the law established by Him demands. God, in distributing heavenly rewards no less than in inflicting the punishments of hell, will avoid all respect of persons; and therefore, without any regard to the

nation, condition, or dignity of men, He will grant to the good and holy works of each one the rewards established in the Gospel, and will give each one his own reward according to his own labor; those who have labored more in the work of God, and have bravely endured greater and harsher struggles for His glory, will also receive more praise and glory from Him in the final judgment. To this, the Apostle refers when he expects the crown of glory from God as a just judge, 2 Timothy 4:7-8: "I have fought the good fight, I have finished the race, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, will award to me on that day; and not only to me but also to all who have loved His appearing."

XXXI. And this is the opinion and doctrine of the Reformed Church, as evidenced also by the two notable theologians cited earlier. For Davenant, in his treatise on Actual Justice, chapter 60, explaining the passage from the Epistle to the Hebrews, teaches that God would act unjustly if He did not reward good works because He would act against the reason of His wisdom, which is like a law to Him: not because He would take away something due to us according to the reason of strictly called justice, which consists in the equality of giving and receiving. Likewise, God is said to act justly when He gives the reward of eternal life to good works; not because He observes equality between the dignity of the works and the rewards, but because He keeps His faith in the exhibition of His promises. And in chapter 66, he affirms that the whole right which we are said to have to eternal life lies in the fact that God is, as it were, a debtor to Himself, to act conformably both to the propriety of His goodness and the faithfulness of His promise.

XXXII. How it befits divine goodness to reward the good works of the pious with eternal life, he explains in chapter 57 of the same book, in response to the third argument. Where he acknowledges that it is congruent to divine goodness and munificence to reward eternal life to those who have not yet equated any merits with lesser benefits. Because eternal life does not surpass the dignity and excellence of the works of pious men more than God Himself surpasses men, and therefore it is fitting that when men render services to God according to their strength, God should reward them with rewards according to His majesty. For there can be conceived a certain geometric proportion between infinite God and miserable man, and between the infinite reward of God and the short service of man.

XXXIII. Finally, at the end of chapter 60, he teaches that God, in rewarding the faithful, acts as a just judge and exercises a kind of distributive justice, and is no respecter of persons: because in that retribution, although the reward greatly exceeds the work of each one, yet He gives to each one according to the quality of the good works, rewarding good works with a good reward; and moreover according to a certain proportion of the works, because He grants greater and clearer rewards to greater and holier works. Neither does He give the spiritual rewards, which are proposed by divine ordination to the faithful and those living piously, to the noble, the wealthy, or any others, without regard to their faith and holiness, which would incur a kind of unjust respect of persons. When, he says, the supreme ruler of heaven and earth gives eternal and blessed life to each Christian soldier who fights bravely, He also gives a different and

outstanding measure of glory in this life to those who have exercised the diverse measure of grace more excellently, thus preserving the proportion between different works and rewards. This does not, however, mean that the virtue of any excellent soldier corresponds equally to the reward of a blessed life or the degree he holds in a blessed life if equality of thing to thing is considered.

XXXIV. The notable scholar M. Amyraldus, in his French treatise on Justification against Milleterium, page 200, teaches similar things. Where he says that God, as He crowns the good works of the faithful, can be called just in three respects or for three reasons: Firstly, because the purity of the divine nature, which is also called justice, is the true cause of the love with which God pursues whatever in creatures reflects and imitates it: according to Psalm 11, "The Lord is righteous; He loves righteous deeds." Secondly, because if one compares pious men with the impious, and the different rewards of the former and latter, which in themselves and absolutely speaking are pure mercy, it seems in some way to be justice. To this, he applies the saying of Paul, "It is just with God to repay with affliction those who afflict you, and to grant relief to you who are afflicted as well as to us when the Lord Jesus is revealed from heaven." Thirdly, because when God mercifully rewards us, He does so according to His promises. Now, faith in promises is also usually called justice according to Cicero's saying, "The foundation of justice is faith."

XXXV. Thus far we have shown clearly, according to the truth of the matter and the common doctrine of the Reformed School, that there is indeed a great congruence and relationship between eternal life and the good works of the regenerate: but still, there is not found that proportion of equality in which strictly called justice is founded: and therefore, eternal life is not due to good works in themselves and by strict right, nor is it rendered from strictly called justice. Hence follows what we undertook to prove, namely, that eternal life, with respect to good works, does not have the nature of a properly and strictly called reward.

XXXVI. Since reward and merit are related terms, with one implying the other; if one is removed, the other is also removed; by this very fact that eternal life, with respect to good works, does not have the properly called nature of reward, it is also clear that good works, with respect to eternal life, do not have the proper nature of merit.

XXXVII. Indeed, although theologians vary in assigning the reason for properly said merit, and some require more, others fewer conditions for it, all Protestants agree that two things are absolutely necessary for merit properly taken: one, that the work be equal and proportional to the reward; the other, that it can demand the reward as strictly due by justice properly so called. Since all Protestants agree that these two things are absent in our works in this matter, they therefore unanimously deny that our good works are meritorious of eternal life and glory.

XXXVIII. However, just as sacred Scripture calls eternal life the reward of good works in a more common and broader sense, so also the ancient Church Doctors attribute the term "merit" to good works in a broader sense. They call merit every work that is imputable to praise or reward; that is, any work by which we achieve and obtain something, and which is ordained to some reward. Therefore, when they affirm that the faithful merit eternal life and glory by their

good and holy works, they mean nothing else but that good works are the means ordained by God through which we attain eternal life and glory; and the conditions by which it is gratuitously promised by God.

XXXIX. We do not deny that such an improper sense of merit is found in the good works of the faithful; nor do we think that the term "merit" taken in this sense should be simply condemned and rejected. We acknowledge that the good works of the faithful are imputed to them for eternal glory and are ordained to the reward of heavenly life, as is abundantly clear from what has been explained before.

XL. David Pareus teaches and observes the same thing in the preface to Book 5 of Bellarmine on Justification, where, after reporting that Gabriel Biel defines merit as a work imputable to praise, he adds, "If the adversaries were content with this sense, there would be no question. For it is not doubtful that good works are worthy of praise before God and men." He also adds, "It can also be said that merit is a work imputable to reward, that is, worthy of a reward. Nor will we simply deny this, provided the distinction between grace and law is maintained."

XLI. Similar things are read in John Davenant's "On Actual Justice," chapter 53. For he says, "Among the Fathers, 'to merit' denotes nothing else than to obtain or achieve some benefit from God by means of a good work; and merit signifies nothing else to them than a good work ordained by God for reward. Therefore, to merit eternal life is to do those works which, according to God's ordinance, are means of attaining it. If anyone calls the good works of the regenerate 'merits' in this sense, that is, because they are ordained by God for reward, and teaches that the regenerate merit eternal life because, walking in the way of God's commandments, they finally obtain the crown of eternal glory from God as a reward, he agrees with the Fathers in his way of speaking, and with us in the thing itself." And similarly in chapter 54, he says, "We do not oppose the mere name of merit used by the Fathers in an innocuous sense; but we oppose the proud and false opinion of condign merit recently introduced into the Church by the Papists. For what the Fathers understood by the name of merit, namely, the work of a faithful and regenerated man endowed with supernatural goodness, pleasing and acceptable to God in the supernatural order, and ordained by the promise of the most munificent God to gracious rewards both in this life and in the future life, all of this our people have always conceded."

XLII. Indeed, some Protestant confessions also use the term "merit" in this sense. For the Württemberg Confession, in the section on Good Works, begins with these words: "We teach that good works divinely commanded must necessarily be done and merit certain rewards by the gratuitous mercy of God, whether corporal or spiritual." And the Augsburg Confession, Article 6, states: "Therefore it must always be believed that we obtain remission of sins and are pronounced righteous, that is, accepted gratis for Christ's sake through faith. Afterward, our obedience to the law is also pleasing and is accounted as a kind of righteousness and merits rewards." And later, in Article 20, in the section on good works: "Although this new obedience is far from the perfection of the law, it is still righteousness and merits rewards because they are reconciled persons." Thus, it should be judged about works: they should indeed be adorned with

the highest praises because they are necessary, the worship of God, and spiritual sacrifices, and they merit rewards.

XLIII. The Apology of the same confession contains many similar statements. For example, in Article 6, it says: "We teach that good works are meritorious not of remission of sins, gratis, or of justification, but of other rewards, corporal and spiritual, in this life and after this life; for Paul says, 'Each one will receive his own reward according to his labor.' Therefore, there will be different rewards for different labors." Similarly, in Article 20, it says: "Afterward, because works please God, they merit other corporal and spiritual rewards. For there are degrees of glory among the saints."

XLIV. But although Protestants recognize that the term "merit" was used by the ancient Church Doctors in that improper and innocuous sense, and even in some recent confessions, nevertheless today they abstain from this term; nor do they allow any merit to be attributed to the good works of the faithful with respect to eternal life and glory, or that these works should be called meritorious of life or glory: because that term has been twisted into a perverse sense in the Papal Schools. That is, to signify a certain condignity in good works with respect to eternal life; on account of which they are considered equivalent to the price of it, and for which it is due to them by justice properly so called. It is much better and safer, says Davenant, to abstain from this word. "On Actual Justice," chapter 53. And in the following chapter, he says, "Although our theologians now abstain from the term 'merit,' frequently used by the Fathers, they do so not because they disagree with the Fathers, but lest they agree with the Papists, who have twisted that term into a pernicious and heretical sense." Similar things are read in Vossius's theses, Disputation 4, "On the Merits of Good Works." He says, "We do not entirely dare to condemn the term 'meriting,' which was used by many of the ancients and by the Reformed in their confessions, namely, the Augsburg and the Württemberg Confessions; nevertheless, we think it better to speak with the Scriptures, especially since the term 'merit' is ambiguous and particularly in our age, when pride is to be avoided by name.

THEOLOGICAL THESES; ON THE RELATION OF GOOD WORKS TO ETERNAL LIFE. PART TWO.

In which the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church is reported, and the controversy of the state is summarized and examined.

Thesis I

In the previous theses, as much as was within our power, we have accurately expounded what Reformed theologians think about the relationship of good works to eternal life. It follows that we should also briefly explain the opinion of the Roman Church on this matter.

II. Indeed, it is well known and manifest to all that, according to the common consensus of the Doctors of the Roman school, the good works of the regenerate are condign for eternal life

and glory, are owed to them by right, and are to be rewarded out of justice. Therefore, good works are meritorious of eternal life in a condign sense. But it is necessary to explain this more distinctly so that their meaning may be clearly perceived. For unless one has read their writings, one might easily conceive something different from their meaning from these forms of speaking. Furthermore, although they all speak in this way, not all think and understand the same.

III. First, although they generally teach that the good works of the just have a certain condignity and proportion to eternal life, some attribute more and others less to good works in this part. For some seem to attribute entirely equal value to the good works done by grace of Christ and to eternal life. Among these, we can count Gabriel Vasquez. For in volume 2, 1, 2, Disputation 214, chapter 11, he says that eternal life and the good works of the just are indeed unequal in what they formally have: since, for example, the joy of eternal beatitude greatly exceeds the tribulation of this present life which the just suffer for Christ: but this does not prevent there being equality between those good works and eternal life in terms of dignity and merit: just as sins and punishment are also not equal in what is formally in each: since there is more torment and pain in the punishment inflicted for sins than there is pleasure in the sin itself. And yet no one will deny that there is an equality of condignity between sin and punishment, and that the punishment is equal to the sin in this respect, not greater than the sin deserves and is worthy of. Hence afterward, in Disputation 215, chapter 2, he concludes that it was rightly said by the Jesuits of Cologne that heaven is offered to us for sale, and that it should be obtained by condign merits as an equal price. Augustine Monk agrees with these, having taught theology some years ago in the Academy of Toulouse. For in 1, 2, q. 114, art. 1, doubt 7, he says that between our merit and the reward of eternal life there is found the most perfect equality and condignity. He repeats the same in doubt 8, concerning the third and fourth conclusion.

IV. Others speak less harshly on this part. Thus Thomas Stapleton, in his work "On Justification," book 10, chapter 2, says that works of grace have a certain condignity and equality to eternal life, such as merit should have to reward: because the seed of eternal life is grace itself, which is therefore equal to that glory in power, though not in act; just as a seed is equal to a tree. But he afterward adds that the reason for merit does not require strict equality of justice, because it is not a servile or mercenary work; but it is a work of virtue and therefore of charity, which posits friendship; so that thus we merit from God as from a Father. In such works of justice, the reward is not compensated by the equality of the thing, but by the dignity of the person or acceptance.

V. Similarly, Bellarmine, in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 17, says that a good work of the just is equal to the reward of eternal life: but he later explains this about proportional equality, in chapter 18, where he says that for merit by condignity, absolute equality between merit and reward is not required; but proportional equality is sufficient, like that between a source and the stream that arises from the source: between a seed and the thing of which it is the seed, to which the seed is equal, not in size, but in power; and finally between the way and the terminus to which that way leads, with such similarities explaining his meaning, chapter 17. "It cannot be denied," he says, "that beatitude far excels the meritorious action, since in it there is

perfect knowledge and charity; in the latter, there is imperfect knowledge and charity. But absolute equality between merit and reward is not required, according to distributive justice, to say that the reward is owed to merit by condignity, even on the part of the work; but it is sufficient that there is a certain proportion according to which he who merits can be said to be worthy of that reward. For here on earth, one who is endowed with learning and good morals, and has labored for the Church for some time, is judged worthy of the episcopate, although absolutely the dignity of the episcopate is very great and incomparable. Similarly, in natural things, the disposition to form is much more imperfect than the form itself, and yet from a natural justice, the properly disposed subject is owed the form. Thus, therefore, he who loves God with all his heart, and is thereby pure in heart, peaceful, humble, merciful, is worthy to be admitted to that beatitude which is promised to those who love God, are pure in heart, peaceful, and merciful, as those who are properly disposed." And a little later, he says, "Therefore we say that the vision is due by condignity to faith formed by charity, because it is worthy that the thing begun and disposed by God should finally be perfected and completed."

VI. Whatever may be the condignity of good works concerning eternal life, the Doctors of the Roman Church do not wish to attribute it to good works as they are esteemed in their own nature and according to the goodness inherent in them; but they teach that this dignity arises, at least in great part, from the principle from which they proceed and from the dignity of the person performing them. Namely, the good works of the just are condign for eternal life and glory because they are done by those whom God has already seen fit to adopt as sons, who have been elevated to a certain supernatural state, and have the indwelling Holy Spirit, who is the principle of such works. So that, if a man created and left by God in a pure natural state, without any supernatural grace and favor, were to do good works and conform to the law, such works would not be deemed worthy of eternal life. Just as in human affairs, a father of a family values the same services much more highly in his sons than in his servants.

VII. This is what Thomas Stapleton means, in "On Justification," book 10, chapter 2. "The proper foundation of merit," he says, "is primarily and especially that the works of the just are the works of the sons of God, which proceed from the grace of the indwelling Holy Spirit in us." And shortly after, he adds, "Therefore, inheritance is given, not only because we are sons, but because we are good sons suffering with Christ: nor again because we are good only, but because we are good sons. For neither goodness nor justice of works has any right to the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom except in the sons of God: nor does mere adoption without the justice of good works attain that right by way of merit." The former is against the novel opinion of some theologians today, who teach that from the natural constitution of man, a good work and obedience to the law, from the integrity of the work, merit eternal life, not from any dignity of the worker. The latter is against today's heretics, who dogmatize that beatitude is given by reason of adoption only, because we are sons of God through faith. And at the end of the next chapter, with Augustine, he teaches that the just have merits, not because their works considered in themselves are truly merits, but because they are the works of the just sons of God, which otherwise would not be merits.

VIII. And this, as Vasquez testifies in 1, 2, volume 2, disputation 216, is the common and accepted opinion of the Scholastics, who agree that for works to be meritorious of eternal life, the adoption of the sons of God is necessary in those who are to merit. The contrary opinion of Michael Baius, Professor of Louvain, was condemned by Popes Pius V and Gregory XIII in a bull in which they censured various opinions of this doctor. For among the many propositions noted for error in that bull, these two occur: "It is a Pelagian opinion that a good work done without the grace of adoption is not meritorious of the heavenly kingdom." Also, "Good works done through the spirit of adoption do not acquire the nature of merit because they are done through the spirit of adoption dwelling in the hearts of the sons of God, but rather because they are in conformity with the law." As Bellarmine reports in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 13, where he teaches that even if someone perfectly fulfilled the law, he would still not merit eternal life unless he were elevated to a supernatural state, and condemns as erroneous the opinion of those who say that eternal life is owed to good works because they are true obedience to the law, not because they are done by a person elevated by grace to the state of the sons of God.

IX. Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church teach that for our works to be considered condign of eternal life and heavenly glory before God, it is necessary that they be stained and sprinkled with the blood of Christ, that is, that some value and price should accrue to them from the merit and obedience of Christ, which they would not have even if they were done by the grace of God: so that Christ not only merited for us that we should do good and just works; but also that our works, once done, should merit and receive the power of meriting from Him.

X. This is the doctrine of Thomas Stapleton in "On Justification," book 10, chapter 4. He says, "Our righteousness and merits depend on the righteousness and merits of Christ, not only because, as the universal principle of reforming the human race, He imparts grace by which we both work justly and merit by working; but also because, being made one with Christ, we have obtained that our merits, as the merits of Christ our head, merit before God through Him and for His sake. For He merited this for us, that our good works, when we are incorporated with Him, should be valid before God for the merit of eternal life. Thus, by His passion being consummated, He became the cause of salvation for all who obey Him, that is, He makes our obedience to His commandments effective for obtaining salvation, that is, meritorious of eternal life."

XI. Similar things are taught by Francisco Suarez in the third part of Thomas, volume 1, disputation 41, section 3, where he shows with many testimonies of the Scholastics that the common opinion of the School is that through Christ, not only is help given to us to perform meritorious works, but also value is given to the work itself, for which it is accepted as condign merit of such grace or glory. And the merit of Christ has such an influence on our merits and on every effect of them, that whatever we merit is given to us not only because of our merit, but also because of the merit of Christ: and our works have the nature of merit that they now have, not only from their goodness and quality, and from the proximate grace from which they proceed;

but also from their conjunction with the merit of Christ, on which they depend, and from which they derive power and efficacy.

XII. The Jesuit Costero, in the "Enchiridion of Controversies," in the chapter on merits, illustrates this matter with this simile: "Just as," he says, "if a rustic were forming characters moved by the hand of the King in writing, the writing which is partly produced by the rustic is of no weight; but because the King guided the hand of the scribe in writing and delineating, it has great dignity: so our works, because of Christ, who uses us as members and the indwelling Holy Spirit, and who works through us, are worthy of heavenly reward."

XIII. And Vasquez attributes this same doctrine to Alfonso Virvesio, Bishop of the Canaries, Hosius the Cardinal, Tapper, Lindanus, and many other writers of the previous century, whom he testifies teach that the works of the just done with the help of grace receive much greater dignity from the merit and grace of Christ. Indeed, the works of the just have very little dignity from themselves, but the greatest as far as they depend on the grace and merits of Christ, and are in some way His merits. He adds that Cajetan affirms that the works of the just have the nature of merit from the dignity of the works, because they proceed from the grace of the Holy Spirit, but thinks that the nature of merit in the works of the just is more clearly derived from the fact that the action of the just is not so much the action of themselves as the action of Christ Himself. For Christ, as the head, flows into the members and works and merits; so that each just person can say, "I merit, yet not I, but Christ merits in me." In the first part of the second, volume 2, disputation 214, chapter 2. And this sentiment is openly favored by the words of the Council of Trent, session 6, chapter 16, where it is said that without the virtue of Christ, which continually flows into the justified, their good works could by no means be pleasing and meritorious before God.

XIV. However, Vasquez himself takes a different opinion, contending that the works of the just derive no increase in dignity from the merits or person of Christ, which they would not otherwise have if they were done by the same grace liberally bestowed by God alone. In chapter 7 of the aforementioned disputation, titled "That our works do not have greater dignity from the merits or grace of Christ than they would otherwise have from the grace of God," he observes that he does not deny that some glory is given to us in consideration of the merits of Christ, beyond what our works condignly merit. But he denies that our works are thereby made more worthy than they would otherwise be if done apart from Christ by the same or similar grace liberally given by God. For it is one thing for a work to have greater or lesser dignity, and another to assign a greater or lesser reward to the worker.

XV. Many Doctors of the Roman Church also believe that the condignity, which they attribute to good works concerning eternal life, depends on the gratuitous promise of God, who has promised eternal life to them; for good works, apart from the gratuitous promise of God, cannot be deemed worthy of heavenly glory: but by that promise, they are made condign for eternal life and in some way equivalent to it. This is the opinion of Gregory of Valencia, a Jesuit, in the "Summa Theologiae," volume 2, disputation 8, question 6, point 4. He observes that the work of the just can be considered in two ways. First, absolutely and in itself, according to the

goodness it has, both from its object, its circumstances, and its principle, that is, from grace, and in this way, he acknowledges that there is no equality between the work of the just considered in this way and eternal life: because the dignity of eternal life far surpasses the excellence of such a work. Secondly, the work of the just can be considered in relation to the divine promise, because of which eternal life is to be rewarded. And in this respect, he contends that it is condign to the reward of eternal life and equal to it. For in this way, the work considered, namely, as it is related to that promise, and is, as it were, supported by it, is wholly valid for eternal life, since through it the just person, unless they oppose an obstacle of sin, is certain to obtain eternal life. Thus, by the divine promise, the work of the just, which in itself is not equal to eternal life, is made equal to it. He then illustrates this with an example: "For," he says, "if money by the command of a prince is made of some base material, which considered in itself is not worth as much as the things that can be exchanged for it, then indeed, if this money is considered absolutely, without regard to the prince's decree, it is certain that according to commutative justice it is not equal to the things that can be obtained for it; but if it is considered as subject to the prince's decree and law, by which it is ordained that whoever presents such money shall obtain necessary things according to the established value of the money, then in this way, the money is valued at as much as the things themselves that can be obtained by it. Thus it is in this proposition. For if the work of the just is considered precisely in itself, it is not equal to glory. But if it is considered as subject to the divine promise, by which through it glory can certainly be obtained, then it can be valued at as much as that glory, and in this way, it is equal to glory."

XVI. Similar things are taught by Alphonsus à Castro in "Against Heresies," book 10, under the word "Merit." He says, "If Luther, when he says that there is no merit of man for glory, takes merit to mean such a work that by its own nature and from itself is equal to the reward; certainly his opinion is not to be noted as an error, because there is no such work of ours that can be equated with eternal glory. But merit is not taken to imply such equality but another kind of equality, which does not arise from the nature of things, but from a certain pact, by which the work becomes equal, which was not previously said to be equal."

XVII. Especially in this opinion are the Canons of Cologne, in the "Enchiridion," under the title "On Justification." They say, "Nor does Scripture fear to call eternal life the reward of good works, not that we should think our good deeds are worthy of eternal life or that eternal life is owed to them because of the worth of the works themselves. For who is so foolish as to think so? But rather that God has promised eternal life to our faith, which is exercised through such works." As Gabriel Vasquez reports in 1. 2. volume 2, disputation 214, chapter 1, where he attributes the same doctrine to many ancient Scholastics, whom he testifies teach that the good works of the just, proceeding from grace, if considered in themselves and without God's pact and acceptance, are not condign for eternal life, nor have the condignity and nature of merit for eternal life; but that all the dignity and the entire nature of merit which is in them is sought from God's pact and promise.

XVIII. However, Vasquez himself thinks that the good works of the regenerate are condign for eternal life, even without God's promise, and have equal value and dignity for it in

themselves, without God's pact. As can be seen in the aforementioned disputation, chapter 4 and following, where he attempts to prove that there is an equality of dignity between works and eternal life before God's pact and promise are added to them. Puteanus joins this opinion in 1.2, question 114, article 1, doubt 5, where he expressly says that operations done by grace are equal or condign to the reward of eternal life, even without the divine promise. Likewise, Peter a Sancto Josepho in "The Idea of Speculative Theology," book 4, chapter 11, Resolution 4, where he affirms that the works of a just man have a certain condignity with the reward of eternal life in themselves, and proves this from the fact that they are supernatural and proceed from an adopted son of God, and therefore have a certain proportion with the supernatural reward of eternal glory, which is the inheritance of the sons of God. Similar things are read in Martin Becanus in the "Summa of Scholastic Theology," volume 2, treatise 4, chapter 5, number 11. He says, "The works of a just man and one existing in a state of grace are in themselves worthy and proportionate to eternal life, because they proceed from grace which is the seed of glory." And he later adds that such works, without the promise, are worthy of eternal life, not indeed by the dignity of justice, but by the proportion of the means to the end.

XIX. Although many Doctors of the Roman Church insist that the good works of the just are condign for eternal life and glory even without God's promise and apart from regard to it, they all unanimously agree that it is only God's promise that obligates God to render eternal life for the good works of the regenerate, and that if this promise were set aside, God could, without any injustice or injury, deny eternal life to any good works whatsoever; for by themselves, without God's pact, they acquire no right to eternal life.

XX. This is the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez, who in this question seems to be the most rigid of all. For although, as we have said, he contends that there is an equality of dignity between works and eternal life before God's pact and promise are added to them, he nevertheless admits that unless God had promised the reward, we could not demand it from Him or require it by any right: for the debt of the reward of eternal life and glory arises not from the works, however worthy, but from the munificence of God, who promised, since He could not promise. As can be seen in the aforementioned volume, disputation 213, chapter 8. Similar things are read in the same volume, disputation 204, chapter 2, towards the end. "God could, if He wished, without any injustice or ingratitude, deny eternal life to one who has justice and sanctity." For although a just man, by inherent justice, is pleasing and beloved by God, and thereby worthy of eternal glory, either as a son by the inheritance of the Father through habitual grace or by merits and good works, as a worker by reward and payment, and in this way could be said to be acceptable to eternal glory, that is, beloved as worthy of it; nevertheless, since God is the author of all things, He could freely never confer beatitude on him.

XXI. Similar things are taught by Becanus in the previously cited place, where he says, "The works of a just man and one existing in a state of grace are in themselves worthy and proportionate to eternal life, because they proceed from grace which is the seed of glory; nevertheless, God is not bound by justice to recompense them, apart from the pact and promise." Also, the often-cited Puteanus in "Summa Theologiae," question 114, article 1, doubt 5, where

he indeed affirms that operations done by grace are in themselves condign and equal to the reward of eternal life, but at the same time admits that eternal life is not owed to them before the divine promise.

XXII. The contrary opinion, which states that good works merit eternal life in themselves, before the gratuitous promise of God, was expressly condemned by the Roman Pontiffs in a bull first issued by Pope Pius V, and later renewed by Gregory XIII, as reported by Bellarmine in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 14. Where he testifies that among the many propositions noted in that bull, this is the eleventh: "That those who have lived piously and justly in this mortal life until the end obtain eternal life, this is not to be attributed properly to the grace of God, but to the natural ordinance established at the beginning of creation by God's just judgment: nor is this reward of the good to be attributed to the merit of Christ, but only to the original institution of the human race, according to which it is ordained in the natural law that eternal life is rendered to the obedience of the commandments by God's just judgment."

XXIII. However, given the gratuitous promise of God, the common doctrine of the Roman School is that eternal life is owed to good works by justice. But what kind of justice that is, by which eternal life is to be rewarded to good works, is not entirely agreed upon among the Doctors of the Roman Church. For most of them admit that strict and proper justice cannot apply here, nor is eternal life owed to the good works of the faithful out of the rigor of justice. This is repeated and emphasized by Vasquez in many places, especially in 1. 2. volume 2, disputation 213, chapter 4, where he often affirms that in God with respect to us there is no justice properly so called, but only according to a certain common reason and meaning. And he also attributes the same opinion to Scotus, Gabriel, and many other ancient Scholastics, who he says teach that eternal life is rendered and owed to the works of the just according to the equity of justice, but nevertheless, in God with respect to men, there is no justice according to propriety, but only in a certain common sense. For what is called justice in God, they said, is only a certain decency of His goodness. And justice is not to be granted to God as it signifies a debt of necessity; but as it signifies a certain decency of propriety, as can be seen in the same Vasquez in the first part of Thomas, disputation 86, chapter 2. Thus Vasquez himself explains his own opinion. "We," he says, "who said that between God and us there can be no proper justice, but only in a certain common reason, do not attribute to God an obligation to give glory in remuneration for good works from accepted justice, as if He must compensate out of justice for the good works He has received from us: but we say that He owes to give eternal life in remuneration solely from the word of promise, and therefore from His fidelity alone, as we will prove from Augustine below. Therefore, if He did not give it, which cannot happen, He would indeed be unfaithful because He would not keep the truth of His promise; but not unjust properly, because He would not act against proper justice. Nevertheless, He would be called unjust, in that fidelity is a certain kind of justice, namely, a part of potential justice, and thus this infidelity could be called injustice in a common sense. And in this sense, Paul said to the Hebrews, 'God is not unjust to forget your work.'"

XXIV. Becanus agrees with this in "Summa Theologiae Scholasticae," volume 2, treatise 4, chapter 5, question 8. Regarding the first point, he says, "The merit of a just man before God is not from strict justice. So says Saint Thomas in the third part, question 1, article 2, and elsewhere. The reason is that the rigor of justice requires such a contract that there is no grace and liberality between the contracting parties, in which merit is founded. But this is not the case between God and man, because all human merit is founded on the grace and liberality of God, especially on justifying grace which is given freely, and on the liberal promise of God by which He willed to reward our merits, which were not useful to Him, and were owed to Him for many other reasons. In this sense, the Council of Trent said in session 6, chapter 16, that it is the goodness of God that He willed our merits, which are His gifts, to be merits."

XXV. Similar things are read in Costero the Jesuit in "Enchiridion," chapter on Merits, where this is his third proposition: "Between God and men, there cannot be exact justice as it is between men. For God cannot be obligated to us in such a way that, excluding His merciful grace, He remains bound to us by anything." 1. Because we are His creation, who made and possesses us entirely, and to whom all our things belong. 2. Because He has bound us to Himself with countless benefits, and He has bought us with the price of His blood and life. Hence, if a father owes nothing to a son for the benefit of birth, and a master owes nothing to a servant whom he bought with money, much less can God, our Creator and Redeemer, become a debtor or be obligated to man by any gift. 3. Because the merit we gain from Him is the grace of God, in which the entire reason for our merit before God consists. This is also the opinion of Baillie the Jesuit as reported by Rivetus in "Summa Controversiarum," treatise 4, question 17. He says, "Merit primarily signifies an action for which compensation is owed by the rigor of justice. But we are not so rash as to claim this privilege for ourselves, which we attribute only to the Son of God incarnate, who merited salvation for us by His justice." Finally, Bellarmine himself, in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 18, agrees with this. For in responding to a certain testimony of Bernard, he acknowledges that life is not owed to the pious by the rigor of justice, which presupposes no grace, and that God would not be doing any injustice if He deprived the just of the reward of justice; although hypothetically, God would be doing an injustice if He did not give eternal life to good works as promised by covenant.

XXVI. Therefore, according to these Doctors, no matter what the works of man are, God, absolutely speaking, and if you set aside His gratuitous and merciful promise, owes man nothing and is not bound by any justice to give him anything; and in this respect, the rigor of justice does not apply between God and man. And yet, given God's promise, justice requires that what is promised be rendered to the one who works well. Furthermore, when God rewards the good works of the just with eternal life and heavenly glory, He exercises a certain kind of justice called distributive justice, because He shows no partiality but renders to each according to his works, and He maintains such a proportion between works and rewards that to him whose works are more excellent and abundant, more glory and praise are given. In this matter, He also satisfies commutative justice and maintains its mode, because He rewards no one with less, but rather with more and more ample rewards than their works deserve.

XXVII. This is the doctrine of Bellarmine in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 14. He affirms that the substance of divine judgment, when God rewards the works of the just, will be according to commutative justice. Indeed, the substance of that judgment will be according to distributive justice, since God as the supreme judge will distribute rewards according to merits: and in this, He will not show partiality, which is contrary to distributive justice. The mode of the same judgment, however, will be according to commutative justice, because God will not only establish a proportional equality between merits and rewards, so that he who has more merit will have more reward, which is proper to distributive justice; but also will establish an absolute equality between works and rewards, so that each person receives no less reward than they justly deserve, which is commutative justice.

XXVIII. Moreover, when Bellarmine says that God will establish an absolute equality and, as he later repeats, a perfect equality between works and rewards, he does not mean that the reward will be so equal to the merit that it is neither above nor below merit, and thus each person receives neither more nor less from God than they have merited: but simply, as he himself explains, that the reward will not be less than the merit, and God will attribute to each no less than their works justly deserve. For he does not deny, indeed he expressly teaches in the same book, chapter 16, that God rewards good works above condignity, and that the good works of the just will receive on the day of final judgment a greater reward than they justly deserve to receive from God's judgment. Therefore, Bellarmine's aim is only to say that in that distribution, God will so preserve distributive justice that He will not fail in commutative justice, unlike what often happens in human affairs. For example, when princes distribute stipends to soldiers, considering the office and dignity of each, they maintain distributive justice, but give much less to each than they are owed by contract, and in this respect do not preserve commutative justice; they would not violate it if they gave each more than they owed by right.

XXIX. However, among the Doctors of the Roman Church, some are found who teach that eternal life is owed to the good works of the just by the rigor of justice, and is repaid from strict justice. For they think that in this matter that very justice called commutative justice applies, which maintains, as the schools say, the equality of thing to thing, and renders equal to what was received. They believe that two things are required and sufficient for this: one, that a work be presented that is in itself equal to the reward; the other, that a certain pact intervene by which the reward is promised to the work. They contend that both apply here. For they believe that not only has eternal life been promised by God to the good works of the just, but also that those works have an equal dignity to eternal life in themselves, and are its equivalent price. Vasquez attributes this opinion to certain recent theologians, whom he claims teach that in the good works of the just there is found the nature of merit concerning heavenly glory even according to the rigor of justice. This is because the just offer God good works by which they not only give Him honor but which are equally worthy of the reward of eternal life and glory, and to which God has also promised such a reward. Hence, according to them, God is a debtor of eternal life and glory to them from strict commutative justice. Vasquez explains this at length in the first part of Thomas, disputation 85, chapter 1 and following.

XXX. John Davenant attributes the same doctrine to Francisco Suarez in "On Actual Justice," chapter 66, where he affirms that, according to this Doctor and others of the same opinion, after the promise of God has been made, all the conditions of commutative justice are found in the reward of works: and therefore, given the promise, God rewards according to commutative justice. They prove this by examining the individual conditions of commutative justice, which they claim apply here. The first is the equality of thing to thing. They believe this is found between human merit and the reward of eternal life: for although works of grace, according to their entity, are not entirely equal to the reward of glory, nevertheless, according to moral value, they are equivalent to it. The second property of commutative justice is that there be such a mutual exchange that places mutual giving and receiving on both sides. They say that such an exchange exists between man and God: for God accepts our works and gives us His rewards for them, and we, in turn, accept divine rewards and give God our works. Finally, the third condition of the same justice is that from the acceptance arises a debt, and an obligation of justice in the retributor, by the force of the right acquired by the other through the work presented and given. They claim that such a debt and obligation of justice to reward arises in God from the work itself, as it is founded on the promise or pact of God made beforehand.

XXXI. Peter of St. Joseph also teaches that God rewards the works of the pious from strict justice in "The Idea of Speculative Theology," book 1, chapter 17. There he presents his fourth resolution: "In God, there is justice properly and strictly taken, as it is a special virtue distinct from others." He proves this from the fact that Scripture, as he says, judges that God gives eternal glory from true justice, for the merits of good works; and in the bestowal of beatitude, true justice is exercised on the part of God. This was also the opinion of Cajetan, as is clear from what John Davenant reports from him in "On Actual Justice," chapter 57, where he brings forth one who affirms that a good work of the just, according to strict justice, merits eternal life and glory.

XXXII. Moreover, it is clear from what we have said that even those Doctors who say that eternal life is owed to the good works of the just by the rigor of justice do not believe that eternal life is owed to good works by justice without the gratuitous promise of God. Since they do not base that strict debt of justice on the dignity of the work alone, but also on the free promise of God, without which no such debt could exist. For just as he who works in another's vineyard, even if his labor is worthy of such a price, does not make the owner of the vineyard a debtor for his payment unless the owner has promised the payment: so also, according to their view, God would not owe us the recompense of good works by justice unless He had bound Himself by His word, as Vasquez observes in 1. th. Disputation 85, chapter 1.

XXXIII. Nor do the same Doctors deny what others commonly teach, that God rewards the good works of the just above condignity. For what we attributed to Bellarmine above is the common and accepted opinion of the Roman School, namely that God not only rewards good works with the recompense that is condignly due to them, but also adds something undeserved. According to the Gospel, "A good measure, pressed down, shaken together, and running over, will be poured into your lap." Moreover, the Roman Pontiffs themselves, namely Pius V and

Gregory XIII, have expressly defined this in their constitutions, as can be seen in their oft-cited bull. For there, among many condemned opinions, the fourteenth is expressed in these words, "The good works of the just will not receive on the day of the last judgment a greater reward than they justly deserve by the judgment of God," as Bellarmine testifies in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 19, whose title is, "That God rewards good works above condignity."

XXXIV. To reconcile these points, namely that the good works of the just are condign for eternal life and glory, and even that eternal life and glory are owed to them by the rigor of justice, and yet that God rewards such works beyond what they condignly deserve, they say that beyond the glory which good works are worthy of and which is justly due to them, God adds some degree of glory: thus something is rendered to the dignity of the merits of eternal glory, and something is added beyond the dignity of the merits. "I willingly concede," says Vasquez, "that God rewards our merits with the reward of eternal life more abundantly than they condignly deserve: not because they are not condign for eternal life and its increase, but because God, out of an abundance of gratitude, adds more glory than the merits of the saints condignly demand," volume 2, in 1, 2, disputation 215, chapter 4. And later, clarifying the mind of the Scholastics, he says, according to their view, which he approves, "something is given to the dignity of the merits of eternal glory, and something is added beyond their dignity." Similar things are read in Cajetan. "From the fact," he says, "that God rewards above condignity, the condignity of the good work for eternal life is not overthrown, because when God rewards a good work deserving glory with double glory, He does not take away from the work the fact that it, according to strict justice, merited glory," in 1, 2, question 114, article 3.

XXXV. Moreover, although the Doctors of the Roman Church with common consent teach that the good works of the regenerate are owed eternal life and glory by justice, whether that justice is said only according to a common and broader meaning, as many think; or in a strict and proper sense, as others believe, none of them deny that eternal life, with respect to the faithful, has the nature not only of a deserved reward but also of grace and a gratuitous gift. This is because the matter is defined in the Council of Trent. For in session 6, chapter 16, the Council speaks thus: "To those who work well to the end and trust in God, eternal life is to be proposed as both a grace mercifully promised through Jesus Christ to the sons of God, and as a reward to be faithfully rendered to their good works and merits."

XXXVI. Furthermore, they believe that eternal life, with respect to the faithful, has the nature of grace for many reasons. First, because eternal life is mercifully promised by God for our good works, whereas otherwise God could, without any injustice or injury to the creature, not promise eternal life for good works, nor deem them worthy of such a reward. Secondly, because our good works are the gifts and effects of grace, which God works in us entirely freely. Gregory of Valencia touches on both of these reasons, volume 2, disputation 8, question 6, point 4. He says, "Merit for eternal life is thus a merit of condignity, yet it relies on divine liberality and mercy: namely, that God mercifully promised to reward the good works of the just with eternal

life. Similarly, for this reason, the merit of the just relies on liberality and mercy, because it is not such unless it proceeds from grace and charity, which are freely given to us by God."

XXXVII. Moreover, according to the mind of the Doctors of the Roman Church, the faithful have from the grace of Christ not only the ability to do good works, but also that their works are condign for eternal life, which they would not be unless they were done by those whom God has adopted as sons through Christ, as is clear from what was explained above. Furthermore, the same Doctors do not want eternal life to be simply rendered to the faithful as a reward due to their labors and merits, but also to be given as a paternal inheritance, which Christ merited for them immediately by His death, along with their adoption as sons of God.

XXXVIII. This is seen in Bellarmine in "On Justification," book 5, chapter 14, where he refutes a certain doctor from Louvain, condemned by the Roman Pontiffs, who taught that good works by their nature are meritorious of eternal life, so that no pact or gratuitous promise is required for eternal life to be owed by justice to good works. Bellarmine, on the contrary, asserts that eternal life is not owed to human works except by the gratuitous and merciful promise of God; and furthermore, that Christ merited immediately for us not only the grace of doing good works but eternal life itself, to be given to us as sons.

XXXIX. First, he proves that the reward of eternal life is not owed to good works without God's promise, which is entirely gratuitous, with three reasons. The first reason, he says, is taken from the works themselves, which, if considered by their own nature, apart from the promise, and the dignity of the acting principle, have no proportion to that supernatural beatitude; therefore, the reward of eternal life is not owed to them by justice if considered by their own nature alone. The second reason is taken from God, who needs nothing and to whom all things belong by the right of creation. Hence it follows that God is not bound to accept works for a reward to be justly given unless He has first bound Himself by His liberal promise. The third reason is taken from men, who merit. Since we are all in the condition of servants and possessions of God, there could be no justice between us and God unless He, by a liberal agreement, willed to establish a reward for our works, which were otherwise due, even if no reward was to be given for them.

XL. That Christ merited for us immediately, not only the grace of doing good works, but also eternal life itself, he proves with this reason based on Scripture. For, he says, by the very fact that we begin to be sons of God, we begin to have a right to the inheritance of eternal happiness. For if sons, then heirs, says the Apostle to the Romans 8 and to the Galatians 4. If a son, then an heir through God. But we begin to be sons of God before we begin to do good works, for (as we have proven above from Augustine) men do not live rightly unless they first become sons of God. Therefore, we have a right to the eternal inheritance by the grace of regeneration before we begin to do good works: indeed, even baptized infants are saved by this grace alone before any good works. Therefore, Christ merited for us the inheritance itself when He merited the grace of regeneration and adoption for us. That He willed that we should also merit the same by good works is an argument of His greater grace and kindness, who (as we

have demonstrated above) not only wanted us to have eternal life by the right of inheritance, but also by the right of merits, which He Himself also gave us.

XLII. Similar teachings of Bellarmine are also found in Francisco Suarez in 3. Tho. Volume I, Disputation 41, Section 3. Where he teaches that not only are our merits the gifts of Christ, who merited for us the grace of doing good works; but also that the promise of eternal life to our works is due to the merits of Christ. "The promise," he says, "made to our works is to be referred to the merits of Christ." And he later explains at length that Christ merited for us both the initial glory and the increase of glory. Therefore, glory, no less than grace itself, is given to us for the sake of Christ and in view of His merits: and thus the same reward is given to us by a double title, being both repaid for Christ's merits and for our own. "An adult who is justified," he says, "by an act of contrition merits condignly the initial glory, and nevertheless that same initial glory is given for the merits of Christ just as grace is, as the Council of Trent expressly said. Otherwise, Christ would not have merited glory for all men, but only the grace by which they themselves would merit glory, which is false. But He merited both for us: although we can also add our own merit with respect to glory. The same must be said of the increase of grace and glory: so that Christ is the most perfect cause of all salvation and eternal life for the just, and all the blessedness of the saints is the reward of the works of Christ."

XLIII. However much the Doctors of the Roman School attribute to divine grace, they nevertheless all unanimously state that the good works of the regenerate truly merit eternal life and glory before God, and can rightly be called meritorious. This was expressly defined by the Council of Trent in session 6, chapter 16, where these words are read: "To those who work well to the end and trust in God, eternal life is to be proposed both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ, and as a reward faithfully rendered to their good works and merits by the promise of God Himself. For this is the crown of justice which the Apostle said was laid up for him, to be rendered to him by the just judge after his struggle and course; and not only to him but also to all who love His coming. For the same Christ Jesus, as the head into the members and as the vine into the branches, continually infuses virtue into those who are justified, which virtue always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, and without which they could not in any way be pleasing and meritorious before God. Nothing further is believed to be lacking for the justified, by which they may not be fully deemed to have satisfied the divine law in this life, according to their state, by the works done in God, and truly merit eternal life in its due time, if they die in grace." In the same session, Canon 32 is conceived in these words: "If anyone says that the good works of a justified man are so the gifts of God that they are not also the merits of the justified man himself, or that the justified man, by the good works performed by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, whose living member he is, does not truly merit the increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of eternal life itself, if he dies in grace, and also an increase in glory, let him be anathema."

XLIV. Although the Doctors of the Roman Church hold as an article of their faith that the good works of the just truly merit eternal life, there is no agreement among them on what

generally constitutes the notion of merit and what the merit of good works of the just consists of and how much it is worth.

XLIV. To understand this, it should be noted that in the Roman School, a distinction is made between merit of condignity and merit of congruity. Moreover, merit of condignity to them is not the same as merit taken strictly and rigidly. Not everyone who teaches that good works merit condignly thereby attributes strict and rigid merit to good works. John Bunderius, a notable writer of the previous century, can serve as an example. He says, "Merit of condignity is found in two ways. One, taken strictly and properly, is a voluntary action for which a reward is owed by the rigor of justice: in such a way that he who does not give this reward is considered unjust. Such merit is not of man before God. For if God rendered no reward for our works, He would not be unjust. For whatever is our duty, we owe to Him. And we render to Him what is His. The other is called merit which is not by its own nature or simply worthy of reward, but from the supposition of the one rewarding. Such as the merit of a prize in a contest, in a dance, in theaters. Such is the merit of man before God, who by His own liberality, has determined to accept our works as worthy of eternal happiness; according to the saying of the Apostle, 'He has made us worthy to share in the inheritance of the saints.' This merit is said to rely on justice, because it is just that He who made the law should observe it. And He who promised should make good His promise. But if God did not keep the law of His promise and did not make His pledge effective, He would do no injustice to others, but would wrong Himself."

XLV. Bailie the Jesuit also observes this in Andrew Rivet's "Summa Controversiarum," treatise 4, question 17. He says, "Merit first signifies an action for which compensation is owed by the rigor of justice. But we are not so rash as to claim this privilege for ourselves, which we attribute only to the Son of God incarnate, who merited salvation for us by His justice. But we recognize a certain mode of merit by analogy, which our theologians call merit of condignity, which depends on the liberal promise that God has given to men, that He wills to compensate their labors undertaken for His honor and glory. Since God has freely bound Himself to compensate us, out of infinite mercy, He is bound to keep His promise. He has promised us His glory on this condition, if we keep His commandments. If we consider our works as they proceed from us, they can merit nothing; but if we contemplate them animated and, as it were, vivified by divine grace, they merit. For God has solemnly bound Himself by promise to render a reward for them." And we have cited many other places of the theologians of the Roman Church above, who deny that good works merit before God by the rigor of justice, and yet defend the merit of condignity.

XLVI. Therefore, they call merit of condignity any work that, according to some mode of equality or justice, ought to be compensated by some reward from another. And so, according to them, for merit of condignity to exist, the reward must be owed to the work by justice. It is sufficient that it be owed by some form of justice, namely, either by commutative justice, which considers the equality of thing to thing, or by distributive justice, which considers the proportional equality of merit to reward. Nor does it pertain to the essence and nature of merit from where that justice originates, what foundation it has, and whether the justice is strictly so-

called, or only according to some common meaning. Therefore, in their view, however much a work may seem worthy of a reward by itself, if a reward is not owed to it by some obligation of justice, it is not to be considered meritorious of reward by condignity. Conversely, even if a work, by itself and by its nature, is not worthy of a reward, either equal to or corresponding to the reward; if, however, by some pact and agreement, the reward is owed to it, and because of the agreement can be justly demanded, such a work is truly considered meritorious by condignity. Thus, for example, a soldier in war, fulfilling duties assigned by the Emperor, merits the promised pay by condignity. But however bravely he may act, and therefore be worthy of being promoted to a higher rank by the Emperor, he is not said to merit that rank by condignity; because the Emperor is not bound by any law to confer that honor on the soldier. If, however, the prince had promised to compensate the not-so-great services of his servants with a great reward when they performed those services, those services would be truly meritorious by condignity for the servants; although the obligation by which the prince ought to compensate them does not arise solely from the goodness of those services, but primarily from the prince's promise.

XLVII. Merit of congruity, however, is a work that, although it should not be compensated by some reward according to some form of justice, it is still fitting and proper that it be compensated, according to a certain honesty. Thus, a son, when he shows due obedience to his parent, can be said to merit some reward from the parent in this way. Therefore, merit of condignity and merit of congruity differ in that in merit of condignity there is some obligation of justice to compensate it. In merit of congruity, no such obligation is found, but only a certain propriety inviting compensation.

XLVIII. Gregory of Valencia in Volume 2, Disputation 8, Question 6, Point 1 and 2, and Becanus in "Summa" Volume 2, Treatise 4, Chapter 5, Question 1, philosophize about merit in general in this way. Bellarmine also agrees in several places in "De Justificatione," especially in Chapter 17, where he teaches that even if the work is far inferior to the promised reward, as if the master of the vineyard hired laborers and promised not a denarius per day, but a hundred gold coins as a reward, there would still be merit of condignity, not by reason of the work, but by reason of the pact. And this is the common opinion of the Roman School.

XLIX. However, some philosophers have a completely different view of merit. For they think that for merit, even condign merit, it is not at all required that the reward be owed by justice, but only by gratitude. Indeed, whenever an action acquires a right of justice to compensation, in their opinion, there is no true merit strictly so-called. Therefore, contrary to the previously cited philosophers, they would say that a soldier's service, for which a stipend has been promised by the king, does not have the nature of merit strictly so-called with respect to the stipend: but the outstanding deeds of the same soldier would truly and condignly merit an honorable reward from the same king, to which the king is not bound by justice, but by gratitude. They believe that the true nature of merit consists in it being a work worthy of praise and glory. And they do not want the reward that corresponds to true merit to be something that can be estimated by price; but something that pertains to praise and glory. They describe merit in general as an action that can acquire some such reward from gratitude. If that reward has equal

dignity and value, it will be merit of condignity; if, however, it receives a more abundant reward from liberality, beyond its proper value, it will be merit of congruity.

L. This is the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez in 1, 2, Volume 2, Disputation 213, Chapter 5. He teaches that the nature of merit in general is the dignity of praise and honor, either before God or before men: which dignity of praise follows the goodness of the human action. He considers eternal blessedness itself to be the true nature of praise before God. Then he notes that not only is it not required for the nature of merit simply, or merit of condignity, which he considers the same, to be owed by justice, whether commutative or distributive: but also whenever an action acquires a right of justice to compensation, that action does not have the true nature of merit, except in an improper and broad sense: just as we also use the term merit for value in irrational matters. Hence, he concludes that the nature and obligation of justice have nothing to do with the nature of merit. For, he says, just as the nature of merit is not value that must be estimated by price; but only in the moral goodness, which is rewarded with praise or something similar: so also the nature of merit is not considered in the matter of justice, which requires payment by justice. This is because the matter of justice in giving and receiving, or in any other way, is money, or what is valued as a price: but the nature of merit is not something that can be estimated by price nor having the value of money or price; but of praise or similar remuneration.

LI. Finally, after concluding from many things that the nature of merit is the property of a diligent human action, that is, which is according to virtue, to which only praise, or glory, or something pertaining to it is due from a grateful mind, he distinguishes merit of condignity from congruity. However, he says, since gratitude usually rewards not only great services, but also small ones abundantly, we must still distinguish in the aforesaid matter of gratitude a double nature of merit. We can call one congruous, or impetratory, and the other condign. In the former way, merit is any diligent action done in the service of someone, which can be rewarded from gratitude beyond the dignity of the work itself. And this merit is called congruous because it is a suitable matter for which it is fitting to return something from gratitude that even exceeds its dignity. It is also called impetratory because it obtains what is given in view of it. For it is the same from the part of the work to obtain, as from the part of the rewarder to grant in view of the work. In the latter way, merit is, in comparison to some reward; service that by its nature requires such a reward, as a fitting grace to be returned to it, by the law of a grateful mind, and to which that reward responds as an equal remuneration and legitimate compensation, according to the correct estimation of service and reward. And this is what the Scholastics call worthy, or condign.

LII. With these things considered, it is questioned among the Doctors of the Roman Church what kind of merit that is which they consider to be attributed to the good works of the just, with respect to eternal life and glory. And from the older Scholastics, some have thought that this merit is not properly merit of condignity, but should rather be reduced to merit of congruity. Vasquez attributes this opinion in the previously cited disputation, Chapter 3, to Paul of Burgos, Bishop, who is said to have written that no one, according to common law, merits

eternal life by condign merit: and also to Durandus, who is said to have taught that our merits before God are not condign with the reward of glory; but are only called merits because God, by His law and ordinance, requires our works, so that He may grant the glory itself: and that there is no equality of condignity between the meritorious works of the just and eternal life, still in the likeness of that which is between the seed and its fruit, and thus the merits of the just, in comparison to eternal life, are only congruous merits. Bellarmine adds that Durandus seems altogether to hold that our merits proceeding from grace, and placed in promise, are still not such that the reward is owed to them by justice, but by the sole liberality of God. Although that Doctor concedes that the merit that the just have for eternal life is intermediate between the congruous merit of one in sin, and the simply condign merit, which is from justice: and thus it can partly be called congruous merit, partly condign merit. Bellarmine also testifies that Gregory of Rimini agrees with him.

LIII. However, the vast majority of the Roman School has long adopted a different view. Indeed, its Doctors, by almost unanimous consensus, maintain that the good works of the just merit eternal life and glory by condign merit. Nevertheless, they greatly differ among themselves, and they do not explain in the same way on what this condign merit of the good works in the just depends and in what it consists. According to them, there are three types of condign merit. One is based solely on a pact; another is based solely on the work; and the third is based on both the pact and the work. A work is said to be meritorious solely by reason of a pact when the reward is indeed owed by promise, but the work itself is much inferior to the reward and has no parity or equality with it in itself, as if the master of the vineyard hired laborers and promised not a denarius per day but a hundred gold coins as a reward. Someone is said to merit solely by reason of the work when the entire basis of the merit is not in any pact but in the value and dignity of the work. Finally, someone merits by reason of both the pact and the work when the work itself is not only equal and proportionate to the reward but also has the reward promised by an agreement.

LIV. In all these ways, some in the Roman School attribute condign merit with respect to eternal life to the good works of the just. Firstly, many among the older Scholastics believe that the good works of the just are meritorious solely by pact. This is because, according to them, those good works proceeding from grace, if considered in themselves and without God's pact and acceptance, are not worthy of eternal life and do not have the nature of the merit of eternal life: whence they conclude that the entire dignity and nature of merit in them is derived from God's pact and promise. Vasquez attributes this opinion to Scotus, Gabriel, Ockham, and William of Paris. He also says that, among the more recent, Andriam de Vega and Alphonsus à Castro agree with them. Likewise, the Canons of Cologne and John Bunderius, whose testimonies we have already mentioned above. In 1, 2. Tom. 2, disp. 214. cap. I.

LV. Others, however, hold the opposite view, believing that the good works of the just are condignly meritorious of eternal life in themselves and without regard to the divine promise. And previously, there were some in the Roman Church who taught that good works by their very nature and in themselves were meritorious of eternal life, such that no gratuitous pact was

required for the reward of eternal life to be owed to them by justice: and thus a good work is by its very nature meritorious of eternal life, just as an evil work is by its nature meritorious of eternal death. But this opinion was condemned by the Bull of the Roman Pontiffs already frequently cited, in which the proposition is noted as erroneous: "Just as an evil work by its nature is meritorious of eternal death, so a good work by its nature is meritorious of eternal life." And furthermore, that which asserted that "those who live piously and justly in this mortal life until the end, obtain eternal life, not to be attributed properly to the grace of God, but to the natural order established at the very beginning of creation by the just judgment of God," as Bellarmine testifies in "De Justificatione" lib. 5. cap. 14.

LVI. Whether some Doctors of the Roman Church persist in the same opinion after this Pontifical Bull, I do not know. It is certain, however, that there have been those who taught that the good works of the just merit eternal life condignly, not by reason of a pact but solely by reason of the work. But this does not prevent them from admitting that only God's promise obliges Him to grant eternal life to the good works of the regenerate; and without this promise, God could, without any injustice, deny eternal life to any good works, because by them, without God's pact, no right to eternal life is acquired. Indeed, they believe it is not essential to the nature of merit that the reward is owed by justice and must be given by justice: but it suffices that it is a work worthy of the reward and equal to it, which it demands from a grateful mind. The good works of the just that proceed from grace, in their view, before God's promise and without regard to it, are worthy of the reward of eternal life and have in themselves an equal value and dignity to it.

LVII. This is the doctrine of Gabriel Vasquez in 1, 2. Tom. 2. Disp. 214. cap. 4. & following, where he contends to prove by various arguments that good works of the just by themselves, without any pact or favor of acceptance, condignly merit eternal life: and although the divine promise has been added to the just works, it in no way pertains to the nature of merit itself: for there is an equality of dignity between the works and eternal life before the pact and promise of God is added. Nevertheless, as we said above, he concedes that if God had not promised the reward, we could not demand it from Him nor rightfully claim it: and the debt of the reward of eternal life does not arise from the works, however worthy, but from the munificence of God, who promised, since He could choose not to promise, as can be seen in the cited Tom. Disp. 213. cap. 8. For in his view, merit does not include a debt of justice.

LVIII. But the more common opinion of the Roman School is somewhat in between these two extremes. It maintains, namely, that the good works of the just, done by the grace of Christ, merit eternal life condignly, not solely by God's pact, nor solely by the dignity of the work; but by both the pact and the work together. Not that, according to them, without the pact or acceptance of God, the good work does not have a proportion to eternal life: but because God is not bound to accept the good work for that reward, even if it is equal and proportionate to the reward unless an agreement intervenes. Therefore, those in this opinion differ from the authors of the first opinion in that, contrary to them, they believe good works, before the promise, and without regard to it, are condignly worthy of eternal life and have a certain proportion and

equality to it. They differ from Vasquez, the advocate of the third opinion, in that they think this is not sufficient for the nature of merit; but additionally, it is required that the reward be owed to the work by justice. Since this debt is founded on the divine promise, not on the very nature of the works, they thus agree with the authors of the first opinion that good works, before the promise, are not condignly meritorious of eternal life. This is the opinion of Bellarmine in "De Justificatione" lib. 5. cap. 17. Peter of Saint Joseph in "Idea Theologiae Speculativae" lib. 4. cap. 11. Resolution 4. Becanus in "Summa Theologiae" Tom. 2. tract. 4. cap. 5. num. 11. and many others, whose names and testimonies it would be superfluous to list in detail.

LIX. Now, to sum up the whole matter briefly, from what has been presented so far, it is clear that the Doctors of the Roman Church unanimously agree on the following points: 1. The good works of the regenerate are not condignly worthy of eternal life if they are considered solely by their intrinsic goodness, without considering the persons from whom they proceed and that they are the services of those whom God has graciously adopted as sons. 2. Whatever dignity may be thought to be in the good works of men, God, speaking absolutely, that is, excluding any pact and divine promise, owes nothing to them; nor is He bound by any right to crown them with eternal life and heavenly glory. 3. That God has promised eternal life and glory to the good works of the just is wholly and entirely attributable to His liberality and kindness, not to any obligation. 4. Eternal life, with respect to the faithful, has the nature not only of a due reward but also of a gratuitous gift. 5. Christ, by His blood, has immediately merited for us eternal life to be given to us as children of God, not only mediately, in that He merited for us the grace by which we do good works and by which we obtain eternal life and glory. 6. The faithful have a right to eternal life as a paternal inheritance, as adopted sons of God through Christ, before they obtain it as a reward liberally promised by God for their works. 7. From all these points, it follows that the good works of the just are not by their nature meritorious of eternal life, just as evil works are meritorious of eternal death. 8. The good works of the faithful will receive a greater reward on the last day than they justly deserve to receive.

LX. Moreover, we have also shown that many Doctors of the Roman Church admit that the good works of the just, before God's promise and without regard to it, are not condignly worthy of eternal life, nor do they have a value and equality to it, because the dignity of eternal life far surpasses the excellence of such works, even if considered according to all the goodness they possess, not only from their object and circumstances but also from their principle, namely, the grace of Christ. 2. Many of those who maintain that good works, even before God's promise, are condignly worthy of eternal life, do not thereby place an absolute and strict equality between good works and eternal life, but only a relative and proportional one, like the relation of a way to its end, means to their goal, seeds to their fruit, and such as can be found between things of the same kind and which originate from the same principle, which are related to each other like the beginning and the end. 3. The good works of the faithful are not accepted by God for the reward of eternal life except as they are sprinkled with and purified by the blood of Christ, that is, because of the value that accrues to them from Christ's merit, either from a special favor and benevolence of God, which Christ has merited for us by His blood. 4. Even with God's promise,

eternal life is not owed to good works done by the grace of Christ by strict right, that is, by the rigor of justice, but only by a justice that presupposes mercy and accompanies it: Thus, good works, with respect to eternal life, do not have the nature of strictly taken merit; nor do they merit it according to the rigor of justice. 5. The justice that God exercises when He rewards good works with eternal life is called justice only in a general sense, namely, it is nothing other than God's faithfulness or the appropriateness of His goodness, or the rectitude of His divine will conforming to the law or dictate of divine wisdom.

LXI. Finally, despite these points, we have shown that, according to the common opinion of the Roman School, the good works of the just should not only be said to truly merit eternal life but also to be condignly meritorious of it. Indeed, some Doctors of the Roman Church attribute perfect equivalence and parity with eternal life to the good works of the just, without any regard to the divine promise. And some even go so far as to assert that, at least with the divine promise, the good works of the just merit eternal life and glory according to the strict rigor of justice and that eternal life is to be retributed to them properly and strictly speaking, from that justice which is called commutative, which maintains equality in given and received things.

LXII. From what has been more fully explained in the earlier part of these theses, it is clear that the Doctors of the Reformed Church do not deny that there is a manifold relationship or connection between the good works of the faithful and eternal life. They freely admit and teach: 1. That the works of the regenerate, done by the grace of Christ, please and are approved by God, and that eternal life and glory have been promised by God to them. 2. That such good works have a certain natural congruence and aptitude for such a great reward, and are therefore ordered to it: not only because they are the works of the sons and friends of God but also because they proceed from the love of God and are directed to His honor and are good and holy by a certain supernatural goodness: and therefore it is fitting and appropriate to divine goodness and munificence to propose to them supernatural glory and happiness. 3. That the good works of the pious can therefore be said to be worthy of eternal life; not indeed by the dignity that consists in the relation of justice, but by that which consists in a certain natural congruence. 4. That the good and holy works of the faithful have a relation and proportion to heavenly glory similar to that which a way has to its end, means to their goal, seeds to their fruit, and the sowing to the harvest; a contest to the crown generously proposed and labor to the reward gratuitously promised; finally, the beginning of a thing to its completion. 5. That therefore eternal life is granted to the faithful and the saints by a double title, both as an inheritance belonging to them by the right of adoption and as a reward gratuitously promised by God to their pious labors and services. 6. That eternal life is retributed to the good works of the regenerate not only out of mercy but also in some way out of justice: as far as justice signifies in God faithfulness in keeping His promises and that equity by which God, without respect of persons, renders to each according to his works, which is fitting and suitable both to His goodness and to His wisdom.

LXIII. We have also shown that the Reformed Theologians indeed deny that the good works of the faithful are properly speaking meritorious of eternal life, because they do not have in themselves an equal value to it, nor can they demand it by strict and rigorous right; which they

think is required for true and properly said merit. And yet they acknowledge that the good works of the regenerate can be said to merit eternal life and glory in a certain broader and improper sense, customary among the ancient Doctors of the Church and received in some public writings and confessions of Protestants; according to which merit signifies any work ordered to a reward in any way whatsoever. From this way of speaking, however, they now judge they must abstain, lest they seem to favor those who assert that good works are meritorious of eternal life *de condigno* and according to the rigor of justice.

LXIV. Furthermore, from all these points we gather that the fundamental issue in this controversy is that good works are not owed eternal life by themselves; nor is God bound to crown them with such a great reward except by a gratuitous pact and His liberal promise; and that God will reward good works with a greater reward than they justly deserve to receive, which has such evident truth that it is commonly received in the Roman School, and the Roman Pontiffs themselves have condemned the contrary opinion. Moreover, there remains no real and significant question for us here except with those who, like Francisco Suarez, say that the good works of the just merit eternal life according to the strict rigor of justice and that eternal life is to be given to them out of proper and strict justice; and that commutative justice, which maintains equality in given and received things. Or at least those who, like Vasquez, assert that good works, without any regard to the divine promise, are equivalent to the price of eternal life and glory, and that they have equal value and dignity with it, and by reason of which heaven can be said to be sold for good works. But all those who say that good works merit eternal life *de condigno* and yet teach that the entire dignity and merit of good works depend on a gratuitous pact of God; or at least, if before God's promise they are to be called worthy of eternal life, they do not yet have strict justice equality with it; but only some congruence and suitability, and that eternal life is not to be retributed to them out of proper and strict justice; but out of God's faithfulness and the appropriateness of His goodness, which is broadly called justice: therefore, good works do not have the nature of strictly taken merit with respect to eternal life and do not merit it according to the entire rigor of justice: all these doctors, I say, agree with us in the substance of the matter, although they follow a mode of speaking which we rightly disapprove of.

LXV. They define *meritum de condigno* very differently from us. Whenever there is no agreement on the definition of what is denied here and affirmed there, the contention must be about the name, not the thing signified by the name. For, according to our view, two things are absolutely required for merit. One is that the work called meritorious, in itself and by its nature, is equal in value and price to the reward it is said to merit. The other is that the reward, because of this equality, is owed to the work by the rigor of justice, that is, by justice properly and strictly said. Therefore, when we deny that the good works of the faithful merit eternal life and glory *de condigno*, we mean to deny that those works are equal in value and price to eternal life in themselves, and therefore that eternal life and glory are owed to them by the rigor of justice, which is also denied by those we are now discussing. But they maintain that this is not at all necessary for our works to be considered to merit eternal life *de condigno*. For, in their view,

meritum de condigno can be found even where exact justice, properly and strictly said, does not apply, and where the work is not equal to the reward, nor has strict and absolute equality with it. But to establish true meritum de condigno, any promise made under any condition of work suffices, however much that work by itself is inferior in value and dignity to the reward, nor is the reward owed to it by any other justice than that which requires that, the condition being fulfilled, what was liberally promised under such a condition is given. Therefore, when they say that the good works of the regenerate merit eternal life de condigno, they do not mean to signify that there is an exact commensuration between good works and eternal life; but only a certain suitable proportionality, as the fruit is rightly said to be commensurate to the seed, as Bonaventure speaks. Nor is eternal life owed to those good works by a justice called common and improper, as it is just that God should fulfill His promise to give eternal life to good works; and it is fitting to the goodness and wisdom of God to generously reward the pious and holy works of His children, whom He has adopted in Christ, with such a magnificent reward. These two points the Reformed Theologians readily concede.

XXVI. Therefore, when the more moderate theologians of the Roman School assert that the good works of the regenerate truly and de condigno merit eternal life, they do not intend to affirm what Protestants so vehemently abhor, namely, that there is an equality of value between the good works of the faithful and eternal life, such as must exist between the price and the purchased item, and consequently, that eternal life is owed to them by the rigor of justice properly and strictly said: but only what the Reformed admit, namely, that there is a certain suitability and proportion between eternal life and the good works of the just, like that found between the seed and the fruit, between means and ends, between something begun and completed, and between the contest and the reward generously promised for it: and furthermore, with God's promise given, His faithfulness and truthfulness, and the appropriateness of His goodness, require that the reward of eternal life be rendered for the good works of the pious. And thus it seems that there is a mere verbal dispute between the two sides. Indeed, since they agree on the relation and connection that exists between eternal life and the good works of the pious, the question is whether that relation and connection can rightly and appropriately be called meritum de condigno? The Doctors of the Roman Church affirm this, while the Reformed deny it, thinking this mode of speaking to be abusive, dangerous, and very much alien to reason.

LXVII. However, as we have already said, many Doctors of the Roman Church, although they speak poorly and inappropriately on this point, nonetheless in reality acknowledge the truth of our doctrine, and therefore we have a real dispute only with some of the more rigid Doctors of the Roman School, as repeatedly testified by Davenant in "De Justitia Actuali" chapter 53. Where, after showing that Thomas Aquinas himself, by meritum, even de condigno, denotes nothing other than a work that, by God's ordinance, is fitting for a reward, without equality of value to the reward and without a debt of justice in God to retribute the reward. And Durandus explicitly denies that strict meritum de condigno can exist between man and God: and that the Doctor by a meritorious act understands nothing other than an act that can be ordered to a reward. He adds that Scotus, Gregory, Gabriel, Ockham, Alphonsus, and many others of better

repute among the Papists have professedly taught that the good works of the just done with the help of grace do not have intrinsic condignity to eternal life: but with respect to this remuneration, it entirely depends on God's gracious acceptance and promise, adding, "Therefore, with the Fathers, nor with these more recent Papists, will we have any dispute about the bare term of merit. (Although it is much better and safer to abstain from this term) but we will fight against the recent Papists, who defend merit in such a way that they affirm that because of these works which they call merits, God Himself is a debtor to men out of justice, and they establish a condignity or equality between these human merits and the reward of eternal life. The refutation of which error, as well as of others that can be noted in the Doctors of the Roman Church, we reserve for another dispute, as this one has already grown too long.

THEOLOGICAL THESES
ON
THE RELATION OF GOOD WORKS
TO
ETERNAL LIFE
In which are noted

PART THREE
and refuted the errors of the Doctors
of the Roman Church.

Thesis I

In the subsequent part of these theses, to the best of our ability, we have clearly explained the doctrine of the Roman School concerning the merit and value of good works with respect to eternal life and glory. We have briefly reviewed the various opinions of the Scholastics on this matter and inferred what remains controversial between the Roman and Reformed Schools. It remains for us to refute, in brief, the various errors that can be noted in the Doctors of the Roman School regarding this issue, whether concerning the matter itself or the manner of speaking.

II. The first and most serious error of those who teach that eternal life is owed to the good works of the just out of justice, even without any gratuitous covenant or liberal promise from God, is that they claim good works by their very nature merit eternal life, just as evil works by their very nature merit eternal death. This can be shown to be against all reason with various arguments.

III. First, whatever good a person can do is owed entirely to God in many ways, and no matter how perfectly one performs their duty, with respect to God, it only fulfills what is owed. No one, by giving another what is fully owed, can thereby obligate that person to provide a reward or recompense.

IV. Moreover, the dependence of humans on God is far greater than that of servants on their master or children on their father. Now, a servant, no matter what he does, has no right to demand a reward from his master because whatever the servant is or has belongs entirely to the master, and whatever he acquires, he acquires for the master. Similarly, a child, no matter what he does for his parent, in whose power he resides, cannot make the parent indebted to him, because no one can return an equivalent to a parent for the benefits received. How much less, then, can a human make God a debtor to them, given that God has far more right and power over us than a master over a servant and a father over a child, and we are obligated in many more ways than a child to a father and a servant to a master.

V. Even among equals, no one is obliged by law to remunerate another's labor and effort unless they have voluntarily obligated themselves by some agreement or are at least bound by some superior law. What then can obligate God to grant eternal life to humans before His free promise when He has no superior, nor can any law be imposed on Him by another?

VI. Additionally, according to the covenant made by God in the law with humans, eternal life and glory are not due to the good works of the faithful. For even those works, as acknowledged by the Doctors of the Roman Church themselves, do not achieve the full perfection that the law given to the first man demanded, which he could and should have truly performed in the state of original integrity to become a partaker of eternal life. Therefore, for God to be considered in any way to owe eternal life to the good works of the faithful, it is necessary that He has newly obligated Himself to this by a gracious and liberal promise.

VII. Furthermore, our good works proceed from the grace of God and are His free gifts. Therefore, can God be obliged to give another grace by already giving one grace? And who can conceive that by receiving a benefit from another, one thereby acquires a right to demand a new benefit from the same?

VIII. But we linger too long in refuting such a gross error, which we could have entirely omitted, given that it is commonly rejected in the Roman School today and has been explicitly condemned by the very Bulls of the Roman Pontiffs, where the following proposition is marked as erroneous: "Just as an evil work by its nature merits eternal death, so a good work by its nature merits eternal life." Also, this: "That those who live piously and justly in this mortal life until the end obtain eternal life, is not properly attributed to the grace of God but to the natural order established from the beginning of creation by the just judgment of God." As we have previously shown from Bellarmine.

IX. Nevertheless, errors very similar to this and scarcely less serious and contrary to piety and right reason still prevail in the Roman School. Although it is now generally acknowledged, as far as I know, that before God's covenant and promise, eternal life is not owed out of justice to the good works of the just, some of their Doctors, including Gabriel Vasquez the Jesuit, still insist that eternal life is due to good works, if not out of justice, then at least out of gratitude, as we have discussed in the previous disputation.

X. But in this, we first miss Vasquez's consistency. Although he affirms that the good works of the just before God's promise and without reference to it are meritorious of eternal life

out of condign merit and defines merit as a work to which a reward is owed out of gratitude, he nevertheless elsewhere admits, compelled by truth, that God could, if He wished, deny eternal life to one possessing justice and sanctity without any injustice or ingratitude since God is the author of all things and therefore is obligated to no one. How can these two statements coexist, namely that eternal life is owed to the good works of the faithful at least out of gratitude, and yet God can, without injustice or ingratitude, not grant eternal life to those good works?

XI. However, although Vasquez might wish to deny the latter, the truth of it is plainly evident from the Gospel. For in Luke 17, Christ teaches that the faithful are like servants to whom, even if they have diligently and faithfully performed their duty, the master not only owes no reward but is not even obliged to give thanks or hold them in gratitude. He says, "Which of you, having a servant plowing or tending sheep, will say to him when he has come in from the field, 'Come at once and sit down to eat'? But will he not rather say to him, 'Prepare something for my supper, and gird yourself and serve me till I have eaten and drunk, and afterward you will eat and drink'? Does he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I think not. So likewise you, when you have done all those things which you are commanded, say, 'We are unprofitable servants. We have done what was our duty to do.'" How far then should the faithful be from thinking that God owes them such a great reward as eternal life and glory out of gratitude for the works they have done according to His commandments? For can the eternal and infinite God owe more to wretched humans whom He created and redeemed than a master owes to a purchased servant, who is of the same nature as the master and not inferior in any respect before God?

XII. Moreover, nothing is owed out of gratitude except to those from whom some benefit has been received. But God receives nothing from His creature. Nor does anything we do confer any advantage on Him. Eliphaz says in Job 22, "Can a man be of benefit to God? Can even a wise man benefit Him? What pleasure would it give the Almighty if you were righteous? What would He gain if your ways were blameless?" Therefore, nothing can proceed from us that can make God a debtor to us out of gratitude, let alone a debtor of such great recompense.

XIII. Indeed, far from our works being considered a benefit to God, they should rather be counted among the greatest benefits received from God, for which we are highly indebted to Him and obligated to give thanks. For as many good works as we perform, so many are God's gifts and the effects of His pure grace. Therefore, can the same thing that must be acknowledged and celebrated as the greatest benefit from God also be our benefit to God, for which He is bound to thank and repay us?

XIV. The third error is of those who admit that nothing is owed to good works without the divine promise, but contend that once God's promise has been made, eternal life and glory are owed to them out of strict justice, as Suarez does. However, it is acknowledged by many of the most learned and renowned theologians of the Roman School and is not difficult to show from the very conditions required for such justice by those with whom we contend that strict justice, especially commutative justice, cannot apply between God and humans.

XV. Indeed, to omit other points, in order for any reward to be given out of the justice we are discussing, it is necessary, as they themselves admit, for a mutual exchange to occur, involving a reciprocal giving and receiving from both parties. However, God does not properly receive anything from us. For the good works we perform are more so given by God to us than we to Him. In all good actions, it is God who works in us both to will and to do. We indeed say that we offer our good works to God, but not as a price equal to the rewards expected from Him in the manner of an exchange; rather, they are offered as sacrifices of praise and as testimonies of a grateful heart. Moreover, not every act of giving and receiving constitutes an act of commutative justice between two persons; only those acts do, in which there is mutual damage and mutual benefit, or those through which something is added to the recipient and conversely something is subtracted from the giver. But it is evident that these conditions can in no way apply to God. For when He gives, He does not relinquish ownership of the given thing; when He receives, He does not gain any benefit from our possessions. Therefore, when God dispenses rewards, He does not exercise an act of commutative justice, since neither can He alienate anything from Himself by giving, nor can He acquire anything from us by receiving that was not already His or from which He could gain any benefit.

XVI. Furthermore, for a promised reward to be due to the work out of the strictness of law and to be repaid out of commutative justice, it is necessary that the work by its own nature be due to the promiser and such that the promiser cannot justly demand it without providing the reward. For one who renders what they already owe to another gives nothing to them but only returns what is theirs, and therefore cannot acquire any right over them through this act. Nor does a gratuitous promise made for an already owed work make the work any less owed, thus one who performs it should be considered to give something to the promiser rather than if they had performed the same work without the promise. Thus, one who promises something liberally for works already owed to them, as when a father promises something to his children or a master to his servants for their services, is indeed bound to fulfill what he has promised; but not out of strict justice, rather out of fidelity. And although a father who does not fulfill what he promised to his son, or a master to his servant, may be accused of unfaithfulness or inconsistency, the servant or son cannot justly demand it from the master or father as if they were withholding what was justly earned by the other's labor.

XVII. Moreover, the strictness of law and strict justice exclude all grace, as is well known; therefore, it is contradictory for eternal life to be owed to the faithful and the pious out of the strictness of law and at the same time be given out of grace and to have any nature of a gratuitous gift. But it is evident from Holy Scripture that eternal life is proposed to the faithful as a gratuitous gift and as grace to be expected from a merciful and kind God, where we are commanded to expect the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life. The Apostle Jude says, "Keep yourselves in the love of God, looking for the mercy of our Lord Jesus Christ unto eternal life." This truth is also acknowledged and proclaimed by the Council of Trent itself, teaching that eternal life should be proposed to those who do good works unto the end, not only as a reward faithfully rendered for their good works but also as grace mercifully promised to the

children of God through Jesus Christ; and that the just should hope for eternal retribution from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ. These are the words of that Council: "To those who do well to the end and trust in God, eternal life is to be proposed, both as a grace mercifully promised to the children of God through Jesus Christ and as a reward to be faithfully rendered according to the promise of God for their good works and merits." And in Canon 26: "If anyone says that the just should not expect and hope for eternal retribution from God for the good works done in God if they persevere to the end, let him be anathema." Here it is highly noteworthy, according to the words of the Council of Trent, that not only should it be attributed to God's mercy that sinners are made just, but also that eternal life is to be retributed to the just according to God's promise at the final judgment. Now who can grasp that eternal life is a retribution that the just should expect from God through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ, and such a reward that is also graciously promised; and yet that it is owed to the just out of strict justice and is repaid according to strictly and properly defined justice? And if God retributes eternal life to the just out of mercy, how can it also be out of strict justice, which is opposed to mercy and grace?

XVIII. It is also contradictory for someone to merit admission into the kingdom of heaven out of the strictness of law, and yet be excluded from the same kingdom out of the strictness of law. It is certain, however, from the very confession of the Doctors of the Roman Church, that humans, no matter how just, do not live in this mortal body without some light and daily sins, which, unless forgiven by divine mercy, exclude a person from the kingdom of heaven, into which nothing impure can enter. Hence, even the most holy need to say with the Prophet David, "Enter not into judgment with your servant, for no one living is righteous before you," and to pray daily as Christ commanded, "Forgive us our debts." How then can the same people demand eternal life from God as something owed to them by strict right if it is necessary for God to forgive even the pious and just their debts for them to be admitted into the heavenly kingdom? How can God be considered to owe them that kingdom out of strict justice?

XIX. However, even those Doctors of the Roman Church who admit that strict right has no place here, and that even with the divine promise, eternal life is not owed to the pious out of properly defined justice, are not free from all error in this part. Many of them nevertheless contend that even without the divine promise, the good works of the just are so worthy of eternal life that they are equal to it in value and have a value equivalent to it, not indeed by themselves and by their own nature and simply as actions conforming to God's law, but considering the principle by which they are performed, namely, because they are done through the indwelling Spirit and the grace of Jesus Christ, and by those whom God has adopted as children.

XX. But certainly, far from the services rendered to God by the faithful and the love with which they love God accruing value and worth before God from the fact that God has adopted them as children and made them heirs of His kingdom and by the continual help of His Spirit incites, moves, and impels them to these pious acts, if we suppose the same love and services to be offered by those whom God has not yet honored so highly and to whom He does not confer equal help, they would seem to have more worth and be more deserving of greater praise and

reward. For certainly, one who is provoked by lesser benefits yet still loves and serves as much merits more gratitude; and more praise is due to one who, aided by lesser helps, nevertheless performs no lesser works. Therefore, if good works are valued only by their intrinsic goodness and their conformity to God's will and law, they cannot gain value from the grace by which they are performed, nor from the dignity of the person by whom they are performed.

XXI. Nor can such worth be added to the good works of the just from the blood and merit of Christ, as the theologians of the Roman School imagine. For the blood of Christ has the power to cause the good works of the faithful, stained with it, to be accepted by God for eternal life; but this is not by adding some new value to these works and increasing their worth in themselves, but by ensuring that their deficiencies are forgiven by God and not rigorously examined in His judgment, and by moving and compelling God to promise and at the appropriate time bestow eternal glory and happiness, which far exceeds their worth, without thereby changing their internal worth and value.

XXII. Indeed, whatever the Doctors of the Roman Church may concoct here, they must admit that the good works of the faithful, even if done by the grace of Christ and the indwelling Spirit, do not yet achieve, due to the concupiscence still adhering to the faithful, the perfection required by the supreme law and which the law demanded from the first man and which, while he remained whole, was truly found in his works. How then can these works equate in worth to the utterly perfect and entirely supreme glory and happiness that God has graciously promised them and greater than which no integral man could hope for, when certainly God, being the best and most generous, would have rewarded his obedience above what was deserved and would not have proposed a reward less than his works deserved? Certainly, if the good works of the faithful are said to be of equal value to eternal life and glory, it must be that the works of an integral man, being undoubtedly more perfect, far exceeded that glory in worth and value, and therefore God promised him in His law a reward less than he deserved, for certainly nothing greater than celestial and immortal life was promised for the obedience of an integral man.

XXIII. Regarding those Doctors of the Roman School who teach that the good works of the just, even with the divine promise, do not merit eternal life out of strict justice; nor do those works, before God's promise and covenant, in any way, regardless of how they are considered, deserve celestial glory and be equal in value to it; hence, the good works of the faithful are indeed meritorious of eternal life and glory from condign merit, but only by reason of the covenant, not by the nature of the works themselves; as far as these Doctors are concerned, it is clear from our previous discussion that they agree in essence with the theologians of the Reformed Church, differing only in words and manner of speaking.

XXIV. Nevertheless, we rightly complain about those Doctors who, although agreeing in essence with the doctrine, grossly misuse words, calling that condign merit which in no way deserves that name if we wish to follow the proper and ordinary use of vocabulary. For how can a work that by itself is not worthy of such a reward, but to which the reward has been liberally promised beyond its own worth, be said to merit eternal life condignly? Certainly, the promise can oblige the promiser to grant what was promised under any condition of the work; but the

work thereby does not become worthy of the reward or merit, which far surpasses its value. Just as the daily labor of a vineyard worker, which is sufficiently compensated by a single denarius, does not acquire new value and worth even if one hundred gold coins are liberally promised; nor therefore is it equal to such a reward, and if we wish to speak correctly, it is not condign.

XXV. Moreover, such language is not only abusive but also very dangerous: it sounds inherently proud, flatters human presumption, and provides an occasion for gravely erring in reality by attributing too much to our works and in some measure diminishing the glory of divine mercy. Those with whom we are in contention cannot deny that this has occurred in the Roman School, as they also condemn the excess of those from their own ranks who explain condign merit in such a way that they teach that people merit eternal life out of strict justice and pay an equivalent price for it.

XXVI. If a subsequent divine promise could make a work that by itself is not worthy of the promised reward, nor equal in value and dignity to it, be said to merit it condignly, then acts of faith and repentance, to which justifying grace and the remission of sins are often promised in the Word of God, could be said to merit these things condignly. Yet the Council of Trent itself declares that we are said to be justified freely in Scripture because nothing that precedes justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification. And it is a constant teaching of the Roman School that the remission of sins is a completely gratuitous gift and does not fall under condign merit. (Session 6, Chapter 8).

XXVII. The adversaries respond that the promise of grace made to a sinner, on the condition that he believes and repents, is not properly called a promise or covenant but only an assertion of a certain future event so that the person may be assured of obtaining the benefit if he performs the required work. But I reply, with Davenant, that this is to play with words and not to satisfy the argument. For no divine promise is other than an assertion about some benefit to be conferred upon a person, either absolutely or with the condition of some work to be performed by the person. Therefore, from the standpoint of the promise, no distinction is found when God promises the remission of sins to the penitent and when He promises the kingdom of heaven to those who live piously. In both cases, God declares and sets forth His definite will and stable ordinance regarding the rewarding of such work with the bestowal of such a benefit. Therefore, since the divine promise, as admitted by those with whom we contend, does not make the act of repentance condignly meritorious for the remission of sins, neither can the divine promise make the act of living piously condignly meritorious for glorification, assuming, as they acknowledge, that by itself it is not worthy of it.

XXVIII. Moreover, the same Council of Trent proves that nothing which precedes justification merits the grace of justification by the fact that it is contradictory for something to be grace, or a free gift, and yet be from works, that is, from the merit of works. "Nothing that precedes justification, whether faith or works, merits the grace of justification; for if it is grace, it is no longer from works; otherwise, as the Apostle says, grace is no longer grace." From this, it follows that the faithful cannot properly and condignly merit eternal life, since it is also grace, as taught by Sacred Scripture and acknowledged by all. Thus, it is surprising how the same Council

could define in Chapter 16 of the same Session 6 that the faithful truly merit eternal life by those works done in God, while also teaching that eternal life should be proposed to those who do good works to the end and hope in God as a grace mercifully promised to the children of God through Jesus Christ. And in Canon 26, it states that the just should hope for eternal retribution from God for the good works done in God, through His mercy and the merit of Jesus Christ. For if it follows from the fact that the remission of sins is grace and is called such in Scripture that it is freely given to us and without our own merits, because it is contradictory, according to the Apostle, for something to be grace and yet from the merit of works, why does it not also follow, by the same reasoning, that since eternal life is the gift and grace of God, it too does not fall under merit but is freely conferred by God?

THEOLOGICAL THESES:
ON THE NECESSITY OF GRACE In the State of Fallen Nature with respect to Salvific
Good, and what pertains to true piety towards God.

PART ONE: In which the Doctrine of the Roman School is explained.

Thesis I

In the Roman School, three types of good are usually distinguished. The first is Natural Good, the second is Moral Good, and the third is Supernatural Good. Natural good pertains to the knowledge of those things which can be demonstrated and investigated by the natural light of reason, such as those things taught in human and philosophical sciences and arts. It also includes actions which are naturally or civilly good; such as eating, drinking, walking, cultivating fields, building houses, marrying, holding public office, and the like.

II. Moral good consists in the knowledge and practice of those things which the natural law prescribes and in which there is some element of virtue and honesty. Supernatural good, however, is called everything that pertains to and leads directly to eternal happiness and salvation. Hence, this good is called salvific and beatific good, or good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life. And to eternal life are directly conducive and refer all those things, and only those, in which true piety and religion towards God consist, and which are a part of it, or a beginning thereof; and which, therefore, are deserving of grace or glory before God. Such are both faith itself and the many works proceeding from faith, such as loving God, praying, repenting, hoping, trusting, and the like. Hence, this good is sometimes also called good pertaining to piety.

III. With regard to civil or natural good, the Roman School agrees that the grace of Christ is not necessary for it; and yet no work, however good, can be done by man without the assistance and cooperation of God, at least in a general way, which is necessarily required for all actions and effects of secondary causes. For indeed, God is the universal cause, who works all in all. Nor can there be any good in the creature which does not flow from the first source of goodness, that is, from God. Whence it is that thanks are to be given to God for any good of ours without exception.

IV. What the Roman School teaches about the necessity of grace concerning that good which it calls moral and distinguishes from supernatural has been fully explained by us in the preceding theses, and there is no need to repeat anything here. Now, therefore, it remains to be seen how great the necessity of the grace of Christ is in fallen man concerning supernatural good, that is, what pertains to piety and eternal salvation, according to the opinion of the Doctors of the Roman Church.

V. Today, at least, the common opinion of them is that in this kind of good, fallen man can do nothing at all without the grace of Christ. Ettius says, "The good which a fallen man can neither have nor do without the grace of Christ is everything and only that which leads to eternal salvation, and of such good is to be understood that, 'Without me you can do nothing,' John 15."

Here good is sometimes called salvific good, sometimes good pertaining to piety, sometimes beatific good, as in Augustine, sometimes good pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, as in the Council of Orange. And shortly after he adds, "It is clear that not only the works that merit eternal life, such as the works of the justified, but also those that, though not yet meritorious, still somehow lead to and promote eternal salvation, must be attributed to the grace of Christ." In the second book of Sentences, distinction 26, paragraph 15, whose heading is, "That good cannot be done by man without the grace of Christ."

VI. Similarly, Bellarmine affirms and proves with many arguments that no work of piety can be begun or perfected without the special grace of God. And the same is true, "The human will can will nothing in those things which pertain to piety and salvation without the help of the grace of God." In the second and fourth chapters of the sixth book on Grace and Free Will. And the same also applies to what is read in Puteanus, "An act which by itself leads to the attainment of eternal happiness cannot be done by man without the special help of God; for it requires that everything that helps to obtain it be of the supernatural order, just as this is simply of the supernatural order." In the first part of the second, question 109, article 3, doubt 2. To which Peter of Saint Joseph in the Idea of Speculative Theology concurs. "It is certain," he says, "from faith that man can do nothing without grace that truly leads to his salvation." Book 4, on Grace, chapter 5.

VII. Louis Molina himself expressly contends that free will with the general concurrence of God can do nothing that leads to a supernatural end. And this is his conclusion: "Our free will with the general concurrence of God can do nothing, not only that merits eternal life or increases grace, but also that, as transcending the order of a natural end, is somehow commensurate with a supernatural end, even as a remote disposition to grace, both on the part of the will and the intellect: but for all this it needs supernatural assistance and help, either by the immediate influence of God or by a supernatural habit bestowed for this purpose." Therefore, since after the sin of our first parents God has determined to confer nothing of those things which are of the supernatural order and peculiarly ordered to a supernatural end upon men except through the merits of Christ, Christ was necessary for us as Redeemer, that all these things might be conferred upon us, and we might be able to merit eternal happiness before God. On the concord of Free Will with the gifts of Grace: sixth disputation on the thirteenth article of the fourteenth question.

VIII. And indeed the matter is defined by Councils accepted in the Roman Church. This pertains to that from the Council of Orange, celebrated against the remnants of the Pelagians, "If anyone asserts that by the strength of nature he can think as he ought, or choose anything good pertaining to eternal life, that is, consent to the salvation-preaching of the Gospel, without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all the sweetness in consenting and believing the truth, he is deceived by a heretical spirit." And also that canon of the Council of Trent, which is the third of the sixth session, "If anyone says that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His help, man can believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him, let him be anathema."

IX. Moreover, according to the doctrine of the Roman Church, works that lead to salvation either merit eternal life and the increase of justifying grace, or are not indeed meritorious of eternal life, but still serve to obtain justification and prepare and dispose man for it. For works of the former kind, the Roman School teaches that habitual grace is necessary, by which man is spiritually renewed and regenerated; but for the latter, it considers actual grace sufficient, which consists in a special help of God.

X. But in order for man to be moved both to faith and to other works of piety, the theologians of the Roman Schools do not think that any external aids provided by the mercy of God, however many they may be supposed to be, are sufficient, but they further assert that an internal efficacy of the Holy Spirit is required by which He works in the souls of men. Thus, for example, in order for the mysteries of faith to be believed as they ought to be, it is not sufficient, according to them, that they have been divinely revealed, and that this revelation, either in writing or orally, is proposed to us and besides that, suitable arguments are provided to persuade us that those things which are proposed as divinely revealed are indeed revealed by God; but further, a special help is required, by which the mind is internally affected and moved: while, namely, the mind is internally illuminated by the Spirit, and the will is inclined to captivate and submit the mind to God.

XI. This can be seen in Bellarmine, chapter 1, book 6, on Grace and Free Will. Where, having proposed the question, whether one who hears a preacher, or reads the doctrine revealed by God for himself, and has a suitable persuasion by miracles or another testimony by which the matter to be believed is made credible; can believe that matter without special divine illumination: he rejects the affirmative part as Pelagian and defends the negative part. This is in agreement with what Peter of Saint Joseph teaches in the fifth chapter of the fourth book on Grace, already cited, where this is his first resolution: Man cannot believe the mysteries of faith as he ought for salvation without the help of grace, even after they have been sufficiently proposed and it has been proven that they are revealed by God.

XII. To this agrees the already cited Molina: according to whose opinion, for the act of believing, such as is required for justification, the particular help of prevenient and exciting grace is necessary, not only on the part of the intellect but also on the part of the will. For when matters pertaining to faith are proposed to an adult according to his capacity, so that he may give such assent as is necessary for salvation, it is necessary that at least a supernatural illumination precedes in the intellect, and similarly a supernatural motion or affection to give assent on the part of the will; these two are called the internal vocation of God, and by means of these, God is said to draw believers to faith. Then follows the free command of the will, by which the adult commands the intellect to assent; and finally assent is given, which is called faith. In the cited book of concord, to question 14, article 13, disputation 8.

XIII. Similarly, for eliciting in a sinner acts of hope, fear, love, sorrow for sin, the intention of a new life, trust in God, and other similar acts by which he turns to God, the theologians of the Roman Schools consider the grace of internal inspiration necessary, by which God immediately acts on the will and supplies new strength to elicit such acts as are suitable for

salvation, as we have shown more fully elsewhere in the theses on the distinction of Grace into sufficient and efficacious.

XIV. But although the Doctors of the Roman Schools generally agree on these matters, and none of them openly teaches that something can be done without the grace of Christ which leads to eternal salvation, many of them nevertheless affirm many things indiscriminately which seem at least indirectly to overturn that doctrine and cannot be reconciled with it. First of all, among them it is questioned whether the supernatural precepts of God concerning the internal acts of faith, hope, love, and contrition can be kept as to the substance of the acts without the help of the grace of Christ. And there are those who do not hesitate to openly affirm this, namely, that without the grace of Christ, a fallen and corrupt man can elicit acts of faith, hope, contrition, and love as commanded in the Gospel, at least as to their substance, and thus satisfy the divine precept concerning them so that he does not sin against it.

XV. This is manifestly the doctrine of the renowned Jesuit Louis Molina. For he teaches that the acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting, which are necessary for the justification of an adult infidel, can be elicited as to their substance by a fallen man through the sole powers of free will with the general concurrence of God. In this case, those acts, according to him, are merely natural and not sufficient for justification and salvation. For this, acts of the same kind but supernatural, and which proceed not only from free will but also from a certain supernatural principle, namely grace, are required. Hence he thinks that they differ in species from the former, although they are exactly the same in substance. However, although such acts, produced by the sole powers of free will, cannot justify and save a man, according to his doctrine it follows that by them he can avoid the sin that would otherwise be committed against the supernatural precepts of God, by which we are commanded to believe, hope, love, and repent.

XVI. And first indeed, as regards the act of believing, he admits that the human mind cannot investigate and comprehend the mysteries of faith by itself unless they have been divinely revealed, and this revelation has been suitably proposed to man. But once those things that are to be believed have been proposed and explained, and the arguments usually brought forward to persuade men that they have been revealed by God and commanded to be believed have been applied; and finally an external vocation to faith by preachers and other ministers of the Church has occurred, he asserts that it is within the faculty of free will with the sole general concurrence of God to assent to the matters proposed as divinely revealed by an act which is merely natural and which on the part of the intellect is not sufficient for justification: and thus internal illumination of the mind, internal vocation, and attraction by supernatural help are indeed necessary to assent to those matters concerning faith by a supernatural act, such as is required on the part of the intellect for justification, but not to provide assent to them by a merely natural act. To question 14, article 3, disputation 7.

XVII. Moreover, that supernatural help, according to his view, is not necessary for the intellect to assent easily to matters of faith, against the hardness of the intellect, and precisely, against the errors of the intellect, as Durandus thought: nor indeed for the certainty and firmness of the act of assent on the part of the believer, as Soto wished. For a heretic can assent more

firmly in that way to the articles of faith than many of the faithful assent by infused faith. But that kind of help is constituted because for eliciting those acts so that they may be accommodated supernaturally and necessary for salvation, it is required that they be elicited either by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit or by the concurrence of a supernatural habit. At the end of the eighth Disputation, to the same Article.

XVIII. Therefore, according to the doctrine of this man, by the sole powers of free will and without any particular help from God, someone can assent to all supernatural mysteries as divinely revealed and because they are revealed by God, by a certain and firm assent on the part of the believer, and to which no falsehood can attach on the part of the object. And yet he who believes in this way does not believe as he ought for salvation and justification; for his assent is merely natural, not supernatural; although perhaps firmer and more certain on the part of the subject and no less infallible on the part of the object than is the assent of many from a supernatural principle, and therefore sufficient for justification.

XIX. And although such assent, according to the opinion of this Doctor, is not suitable for justifying and saving a man, yet it is sufficient for him to avoid the sin of unbelief and not to transgress the command by which we are ordered to believe the things that God has revealed to us in His word. For he affirms that those who heard Christ and saw His miracles could have avoided the sin of unbelief with the general concurrence of God by assenting to the doctrine of Christ, which was made remarkably credible by so many miracles. And from the fact that those who, having heard the teachings of faith and the reasons usually brought forward to persuade that they have been revealed by God, did not assent, are not excused from mortal sin; he concludes that it is within the faculty of free will with the sole general concurrence, by a merely natural act, to provide assent to those things. Disputation 7, already cited.

XX. Later he affirms the same thing about hope that he previously taught about faith, namely, that a man can elicit an act of hope as to its substance with the sole general concurrence of God. For, he says, everyone will easily concede that, with the assent preexisting in the intellect, by which we assent to the revealed things, it is within the faculty of free will with the sole general concurrence of God to elicit an act, not indeed supernatural, and such as is necessary for salvation, but merely natural of hoping from God for the things revealed and promised to us by Him, and thus which is called hope, not indeed Christian, but as to the substance of the act. For in that act there is no more difficulty than in the act of assenting to revealed things, indeed much less. Disputation 13, to the same Article 13.

XXI. However, that hope which he does not call Christian according to his hypothesis differs from Christian hope only because it is from the sole free will, while the latter is also from a certain supernatural help of God, by which God influences it, otherwise, both are the same in substance. Nevertheless, this difference seems sufficient to him that the latter differs in species from the former. As we have already indicated above. And as he himself teaches more extensively in Disputation 38. For, he says, we must indeed resort to the influx and causality of God, by which our acts are elevated to a supernatural being, and therefore are of a different species from the natural being of the acts which would be elicited by us around the same objects,

not less in the acts of faith, hope, and charity, that their specific distinction and commensuration of some of them to a supernatural end and not others may be explained.

XXII. In the same way, Molina philosophizes about attrition and contrition; the former being the sorrow for sin conceived because of the evils it brings upon us, with the intention of avoiding sin in the future; the latter being the detestation of the same sin arising from the consideration of God's goodness and benefits, with a similar intention of abstaining from sin in the future. Molina asserts that both can be elicited by a sinner through the sole powers of free will with the general concurrence of God. Indeed, he confirms this with several arguments, saying that this is the opinion of many Scholastics, namely, that our free will with the sole general concurrence of God can elicit not only a natural attrition, that is, sorrow for sin out of fear of God, with the intention of no longer committing mortal sin, but also a natural contrition, which includes the same intention of no longer committing mortal sin. Disputation 14, to Article 13, Question 14.

XXIII. The main reason that seems to support this opinion is that, given the greatest light of faith by which we recognize God as our Creator and the innumerable and greatest benefits, both of nature and grace, that He has bestowed upon us, even to the shedding of His own blood on the cross, by which we also know that eternal happiness is promised to the just, and eternal fire and extreme misery to the impious; and that mortal sin is such an extreme evil, and so greatly offends the divine majesty, that even one such sin is enough that if one who has committed it does not grieve for it and resolve to commit nothing similar in the future, he will lose supreme happiness and fall into extreme misery. Without a doubt, this thought is so powerful to excite and move the will that the free will of one who persuades himself of these things and considers the matter attentively, either by his own insight or by another's suggestion and exhortation, can elicit with the sole general concurrence of God, in view of the extreme evils into which he would otherwise fall, sorrow or detestation of his sins, with the intention of avoiding all mortal sins in the future, in which consists attrition as to the substance of the act; and in view of the goodness and benefits of God, a similar detestation and intention, in which the essence of contrition as to the substance of the act is placed. At the end of the first part of the already mentioned Disputation.

XXIV. However, he adds that such attrition and contrition are insufficient for salvation because they are not excited and brought about by the peculiar impulse of the Holy Spirit. And later in the fourth part, he says that the absolute intention not to sin, which he has just described and which he judges sufficient for attrition and contrition, is beyond the entire scope of the order of grace and therefore contributes nothing to a supernatural end and is a merely natural act proper to free will; which natural light and moral and natural philosophy teach should not be denied to the natural powers of free will, with God cooperating solely as a universal cause, through general concurrence, in the manner in which He cooperates with other secondary causes.

XXV. Therefore, for such acts to contribute to a man's justification and for someone to be contrite as he ought for salvation, according to his hypotheses, it is necessary that a certain influx from God by supernatural help is added, by the power of which that act, with its substance unchanged, becomes supernatural and of a different species than it would be without that help.

XXVI. Moreover, since all true contrition arises from the love of God, by which God is sincerely and above all loved, and not only as the author of nature but also as the author of grace; if someone, by the powers of nature, without the help of grace, can elicit an act of contrition as to its substance, it follows that he can, in the same way, elicit an act of love for God above all, and indeed not only as the author of nature but also as the author of grace. Hence, Molina, insisting on his principles, also teaches that in fallen nature, man, by the sole powers of nature, with the general concurrence of God, can elicit an absolute act of love for God above all, with the absolute intention of pleasing Him in everything; which act, as to the substance of the act, will be such as is required for contrition and the justification of a sinner, and yet will by no means suffice for justification because it will be natural, not supernatural. For he does not think it leads to salvation and justification if someone loves God above all and sincerely resolves to please Him in everything as much as he can, and grieves for having offended God, with the hope of obtaining forgiveness from Him, unless some supernatural help from God influences all these things and makes them supernatural so that they can be commensurate with the supernatural end of eternal happiness. And in this sense, he explains the Canon of Trent, which defines that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His help, man cannot believe, hope, love, or repent as he ought, so that the grace of justification may be conferred upon him. As if these things could indeed be done by man without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but the acts of faith, hope, love, and repentance would remain useless for justification unless they were made by the help of the Holy Spirit. Thus, loving God as one ought is not simply loving Him above all, but loving Him from the inspiration of the Spirit, and so with the rest.

XXVII. To clarify his opinion, he distinguishes three quasi-degrees in the love of God above all. The first is a certain weak and imperfect motion of the will, which in the Schools is called "velleity," whereby someone would wish and desire to please God in everything and above all and to keep all His commandments, from some affection of love towards God; but, overcome by his own concupiscence, he does not will it simply and absolutely, and prefers to indulge in carnal affections.

XXVIII. The second degree is where someone so loves God that he determines with a fixed will, and seriously and absolutely proposes to himself, to please God in everything and to keep all His commandments: although it may happen later that, with a change of will, he does not keep God's commandments and does not fulfill what he had previously proposed. Finally, the third degree is where someone so loves God that not only does he determine absolutely to please Him in everything and to obey His commandments, but also perseveres in that will and intention, so that he actually obeys God's commandments and leads a life pleasing to God. This third degree he calls the absolute and efficacious love of God above all, while the second he calls the absolute but inefficacious love of God above all.

XXIX. Moreover, according to his view, the second degree of love does not differ from the third in the nature of the act of love itself considered in itself. For in both, the love of God can be equally intense; indeed, perhaps more intense in the second than in the third, but the whole difference between them depends on the actual observation of God's commandments

which follows or does not follow, as man, according to his innate freedom, remains constant in his intention or not. From this intention, one who has loved God more intensely can fall away, while another who has loved less intensely may persevere in his intention.

XXX. Furthermore, for contrition and the justification of man before God, he considers the second degree sufficient, where someone absolutely loves God above all, but with inefficacious love, that is, followed by transgression of God's commandments. He proves this by the example of Adam, who, before his first sin, was just and pleasing to God and absolutely loved God above all, but whose love was shown to be inefficacious by his subsequent fall. And also by the example of adults, who in the state of fallen nature are justified with an act of contrition, and thus for that time love God absolutely above all with absolute love; and later fall into mortal sin, not fulfilling what they had resolved to do by the effect of supernatural love at the time of justification. For their love, which was sufficient for their justification, is rendered inefficacious by that subsequent event.

XXXI. Now, he admits that no one can love God above all with not only absolute but also efficacious love without the help of grace. For no one can persevere in received righteousness and obedience to God without the additional help of God, as defined by the Council of Trent itself. But what he asserts is that a fallen man, by his own powers and without any special help from God, can as to the substance of the act attain that degree of love whereby God is loved above all absolutely, and with the true and serious intention of pleasing Him in everything, even if that intention cannot later be fulfilled in actually observing all God's commandments without some particular help from God. Such love, though inefficacious, is sufficient for the justification of man. As can be seen from that Doctor's often-cited Disputation 14, to article 13, question 13, sections three and four.

XXXII. Furthermore, Molina confirms his opinion by the authority of several Scholastics and cites for himself Scotus, Gabriel Biel, Ockham, and many others, among the more recent, Cajetan and Soto, whom he claims to teach that a man existing in mortal sin can, by his natural powers, elicit any act as to the substance of the act which one constituted in grace can elicit. However, many others in the Roman School hold the opposite. Among whom Peter of Saint Joseph first offers himself, whose resolution is this: A man cannot keep any affirmative supernatural precept concerning an internal act as to its substance without the help of grace. And he adds the reason, because such precepts are about acts of faith, hope, and charity, which acts, however considered, as to substance are supernatural, and therefore surpass the powers of nature. In the Idea of Speculative Theology, book four, which is about Grace, chapter 5, resolution 4.

XXXIII. But especially Diego Álvarez refutes Molina expressly; and sets conclusions plainly opposed to his conclusions, in the sixth book on the Aids of Divine Grace. First, he admits indeed that someone can assent to the mysteries revealed in the word of God by the powers of nature, but with only a fallible and opinionative human assent, which relies on some human reason or authority; not with a firm and infallible assent on the part of the believer, whose formal reason is divine revelation; which alone deserves the name of faith, not the former. For in the forty-ninth disputation, this is his third conclusion: Man can, by the sole powers of nature,

assent to the supernatural mysteries proposed to him with a certain opinionative and fallible assent, as far as the part of the believer is concerned, not indeed as revealed by God, so that divine revelation or the first truth revealing is the formal reason for assenting, but for some other motive or human reason. His fourth conclusion is as follows: Man cannot by a merely natural act, with the sole general concurrence of God, assent to all the supernatural mysteries of faith as revealed by God, with a certain and firm assent, or infallible on the part of the believer, but to elicit such an act a special help of prevenient grace is necessarily required.

XXXIV. However, in the fifty-second disputation, he denies that either contrition or attrition, as described above by us, can be had by the powers of nature without grace, even as to the substance of the acts. For this is his first conclusion there: Our free will, with the sole general concurrence of God, cannot elicit any attrition, that is, sorrow for all sins out of fear of God, with the absolute intention of no longer committing mortal sin, with the hope of pardon; but for such attrition, a special help of grace is simply necessary. And he adds that special help is required, not only by reason of faith in the punishments of hell, nor only by reason of the hope of pardon included in the said sorrow, but also by reason of the same sorrow with the absolute intention of no longer committing mortal sin. His second conclusion is: Much less can free will without the help of grace elicit an act of contrition, that is, sorrow for sins out of love for God supremely loved, with the absolute intention of no longer committing mortal sin.

XXXV. Finally, in the fifty-first disputation, he denies that a man in the state of fallen nature can, without the special help of grace, love God above all with absolute love and with the intention of pleasing Him in everything. Whether God is considered as the author of nature and to be loved according to the law of nature, or as the supernatural end and to be loved as He offers Himself in the Gospel. For this is his second conclusion: A man in the state of fallen nature, especially if he exists in mortal sin, cannot, without the special help of prevenient grace, love God above all with absolute natural love, nor have the absolute intention of pleasing Him in everything. Here he calls natural love that by which God is loved as He reveals Himself in nature. His third conclusion is: A man in the state of fallen nature cannot love God above all as the supernatural end by the sole powers of nature, even if we are talking about an act of love as to its substance, and of a faithful man.

XXXVI. He admits, however, that in the state of fallen nature, man can have a certain imperfect and conditional act of love for God above all without the help of grace, which is not a full will but only a certain velleity of pleasing God in everything. Indeed, this is his first conclusion in the aforementioned disputation: A man in the state of fallen nature, existing in mortal sin, can, without the special help of grace, have a conditional act of love for God above all, or a certain velleity expressed in these words: I would wish to love God above all and to please Him in everything. And he gives the reason that such love is not true love of God above all, nor does it turn man away from mortal sin, nor does it convert him to God as to his ultimate end. Hence he concludes that it can be had by the powers of nature.

XXXVII. Eustachius teaches the same thing as Álvarez on this matter. For in writing on the second Sentences, to distinction twenty-six, paragraph 38, he puts forth this proposition,

which is the last of that section: A fallen man cannot, by the sole powers of nature, love God above all, neither as his beatific good nor even as the author of nature, not even for a moment. But the preceding proposition, which is the sixth, states: A fallen man can love God above all in some way of love by the sole powers of nature. To which he adds that such love is not worthy of the name of true love, nor is it simply love of God above all, but only in a certain respect, nor can it in any way be called love with all the heart. However, it is usually called inefficacious love because it proceeds from an inefficacious will, because man loves God in such a way that he does not thereby resolve to obey His commandments. For, he says, a man then loves God with efficacious will when he deliberately resolves to prefer God and His worship to all other goods, so that he does not wish to offend Him for other goods that he loves. And this is simply and properly the love of God above all.

XXXVIII. Therefore, Eustachius and Molina take the distinction of the efficacious and inefficacious love of God differently. Eustachius and Diego Álvarez consider efficacious love to be that which is joined with the absolute and determined intention of pleasing God in everything and keeping His commandments, and therefore which includes the observation of God's commandments as to the preparation of the soul, although perhaps it does not follow in act because man fails from that good intention, as happened with Adam. But according to Molina, there is no other efficacious love of God except that which is actually followed by the fulfillment of God's commandments, however serious and absolute the intention of obeying God may be supposed to have been, which is later changed according to the native inconstancy of human will. And again, Diego Álvarez and Eustachius consider inefficacious only that love by which man would wish to please God in everything if carnal affections allowed, but absolutely does not will it. According to Molina, however, even that love by which man truly and absolutely resolves to render obedience to God in everything can be inefficacious if it later happens that he denies the obedience due to God by changing his intention.

XXXIX. Moreover, Eustachius denies that such inefficacious love pertains to true piety and should be counted among its works; because it does not prefer God to all things, not even in a certain desire and beginning, as does that imperfect love of God by which the grace of God prepares and disposes men for justification.

XL. Bellarmine, however, simply denies that God can be loved by man without the help of grace, not only above all but even with that imperfect love by which someone is indeed affected toward God, but does not yet prefer Him to other things. We believe, he says, that God cannot be loved without His own help, neither as the author of nature, nor as the bestower of grace and glory, neither perfectly nor imperfectly in any way: And we do not doubt that this is the opinion of Saint Augustine, indeed even of the Scriptures and Councils, whatever others may have less considerately written on this matter. Book 6 on Grace and Free Will, chapter 7.

XLI. Similarly, Vásquez generally affirms that it is more probable that God cannot be loved without the help of grace. Universally, he says, I assert that no love towards God can exist by the sole powers of nature, but must necessarily arise from some help of grace, and by the help of grace, I do not mean that which is of a supernatural order for an action that is by its nature

supernatural; but the help of grace, whether it be supernatural in substance or of the natural order, according to the nature and quality of love, which nevertheless is communicated to us through the merits of Christ. He signifies, however, that he is speaking of the love of friendship towards God, not of another, that is, of the love which the Schools call of concupiscence. But we love God with the love of friendship when we will some good for God or rejoice in His good because it is His good, out of complacency with Him, and not out of complacency with ourselves. As he himself explains, Volume 2 on the first part of the second, disputation 194, chapters 1 and 4.

XLII. Especially Jansenius teaches that all true, chaste, sincere love of God, in whatever state of man, and therefore much more in the state of corrupted nature, must be attributed to the grace of God, not to the sole powers of free will. For he also distinguishes a twofold love of God: One by which God is loved freely and for His own sake; the other by which someone does not love God for His own sake but for some other thing which he hopes for and desires to obtain from Him. He calls the former that chaste and gratuitous love and holds it alone as true love of God. For the latter is not properly love of God but of that thing which someone desires to obtain through God. Therefore, the former alone is praiseworthy and leads to salvation, and for that reason, it is owed to the help of divine grace; the latter, however, is vicious and sinful and arises not from the grace of God but from the man's depraved desire.

XLIII. For if, he says, God is loved for the sake of something else, it is not true and chaste love of God, but of that thing which someone desires to obtain through God. For, as Augustine says best, Those who seek God for earthly benefits do not seek God but those benefits, because in this way God is worshipped with servile fear, not with liberal love. Such worship and love can be and often is had by wicked men, as it proceeds from a badly loved creature's desire. For both the envious and the avaricious, and heretics, and whatever else opposes sound doctrine, worship, praise, and love God, and give thanks to Him, the more earnestly as He can more invincibly fulfill their desires. To which he adds that he is not dealing with such falsely called love of God, but with that by which God is loved for His own sake, or which is the same, by which God Himself, not anything else, is loved, so that the heart is not turned downward but is upright with God. And he asserts that such chaste love of God and upright heart with God, which alone is true love of God, and not of another thing, can by no means be had without true and great and properly called grace of God, as the indubitable doctrine of Augustine. On the State of Pure Nature, book 1, chapter 11.

XLIV. Moreover, just as Bellarmine and Vásquez consider that the love of God commanded in His word cannot in any way be had without the grace of Christ, they also state the same about that divine faith by which we are commanded to receive the mysteries revealed by God; that its act, even considered only as to its substance, cannot be elicited by anyone without the special help of God. For this clearly follows from what Vásquez teaches, and what he affirms to have been established by the common consensus of theologians of his time, namely, that the assent of believing the divine, as required by Christian faith, is of a supernatural order, not only on the part of the efficient cause but also in itself; and not only in some manner but also in

substance. Hence, he concludes that there are different kinds of assent in substance, one of human faith, by which we believe the articles of faith based on human testimony, which is natural in its substance; and another of divine faith, by which we believe the same articles based on divine testimony, which is supernatural in its substance. For which he teaches that an actual or habitual light of a higher order than natural light is necessary. That natural light, however, is sufficient for us to assent to supernatural things and mysteries based on human testimony. In the first part of the second, volume 2, disputation 187, chapter 2.

XLV. Bellarmine, however, in the act of divine and Catholic faith by which we receive some mystery of faith, requires three conditions: one, that it be certainly believed, on the part of the object, that is, as divinely revealed, and that it can in no way be false; another, that it be firmly believed on the part of the subject, that is, that a man should have no doubts and would rather die than not believe an article of faith; third, that it be believed with pious affection, that is, with a certain pious inclination toward God, because a man begins to bow his neck to God and submit himself to the obedience of faith, even in matters that surpass human reason. And he denies that such an act of faith can ever be produced by man without the special help of God. Book 6 on Grace and Free Will, chapter 3.

XLVI. Moreover, those who oppose the doctrine held by the Roman School as an article of faith, namely, that nothing conduces to salvation and true piety towards God without the grace of Christ, are not only those who assert that supernatural precepts concerning internal acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition can be kept by a fallen man as to the substance of the acts without any special help from God; but also those who teach that at least the precepts of natural law can also be fulfilled as to the substance of the acts by the sole residual powers in corrupted nature. As we have shown that many Scholastics have felt in the preceding theses.

XLVII. For keeping the precepts of natural law summed up in the Decalogue, so as to satisfy each precept and avoid sin, is a matter that greatly conduces to eternal life and salvation, since this is the way by which one arrives at eternal life. For when the young man asked, "Good Master, what good shall I do to have eternal life?" Jesus our Lord responds in Matthew, "If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments," namely those which He later enumerates: "You shall not kill, you shall not commit adultery, you shall not steal, you shall not bear false witness; honor your father and your mother, and you shall love your neighbor as yourself." All these pertain to natural law. And since among the precepts of natural law the chief one is, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind," it is plainly absurd to say that someone can love God in this way and yet do nothing conducive to salvation and true piety towards God. For what piety is there towards God if it is not to love Him with all one's heart? Matthew 19.

XLVIII. Nor does it make any difference that Durandus observes, with many other Scholastics: In divine precepts, he says, there is something that is commanded as falling under obligation, and something that is intended finally. For what is commanded is the act of virtue as to the substance of the act alone: such as honoring parents, believing in one God, and the like; but what is intended, though not commanded, is that people by such works may be so disposed

that their works may be accepted as meritorious of eternal life, which is done by grace. And so the Savior speaks in Matthew 19: "If you want to enter into life, keep the commandments." For God has promised eternal life to all who perform those things to which His law obligates; and therefore whoever satisfies this obligation and keeps the divine commandments as he is bound to do, does something highly conducive to eternal life, and to which eternal life is due by God's promise. Therefore, if no one can do anything conducive to salvation without grace, no one can perform those things to which the moral precepts obligate without grace.

XLIX. Especially contrary to the doctrine of the necessity of divine grace for those things that lead to and profit salvation are those who teach that man can, by his own powers, acquire grace or prepare and dispose himself for it in any way; but since this matter requires a somewhat longer discussion and deserves to be considered separately, it seems best to refer it to another Disputation.

PART TWO:

In which the Doctrine of the Protestants is explained and compared with the Doctrine of the Roman School.

Thesis I

In the Protestant Schools, natural and civil good is usually distinguished from salvific and spiritual good. To natural good pertain actions that are naturally good and necessary or useful for the preservation of life. Such actions include walking, eating, drinking, and the like. Civilly good actions are those that help and serve to protect and foster civil society and the common life, such as various offices of common life, or even those pertaining to magistrates and public and private duties that constitute families, cities, and republics. These can be easily understood; for example, practicing a craft, fulfilling the duties of a judge, soldier, husband, wife, servant, and many similar ones.

II. Salvific good, which is also called theological, spiritual, and heavenly, is that which benefits a man for eternal salvation and pertains to the true worship of God, piety, and religion; such as the acts of theological and Christian virtues, like faith, hope, charity, humility, meekness, continence, patience, modesty, kindness, etc.

III. Moreover, they do not recognize any intermediate between civil and spiritual good, namely moral good, which would include certain actions that are truly good and according to virtue, and in which there is no element of sin, but which nevertheless do not pertain to piety nor are useful for salvation. For they do not think any action to be truly good whose principle is not the love of God and which is not referred to the glory of God; and they consider anything that does not aim at this and does not proceed from the love of God to be sin, however specious and honest it may appear in the eyes of men. Hence it follows that no action is truly good which does not also pertain to piety and cannot benefit man for salvation. As we have shown elsewhere at length in the theses on the necessity of grace concerning moral good.

IV. However, since Protestants oppose moral good to spiritual good, they confuse moral good with civil good; and by moral goodness, they understand only a certain external goodness which can coexist with an action that is simply evil and which, in truth and before God, has the nature of sin. Generally, by moral good, they mean whatever has the true nature of virtue and piety, whether in conformity to natural law or to the precepts of God.

V. Moreover, with respect to civil or natural good, Protestants acknowledge that man, even in the state of fallen nature, has the use of his free will. And although men generally can do nothing without the general concurrence and cooperation of God, in whom we live, move, and have our being; and besides, for the actions of civil life, they often need some special help of divine providence, yet they do not think that the grace of Christ, which consists of certain morals inwardly stirred by His Spirit or infused habits, is in any way necessary for natural and civil actions: but they believe that man can perform these by his natural capacity and has some freedom of will for them by nature. As Perkins speaks in *The Reformed Catholic*, controversy 1, conclusions 2 and 3.

VI. But they hold most firmly and insist most urgently that a man once corrupted by sin can do absolutely nothing by himself in matters that pertain to piety and eternal salvation without the grace of Christ: for in this, for man to do even the least in that kind, the salvific help of divine grace is absolutely necessary, which not only helps man but also precedes him and provides new strength: and it is not enough for man to be taught externally and aided by any external helps, but there is also a need for internal grace, by which the mind is not only illuminated but also the will is affected and moved.

VII. On this, those who are called distinctly Reformed agree among themselves, as well as those who are called theologians of the Augsburg Confession; for thus the Augsburg Confession states in article eighteen: Concerning Free Will, they teach that the human will has some freedom to achieve civil righteousness and to choose things subject to reason, but it does not have the power, without the Holy Spirit, to achieve the righteousness of God, or spiritual righteousness. This is also confirmed by Melancthon's *Apology* to the same Confession, in the book which is called the *Book of Concord*. He says, The human will can, in some way, achieve civil righteousness, or righteousness of works: it can speak of God, offer certain external worship to God, obey magistrates and parents in external works: it can restrain the hand from murder, from adultery, from theft. But it is false that a man does not sin who does the works of the commandments outside of grace.

VIII. Indeed, concerning the necessity of grace for salvific and spiritual good, those who under the name of Remonstrants stirred many controversies among the Reformed on the matter of Grace teach the same as other Protestants. For this is found in their Confession: Therefore, man does not have salvific faith from himself, nor is he regenerated or converted by the powers of his free will; since in the state of sin, he cannot think, much less will or do, any good that is truly salvific, such as primarily conversion and salvific faith, by himself or from himself, but it is necessary that he be regenerated and wholly renewed by God in Christ, through the word of the Gospel, and the accompanying power of the Holy Spirit, that he may rightly understand,

meditate, will, and perform salvific good. Therefore, we state that the grace of God is the beginning, progress, and completion of all good; so much so that even the regenerated person cannot think, will, or perform any good salvific act, or resist any temptations leading to evil, without preceding or prevenient, exciting, following, and cooperating grace. Thus faith, conversion, and all good works and pious and salvific actions that can be conceived are wholly to be attributed to the grace of God in Christ as their principal and primary cause. Chapter 17, articles 5 and 6.

IX. Incidentally, it should be observed here that the Remonstrants do not require, as the other Protestants do, that for the goodness of a moral action, which is pleasing to God and free from sin, it must be done from faith and for the glory of God: but they consider it sufficient, according to themselves, that it be rightly conformed to reason and not done for any evil end. This can be seen in Episcopius, in the Apology for the Confession of the Remonstrants, in the fourth paragraph of the sixth chapter. For, to be morally good, it is sufficient, he says, if it conforms rightly to reason, that is, if it is done from a mind truly led by the pursuit of virtue, honesty, and probity, even if it lacks the knowledge of the law and the Gospel, and is free from the intention of doing anything against the rule of divine will, and from the pursuit of personal glory. For to include formally the intention of doing only what the divine law or the Gospel commands, the pursuit of divine glory, and faith in Christ, is not required by the nature of morally good action, as is clear from the nature of the matter itself: for there have been many in every age and still are today, who have never even heard of the law and the Gospel, whom no one would easily deny to be or to have been morally good and virtuous. However, they do not think that anyone, by such acts, so pleases God that he is therefore transferred to heaven and given eternal life. And in this sense, they explain that passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "Without faith, it is impossible to please God." Namely, that the Apostle does not mean that without faith no one can in any way please God: but only that without faith no one can please God as Enoch did, that is, to be transferred with Enoch to heaven and live eternally with God: as can be seen in that author there.

X. Moreover, this doctrine of both Schools of Theology, that is, both Protestants and those who are devoted to the Roman communion, they have drawn not only from Councils celebrated long ago against the Pelagians and their remnants but also from Sacred Scripture itself, in which it is very clearly taught. This includes what Christ says in John 15, "Without me, you can do nothing." And what Paul writes to the Corinthians, "Not that we are sufficient to think anything as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God." 2 Corinthians 2. Especially what the same Paul says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, "What do you have that you did not receive? Now if you did receive it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?"

XI. Nor is this little confirmed by the same Apostle's saying, in chapter 2 to the Philippians; "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling. For it is God who works in you both to will and to do for His good pleasure." Hence, in the same Epistle, chapter 1, he testifies that he is confident that "He who began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Christ Jesus." And for this reason also, Peter acknowledges that "His divine power has given to us all

things that pertain to life and godliness, through the knowledge of Him who called us by His own glory and virtue." 2 Peter 1:3.

XII. Therefore, for all our good works we are bound to give thanks to God and continually implore the help and grace of God and Christ, that He may direct us in the way of salvation, prevent our actions by His inspiration, follow them with His aid, and inwardly move and govern us by His Spirit, so that we may be able to do what is pleasing to Him—prayers which no one can disapprove of unless they are completely impious.

XIII. But to make the Protestant Doctrine clearer, it must be noted that they make some distinction between things that pertain to piety and salvation. There are many external actions that in some way pertain to piety and conduce to salvation, such as reading and hearing the Word of God, receiving baptism, participating in the Holy Communion, attending public assemblies of the faithful, and the like. There is no question about such things here. And although these may in their own way be able to benefit salvation, it is certain among all that external actions of this kind can be done by the powers of free will, without any internal grace of Jesus Christ, and with only the general concurrence and aid of God.

XIV. Thus, by things that conduce to salvation and pertain to piety, and for which theologians teach that the grace of Christ is absolutely necessary, are understood only internal actions in which spiritual worship of God consists and which benefit salvation as they are part or a certain beginning of the salvation obtained through Christ: and they promote our eternal happiness by themselves and are referred to it. Such actions include believing in God, trusting in Him, hoping for grace and glory from Him, sincerely loving God and neighbor, seriously grieving over sins from a sense of God's goodness, making a firm resolution to amend one's life, and the like.

XV. However, Protestants contend that these actions, by their very nature and as to the substance of the acts, promote our salvation and pertain to piety. For they do not believe that anyone can give serious, solid, and confident assent to the Word of God, truly and sincerely love God and neighbor, expect grace and glory from God according to His promises, seriously grieve over offending God, detest sin, and be inclined to strive to please God in the future without some piety that God approves and accepts. And they consider it completely irrational for anyone to say that a person can perform such actions and yet do nothing conducive to salvation when God has promised salvation to all who perform such actions without respect of persons.

XVI. Therefore, they believe these actions benefit eternal salvation, not because they are done from some supernatural principle, but simply because they are done: and consequently, they do not think the help of divine grace is necessary for those acts, which otherwise could be elicited naturally by the powers of free will, to become supernatural and thus benefit salvation: but that free will, whose natural power such acts exceed in themselves, can simply elicit them and thus do what God requires for salvation. Indeed, if anyone performs such acts without the help of grace, they believe that this would not make them less pleasing and acceptable to God; on the contrary, they rather assert that such acts would be more pleasing and acceptable to God. For

it is entirely reasonable that more reward and praise is due to one who, provoked by fewer benefits and aided by fewer helps, loves equally and performs as much good.

XVII. Although, according to Protestants, the acts of faith, hope, love, and repentance, which are commanded in the Gospel, exceed the natural power of free will even as to their substance, they acknowledge that the grace of Christ is not necessary for someone to believe, hope, love, and repent in any manner whatsoever: but only to believe, hope, love, and repent as is required for salvation. For not every assent given to the mysteries of faith is that faith which the Gospel requires for salvation; but firm and solid assent, not light and superficial, and which truly rests on God's truth, not on some human testimony. Which is also fit in itself to produce good works and is not without some pious affection toward God.

XVIII. Such assent is considered by Protestants to be above the natural power of a nature corrupted by sin as to its substance. For no one can assent to all things revealed by God in such a manner without having some good thought. But from the Apostle's testimony quoted above, we are not sufficient to think anything good from ourselves, as from ourselves. Nor can it be denied that he who believes in that manner believes Christianly; but all Christian faith is the gift of God. Add that to believe in this way is to come to Christ: but Christ says, "No one can come to me unless it is given to him by my Father." John 6. And moreover, he who believes in this manner knows both the Father and the Son, but "no one knows the Son except the Father, nor does anyone know the Father except the Son, and to whom the Son wills to reveal Him." Matthew 7. And finally, how can anyone, without the internal illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, give serious and firm assent to all things revealed in the Gospel, with a pious affection toward God and by bringing the mind into the obedience of that truth, as the Apostle says, "No one can say that Jesus is Lord except by the Holy Spirit." 1 Corinthians 12.

XIX. However, Protestants do not consider that from this it follows that the grace of Christ is necessary to give any kind of assent to matters of faith and religion. As if someone is somewhat persuaded about these things, moved by some solid perception of the truth, but carried away by some vain prejudices, or led by mere custom and the authority of ancestors, or by some human arguments and reasons. Such assent is given by many infidels and others erring gravely in the principal matters of religion to some articles of Christian faith. For just as such persuasion does not pertain to piety, nor does it contribute to eternal salvation, so natural human powers suffice to conceive it.

XX. Similarly, anyone who hopes for the remission of sins and eternal happiness from God does not immediately produce the act of that Christian hope which Scripture commends. For such hope can only be legitimately conceived by one who, endowed with true and effective faith, lives piously and holily and follows the path of God's commandments, which alone leads to eternal happiness: or who, having fallen into sins, performs serious repentance for them, and, grievously sorrowful for offending God, resolves to avoid offending Him in the future and to abstain from all things which he knows are displeasing to God. And this is the hope that is wholly owed to divine grace and whose act, even in substance, is far above the powers of a nature corrupted by sin. But if someone, gravely erring in the principal matters of faith, and

indulging in the works and vices of the flesh, nevertheless hopes that God will be propitious to him and expects glory and eternal happiness from Him, such hope is undoubtedly vain and deceitful, nor can it be counted among the works of virtues: nor can its principle be the grace of God.

XXI. Likewise, if someone grieves for sins out of mere fear of punishment, without that sorrow being joined with the resolution to avoid sins in the future and the hope of obtaining pardon from God, this is not the repentance which God demands from man and to which no one can attain without the help of God's grace: but he is led to the repentance that is required for salvation, who is not only distressed by the fear of punishment impending on him because of sin but also because he has offended God, rendered himself unworthy of God's love, and been ungrateful to His goodness; and therefore he resolves to do in the future what is pleasing to God and to avoid what offends Him, with the confidence that God will be propitious and merciful to him. The acts of this latter repentance are of an entirely different kind and substance from the former; and this is the repentance which Protestants believe is not possible for man without the grace of Christ, even as to its substance.

XXII. Finally, if it is supposed that someone loves God, not for Himself and to enjoy Him, but only for some temporal benefit to be obtained from Him, such love is inordinate and faulty and does not constitute part of true piety. But it pertains to piety, and therefore must be attributed to divine grace, only that love of God by which the divine goodness itself is loved and by which God is loved in some degree, not for another reason, but for Himself. Protestants believe that such love, which alone leads to salvation, is so owed to divine grace that its acts in no way can be elicited by man without special help from God. And because Scripture simply lists love among the fruits of the Spirit, Galatians 5, and absolutely declares that charity is from God, 1 John 4. Hence, it follows that neither its beginning nor its slightest degree can be from us without God's grace and the inspiration of His Spirit. Which is also confirmed by Christ's absolute statement, "Without me you can do nothing," John 15.

XXIII. However, from this doctrine, founded on the Word of God and now commonly accepted in Christian Schools, namely, that nothing pertaining to true piety and salvation can be done by man in a state of sin without the grace of Christ, Protestants conclude that not only can the supernatural precepts of God concerning internal acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition not be kept by a fallen man without special help from God, even as to the substance of the acts, because those acts, considered in their substance, constitute part of true piety; but they also assert that it follows clearly from this that not even the precepts of natural law can be fulfilled by any mortal man without the same help from God, as to their substance.

XXIV. For among the precepts of natural law, the primary place is held by the command to love God above all things, than which nothing can be thought more intimately related to true piety toward God: indeed, this is the sum of piety, that we love God with all our heart and strive to please Him in all things. If, therefore, a sinner could love God above all things and make an absolute resolution to please Him in all things by his own strength, without the help of Christ's grace, the sinner could rise from sin by his own strength and turn to God, which no one can deny

to be manifestly Pelagian. For certainly, he who loves God above all things and resolves to abstain from sin and is inclined to please God in all things is undoubtedly turned away from sin and turned toward God. We could also, by our own strength and without special help from God, provoke God to love us and to communicate His grace to us; since God loves all who love Him without exception, according to that saying in Solomon, "I love those who love me." But this is against the common sense of Christians and that saying of John in his first epistle, "Not that we loved God, but that He first loved us." 1 John 4.

XXV. Nor do Protestants only conclude from this that no man corrupted by sin can keep all and every precept of the natural law without the grace of Christ, but also that not even a single precept of the natural law can be kept by a fallen man without the help of this grace, so as to satisfy the law in this respect, and thus free himself from the obligation arising from the law, and thus not admit any sin. And this is because the law is spiritual, and therefore in each precept it does not simply command or prohibit certain external works, but it wills that what it commands be done and what it prohibits be avoided out of love for justice and a desire to please and obey God, which undoubtedly pertains to piety and thus cannot be done without the help of grace.

XXVI. Furthermore, from the things expounded in these and previous theses, it is clear that not only all Protestant Schools but also all Roman School Theologians agree on this general thesis, that nothing pertaining to true piety and leading to eternal salvation can be done without the help of Christ's grace.

XXVII. But it is also evident that many Roman School Doctors do not agree either with the Protestants or with other Roman School Doctors on what things are to be considered as leading to salvation and pertaining to true piety or not. For, as we have shown, Molina with many others believes that internal acts, not only those commanded in the moral law but also those commanded in the very Gospel, such as believing in God, loving Him above all things as the giver of grace and glory, hoping for eternal salvation from Him, grieving for having offended Him, with an absolute resolution to please Him in all things in the future—all these acts, if only considered in their own substance and in themselves, do not benefit salvation nor constitute part of that true piety which is the way to eternal life and happiness: therefore, such acts, in this respect, do not exceed the natural powers of free will but can be elicited by a fallen man without the special help of Christ's grace. Such acts, however, are beneficial to salvation and pertain to true piety if they become supernatural through some aid granted above nature, their substance remaining the same. On the other hand, Protestants, along with many and the most celebrated Roman School Theologians, contend that such acts in themselves and in regard to their own substance constitute part of true piety and are something that most directly leads to eternal life: and therefore, in this respect, they completely exceed the powers of human free will and cannot be produced without the special help of divine grace.

XXVIII. This view is certainly based on evident and clear reasoning. For God has promised the remission of sins and eternal life for such acts if they are done as commanded by God and as men are obligated to perform them by the law of Christ: and consequently, if done in this manner, they are most beneficial to salvation and pertain to true piety. Now, God simply

commands that we truly and not fictitiously believe the Gospel, that we hope for the forgiveness of sins and salvation from Him, that we love Him above all things and with all our heart, that we grieve for our sins out of love for Him, and firmly resolve to avoid them in the future; not that we do these things from an infused habit or from any other supernatural principle which is not in our power. Indeed, God out of His kindness supplies us with certain aids above nature so that we can perform these things, but He does not command that we have such aids. Therefore, such aids of this kind help to fulfill the command, but they do not fall under the obligation of the command nor constitute the matter of the command. We have heard that those to whom the Gospel is presented with sufficient signs and miracles or with other persuasions and arguments can, without any special help from God and with only the general concurrence of God, by the natural powers of free will, avoid the sin of unbelief, and consequently, satisfy all the requirements of the command to believe. This is specifically affirmed of those who heard Christ and saw His miracles. Nor does he think that unbelievers would be guilty of mortal sin for not believing the Gospel presented to them, unless they could at that time give natural assent to the things to be believed by a merely natural act: and thus, according to his hypotheses, it is necessary that such natural assent satisfies the divine command to believe. And by the same reasoning, he would undoubtedly easily concede that one who, by a merely natural act and without the help of Christ's grace, loves God as our Redeemer above all things, with an absolute resolution to please Him in all things, as he thinks possible, would thus fulfill the evangelical command to love God above all things, so that in doing so, he would avoid sin and free himself from the obligation arising from that command. Indeed, nothing could be imagined more vain and absurd than to affirm that someone loves God above all things and has a serious and absolute resolution to please God in all things and yet sins against the command to love God above all things.

XXIX. Therefore, according to Protestants and also a large part of the Roman School, to believe, hope, love, and grieve for sins as is necessary for salvation and justification; and to do all these things so that sin is avoided and the obligation arising from the precepts of the Gospel is satisfied, are all the same and fall under the same. But according to Molina and his followers, it is one thing to believe, hope, love, and grieve as necessary to avoid sin according to the evangelical precepts, and another to believe, hope, love, and grieve as necessary for salvation and justification. Because to avoid sin, it is sufficient that such acts, according to their substance, are produced by men; but for them to be beneficial for salvation and justification, it is further required, according to Molina and his followers, that they are done by the benefit of some supernatural aid. Whereas, on the contrary, Protestants consider the goodness of such internal acts to depend solely on their substance; nor do they believe these acts to be more pleasing and commendable to God, and thus more beneficial to salvation, if they are done with some supernatural aid than if they were done without it. Therefore, from the things expounded above, it is clear that there is still a controversy among all Protestants, except for the Remonstrants, and among the majority of the Roman School Doctors, with whom others disagree on this point. Whether at least the fulfillment of any precept of the moral law, by which sin is avoided against each of them, and satisfaction is given to what the law obliges under penalty of death, is

something that by itself is conducive to eternal salvation and in which true piety consists, and therefore simply exceeds the powers of free will in corrupted nature and for which the grace of Christ is absolutely necessary? Many of the ancient Scholastics, including Scotus, Durandus, and Gabriel Biel, and Molina and his disciples deny this, who teach that the precepts of natural law can be kept by natural powers without special help from God by a fallen man, as to their substance, if not all collectively, at least individually, so that no sin is committed against them. But on the contrary, Protestants affirm, along with many Roman School Theologians, that all the precepts of the moral law cannot be kept, nor can sin be avoided against each of them, without doing something most beneficial to eternal life and pertaining to true piety.

XXXII. Their reasoning is that eternal life is simply promised to all those who keep the precepts of the moral law, as confirmed by our Lord Christ, according to the saying, "Do this and you will live." Moreover, among the precepts of that law, the principal place is held by the command, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind," in the observance of which consists the essence and sum of piety. It is entirely unreasonable to say that such love of God is not pleasing and acceptable to God for eternal life unless it is done with some supernatural aid from God: rather, it seems that it should be more pleasing and acceptable to God if someone, not bound by so many benefits and aids, nevertheless pursues God with such singular love

XXXIII. Finally, from what has been said, it appears that the question still remains among all Protestants, except for the Remonstrants, and among the majority of Doctors of the Roman School: whether the observance of any precept of the moral law, by which we satisfy the obligations imposed by that precept and avoid sin against it, is something that pertains to salvation and piety. Many Roman School Doctors deny this, and therefore teach that certain mandates of the law can be kept by a fallen man, as to the substance of the acts, without the grace of Christ, in such a way that all sin is avoided, and the obligation to the law is satisfied. Protestants, however, affirm that fulfilling the obligation of any precept, by which we discharge what the precept obliges us to do and avoid sin against it, is part of true piety and contributes to eternal salvation, because each precept does not simply bind us to avoid or perform certain things but also to do so out of sincere love for God and a desire to please and obey Him, as is fitting for a rational creature: and therefore they contend that the grace of Christ is necessary for such observance, without which the Schools agree no work can be done that is truly pious and conducive to salvation.

THEOLOGICAL THESES: In which the DOCTRINE OF THE PROTESTANTS is explained concerning the question, whether man, in a state of sin, can prepare and dispose himself for grace by his natural powers alone.

Thesis I

From what has been more extensively explained in the preceding theses, it is easy to deduce what Protestants believe regarding the question of whether a man, corrupted by sin, can

prepare himself for grace by his own powers and without any special assistance from God. Firstly, concerning those who are particularly called the Reformed among Protestants, we have shown that they particularly teach and firmly maintain that nothing conducive to salvation can be done by man without God's grace. From this, it clearly follows, by their own admission and acknowledgment, that man by himself can do nothing to obtain, attain, or prepare himself for the saving grace of Christ in any way. For whatever obtains such grace is certainly something significantly conducive to salvation.

II. Moreover, it is certain among them, as has been confirmed by us above in various ways, that nothing truly morally good and acceptable to God can proceed from a fallen man without some special assistance from God. It is utterly absurd and against reason to assert that a man can prepare himself to receive the grace of God by something that is not even morally good or acceptable to God.

III. They hold that the grace by which a man can morally act well is itself the grace of Christ, which begins with faith: thus, all the works of the unbelievers pertain not to virtue but to vice. No matter how much they may shine in the eyes of men, they are truly sins before God and not good but evil. For they lack essential elements since they do not originate from a good principle, but from self-love and depraved desire, and they deviate from the true and legitimate end, which is the glory of God. It therefore clearly follows that nothing preceding the calling to faith can prepare a man for the grace of Christ. How could one obtain the grace of God and prepare to receive it from God by works that are evil before God and considered sinful, like all those works done by men before they are called to faith? For if man can attain grace by his natural powers, thereby excelling over those who have not similarly used their free will and remain deprived of grace, then certainly the beginning of the distinction between the pious and the faithful from others would lie in man. And to the apostle's question, "Who distinguishes you?" one could truly respond, "I, by doing what was in my power through natural abilities, began to distinguish myself from others who neglected to do the same, and therefore obtained from God the gifts of grace, which they lack through their own fault and which they would have infallibly received by performing the same actions as I did."

V. But the principal issue here is that all such preparations and dispositions proceeding from natural powers alone, by which grace is given to one rather than another, contradict so many scriptural statements which affirm that man's salvation and justification are entirely gratuitous and not to be attributed to any human works but wholly to divine grace. As when the Apostle diligently insists in his Epistle to the Romans that we are justified freely and by God's grace, not by works, and without works. And writing to the Ephesians, he says, "For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not from yourselves, it is the gift of God; not by works, so that no one can boast. For we are God's handiwork, created in Christ Jesus to do good works, which God prepared in advance for us to do." This aligns with what he writes to Timothy, "He has saved us and called us to a holy calling, not because of anything we have done but because of his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the beginning of time." Similarly, he writes to Titus, "But when the kindness and love of God our Savior

appeared, he saved us, not because of righteous things we had done, but because of his mercy. He saved us through the washing of rebirth and renewal by the Holy Spirit." 2 Tim. 1. Titus 3.

VI. For if God saves us, calls us, and justifies us freely and by his grace, without our works, not according to our works, nor by the works of righteousness which we have done, it is clear that there are no works of ours that precede the saving grace of God and in any way merit it or invite and provoke God to save, call, and justify us. For if this were so, God would save, call, and justify us not only according to his mercy and kindness but also according to those works in view of which he would grant us his grace. Additionally, in this matter, Paul so opposes grace to works that any works are excluded, and works nullify grace. He says, "And if by grace, then it cannot be based on works; if it were, grace would no longer be grace." Romans 11. Therefore, they think it entirely contrary to evangelical doctrine to say that grace is granted to someone doing what is in their power through natural abilities: not only because grace would then not be entirely gratuitous, but because they believe that man, by nature, can do nothing that is not truly a sin, and hence something that does not deserve God's wrath, far from being able to provoke God's beneficence towards man.

VIII. If anyone were to argue that men left to their nature and selves could at least sin less than others, and thus render themselves less unworthy of God's grace: they respond that God often chooses the most grievous sinners in the communication of his grace and passes over those who seemed less evil: and thus, there is no law by which God grants grace to those who sin less. Besides, they think that the very distinction observed among men, who are outside the grace of Christ, according to which some sin more gravely and atrociously while others sin more lightly and gently, is to be attributed to some special assistance from divine providence; by which it happens that all do not equally rush into crimes and wickedness restrained by laws, and without which, they would all plunge headlong into those crimes no less than the most wicked.

IX. Indeed, there are not a few among the Reformed who expressly teach that God does not forsake any man, if he does his duty, according to his state and condition in which he is found; nor denies the means necessary for eternal salvation to them: and thus, to those to whom the word of God has not shone at all, God, in his supreme goodness, will grant sufficient aids for salvation if they perform their duty towards God as required by their state and condition and through natural abilities. But at the same time, they add that no one can so perform his duty without special grace and assistance from God, due to the moral corruption of human faculties: and that grace by which men are converted and formed to do their duty is tied to God's word, at least according to the ordinary law: and therefore, according to the ordinary law, no one can perform well and do what is his duty unless he is called to faith in Christ through the preaching of the Gospel. This doctrine is elaborately taught and explained by Moses Amyraldus in his Homily on verses 19 and 20 of the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. But there are others who do not even want to say that saving grace should be given by God to those who rightly use the remaining natural gifts in man. This is the opinion of the Professors of the Low Countries in their Judgment on the third and fourth articles, inserted in the Acts of the Synod of Dort. "Although," they say, "he who has or rightly uses gifts will be given increase, yet God does not

grant supernatural and saving grace to those who, after the fall, have rightly used the natural remnants of God's image; for this grace is granted not according to works, but according to the pure and free good pleasure of God." Thesis 4. This opinion is shared in the same Synod by the Deputies of the Synod of South Holland, condemning those who say that God grants further grace and saving vocation, however it happens, to those who are virtuous and rightly use the natural or other received gifts, even in those nations where nothing about the Gospel has ever been heard.

X. Although all the Reformed accurately teach that no one can prepare and dispose himself for grace in any way by his own powers, some of them observe that certain external works, which lie within the power of human free will, are ordinarily required of men before they are brought to the state of regeneration. Such are hearing or reading the word, attending church, and things of that kind. For God is not accustomed to call men to faith by some immediate illumination, as once happened to the Prophets and Apostles, but by the preaching of the divine word perceived by the ears of the body, or at least by the reading of Sacred Scripture. As it is said in Romans 10: "How can they believe in the one of whom they have not heard?"

XI. The theologians of Great Britain, among others, note this in their judgment on the third and fourth articles, which is included in the Acts of the Synod of Dort. In chapter 2, which deals with antecedents to conversion, their first thesis is: There are certain external works ordinarily required of men before they are brought to the state of regeneration or conversion, which they sometimes freely do and sometimes omit, such as attending church, hearing the preaching of the Word, and other similar things. These are within our power, as reason dictates and experience proves, as they subsequently add.

XII. Furthermore, the same doctors observe that there are certain internal acts, both of the mind and will, preceding the regeneration of man, by which man is prepared for conversion. Such acts include a certain knowledge of the divine will, a sense of sin, fear of punishment, thoughts of liberation, and some hope of pardon. They attribute these acts to a certain initial grace, which they call illuminating and exciting, and which precedes the actual converting and regenerating grace.

XIII. For their second thesis in the aforementioned chapter is: There are certain internal effects preceding conversion or regeneration, which are aroused by the power of the Word and the Spirit in the hearts of those who are not yet justified; such as the knowledge of the divine will, a sense of sin, fear of punishment, thoughts of liberation, and some hope of pardon. To confirm this thesis, they add that divine grace does not usually bring men to the state of justification and regeneration by a sudden enthusiasm, but by many preceding actions, subduing and preparing them through the ministry of the Word. This is required by the nature of the thing itself; for, they say, just as in the natural generation of man, there are many preceding dispositions before the introduction of the form, so also in the spiritual, by many preceding actions of grace, one comes to spiritual birth. And they take evidence of this from the fact that God uses the ministry and the word of men as instruments to regenerate men. For if God, they say, wished to regenerate and justify a wicked man immediately, without any preparation of

knowledge, pain, desire, or hope of pardon, there would be no need for the ministry of men, nor for the preached Word. Nor would ministers, in properly preaching the Word of God, need to first wound the consciences of their hearers with the terrors of the law, then lift them up with the promises of the Gospel, and exhort them to repentance and faith through prayers and tears to God.

XIV. Furthermore, they teach that no one who uses this initial grace well is forsaken by God, but that God promotes all who, with the help of these aids, do what they are excited to do by such grace to further grace. For their fourth thesis states: Those whom God thus affects, He does not forsake, nor cease to promote them in the true way to conversion, until they themselves, through voluntary neglect or rejection of this initial grace, are deserted. For the talent of grace, once given by God, is not taken away from anyone unless he first buries it through his own fault. And thus we are often warned in the Scriptures not to resist the Spirit, not to quench the Spirit, and not to receive the grace of God in vain. Nor does God ever take away from anyone the aid of exciting grace or any help once given for conversion without prior fault on the part of the man.

XV. But in subsequent theses, they note that it is possible and common for these initial effects of divine grace to be suffocated by the rebellious will, and thus a man in whom God has begun to work by grace is justly deserted by God and does not attain true conversion. For their fifth thesis is: These preceding effects, produced by the power of the Word and the Spirit in the minds of men, can be suffocated and utterly extinguished by the rebellious will, and often are: so that some, in whose minds an initial sense of their sins, some desire, and some concern for liberation has been impressed by the power of the Word and the Spirit, completely change to the opposite, reject and hate the truth, give themselves over to their lusts, become hardened in sin, and rot in them without any desire or care for liberation. And their seventh thesis is: God justly deserts the non-elect, who, in these preceding acts towards regeneration, resist the divine Spirit and grace, and extinguish its initial effects in themselves through their free will; whom, thus deserted through their own fault, we truly pronounce to remain hardened and unconverted by the same demerit.

XVI. The theologians of Helvetia, too, in the Acts of the same Synod, distinguish between acts that precede conversion and those that constitute it, both of which they equally ascribe to divine grace. If a man, they say, uses the gifts of nature rightly, truly acknowledges his misery, feels spiritual death so that he truly and salvifically hungers and thirsts for liberation and life, opens his heart to the knocking Lord, and with an open heart continues to attend; if he does many other similar things that either precede conversion by beginning or constitute it by progressing, all these things we ascribe to God alone, from whom every good gift and every perfect gift descends from above, and not to free will, natural light, or any human strengths or merits. In the Exposition of their Sentiment on the way divine Grace operates in man to produce Faith and Conversion, Thesis three. Where it is clear enough that by acts preceding the beginning of conversion, they mean the first ones, namely to truly acknowledge his misery, sense spiritual death, and hunger and thirst for liberation and life.

XVII. The theologians of the Palatinate in their judgment on the same article inserted in the aforementioned Synod's Acts, seem to hold a similar opinion. For in censuring that proposition of the Remonstrants, which says that certain good works, as prerequisites, precede the very conversion or regeneration of man, they admit as certain that certain acts of recognizing sin, pain, contrition, etc., precede faith and conversion in a man being regenerated, while he is prepared for receiving grace through the ministry of the law and the Gospel.

XVIII. However, they think that most other conditions are wrongly placed by the Remonstrants as preceding conversion, contrary to the truth of Scripture, for, according to these theologians, they either follow conversion as its fruits or begin it as its salutary beginnings. For they say that godly sorrow, which is more grieved by the offense against God than by the fear of punishment, is proper to those who are already believers. Sincere and not hypocritical humility is a fruit of regeneration. The desire for grace, or hunger and thirst for righteousness, is initial faith, a sort of beginning of it. Prayers are stirred up in the hearts by the Holy Spirit, who is therefore called the Spirit of supplication in Zechariah. Finally, the purpose and attempt to amend life is from the beginning of conversion, just as success and perseverance in that purpose are from its continuation.

XIX. The Hessian theologians speak differently on this question than the British theologians. For they simply reject as heterodox this thesis of the Remonstrants; namely, that man in the state of sin, before faith and the renewing Spirit, can and indeed often has zeal, care, and study, which he uses to obtain salvation; and can hear the word of God, grieve over sin committed, seek saving grace and the renewing Spirit: and that this is ultimately and most necessary for man to obtain faith and the renewing Spirit. Likewise, that man in the state of sin, before his vivification or regeneration, can have knowledge of his spiritual death, its sorrow and lamentation, desire and wish for liberation, hunger and thirst for life. Likewise, confession of sins, pain, initial fear, etc. This is the opinion of the Hessian theologians on Grace and Free Will, inserted in the Acts of the Synod of Dort.

XX. In this matter, the theologians of Embden agree with the Hessian theologians in the same Synod's Acts. For they outright reject the dogma of preparatory works before regeneration as a Pelagian figment. And they oppose this antithesis to the doctrine of the Remonstrants: To recognize one's misery, to grieve, lament, desire liberation, hunger, thirst, seek, etc., no one can do without the special grace of the regenerating Spirit, by whom we must first be sought and found before we seek Him. Found by God, we do not recognize and confess sin before God forgives us; nor do we hunger and thirst for righteousness through His grace without immediately being satisfied. Therefore, to attribute these to men, either wholly or partly before regeneration, is to insult God. And so these theologians call the grace of regeneration the first grace, nor do they acknowledge any initial grace before it.

XXI. Regarding those called Remonstrants or Arminians in Belgium, in their Synod, concerning the third and fourth articles, they teach in their first and second theses: A man in the state of sin cannot think, will, or do any good thing that is indeed a saving good by himself and from himself; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed by God in Christ through

His Holy Spirit in intellect, affections, will, and all his powers, so that he may rightly understand, meditate upon, will, and accomplish saving goods. Likewise, they say that the grace of God is the beginning, progress, and completion of all good, so that good works and actions which anyone can attain by thinking are to be ascribed to the grace of God in Christ. From this, it follows that a fallen man, by natural powers and without the help of God, cannot merit, obtain, or do anything to acquire the grace of Christ, since that by which grace is acquired and obtained, in its way and order, cannot but be saving and is at least the beginning of a good work.

XXII. The Remonstrants openly acknowledge that the calling by which God first calls men to salvation is entirely unmerited and undeserved, and depends solely on the absolute good pleasure of God, without any consideration or precondition of any antecedent condition. Although, they say, a man dead in sins, having heard the preaching of the law first, then the gospel, can admit the teaching and give ear (at least outwardly) to one who desires to teach better things, yet in the very beginning of this calling, God finds nothing in the man that would make him worthy of that grace or deserving of conversion, but rather many things that would make him unworthy of that grace if God were to act according to His strict justice. Therefore, all of Scripture praises that unmerited and undeserved grace of calling, which is not made to man conditionally but according to the absolute good pleasure of God, without any consideration or precondition of any antecedent condition.

XXIII. To this, they add that in this gracious calling and in the diverse and various administration of means necessary for faith, considering the differences in times, persons, and measures, one must regard and revere the profound riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God, His unsearchable judgments, and His ways past finding out. For only the good pleasure and most free will of God, unbound by any condition set by God, is the dispenser and giver of this grace, not any dignity or merit of man, so that all those whom God calls are unworthy of that grace in themselves, though some may be less unworthy than others. This is stated in the Remonstrants' declaration of their opinion concerning the third and fourth articles mentioned.

XXIV. Therefore, they condemn as a Pelagian doctrine the idea that a man can merit the grace by which we are helped in good works through works performed solely by natural powers, at least through desire and imperfect inclination to good. Opposing this error with their own view, they say, "We say that we will good because God's grace prevents us and has aroused the desire for good in us; and grace would not be grace if it were not given freely, but rather on account of human merit."

XXV. After attributing to the Semi-Pelagians the belief that they acknowledged preventing grace, but only the kind that prevents good works, not the kind that prevents the beginning of faith and good will, through which they believed that man could prevent God, though not always but sometimes, they again oppose this view with these words: "We say that God prevents the beginning of faith and good will, and both are by grace, that our will is excited to begin well and that, being thus prepared, it is led to the grace of regeneration." They add, "The Semi-Pelagians said that a man, by previous dispositions performed by natural powers, could obtain grace as a reward, and though the Maffiliens sometimes shunned the word 'merit,' they by

no means excluded the merit itself. We, however, deny that a man can merit grace by natural efforts." This is found in the same Declaration, page 23.

XXVI. However, in the same Declaration of their Sentiment concerning the same third and fourth articles, they state that not all works of the unbelievers and those devoid of knowledge of the divine word should be considered sins and increase their damnation, though they do not have the promise of eternal life. For from the fact that the Gentiles are said by the Apostle to have the work of the law written in their hearts and to do the things of the law, they conclude that those works performed by such people, as far as they are done according to the norm and prescription of right reason or the natural law, are not sins or increasing their condemnation; rather, God rewards these very things with many benefits, though, if examined according to the law of perfection, which has the promise of eternal life in Scripture, they do not deserve to be called good works.

XXVII. Furthermore, from the fact that a man in the state of sin cannot think, will, or accomplish any saving good by himself and from himself, they deny that all care and effort applied to obtain salvation before faith and the Spirit of renewal is in vain and useless; rather, they teach that many things are usefully, indeed necessarily, done by man to obtain faith and the renewing and sanctifying Spirit. However, without grace, man can do nothing of all those things that serve to obtain faith. This is their third thesis on the aforementioned article: "We do not believe that all zeal, care, and effort applied to obtain salvation before faith and the spirit of renewal is vain and useless, much less harmful to man than useful and fruitful, but on the contrary, we affirm that hearing the word of God, grieving over committed sin, seeking saving grace and the spirit of renewal (though man can do nothing about grace himself) is not only not harmful and useless but rather most useful and necessary to obtain faith and the spirit of renewal."

XXVIII. Hence, it is clear that they admit certain dispositions towards faith but attribute them to divine grace and recognize some saving grace that precedes the gift of faith. They more precisely explain their view in the Declaration of the aforementioned article, saying, "We say that God first, through the preaching of the law, always accompanied by the operation of the Holy Spirit using the law, brings a sinner to the knowledge of his sins and to serious grief over his sins, so that, despairing of his own ability to justify or renew himself because of the impotence of the flesh, he eagerly desires, seeks, and longs for liberation, which is announced to him by the law. This is a necessary disposition by divine ordinance that must precede before a man can be made fit to conceive faith in Christ. Therefore, this knowledge of sins, grief over sins, desire, and care to obtain salvation is not only not harmful to man but useful and, as actions congruent with the divine will, ought to be considered grateful to God for communicating further grace to man."

XXIX. Regarding the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, who are called Lutherans, they not only teach and emphasize that a man corrupted by sin can do nothing at all spiritually and salvifically good without God's grace and by his own strength; but they also teach that man cannot prepare, apply, or accommodate himself to God's grace or contribute anything to his own

conversion by his own strength, even in the smallest part. This is particularly evident in the solid Declaration of certain Articles of the Augsburg Confession, which is inserted in the Book of Concord, to which most of the leading Lutherans have subscribed. For in the second article, which is about free will, they have this common confession: "We believe that the intellect, heart, and will of man, who is not yet born again, cannot in spiritual and divine matters understand, believe, embrace, think, will, begin, complete, act, work, or cooperate by their own natural powers, but that man is entirely corrupted and dead to good; so that in the nature of man, after the fall, before regeneration, not even a spark of spiritual powers remains or persists by which he can prepare himself for God's grace, apprehend the offered grace, be capable of grace in himself and by himself, apply or accommodate himself to grace, or by his own strength contribute to his own conversion, either entirely, partially, or in the smallest part, or act, work, or cooperate as if from himself; but man is a slave of sin and a possession of Satan, agitated and led by him. Hence, natural free will, because of corrupt powers and depraved nature, is only active and effective towards those things that displease and oppose God.

XXX. And later, confirming the same matter, they add these words: "Just as a man who is physically dead cannot prepare or accommodate himself by his own strength to receive eternal life, so a man who is spiritually dead in sins cannot by his own strength prepare, apply, or turn himself to receive spiritual and heavenly righteousness and life, unless he is liberated and vivified from the death of sin by the Son of God. Furthermore, they add that all those who feel any spark or desire for divine grace and eternal salvation in their hearts can be certain that God Himself has kindled that beginning as a small flame of true piety in their hearts.

XXXI. Moreover, they believe that the grace by which God converts, quickens, and regenerates man, which always accompanies the preaching of the Gospel according to their understanding, is such that man can reject or accept it, and it does not infallibly determine his will to acts of conversion. They also teach that for the grace of God to be effective in us and for us to receive the power to believe from the preached Word, a condition is required on the part of man; this condition is necessary to acquire preventing grace, and man can fulfill it by the natural powers left to him, namely, to attentively hear and meditate on the divine Word.

XXXII. This is the explicit doctrine of Johannes Henichius, a professor of theology at the University of Rinteln, a man renowned among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession for both his learning and moderation. In his dissertation on grace and predestination published a few years ago, he affirms that God indeed wants to give grace, or the power to believe, to people under the condition that, even if someone has not yet been prevented by any grace, God will give preventing grace if he attentively hears and meditates on the divine Word. And this condition, necessary for acquiring preventing grace, can be fulfilled by a person through the natural powers left to him. (Chapter 1, Objection 12).

XXXIII. He adds that there is no need to fear Pelagianism because hearing and contemplating the Word of God is a natural act, which does not exceed natural powers. Furthermore, Pelagius claimed that grace is given according to merits. But we do not claim that the attentive meditation on the divine Word is the true and meritorious cause of acquiring

preventing grace, but only the cause without which grace is not given and the condition under which preventing grace is granted.

XXXIV. Just as, according to his opinion, God gives the power to believe under the condition that we attentively meditate on His Word, which we perform through the powers of free will, so too He does not give faith itself unless, in the power of preventing grace, a man does not obstruct the Holy Spirit from producing faith but determines himself to cooperate with Him. If someone has already been granted preventing grace, God wants to give him cooperating grace, provided he does not obstruct the Holy Spirit from further working and producing the act of faith, but determines himself to cooperate. Therefore, in such a person, there is something positive, by which he can fulfill the necessary condition for acquiring further and cooperating grace. This positive element is not something natural but supernatural, such as preventing grace or a quality produced by it, by whose benefit he can fulfill the required condition.

XXXV. These teachings align with those of Georgius Calixtus, who was also a professor of theology at the University of Helmstedt (Academia Julia) a few years ago, a man known for his modesty and love of peace. In his *Epitome of Theology*, in the chapter on the Ministry of the Word, he, like other theologians of the Augsburg Confession, attributes true conversion entirely to God and denies that acts constituting true conversion, such as believing in God, fearing God, and loving God, are within human power. He says these acts are supernatural by nature. However, he also affirms that there are certain acts within human power that God wants man to perform before granting him supernatural grace. Such acts include not only hearing and meditating on the Word but also being concerned about one's salvation and diligently seeking the means to it.

XXXVI. These are his words: "Believing is indeed a supernatural act by nature, and therefore we attribute it to the Holy Spirit, who excites the human mind to believe and makes a person believe, love, and fear God. We ascribe supernatural acts and true conversion to God and deny they are within human power. Yet, we do not deny that there are certain acts within human power that God wants man to perform before advancing to supernatural aids and gifts, at least according to the ordinary way."

XXXVII. Shortly before this, explaining how it is within human power to reject or accept the grace by which God, through His Word, excites acts of conversion in us, he says, "There is no doubt that a person can reject offered grace, resist the Holy Spirit working to produce faith, and reject it. God does not draw and convert people by His absolute power but does so according to the order He has instituted. On the other hand, it is certain that a person can be concerned about his salvation, take care of the means to it, hear the Word of the Lord, and receive and study it eagerly, striving to learn and understand the truth, as the Bereans did. Those who do this, God deems worthy of greater aids to understand the Word, recognize their sins, and believe the promises of the Gospel. Not that these actions, however performed, have great dignity or merit, but because God wants this honor to be given to His Word, this order to be observed, and these actions to be performed by man before He provides greater and more special and supernatural aids."

XXXVIII. Although, according to his and other theologians of his school, the Word of the Gospel is the ordinary means without which God is not effective in procuring the salvation of men, they believe that those who do not hear or preach this Word can, if they will, obtain grace by which they are led to true and saving conversion, provided they do what is within their power and rightly use the gifts left in corrupt nature. For God does not fail to grant grace to those who do what is in their power, and He is ready to provide sufficient means for salvation to all and each, unless they fail through their own fault by neglecting their duty.

XXXIX. After Calixtus raises the question of how those who neither live among Christians nor have ever heard anything about Christ can come to faith, given that they alone are allowed to hear the Word, he responds that all humans have some powers of intellect and will and natural knowledge, which if they use rightly, they will take care of their salvation and strive for it as much as they can. He gives the example of Cornelius the Centurion and the Eunuch of the Queen of Candace and then adds that if others, unlike them, neglect the available means and aids, suppress their innate lights, and hold the truth in unrighteousness, they prevent themselves from receiving a clearer light, not by fate or divine decree but by their own fault.

XL. Similarly, Johannes Henichius teaches that God is indeed ready to grant grace to all men by which they can be converted and saved, but it often depends on the men themselves that such grace is not granted by the most gracious Lord. Those who do not exchange the natural law inscribed in the hearts of all mortals for falsehood and who glorify God as much as He can be known and worshiped naturally will certainly not be deprived of further grace but will be led by God's kindness to the knowledge of His Word, by which, being granted grace, they can believe and convert.

XLI. After trying to prove his point from the Apostle's statement that God allowed the Gentiles to walk in their own ways, showing His presence by giving them rain from heaven, fruitful seasons, and filling their hearts with food and gladness, and elsewhere manifesting to them what can be known of God so that they are without excuse because, though they knew God, they did not glorify Him as God, he adds that it is known that God does not fail to grant His grace to those who do what is in their power.

XLII. In the following statements, he explains that God wants everyone to be called and given the Gospel, provided everyone does what is in their power and does not, through their own fault, place an obstacle to God who is ready to give the Gospel. Those who do what is in their power, using the light of nature correctly, and where the light of nature fails, seek a higher principle, approaching places where the Word of God is preached with a desire for salvation, to seek counsel for their ignorance.

XLIII. To show that his opinion is not Pelagian, he says Pelagius erred in claiming that natural powers left to man are sufficient for supernatural acts. He argues that there is nothing absurd in saying that natural powers can perform what does not exceed natural powers, such as the act he attributes to a person doing what is in him before grace. Pelagius also claimed that special and internal grace is given according to merits, or works performed by the powers left to nature, which indeed merit grace. In contrast, the acts performed by a person, according to him,

do not merit God's greater aids but are only considered as an occasion accepted by God to exercise His kindness.

XLIV. To further show that he does not agree with the Semi-Pelagians, he states that Semi-Pelagians are primarily criticized for affirming that natural powers not yet prevented and excited by grace can achieve the invocation of God, the desire for regeneration and faith, or the inclination to believe and a beginning of faith. However, he insists that the true use of natural light, which he attributes to a person before the help of grace, does not connect so directly with faith as to be considered a disposition or beginning of it. (Dissertation cited above, chapter 1, Response to the first objection).

XLV. Having briefly explained the doctrines of both the Roman school and the Protestants on the present question, it may be of interest to many to know what the modern Greeks think about this matter. We can learn this from Metrophanes Critopoulos, formerly a Hieromonk and Proto-Synkellos in the Church of Constantinople, later reportedly the Patriarch of Alexandria. His book, written in this very century, is titled Confession of the Catholic and Apostolic Church in the East, which was translated into Latin by Johannes Horneius, a professor at the University of Helmstedt. In this book, Metrophanes succinctly and clearly explains the doctrine of the Greek Church, addressing the topic of predestination in a specific chapter, the fourth of his work, and simultaneously, due to the connection of the arguments, he discusses grace and free will. First, he asserts that man, through sin, has been deprived of spiritual light and the ability to attain it, thus becoming spiritually dead regarding free will in this matter. Nevertheless, he maintains that the natural light, or natural law, which distinguishes good from evil, remains, and according to this natural law, he affirms that a fallen man can use it for both good and evil.

XLVI. Furthermore, according to him, the proper use of this natural light does not consist in not sinning or doing nothing evil, for that, he says, is spiritual and the greatest gift of God to rational creatures. Rather, it consists in not always obeying the desires of the mind, like brute animals, and when something evil is committed, to acknowledge and erase it without glorying or boasting about it, but to be ashamed, as befits a rational being, when one acts as brutes do. He abuses the natural light who refuses to acknowledge the evil he has committed and is not filled with any shame for it, not indeed for God's sake, which would be spiritual, but at least to give this honor to right reason.

XLVII. From what Scripture says, that the thoughts of man are inclined towards evil, he notes that this does not mean that man cannot resist any evil, nor can he do otherwise than to always incline towards evil. Rather, this statement simply signifies that man is prone to sin and tends towards it.

XLVIII. He further adds that God illuminates all those who use natural light rightly and according to reason, and revives free will, which was dead through transgression, by His grace. However, he does not consider the legitimate use of natural light to be the cause of this good, nor does he think that God is obligated to give these predicted goods to those who rightly use the

innate light, but as a prudent being, He does not want to grant spiritual light to those who willingly abuse their natural light.

XLIX. He illustrates this point with the following example: Suppose there is a good man who is a great lover of the poor and, driven by his goodness, prescribes for himself a law to give a drachma daily to a poor person. When he leaves his house, he seeks someone worthy of alms and encounters two beggars. One is a drunkard, a trifler, proud, squandering all he collects with whores and in taverns. The other is meek, humble, miserable in appearance and voice. To whom will the good man give the drachma, driven by his goodness to give it? Certainly to the latter, any sane person would say. But what is the simple reason that the good man is impelled to give a drachma to one of the poor? The sole reason is the giver's goodness. But as to why he gives it to this one and not to the other, the primary and principal cause is the giver's prudence; the secondary and less principal cause is the miserable condition of the recipient, which the good and prudent man pities. He then adds, "We must think of God in the same way: for while the only cause for God absolutely wanting to impart His grace to some is His own goodness, the reason He imparts it to these and not to those is primarily His prudence and wisdom, which wisely governs all things, and secondarily the capacity of the recipients, although no one has anything of such value in himself to attract such great and vast and eternal gifts of God.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:

In which is explained

THE DOCTRINE OF THE ROMAN SCHOOL

Regarding the Question,

Whether a Man in the State of Sin, by the Power of Nature Alone, Can Prepare and Dispose Himself for Grace?

Thesis I

In the previously published theses, we have shown that the Doctors of the Roman School agree that a person fallen into sin cannot, by their own powers and without some special assistance from God, do anything that contributes to their eternal salvation and pertains to true piety towards God. At the same time, we have clearly shown that many Doctors of the same School teach doctrines that contradict this, attributing to human natural abilities what should be considered as true piety towards God and conducive to eternal salvation, although they do not acknowledge it. One topic has been deliberately omitted by us and reserved for a separate discussion, which, although it greatly contributes to salvation, is attributed by many theologians of that School to human free will without any special assistance from God. Specifically, they affirm that a person corrupted by sin can, by their own powers, prepare and dispose themselves for the grace of Christ.

II. To understand their doctrine more distinctly, it must be noted that in the Roman School, a distinction is made between two types of grace: one habitual, by which a person is formally constituted as just, often called grace absolutely and by excellence; the other actual, by

which a person is moved to acts of faith, hope, and repentance, by which they are usually disposed to justification. First, regarding that habitual and justifying grace, the Roman School questions whether a person can, by their own powers and without special assistance from God, prepare and dispose themselves to obtain it.

III. Indeed, many renowned theologians in the Roman School have openly taught that a person can keep the precepts of natural law by their own powers, and thus do what that law commands, such as loving God above all things, and from that love, sorrow for committed sins, and make a firm resolution to avoid sin in the future; and that this can dispose them to the grace of justification, so that it is not due to them by condign merit, but by congruous merit, that is, not from justice, but from a certain appropriateness of divine goodness.

IV. This opinion is attributed by Vasquez to Scotus, Gabriel Biel, and Cardinal Cajetan, who, according to his testimony, affirm that a person can, by their own powers, feel sorrow for sins because they love God above all things, and that this is the ultimate disposition to habitual justifying grace, and a merit for it, not indeed condign, but congruous. Moreover, this contrition, later informed by habitual grace, becomes meritorious of the kingdom of heaven by condign merit. He adds that these doctors differ only in that Scotus says justification does not happen immediately but after a brief continuation of that contrition; while Gabriel and Cajetan affirm it happens at the same moment.

V. In truth, Gabriel teaches that there is a twofold disposition for Grace: one preliminary and the other concomitant. The preliminary disposition, which is insufficient, consists, in his opinion, of the initial acts of considering sin and the offense against God, which dispose a person to elicit from natural powers an act or movement of loving God above all things. However, this love of God above all things, elicited naturally, is the concomitant disposition, with which grace or charity is infused. For according to him, when an act of love of God above all things is elicited from natural powers, that is the immediate, sufficient, and ultimate disposition fitting one to receive grace; and with its presence, grace is immediately infused.

VI. Elsewhere, he teaches that an unbeliever does what is in them, by the powers of nature, to be justified immediately by God's grace when they conform their free will to natural reason and wholeheartedly seek to be enlightened to know the truth and justice. Similarly, a believer does what is in them, according to the rule of faith, when they detest sin and resolve to obey God for His sake, all of which can be done by the powers of nature without any prior grace.

VII. The history of the Council of Trent shows that the Franciscans ardently defended the aforementioned opinion of Gabriel and Scotus in that Council, affirming that moral works done by natural powers before grace truly and properly prepare a person for justification and that they infallibly and by a certain law deserve it congruously. Moreover, they claimed that a person, by nature, can feel such sorrow for sin that they merit its remission congruously.

VIII. After the determinations of the Council of Trent on this matter, in the sixty-fourth year of the last century, Johannes de Combis, a Doctor of Theology of the Order of Minors, published anew and illustrated with notes a compendium of the whole truth of theology, in which the twelfth chapter of the fifth book begins thus: "Although no one merits the first grace for

themselves, as stated, a sinner can habilitate themselves for grace by doing what is within them, because grace is not denied to anyone who does so. This is not due to condign merit but to congruous merit." Referring to the previous chapter, he alludes to the statement: "Therefore, it must be said that no one merits the first grace for themselves by condign merit, but only by congruous merit."

IX. Durandus also seems to have held a similar opinion. He not only taught that a person, without grace and by the powers of nature, can fulfill divine precepts to the extent that they do everything required by the law, but also affirmed that without a supernatural gift and special movement of the Holy Spirit, a person can prepare themselves for habitual grace by performing moral good through natural powers. For, he says, if special assistance is understood as the immediate movement of the will by God, a person can prepare themselves for grace without such assistance because moral good has an immediate order to grace.

X. He admits, however, that a person cannot prepare for grace without some external aids of divine providence, such as external admonition by another person or physical illness or something similar. Responding to the first argument, he says: "It must be said that spiritual death is worse than bodily death concerning the act it deprives; but it is better concerning the aptitude it leaves in the subject, by which one can prepare to recover the life of grace, which is not the case in bodily nature."

XI. William Estius of Auxerre, Thomas of Strasbourg, and even Almainus from the older Scholastics held the same opinion. Among modern theologians, Alphonsus à Castro, in his second book on the Penal Law, chapter fourteen, teaches that a person, using their natural abilities and free will to do what is within them concerning the observance of the natural law, receives God's grace at the same moment because divine goodness does not allow a person living morally justly to be deprived of grace even for a moment, even if they are not yet imbued with faith in Christ or place their hope in Christ. Estius also states that Alphonsus fought so strongly for this opinion that he condemned any different opinion as impious and heretical, not without great audacity.

XII. Furthermore, this doctrine seems to be openly contradictory to the Council of Trent, where it was defined that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit, no one can love or repent in the manner required to be granted the grace of justification. For, as Canon III of Session VI states: "If anyone says that without the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His assistance, a person can believe, hope, love, or repent as they ought, so that the grace of justification is bestowed upon them, let him be anathema." Therefore, if anyone can, by natural powers, feel sorrow for sins because they love God above all things and thus immediately prepare themselves for the grace of justification, such that justification is due to them congruously, then the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit is not necessary for a person to dispose themselves through acts of love and repentance for that grace. Consequently, after the promulgation of the Council of Trent, the opinion that a person, without special assistance from God, can prepare themselves directly and sufficiently for the grace of justification was commonly rejected in the Roman School.

XIII. However, not far from this is the doctrine attributed by Estius to Dominic Soto, Melchior Cano, Francisco de Vitoria, and many others, who he claims taught that attrition, which alone with the sacrament suffices to obtain the grace of justification, can be achieved by natural powers alone. Since, as the same Estius observes, no adult is justified without the necessary preparation before receiving the sacrament, if mere attrition obtained by natural faculties suffices for justification with the sacrament, it clearly follows that a person can prepare themselves for the grace of justification by natural powers alone, without the assistance of grace.

XIV. Indeed, not only before but also after the very canon of Trent, there were many in the Roman School who taught that a person cannot, without special assistance from divine grace, dispose themselves directly and immediately for justification; but they can, by natural powers alone, obtain and receive the assistance they need to dispose themselves directly and immediately for habitual and justifying grace. This disposition is remote and indirect preparation for justification. This opinion is attributed by Vasquez to Richard, Antonio Pantoja, and many others who, according to his testimony, attribute some disposition to our free will towards justifying grace, not proximate but remote, and as Richard calls it, indirect, by which a person obtains from God the assistance of grace, through which they are promoted to justice.

XV. According to these theologians, a person does not dispose themselves directly and immediately for habitual grace by their own powers; however, they do dispose themselves for actual grace, by which they are prepared for habitual grace, through morally good works performed by the free will alone, without special assistance from God. These works can be called remote dispositions for grace, absolutely so called, that is, justifying. Recent theologians testify to this, stating that just as one sin is often permitted as a punishment for another, so often God assists one person more quickly and readily than another due to almsgiving and other morally good works done by someone in mortal sin, so that they may rise from sin. In this way, such works can rightly be called remote dispositions for grace.

XVI. This doctrine is also taught by Johannes Driedo and Ruardus Tapper, professors at Louvain. They teach that when someone uses natural powers well by exercising some good moral works, God in His mercy is ready to bestow the assistance of His grace, by which they are gradually disposed to the remission of sins. Tapper affirms that while it is an injury to divine grace to say that a person can, by the innate stimuli of the natural law, through the power of free will, believe, please God, live without sin, or live justly and rightly, it does not seem to derogate from the same grace to say that a person, by the innate stimuli of the natural law alone, can prepare and make themselves apt for the assistance of God, which will come to them not because they deserve to be assisted but because they show themselves to be so docile and tractable that it befits God's goodness to assist them, especially if, by the light of internal reason, they sigh towards one God known from the creation of the world, love Him as a parent, and do not do to others what they would not want to be done to themselves.

XVII. A little earlier, Tapper affirms that most scholastics teach that it is within the power and ability of any person to be infused with faith and charity, even though they cannot have it by themselves. For they can do something, by doing which they will receive faith and

charity, given by God according to His infallible ordinance, just as someone in a house with all windows closed cannot illuminate themselves or produce light in their eyes but can open a window, by which light will immediately come to them.

XVIII. However, Tapper later denies that a person can prepare themselves in a way that they are sufficiently and ultimately prepared to receive the grace of justification, without the prior movement of God inspiring the beginnings of some gratuitous faith or charity. "A person left to themselves, without any gratuitous assistance from God, doing what is within them, does not show themselves so docile and tractable as to make themselves apt and sufficiently prepared to receive the grace of God, namely habitual and justifying grace, without the prior movement and inspiration of God, by which some beginnings of faith and a pious affection towards God are received."

XIX. This doctrine of Tapper can be seen almost in the same words expressed by Johannes Driedo. For he says: "It is an injury to divine grace to say that a person, by the innate stimuli of the natural law alone, through the power of free will, can live justly and rightly, be without sin, and please God; this is indeed an impious and long-condemned Pelagian heresy. However, it does not seem to derogate from the same grace to say that someone, by the innate stimuli of the natural law alone, can prepare and make themselves apt for the assistance of God, which will come to them not because they deserve to be assisted but because they show themselves to be so docile and tractable that it befits God's goodness to assist them, especially if, by the light of internal reason, they sigh towards one God known from the creation of the world, love Him as a parent, and do not do to others what they would not want to be done to themselves; even if they sometimes transgress the precepts of the natural law due to some passion or occasion, they sigh to God, the author of the natural law."

XX. Driedo adds that in this argument, we must be circumspect not to fall into agreement with the heresy of the Pelagians, who erred among other things in saying that people, without the gratuitous assistance of God, could sufficiently prepare themselves for grace. For, as he says, it is evident from the word of Christ, "No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws them." Therefore, after the fall of Adam, a person left to themselves with only the talents of nature, doing what is within them, but not having the internal drawing of the heavenly Father, cannot come to Christ, and thus cannot sufficiently prepare themselves for grace. Hence, he says, such a person will not receive justifying grace unless there is a special movement from God, suggesting internally to the soul, so that it consents to God, the author of gratuitous justifying grace, while dissenting from sins. Therefore, no one, doing what is within them, without the inspiration of God giving some beginnings of gratuitous faith or charity, sufficiently prepares themselves for grace.

XXI. However, the far more common opinion among recent Doctors of the Roman School is that no one can prepare themselves for grace by their own powers, either mediately or immediately, either proximally or remotely, that is, either by doing those things which, according to the order established by God, merit the infusion of habitual grace, or at least by obtaining the assistance of actual grace, by which they are prepared for habitual grace.

XXII. To illustrate this point with a few examples among many, Peter of Saint Joseph supports this part with his resolution: "A person cannot, either proximally or remotely, dispose themselves to habitual grace without the assistance of grace." He offers the reasoning that the beginning of justification starts with remote dispositions, which are the work of God's grace. For, in every good work, God begins, not us, according to the Councils received in the Roman Church. ("*Idea Theologiae Speculativae*," Book 4, Chapter 5, Resolution 5.)

XXIII. Similarly, the Toulouse professor Puteanus, following Thomas, teaches that no one can absolutely dispose themselves to obtain justifying grace without a particular gift from God. He asserts that this doctrine pertains to the teachings of the Catholic faith, as defined in the Council of Orange II and also in the Council of Trent, Chapter 11, Session 6, which states that the beginning of our salvation is from God, and in Session 16, Chapter 4, which defines that even imperfect contrition is a gift from God. Although he tries to excuse those who say that actions done without a special gift from God can be dispositions for justifying grace—not indeed proximate, but only very remote—because those who morally act well without grace are not so indisposed to justifying grace, he still teaches that it is more correct to simply deny that such actions dispose to grace because it is true that those in whom morally good works are found do not have as many obstacles to grace. However, it is false that there are any dispositions in them. ("*Quaestio 109*, Art. 6.")

XXIV. Similarly, Stapleton denies that any purely moral works produced by the powers of nature alone can dispose or prepare a person for Christian righteousness or merit anything that pertains to spiritual life or glory. ("*Prolegomena I*," in Book 4, "*De Justificatione*.")

XXV. Even Molina himself admits that free will, without special assistance or a supernatural gift from God, can do nothing in any way proportionate to a supernatural end, and consequently cannot be a proximate or remote disposition for justifying grace. He states, "Our free will, with only the general concurrence of God, can do nothing that merits eternal life or increases grace, nor can it be proportionate in any way to a supernatural end, even as a remote disposition to grace, both in terms of the will and the intellect. For all these things, it needs supernatural assistance, either through the immediate influx of God or through a supernatural habit granted for that purpose." ("*Quaestio 14*, Art. 13, *Disputatio 6*.")

XXVI. However, among those who teach that no one can dispose themselves to grace by their own powers, either proximally by doing things that immediately result in the infusion of habitual grace, through which a person is regenerated and sanctified, or remotely by performing actions that obtain the assistance of actual grace, by which they are prepared for habitual grace, many undermine and destroy this claim in practice. First, they simultaneously teach that despite this, a person corrupted by sin can, by their own powers and without any gift or supernatural assistance from God, perform all the acts necessary to prepare and dispose themselves for justifying and sanctifying grace with divine assistance. For example, they can give firm and certain assent to all that God has revealed in His word, love God above all things sincerely and with a firm resolve to please God in all things, and regret sins committed against God not only out of fear of impending hellish punishments but from love of God and a sense of divine

goodness. Additionally, they can resolve to avoid sins and abstain from anything that contradicts the love and affection of God and ultimately hope for forgiveness and trust in divine mercy. Molina, along with many scholastics, believes that a fallen person can perform all these acts by the natural powers of free will with only the general concurrence of God.

XXVII. But what is more astonishing and contrary to the common Christian sense and evangelical doctrine than to claim that a sinner can believe the whole word of God, love God sincerely and above all things, detest their sins, resolve to live a better life, and hope for mercy and forgiveness from God, and yet such a person has no, not even a remote, disposition to grace? What else does it mean to turn to God if not this? And can someone be turned away from God while they believe God's word, trust in His promises, love God sincerely and above all things, weep over their sins, and resolve to please God in all things and avoid all offenses against Him? Or can it be that someone can be thus turned to God and yet be considered in a state of perdition and insufficiently disposed to receive the forgiveness of sins and the sanctifying Spirit from God, even though God repeatedly swears in His word that He does not desire the death of the sinner but that they should turn and live?

XXVIII. It is plainly frivolous to say, as Molina and others do, that the acts listed are indeed dispositions for justifying grace if they are performed from some supernatural principle, from which they receive proportion to a supernatural end, such as the salvation obtained for us by Christ. But if they are performed by the natural powers of free will, not transcending the ends of nature, they cannot be proportionate to a supernatural end. For the acts of believing, repenting, hoping, and loving do not dispose one to receive the forgiveness of sins and the sanctifying Spirit because they are done with supernatural assistance, but because God has promised His grace in the Gospel to such acts and has declared by His good pleasure that He will forgive the sins of those who believe, repent, hope, and love, and will give them the Spirit of sanctification. It is not necessary for supernatural assistance that such acts, which could otherwise be naturally elicited by the powers of free will, become supernatural and have a proportion to a supernatural end. Instead, it is required that humans, by the aid of supernatural assistance, can perform those acts which transcend the powers of corrupt nature and by which they can obtain the grace promised by God.

XXIX. Indeed, it cannot be denied in any way that such acts prepare people to receive God's grace if they are done as prescribed in the Gospel. For they do not otherwise prepare for grace except because God has promised His grace to those who believe, love, hope, and repent as they are commanded in the Gospel. And there is no doubt that God has promised His grace to all who believe, hope, love, and repent as they are commanded to do in the Gospel. Nor is it any less certain that the Gospel does not command people to believe, love, etc., from a supernatural principle that is not within their power. The same Molina and others teach that people can, with only the general concurrence of God, avoid the sin of unbelief if the Gospel is fittingly proposed to them, and therefore also avoid the sin of impenitence and similar sins that violate the precepts of the Gospel. Consequently, those precepts simply oblige us to do what they command in substance, not necessarily with supernatural assistance. From all this, it follows that the

aforementioned acts dispose to grace as they can be performed in accordance with the Gospel's prescription, not because they are performed with supernatural assistance.

XXX. However, although Molina and his followers deny that people are disposed to grace through the acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting, which they assume can be elicited by the natural powers of free will with only the general concurrence of God, they still attribute things to these acts that result in people being truly disposed to grace. They teach that whenever a person, by their natural powers, undertakes any work that pertains to justification, God is always ready to assist them to complete it as is necessary for salvation. Thus, no one naturally elicits those acts of believing, hoping, etc., without obtaining from God the assistance by which they can be immediately and proximally disposed to justification. Therefore, those acts dispose for justification at least mediately and remotely.

XXXI. Indeed, Molina's doctrine is clear: "Just as God is always present through His general concurrence with free will, enabling it to choose as it pleases, so too is He present with sufficient grace whenever free will, by its natural powers, undertakes any work related to justification, enabling it to accomplish it as needed for salvation. He asserts that every person who does what they can naturally will always receive sufficient assistance from God for faith and justification. He affirms that whenever free will endeavors by its natural powers to perform acts related to faith and justification, God grants prevenient grace or assistance necessary to perform these acts properly for salvation. Not because such effort merits these aids in any way, but because Christ's merits obtained this for us. Both Christ and the eternal Father established laws whereby, whenever we strive to do what is in us by our natural powers, the aids of grace will be provided to accomplish them as needed for salvation, so that while we are on the journey, our salvation always depends on our free will, and it remains within our power not to turn to God." (Disputation 10, Article 13, Question 14.)

XXXII. According to Molina's opinion, human salvation in some way depends on the natural powers of free will. Even those not yet prevented by God's grace have the power to become children of God. He says, "To that extent, they were given the power to become children of God, that if they strive as much as they can, God will assist them to attain faith and grace and will not let them be disappointed in their desire." He later adds, "If God is not always present with prevenient grace or assistance when someone strives by their natural powers to embrace faith or grieve over their sins, how can it be true that God wills all men to be saved?" (In the same Disputation.)

XXXIII. Although Molina asserts that it always depends on us whether we turn to God and receive faith and grace, because God is always ready to assist us if we strive and do what we can by the powers of nature, he nevertheless teaches that all these efforts and natural acts, which we perform in substance as God commands and by which people are usually disposed to justifying grace, are not true dispositions to that grace. These acts do not merit grace nor is it owed to them in any way, but their efficacy is solely due to Christ's merit and God's pure benevolence towards us, as we have previously mentioned.

XXXIV. Molina explains his view more precisely in the previously mentioned Disputation Nine on the same Article. Speaking of the grace by which the act of believing is formed in us as needed for salvation, he says: "Whatever a person does by their natural powers alone—whether to give natural assent to revealed truths, to wish to believe after being taught that supernatural assent is necessary for salvation, to strive by natural powers to receive divine assistance, or to ask for that assistance or to prepare themselves to receive it—none of this is of any merit or efficacy to obtain prevenient grace. Whenever grace is given, it is entirely due to Christ's merits and God's gratuitous gift, and thus it is mercifully given to a subject not only unworthy but also unworthy because of sin, at least original sin, in which they exist, and grace is given purely gratuitously to anyone to whom it is given."

XXXV. To further clarify how human free will and natural powers relate to our salvation, and how God's internal drawing and calling induce and compel someone to perform acts of faith and contrition for salvation, Molina philosophizes in Disputation Nine. He says, "It is evident that God's internal calling greatly depends on the free will of the one being called. This is because they could have chosen to attend or not to attend to hear or read God's word, from which they might gain knowledge and be called to faith. Even after attending, they could have turned their thoughts elsewhere and not focused on the teachings proposed for belief. Lastly, they could have approached with the intention of learning and embracing what is true and good, or with the intention of mocking or opposing what was said. Although God does not call someone to faith because of any merit, He often mercifully calls those who persistently resist and contradict. Nonetheless, one who approaches with the intention of obeying and embracing the truth is less unworthy of being supernaturally assisted and called than one who approaches with a malicious intent. It is most reasonable for God to mercifully assist the one less unworthy and less unfit to receive God's gifts."

XXXVI. Molina adds that the same understanding applies to the internal stirring of a believer to repentance through prevenient grace, as it greatly depends on each person's free will. This is because people freely choose to listen to sermons, read the Holy Scriptures, pray, meditate on spiritual matters, and engage in similar activities that typically stir pious thoughts. As the will is stirred, God intervenes, infusing a feeling of supernatural love or fear, thereby preventing, attracting, and inviting the will to contrition or attrition, which, with the sacrament, suffices for obtaining forgiveness.

XXXVII. Although Molina and his followers do not claim that a person can dispose themselves to either habitual justifying grace or prevenient actual grace by the natural powers of free will, which would remotely dispose them to habitual grace, it is clear from what we have reported that they admit at least some conditions dependent on free will. These conditions, without which God does not usually give His grace, He grants infallibly and according to His established law due to Christ's merits. They do not claim that God, for instance, usually calls people internally to faith and repentance other than those who approach to hear or read His word, pay attention, and focus on what is proposed for belief with the intention of learning and embracing what is true and good—all of which can be done by the natural powers of nature.

They also assert that everyone who performs the acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting in substance by natural powers and desires to do them as needed for salvation, asking for the necessary assistance to do so, infallibly receives the saving grace of God. All these acts can be performed by the natural powers of free will.

XXXVIII. However, other theologians of the Roman school not only deny that a person can dispose themselves to any grace by their natural powers, either proximally or remotely, mediately or immediately, but they also teach that there are no conditions on the part of humans, either without which or by which God grants the first grace. There are no conditions by which a person prepares themselves in any way, even minimally, to receive grace.

XXXIX. William Estius particularly emphasizes and urges this point. He strongly argues using the Canon of the Council of Orange, which condemns anyone who claims that divine mercy is granted to those who desire, strive, labor, ask, seek, or knock without acknowledging that these actions can be done rightly only by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. It condemns those who resist the Apostle Paul, who says, "What do you have that you did not receive?" and "By the grace of God, I am what I am." (In the Second Book of Sentences, Distinction 26, Section 34.) Estius endeavors to prove that no one can prepare themselves for grace without grace.

XL. In Section Thirty, he explains the sense in which the Fathers defined against the Pelagians that grace is not given according to our merits. He observes that by grace, they understood not only the gift of habitual grace but generally all grace given by God through Christ, including special assistance and any effect of this grace—that is, every good of a person pertaining to piety and the salvation of eternal life. Similarly, by merit, they meant not only what is called condign merit but any preparation or disposition that could obtain or deserve something to be given by another, whether it be condign merit, congruent merit, or even something less than both. In short, they meant any good that in some way provokes retribution or any good preceding another that can be acquired with its consideration. To clarify further, he adds that merit with respect to grace means whatever has some order towards obtaining grace. Therefore, the Fathers' position, when they said grace is not given by merit, is that a person by themselves and their own powers can have no preparation for God's grace, nor can they do anything good to provoke or invite God's beneficence towards them concerning eternal salvation.

XLI. Thus, Estius asserts that the common saying of the Schools, "To the one who does what is in themselves, God grants grace," should be understood not about the one who does what is in themselves by the powers of nature, but about the one who does what is within their power with the help of God's moving grace. Such a person receives further grace, such as justifying grace or its increase, or even explicit and perfect faith if they previously had only imperfect or implicit faith. He rejects the claim that someone doing what they can by natural powers will always receive grace, not because of any merit or by considering their actions as preparations for grace, but purely out of God's liberality and mercy. This assertion, he says, cannot stand unless it is understood that God gives grace because the person does what is in themselves, implying that some reason for giving grace exists on the part of the person. Such a reason can only be

meritorious according to the general meaning of merit he previously explained. Hence, the statement that God grants grace to someone because they do what is in themselves does not align with the idea of God giving grace purely out of liberality and mercy. (In the same Distinction, Section 35.)

XLII. The same doctrine can be found more extensively explained in Alvares. In the seventh book on the Aids of Divine Grace, disputation fifty-five, this is his second conclusion: "No remote disposition to grace can be had by the natural faculty alone; whether it is to seek, desire grace, or anything else: rather, a special aid of prevenient grace is necessarily required for it." Subsequently, he adds this third conclusion: "The opinion that asserts that due to alms and other morally good works performed by someone in mortal sin, God grants grace assistance more readily or sooner to one than another, according to an ordinary law, is against St. Augustine, St. Prosper, and St. Thomas."

XLIII. In the following disputation, addressing the question of whether God infallibly grants the aids of prevenient grace to those who, by their natural faculties alone, do all they can, according to a certain law, so that they can execute it as needed for salvation, he states this conclusion, which is the first of that disputation: "There was never any law established of giving the aids of prevenient grace to those doing all that is in them by the natural faculty alone, nor did Christ our Lord merit or intend such a law to exist." He adds the reason: "For if the aids of prevenient grace were given by any law and agreement to those doing all they can by natural faculties, they would be given to them out of justice based on a divine pact and agreement; since whatever is given by law and pact to a person working is given to them out of at least imperfect justice. Thus, those aids would be in some way owed to works, and so would not be mere gifts of grace, because 'If by grace, then it is no longer by works; otherwise, grace is no longer grace.' (Romans 11:6)"

XLIV. His second conclusion is: "It is false that is asserted in the first statement of the first opinion, namely, that according to the ordinary law or common mode that God observes, He does not give the aids of prevenient grace unless to those doing what is in them by the natural faculty." The reason is that otherwise, according to the ordinary law and common mode that God observes, the aid of grace would be subordinate to human humility or obedience, and that God, according to the same law and mode that He observes, would wait for our will to grant us the initial aids of prevenient grace; both of which are against the Canon of the Second Council of Orange. Moreover, the grace called prevenient would not truly be such but would be preceded by nature and the created will.

XLV. Elsewhere, Alvares denies that the internal excitation of the one called depends on their effort and industry, even as a condition without which it does not happen. That is if we speak of effort and industry proceeding from the natural faculties alone. For if we speak of effort and industry proceeding from some prior aid of exciting grace, there is no inconvenience in admitting that one internal excitation depends on another and presupposes it, according to the common mode that God observes in calling and exciting people. Thus, the excitation to the act of repentance depends on the excitation to the act of fear of hell's punishments. The excitation to

pious thoughts, desires, and prayers, by which a sinner knocks at the door of divine mercy, precedes many other acts by which they are proximally disposed to justification. Indeed, approaching to hear the word of the Gospel, with the intention of attending to what is said and recognizing and embracing the truth, is not from us, by us, but by the aid of some prevenient grace. Thus, we ultimately come to the first excitation, or the first prevenient grace, which, even according to the common mode that God observes in calling people, does not depend on the effort and industry of the one called, as a condition without which it would not happen; so that the first beginning of salvation is attributed to God, the author of grace, and not to the natural faculty of our will. (Book 8, Disputation 78.)

XLVI. Bellarmine's doctrine in this matter is no different. He not only simply denies that a person can dispose themselves to receive grace by their natural faculties in any way; he adds that this should be understood to mean that a person cannot prepare themselves for the habit of grace, which makes them pleasing to God, nor for the special aid of grace; and again, not only can they not prepare themselves in such a way that grace is given to them out of condignity, but not even out of congruity; and finally, they can do nothing for which God is said to grant them grace. (Book 6 on Grace and Free Will, Chapter 5.)

XLVII. Therefore, in the following chapter, after addressing the common scholastic proposition, "To the one who does what is in them, God does not deny grace," which seems to imply that if someone does what they can by the natural faculties alone, they thereby dispose themselves to grace, or at least to special aid through which they are then prepared for grace, he responds: "Then grace is not denied to the one who does what is in them when a person cooperates with God's grace by which they are moved." He says, "To the one who does what is in them by their natural faculties alone, grace is not due, but punishment is; not for doing what they can by natural faculties alone, but because for one or another morally good deed, they undoubtedly commit many mortal sins." He adds that those who teach that a person, by doing what they can by natural faculties alone, disposes themselves to grace, either think that a person can, by their own faculties, desire and seek grace, which he considers to pertain to the Pelagian heresy, or they think that a person can, by their own faculties, observe all moral precepts and lead an innocent life according to reason, and by this moral sanctity provoke God to grant them special aid, by which they finally come to faith and grace, which is also akin to the same heresy.

XLVIII. Vasquez also adheres to this opinion. He says: "The Catholic opinion is that no cause, no beginning, nor any occasion can be conceived on the part of the predestined, for which God, either in time gave him grace, or decreed to give it in His foreknowledge. This doctrine must be understood not only of the beginning of faith, prayer, or the will to attain salvation, or of other works that in any way concern God, such as those of religion; but also of any work of moral virtue, which is referred to the sole good of honesty; so that no such thing can be the occasion or beginning of the donation or predestination of grace. Furthermore, we exclude not only the beginning that is a condign merit but also a congruent merit, or impetratory, or disposition; finally, any cause and occasion for which God has given or decreed to give grace to this person rather than another: so that the entire reason for preparing this person rather than

another for grace is the good pleasure of the divine will; and nothing, not even the slightest thing, from the part of the predestined." (In 1 Tho. q. 1, disp. 91, cap. 11.)

XLIX. Therefore, in the previous chapter, he teaches that the common proposition, "To the one who does what is in them, God does not deny grace," should be understood of the one who does what is in them not by natural faculties, but by the aid of grace; meaning that God does not deny further gifts of His grace necessary for salvation, but that person daily disposes themselves more for these.

L. Vasquez confirms his opinion again in the second volume of the first part of the Second Section: "The true opinion is that no work from us, that is, by the virtue of our own free will, nor the smallest thing, can precede as an occasion for us to be granted the first aid of grace." (Disp. 199, cap. 2. whose lemma is: No one by their own faculties can in any way prepare themselves for the first aid of grace.)

LI. Jansen particularly defends that human free will by its faculties can produce nothing to prepare for grace well. His reasons are that free will cannot perform any morally good work by its faculties and therefore cannot prepare or dispose itself to God's grace. He says, "For a work to dispose itself, or for which grace would be granted, it must at least be morally good." Then, whatever free will does before grace is a true sin. There is no hope of attaining grace by committing sin. Therefore, whatever precedes Christ's saving grace in a person, even faith in Christ, from which that saving grace begins, according to his opinion, is deserving of damnation: far from having any merit of grace or any order to grace.

LII. From this, he later concludes that there is no stable law for granting grace to those who do what is in them by the powers of nature. For he says, "There is no law or ordinance of God by which grace is conferred by a certain law to sinners and those who do no good work whatsoever. Rather, this happens entirely gratuitously, and according to the most profound and incomprehensible laws of divine governance, by which grace is sometimes given to the gravest sinners and denied to the most innocent." He adds that when it is asked whether grace is given by a stable law to those who do what is in them by the powers of nature, the question essentially is whether grace is given infallibly to those who sin less? It is clear from Scripture, from Augustine, and from experience that lesser sins are not the rule for the distribution of divine grace, nor is this taken into account in the bestowal of grace: there is nothing from which one can legitimately deduce the suspicion that grace is given to all who sin less. (On the Grace of Christ the Savior, Book 1, Chapter 5.)

THEOLOGICAL THESES:

In which the opinions of the Protestants and the Doctors of the Roman School are compared regarding the question:

Whether a person in the state of sin, by the powers of nature alone, can prepare and dispose themselves for grace?

In two previous Disputations, as clearly and candidly as we could, we expounded the doctrine of the Roman School regarding the question, 'Can a person, having fallen, prepare themselves for grace by the powers of nature alone, without special assistance from God?' And on this matter, we presented various opinions of its theologians. Then, we also reviewed the different opinions of Protestants on the same question; and we showed specifically what the so-called Reformed, the Remonstrants, and the Doctors of the Augsburg Confession teach about this matter. It remains for us to briefly compare these opinions and gather from what has been said what controversy remains in the Schools on this point.

II. First, it is clear from what has been expounded by us above that not all Doctors of the Reformed School agree among themselves, or at least do not speak in the same manner, concerning certain points related to the present question. For the Belgian Professors and Deputies of the South Holland Synod, in their judgments presented to the Synod of Dordrecht, do not want to say that God will grant saving grace to those who, after the fall, have rightly used the natural remnants of the image of God: and they condemn those who assert that God grants further grace and saving vocation to those who are upright and rightly use their natural or other gifts, even in those nations where nothing has ever been heard about the Gospel. On the contrary, Moses Amyraldus and other theologians of the Cameron School openly teach that God will not fail those who, being devoid of the evangelical knowledge of God and left only to nature, rightly use the powers and light granted to them by God and fulfill their duty towards God and neighbor as required by their state and condition. And so it would happen that God would not allow such people to perish, but would provide the necessary means for eternal salvation according to His wisdom.

III. In this matter, it is certain to me, and also conceded by the disciples of Cameron, that none of those who live under the law of nature alone and to whom the word of God has not yet come, can rightly use the light of nature and fulfill their duties towards God without the special assistance of God's grace, as required by right reason for that state. This is due to the extreme corruption of all human faculties derived from our first parent to all his descendants.

IV. It also seems entirely to be conceded, which the same disciples of Cameron do not deny, that the grace by which people are moved to perform their duties according to their state is not separate from the word of God, nor does God usually assist people with such grace without some form of instruction from His word: and therefore, according to the ordinary law, no one does what is their duty or rightly uses any gifts of God unless God has called them through His word.

V. But it seems harsh to us and alien to divine goodness to say that even if someone among Adam's descendants, who has never heard anything about the word of God, rightly and well uses the light of nature and is upright and God-fearing as much as that light suggests, God would nevertheless not grant such a person saving grace but would permit them to perish with others. For God does not abandon anyone unless He is first abandoned by them. And how could He, who does not delight in the death of the sinner but rather that they turn and live, and who does not want anyone to perish but all to come to repentance, willingly allow a rational creature

who fulfills their duty towards Him according to the rule of right reason and the light granted by Him to perish?

VI. Nor can I bring myself to believe that the intention of the Belgian Theologians at the Synod of Dordrecht was otherwise. For they are arguing against the Remonstrants, whom they assume held the opinion that a person, without the special assistance of divine grace, can rightly use the light and gifts of nature, and sometimes indeed uses them well; and that God, in fact, grants His grace to those who rightly use that light. Therefore, when they deny that God grants saving grace to those who have rightly used the gifts of nature, they seem to be impelled only by the thought that no one rightly uses those gifts or can use them without God's grace, which, however, God does not usually grant to those deprived of the word of the Gospel. But as to what God would do on the hypothesis that someone having no knowledge of the word of God used the light of nature in such a way as to fulfill their duties towards God as required by that light according to right reason, it is unlikely they even considered it.

VII. Moreover, it appears from the above that several Reformed School Doctors acknowledge that there are certain internal works in a person preceding and preparing for their vivification and regeneration: and therefore they posit that before the converting and regenerating grace, there is a certain initial grace that disposes and excites a person to conversion itself. Others, however, argue against this, asserting that the grace of regeneration is the first and is not preceded by any other grace: nor are there any works preceding regeneration that prepare a person for it.

VIII. These opinions, although seemingly contradictory, can nevertheless be reconciled. To understand this, it must be noted that the grace of regeneration is taken in three ways: broadly, more strictly, and most strictly. The grace of regeneration broadly encompasses the effects of the Holy Spirit in a person by which they are aroused from the death of sin and transferred to a state of grace and spiritual life. The grace of regeneration most strictly signifies a certain habitual transformation by which the habit of true justice and holiness is divinely infused into a person. In the intermediate sense, regeneration, besides that habitual transformation, includes those acts of faith and repentance in which our conversion to God consists.

IX. If the grace of regeneration is taken in the broadest sense, as it encompasses all the effects of the Holy Spirit by which we are aroused from the death of sin and promoted to a state of grace and justice, it is certain that a person is prepared for it by no works. For if certain works were granted as preparatory for the grace of regeneration in this respect, it would be necessary for them to come from the powers of nature alone; since they would precede all the effects of the Holy Spirit in us. But we have shown above that a person cannot in any way prepare themselves for grace by their own powers, and this is the common doctrine of the Reformers. Now, however, those theologians who simply deny that there are any works that prepare and dispose a person for regenerating grace take the grace of regeneration in this broadest sense.

X. But if the grace of regeneration is taken more strictly, as it begins with the acts of faith and repentance which constitute true conversion, as the British theologians do in their judgment presented to the Synod of Dordrecht, it is certain that there are certain effects of the Holy Spirit

by which people are usually prepared for it. For before the true and saving act of faith is formed in a person's heart, there are usually, by divine ordination, as those theologians rightly note, certain knowledge of the divine will, a sense of sin and horror of the divine curse announced to sinners in the law, some thought of deliverance and a desire for it, and other things of this kind. For it does not happen so suddenly that someone is changed from an unbeliever to a believer by the grace of God without having previously thought anything about themselves or God, nor having any concern for their own salvation.

XI. But if regeneration is taken in the strictest sense, namely, for that habitual renewal by which the Holy Spirit adorns a person with the habit of justice and holiness, as the Reformed Doctors take it when they distinguish regeneration from justification and teach that it is by nature posterior to justification, in this respect regeneration has not only the acts mentioned above but also the very acts of faith and repentance in which a person's conversion to God consists. For God does not usually grant the indwelling and sanctifying Spirit except to those who believe and repent. Moreover, faith and repentance are certain conditions antecedent to the justification of a sinner and consequently to their regeneration, which is by nature posterior to justification itself.

XII. Again, it must be observed here that a person's conversion can be considered in two ways: either according to those things that initiate it or according to those things that already constitute it as accomplished. This is what the Schools would say is in the making or in the doing. And thus, some things can pertain to a person's conversion as merely its rudiments and beginnings, by which, therefore, conversion is not immediately considered accomplished. Just as the foundations of a house initiate it and are part of it, but if one stops at them, the house is not therefore considered constructed. But other things pertain to a person's conversion in such a way that they constitute it as accomplished, and with these, conversion is considered done.

XIII. Indeed, this is why Reformed Theologians speak variously about those things which prepare and dispose for conversion. While some say that this or that act precedes a person's conversion, others deny this and affirm that such an act is part of conversion and pertains to it. For example, the British Theologians in their often-mentioned judgment place the desire for liberation and grace among the preparatory acts for a person's conversion: the Palatines, on the other hand, deny that such a desire is a preliminary condition for conversion. But the intent of the British Theologians is that before a person's conversion is accomplished, they must be touched by a desire for divine grace: and once such a desire is present, it cannot immediately be said that the person has turned to God. The Palatines, however, base their negation on the reason that such a desire and certain things of its kind begin conversion as its salutary beginnings and pertain to some initial faith.

XIV. Furthermore, from what we have reported above, it is evident that the Remonstrants, at least judging from their Synod, agree with the Reformed in that a person cannot in any way prepare or dispose themselves for saving grace by their own powers and without any special assistance from God. And although they think it is necessary to grieve for sins, seek grace, and have some concern and care for their own salvation to obtain faith and the Spirit of renewal, they also acknowledge that a person can do none of these things without grace. Indeed,

they also admit that the bestowal of divine grace and the saving call do not depend on any condition to be provided by human powers but should be referred to God's absolute good pleasure without regard to any preceding condition.

XV. They deny that all the works of unbelievers and those who lack the knowledge of God's word are to be considered sins and that their condemnation is thereby aggravated, but at the same time, they teach, as we have seen, that there are no works of such unbelievers that deserve to be called good according to the perfection that the law requires so as to be accepted for eternal life, and therefore cannot prepare a person for saving grace.

XVI. It is also clear from what has been said that many, at least from the Reformed School, concede to the Remonstrants that if anyone rightly and according to reason used the light of nature and sought God as much as that light requires, God would not fail them nor deny them the means necessary for salvation: and conversely, the Remonstrants would easily concede to the Reformed Doctors that no one can use the light of nature well and in that way perform their duty to God without some assistance from grace. But the difference is that the Remonstrants believe that such grace is commonly and ordinarily available to all those who live under the law of nature and to whom the word of God has not come; this, however, the Reformed Doctors deny.

XVII. It is also established from what has been said that the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession generally agree with the Reformed and the Remonstrants that a person cannot by the powers of free will, without special assistance, merit saving grace or prepare for it: but they nonetheless differ from both in that they suspend the bestowal of that saving grace on a condition to be provided by the powers of free will, and do not want God to ordinarily bestow it except to those who do what is in their power by the powers of nature in this respect. Hence, it follows that the reason why God grants the beginnings of saving grace to some rather than others is not simply to be referred to God's absolute good pleasure, as the Reformed assert and the Remonstrants admit, but also to something on the part of the person, dependent on their will. In this matter, we have also shown that the modern Greeks are of the same opinion as the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession.

XVIII. We have indeed shown that the Doctors of the Reformed School acknowledge that, according to the ordinary law, there are certain external works antecedent to conversion, which can be done by the powers of free will; such as reading or hearing the word of God, and at least giving the ears of the body to it, but they do not want these to be a condition on which the bestowal of grace is suspended; but rather the means by which God's providence brings to the communion of grace those to whom God has absolutely decreed to give it.

XIX. Therefore, what the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession affirm, that God never denies grace to one who does what is in them by the powers of nature, the Doctors of the Reformed School deny: because, according to their sense, a person left to themselves and by the powers of nature alone can never do anything that moves God to bestow His grace on one rather than another: although God would not deny it to a person doing what befits a rational creature and what is their duty according to any state in which they are found according to the order of divine providence. For because of the utmost corruption arising from sin and the depraved habits

with which the mind and will are wholly occupied, whatever a person does outside of grace, they do it badly, nor can they perform their duty in any state without God's assistance through His grace.

XX. Moreover, from what has been said above, it should be noted here in passing that certain things in the doctrine of the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession do not seem sufficiently coherent. For in the Book of Concord, in which they declare and expound their doctrine by common consent, they marvelously exaggerate the necessity of grace and the impotence of human free will for any salutary good. For they affirm that after the fall there remain no powers in a person by which they can prepare themselves for grace, apply, accommodate, and in any way turn themselves toward conversion, or do and contribute anything towards it, even in the slightest part. And so they say that all those who feel any spark and desire for divine grace and eternal salvation in their hearts can be certain that God Himself has kindled that beginning of true piety as a little flame in their hearts. And yet we have seen them teach that a person can, by their own powers, accept or reject the grace offered to them, and do those things by which God, according to the law established by Him, does not deny His grace and usually does not grant it without them. For to accept grace by one's own powers and to facilitate its effectiveness when the opposite is within one's power, is it not in some way to turn and accommodate oneself to grace by one's own powers? And to do those things by which God never denies the grace by which we are converted, is it not to contribute at least in the slightest part to one's own conversion?

XXI. Moreover, we have shown that among the natural acts which are within the power of people, they enumerate the study of learning and knowing the truth, some concern for their own salvation, and the care of the means to it. But how can this be reconciled with what we have just repeated from the Book of Concord, that all those who feel in their hearts any desire for divine grace and eternal salvation can be certain that God has kindled that very spark in their hearts?

XXII. Furthermore, we have shown elsewhere that the Theologians of the Augsburg Confession in their Apology for that Confession teach that a person outside of grace, even when performing the external works of the law's precepts, always sins, and does nothing that is truly and in the sight of God good. How then does this accord with what they also teach, that God does not deny His grace to one who does what is in them by the powers of nature, and provides the necessary means for salvation? For if, by their own admission, a person by the powers of nature and outside of grace does no good work, and whatever they do always sins against God, must it not be said that God does not deny His grace to one who, by those very actions by which they sin against God, does what is in them, and grants His grace according to a certain law?

XXIII. Moreover, from what we have elaborated in the earlier part of these Theses, it may be established that there is no controversy on this question between the Doctors of the Reformed School and Jansenists and their disciples. For Jansen, with the Reformers, acknowledges that a person by their own powers can do nothing to prepare themselves for the grace of good works. And this because a person by the powers of nature alone cannot even

morally act well; but whatever they do without God's grace is truly sin: and therefore something that merits damnation, far from being able to merit divine grace or be considered to have any order towards it. Thus, it is utterly false what many in the Schools hold, that God grants His grace to a person doing what is in them by the powers of nature, according to a stable law; since a person by themselves and by nature can do nothing except perhaps sin less: but it is clear from Scripture and experience that God's grace is not always given to those who sin less.

XXIV. It is also evident from this that, precisely regarding this question, there is no controversy between the Reformed and the more recent Thomists, such as Guilielmus Estius and Didacus Alvarez. For although they, along with the vast majority of the Roman School, teach that some morally good acts can be performed by a person in a state of sin without special divine grace, they nonetheless accurately teach and vigorously defend, as we have previously demonstrated at length, that there is no disposition or preparation in a person, either proximate or remote, or any good by which they may obtain the first grace from God or which has any order towards obtaining it. Therefore, the common axiom of the Schools, "To the one who does what is in themselves, God does not deny grace," must be understood not of the one who does what is in themselves by the powers of nature, but of the one who does what is in their power with the assistance of God's grace moving them.

XXV. Indeed, the internal excitation of the one who is called does not depend on any effort or industry proceeding from the powers of nature alone, even as any condition without which it would not occur. For example, if someone comes to hear the word of the Gospel with the intention of understanding what is said and accepting the truth, this is not from us or by us but by the assistance of some pre-operating grace. Finally, God does not grant the assistance of grace to one person more than another, nor does He assist one more quickly than another, according to the ordinary law, because of almsgiving and other morally good works done in mortal sin.

XXVI. Indeed, it is evident from the theses we have previously mentioned that some of the most celebrated Jesuits, namely Bellarmine and Vasquez, concede to the same opinion. We have shown that both teach that a fallen person cannot do anything by themselves for which God would grant them grace. Nor can any cause, beginning, or occasion be conceived on the part of a person by which God would grant grace to one rather than another, so that the whole reason for this lies in the good pleasure of divine will and not in any condition on the part of a person. Therefore, the saying "To the one who does what is in themselves, God does not deny grace" must be understood of the one who does what is in themselves by cooperating with the grace of God by which they are moved. For to the one who does what is in themselves by the powers of nature, grace is not due, but punishment is, because for one or two morally good things they might do, they will undoubtedly commit many mortal sins.

XXVII. But it is also clearly shown by the same theses that before the Council of Trent, it was a famous and widely approved opinion in the Roman School that a person could prepare and dispose themselves for grace by the powers of nature and without any special divine assistance, not only for actual and prevenient grace but also for habitual and justifying grace, and that they

could merit it, if not by condignity, at least by congruity. This was believed to be accomplished by performing what the moral law obliges and whose chief and sum is to love God above all things. Likewise, after the law was violated, to grieve for offending God out of love for Him and to adopt a firm resolution to avoid sin henceforth.

XXVIII. We have shown that this opinion was held by men of the greatest renown in the Roman School, such as John Duns Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel Biel, Almainus, Altissiodorensis, Thomas of Strasbourg, Cardinal Cajetan, and many others. And it was commonly followed by the Franciscans at the time of the Council of Trent because of the authority of their John Duns Scotus. Thus, even after the determinations of the Council of Trent on this matter, it was newly published with applause, and Alphonsus a Castro, a doctor of that order, so vehemently and vigorously defended it that he dared to accuse the opposing opinion of heresy.

XXIX. It is no less evident from the things set forth in these theses that all Protestants utterly abhor and unanimously condemn this opinion as openly contrary to the evangelical doctrine of the free salvation and justification obtained for us through Christ, which the Apostles so often inculcate and urge so diligently against its adversaries. Indeed, this is the chief error that the Protestants had in mind when they so ardently contended around the beginning of the previous century that the doctrine of our free justification in the Roman School was corrupted and depraved.

XXX. This is especially seen in the Augsburg Confession itself. For what it most strongly urges and opposes in the doctrine of the Doctors it combats is that a person cannot be justified before God by their own works or merits. For in Article IV, it declares that the churches of the Protestants teach with great consensus that "people cannot be justified before God by their own strength, merits, or works, but are justified freely for Christ's sake through faith when they believe that they are received into grace and their sins are forgiven for Christ's sake, who by His death has made satisfaction for our sins." And in Article V, it repeats that this is the doctrine of the Gospel, "that God justifies those who believe that they are received into grace for Christ's sake, not on account of our merits." Finally, at the end of the article, it condemns, along with the Anabaptists who reject the external ministry of the word, those who think that the Holy Spirit is given to people through their own preparations and works.

XXXI. Moreover, in Article VI, it reiterates that good works commanded by God are to be done because it is God's will, not that we should trust in them to merit justification before God. And in Article XX, explaining its purpose in this matter, it says, "Our teachers have reminded the churches that works cannot reconcile God or merit the forgiveness of sins, grace, and justification, but we obtain this only by faith when we believe that we are received into grace for Christ's sake, who alone is appointed as the Mediator and propitiatory by whom the Father is reconciled." Therefore, those who trust in their works to merit grace despise the merit and grace of Christ and seek, without Christ, by their own human strength, a way to God, when Christ Himself said, "I am the way, the truth, and the life." And later, to make their intention clearer, they express and confirm it with the very words of Ambrose, "The redemption by Christ's blood would become worthless, and the prerogative of human works would overshadow the mercy of

God if justification, which is by grace, were due to merits preceding it, so that it would not be a gift of the giver but a reward for the worker."

XXXII. The same is also evident from the Apology of the Protestants for the Augsburg Confession. For in the chapter on Justification, speaking of those things that the adversaries condemned in their Confession, they begin with these words: "In Articles IV, V, and VI, and later in Article XX, they condemn us because we teach that people do not obtain the forgiveness of sins by their merits, but freely for Christ's sake through faith in Christ." And in the following passages, explaining where the Scholastics, whom they oppose, chiefly err, they say that they imagine "that reason without the Holy Spirit can love God above all things." And they add, "In this way, they teach that people merit the forgiveness of sins by doing what is in themselves, that is, if reason grieving over sin elicits an act of love for God or works well for God's sake."

XXXIII. And later, refuting this doctrine of the Scholastics, they say, "If we merit the forgiveness of sins by these acts elicited by us, what does Christ provide? If we can be justified by reason and the works of reason, what need is there for Christ or regeneration?" Then, having refuted the distinction between merit of condignity and merit of congruity, they focus on proving that it is false that reason by its own powers can love God above all things and fulfill the law of God, and that people do not sin when they fulfill the precepts without grace. Hence, they conclude that by such works, we cannot obtain justification and the forgiveness of sins.

XXXIV. Moreover, what the Protestants mainly aimed at when they denied that a person is justified by their works and to which error they opposed their opinion in this matter is clear from the words of the same Apology when it responds to Paul's statement, "The doers of the law will be justified," and James saying, "A person is justified by works and not by faith alone." The sum is that neither Paul nor James teaches that we are born again by our works and that our works are a propitiation for our sins. And with both Apostles, to be justified does not mean to be made righteous from being wicked, but in the usual sense, to be pronounced righteous: and James deals with the works that faith produces, not those that precede faith. Thus, the sense of Paul and James is simply that those who have faith and good works and do what the law commands are pronounced righteous. Nevertheless, it does not follow that our works merit the forgiveness of sins, regenerate our hearts, or are a propitiation for us.

XXXV. The words of the Apology are: "Thus we understand James's words, 'A person is justified not only by faith but also by works,' because certainly people are pronounced righteous who have faith and good works. For good works in the saints, as we have said, are righteousness because they please on account of faith. For James preaches only those works which faith produces, as he testifies when he says of Abraham, 'Faith helps his works.' In this sense, it is said, 'The doers of the law will be justified,' that is, those are pronounced righteous who believe in God with their hearts and then have good fruits which please on account of faith, and therefore are the fulfillment of the law. These statements, simply as they are said, have no fault, but are perverted by adversaries who ascribe impious opinions to them. It does not follow from this that works merit the forgiveness of sins, regenerate hearts, are propitiation, or please without Christ the propitiator. None of this is said by James."

XXXVI. From all of this, it is apparent that the primary and original question between the Protestants and the Roman School in the matter of justification was whether a person could, by the works done by the powers of nature, prepare themselves for justifying and regenerating grace and merit it by congruity. And other questions arose from this primary one during the disputes. Thus, the first and principal error in the matter of justification, which the Protestants began to oppose, was what we have mentioned, namely, that a person can prepare themselves for the grace of justification by the powers of nature and merit the forgiveness of sins by congruity.

XXXVII. Indeed, it must be admitted, as we noted in the preceding Theses, that there are some things found in the decrees of the Council of Trent that seem to correct this error of the older School. For it pronounces anathema on those who say that without the inspiration and help of the Holy Spirit, a person can believe, hope, love, or repent as necessary to receive the grace of justification. And it teaches that none of the things preceding justification, whether faith or works, can merit the grace of justification itself. But this does not prevent the opinion, which held that morally good works done by the powers of nature dispose a person proximally to justifying grace and at least merit it by congruity, from having reigned in the Roman School before that Council and having been accepted with applause. We have shown that this opinion was held by very renowned men in that School, who had a large following, without opposition or disapproval from those who then presided over the Roman Church.

XXXVIII. And although after the times of the Council of Trent, this doctrine was commonly rejected, at least in terms of expression, as we have seen, and retained and proposed crudely and openly by a few, many, as we have also demonstrated above, softened their words but always retained the substance or at least what is fundamental in it. For Dominicus à Soto, Franciscus à Victoria, Melchior Cano, and many others did not mention the merit of congruity which applies to the works of nature, but nonetheless said that a person by the powers of nature could have sorrow for sins, which they call attrition, which alone with the sacrament suffices to obtain the grace of justification. What else is this but saying that a person can by works done by the powers of nature proximally dispose themselves to justifying grace and repent as necessary to receive the grace of justification without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit?

XXXIX. We have also shown that many theologians of the Roman School, both before and after the Council of Trent, indeed deny that a person can by the powers of nature alone proximally and sufficiently prepare themselves for justifying grace; but at the same time, they hold that by morally good works done by the powers of nature, a person can obtain and receive the assistance they need to proximally and immediately dispose themselves to the same grace. This means preparing themselves for justifying grace at least remotely and mediately and doing things by which it is fitting for God and worthy of His goodness not to deny the first beginnings of saving grace. Does this not mean meriting it by congruity according to the manner of speaking in the Schools? And whatever may be made of it and however it may be expressed, a person always obtains saving grace by their own works; and our salvation and consequently our justification are not entirely free as the Scriptures proclaim, but depend on some preceding works of a person, contrary to the repeated pronouncements of the Apostle.

XL. Nor do Molina and his followers err any less in this matter, although they completely avoid the term merit and deny that a person can prepare themselves for grace by their own powers, not only proximally but even remotely, as we have shown before. For they indeed abstain from certain odious words, but they nonetheless reintroduce the same thing under different terms. For we have shown that while they deny that a person can merit grace or dispose themselves for it in any way by their own powers, they still teach that a person can, by the powers of nature and without any supernatural assistance from God, perform all those things in substance by which, with divine assistance, sinners are usually prepared and disposed for the grace of regeneration and justification: namely, to believe the Gospel and give firm and certain assent to all that God has revealed in His word, because of the truth and authority of the revealing God; also to love God above all things and to have an absolute intention to please Him in all things; moreover, to grieve for sins not only out of fear of hell's punishments but from love of God and a sense of His divine goodness; and thus at the same time to resolve firmly to avoid henceforth sins and abstain from those things which are contrary to the love of God; and finally to conceive some hope of pardon and to trust in divine mercy.

XLI. Can anyone understand from these statements that a person is not at least remotely disposed to obtain from God the grace and forgiveness of their sins? For one who converts to God through acts of faith, hope, love, and repentance as prescribed in the Gospel cannot but be disposed to obtain that grace. Scripture, through the mouth of Peter, says, "Repent and be converted, so that your sins may be blotted out." And no scholastic subtlety will ever suffice to prevent the common Christian sense from clearly seeing and certainly judging that one who believes the word of the Gospel, trusts in its promises, loves God above all things, detests sins, and firmly resolves to do what pleases God and avoid everything that offends Him, is truly converted to God and cannot be considered by God in that state to be turned away from Him for any reason. Therefore, if a person can, by the powers of nature, perform the acts of faith, hope, contrition, and love toward God prescribed in the Gospel in substance, as Molina and his masters and disciples believe, is it not necessarily concluded, whether they like it or not, that a sinner can by the powers of nature convert themselves to God and immediately prepare themselves for justification to be obtained from Him? This is the very opinion of Gabriel and Scotus, directly contrary to the Apostolic doctrine of our free justification, from which they still want to appear to be distant.

XLII. In previous Disputations on this question, we have adequately closed the escape route for Molina and those who share his views on this point. For from their writings, we have shown that they indeed teach that the acts often enumerated are proximate dispositions to justifying grace and merit it by congruity if they are done from some supernatural gift and principle, from which they take proportion to the supernatural end, which is salvation and justification obtained for us through Christ; but that they cannot have the status of such dispositions if they are done by the natural powers of free will; because in that case, they do not transcend the ends of nature and cannot be proportionate to a supernatural end.

XLIII. At the same time, we have demonstrated that what they say here is utterly without foundation and reason. And this is because the acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting do not prepare a person to obtain from God the forgiveness of sins and the spirit of sanctification, nor have such power, from the fact that they are done by a person through supernatural assistance; but from the fact that God has promised His grace in the Gospel to those acts: and of His own accord and good pleasure has declared that He will grant the forgiveness of sins and the spirit of sanctification to those who believe, repent, hope, and love, and will ultimately lead them to eternal life, even though those acts in themselves do not have a proportion to such great salvation. Therefore, it is true indeed that those acts, considered simply and in their substance, do not dispose a person to eternal salvation; but that they achieve this by divine promise, not from the fact that they are done through supernatural assistance. Nor is that assistance required for those acts, which otherwise could be elicited naturally by free will, to become supernatural and proportionate to a supernatural end; but so that people may perform those acts which surpass the powers of corrupt nature and through them obtain the grace which God has promised to them.

XLIV. We have confirmed this matter by showing that God has promised grace and salvation, without exception, to all those who believe, hope, love, and repent, as they are commanded to do by the word of God: and consequently, that those acts, performed in this manner, according to God's institution, prepare all those in whom they are found for salvation and grace. Nor does God command us to believe, hope, and repent from a supernatural principle that is not in our power, but simply to perform these acts seriously and sincerely. We have shown that Molina himself acknowledges this when he teaches that people can, by the powers of nature, with only God's general concurrence, avoid the sin of unbelief if the Gospel is fittingly proposed to them: and therefore also the sin of impenitence and other similar sins by which the precepts of the Gospel are violated. Hence, it clearly follows that those precepts simply oblige us to do what they command in substance, not necessarily with supernatural assistance: otherwise, one who does those things otherwise, by the mere powers of free will, would be sinning against the precepts. Thus, whatever Molina may assert to the contrary, it remains evident that all those who perform the aforementioned acts, in substance, are thereby disposed to obtaining salvation from God, since they are doing what God commands and by which He has promised salvation, in the manner they are commanded to do it. Therefore, if a person can, by the powers of nature, elicit those acts in substance, as Molina believes, they can also by the powers of nature prepare and dispose themselves for grace and salvation.

XLV. But the same can also be deduced from Molina's principles in another way. Although Molina and his disciples do not want to say that the acts of believing, hoping, loving, and repenting, which they assume can be elicited by the natural powers of free will, dispose for grace, we have nevertheless shown that they attribute to those acts such qualities from which it follows that people are disposed to saving grace by such acts. For they teach, as we have shown at length, that whenever a person by their natural powers attempts any work that pertains to justification, God is always ready to assist them to complete it as necessary for salvation: not only because it befits divine goodness, but also because a certain law concerning this matter, due

to Christ's merit, has been established by God. Thus, they hold that no one elicits the acts of faith, hope, love, and repentance naturally, in substance, without obtaining from God the assistance by which those acts become supernatural and thereby immediately and proximally dispose a person to justification.

XLVI. Hence, it follows, contrary to Molina's protestations, that those acts elicited naturally, as he wants them, at least remotely dispose for justification, but proximally for grace, which is commonly called special assistance in the Schools: since they infallibly obtain it from divine goodness and by a certain and stable law. For every condition by which we infallibly obtain something is a certain moral disposition to that thing. Indeed, it follows from this that those acts elicited naturally merit the same grace by congruity, according to the manner of speaking in the Schools. For merit by congruity is that to which something is not due by justice, but only by a certain fitness of divine goodness. The grace in question is given to such acts, according to Molina, because it befits divine goodness; and moreover, by a stable law established for Christ's sake. Therefore, by his hypothesis, they merit that grace by congruity, although he does not dare to say and affirm this.

XLVII. From all of this, it is clear that the Apostolic doctrine of free salvation and justification, acquired for us by the blood of Christ, has been greatly corrupted and depraved in the Roman Church, not only before the times of the Council of Trent but also after the promulgation of that Council, by those who openly retained the essentially Pelagian error of the Old School; although they have attempted to modify and soften it in various ways.

XLVIII. Hence, it is clear that the Protestants who initiated the dispute with the Roman Church at the beginning of the previous century, concerning various errors and abuses that reigned and prevailed in it, did not accuse the Roman School of perverting the evangelical doctrine of justification without cause or foundation. They attributed to human works and merits, in part, that benefit of God which was to be attributed solely to the grace of Christ received through true and living faith. Indeed, at the time when they began to complain about this, the opinion that a person could merit justifying grace by works done before grace by congruity, and could love God above all things by their own strength, and grieve for sins out of love for God because they had offended Him, and adopt a firm resolution to change their life for the better, was reigning in the Roman School, publicly defended by many and very renowned Doctors, and was accepted with applause by those who then presided over the Roman Church.

XLIX. And although the Council of Trent seems to have condemned that opinion, and it is no longer proposed openly and nakedly as before in the Roman Church, the decrees of that Council, as is evident from its history, were crafted with such words and in such a way that many errors closely related to that opinion, and approaching it nearly, can easily hide under their ambiguity. For both those who teach that a person can dispose themselves remotely to justifying grace by works done by the powers of nature, and even obtain justifying grace immediately, but with the sacrament, not without it; and especially those who, with Molina, deny that a person can dispose themselves either proximally or remotely to grace by works done by the powers of nature; but at the same time affirm that the acts of faith, hope, love, and contrition prescribed in

the Gospel can be elicited in substance by the powers of free will without special divine assistance, and that a person can obtain saving grace by such naturally elicited acts by a certain law; all of these, I say, can easily interpret the decrees of Trent in their sense.

L. For example, when that Council anathematizes all those who say that without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and His assistance, a person can believe, hope, love, or repent as necessary to receive the grace of justification, Molina thinks it acts in his favor, not against him. As if the Council's intention was that a person can believe, hope, love, and repent, and exercise those acts commanded by the word of God, without the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, but not in such a way as necessary to receive the grace of justification: because those acts in themselves are not sufficient unless they are elevated to a certain supernatural state by the assistance of the Holy Spirit; which assistance, demanded by divine goodness, they infallibly obtain by a certain law established by God.

LI. That the Roman Church does not disapprove of these interpretations of the Canons of Trent can be inferred from the fact that since the times of the Council of Trent, the Roman Pontiffs, by Bulls issued for this purpose, have condemned and disapproved of many things that seemed erroneous or suspect to them in the writings of those of their communion: yet they have never marked with even the slightest censure any of the things we have cited from Tapper, Melchior Cano, Molina, and many others regarding works preparatory and dispositive to grace, or the powers of free will without grace, in respect to the acts of faith, love, and contrition, in their substance, as far as I know, not even as slightly suspect.

LII. Moreover, the Censors of books, by the mandate of the Inquisition, daily delete, correct, and alter in the writings of their School's authors whatever they judge to have even a slight appearance of error, and they compile and augment what they call Expurgatory Indexes, in which they diligently note what in each book they think should be expunged or corrected, whether it contains anything false or might at least cause scandal and be interpreted in a worse sense. Thus, for example, the Index of Expurgated Books printed in Madrid by Alphonsus Gomez in 1584 orders these words to be deleted from Ferrus on Matthew, chapter 12, concerning "Make the tree good, etc.": "Christ here openly declares that by our nature we are bad trees." And from the book titled "Order of Baptizing, with the Mode of Visiting," published in Venice in 1576, these words are ordered to be deleted: "Do you believe that our Lord Jesus Christ died for our salvation, and that by our own merits or in any other way no one can be saved except by the merit of His passion?" Similarly, from Robert Estienne's Index of Bibles, these propositions are ordered to be deleted as suspect: "By believing in Christ, sins are forgiven. By faith, the Holy Spirit is received. Hearts are purified by faith. We are freed not by works. Repentance is the gift of God." And from the Notes on Ecclesiastes, these words are ordered to be deleted: "This proposition condemns human works without grace." Yet in those Indexes, nothing from the things cited by me from the writers of the Roman communion concerning works preparatory and dispositive to grace, or the powers of free will without grace, with respect to the acts of faith, love, and contrition, in their substance, has ever been marked with any censure, as far as I know, not even as slightly suspect.

LIV. Hence, Protestants after the Council of Trent have always considered themselves to have just cause for complaining against the Roman Church for not preserving the Apostolic doctrine of free salvation and justification intact, but choosing to maintain rather than remove the gravest errors of their School on this matter. And there can be no doubt to anyone which side the Roman Church favors more in this regard, whether Molina or his adversaries.

LV. Moreover, as one dispute begets another and one question another, as is often the case, from this primary and original controversy about justification, namely, whether a person can attain it and obtain it from God by works done by the powers of nature, which is a real and significant question and whose affirmative side was publicly and commonly held in the Roman School at the time of Luther, many other questions have arisen, among which not a few seem to be ultimately reduced to mere verbal disputes. And the opinion of the Protestants on these matters, when presented in plain and simple words and disentangled from the intricacies of the Schools, is so certain and evident that even the more learned and moderate among the Roman School recognize its truth. As we have shown elsewhere in several Disputations, in which, as is immediately apparent to the readers, our aim was to vindicate the Protestant doctrine in the matter of Justification from the calumnies of adversaries and to prove its truth, if presented without any ambiguity, to be so clear and perspicuous that even the chief Doctors of the Roman School are compelled to acknowledge it, as we have made evident with many of their testimonies.

**THEOLOGICAL THESES:
ON
THE USE AND EFFICACY
OF THE SACRAMENTS
OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.**

**In which
the Doctrine of the ROMAN Church and School is expounded.**

Thesis I

The Roman Catechism, published by decree of the Council of Trent, explains the various uses and purposes for which the Sacraments were instituted by God. The first is to aid the weakness of the human mind. Thus, to help us more easily understand the things done by God's hidden power, the supreme craftsman of all things wisely made it so that the same power would be declared to us through certain signs which fall under our senses, by his kindness towards us. For, as St. Chrysostom excellently said, if man had been without the concretion of a body, the pure good itself, uncovered by any veils, would have been offered to him: but since the soul is joined to the body, it was necessary to use the help of sensible things to understand those things. Part 2, On the Sacraments in general, num. 14.

II. Moreover, it teaches that the Sacraments were instituted to elevate the slowness of believing. Because our mind is not easily moved to believe what is promised to us, Christ our Savior, when he promised us forgiveness of sins, heavenly grace, and the communication of the Holy Spirit, instituted certain signs subject to our eyes and senses, so that we would have him as if obligated by these pledges, and thus we could never doubt that he would be faithful to his promises.

III. According to the mind of that Catechism, the Sacraments are symbols of Christianity and true religion, and bonds of holy society. They were instituted for this purpose, so that they would be certain marks and symbols by which the faithful could be recognized, especially since no group of men can be joined together as one body under the name of either true or false religion without being united by some visible signs. Therefore, the Sacraments of the new law serve both purposes: they distinguish the worshippers of the Christian faith from unbelievers and connect the faithful among themselves with a holy bond.

IV. The Catechism also teaches that the Sacraments are testimonies of our faith and a certain declaration of it. Furthermore, they are incitements to faith and charity. By the Sacraments, we seem to profess and make known our faith in the presence of men. And the Sacraments have great power not only to excite and exercise faith in our souls but also to inflame the charity by which we ought to love each other, remembering that we are closely bound by the sacred mysteries and made members of one body.

V. The same Catechism adds that the Sacraments were given by Christ as instruments for exciting humility. For the Sacraments subdue and curb the pride of the human mind and exercise

us in humility while we are compelled to subject ourselves to sensible elements to obey God, from whom we had previously impiously defected to serve the elements of the world.

VI. Finally, it affirms that the Sacraments were instituted as remedies and medicines to restore or preserve the health of souls. For the virtue flowing from the passion of Christ, that is, the grace he merited for us on the cross, is conveyed to us through the Sacraments as through a certain channel; otherwise, no one could have any hope of salvation. Therefore, the most merciful Lord willed to leave the Sacraments, consecrated by his word and promise, in the Church so that we might believe without doubt that the fruit of his passion is really communicated to us, provided each of us piously and religiously applies this remedy to himself.

VII. And this is the principal use of the Sacraments, according to the Doctors of the Roman Church, as William Estius notes in his book on the Sentences, Book 4, Distinction 1, num. 2. For after saying that the Sacraments were instituted as remedies for our sins, aids for our infirmity, and instruments of our sanctification, effective through the passion of Christ, he adds: "This is indeed the chief cause of the institution of the Sacraments of the new law, and proper to them." This use of the Sacraments is signified by the parable of the Good Samaritan, who poured wine and oil into the wounds of the half-dead man.

VIII. Thus, according to the doctrine of the Roman School, the Sacraments are efficacious signs instituted by Christ to communicate the grace they signify. Therefore, they not only say that the Sacraments are signs of the grace of Christ but also its instrumental causes; not primary causes, but instrumental ones, as can be seen in Martin Becan, the Jesuit, whose conclusion is: "Although the Sacraments of the new law are not the primary causes of grace, they are instrumental causes." In the *Summa Theologica*, vol. 6, chap. 3, on the Sacraments in general, question 1. They observe, however, that the Sacraments can be understood in two ways to confer grace and be its causes. First, immediately; second, by exciting faith which then obtains grace. The latter sense they attribute to their adversaries, but the former they affirm to be Roman; who require faith as a prior disposition in the one who receives the Sacrament, but contend that the Sacrament itself confers grace immediately and directly. In the same way, Bellarmine tries to prove that the Sacraments are true instrumental causes of grace, conferring it immediately and directly, not merely by exciting faith as preaching does. Book 2, On the Sacraments in general, chap. 3.

IX. And this doctrine is held as a matter of faith in the Roman Church, as it was defined in the Council of Trent. For in session seven of that Council, Canon six pronounces anathema on anyone who says that the Sacraments of the new law do not contain the grace they signify, or do not confer grace on those who do not place an obstacle. And in Canon seven, on anyone who says that grace is not always given through such Sacraments, to all who receive them rightly, as far as God is concerned.

X. But although the theologians of the Roman School agree among themselves that the Sacraments of the new law are instrumental causes of grace, conferring it immediately and directly, they vehemently dispute among themselves about the nature and kind of these causes,

and by what means they are said to effect and produce grace; namely, whether they are physical causes of grace or merely moral ones.

XI. They call a physical cause one that properly and immediately influences the effect, or is the immediate principle eliciting the action by which something is produced. A moral efficient cause, on the other hand, is one that moves the physical cause to act, not in the way that an end moves, but by its prior existence: that is, so that the physical cause is said to act or produce something in view of the other, not to be that other, in which case the end would be the reason, but because it exists and preexists. Therefore, what already exists moves the physical cause, which looks at it, to act, and is called a moral efficient cause.

XII. The Moral cause, no less than the Physical, is again divided into principal and instrumental causes. To the principal Moral cause belong those who command or counsel the matter, or urge and incite it. To the instrumental, however, belong public writings by which people are compelled to maintain the faith, or even ransoms by which some are redeemed from slavery, and many similar things, such as all signs through which something is customarily done by pact and agreement. With these established, the Scholastic Doctors ask whether the Sacraments of the New Law are only instrumental Moral causes in the production of grace, or also Physical? as can be seen in Becan, in the already cited third chapter, eighth question.

XIII. William Estius proposes the same question more simply and clearly: "Since," he says, "it is indubitable among orthodox theologians that the Sacraments of the new law confer the grace they signify, and in some way cause it in the general sense of an efficient cause: nevertheless, there is considerable controversy among them about the manner of causing. This diversity of opinions can be reduced to two general modes. Some wish the Sacraments to be properly called instruments of God, as the principal cause, for producing grace: and thus they attribute to them a certain power, which is suitable to an instrumental cause, insofar as it is moved by the principal agent. Others, however, do not recognize a proper, that is, a Physical instrumentality in the Sacraments, nor do they think that any created power resides in them by which grace is produced: but they say that the Sacraments are effective signs of grace only to the extent that the divine power certainly and infallibly assists the Sacraments in producing the effect of grace by Christ's promise; so that they have the nature of a cause sine qua non, or rather, they call it an instrumental cause generally, a moral instrument." In book 4 of the Sentences, Distinction 1, num. 5.

XIV. It might seem that these views are not sufficiently consistent with each other, namely, from the unanimous consensus of the Doctors of the Roman School, that the Sacraments of the New Law confer and produce grace immediately and directly; and yet many of them assert that the same Sacraments do not have a true and proper influence on that grace, nor are they the immediate principle eliciting the action by which it is produced. But nevertheless, in their view, these do not contradict each other. For when they say that the Sacraments confer grace immediately and directly, they do not mean that the Sacraments are the immediate principle of grace, producing it by some inherent power, but only that, once the sacramental action is performed, grace is immediately and directly produced in a duly disposed subject by a certain

divine power that perpetually assists the Sacraments and infallibly and instantly produces grace unless an obstacle is placed by the subject: not merely by the faith of the recipient, by which that grace is obtained.

XV. However, in the Roman School, many deny all physical efficacy to the Sacraments, and attribute only moral efficacy to them: thus, in their view, the sacramental sign by itself does not touch the production of grace; but only signifies its presence, while God, by himself and immediately, according to his covenant and promise, operates the grace signified in the Sacrament.

XVI. Among recent authors, Gabriel Vasquez holds this opinion in 1. 2. vol. 2, Disp. 184, chap. 3, num. 2. Where he testifies that he has never liked the opinion of those who think that the Sacraments of the New Law should be attributed the nature of a physical instrument, and that this matters greatly. For, he says, besides the fact that I think it is impossible for this kind of instrument to be so voluntarily assumed, I consider the opinion more probable of those who say that the Sacraments of the New Law operate as merely moral instruments; it matters little to the salvation of souls, and to the excellence of the Sacraments, whether they are instrumental causes of grace in one way or another. Moreover, it seems more than sufficient to consider the Sacraments as moral causes and instruments only by way of impetration; so that they are said to contain and cause grace.

XVII. Following Gabriel Vasquez, Becan, as is his custom, considers it more probable that the Sacraments are not physical instruments of grace, but only moral. His first argument for this is that Baptism, when received insincerely, later confers grace when the insincerity is removed: which it cannot do by some physical power, since it is already past, but by its moral efficiency alone; and yet in such a case, it has the true nature of a Sacrament. Many theologians of the same opinion commonly use this argument as their main one. Vol. 6, chap. 3, on the Sacraments in general, question 2, conclusion 4.

XVIII. Melchior Cano holds the same opinion in his treatise on the Sacraments, part four, on the Sacraments causing grace. "We," he says, "pronounce with the Florentine Council that our Sacraments both contain grace and confer it worthily on those who receive it, I say contain, not as a natural cause contains its effect, but as a moral cause. For the purse is said to contain the redemption of the captive, because it contains the money; and the Sacraments, which contain the blood of Christ, are said to contain grace and the remission of sins: and just as the purse confers redemption by dispensing the money, so the Sacrament confers grace by applying the price of the blood: And this is the power of the Sacraments, which has so tormented the minds of many. For the power of redemption is in the purse, in which the price of redemption is kept, and the power of the Sacraments is the blood of Christ, which is applied in the Sacraments.

XIX. Peter of St. Joseph supports this, whose resolution is that the Sacraments of the new law do not produce grace physically, but only morally. He proves this by stating that miracles should not be multiplied without necessity: and there is no necessity for attributing physical causality to the Sacraments, which would be very miraculous concerning grace: because the Sacraments, since they virtually contain Christ's merits, can confer grace as surely as moral

causes, as if they were elevated to physically cause grace. In "Idea Theologia Sacramentalis," book 1, chapter 6, Resolution 2.

XX. Finally, William Estius judges this opinion not only more probable if we consult reason but also affirms that it has been and is the common opinion among Scholastic Doctors; and he cites Dominic Soto confessing it to be the opinion of almost all Doctors, even the modern ones. In book 4 of the Sentences, Distinction 1, num. 5.

XXI. However, there are most eminent Doctors in the Roman School who attribute some physical efficiency to the Sacraments of the New Testament concerning grace: and they believe that God uses the Sacraments as proper instruments for the production of grace: so that the Sacraments themselves, moved by God, reach that production instrumentally, cooperating with God as the principal cause of the same grace. Nor do they therefore abolish all moral causality from the Sacraments. But they acknowledge that the Sacraments also morally contribute to producing grace in man. Furthermore, they believe that the Sacraments are elevated above nature to physically cause grace. This is noted by Becan in "Summa Theologiae Scholasticae." After stating this fourth conclusion, that the Sacraments of the new law are moral causes of the production of grace; he adds, "Thus, theologians commonly, not only those who think that the Sacraments have no other causality than moral; but also others who teach that they have physical efficiency." Volume 6, chapter 3, on the Sacraments in general, Question 2, Conclusion 4. Similarly, Peter of St. Joseph, in the previously cited place, notes that all concede that the Sacraments are moral causes of grace, although some also attribute some physical causality to them.

XXII. Among those who believe that the Sacraments contribute to the production of grace not only morally but also physically is Cardinal Bellarmine, who, after relating the opinion of those who teach that the Sacraments truly justify and yet only God produces grace at the presence of the Sacraments, so that the Sacraments are not physical causes unless, without them, the effect would not happen, declares that he considers the opinion that gives the Sacraments true efficiency to be far more probable and safer: which he proves, among other things, by stating that otherwise, there would be no difference between the mode of acting of the Sacraments and that of magical signs. He explains his opinion by adding that the Sacraments are also efficient physical causes, but instrumental ones, and the divinely imparted power is not some new inherent spiritual or bodily quality, but only the motion or use of God. For, he says, by the fact that God uses this sacramental action to produce grace, he elevates it and makes it attain a supernatural effect, which it could not attain if moved by anyone else. Book 2, on the Sacraments in general, chapter 11, paragraph "Secundo posset." Becan attributes the same opinion to Cajetan, Andrea Vega, and Suarez. "On the Sacraments in general," chapter 3, question 3.

XXIII. Moreover, the Synod of Trent not only defined that the Sacraments confer grace and that grace is given through the Sacraments but also that grace is conferred by the Sacraments ex opere operato. For this is the eighth Canon of the seventh session: "If anyone says that grace is not conferred by the Sacraments of the new law ex opere operato, but that faith alone in the divine promise is sufficient for obtaining grace, let him be anathema."

XXIV. Furthermore, the Doctors of the Roman Church diligently point out what is the true and what is the false meaning of these words and complain that Protestants wrongly interpret them. First, they observe that *ex opere operato* does not mean a meritorious work or the dignity of the work either on the part of the minister or the recipient: and therefore, the Sacraments are not said to confer grace *ex opere operato* because they confer grace from the dignity and merit of the work, which is exercised by either the one who celebrates or the one who receives.

XXV. Second, they note that it is false to say that conferring grace *ex opere operato* means conferring grace to a sinner without faith and a good movement of the sinner's heart: as if the power of *ex opere operato* was devised to exclude faith and internal repentance in the matter of justification. For in adults who receive the Sacraments, faith and repentance are required as prior dispositions, without which the Sacrament has no effect. These two points are noted by Bellarmine in book 2, on the Sacraments in general, which is on the effect of the Sacraments, chapter 1, and by Becan in "*Summa Theologiae Scholasticae*," volume 6, chapter 3.

XXVI. Estius, in the first Distinction of the fourth book of the Sentences, first observes that when the Sacraments are said to confer grace *ex opere operato*, this phrase does not mean that the Sacraments produce some spiritual effect by the nature and condition of the work itself, apart from divine institution. For, he says, if they were not divinely instituted and ordained for such an effect, they would have no such power, no more than any other external actions. Indeed, excluding divine institution, it would be superstitious to expect any supernatural effect infallibly from such actions.

XXVII. Next, he notes that the Sacraments do not have such power from divine institution that they require no preparation, no good movement of the heart on the part of the recipient; which, he says, heretics falsely attribute to Romanists, on the occasion of certain words of Gabriel Biel misunderstood. And he adds that it is the constant doctrine of all Scholastics that the Sacraments should not be administered to those who do not wish to depart from their sins or forsake unbelief. Hence it is clear, according to the doctrine of the Scholastics, that a movement of faith and repentance is required in the recipient; except for infants, for whom the faith and piety of the mother Church supply both.

XXVIII. Thirdly, he says that this phrase does not mean that there is any created power inherent or residing in the Sacraments by which they operate the mystical effect. That this phrase does not signify this is clear from the fact that both those who do not recognize that power and those who assert it commonly embrace this form of expression. We can add that according to the mind of the Roman Church, the Sacraments are not said to confer grace *ex opere operato* because they are physical causes of it, in whatever way this physical causality is explained. Since all the Doctors of that Church, after the Council of Trent, admit that the Sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato* and hold this as a matter of faith: and yet many of them assert that the Sacraments are only moral causes of grace and deny them all physical efficiency.

XXIX. Therefore, according to the mind of the Roman Church, the Sacraments of the new law are said to have efficacy *ex opere operato* and to confer grace because grace is

conferred by the very fact that such a work is done, not indeed as it is a certain natural action, but as it has a divine institution and an infallible promise for the effect of grace, although that promise, being conditional, requires due preparation in adults. This is how Estius explains this phrase in the place cited above.

XXX. To make this clearer, he notes that *opus operatum* is said in distinction to *opus operantis*. This can be understood in two ways; one of the minister, the other of the recipient. For the Sacraments do not have efficacy from the work, that is, from the faith or devotion of the minister: as Augustine teaches in many places against the Donatists. Nor from the work of the recipient. For although some preparation through faith and repentance is necessary in the recipient, if he has the use of reason, and this by the very institution of the Sacraments, yet the Sacraments do not derive their power and efficacy from this, but receive it from the one who instituted them. Hence, if two are supposed equally prepared by faith and repentance to receive, for example, Baptism, of whom one receives Baptism and the other does not, he who receives the Sacrament will obtain grace, which the one who does not receive the Sacrament will not yet obtain. Again, if two adults are supposed to be prepared for Baptism indeed, but unequally, they will receive equal grace from the Sacrament, if both are baptized; although he who approaches more prepared will receive something more according to the measure of his preparation and devotion.

PART TWO:

In which the Doctrine of the Protestants is explained and compared with the Doctrine of the Roman School.

Thesis I

Those who are called the Reformed Protestants acknowledge the multiple uses of the Sacraments and that they were instituted by God in the Church for various purposes. They are public tokens of our profession by which the faithful are distinguished from unbelievers. They are also bonds of mutual charity, by which the faithful are united and bound together into one body, one society, and one communion. As Paul wrote to the Corinthians, 'In one Spirit, we were all baptized into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, slaves or free; and we were all given to drink of one Spirit.' 1 Cor. 12:13.

II. Moreover, the administration and reception of them constitute a notable part of divine worship. And just as soldiers of old would solemnly bind themselves to their leaders with a military oath, so whenever we receive the Sacraments instituted by Christ, we pledge and vow our obedience to Him, and as they say, we solemnly swear an oath of allegiance and obedience to Him.

III. But these are not the sole or primary purposes of the Sacraments, according to the Doctors of the Reformed School. They assert that the Sacraments were instituted by Christ for the primary purpose of sealing the promises of saving grace in Christ to the faithful and offering,

exhibiting, and conferring that grace in their own way. This saving grace consists chiefly in the forgiveness of sins, regeneration, and the internal renewal by the Spirit.

IV. Therefore, they do not regard the Sacraments as bare and empty signs, which only theoretically commemorate and present grace to the mind: but as practical and efficacious signs, which are connected with the exhibition of the very thing itself. Hence, they teach that the Sacraments are not only signs of grace but also instruments and means by which God not only seals but also offers and exhibits grace to us.

V. This is the clear doctrine of Samuel Maresius, in his System, in the last place, which is about the Sacraments, Aphorism 22. "The purpose of the Sacraments," he says, "is not only to be public tokens of our profession, or merely theoretical commemorative signs, or bonds of mutual charity, but to be moral instruments, by which, like His Word, God offers and exhibits His grace to us and seals the promises of the Gospel to the faithful. They are not only commemorative or distinctive signs but also seals of divine grace and in their own way, exhibit the thing signified; just as by the handing over of keys someone is given possession of a house, and bishops of old received their investiture through a ring and a staff."

VI. Windelinus, a fellow citizen, establishes the form of the Sacraments in the signification, sealing, and bestowal of the things signified, by which what is spiritually given is truly presented, through the hidden power of the Holy Spirit: and teaches that the primary purpose of the Sacrament is the signification, exhibition, and sealing of God's invisible grace and our union with Christ. Hence, he later concedes that the Sacraments are ordinary instruments for conferring grace. "Christian Theology," book 1, chapter 20, Theses 9 and 10, and at the end of the explanation of Thesis 11.

VII. Similarly, Antonius Walaëus, after establishing that the Sacraments are not only signifying signs, like trophies set up as signs of victory, but also sealing, like seals and rings given as a pledge of marriage: further asks whether they are also signs exhibiting the promised thing? and answers in these words: "Nor do we deny this in the proper sense, provided they are not said to exhibit *ex opere operato*, or to include the thing signified as in vessels: but that the Holy Spirit, by divine promise, produces in the proper use of the Sacrament what is promised, not the signs themselves." In "Commonplaces of Sacred Theology," under the title "On the Sacraments."

VIII. To this agrees Amesius in "Bellarmine Enervated." After introducing Bellarmine, who infers that in places where we are said to be cleansed and saved by the washing of water, and through washing, Sacraments are instrumental causes of grace, he responds: 1. "We concede the whole, because the Sacraments are moral instruments; 2. Sacraments are said to effect what God simultaneously works, according to their signification and sealing." Volume 3, book 1, chapter 3.

IX. The same doctrine is held by Zanchius, who, in response to the question, "What is Sacramental Union?" answers with the following words: "It is a certain mystical order, proceeding from the institution of God, between the sacramental signs and the things signified by the Sacraments, by which heavenly and spiritual things are signified, offered, and indeed

exhibited to the elect by the power of the Holy Spirit through earthly and bodily signs, and are sealed in their souls." Volume 4, book 1, in the chapter on the external worship of God.

X. And this is also the opinion of Calvin himself. "If there are any," he says, "who deny that the grace signified is contained in the Sacraments, we disapprove of them." He then adds, "While we reject that monastic fiction that Sacraments benefit in any other way than through faith, we gladly unite the true exhibition of the thing with the signs themselves; so that none of them is without effect outside of faith: and yet they are not empty signs, far removed from the grace they signify." In "Antidote to the Seventh Session of the Council of Trent," in Canon 6 and in Canon 7, he admits that grace is given through the Sacraments if anyone receives them with legitimate disposition. "For who," he says, "doubts that those who receive them as they should are granted the grace that God there promises?"

XI. Finally, this agrees with the Gallican Confession of the Reformers. "We believe," it says, "that the Sacraments are attached to the Word for the sake of greater confirmation, namely, that they may be tokens and pledges of divine grace, by which the weakness and rudeness of our faith are aided. For we confess that these external signs are such that God, by them, through the power of His Holy Spirit, works in us, so that they are not vainly shown to us in vain." Article 35. And in Article 38: "We believe," it says, "that, as said before, both in the Lord's Supper and in Baptism, God truly and effectively gives us whatever is there sacramentally signified; and therefore, we unite with the signs the true possession and enjoyment of the thing which is there offered to us." The same is taught by the confession of the Reformers in the Kingdom of Poland, presented at Thorn in 1645. For according to its definition, the Sacraments are external and visible signs, seals, and testimonies of the divine will, instituted by God Himself through the word added to the element, to seal the invisible grace promised in the word of the covenant, and to exhibit it through these signs.

XII. This is therefore the common doctrine of the Reformers, that the Sacraments are not empty signs of grace, which only theoretically recall its thought to the mind; but practical signs which seal it and are certain pledges and guarantees of it; they are also instruments and means, which truly confer and exhibit it.

XIII. Moreover, when they say that the promises of grace are sealed by the Sacraments, and that the Sacraments are the seals of divine promises, they mean that God's promises are more strongly impressed on our minds by the help of the Sacraments, and penetrate our souls more deeply; thus increasing the certainty of the faith which we place in them, and making us embrace them with greater confidence. Because things that are conveyed to us through multiple senses strike and move the mind more sharply. Now indeed the same benefits of God, which are signified to us by the words of divine promises striking our ears, are offered to our eyes in the administration of the Sacraments by certain visible signs and figures; and are also, as it were, to be touched by hands and tasted by the mouth, through their symbols, which are to be received by the mouth and hands.

XIV. Therefore, their intention is not that the Sacraments add some greater certainty to the divine promises considered in themselves. For what God says, who is the primary truth,

cannot receive any greater certainty from elsewhere. Nor do they think that the Sacraments, if distinguished from the promises and opposed to them, have something more known and certain to us than the promises themselves: but that promises and Sacraments together strike our minds more powerfully than the promises alone separated from the Sacraments; and thus our faith, which is always too weak, becomes more confirmed.

XV. Just as God, when making a covenant with Abraham, wished Abraham's faith to be confirmed by an oath which he added to the promises made to Abraham: and also by a certain visible sign, when He passed through the midst of the parts of the animals under the appearance of a flaming fire, which, at God's command, had been cut in half by Abraham. Just as it was the custom of those who made a covenant to cut animals in half and pass between the divided parts. Hence the Hebrew phrase arose, where cutting a covenant means making and contracting a covenant. Yet God's words are not more firm in themselves with the added oath than without the oath. Nor was God's oath something more known to Abraham than God's promise. The same God, visibly appearing to Abraham, at the same time promised him that He would be his God and later the God of his descendants, and commanded Abraham to cut the animals in half, to confirm that covenant with Abraham in a human manner. And so Abraham learned both, namely God's promise and His command, from the same word of God at the same time. Nor did the visible symbol of God passing between the parts of the animals have in itself anything more known and certain than the visible symbol of God speaking with Abraham and directing His promises to him.

XVI. They say therefore that God, when instituting the Sacraments, accommodated Himself to human weakness and dealt with them in a human manner. For people are accustomed, when making covenants, to confirm their promises with certain visible signs. Just as when a groom binds his faith to his bride, he gives her his right hand; and places a ring on her finger; and a king orders wax seals to be affixed to his diplomas. Therefore, God, in a similar manner, so that He might make people more certain of His grace towards them, wished not only to promise it in words but also to add visible signs by which He would make it more testified to them.

XVII. But it should also be observed, according to the Reformers' understanding, that the Sacraments not only confirm the divine promises but also apply them to the individual faithful, and are not only seals by which the divine promises are confirmed, but also tokens and pledges of the promised grace, which testify that that grace absolutely and simply pertains to the individual faithful. To understand this, it must be noted that the promises made in the Gospel are both general and conditional. The Gospel generally promises forgiveness of sins and eternal salvation to all who believe and repent. Therefore, those promises are proposed and announced to everyone indiscriminately. But the Sacraments are administered only to those, and are instituted for the use of those, who are supposed to be faithful and to have fulfilled that condition which the divine promises require of us. And therefore, if anyone approaches the Sacrament duly, grace is not only offered to him in the Sacrament under some condition but is absolutely applied to him, and a pledge and guarantee of the same grace is given to him in the Sacrament, as a matter that rightfully pertains to him, having fulfilled the condition under which that grace is

offered to everyone in the Word. And this is what the Doctors of the Reformed School mean when they say that not only the promises of grace but grace itself is sealed to the faithful in the Sacraments.

XVIII. But as seen above, they attribute to the Sacraments not only the sealing of grace but also that they provide, exhibit, and confer it, and are its instruments and instrumental causes. To understand in what sense they say this, it must be noted that they agree that the Sacraments are not physical instruments of grace but only moral ones. Chamier, whom we have already cited, observes this with those who, when dealing with the Sacraments, say, "We agree with those who entirely reject the kind of physical instruments and prefer moral ones." "Pansrat." vol. 4, book 2, chapter 2, number 11. And after Chamier, Nicholas Arnold, a professor of Theology at the University of Franeker, in response to the question, "Are the Sacraments instruments for conferring grace?" answers, "If you say physical instruments, I deny it; if moral, I concede it." Against Eckhardt's "Fasciculum," chapter 18, question 3.

XIX. When they deny that the Sacraments are physical instruments of grace, they mean that the Sacraments do not in themselves reach the production and bestowal of grace, nor does the external action of the minister actively, truly, and immediately produce grace, nor is there any inherent power in the sacred signs by which they act on the souls of the faithful; thus the grace perceived in the legitimate use of the Sacraments is solely to be referred to the divine power which assists the Sacraments and by which the Holy Spirit immediately works what the Sacraments signify and seal. Concerning this, Chamier, in the already cited chapter, explains his view thus: "But we declare ourselves to be among those who deny that the Sacraments, that is, the signs themselves, have any inherent power which either acts on grace or on any quality of the soul: whether you call it an adornment, a character, or anything similar. Therefore, we gladly acknowledge the assisting divine power." And later he cites and praises Calvin, who says, "The Holy Spirit, whom the Sacraments do not promiscuously convey to all, but whom the Lord particularly confers on His own, is the one who offers the grace of God; who gives the Sacraments their place in us, who makes them fruitful. Although we do not deny that God Himself, with the most present power of His Spirit, assists His institution so that the administration of the Sacraments, which He has ordained, may not be fruitless and empty, we affirm that the inner grace of the Spirit, as it is distinct from the external ministry, must be separately reckoned and considered." Therefore, God truly accomplishes whatever He promises and signifies with the signs: the signs do not lack their effect, so that their author may be proven true and faithful. The only question here is whether God operates by His own proper and intrinsic power, or whether He seals His power through external symbols? We contend that whatever instruments He uses, nothing detracts from His primary operation. And therefore Chamier, at the end of the cited chapter, establishes this state of controversy about the efficacy of the Sacraments: "It is conceded on both sides that the Sacraments are efficacious: secondly, that their power is instrumental: thirdly, that they are said to be efficacious in regard to the divine grace, which is conferred on those receiving the signs. Therefore, the only question remaining is about the mode of efficacy. For some instruments have inherent power, others do not. Therefore,

it is only in question whether the Sacraments belong to those instruments which have no inherent power, or to others?" And he attributes to the Doctors of the Roman School that they refer the Sacraments to this latter kind of instruments. Against which he asserts the Orthodox opinion that the Sacraments belong to those instruments which have no inherent power. Such was the branch of Elisha, used to retrieve the axe from the water; the rod of Moses, for dividing the Red Sea; and the scepter of Ahasuerus, for admitting Esther to him.

XX. Moreover, all the Reformed strenuously contend that the Sacraments do not confer grace *ex opere operato*. But not all seem to take and understand those words in exactly the same sense. To most recent writers, to confer grace *ex opere operato* is the same as to confer it physically, and in the manner of a properly so-called instrument, which immediately and by itself reaches and truly influences the effect. And therefore, when they deny that the Sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato*, they mean to deny nothing other than what we have already said they deny, namely, that the Sacraments are physical and properly so-called causes of grace.

XXI. But many of the older theologians of the Reformed School, when the Sacraments are said to give and confer grace *ex opere operato*, believe that these words imply not only some physical causality attributed to the Sacraments but also that, in the administration of the Sacraments, grace is conferred by the power of the external work, even to those who lack faith and repentance, and are devoid of all good motion: indeed, that the mere external reception of the Sacrament has some merit by which sacramental grace is obtained; all of which they intend to deny when they teach that the Sacraments do not confer grace *ex opere operato*.

XXII. But however the Reformers interpret that expression, they all agree that the Sacraments, in respect of grace, lack all physical and properly called efficiency, and only morally contribute to it; moreover, when it comes to adults and those who use reason, the Sacraments confer no grace at all except to those who approach them with the proper movements of faith and repentance; and therefore, in those who receive the Sacraments, there is no merit by which they can obtain grace, even if they receive them rightly, if they only perform the external work.

XXIII. Furthermore, although the Reformers teach by common consent that the Sacraments are instruments of grace, not physical but only moral, they do not all explain in the same way in what that moral causality consists, which is appropriate to the Sacraments, and by what manner, in their legitimate use, they contribute to the production and bestowal of grace. Moses Amyraldus, who discusses the Sacraments extensively and accurately in the Theses of Saumur, attributes to the Sacraments no other efficacy than objective; for he teaches that the Sacraments, being signs, do not act except in the manner of signs. Signs differ from physical causes in this: physical causes have such power that they neither know themselves nor need the intervention of knowledge in the one on whom they act, to explain and exert themselves. But signs, like all other objective causes, although unaware of themselves, do nothing at all unless and where they are known, and for this reason, because they are known. For just as if someone were to say that a word, even if neither heard nor understood, still works and moves those to whom it is directed, they would rightly be laughed at; so those who think that signs, as signs, can

act unknown, are worthy of being rejected by the wise. For the reason that a word moves through the ears, namely the relation between sounds and the things signified by sounds, is the same reason that a sign moves through the eyes, whether by nature, as in natural signs, or by institution, as in Sacraments, between the Sacraments themselves and the things for the signifying and sealing of which they are used.

XXIV. Hence, comparing the word and the Sacraments, he teaches that they have the same manner of acting. Namely, both the word and the Sacraments are certain signs offering and presenting Christ with His benefits to our minds, which cannot first generate faith and holiness born of faith in our souls, nor later increase and confirm it unless known and apprehended by the intellect. Yet neither in the word nor in the Sacraments does that external presentation and inculcation of such and so great an object suffice for the generation and confirmation of faith and holiness in us: because on our part, inherent corruption and weakness oppose. And therefore, that both by the Sacraments and by the word, faith and holiness may be generated in us, nourished, and cherished, it is necessary that a certain heavenly and supernatural power be present, which internally disposes and affects our minds and souls so that they rightly use the object presented externally.

XXV. Therefore, both the word and the Sacraments can be considered in two ways, namely either as they are conjoined with that heavenly power, or separately from it, and as it were detached. And if considered in that former way, they generate and increase faith and holiness in the soul not only as an object, and in some moral manner; but also by something else that internally affects the subject and influences it with a certain operation that is by no means objective, but different from any other operation, whatever it may be. In the latter way, if the word and the Sacraments are considered, they do not otherwise act on our souls and produce or promote faith and holiness than objects operate: by a moral action as everything does that is externally introduced to the intellect through the senses. From all this, he concludes that the word and the Sacraments, if compared with each other, do not differ according to the manner of acting which is in themselves, but according to the degrees and vehemence of that efficacy, and other differences, in respect of which the Sacraments sometimes surpass and sometimes are surpassed by the word.

XXVI. Therefore, he does not wish to compare the Sacraments to those signs or instruments at whose presence God worked certain miracles: as when some sick people were healed by the shadow of Peter passing over them, or by the handkerchiefs of Paul applied to them, or by the hands of the other Apostles laid on them: although God immediately worked the healing of those sick people at the presence of such signs, yet neither Paul's handkerchiefs, nor Peter's shadow, nor the hands of the other Apostles, contributed anything to that healing. As if in the same way, at the presence of the sacramental signs, in their legitimate use, God would bestow the gifts of grace, while the Sacraments meanwhile neither touch that grace nor contribute anything to its production. In the Sacraments, however, he contends that the matter is otherwise. For they were instituted for this purpose, not to remind us that God works something, but to be effective instruments which God uses to work something in us. And thus, according to

him, the Sacraments have some efficacy, but objective, as has been said, and which requires the cognitive faculty to be aroused, and, as the Schools say, in act. Disputation 1 on the Sacraments in general, and the Disputation on the comparison of Evangelical Sacraments with the word.

XXVII. And consequently, dealing with Baptism in particular, he asserts that it operates our sanctification no otherwise than objectively: but as for justification, Baptism confers it no otherwise than by sealing its promise. And he maintains that sealing consists in this, that Baptism testifies that the fruit of Christ's death pertains to us because by Baptism we profess that we have communion with Christ: and thus a tacit stipulation of perseverance in faith is included in that sealing. Disputation on Baptism, Theses 27, 28.

XXVIII. Therefore, according to that learned man, grace is conferred through the Sacraments no otherwise than because they supply arguments very suitable for strengthening faith and raising our hope; and many incitements to piety and holiness occur in them; and also ample material for gratitude and love towards God, while they recall and bring to mind the immense benefits of God and Christ, by which we are delivered from native perdition; and are placed on the path to salvation and eternal happiness. Of these benefits, we have in the Sacraments not only notable types and images but also pledges and guarantees.

XXIX. But there are other Doctors of the Reformed School who attribute to the Sacraments some efficacy more than objective. Among these is Gerardus Vossius. In his disputation on the power and efficacy of the Sacraments, prefaced to his treatise on Baptism, he speaks thus in Thesis 2: "They excessively diminish the power of the Sacraments who would have them to be only tokens of Christians, or symbols of mutual charity, or testimonies of a grateful mind towards God, or allegorical reminders, by which Christian mortification, vivification, and spiritual nourishment are set before our eyes as if by paintings; or who would have them instituted only to excite faith by way of a representative object; or who indeed admit that they are symbols of grace, but only of grace previously and extrinsically conferred, not of present grace, that is, grace which is exhibited and conferred in the legitimate use of the Sacrament."

XXX. This is also relevant as he places the Sacraments among signs, which by some covenant and statute exhibit the thing signified. For after teaching that some signs are only significative, as an image is a sign of a person, and ivy is a sign of wine for sale: some are sealing, as a seal which seals the matter contained in a diploma: some, however, are exhibitiv; in the way that anointing is a sign of the prophetic, kingly, or priestly office; likewise, the giving of a cup, foot, hat, or something similar is a sign of the episcopal office or the power to teach in academies: he adds in Thesis 29. "The Sacraments are signs of the third kind, because they not only signify the promise of grace in Christ but also seal and exhibit the promised thing. Hence Bernard, in his Sermon on the Lord's Supper, says, 'Just as a canon is invested with a book, an abbot with a staff, a bishop with a ring; so the divisions of graces are handed down to different people by the Sacraments.

XXXI. Add that he claims Baptism has some efficacy towards infants, by which it generates faith in them, without which no one will see eternal life. By that faith, however, he

understands not actual faith, nor even the habit of faith, but some principle or seed of faith only. For he believes that the Holy Spirit in Baptism is not idle in infants; but joins them to Christ, their head, from which mystical union the habit of faith may arise in its due time. Thesis 47.

XXXII. To explain how the Sacraments confer and exhibit grace, he considers a twofold virtue in the Sacraments: one internal, the other assisting. The internal virtue is that by which the sacramental sign acts on the intellect; which, considering the analogy between the elements and heavenly things, more fully and clearly understands the nature of heavenly grace: and not only understands it better but also, with the intellect elevated by the meditation on heavenly things, is more disposed and excited to apprehend heavenly grace. The virtue that assists the Sacraments is that by which the Holy Spirit, through the sacred sign signifying the spiritual signified to the intellect, internally offers and confers the signified in the legitimate use of the sign. For in the Sacraments, there is such a conjunction of the sign and the signified, that in the legitimate use of the sign, by virtue of the divine promise, the signified is simultaneously granted, Theses 52, 53, and 54. Hence he concludes in Thesis 62 that the Sacraments confer grace, indeed, dispositively by virtue of the sign; but effectively by the immediate virtue of the Holy Spirit.

XXXIII. In the following thesis, after briefly recounting the many uses of the Sacraments, and advising that all these should be considered together, he adds that even then the principal purpose and power of the Sacraments will not be sufficiently expressed unless it is also added that the Sacraments are symbols of present spiritual grace, that is, grace which is perceived in the sacramental action, dispositively by the virtue of the sign, as has already been said, inasmuch as the visible symbols both nourish and cherish faith by a sensible representation of heavenly things, and excite it to apprehend spiritual grace: and effectively by the virtue of the Holy Spirit, inasmuch as He offers and effectively confers the grace which the sign cannot grant, by Himself to the faithful person.

XXXIV. Without doubt, Samuel Ward held the same opinion, one of the deputies of the Church of England to the Synod of Dort, and later a very celebrated Professor of Theology at Cambridge University. For when, under his moderation, the thesis, "The Sacraments confer grace on those who do not place an obstacle," was proposed for debate, he thus explained his view on the efficacy of the Sacraments: "We say that the Sacraments confer grace both by offering, presenting, exhibiting, and by sealing and assuring us of the grace received. As to the manner of the bestowal; it should be noted that the Sacraments can be said to confer grace in two ways: either as instrumental physical causes or as moral. We do not say that the Sacraments confer grace by any power or quality inherent in them, either natural or supernatural, which would be to confer grace as a physical cause. But they are said, according to our Church's view, to be efficacious signs of grace because the divine power certainly and infallibly assists these Sacraments, by the tenor of the covenant and the promise of Christ, to produce the effect of grace: namely, so that they have the nature of a cause without which not, or rather, they are generally called instrumental causes, a moral instrument: as Bernard says, the canonry is conferred by the giving of a book, the abbacy by a staff, the bishopric by a ring. Just as by the agreement of the contracting parties, inheritance is conferred by the handing over of an authentic

instrument; just as by one coin, a pledge is made, which is worth the payment of a thousand coins. Thus, by the pact and agreement between God and man, divine grace and the pledge of heavenly inheritance are conferred upon the worthy reception of the Sacraments. And since, according to his view, the Sacraments confer grace in this manner on all those who do not place an obstacle, he concludes that the Sacraments infallibly confer grace on all those who are capable of grace, and yet cannot act morally, due to a lack of understanding and the use of free will, since such people cannot place an obstacle to the Sacrament. Consequently, this is his conclusion: Baptism always confers the first grace on infants who cannot place an obstacle; namely, the remission of original guilt. In his earlier treatise on the number and efficacy of the Sacraments in general, in the Determination of the Moderator.

XXXV. The same opinion was held by Thomas Bedford, Bachelor of Theology, who defended the aforementioned thesis under the moderation of Samuel Ward. Explaining the acts of the Sacraments concerning sacramental grace, he says: "They not only signify or represent; nor do they merely seal and certify grace given elsewhere; but they also exhibit, confer, and deliver it to us into possession and enjoyment; and that as instrumental causes, not principal, for this is the work of the Holy Spirit, but instrumental. Not physically, like bread and wine retaining some power in themselves to nourish the body, but metaphysically, whose whole power and virtue rests not in the signified and correlated, and proceeds from the cooperating Holy Spirit. Hence, in the definition, they are called means of receiving grace. In the treatise just cited, in the Respondent's Thesis.

XXXVI. Especially, he attributes to the Sacraments some efficacy more than objective; this is evident because he affirms that Baptism confers some present grace on infants, by which not only is the guilt of original sin remitted to them, but they are also regenerated in some way. For he teaches that Baptism confers on infants not only the potential or conditional fruit; but also actual regeneration: at least in a signified and radical act. In the summary of his disputation, Aphorism 4. And in the explanation of the theses, clarifying his view on this matter, he says that the Church of England acknowledges the present and actual regeneration of infants who rightly and duly receive the Sacrament of Baptism. "It is not merely an ecclesiastical regeneration, and aggregation of the baptized infant to the Church and the communion of saints; but truly a spiritual one from the gift of the Spirit. We seek this while praying for infants, that God may deign to wash them with the Spirit, to grant them the Spirit, that they may receive the remission of sins through spiritual regeneration." He adds that this sacramental regeneration is considered either in seed and in the first act or in flower and in the second act. The former, considered in the first way, can be called initial and seminal; but in the latter, it can be called full and perfect, and indeed habitual. He professes to believe that this seminal and initial grace is conferred in Baptism.

XXXVII. In this doctrine, Bedford had a precursor in John Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, also one of those from the English clergy deputed to the Synod of Dort. For in a certain letter to Samuel Ward, prefixed to the cited treatise on the efficacy of the Sacraments in general, he teaches that the blood of Christ is applied to all infants rightly baptized for the

remission of original sin. And thus, this is his first proposition concerning the efficacy of Baptism: "All infants baptized are absolved from the guilt of original sin." In the explanation of this thesis, he teaches consequently that infants in Baptism are in some way not only adopted and justified but also regenerated and sanctified. And then he adds this second proposition: "The justification, regeneration, and adoption which we grant to baptized infants is not univocally the same as that justification, regeneration, and adoption which, in the question of the perseverance of the saints, we defend as never being lost."

XXXVIII. Although, in his sense, the justification, adoption, and regeneration received by infants in Baptism is not univocally the same as the justification, adoption, and regeneration of adults, nevertheless it suffices for the salvation of infants. For this is his third proposition: "The justification, regeneration, and adoption of baptized infants confer upon them a state of salvation according to the condition of infants." Hence he concludes that there should be no doubt about the election and salvation of infants who die after Baptism before the use of reason.

XXXIX. However, many who were justified and regenerated by Baptism in infancy perish eternally because of the sins in which they die when they reach adulthood; he says that this is because infants are indeed placed in a state of salvation by Baptism, but only relatively to the age and condition of infants. Therefore, those who perish in older age, not fulfilling the vow of Baptism, do not lose the state of salvation they had according to the condition of infants, but lose the infantile state, which, when changed, ceases to be sufficient for the salvation of an adult, which by divine ordination was sufficient for the salvation of an infant. For, as his fourth proposition has it: "Those who were truly justified, regenerated, and adopted in Baptism according to the common condition of infants, are not justified, regenerated, or adopted in the specific condition of adults unless, by repenting, believing, renouncing, they fulfill the vow made in Baptism."

XL. Whatever may be the case regarding the regeneration of infants in Baptism, it is certain, according to Davenant's view, that some present grace is given to infants through Baptism, by which they are placed in a state of salvation: and therefore the Sacraments must have an efficacy other than objective since they cannot act objectively on infants. Nor can it be otherwise understood by those theologians who teach that the Sacraments are moral instruments of grace, because, in their legitimate use, the gracious operation of the Holy Spirit infallibly accompanies the sacramental signs, by which those who receive them are endowed with the grace required by their state and condition. Among these theologians is Samuel Maresius. He says, "The thing signified is exhibited in the Sacraments on the part of God offering and promising, if it is not received by the one who does not bring the necessary faith to that reception. For it is not exhibited by the Sacrament as physically joined to the material sign, but in the use of the Sacrament, by divine covenant, to those who have brought the necessary dispositions and conditions." In his *System*, Last Section, Thesis 25.

XLI. But to finally open what I myself also think about this matter, first of all, I am certain, as the Reformers assert with common consent, that the Sacraments have no physical power by which they concur in the production and bestowal of grace: whether that physical

power is supposed to be a quality infused and inherent in the sacramental signs, or some transient motion, or something else unknown to us. I am chiefly driven to this opinion because neither right reason nor the Word of God compels us to imagine anything like this. For whatever is read either in Scripture or among the ancient Church Fathers about the virtue and efficacy of the Sacraments can be well and easily understood and explained, even if we attribute to the sacramental signs no other than moral efficacy. What need is there, therefore, to suppose things that cannot be true without a great miracle and a manifest violation of the nature of things? For it is against nature that a physical body acts on a spirit and produces some spiritual property in it by its own action.

XLII. I am also certain, and it seems to be denied by no one, that the Sacraments have some objective power and act objectively on the faithful, who approach them with due attention. For they are suitable to powerfully move the intellect and contain many things in themselves that greatly contribute to confirming faith. They also vividly present various benefits of God to us and bring them to mind, reminding us in many ways of our duty towards God and our neighbor and solemnly binding us by a vow to die more and more to sin and the world and to live henceforth to God and Christ. By all these things, the faithful are strongly incited to grow in love for God and their neighbor; and, renouncing worldly desires, to live temperately, justly, and devoutly in this age.

XLIII. Although the Sacraments act objectively on the faithful and have no other efficacy than that which belongs to signs, I still believe that another efficacy must be attributed to them than merely objective, that is, one that depends so much on the knowledge of the person on whom they are effective that it cannot exert itself without that knowledge. The evidence for this is infant baptism, perpetually approved by the common consent of the Orthodox Church and almost universally received among Christians, having a firm and valid foundation in Scripture. For it is contrary to sound doctrine to say that Baptism is utterly ineffective in infants who, after receiving it, are taken from this life before the use of reason. Since Baptism is rightly administered to them according to Christ's institution, it must be effective in them. For Sacraments are practical and active signs and do not lack some salutary effect in all who receive them rightly. Indeed, why, and to what end, do we baptize infants who are immediately and certainly to die, according to the perpetual custom of the Christian Church, if there is no efficacy in Baptism for them? But whatever that efficacy may be, Baptism cannot act objectively on infants: therefore, the Sacraments act otherwise than objectively.

XLIV. Add that signs which are called collative and exhibitivae, of which many have been instituted by men themselves, do not lack power and efficacy even towards those who do not have knowledge of them when they are applied: nor do they cease to confer the highest rights and dignities upon them. Thus, a royal infant, which has sometimes happened, can be anointed and crowned, by which anointing and crowning the royal dignity is either conferred or at least solemnly confirmed upon them. And thus also often the insignia of a noble and sacred order are hung around the necks of royal infants in their cradles, by which sign no small dignity and eminent rights are conferred upon them. Now, it is a constant consensus of the Reformed School

that the Sacraments are of the kind of signs which are called exhibitiv and collativ, relative to the saving grace of Christ.

XLV. Furthermore, I cannot agree with those theologians who, while admitting that the Sacraments are practical and exhibitiv signs and do not lack their efficacy when rightly administered to those who do not understand them and do not have the use of reason, still hold that the Sacraments are not otherwise active and practical than by sealing grace already received, and therefore they presuppose and require justifying grace in both adults and infants, a view held by Henricus Altingius, who affirms that the Sacraments are only signs and seals of grace, which merely declare and seal it, but do not confer or communicate it. In Common Places, Part 2, Section 12, on the Sacraments.

XLVI. On the contrary, I firmly believe that the Sacraments not only seal received grace but are also means of receiving grace and signs of some present grace, which is conferred and communicated along with them. For besides that objective efficacy which we have said should not be denied to the Sacraments, the Sacraments seem to me to be called means of receiving grace for two reasons. First, because their reception is part of the condition which God requires of us to be made partakers of grace and salvation, according to that saying, "Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved." Secondly, because in their legitimate use, a certain divine power assists the sacramental signs, which, according to God's certain covenant and promise, confers saving grace to the recipient and works in their soul.

XLVII. Indeed, the Word of God is also accompanied by some efficacy of the Spirit of God, by which it generates faith in the souls of some; however, that efficacy is entirely dispensed by God freely, without any covenant and promise by which God has bound Himself to give such grace to some rather than others. But with the Sacraments, a certain power of the Divine Spirit is joined by God's covenant, by which they act infallibly in all to whom they are rightly administered and who receive them with the disposition which God requires in them. And therefore, in terms of the mode and manner of acting, the Sacraments seem to differ from the Word in two respects. First, the Word does not act except objectively, that is, unless it is perceived and known by those in whom it is effective; the Sacraments, however, act otherwise than objectively. Secondly, God is not bound by any covenant to accompany the Word with the power of His Spirit to create faith in some rather than others; but by a certain divine covenant, a divine power accompanies the Sacraments, by which they infallibly communicate some saving grace to all those who participate in them according to the order established by God.

XLVIII. Furthermore, when we say that the Sacraments are means of receiving grace, we mean that grace is either first conferred through the Sacraments, or at least preserved, cherished, and increased, and therefore the Sacraments are ordinary means and instruments which God uses in communicating saving grace to us, and in cherishing and promoting it through necessary growth and increase. That this is the case, and that the Sacraments are moral signs and instruments of grace, which God infallibly and certainly communicates in their legitimate use to all those who rightly and duly receive them, is proven by all those passages of Scripture which attribute to the Sacraments things that can be conveniently and sufficiently explained only about

the signification and sealing of already received grace. For when the Apostle, alluding to Baptism and the Eucharist, says that we have all been baptized into one Spirit and made to drink of one Spirit, does this not clearly presuppose and imply that the sacred Eucharist and Baptism were instituted so that in both Sacraments the same Spirit might be communicated to us? Nor can what the Apostle says about Baptism, namely that it is a washing of regeneration and renewal by the Holy Spirit, and that God saves us by this washing, and that He sanctifies His Church by the washing of water, be referred to the simple signification and sealing of divine grace without being very jejune and forced. Ananias also presupposed some other efficacy than sealing when, about to baptize Paul, he addressed him thus, "Rise and be baptized, and wash away your sins," or, "be cleansed from your sins." Do not these words clearly indicate some washing that accompanies Baptism, and of which we are made partakers in Baptism itself? 1 Cor. 12, Tit. 3, Eph. 5, Acts 22.

XLIX. Furthermore, the vast majority of theologians of the Reformed School distinguish between the exhibitiv power and the sealing power in the Sacraments. Indeed, the common doctrine of this School is that the Sacraments are not only sealing signs but also signs that present and exhibit the thing signified. Hence, it is clear, according to the doctrine of this School, that the Sacraments are effective and active concerning grace, not only by sealing it; and therefore, in the Sacraments, not only is received grace sealed, but some present grace is exhibited. Consequently, the Sacraments in Protestant Schools are compared to those signs which are joined and accompanied by the actual delivery, donation, and possession of the thing itself: such as the laying on of the Apostles' hands, by which the sick were healed, and by which the baptized were accustomed to receive extraordinary gifts of the Spirit. And the common consent in Reformed Schools approves of that saying of Bernard already cited, 'As a canon is invested by a book, an abbot by a staff, a bishop by a ring; so are the various divisions of graces given to different Sacraments.'

L. Especially, the moral efficacy of the Sacraments, by which some present grace is conferred in their legitimate use by virtue of the covenant established by God, seems manifestly proven by the Baptism of infants. Nor can it reasonably be denied that Baptism is an ordinary means by which God confers the grace necessary for infants to enter the kingdom of heaven. It is undoubtedly necessary for them to have some grace for this purpose, as they are born infected with original sin, from which they need to be cleansed to be admitted into that kingdom of God, into which nothing defiled by sin can enter. And no one can say that infants, even those rightly baptized, are deprived of that grace without infringing on God's covenant and promise, by which saving grace is joined to sacramental signs in their legitimate use. Therefore, that grace was conferred on them either in Baptism or before Baptism and only sealed by Baptism. But it is rash and without sufficient foundation to assert that infants born in the Church are ordinarily granted saving grace by God before Baptism. This certainly contradicts the common consent of Christians, not only of the Church, both Greek and Latin, but also of all those who are called Augsburg Confession theologians among Protestants, and moreover, the majority of Reformers.

Indeed, it seems very rash to oppose such a concordant, ancient, and universal opinion of Christians without any convincing argument.

LI. Those who hold the contrary opinion indeed rely on the words of the Apostle, who says to the faithful, 'Your children are holy' (1 Cor. 7:14). But the Apostle is not speaking there of any internal and real holiness by which someone is truly received into God's grace and accepted for eternal life. The evident argument for this is that the Apostle speaks of such sanctification that can coexist with unbelief and pertains to the unbelieving part joined with the faithful spouse. For he says, 'The unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband; otherwise, your children would be unclean, but now they are holy.' Certainly, if the Apostle were speaking of real and saving holiness, it would have to be said that the children of all those who are in the external communion of the Church and belong to God's covenant by an external profession of faith are already sanctified from the womb: for the Apostle speaks of such holiness that no less applies to the children of the faithful still in the womb than after they are born. Hence, it would follow that all those born in the Church are not born as children of wrath and guilty of any sin since it would be supposed that original sin is remitted to them and they are cleansed and absolved from it. But the common doctrine of Christians is that we are all born children of wrath and guilty before God; and it is wholly contrary to the understanding of the majority of the Reformed School's doctors to say that no one born in the external communion of the Church is absolved from original sin and has nothing in them that could hinder their entrance into the kingdom of heaven.

LII. This is clearly testified by the liturgies received among the Reformed. For in the form of the administration of Baptism used by the Reformed in France, before the minister baptizes the infant, he asks God to remit the original sin to the infant, of which the entire progeny of Adam is guilty; and to sanctify him with His Spirit: and to grant these benefits from God, that God may be willing to insert him into the body and communion of Christ, so that being made His member, he may partake of His goods. This prayer clearly presupposes that the infant to be baptized has not yet had original sin remitted, nor is he yet grafted into Christ and a partaker of His grace. Similar statements are found in the liturgy of the Church of England.

LIII. Some learned men here say that infants who do not yet use reason are appendages of their parents, and therefore are reckoned in the same place as their parents: but from this, it follows at most that infants born in the Church belong in some way to the body of the Church, but not that they are truly sanctified, which does not apply to many of such infants' parents who, though professing faith with their mouths and thus externally belonging to the Church, deny it by their deeds and are guilty of eternal damnation and outside the true and mystical body of Christ.

LIV. Therefore, the children of the faithful are called holy because, as Tertullian says, 'they are destined for holiness, consecrated to God from birth by their parents' vow, to be brought to Christ through Baptism and to truly participate in holiness and grace.' Especially, when the Apostle speaks thus, he seems to refer to the fact that the Jews considered children born of one parent not belonging to God's people to be unclean, and they were commanded to put away such children along with their mother, as we read happened in the time of Ezra and Nehemiah. The

Apostle does not want Christians to be held by this scruple, and therefore advises not to abandon the unbelieving part with whom they were united in marriage when they embraced the faith: lest, in a singular manner, their children be considered polluted because they were born of an unbelieving parent. To remove this scruple, the Apostle advises that the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the believing husband, and therefore children born of such a union are to be considered holy, in the same way, that those born among God's people are considered holy, not unclean as the Jews judged those born of a foreign parent.

LV. Furthermore, the learned men with whom we are dealing here cite that promise often repeated in Sacred Scripture, 'I will be your God, and the God of your descendants after you,' as if it follows that the descendants of the faithful are received into God's grace by that very fact of being born of faithful parents. But God promises nothing else by these words than that He will extend His covenant to the children of the faithful, so that the sons, no less than the parents, can be partakers of the benefits promised in the covenant, provided they fulfill the conditions of the covenant. Thus, just as it does not follow from this that an impious and impenitent son is a partaker of the same salvation as the faithful parent, so it cannot be concluded that all infants born of the faithful are cleansed from original sin and absolved from it before the ordinary means of conferring that grace, which for infants is Baptism, are applied to them.

LVI. Since Christian doctrine requires us to believe that infants, who are rightly and lawfully baptized in Christ's Baptism, are partakers of saving grace which they are capable of and which they need to be granted eternal glory: since they could place no impediment to such grace, and that grace is joined with the sign of Baptism by a certain promise of Christ: and furthermore, since it is rash and without the Word of God to presume that such grace is usually granted to the children of the faithful before Baptism and only sealed by Baptism: it remains to conclude that such grace is truly communicated and ordinarily conferred to them by Baptism. According to what the Baptismal liturgy used in our Churches says, the graces signified in Baptism are conferred on us when it pleases God to incorporate us into the body of the Church by Baptism. Hence, it follows that the Sacraments are instruments, not physical but only moral, through which saving grace is truly conferred, as the same Baptismal liturgy says, that God distributes the riches of His grace to us through the Sacraments. Just as by the laying on of the Apostles' hands the Holy Spirit was given to believers and the baptized, and various sick persons were healed.

LVII. All the theologians of the Augsburg Confession firmly hold this doctrine. Among others, Eckard, in the Fascicle of Controversies, chapter 18, question 3, affirms that the Sacraments are instruments for conferring spiritual grace and for applying divine benefits. And in the following chapter on Baptism specifically, he teaches that it is an effective means by which we are cleansed from sins and incorporated into Christ, and condemns those who say that we are already grafted into Christ and made sons of God before Baptism by the power of the covenant of our parents' faith and that such are merely declared by Baptism, but not truly made so. And in the same chapter, question 10, he strives to prove with many arguments that by the

Sacrament of Baptism, by God's ordinance, the remission of sins, adoption, regeneration, and renewal are conferred.

LVIII. Conrad Dieterich affirms the same opinion, stating that Baptism has two main purposes. First, that it is an instrument, means, or tool that offers, exhibits, confers, and applies the divine promise of the free remission of sins, righteousness, and eternal salvation. Second, that it serves as a seal, mark, testimony, and pledge of our faith in the divine promises. In his *Institutes of Catechetics*, in the treatise on the Sacraments in general, and in the treatise on Baptism, he affirms that it works the remission of sins.

LIX. Similarly, John Gerhard not only asserts that the Sacraments are instruments, means, and channels through which God offers, exhibits, and applies to believers the promise of the Gospel regarding the remission of sins, righteousness, and eternal life: but also refutes those who maintain that the Sacraments are merely seals that mark grace already given or to be given afterward, and therefore deny that the Sacraments are instrumental causes of grace, the remission of sins, and salvation. In *Theological Commonplaces*, volume 4, treatise on the Sacraments, chapter 9, section I.

LX. Moreover, from the things expounded in these and previous theses, it is clear that the Doctors of the Roman Church and Protestants agree on many aspects concerning the purposes and uses of the Sacraments. Both acknowledge that the Sacraments of the New Testament are public marks and badges by which Christians should be distinguished from infidels. They also acknowledge that these are bonds by which the faithful are united and knit together into one body. They recognize that in the Sacraments we profess our faith and take and renew a kind of oath of our obedience and fidelity to God and consecrate ourselves to God with a solemn vow and are bound to keep Christ's laws. Furthermore, they acknowledge that the reception and celebration of the Sacraments constitute a significant part of divine worship and, if done rightly and with legitimate preparation, solicit divine kindness towards us and obtain various gifts of God's grace. Neither side denies that we find in the Sacraments various incentives to Christian virtues and ample material for exercising charity and humility. They also agree that through the Sacraments, the hope of Christians is elevated, faith is stirred up, and they are pledges and testimonies of God's faithfulness in keeping promises, as the Roman Catechism teaches similarly to the Protestants.

LXI. The Protestants mean nothing else when they say that the Sacraments are seals of divine promises and that God's promises are sealed by the Sacraments, and our faith is confirmed through them. Hence, it is surprising that Bellarmine disputes with the Protestants because they teach that the Sacraments seal like a seal and confirm like a miracle the promise of grace, to excite and nourish faith. In *The Sacraments in General*, book 1, chapter 14, even though this is the very doctrine of the Roman Catechism. For when explaining the various reasons why the Sacraments had to be instituted among Christians, it says, 'Another reason is that our minds are not easily moved to believe the things promised to us. Therefore, from the beginning of the world, God frequently used words to declare what He intended to do, and sometimes added other signs, which occasionally had the appearance of miracles, to His words when establishing a work

of great magnitude to confirm the faith in His promise. For when God sent Moses to liberate the Israelite people, and Moses, relying not even on the help of God commanding him, feared that the burden would be too great for him to bear or that the people would not believe the divine oracles and words, the Lord confirmed His promise with many signs. Just as in the Old Testament, God used signs to attest to the certainty of a great promise, so in the New Testament, Christ our Savior, having promised us the forgiveness of sins, heavenly grace, and the communication of the Holy Spirit, instituted certain signs to be presented to our eyes and senses, by which we might have Him as it were pledged, and thus we could never doubt that He would be faithful to His promises.' And later it adds, 'The Sacraments have great power to excite faith in our souls.' In *The Sacraments in General*, section 14.

LXII. Concerning the efficacy of the Sacraments and their mode of operation, the Doctors of both schools agree that the Sacraments have some objective power and in many ways foster and increase faith and holiness in us by way of objective confirmation of faith and moving and inciting to piety and holiness, as already mentioned briefly. But there is no one in the Roman School who thinks that the Sacraments have only objective power, or even only sealing power, as it seems to some in the Reformed School.

LXIII. On the other hand, in the Protestant Schools, no one attributes to the Sacraments any physical power by which they operate grace in the souls of the recipients in the manner of a physical and properly so-called instrument, so that the external signs immediately reach the production of grace: which is the opinion of many in the Roman Church.

LXIV. However, the majority of Protestants and also the Doctors of the Roman Church agree that the Sacraments have some power beyond objective, and even beyond sealing, yet not physical, and for this reason, the Sacraments are only moral instruments of grace, meaning that they do not produce grace by themselves but have its bestowal joined to them in legitimate use, by a certain covenant and promise of God, by which God has freely bound Himself to grant His grace to all who receive them rightly and according to the institution of God and Christ.

LXV. There remains one point in which all Protestants seem to differ from all the theologians of the Roman School, namely whether the Sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato*, which the Roman School, by common consent after the Council of Trent, affirms, while the Protestants, also by common consent, deny. But the intention of the Council of Trent was not to define what the Protestants deny. For that council did not intend to assert that the Sacraments exercise their power even in adults who use reason, who lack faith and repentance and are devoid of any good motion; or that the reception of the Sacrament is a meritorious work of the grace conferred in the Sacrament; or finally, that the Sacraments, by physical, real, and properly so-called action, operate grace, all of which the Protestants intend to deny when they deny that the Sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato*. But what the Council of Trent intended to define as an article of faith, when it stated that the Sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato*, is that certain grace is infallibly given to those who approach the Sacraments rightly prepared or receive them according to the divine order, without placing any obstacle on their part; and that this grace is above the grace that their own faith and devotion can obtain for them, by virtue of the

institution by which God willed that such grace be joined to the sacramental signs in their legitimate use, whether the Sacraments are considered to concur morally only or even physically in the production of grace.

LXVI. Therefore, the Council of Trent defines nothing contrary to the opinion of all those Protestants who acknowledge that the Sacraments have an efficacy beyond objective; nor that they are only sealing of grace already received or to be received afterward, but also means of receiving and instruments for conferring some present grace, which is conferred in the legitimate use of the Sacrament by virtue of the divine covenant and promise, to all who receive the Sacraments rightly and according to the order established by God; even if the sacramental signs have no inherent power or quality by which they produce grace by themselves and immediately. This opinion is held in the Roman Church by all those who attribute to the Sacraments no other than moral efficacy.

LXVII. Therefore, while those Protestants, among whom are all the theologians of the Augsburg Confession and many Reformed, deny that the Sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato*, and those Roman School doctors who teach that the Sacraments are only moral instruments of grace affirm the opposite, the dispute between them is merely verbal. The real controversy remains only between the Roman Church and those Reformed who maintain that the Sacraments act only objectively in the production of grace or are merely sealing signs and not also instruments for conferring grace; and between all Protestant Schools and those Roman Church doctors who attribute to the Sacraments more than moral efficacy and consider them to reach the very production of grace immediately and by themselves, thus being physical instruments of it.

PART THREE:

In which it is inquired whether the intention of the Minister is necessary for the validity and efficacy of the Sacrament. The doctrine of the Roman School is expounded and compared with the doctrine of the Protestants.

Thesis I

According to the declaration of Pope Eugene in the Council of Florence, all Sacraments are perfected by three things: matter, as the material, words, as the form, and the person of the minister conferring the Sacrament, with the intention of doing what the Church does. If any of these is lacking, the Sacrament is not perfected. Following this doctrine, the Council of Trent constructed the eleventh canon of the seventh session: "If anyone says that in ministers, the intention is not required, at least of doing what the Church does; let him be anathema." However, not all theologians of the Roman School explain in the same way what and what kind of intention is required in the minister for the Sacrament.

II. Ambrose Catharinus, a renowned bishop gathered at Trent, does not believe that the intention necessary for the truth of the Sacrament should be understood as any mental and

internal intention, but that which is manifested by an external act: as long as someone in the administration of the Sacraments uses the rites instituted by Christ and shows that he seriously intends to perform a sacred act and confer a Sacrament, whatever he thinks internally, and holds in his mind, cannot prejudice the truth and efficacy of the Sacrament. However, if someone openly professes that he does not intend to perform a sacred act but uses Christ's instituted words and rites as a joke and mockery, he admits the Sacrament would be null. This opinion of Catharinus is reported by the author of the History of the Council of Trent, in the year 1546, Italian edition, pages 247 and 248.

III. Vasquez explains Catharinus's opinion by teaching that he admits the necessity of some internal intention in the minister of the Sacrament, but one that is solely to externally follow the Church's rite in the words and things necessary to perfect the Sacrament:

"Catharinus," he says, "in his work on the intention of the minister of the Sacraments, first acknowledges the Roman doctrine we have stated: but he explains that general intention of doing what the Church does, so that the minister does not necessarily need to have any other intention than that of externally following the Church's rite in the words and things necessary to perfect the Sacrament: although he neither believes in the Church nor any effect of the Sacrament other than that intention." Vasquez attributes this opinion to Sylvester as well in the Summa, under the word Baptism.

IV. The same opinion seems to have been held by Thomas Aquinas. In the third part of the Summa, question 64, article 8, addressing the question of whether the minister's intention is required for the perfection of the Sacrament, he objects negatively: "A person's intention cannot be known by another. Therefore, if the minister's intention were required for the perfection of the Sacrament, it would not be known whether one received a Sacrament; and thus, one could not have certainty of salvation." To this, he responds: "There is a twofold opinion on this matter. Some say that a mental intention in the minister is required, which if lacking, does not perfect the Sacrament. But this defect is supplied in children, who have no intention of approaching the Sacrament, by Christ, who inwardly baptizes: in adults, who intend to receive the Sacrament, this defect is supplied by faith and devotion. But this could be said concerning the ultimate effect, which is justification from sins: but concerning the effect, which is the thing and the Sacrament, namely, concerning the character, it does not seem that it can be supplied by the devotion of the recipient: because the character is never imprinted except through the Sacrament. Therefore, others say better that the minister of the Sacrament acts in the person of the Church, whose minister he is. In the words he pronounces, the Church's intention is expressed, which suffices for the perfection of the Sacrament, unless the contrary is expressed outwardly by the minister or the recipient."

V. From the cited words of Thomas, it is clear how futile are those Roman Church doctors who want Thomas to have held the opinion that the internal mental intention of the minister to do what the Church does is simply necessary for the truth of the Sacrament. When they are confronted with the words of Thomas, they respond that Thomas does not mean that the external utterance of words, without mental intention, suffices for the Sacrament itself, but only

in relation to us, or to pacify the consciences of the recipients: because, as long as it is not evident that the minister acts with a wrongful intention, it is piously believed that he acts sincerely, and the Church, which does not judge of hidden things, holds such a Sacrament as valid. For it is evident to the reader that Thomas distinguishes between two opinions: one that requires a mental intention in the minister, which if lacking, does not perfect the Sacrament; the other, opposed to this, says that the minister of the Sacrament acts in the person of the whole Church, whose minister he is, and the intention of the Church is expressed in the words he pronounces, which suffices for the perfection of the Sacrament unless the contrary is expressed outwardly by the minister or the recipient. Thomas rejects the first opinion and approves the latter as better.

VI. The contrary is not proven by what is often cited from the tenth article of the same question, where Thomas says that a perverse intention concerning the Sacrament itself destroys its truth. "When someone," he says, "does not intend to confer a Sacrament but to mock, such perversity destroys the truth of the Sacrament, especially when he outwardly manifests his intention." It seems that Thomas intended to solve the question of whether a right intention of the minister is required for the perfection of the Sacrament both according to others' sense and his special sense. Therefore, he says in general, when someone does not intend to confer a Sacrament but to mock, the truth of the Sacrament is destroyed; but he adds these words, especially when he outwardly manifests his intention, to indicate in which direction he inclines, namely that the perverse intention of the minister does not destroy the truth of the Sacrament unless it is outwardly manifested.

VII. But whatever the case, the current doctrine of the Roman School is that the internal mental intention of doing what the Church does and performing the sacred act is so necessary in the minister of the Sacrament that without it, the Sacrament is never perfected. Thus, even if the minister of the Sacrament shows that he intends to administer the Sacrament and omits nothing that is outwardly to be done in the administration of the Sacrament, the Sacrament will still be null if he internally conceals an intention contrary to his words and deeds.

VIII. The theologians of the Roman Church inquire and variously explain what this intention of doing what the Church does consists of. First, they distinguish between two intentions. One is to simply perform the external act that the Church does, using the things and words that constitute the Sacrament: the other is to perform such an act as a certain holy and religious ceremony, such as Christ instituted and the Church celebrates. They deny that the former intention is sufficient for the truth of the Sacrament in the minister and contend that the latter is also required. Peter from Saint Joseph explains his opinion on this matter in Book 1 of the Sacraments, chapter 4, resolution 3.

IX. Becanus distinguishes three intentions. The first is the intention to utter words and perform the external action. The second is the intention to perform the Sacrament or at least to do what the Church does. The third is the intention to confer the effect of the Sacrament. He then explains his view in two conclusions. The first is that for the validity of the Sacrament, the minister's intention must not only be to perform the external act but also to perform the

Sacrament or to do what the Church does and what Christ instituted. The second conclusion is that for the validity of the Sacrament, a formal and explicit intention to confer the effect of the Sacrament is not required, but the aforementioned intention suffices. Therefore, if someone intends to confer the Sacrament of Baptism, even if he does not intend to confer the character and justifying grace, Baptism will still be valid unless there is an impediment on the part of the recipient. This is found in *Summa Theologia Scholastica*, tome 6, chapter 3, question 3.

X. Bellarmine, explaining the matter more precisely, posits that for the validity of the Sacrament, it is not sufficient to merely intend to perform the external act that the Church performs; rather, it requires the intention to perform the external act, not merely, but as a sacramental act, or with the intention of celebrating the mystery that Christ instituted and the Church celebrates. He notes that when Councils define that for the truth and value of the Sacrament, it is necessary for the minister to intend to do what the Church does, their meaning is not that the minister must intend to do what the Roman Church does, but what the true Church does, whatever that may be. Or what Christ instituted, or what Christians do, for these amount to the same thing. Indeed, if someone intends not to do what the Roman Church does but what some particular and false church does, he notes that this suffices for the validity of the Sacrament, because whoever intends to do what some false church does, which he judges to be true, by this very fact intends to do what the true Church does, even if he errs in his judgment about the true Church. The efficacy of the Sacrament is not hindered by the minister's error concerning the Church, but by a defect of intention. (*De Sacramentis in genere*, Book I, Chapter 27).

XI. Vasquez, addressing the same matter, though using different words, expresses a similar view. He first states that for the validity of the Sacrament, it is not sufficient for the minister to intend to do what the Church does only materially. According to him, one does what the Church does only materially, who uses the same things and words that the Church uses when he wants to confer a Sacrament but does not consider any aspect of the rite or religious ceremony in them. Therefore, it is necessary, in his opinion, that the minister of the Sacrament internally intends to do what the Church does formally in some way.

XII. He teaches that the intention he calls formal can be held in many ways. Firstly, if someone knows what the universal Church is, that is, the congregation of the faithful, and intends to use those things and words in the way it usually does. Secondly, if someone, ignorant of the universal Church or not thinking about it, has the intention of doing what he saw or heard such a parish priest or minister of such a Church do. Finally, if someone intends to use those words and things as religious ceremonies, knowing that someone or some people usually use them. In all these ways, he considers the intention to do what the Church does to be formally held. One of these ways or an equivalent one suffices for the substance of the Sacrament. For, he says, by thinking that something religious lies hidden under those things and words, according to the rite and custom of some, and using them for that reason, one confusedly has the intention of doing what Christ instituted and what the true Church uses in that way. But if someone entirely ignorant of the things and words of the Sacraments, as religious ceremonies in any nation or

person, should utter the same words and use the things because he learned to do this simply for another purpose, he teaches that in this case, no Sacrament would be conferred, because with such ignorance, he could not even confusedly have the intention of doing what the Church does. (In tertiam Thomæ, Tome 2, Disputation 138).

XIII. He adds in the following that it suffices for the truth of the Sacrament if someone administers it as a certain religious ceremony, and no further intention of the end or effect of the Sacrament is required, as some old Scholastics said. However, he explains their words so as to bring their opinion to the common doctrine of the School. Namely, he holds that, according to them, the intention of the end or effect of the Sacrament is necessary, not explicitly but only implicitly: because, namely, the intention regarding things and words is necessary, not only as they are natural things but as they are instituted signs, or what amounts to the same, as they are certain ceremonies of some nation or people. In this expected intention, the intention of the effect of the Sacrament is also contained virtually.

XIV. However, the old Scholastics seem to have felt more than what Vasquez attributes to them. For Vasquez himself acknowledges that Scotus distinguished here between the remote end of the Sacrament, such as justification, and the proximate end, such as in Baptism, to make one a Christian. With this distinction made, Scotus considers the intention of the proximate end necessary for the truth of the Sacrament, but not of the remote end. But this distinction is entirely useless if the intention of the proximate end suffices for the true Sacrament only implicitly. For the intention of the proximate end cannot be had implicitly without a similar intention of the remote end.

XV. From what has been said, it is clear what the minister of the Sacrament must intend for the Sacrament to be true and valid, according to the Doctors of the Roman School, namely, to do what the Church does, in the manner already explained. Now we must see how and in what way he must intend this, according to the same School's opinion. To understand this, it is to be noted that they distinguish a threefold intention. One is actual, the other virtual, and the third habitual. Actual intention is when a man is mentally present and attentively does what he does. Habitual intention is an inclination or readiness to have that intention, which can be found in one who is sleeping or drunk. Virtual intention is when actual intention is not present because of some distraction of mind, but it was present a little before and operates in its virtue.

XVI. They indeed acknowledge that the minister of the Sacraments should strive to have an actual intention of doing what the Church does when administering any Sacrament, and to be mentally attentive to that action. However, they deny that such an actual intention is necessary for the truth of the Sacrament; because it is not in our power to prevent our thoughts from sometimes being distracted, even while performing the most holy acts. Therefore, even if someone, while baptizing or consecrating the Eucharist, is completely distracted and does not think at all about what he is doing, this would not prevent the Sacrament from being valid.

XVII. On the other hand, a merely habitual intention does not suffice, according to them, for a true Sacrament. For such an intention, as mentioned, remains even in a drunk or sleeping person. However, if it should happen that a drunken and crazed person, or even one sleeping,

should baptize another or administer any other Sacrament, as it is not entirely unusual for some to do many things while sleeping, no one would dare assert that in this case, a true Sacrament had been administered, since the administration of Sacraments ought to be a voluntary and deliberate act, which cannot be elicited by a drunk or sleeping person.

XVIII. It remains, therefore, that in their opinion, only virtual intention is sufficient and necessary for the truth of the Sacrament when actual intention is not present. That is, as long as someone, intending to celebrate a Sacrament, begins to prepare for those things that contribute to it, even if, continuing in the actions customarily used in the celebration of any Sacrament, his mind is completely distracted and he does not consider what he is doing, nonetheless, by virtue of that first intention, with which he set out to act, a true Sacrament will be performed, provided no contrary intention arises, making the Sacrament null. Bellarmine explains the opinion of the Roman School in this way in Book 4, On the Sacraments, Chapter 27.

XIX. Peter from Saint Joseph also philosophizes in the same way about this matter, stating: "For the validity of the Sacrament, actual intention is not required, nor does habitual intention suffice, but virtual intention can suffice and, indeed, if actual is lacking, it is necessary." He proves the first part by stating that although actual intention is the most perfect of all and should be striven for, it is not always in our power to have it because of the various thoughts that sometimes, willingly or unwillingly, distract the mind. He shows the second part from the fact that habitual intention in itself has no influence on the effect: and that if it sufficed, someone without the use of reason applying the matter and form of the Sacrament would truly confer the Sacrament, provided he once had an actual intention of conferring the Sacrament and never retracted it. Finally, he concludes the third part from the preceding. For, he says, if actual intention is not necessary, and habitual does not suffice, then either no intention is required, or if actual is lacking, virtual is necessary and sufficient. That is, even if there is no need for actual intention to formally exist, it is required that it persist virtually, or in some effect of it, which can be said to move to operation, as happens when a priest, from the actual intention of confecting the Eucharist, goes to the altar and celebrates Mass, and finally, while thinking of something else, pronounces the words of consecration. Then, despite the present distraction, the preceding intention is considered to persist virtually, namely through that series of actions preceding the consecration, which flowed from it. (In *Idea Theologiæ Sacramentalis*, Book One, Chapter Four, Resolution Four).

XX. Statements consistent with these can be found in Becanus's *Summa Theologia Scholastica*, Volume 6, Chapter 5, on the Sacraments in general, Question 4. He writes: "An actual intention is not necessarily required for the confection of the Sacrament, nor does a habitual intention suffice; but a virtual intention is required and is sufficient, although care should be taken to have an actual intention. It is called actual when someone, at the time he is performing the Sacrament, thinks about its confection and simultaneously intends to perform it. This indeed is the most perfect, but it is not required since it is not always within our power. For, morally speaking, we cannot prevent our thoughts from sometimes being distracted, even when handling the most sacred things. It is called habitual when it is a certain readiness acquired

through previous acts, which can even exist in a sleeping person. This does not suffice because it cannot contribute to the external sacramental action except through an internal act of the will, which we suppose to be absent. It is called virtual when an actual intention is not present due to some distraction of mind, but it was present a little before, and the operation is performed by its virtue. This suffices when actual intention is absent."

XXI. Hence, the common doctrine of the Roman School holds that for the truth and perfection of the Sacrament, it is not sufficient for someone to externally do what Christ instituted and what the Church does, nor to omit anything legitimate in this part; but additionally, an internal intention is required to celebrate the rite as something sacred and religious, and to do what Christians intend to do. However, it is not necessary for the minister of the Sacrament to actually think about this and be attentive to the present matter, but it is enough if he began or prepared himself for that action with that intention, even if his mind later wanders elsewhere. Whatever he may outwardly express or profess, if he internally conceals an intention contrary to what has been stated, the Sacrament will be entirely invalid.

XXII. As for Protestants, they indeed consider it a grave crime for the minister to celebrate the Sacraments with a profane mind and not treat them as sacredly as befits a holy matter, and they believe it to be a thoroughly abominable sin if someone in the celebration of those Mysteries has an intention contrary to Christ's intention; indeed, they consider it highly culpable negligence if someone is not attentive to the present matter while engaged in that sacred ministry. However, for the truth and effect of the Sacrament, from the minister's side, they think it is sufficient if he does what Christ commanded, and in the external rite, uses nothing but what is legitimate and consistent with the practice of the Christian Church. Regardless of what he internally thinks and intends, the Sacrament will nonetheless be true and valid if he omits nothing externally required by the legitimate celebration of the Sacrament.

XXIII. However, if someone mockingly and jocularly uses the rites instituted by Christ, such as baptizing or celebrating the Eucharist on stage in public mockery of the Christian religion, they do not doubt that this would not be a Sacrament but sacrilege. For that is entirely against Christ's institution, and such baptism and Eucharist cannot be said to be legitimately performed since Baptism and the Eucharist are very serious matters and should not be taken in jest. Therefore, although they do not think the truth of the Sacrament depends on the minister's internal intention, they consider it necessary that, as far as external judgment allows, the action should be serious, and the minister should appear to truly intend to celebrate a sacred matter. Hence, they readily admit the necessity of some external intention in the minister of the Sacrament to do what the Christian Church does and what Christ our Lord instituted.

XXIV. William Ames explicitly acknowledges this in *Bellarmino Enervato*: "Indeed, an external expression by words and deeds consistent with the intention of administering the Sacrament is required; but an internal or mental intention of this kind is not required for the essence of the Sacrament." Later, responding to certain absurdities Bellarmine tries to derive from the Protestant position, he responds: "They by no means follow, because an external

intention of the work is required sacramentally, although not an internal intention of the minister operating." (Tom. 3. lib. 1. cap. 2. quæst. 3.)

XXV. Thomas Bedford, in his dissertation on the number and efficacy of the Sacraments in general, explicitly teaches the same: "It should also be noted that the entire efficacy of the Sacrament depends on its legitimate use and administration. For we suppose in this whole question that all things are done rightly and correctly according to Christ's command, both on the part of the minister consecrating and on the part of the Sacrament. It is not enough that the body is washed with water unless it is done by a legitimate minister; nor is it sufficient unless it is done with a sacramental intention. However, we measure this intention not by some secret and unknown motion of the heart but by the circumstances of place, time, and preparation; and especially by the prayers and supplications which those present pour forth with one voice during the sacred action." (Disputation on the Number and Efficacy of the Sacraments in General, Thesis of the Respondent.)

XXVI. Similarly, Chamier teaches that in the administration of the Sacraments, we assume that all things are done legitimately and according to Christ's institution, and nothing is lacking except the internal intention of the minister; about which people neither should nor can judge: and the only question is whether, in administering any Sacrament, if all other things are presumed legitimate, and nothing else is lacking, the sole defect of the minister's internal intention can hinder the perfection of the Sacrament. Like other Protestants, he denies this. (Tom. 4. lib. 1. cap. 19. num. 2.)

XXVII. Chemnitz is equally clear on this matter. Explaining how nothing but Christ's institution needs to be observed for a true Sacrament, he says: "The institution of Baptism does not intend that it should be some common washing or that it should be nothing but a ridiculous game, mockery, or profanation of the institution with the recitation of words: rather, it requires a particular action, and indeed the action which Christ instituted. This suffices for observing the institution. What the administrator of Baptism thinks about that action in his heart does not pertain to the truth or integrity of Baptism." He later admits that for the truth of Baptism, it is required that the baptizer intends, or at least appears to intend, not just to wash but to baptize. (Examination of the Decrees of the Council of Trent, Canon II, Session 7.)

XXVIII. Calvin indeed seems to admit as legitimate the Eucharist administered by a mocking Epicurean, but he means internal mockery that is not outwardly shown, while assuming that all things are done according to Christ's command and rule. He writes: "I so highly respect the sacred institution of Christ that if an Epicurean, inwardly mocking the whole action, should administer the Supper to me according to Christ's command and the rule given by Him, and in the legitimate rite, I would not doubt that the bread and cup offered by his hand are true pledges of Christ's body and blood." (Antidote to Session 7 of the Council of Trent.)

XXIX. From this, it is evident that Protestants agree with the Roman School that some intention of the minister is required for the Sacrament to be valid, namely what they call the external intention. Internally, someone intends something if he truly wants to do it. Externally, he intends the matter who wants to seem to intend it, even if he thinks otherwise in his mind; thus,

for the truth and perfection of the Sacrament, Protestants require that the one administering it appears to be serious about the matter and intends to perform a sacred act: and this can be gathered from the circumstances of place, time, persons, and other things. Therefore, they agree with the Doctors of the Roman Church that there is no Sacrament if it appears to have been administered only in jest and mockery: as if someone were to baptize or celebrate the Eucharist theatrically and on stage. Certainly, one who does something mimically and theatrically does not truly do it but only pretends to do it: hence, the matter is not real but simulated.

XXX. However, the external intention required in the minister of the Sacrament includes some true and real intention: namely, externally doing what the Church does and what Christ instituted. For the external celebration of the Sacrament, it is necessary that it does not appear to be a mere joke but rather appears to be serious. Therefore, the only remaining controversy between Protestants and the Roman School is whether it suffices for the truth of the Sacrament that the minister externally does and intends to do what Christ instituted and what the Church does, and also intends to appear to celebrate a sacred matter and to act seriously: and it is not further necessary that the minister of the Sacrament internally and actually or at least virtually intends to celebrate a sacred and religious act: so that even if such an intention is absent, or even if a contrary intention is concealed in the minister's mind, the Sacrament should nonetheless be considered true and valid and not lack its effect unless there is an impediment on the part of the recipient. This is what Protestants affirm, but the modern Roman School denies.

XXXI. Hence, it is clear that the Protestant position does not differ in substance from Catharinus's position on this question. Therefore, it could be defended that their doctrine on this matter was not condemned by the Council of Trent itself. Since the words of this Council are so phrased that Ambrosius Catharinus could easily interpret them in his own sense, and indeed shortly after the Tridentine decree, Catharinus published a book in which he not only defended his opinion but insisted that it was the opinion of the Council itself. Nor was Catharinus publicly condemned for this.

XXXII. But whatever the intention of that Synod was, it can easily be proven that for the truth of the Sacrament, it is not necessary for the minister who administers it to have a true and internal intention, not only of externally doing what the Church does but also of celebrating some sacred rite and religious ceremony, as the modern Roman School doctors assert. For it is absolutely certain, and conceded by the whole Roman School, that faith is not necessary in the minister of the Sacrament and that the minister of a true Sacrament can be not only a hidden infidel but even an Epicurean or outright atheist who holds the Christian religion in derision and considers it a mere imposture. How can an atheist or Epicurean, who believes that all the rites of the Christian religion have nothing sacred about them but are mere tricks invented to delude and deceive people, have a mental and true intention of performing those rites as something holy and religious? These two notions are mutually exclusive: that someone considers certain rites as mere deceits and yet internally wills to perform them as something sacred and holy. And how can someone consider something as not sacred and yet will to perform it as sacred with an internal and real, not merely external and apparent, will?

XXXIII. Moreover, if some internal and hidden intention of the minister is necessary for the Sacrament to be valid, no one can be certain that they have received a true Sacrament or that this or that person has been administered a true Sacrament since no one knows what another person holds in their mind and what they truly will and intend. This would lead to many absurdities. Firstly, Christians are persuaded that the salvation of infants is certain if they are not only born in the Church of God but also brought to Baptism and washed with water in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit according to Christ's institution. This belief is a solace for the grief of parents who see their children taken from this life before the use of reason. Yet, if the doctrine of the Roman School holds, no one can be certain of the salvation of an infant who dies prematurely, no matter how clearly it seems they were baptized. According to the Roman School's doctrine, Baptism is absolutely necessary for infants to be saved, yet no one can be certain that an infant, who appears to have been baptized, was truly baptized, given that the intention of the priest who appeared to baptize is unknown and might have been contrary to what was outwardly done.

XXXIV. It also follows from this doctrine that in the Roman Church, no one can ordinarily be sure in any way that they are in the state of grace and that their sins have been forgiven, and thus everyone has great reason to doubt this, which cannot coexist with a peaceful and tranquil conscience. How can someone enjoy that spiritual joy and peace so highly recommended in the Gospel while being doubtful and uncertain whether God is pleased with them or angry, and whether they are in a state of salvation or damnation? That the faithful in the Roman Church have perpetual cause for doubting and wavering about this is evident from the fact that according to the Roman School's doctrine, very few are found to be so disposed that they can obtain grace from God without a priest's absolution: and yet no one can be sure they have been truly absolved by the priest to whom they confessed their sins. For whatever words the priest might pronounce, how can they know that he truly intended to absolve them? And even if he had such an intention, it is equally uncertain whether he is truly a priest and therefore whether he had the power to absolve them in any way. For the intention of the bishop who ordained the priest is no more known than that of the priest when he absolves penitents. Indeed, if perhaps he was not baptized, and a malicious priest refused to baptize him, he could not have been ordained by a bishop, no matter how much the bishop wished and intended to ordain him.

XXXV. Moreover, from the doctrine that a mental and hidden intention of the minister is necessary for the truth and perfection of the Sacrament, it follows that the people of the Roman Church, to whom the Sacrament of the Eucharist is proposed daily for the highest worship due to God alone, do not know what they adore and whether the object before which they kneel is truly worthy of adoration. For they cannot know if any true transubstantiation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ has taken place. Since there is no transubstantiation if the priest celebrating does not have the true intention of consecrating, about which no one can be certain. Moreover, it is equally uncertain whether the one who celebrates that mystery is truly a priest and has the true power to consecrate the body and blood of Christ. For who can certainly know whether he has been marked with the character of Baptism and is qualified to receive holy

orders, and also whether the one who ordained him was truly a bishop and indeed conferred holy orders upon him, as all these depend on some intention hidden in the hearts of various individuals.

XXXVI. Roman Church theologians, especially Bellarmine, respond that no one can indeed know with the certainty of divine faith whether the Sacrament they receive and which is celebrated is true and effective, but they can know it with human and moral certainty, which suffices to calm the conscience. He says that since having the intention is very easy, there is no reason to doubt whether the minister had the intention unless some external sign shows otherwise. They also add that Protestants themselves do not have any certainty other than moral certainty about the Baptism administered to each of them. For they know they were baptized not from divine revelation but only from the testimony of others, since they were baptized in infancy and before the use of reason.

XXXVII. But this is to evade the Protestant argument rather than answer it. For Protestants do not object to their adversaries that, according to their hypotheses, they are not certain by divine faith of the truth of the Sacrament they see being celebrated or that was administered to them, but rather that they have no true certainty of this kind, such as individual Protestants have about their own Baptism. Even if they cannot remember the Baptism they received in their infancy, nor know they were baptized by any divine revelation, this is nonetheless known to them by such a certain and constant testimony that there is no occasion for doubt at all.

XXXVIII. But the situation is very different according to the doctrines of the Roman School. Although those who adhere to this doctrine can know with certain and irrefutable testimony that they were once washed with water in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, according to the rites prescribed by Christ and the Church, they do not thereby know that they were truly baptized. For their Baptism was not true if the intention of the baptizer was absent. And there is no testimony that can make them certain that the one who baptized them had the necessary intention in mind or did not have some contrary intention.

XXXIX. Nor is it true, as Bellarmine says, that there is no reason to doubt the intention of the one conferring the Sacrament unless some external sign shows he does not have it. For from the openly profane and flagitious life and behavior of many who serve in ecclesiastical ministries, a vehement and legitimate suspicion arises that they do not believe in the mysteries of the Christian religion and are actually atheists or Epicureans who consider the Sacraments as human inventions and superstitions. Is there not, therefore, just cause to doubt whether those who are of this mind, when conferring the Sacraments, intend not only to do externally what Christians usually do but also to celebrate something sacred and religious? Furthermore, besides those whose lives are openly profane, it cannot be doubted that among ecclesiastical ministers there are many hypocrites who, under an external guise of piety, inwardly conceal an impious and unbelieving mind, about whom the same suspicions can be held as about the former. Additionally, in this very age, there have come to light, been recorded in public acts, and even documented in literary records, many examples of priests who were magicians and sorcerers,

who solemnly confessed before judges that while they served in their ministry in the Roman Church, they did not have the intention of administering the Sacraments, but indeed had the opposite intention in their minds.

XL. Now consider how many infants have been seen to be baptized by these criminals who were publicly punished, and by others whose crimes were not discovered, who, according to the doctrine of the Roman School, were not truly baptized. From this, it is very likely that many were later ordained as priests or even bishops, who, nonetheless, were not truly such because no one can receive holy orders and be marked with the character of those orders who was not first truly baptized. These priests and bishops, improperly created, could not truly absolve any penitents, nor consecrate any Eucharistic symbols, nor ordain anyone to holy orders, and therefore it follows that by them, though unknowingly and unwillingly, innumerable penitents have been deceived, and in many places, the Roman Church congregation has been compelled to adore mere bread instead of Christ. Especially since many priests were ordained by these improperly created individuals, it follows again that in the administration of the Sacraments, the Christian people have been similarly deceived. From all this, it is clear how many and how serious the causes for doubt are regarding the truth and efficacy of the Sacraments conferred in the Roman Church; since not only is there doubt, nor can it be proven with any adequate testimony, about the hidden intention of many ministers, who are either openly impious or hypocritically hide their infidelity, but also it is unknown whether those who appear to be upright and honest are truly initiated into holy orders and thus have the power to administer the Sacraments entrusted solely to the Church's ministers. Since it could easily have happened that they were not truly baptized, or were ordained by those who lacked the intention, or who were themselves improperly created due to some similar defect, and thus could not transfer a power they did not have. Hence, it is easy to conclude that not only is there no place here for divine faith certainty, but not even for moral and human certainty, as Bellarmine claims, since such varied, grave, and frequently recurring causes for doubt remove any true certainty and leave the mind entirely doubtful and uncertain.

XLI. Moreover, it can be validly concluded that a hidden intention of the minister is not necessary for the truth of the Sacrament from the fact that no testimony of sacred Scripture or consensus of the ancient Church doctors supports such a doctrine, but it is a recent invention of the Roman Church, of which there is no mention among the ancients before Peter Lombard, and which arose from the disputations of the scholastics on Peter Lombard's books. Indeed, as we have seen before, the Council of Trent itself did not dare to define this openly, but crafted the words of its decree concerning the intention of the Sacraments' ministers so that it could easily admit the interpretation of Ambrosius Catharinus, which entirely agrees with the Protestant doctrine.

XLII. That this is the case is made clear by the very disputations of the Roman School doctors, who attempt to prove their opinion not with any Scripture passages, nor with any testimonies of the ancient Fathers, but only with the authority of the Councils of Florence and

Trent, although they cannot even do this convincingly, and moreover with certain reasons which are so weak that they can be easily and effortlessly refuted.

XLIII. First, they say the words used in the Sacraments can have various meanings. For example, the words “I baptize you” can signify a simple washing done to cleanse bodily filth or to achieve some other natural end. Therefore, something is required to determine the meaning of the sacramental words, but there is nothing that can determine it except the mental and internal intention of the minister. I respond that the meaning of the words we use in administering the Sacraments is sufficiently determined by the entire series of actions instituted by Christ and by the circumstances of place, time, and persons, from which it appears that a sacred matter is being performed and a mystery instituted by Christ is being celebrated, as in Baptism, for example, the washing is not common but mystical and religious. No other internal and hidden intention is needed for this besides the intention that the minister shows outwardly.

XLIV. Secondly, to prove the necessity of that intention which they require in the minister of the Sacrament, they say that the ministers of the Sacraments are instruments of God, not brute but animated and rational ones: just as when a king appoints governors and judges in cities to administer justice in his name. In such cases, they say, the will and intention to exercise the actions for which they are instruments are required. I respond that the ministers of the Sacraments are indeed rational instruments and act freely and deliberately in administering the Sacraments: therefore, the Sacrament would be entirely null if administered by someone sleeping or insane. But for this reason, they should not be compared to royal governors and judges, but rather to those who, by special mandate, handle certain business. In handling the business entrusted to them, they indeed use their reason and freedom, but as long as they externally do what they have been mandated to do, the business is valid, whatever intention they might internally have and conceal. Indeed, when a judge appointed by the king solemnly and according to custom absolves someone, the absolution is true, whatever intention the judge might conceal in his mind.

XLV. They also add that the words of the Sacraments are practical: but practical words are not effective unless spoken by one who has the power and will to do what the words signify. I respond that the words used in administering the Sacraments are spoken and are practical by virtue of Christ acting through them, and their efficacy depends on Christ’s institution and power, not on the will and intention of the minister. It is indeed true that God does not act through these words unless they are pronounced by a suitable minister, and then they are Christ’s effective instruments when pronounced by one to whom He has entrusted this task: just as the commands of kings and princes are not effective when signified by just anyone, but only when delivered by ministers chosen for this purpose. But as long as the minister wills to pronounce the words at the prescribed time, place, and form, those words have their effect, whatever else the minister may internally think and intend. Just as no hidden intention of a herald proclaiming the king’s edict solemnly and customarily can prejudice the force and authority of that edict,

XLVI. Finally, the theologians of the Roman School try to prove their position from the absurdities they think would follow from the contrary doctrine. They say that if the minister’s

intention were not necessary in the Sacraments, it would follow that someone who washes another in a health bath and invokes God's name with the words used in Baptism would truly baptize him; or if someone were to mimic and theatrically use the rites and words of Baptism on stage, it would be a legitimate Baptism; and that reading those words, "This is my body," at a table would consecrate all the bread on the table, and similarly with the words "This is my blood" for the wine. I respond that these do not follow at all from the Protestant doctrine. For they require for the truth of the Sacrament that the minister wills and intends externally to celebrate what Christ instituted. Therefore, if from the circumstances of the action, it appears that the action is not serious, nor does the one performing the sacramental work intend it to be a sacred act, but something else, they concede that the Sacrament would be entirely null. They only teach that as long as the minister of the Sacrament shows that he intends to celebrate the Sacraments and act seriously, and this is inferred from the circumstances of the action, and nothing is omitted that Christ commanded as necessary, the Sacrament is true and legitimate, whatever the minister may internally think and intend: and therefore, the external intention, as they call it, suffices for the truth of the Sacrament; no other mental and hidden intention is required.

XLVII. Therefore, since the doctors of the Roman Church cannot prove their opinion about the necessity of some hidden and secret intention in the minister of the Sacraments by testimonies of sacred Scripture, nor by the tradition of the ancient Church, nor by the consensus of the early Church doctors, and besides, their arguments are weak and can be easily refuted, it is clear that their position is unfounded and should therefore be rightly rejected and dismissed.

THEOLOGICAL THESES: In which it is explained whether CHRIST Is a Mediator according to both Natures, DIVINE & HUMAN?

And on this matter, the opinion of the ROMAN Church is compared with the PROTESTANT Doctrine. Which, with God's favor, under the presidency of LOUIS LE BLANC, Professor of Theology at the Academy of Sedan, will be publicly defended by JOHN MARTIN, Anglo-Sarnian.

Thesis I

According to the view of the Roman School theologians, the mediation of our Lord Jesus Christ must be understood and explained as follows. A mediator is properly one who places himself between two parties that are at odds or not united, to reconcile them and bring them to agreement, or to unite them in some new covenant. Therefore, since Christ undertook to unite men to God and to bring those who had turned away from God and become enemies due to sin back into favor with God, He is rightfully called the Mediator between God and men.

II. In order for the Son of God to accomplish this, though He existed in the form of God and was equal and consubstantial with the Father, He assumed the form of a servant and became man, being like us in all things except sin. Thus, in Him now exist two natures, divine and human, which are so closely united in Christ that they constitute only one person. Therefore, Christ, in view of His person and the dual nature within Him, holds a mediating position between God and men, since He is neither simply and solely God nor simply and solely man, but both God and man. This participation in both divine and human nature, and the personal union, is called by Bellarmine "substantial mediation." There is no question as to which nature this should be attributed, as it pertains to Him by virtue of the union and conjunction of both natures.

III. However, to reconcile sinful men to God and unite them with Him, it was not enough for the Son of God to assume human nature into the unity of His person; He also had to endure and perform many things. For understanding these, it is noted that someone can act as a mediator between disagreeing parties in three principal ways: First, by conveying messages and conditions between the parties, as all intermediaries can be called mediators. Second, by praying and interceding with one party on behalf of the other. Third, by paying and satisfying one party on behalf of the other.

IV. In these three ways, Christ acted as the Mediator between God and men. He declared God's will and laws to men, He prays and intercedes for us before God, and most importantly, He offered Himself to God as redemption for us, and satisfied God for us with His death. The Roman School refers to these functions of Christ's mediatorship. This is called by Bellarmine "mediation by operation" as opposed to "substantial mediation."

V. Furthermore, concerning these mediatorial functions, the question arises: According to which nature do they belong to Christ? And, is Christ a Mediator according to both His divine and human natures in respect to these functions? Here, Scholastic theologians use a certain distinction. In Christ's works, two principles can be considered: one is the principle by which the works were performed, and the other is the principle through which and by which they were

performed. The former is called the material principle, and the latter the formal principle, according to Scholastic custom.

VI. In all Christ's works, the principle that performed the works is the person of Christ Himself, who is both God and man; not merely one of His natures. For, according to the Scholastic axiom, actions belong to the suppositum (person), not to the nature which is in the suppositum. But the formal principle, or the principle through which the works of Christ are performed, is sometimes the divine nature, sometimes the human nature. Thus, when our Lord Christ walks or eats, it is not only God or only man who walks and eats, but both God and man. However, these actions were performed by Christ only through His human nature, which alone is the formal principle of such actions. Conversely, the one who sends the Holy Spirit is Christ, not only as God but also as man, although He sends the Holy Spirit only as God, through His divinity.

VII. According to this distinction, the theologians of the Roman School, by common consensus, teach that the principle performing and still performing the works of the Mediator is neither solely man nor solely God, but both together, namely, God made man. In this sense, it can be said that Christ is Mediator not only according to His human nature but also according to His divine suppositum. For it is the Son of God who redeemed the Church with His own blood, and who was made under the law for us and obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. However, if we consider the principle by which these works of the Mediator are done, that principle is the human nature, not the divine. In this respect, Christ is the Mediator according to His human nature alone, because it is through this nature, not the divine, that He exercises the mediatorial functions, such as praying, suffering, and obeying. There is no such mediatorial function that can be attributed to the divine nature as the formal principle.

VIII. Although the Scholastics attribute the mediatorial functions of Christ to the human nature alone as the formal principle, they acknowledge and teach that these functions are such that they could not have been performed by one who was merely human. For it was not simply necessary for our Mediator to obey, suffer, and pray for us, but what was required was merit, suffering, and prayer of infinite value. Such merit could only pertain to a divine person whose dignity could infinitely augment the value of His prayers and sufferings.

IX. Thus, although the works of Christ the Mediator are, as to their substance, proper to the human nature, it is the divine Word, which sustains the human nature hypostatically, that imparts infinite value to Christ's actions, making them sufficient for satisfaction. Therefore, it must be considered the primary root and principal cause of Christ's infinite satisfaction. Accordingly, when speaking absolutely of the office of Mediator, the Scholastics do not deny that it must be said that Christ is Mediator not only as God or as man alone, but jointly as God and man. As seen in Eustachius of St. Paul's *Summa Theologica*, part 2, tract 1, disputation 11, question 3.

X. This is confirmed by Gregory de Valentia. If the question is asked, he says, in what capacity Christ properly and immediately fulfilled the office of Mediator, it must be said that He was a Mediator only as a man. However, if the question is asked in what capacity He was

entirely a Mediator, either as in what capacity He immediately exercised that office, or as in what capacity He certainly received the value of His function: it must be answered that Christ was a Mediator not only as a man, nor only as God, but conjointly as both God and man. In 3. Thom., question 200, point 3. According to their view, one should say that Christ was a Mediator as a man united to the Divine Word.

XI. Finally, if one wishes to distill the opinion of the Scholastics from their formulas and complexities and present it in simple and clear words, it seems to reduce to this: the person who exercises the office of Mediator must necessarily be both God and man. However, none of the functions of the Mediator are divine but only human since all are from humanity as their immediate principle. Yet, these functions derive efficacy, value, and worth from the divine nature with which the human nature is united in one person.

XII. As for the Protestants, they take the term "Mediator" in a broader sense than the doctors of the Roman School. Under this office, they include many more functions. For whatever Christ our Lord performed and continues to perform in any way for the salvation of men, they refer entirely to His mediatorial office. Thus, in their sense, the functions of Christ as Mediator are as extensive as His functions as Redeemer and Savior of men. Now, Christ not only earned and procured grace and salvation for us through His obedience and suffering, but He also applies and confers them to us, saving us not only by merit and satisfaction but also by His power and efficacy.

XIII. Moreover, Christ teaches and governs us not only as a man who is an instrument of divinity united and singularly, but also as the primary author of all truth and light, on whose omnipotence everything depends and will eternally depend. Therefore, the power and right to forgive sins, to renew hearts by grace, to send the Holy Spirit, to open hearts, to enlighten minds, to raise the dead, to bestow immortality, and many other such works are the operations of Christ our Savior, who, as stated, not only merited these benefits for us but also confers them in reality and by His own power. Protestants attribute all these to Christ the Mediator and count them among His mediatorial functions.

XIV. Furthermore, among the mediatorial functions of Christ, they recognize many of which the formal principle is not the divine nature, but only the human nature, if we consider the substance of the work, such as praying, suffering, and obeying. However, since these acts derive their worth and efficacy from the divine nature of Christ, to which the human nature is personally united, they also do not allow Christ to be called a Mediator in respect to these functions according to the human nature alone, but teach that Christ performs them not simply as a man, but as God-man.

XV. However, they also believe that many of the functions of Christ as Mediator, in terms of the very substance of the work, have their formal principle in the divine nature, not the human nature. Such functions include sending the Holy Spirit, enlightening minds internally, effectively renewing and sanctifying hearts, raising the dead, and similar acts. Whatever Christ does as one sent by the Father to redeem the human race and save the elect, they attribute to Christ's mediatorial office, as we have already stated.

XVI. Therefore, they teach that Christ our Lord is truly called and is the Mediator between God and men according to both natures, not only because the suppositum that exercises the mediatorial functions is a divine person who is both God and man, but also because there are some operations and effects of Christ as Mediator that are from the divine nature as the formal principle through which Christ operates them, and others that are from the human nature. Thus, in the functions of the mediatorial office, the humanity plays its part, and the divinity also has its role, with each nature having its respective actions, some of which are properly divine and others human. Although neither nature should be considered apart from the other, each acts with the communion of the other.

XVII. From what has been explained, it is clear that theologians of both the Roman School and the Reformed School agree on the following: 1. In a good sense, it can be said that Christ is a Mediator according to both natures, that is, at least if the principle that gives the works of the Mediator is considered. 2. Speaking absolutely, Christ is and should be called our Mediator not only as He is man, nor only as He is God, but as He is both God and man conjointly.

XVIII. Furthermore, from what has been said, it is clear that Scholastic doctors concede to Protestants that there are no functions of Christ as Mediator that do not depend on the divine nature as their principle, from which they derive their value and worth. Conversely, Protestant theologians do not deny that if we speak of the acts to which the Roman School seems to restrict the mediatorial office of Christ, those acts are according to their substance from the human nature as their formal principle, although the divine nature bestows their dignity and efficacy upon them.

XIX. Thus, the controversy returns to this: whether there are certain functions of the mediatorial office that, in terms of the very substance of the work, are from Christ's divine nature as the formal principle, not from the human, that is, which Christ exercises through the divine nature, not through the human. Protestants affirm this, while doctors of the Roman Church deny it.

XX. This controversy, however, seems to be of little or no importance. For converting hearts, imprinting faith on minds, vivifying the dead, sending the Holy Spirit, and similar acts, which Protestants say Christ performs mediatorial acts through the divine nature, are works that the Roman School acknowledges Christ performs. They also agree that the divine nature of Christ is the formal principle of these acts and that they are performed by Christ. The only question is whether these acts should be called mediatorial and whether they belong to Christ as our Mediator, which Protestants affirm and the Roman School denies. But since we are certain that Christ is able and willing to perform these acts for the salvation of men, it does not seem to matter much whether we say that Christ performs these acts as Mediator or by another title. This is like asking whether the title of Mediator is as broad as the title of Savior in Christ, or whether the title of Savior is broader and encompasses more acts than the title of Mediator.

XXI. To clarify what I think on this matter, those acts in Christ that should properly be called mediatorial seem to be those that could not have been performed except by the Incarnate Word, and which are so proper to Christ that they do not belong to other divine persons and cannot be performed by them. For the title of Mediator does not belong to the Father or the Holy Spirit, nor can any mediatorial acts be attributed to or performed by them. However, bestowing grace and glory, conferring salvation earned by Christ's merit and obtained by His intercession, and effectively illuminating minds, converting hearts, raising the dead, and similar acts are not peculiar to Christ but belong to the undivided work of the Trinity, which is common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For the Father and the Holy Spirit, no less than the Son, convert hearts, illuminate minds, vivify the dead, bestow grace and glory, and confer eternal salvation. Therefore, those acts are not properly and strictly speaking mediatorial. Thus, what Christ earns and obtains for us, grace, glory, and eternal salvation, He does as Mediator. But what He effectively bestows upon us and communicates as the primary author, He does not do as our Mediator, but simply as our Savior and Deliverer. The title of Savior is indeed appropriated to Him in a certain respect, just as the title of Creator is appropriated to the Father, but it is common to Him with the Father and the Holy Spirit. Hence, in my judgment, the title of Savior is broader than the title of Mediator and encompasses more acts in Christ.

XXII. Therefore, it is peculiar to Christ that He saves us by His merit, satisfaction, and intercession, or even as a unique and singular instrument of divinity. Thus, He does this as our Mediator before God. But what He effectively applies salvation to us and transfers us by His own power from death to life is not peculiar to Christ but common to the Father and the Holy Spirit and should not be referred to the mediatorial office of Christ. Nor should anyone say that the Father, along with Christ the Son, illuminates, converts, sanctifies, vivifies, and glorifies us by His omnipotent power, but that it is peculiar to Christ that He does these things as sent by the Father to save men. For it is not enough for a divine person to act as a mediator to perform something as sent by another of the divine persons. Otherwise, the Holy Spirit, who is sent by the Father and the Son to illuminate and sanctify us, should also be called our Mediator. This, however, is alien to true theology.

XXIII. Hence, it follows that some theologians reason less correctly when they infer that the Son of God, before His incarnation and under the Old Testament, already acted as Mediator because He was sent by God the Father to procure the salvation of men, for which reason the Son of God appearing to the patriarchs in human form is often called an angel. For even if this is conceded, which we do not deny, it does not follow that the Son of God then fulfilled the office of Mediator; for this office is not adequately fulfilled by the mission of one divine person by another. Furthermore, it is granted by all Protestants that Christ is not our Mediator simply as He is God, nor simply as He is man, but as He is God and man conjointly. Given this, it is impossible that the Son of God exercised any mediatorial function before assuming human nature and before the Word became flesh.

XXIV. Indeed, all who have attained salvation from the beginning of the world were saved by Christ the Mediator, but not by any mediatorial act performed by the Son of God at that

time, but by the virtue of the mediation to be performed by Christ in due time and His obedience to the point of death on the cross, by which He was to satisfy divine justice for us most abundantly. For Christ's merit, which was eternally present to God, reconciled to God all who embraced the promises of grace first proposed to our first parents by God. In this respect, Christ is called the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world in the Apocalypse because the efficacy of His future death was already exercising itself in reconciling sinners to God from the beginning of the world.

XXV. Neither can I approve of what some among the Reformed say, to show that Christ exercises the office of Mediator even according to the divine nature, that the Incarnation, by which the Son of God assumed human nature, is a mediatorial work whose formal principle is not the human nature itself, which did not unite itself to the eternal Word of God, but only the divine nature. For the incarnation is not a mediatorial work but that by which the Mediator himself was constituted. To appoint a mediator before God is one thing, and to perform the office of Mediator is another. The former belongs to God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; the latter does not.

XXVI. I would also not say, with some, that Christ, according to the divine nature, offered the sacrifice to God and that on the cross the human nature held the place of the victim, while Christ, as God, acted as the priest offering the victim to God. For every priest, as such, is inferior to the one before whom he performs the priestly service. Hence, if Christ, as God, performs the priestly service before the Father, as God, He is inferior to the Father, which is contrary to sound doctrine. Therefore, our great high priest before God is indeed the God-man, but He performs the priestly service not as God but only as man. Hence, in the sacrifice of the cross, Christ, as man, was both the victim offered and the priest offering. But to offer Himself to God and to be obedient unto death on the cross, He was moved and impelled by the eternal Spirit of God, and thus by the divine nature dwelling bodily in Him. This is what the Apostle intends to teach when he says of Christ that He, through the eternal Spirit, offered Himself without blemish to God (Heb. 9:14), besides the fact that it is the divine nature of Christ that gives infinite worth and value to Christ's oblation.

XXVII. Although these things are so, and we do not think that the acts of Christ that should be listed as mediatorial include those that, by common action with the Father and the Holy Spirit, and by omnipotent power, He works for our salvation, raising us from the death of sin, illuminating, and sanctifying us, yet we still affirm that it is rightly and fittingly said by Protestants that Christ is Mediator according to both natures, divine and human. This is because Christ's mediatorial works, indeed, according to their substance, are performed by Christ through the human nature, but they derive their dignity, worth, and value from the divine nature to which Christ's human nature is personally united. However, to argue vehemently on either side about such a manner of speaking, when the matter itself is clear, would be to violate the Apostle's command, who forbids Christians to contend with each other.

THEOLOGICAL THESES:

In which it is inquired whether, from the proposed and desired UNION of those among the Protestants who are called Reformed with those who are called of the Augsburg Confession, it follows that Protestants can and should unite with the Roman Church?

Thesis I

Since a division arose among Protestants regarding certain key points of the Christian religion, and those who follow the Helvetic, French, and Belgic Confessions have openly separated from those who adhere more closely to the Augsburg Confession, the former, known specifically as the Reformed, have always tried to reconcile with those of the Augsburg Confession, and have attempted various ways to establish ecclesiastical peace and remove the schism between the two groups.

II. Although these latter ones have often rejected the offered peace and many of them still seem very averse to it, sometimes the effort has met with success. For example, a hundred years ago at the Synod of Sandomierz, ministers who taught the Gospel of Christ according to both the Augsburg Confession and the Confession of the Waldensian Brethren and the Helvetic Churches in both Poland, Lithuania, and Samogitia came together in a common confession and were reconciled. Recently, in the Colloquium of Kassel, between the theologians of Marburg and Rinteln, a mutual communion was agreed upon despite remaining disagreements on what were considered fundamental issues.

III. Furthermore, in this century, there have been among other theologians of the Augsburg Confession some highly learned and celebrated men who publicly declared in their writings their desire for such ecclesiastical peace between the two Protestant parties and outlined the means to achieve it. For instance, Matthias, Bishop of Strängnäs in Sweden, in his book "Northern Olive Branch," and George Calixtus, professor of theology at the University of Helmstedt, in his book "Judgment on Theological Controversies between the Reformed and Lutherans."

IV. From this concord sought and sometimes achieved by the Reformed with the Churches of the Augsburg Confession, Roman Catholic scholars infer and believe that the Reformed can and should also unite with the Roman Church and not reject its communion. As if, in their view, there were no reason to secede from the Roman Church more than from the Churches of the Augsburg Confession, with which they also have significant controversies. Therefore, it will be useful to explain the reason for this distinction and to show why Protestants, despite the controversies between them, can and should seek unity among themselves, while such a union with the Roman Church is neither lawful nor possible.

V. To make this clear, it must be observed that for the Reformed to seek peace and unity with other Protestants, it suffices if, after weighing and accurately judging everything according to God's word, it appears that the remaining controversies between them are not such as to undermine the foundations of the Christian religion and true piety toward God. Thus, they can tolerate each other and recognize each other as brothers in Christ.

VI. This was the basis of the concord established a few years ago at Kassel between the theologians of Marburg and Rinteln. After both sides clearly and distinctly explained their doctrines and views to each other, and saw to what extent they agreed and what real differences remained, it was mutually acknowledged in good faith that what remained was not so significant as to prevent them from maintaining Christian and religious communion. Thus, they agreed on mutual tolerance and decided not to attack or insult each other but to maintain their own views until God revealed the truth to all while still communicating when the occasion arose, which has since been the practice.

VII. This was also the principle by which Paul attempted to reconcile believers of his time who contended among themselves over the observance of legal rites. He wanted those better instructed in Christian liberty, who had learned from the gospel that Mosaic ceremonies were abolished by Christ, to tolerate and bear with those still scrupulous about this matter and thought themselves bound to keep Mosaic ceremonies. He instructed them to admit such weak-in-faith individuals to their communion and not trouble their consciences by urging them to renounce their beliefs. This is reflected in Paul's words to the Romans, "Accept the one whose faith is weak, without quarreling over disputable matters" (Romans 14:1), and to the Philippians, "If on some point you think differently, that too God will make clear to you. Only let us live up to what we have already attained" (Philippians 3:15-16).

VIII. But the Roman Church requires as a necessary condition for all who wish to embrace its communion and associate with it that they subscribe entirely to the decrees and canons of the Council of Trent and make the profession of faith dictated by the Roman Pontiffs. Since it openly anathematizes all who hold anything contrary to the definitions of the Council of Trent, it cannot recognize as faithful and members of Christ any who profess anything manifestly opposed to that council.

IX. Therefore, Protestants cannot unite with it or have any communion unless they completely renounce and anathematize all that they have previously held and defended against the decrees of the Council of Trent and consider them pernicious errors. This is an insurmountable obstacle to their union with the Roman Church. It is far easier to get people to recognize that something in controversy, for example, the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist as explained by the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, can be tolerated without overthrowing the foundations of Christian piety than to make them hold it as a true and necessary article of faith.

X. Moreover, even if someone believes that a doctrine does not entirely conflict with Christian piety, if they still think it is false, they cannot subscribe to it, declare they believe it in their heart, and confess it with their mouth, much less hold it as necessary without significant hypocrisy and without sinning against their own salvation. No honorable person would communicate with any society under such conditions. None of the Reformed who seek communion with the theologians of the Augsburg Confession would admit and confess their consubstantiation, even if they considered that error tolerable. Just as in the time of the Apostles, no believer correctly informed about and convinced of Christian liberty would declare the use of

Mosaic ceremonies necessary to maintain peace with Christians who still somewhat Judaized, although they would be prepared to tolerate such weak individuals. Paul never demanded that such weak individuals profess anything against their scrupulous and erroneous conscience but allowed them to hold their views until God further enlightened them.

XI. To take an example from the controversies between Protestants and the Roman Church, they disagree on whether the books of Judith, Tobit, and Maccabees are canonical or not. Protestants are fully convinced that these books should be rejected as apocryphal due to the consistent tradition of the Jewish Church, which never held them as canonical—a tradition also received in the early Christian Church and maintained to this day in the Greek Church, and even in the Roman Church itself up to the Council of Trent, acknowledged and approved by the most learned and celebrated of its doctors. They also reject them due to the evident human errors found throughout these books. However, Protestants do not believe the error of those who hold these books as canonical without just cause is pernicious and intolerable. Still, they consider they would be sinning against their own salvation if they declared and professed to believe these books are truly divine and of equal authority with the prophetic and apostolic writings and anathematized all who think otherwise, as the Council of Trent pronounces.

XII. Hence, what does not prevent the union of Protestants with other Churches is a significant obstacle to their union with the Roman Church because the Roman Church requires absolute adherence to its established profession from all who wish to have any communion with it, whereas other Churches tolerate many who hold different views.

XIII. What chiefly prevents the Reformed from uniting with the Roman Church, while they are ready to reconcile with those who follow the Augsburg Confession, is that in the public and external worship of those singularly devoted to the Augsburg Confession, there is nothing that could gravely scandalize the Reformed and prevent them from attending in good conscience. Conversely, there is nothing in the Reformed worship that could reasonably offend the conscience of other Protestants or be a stumbling block to them. In neither case is anything publicly adored that is not believed and professed by both to be God. But the public and external worship of the Roman Church primarily consists of practices that the Reformed cannot, in good conscience, either perform or approve.

XIV. Firstly, the most significant and ordinary aspect of that worship is the solemn adoration, the highest and supreme, that is given daily to the Eucharistic Sacrament as to Christ the Lord Himself, who is supposed to be truly and substantially present in the Sacrament, without any figure: so that there is no substance of bread and wine, but only the substance of Christ's body and blood, which lies hidden under the accidents of bread and wine. The Reformed cannot participate in this worship without grave sin, since they are convinced that the body of Christ is not present in the Eucharist according to substance but only in the sacrament and commemoration. Therefore, if they were to give the supreme worship of latria to the Eucharistic Sacrament, they would be adoring an object as God which they do not believe to be God, and thus would convict themselves of idolatry by their own judgment.

XV. Here, prominent and esteemed men in the Roman Church usually counter that the Reformed Doctors themselves concede that if the real and substantial presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist were granted, it would follow that the Sacrament should be adored by those who hold such a belief. But can it be concluded from this that those who are justly convinced of the contrary can adore the Sacrament without endangering and prejudicing their own salvation, and without sinning, even if their erroneous conscience compels them to such adoration?

XVI. The same prominent men add that, according to the Reformed Doctors, the doctrine of the real presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist has nothing poisonous in it and does not overthrow the foundations of faith and salvation; therefore, it should not break communion among Christians. From this, they conclude that the adoration of the Sacrament, which follows from the doctrine of the real presence, according to the Reformed, has nothing poisonous and thus does not extinguish spiritual life, and that communion among Christians should not be broken because of it, no more than because of the doctrine of the real presence.

XVII. But the Reformed never taught or believed that the doctrine of the real presence, in whatever form it is taught, has nothing poisonous and does not overthrow the foundations of salvation. They spoke only of the real presence as believed by the theologians of the Augsburg Confession, who hold that the presence of Christ's body in the Eucharist does not abolish the substance of bread and wine, and that Christ's body is present in such a way only in the act of receiving the Sacrament, not before or after the reception, so that it in no way follows that the Eucharistic Sacrament, placed on the altar or carried by the priest, can be proposed to the people for adoration.

XVIII. Even if it could be deduced from the doctrine of the theologians of the Augsburg Confession concerning the presence of Christ's body in the Sacrament that the Sacrament can and should be adored, it would not be correct to conclude that the doctrine of the adoration of the Eucharistic Sacrament is tolerable because the doctrine of the real presence of Christ's body in that Sacrament, from which adoration is supposed to follow, is considered tolerable by those who do not perceive the connection or explicitly deny it. It is certain and well-known that many doctrines among Christians should be tolerated as long as they are not extended and those who adhere to them do not perceive the consequences; even if the consequences cannot be tolerated, and those who use such tolerance clearly perceive them.

XIX. Thus, those who follow Molina contend that physical predetermination, much debated in the Roman School, overthrows free will, and that this follows by legitimate and good consequence; yet they tolerate physical predetermination in those called recent Thomists, while rightly considering it a most serious heresy to deny free will. Conversely, these recent Thomists believe that by correct reasoning purely Pelagian conclusions can be drawn from Molina's doctrine and that of his disciples; yet they think that, in the current state of affairs, Molina's doctrine should be borne and tolerated. Similarly, the opinion of those who hold that the human soul is transmitted through the act of procreation and not immediately created by God does not overturn faith nor is it utterly intolerable; yet theologians, when they refute this opinion, claim it

follows that the soul thus produced is also mortal and perishable, a doctrine so intolerable that it completely overturns all religion.

XX. Furthermore, various acts of worship are publicly and solemnly offered to the images of Christ and the saints and their relics in the Roman Church. Namely, knees are devoutly bent before them, incense is burned, kisses are given, and many offerings are made. The saints themselves are frequently invoked by voice and heart, with the belief that they can always hear and respond to all who flee to their patronage and assistance, whether by word or thought alone. All these practices, according to the theologians and reformers, are contrary to divine law and the teachings of God's word. Therefore, they cannot participate in such worship or use such practices in good conscience, nor can they at least by their presence give approval.

XXI. To excuse such practices, various plausible arguments are brought forward by the doctors of the Roman Church, but they all essentially come down to this: that whatever is done towards the images and relics of Christ and the saints proceeds from the love of God and does not terminate in the relics or images themselves, nor even in the saints, but ultimately returns to God, for whose sake, as the ultimate object and end of these acts of worship, all these things are done. Just as when we love, honor, and revere a person among men, our civil worship and love extend to all things related to them, not only without offending them but in such a way that they gratefully receive all these things as signs of a heart inclined and devoted to them.

XXII. But this cannot satisfy the Reformed in any way. They are convinced that in God's word, all religious worship offered to creatures under any pretext is condemned. They do not believe that such worship can be excused by claiming it is inferior to the worship given to the supreme God as the first principle and ultimate end, nor do they think it matters if it is said that creatures are worshipped for God's sake and in His honor, who is their author and from whom they have whatever excellence and preeminence they possess.

XXIII. Indeed, this is the very excuse and pretext that the wise men of the Gentiles used to justify their superstitious worship, which they offered to various signs of deities and many creatures. For whatever the Gentiles worshipped and proposed as the object of their religious adoration, whether a celestial body, an animal, a plant, a mountain, a river, a statue, or any monument of any form, they claimed that all these were not worshipped simply for their own sake but for the sake of God, the supreme Father and Creator of all, whom they intended to worship in all these things and by whose love and reverence they professed to be moved to perform all these acts.

XXIV. To omit many other citations elsewhere on this matter, it suffices here to refer to what the pagan philosopher Maximus of Tyre, living in Rome under Emperor Commodus, wrote on this subject in his thirty-eighth dissertation, in which he discusses whether statues or images should be dedicated to the gods. He first teaches that if there are those whose memory is so strong that they can immediately reach heaven with an uplifted mind and directly approach God, perhaps they need no statues. However, such individuals are very rare among men, and it is not easy to find anyone in the whole nation who always remembers the divine nature and does not

need such aid. Therefore, statues and images were rightly invented and established as signs or symbols of divine honor, by which men are led to the memory of God as by some guide.

XXV. He then observes that the symbols of divinity are not the same among all peoples. The Greeks use images shaped like humans; fire is the symbol of God among the Persians; for the Egyptians, it is a bull, a goat, or a crocodile; for the Indians, a dragon; for the people of Africa, the mountain Atlas; for the Celts, a tall oak is the image of Jupiter; for the Arabs, a quadrangular stone; the inhabitants of Paphos worship the sun and the image of the sun; for the people of Paphos, it is a pyramidal statue. Finally, various peoples worship various mountains and rivers.

XXXI. To this, it is usually responded that, regardless of the terms used, the Roman Church only intends that the saints obtain from God the prayers, graces, and benefits asked of them. But it is extremely difficult to interpret those prayers in which the saints are asked to grant certain things by command, order, word, or power in this sense. For opening heaven, freeing from sins, sanctifying hearts by command, order, or power is entirely different from obtaining the same things from God through their prayers.

XXXII. Furthermore, if the Roman Church intends nothing other than to ask the saints to pray to God for us, why does it phrase its prayers in terms that plainly signify something else? It is entirely unreasonable to express one thing in words but intend another, especially when the manner of speaking is dangerous, and if the words are taken as they sound, they contain impiety and attribute to a creature what belongs solely to the Creator.

XXXIII. Even if it were hypothetically permissible to ask the saints in Christ who have died to pray to God the creator on our behalf, could such petitions be reasonably made with phrases like "free us from sin," "protect us from the enemy," "receive us into heaven," "grant us eternal kingdoms," "free us from death," and "restore us to health of mind and body"? By the same right, it would be lawful to address the faithful living with us on earth in the same way, since we can licitly ask them to obtain such benefits for us from God through their prayers. Yet if anyone had addressed the apostles themselves in this manner while they were living in this world, they would have undoubtedly proclaimed it impious and blasphemous to ask such things from men, and would have protested that only God should be asked for such things, just as any righteous and holy person would be obliged to do if someone asked similar things from them. How, therefore, can we reasonably think that such prayers are pleasing and acceptable to the saints who have piously died, when they can no more grant such things themselves than they could when they lived on earth, and are no less zealous for the glory of God, nor less averse to anything improperly attributed to them?

XXXIV. But even if the saints reigning with Christ were simply asked to pray for us, it is a matter that Protestants find entirely unacceptable, and they believe they cannot practice it or give their approval to it with a good conscience. For this to be done reasonably, it must be supposed that the saints now living in heaven know the hearts of men and can hear and answer prayers made to them anywhere on earth, whether spoken aloud or conceived in the mind. These things are proper to God alone. Neither Scripture nor the doctrine of the Christian Church for the

first three centuries after Christ can demonstrate that these things belong to the saints who have died.

XXXV. Indeed, those who later began to practice the invocation of saints, and in whom its first traces are found, testify that they doubt whether the saints they addressed actually heard what was said to them. This is especially evident in Gregory Nazianzen, who addresses Gorgonia with these words: "If there is any care for us in the souls of the departed, and if this grace is granted to the holy spirits by God to perceive these things, receive our prayer." And in his first oration against Julian, he says, "May the soul of Constantine the Great hear this, if there is any sense in the dead."

XXXVI. Therefore, from the fact that we licitly ask the faithful living with us to pray to God for us, it does not follow that we can ask the same from saints received into glory, who are as far removed from us as heaven is from earth. Just as it would be madness to conclude that one living in France could reasonably ask, either in thought or aloud, a pious man living in America or China to obtain something from God for him through his prayers, based on the fact that we can licitly ask such a duty of charity from the faithful with whom we have contact or communication. Nor do mutual prayers that the faithful on earth offer for each other justify prayers directed to saints received into heaven, any more than they would justify someone in Spain asking, either verbally or mentally, a holy man preaching in Japan to help them with his prayers to God. This would not only be considered foolish but also impious, since it would attribute to a human something divine, namely, the ability to know and perceive the words and thoughts of those far away.

XXXVII. Finally, a third obstacle arises, which most impedes the union of Protestants with the Roman Church, yet in no way prevents the union of Protestants among themselves; namely, that Protestants cannot unite with the Roman Church without submitting themselves and their consciences to the Roman Pontiff. And how much power over consciences is to be feared, which the Roman Pontiff claims for himself, many have experienced recently, who have not yet separated from the Roman Church. And if it is permissible to judge the future by the past, there is no hope of any Reformation in the Roman Church as long as the Pope holds power in it. Such a Reformation, however, is necessary to pave the way for the proposed union.

To the Reader Concerning These Posthumous Works

While the author was engaged in the elucidation of the state of controversies, as he had proposed and declared in the preface of his work, he was unexpectedly overtaken by death. The following works, which aim at the same goal, namely the explanation of the state of controversies, were obtained from his students to whom he had dictated these in the school. Although they may be of lesser dignity and value, and perhaps less precise than those the author himself published, they are nonetheless entirely worthy of being made public. He published many things on sacred scripture which are read in earlier theses: on its fullness, authority, clarity, and translations, etc. Here you have, reader, the rest which he did not publish. To these we have added a treatise on Christ, a complete examination of the controversies about the Church, an excellent dissertation on the use of foreign language in sacred matters; to which, while the most learned man was giving the final touch, he succumbed to illness and passed away.

ELUCIDATION OF THE STATUS OF SOME CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING THE WORD OF GOD AND SACRED SCRIPTURE

CHAPTER I.

On Canonical and Apocryphal Books

Here, by Canonical Books, we understand the books written under divine inspiration and thus their authority is supreme and their truth infallible. Furthermore, they are called Canonical from the Greek word "kanon," which signifies a rule and sometimes an index or catalog. These books are designated by this name either because they serve in the Church as the rule of faith and morals, to which all other writings or doctrines must be examined and rigorously measured, or because they are placed in the Canon of Scripture, that is, in the index or catalog of sacred books, which the Church Doctors privately, and the Councils publicly, have maintained and promulgated to assist the less learned and simpler ones in recognizing the Sacred Books and to counteract the fraud and deceit of those who attempted to introduce spurious books falsely attributed to Prophets and Apostles as divine into the Church.

By the name Apocrypha, however, in this controversy, certain books are designated that are falsely and without certain reason attributed to men inspired by God and imposed as divine, and are considered by some as such. They are called apocryphal, from the Greek word meaning "hidden," either because their authority was hidden and uncertain, not open and manifest, and not established before the common consent of the Church, as is the authority of the Canonical books, or because the use of these books was not supposed to be so public as to derive and confirm the articles of our faith from them, but only private and particular, that is, as it was lawful for individuals to use them for edification, and derive lessons from them useful for life and manners.

Since all Canonical books pertain either to the New or the Old Testament, there is no controversy between us and the Roman Church regarding the books of the New Testament; it does not add any books to the Canon of the New Testament, nor is there any book of that Canon which it does not acknowledge and receive as divine, as is evident in the index of Canonical books found in Session 4 of the Council of Trent.

But as for those who are called Lutherans, they seem to differ somewhat from our Churches and from the Roman Church, for there are many books of the New Testament which they do not consider properly Canonical, and such as constitute part of the rule of faith. They do indeed count them among Ecclesiastical writings and useful ones, but do not attribute to them certain authority and call them apocryphal. These are the Apocalypse of John, and the seven Epistles, namely, the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Epistle of James, the Second Epistle of Peter, the Second and Third Epistles of John, and the Epistle of Jude; they do not consider these books suitable to confirm the authority of dogmas and to prove matters of faith and church controversies, nor do they attribute greater authority to them than to the apocryphal books of the Old Testament, like the books of Tobit and the Maccabees. This opinion is transmitted by Chemnitz in his examination of the Council of Trent, in Session 4, title on Canonical Scripture, and Brentius in the Wittenberg Confession, and I believe other Lutherans adhere to this view.

Concerning the Old Testament, the Roman Church indeed holds as divine all those books which we believe belong to its canon, but it adds many more as truly Canonical and constituting part of the Old Testament, which our Churches by no means count as divine but number among the Apocrypha. For the Reformed Churches follow the Hebrew canon, and contend that nothing belongs to the Old Testament Scripture that was not formerly received by the Jewish Church and is not found in Hebrew codices. But besides the books received by the Jews, which some reduce to 22, others to 24, the Roman Church adds to the Old Testament seven others that are read only in Greek, namely, Tobit, Judith, Baruch, Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the two books of Maccabees, namely the first and second; and furthermore, it adds certain chapters to some truly Canonical books, which are not found in the Hebrew text, namely, three chapters to the book of Daniel, one containing the story of Susanna, another the story of Bel and the Dragon, and the third the Song of the Three Children. It also adds seven chapters to the book of Esther, which in the Vulgate version are appended to the ten chapters translated from Hebrew. The Council of Trent, under the penalty of anathema, commands that all these books and parts of books be received as sacred and canonical, as is seen in Session 4.

But up to the Council of Trent, the authority of these books remained so doubtful and uncertain in the Roman Church itself, that they could be rejected among the apocrypha without prejudice to the Roman faith and without the danger of heresy. Indeed, many and most celebrated Doctors of the Roman communion rejected them, as demonstrated by the testimonies collected by the most learned Moses Blondel in his published treatise on this matter titled "Rome Called to Aid Geneva," where he cites among others in this opinion Nicholas of Lyra, Thomas Walden, Thomas Aquinas, Alphonsus Tostatus, Cardinal Antonius, Cardinal Ximenes, and

Cardinal Cajetan, who explicitly assert and argue that these books, which are outside the Hebrew canon, are not canonical nor have the same authority as the others.

What is more astonishing is that even after the Tridentine anathema, some Doctors of the Roman Church dared to reject as apocryphal certain books included in the Tridentine canon: thus, John Driedo, as reported by Bellarmine, denies the divine authority of the book of Baruch, although Baruch is explicitly named in the index of Sacred Books sanctioned by the Tridentine anathema. And Melchior Cano, although he himself believes this book to be divine, acknowledges that its authority is not entirely certain.

Our Churches, though they consider these books added by the Roman Church to the Old Testament canon to be apocryphal and do not attribute to them divine authority, do not despise or reject them as harmful or useless. Just as the ancient Christian Church, although not equating these books with the divine, held them in high honor and deemed them worthy of being publicly read for moral edification, so too we today do not deny them an honorable place in the Church of God and a certain privilege above all ecclesiastical writers. An argument for this is that we customarily bind them in the same volume with the truly sacred and canonical books and do not disdain to often cite them in homilies. Furthermore, in Great Britain, something from these books is customarily read in public and ordinary worship, as evident in the celebrated Anglican Liturgy used in that kingdom. Our theologians do note certain errors and blemishes in these books, to show that they are not, like canonical books, written by the Spirit of God, who is free from all error, dictating and inspiring, yet this does not prevent them from being filled with the most salutary precepts and lessons of piety and containing histories most worthy of being known and very useful for the edification of morals, especially evident in the Book of Wisdom, Ecclesiasticus, and the two books of Maccabees, particularly the first.

Thus, the question here is whether the aforementioned books are truly divine and prophetic and should have equal authority with the other unquestionably canonical books, or whether, although useful for moral instruction and filled with divine and salutary precepts, they are nonetheless composed by human art and thus not of such authority that articles of faith can be drawn and confirmed from them. The former was defined by the Council of Trent and is commonly taught today by the Doctors of the Roman Church; the latter is affirmed by the common consensus of the Churches not only of those called Reformed but also of those commonly called Protestant.

But besides those books whose authority is disputed between us and the Roman Church, certain writings are customarily added at the end of the Bible, which, although sometimes honorably cited by the ancients and parts of which are also publicly read in the Roman Church, as was once customary among us in England, yet are placed and held as apocryphal outside the divine canon of Scripture. Among these are the books of Esdras, called the third and fourth, because they are found added to the two books of Esdras, which are truly canonical in the Latin Vulgate edition, the first being the one that retains the name of Esdras among us, and the second being the one we call Nehemiah. But in ancient editions of Greek Bibles, what is the third Esdras to the Latins is regarded as the first Esdras by the Greeks; the second Esdras according to the

Greeks includes the two books that are the first and second to the Latins; which both the Hebrews also count as one book. The fourth Esdras, however, is not found in the Greek Bible edition and is only found in Latin today; thus the Greeks have only two books of Esdras, the first being apocryphal, and the second canonical.

The Roman Church, together with us, also holds the Prayer of King Manasseh as apocryphal, which is appended to the end of the second book of Chronicles in the Latin Vulgate. Finally, the third book of Maccabees is also apocryphal to the Doctors of the Roman Church, though it is not found in the Latin edition, but is customarily added to the second book of Maccabees in the Greek Bibles and contains an admirable deliverance of the Jews that occurred under Philopator in Egypt.

But here it should be noted that, although the Council of Trent did not place these books in the index of divine books, and thus they are commonly held as apocryphal in the Roman Church, there are some theologians among the Romans who attribute canonical authority to certain of these books. For instance, John Benedict, a Parisian theologian, in the preface to the Bible in which he compiled certain scholia from the Fathers, includes the third and fourth books of Esdras in the number of those books which, although not in the Canon, are nonetheless received by the Christian Church. Similarly, Renatus Benedict, following the former Benedict, in his *Stromata Biblica*, book 1, chapter 9, also counts the third and fourth books of Esdras among the canonical books. But particularly notable is Gilbert Genebrard, also a Parisian theologian and Archbishop of Aix, who, writing in the previous century in his *Chronology at the Year of the World 3749*, not only calls both these books canonical but also laboriously attempts to prove his paradox, for which he is noted and rebuked by Bellarmine in "*De Verbo Dei*" book 1, chapter 2.

CHAPTER II

On the Integrity and Authority of the Hebrew Text of the Old Testament and the Greek Text of the New Testament.

No Christian doubts that the Old Testament, at least as regards those books which by common consent are held as canonical by both our churches and the Roman Church, was written in Hebrew by Moses and the Prophets, indeed under the dictation and inspiration of the Spirit of God. Moreover, the reason why God chose this language in which to first deliver His oracles seems not to be due to the dignity and antiquity of the Hebrew language, but rather because the descendants of Abraham, for whose particular benefit the Law and the entire Old Testament were written, spoke the Hebrew language. For God had chosen the descendants of Abraham to be a peculiar people unto Himself, with whom He made a covenant and to whom He revealed Himself in a special way, while He permitted other nations to walk in their own ways until the coming of Christ and the calling of the Gentiles.

However, there are certain portions of the Old Testament written in Chaldee, specifically the eleventh verse of the tenth chapter of the prophet Jeremiah, six chapters in Daniel, namely from verse 4 of chapter 2 to the end of chapter 7, and approximately three chapters of the book of

Ezra, from verse 6 of chapter 4 to verse 19 of chapter 6. This was not done arbitrarily but for specific reasons. The Chaldee verse in Jeremiah contains the words with which Jeremiah exhorts the Jews to rebuke the idolatry of the Chaldeans, among whom they would be captives. "Thus shall you say to them," he says, "The gods that have not made the heavens and the earth shall perish from the earth and from under these heavens," which he writes in Chaldee because it was to be said to the Chaldeans.

The chapters in Daniel and Ezra written in Chaldee contain the letters and decrees of the Persian and Babylonian kings and other matters that seem to have been transcribed verbatim from the records and archives of the Persians and Babylonians for greater historical accuracy.

Therefore, it is certain and acknowledged by all that the Hebrew text of the Old Testament is the original text, and that all other editions of the Old Testament Scripture are derived from the Hebrew as from a source.

As for the New Testament, it is universally acknowledged that it was written in Greek by the Apostles and Evangelists, except perhaps for one or two of its books. The reason why God willed the New Testament to be written in Greek rather than Hebrew, as was the Old Testament, is because the Old Testament was written, as has just been said, primarily for the benefit of the Hebrew people, with whom God had made a covenant, rejecting other nations. But the New Testament was written when the calling of the Gentiles had arrived, and thus was written not particularly for one people, but for all peoples indiscriminately and universally. Therefore, it was fitting for it to be written in a language as widely known as possible and understood by many nations. There was no language more widely known and commonly used at that time than Greek. Cicero attests to this when he says, "The Latin language is indeed confined to its own narrow limits, but Greek is read throughout the world." Therefore, by divine providence, it was written in Greek rather than in any other language.

Many of the ancients, such as Irenaeus, Eusebius, Jerome, and the author of the Synopsis attributed to Athanasius, indeed assert that Matthew first wrote his Gospel in Hebrew, and this tradition is commonly followed by the doctors of the Roman Church. Consequently, some of them, especially Baronius, seek to undermine the authority of the Greek text of Matthew, saying, "We cannot affirm the credibility of the Greek text unless it is compared with the original Hebrew." However, if we are to believe the ancients who handed down this tradition, the Greek text of Matthew is not to be doubted as Apostolic, because if it is not the original text of Matthew, it is at least a version published or approved by the Apostles themselves. This is what the Fathers who said Matthew first wrote his Gospel in Hebrew taught: that the Hebrew Gospel of Matthew was translated into Greek by James, or by John, or by Matthew himself. Bellarmine, acknowledging this, teaches that the Greek text of Matthew, though it may be a translation, was received by the Church as if it had been written first in that language. Though some of our theologians leave this tradition as uncertain, most of them find it improbable and do not believe Matthew wrote in any language other than that of the other Apostles.

As for the Epistle to the Hebrews, most Papist theologians believe it was written by Paul in Hebrew. Certain ancient sources, such as Clement of Alexandria cited by Eusebius (Book 4,

Chapter 14) and Eusebius himself (Book 3, Chapter 37), indeed maintain this. But our doctors refute this tradition with many indications and arguments derived from the text of the Epistle itself. Yet, even if this were conceded, it would not diminish the authority of the Greek text; for those ancients who said this Epistle was first written in Hebrew also asserted it was translated into Greek by an apostolic man, whether that was Luke, as Clement of Alexandria thinks, or Clement of Rome, as Eusebius suspects.

It is entirely unfounded and has no basis in the ancients that Bellarmine, following some of his own, suspects the Gospel of Mark was first written in Latin by Mark when he was in Rome and later translated into Greek by him at Aquileia in Italy. The Pontifical of Damasus, from which this story is taken, is a modern work falsely attributed to Damasus, as acknowledged by the most learned among the Romanists.

From all the above it clearly appears, by the consent of all Christians, that the Greek text of the New Testament, except for these three books, is the original text written by the authors themselves. As for these three books, though the doctors of the Roman Church believe they were written in another language than Greek, most of them acknowledge that they were at least translated into Greek by the Apostles or Evangelists, and thus even in these books, the Greek text is divinely inspired and of no less authority than if they had been originally written in Greek by their authors.

Further, it should be noted that the Hebrew text can be considered in two ways: either as it consists of the bare Hebrew letters, as in those Bibles printed without points, or as it has the vowel points and various accents added. There is no controversy, either among Jews or Christians, that at least in the former way it was handed down and written by Moses and the Prophets. Among scholars, however, there is a debate about whether the points were added by the early doctors or are a more recent invention of the Rabbis. The latter is the opinion held by Papist doctors, as I have seen. Among our doctors, there is a sharp dispute on this matter, and in France, Louis Cappel, a professor at Saumur, teaches and tries to prove the novelty of the Hebrew points in published writings and has many eminent supporters today. In Germany, however, Johannes Buxtorf the Younger follows his father Johannes Buxtorf, Antonio Caravario, and Junius, defending the opposite view and refuting Cappel in writings, asserting that the vocalic notes were added to the Hebrew text by the Prophets themselves. But the former opinion seems more probable to us, according to which, even though the unpointed codices generally do not differ in reading from those with points, wherever a more convenient reading occurs, it should not be rejected merely because it does not agree with the received points, since the pointed codices, as such, do not have divine authority but human authority, which we do not deny is great and should not be opposed without substantial reason.

Similarly, concerning the Greek text of the New Testament, it can also be considered in two ways: either as it consists of the bare elements of the Greek letters, or as it has the notes, accents, and distinguishing points added. In the former way, it is unquestionably divine and Apostolic. As for the latter, Sixtus of Siena in "Bibliotheca Sancta" book 3 and Francisco Ximénez, Archbishop of Toledo, in the edition of the New Testament, deny that the accents and

points were added by the sacred authors themselves. Epiphanius, at the beginning of his book on weights and measures, quite clearly teaches that not the sacred authors, but certain others after them, added the points and accents to the Greek text of Scripture. Indeed, Greek grammarians with many arguments show that the accents were not an invention of the earliest grammarians and that it is not probable that accents were customarily added to Greek books in the time of the Apostles, except perhaps by certain curious individuals learning the Greek letters. Therefore, it follows that no certain and firm argument can be derived from the accents and distinguishing notes against any interpretation of the Greek text that is otherwise apt and suitable, since they were added not by the original authors themselves, but by learned and skilled men with only human authority. Even less ancient and of lesser authority is the division into verses and chapters. The Greeks and Orientals do not divide the books of the New Testament into chapters as the Latins do but into much shorter sections, as can be seen in the edition of the New Testament printed in smaller form in Paris by Robert Estienne. The division of Scripture into verses as we see today is no older than Robert Estienne, who somewhere claims to be the author of it.

Moreover, from what has been said, it appears that the Roman doctors agree with the Reformers that the Hebrew text of the Old Testament is prophetic and original, at least if considered not as determined by specific points, but as consisting of the bare Hebrew letters according to the ancient and still common manner of writing. Similarly, both recognize that the Greek text of the New Testament is the original and the source of other editions, or at least an apostolic translation in the case of some books, which is as good as a source, except for one or two Roman doctors who either deny this or do not dare to affirm it.

However, there is greater contention and greater divergence of opinion about the integrity and authority of the Greek and Hebrew texts, both among us and the Romanists, and among the doctors of the Roman Church themselves. Some Romanists indeed admit that the Hebrew edition was once written by Moses and the prophets, but they claim it is no longer intact but has been much corrupted and altered, partly due to the ravages of time, partly due to the fraud and malice of the Jews, who, out of hatred for the Christian religion, have maliciously corrupted many places in the Old Testament. From this, they conclude that the Hebrew text, as it simply exists today in Bibles, has no certainty, and in disputes of faith and morals, we should not refer to the Hebrew but to the Greek exemplars, and that no certain faith in controversies can be established from it. Therefore, although the Greek and Latin editions were once derived from the Hebrew source, they claim that the greater purity is found in them, especially in the Latin Vulgate edition, and they do not wish those editions to be corrected and examined by the Hebrew text. Melchior Cano elaborately discusses this in his second book on theological places, chapter 13. Stapleton affirms the same in his treatise on the principles of doctrinal faith, controversy 5, question 3, article 1.

But many men of great name and authority within the Roman Church dissent from this view, asserting and proving with many reasons that the Hebrew text has not been maliciously corrupted by the Jews, and while they do not deny that some errors may have crept in, they argue

that they are minor and of no great significance, and do not impair the integrity and purity of the Hebrew text concerning matters of faith and morals. Therefore, they condemn as rash and inconsiderate the opinion of those who think the Latin Vulgate edition is to be trusted more than the Hebrew volumes. Such are the opinions of John Driedo in his first volume, book 2, chapter 5, and Andradius in his defense of the Council of Trent, book 4, to whom Bellarmine himself joins in his second book on the Word of God, chapter 2.

The same diversity of opinion is found among the Romanists regarding the New Testament edition. The former maintain that it is so corrupted, whether by the negligence of scribes and copyists or by the craftiness and evil arts of heretics, that it can no longer be relied upon for certainty in controversies, and the Latin exemplars should not be compared to it, as they now have greater and more certain authority among us. The latter, however, while not denying that Greek codices may contain some errors, deny that they are so corrupted that their integrity and purity in matters of faith and morals are lacking, and thus their authority is less and more uncertain.

As for our theologians, Bellarmine speaks of them as if they attribute such integrity and purity to the Hebrew text that they deny any error, however slight, can be found in it. And indeed, our theologians do not propose their opinion so rigidly, nor do I know of any of them who simply and absolutely denies any error, however slight, can be indicated in the Hebrew text. Rather, they all willingly concede that some minor errors could have crept into the Hebrew codices through the fault of scribes and even seem to have done so, as scholars infer from many indications, especially from the various readings noted long ago by Jewish critics called Masoretes in the Hebrew text, to which pertains the "Keri and Ketiv," frequently mentioned among Hebrew grammarians and critics. With these Chaldaic words meaning "read" and "written," they indicate certain places in Scripture noted by the ancient rabbis of the Jews, which are written one way and read another. Besides these errors noted by the Jewish doctors, there may be some that escaped their notice, and it is not impossible that in numbers and proper names some things were written incorrectly through the fault of the scribes, giving rise to apparent contradictions in Scripture.

But what our theologians commonly teach is first that the Hebrew codices were not corrupted and depraved by the malice and fraud of the Jews, but were rather religiously kept and preserved by them as much as humanly possible. Secondly, they teach that the errors which for any reason have crept into the Hebrew text are minor and of no great significance, and do not in any way impair the integrity of Scripture concerning faith and morals. Thirdly, they teach that whatever the errors are, they can be corrected and detected from the context and by comparing other passages of Scripture. Finally, they teach that the number of errors is small relative to the number of volumes that make up the Sacred Scripture, so that there is no edition of Scripture purer and more accurate than the Hebrew text, and where fewer errors and mistakes can be found.

Therefore, they conclude that in controversies of faith and religion, it is safest to refer to the Hebrew codices, and from them, the mind and meaning of the Holy Spirit can be more

certainly sought than from any other version or edition; thus, the Hebrew text is not only the source from which other editions of Sacred Scripture have been derived but also the norm and rule by which all those editions should be corrected and examined.

This is, as I said, the common opinion of our theologians, from which, however, Louis Cappel, a professor at Saumur, has departed. He acknowledges the integrity of the Hebrew text concerning matters of faith and morals, but nonetheless contends that many errors have crept into it for various reasons, and believes that it can be corrected and amended in many places by the Greek version of the Septuagint, which often reads differently and better than what is read today in the Hebrew codices. He has published a large volume on this subject, which he is said to have titled "Critica Sacra."

Furthermore, what our theologians think about the Hebrew text of the Old Testament, they also think about the Greek text of the New Testament. They do not deny that some errors may be found in it, as the diversity of codices and various readings noted by scholars sufficiently argue and show. However, they maintain that it has not been so corrupted and depraved by the fraud of heretics, the ravages of time, or the negligence of scribes, that any dangerous change has occurred in it. Even if some errors are noted by scholars, they have not invaded all codices, nor are they of great significance and do not introduce any notable change in meaning. Nor are there many, so that the Greek edition does not cease to be the purest and most complete of all; nor is there any version in which fewer errors are found. Therefore, in matters of religion, it is safest to seek the meaning of the Holy Spirit from the Greek text rather than from any other edition. And all other versions and editions of the New Testament should be referred to and examined by the Greek text as the source.

Chapter III: On the Greek Version by the Septuagint Translators

There is some question regarding this version among the doctors of the Roman Church and our theologians, but it does not seem to be of great importance. Both sides understand by the Septuagint the Greek version of the Scriptures that was in use among Hellenistic Jews at the time of Christ and the Apostles, from whom the early Christians and the Apostles themselves adopted it. This version is frequently cited in the New Testament when referring to the Old Testament, and therefore, it has been widely used both privately and publicly in the Christian Church since that time.

However, whether the entire version truly comes from the seventy-two interpreters who were sent by the high priest of the Jews to Ptolemy Philadelphus, King of Egypt, to translate the Scriptures, as narrated by Josephus, or whether those interpreters only translated the Pentateuch while other later interpreters translated the rest of the Scripture, is a matter of debate among scholars on both sides, and some leave the matter undecided. Nevertheless, it seems more probable to most that all the books of the Old Testament were translated into Greek by those seventy-two interpreters. But whatever the case, both sides recognize that the Greek version which was in use at the time of Christ and the Apostles is no longer intact and uncorrupted. Over

the centuries, it has been so altered and interpolated by various errors and corrections that it may now seem different and does not have the same authority it had before it was corrupted and depraved.

Thus, the only question is what authority the Greek version originally had in the Church. The Romanists argue that it had supreme and divine authority because the notable seventy-two interpreters did not produce it solely by human art and intellect but had the special guidance and assistance of the Holy Spirit to prevent them from deviating from the true meaning. Therefore, they are seen more as prophets than mere translators. Our doctors, however, admit that the Greek version deserved great authority due to the expertise and number of interpreters and also because the Apostles, by their usage, somewhat endorsed and consecrated it. Nevertheless, they do not concede that these interpreters were prophets or possessed a similar prophetic spirit; thus, they do not believe its authority should ever be equated with that of the Hebrew text, but rather that it could and should always be corrected and examined by the Hebrew text as the source and rule.

Chapter IV: On the Necessity of Sacred Scripture

On the necessity of Scripture, many of our theologians debate with the Romanists as if we were affirming its necessity while they were simply denying it. Indeed, both sides do not speak in the same way about this matter. Our theologians greatly emphasize the necessity of Scripture, while the Romanists minimize it as much as possible. Moreover, some of their arguments on this subject are utterly unacceptable and can rightly be considered blasphemous against Scripture. For instance, it is reported that a certain cardinal once said and wrote that it would have been better for the Church if Scripture had never existed at all.

However, if we consider calmly and objectively what both the Romanists and our theologians teach, it will easily become apparent that there is little to no substantial difference in their opinions on the necessity of Scripture. We do not claim that Sacred Scripture is simply and absolutely necessary, as if without it the Church could in no case exist, nor that Divine Wisdom has no other means by which true faith could be preserved in the world. Rather, we assert that it is necessary based on the divine ordination and the current state of the Church, which requires this means ordained by God to preserve the pure and uncorrupted word of God within it.

On the other hand, the Romanists only seek to prove that Sacred Scripture is not simply necessary. As can be seen in Bellarmine's writings, where he briefly addresses this issue at the beginning of chapter 4, book 4 of "De Verbo Dei," he distinguishes between simple necessity and necessity for a good existence. He concedes that Sacred Scripture is necessary in the latter sense, especially since the advent of Christ.

Indeed, although according to our theologians, who argue that after the apostles and their immediate successors passed away, there was no absolutely infallible person or assembly left on earth, it might seem to follow that Scripture as a kind of infallible rule of faith is more necessary in the Church. This would be more so than if we admitted, as the Romanists do, that the Church in judging matters of faith is not subject to error. Nevertheless, according to their own opinion, if

properly considered, it also follows that Scripture is necessary. They believe that the Church (by which they mean the Roman Pontiff and bishops assembled under his authority) is led by the Spirit of God into all truth that is significant for faith and salvation. However, they do not believe the Church is guided by new revelations but rather led into the knowledge of the truth through the use of means established by God for this purpose, among which they include not only the Church's tradition but also Sacred Scripture. They profess to venerate both with equal piety.

Therefore, since we do not assert that Scripture is simply necessary and they do not deny that it is necessary in a qualified sense, any remaining controversy here is very slight and of little significance.

End of Book One

ELUCIDATION OF THE STATUS OF CONTROVERSIES REGARDING THE PERSON AND OFFICE OF CHRIST

CHAPTER I: Whether Christ is 'AUTOTHEOS'

Calvin in Institutes, book 1, chapters 13 and 19, explains that what some Fathers have asserted, namely that the Son has divinity and essence from Himself, can be properly understood. He writes: "Therefore, when we speak simply about the Son without reference to the Father, we correctly and properly assert that He is from Himself: and in another place, he states, 'We confess that the Son, insofar as He is God, is from Himself, without regard to His person.'" Elsewhere in his writings, particularly against Valentinus Gentilis, he asserts that Christ is "autotheos," a term and mode of speech also approved by other theologians.

From this, many Romanists have taken the occasion to fabricate a new heresy they call "Autotheanism," by which they try to slander our theologians. By twisting their words, they falsely and erroneously attribute to them a sentiment far from their beliefs, as if they taught that the Son of God and the Holy Spirit similarly derive their essence from themselves, rather than the Son from the Father and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. This would necessarily lead to either the denial of the distinct persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as Sabellius taught, claiming there is only one person, or to the assertion that there are not only three distinct persons but three different essences, thus implying three gods, as the Tritheists believe.

However, Bellarmine, more candid than other Romanists, frees Calvin and our other theologians from this charge, acknowledging that they openly and without any ambiguity confess one essence in the divine and three distinct persons. They also teach that the Father, being unbegotten, has the divine essence from no other, while the Son has it communicated from the Father through generation, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son through an ineffable procession. Indeed, this has always been the consistent teaching of our theologians, and attributing contrary beliefs to them is a manifest and severe calumny.

Nevertheless, Bellarmine criticizes Calvin's mode of expression when he says that the Son has the essence from Himself. Though this phrase, according to Calvin's understanding, holds a sound meaning, Bellarmine insists that it should simply be rejected.

Moreover, Bellarmine does not approve of the usage where the Son and the Holy Spirit, or even the Father Himself, are called "autotheos" as our theologians use the term—namely, for one who is God of Himself. This is because, according to Bellarmine, the Son, being begotten of the Father, is not God of Himself but from the Father, and likewise, the Holy Spirit is not God of Himself but from the Father and the Son, from whom He proceeds. However, the Father, being simply unbegotten and unproduced, is not even from Himself since to be from Himself implies being self-produced, which the Father is not, as He is from no one.

In another sense, Bellarmine acknowledges that the Son of God, and hence God the Father and the Holy Spirit, can rightly be called "autotheos," meaning if "autotheos" signifies that He is God Himself, i.e., most truly and properly God, just as "autaletheia" in Greek means "truth itself." Thus, Epiphanius notes that the Son of God is called "autos," heresy 69.

To better understand this whole matter and clarify the position and manner of speech of our theologians, note first that they understand "autotheos" to mean God who is from Himself, but not in the sense Bellarmine attributes—as if it meant the same as being self-produced. To our theologians, "from Himself" means being from no one, not self-produced, which is impossible. In this sense, the metaphysicians' distinction of being into "being from itself" and "being from another" is most common, making it surprising that Bellarmine, well-versed in metaphysics, would argue this point and deny that the Father is God from Himself because He is from no one, while metaphysicians equate "from Himself" with "from no one."

Moreover, since God is a being from Himself, unproduced and independent, the divine essence is neither generated nor produced. Thus, true God is not one whose essence is produced by another but, in every person who can be called true God, there necessarily exists an essence that is from Himself, i.e., from no one and dependent on no one. Therefore, since Christian faith teaches that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one true God, each of these persons necessarily possesses that primary and unproduced essence, and it is true of each that they are God from Himself, i.e., from no one. This is the intended meaning of our theologians when they sometimes call the Word and the Holy Spirit "autotheos," opposing the Tritheists who believe only the Father has an uncreated and unproduced essence, while the Son and the Holy Spirit have another essence produced by the Father. They thus believe only the Father can be called "autotheos," while the Son and the Holy Spirit do not deserve this title because their essence is from another.

Nor does Calvin mean anything else when he occasionally says the Son is from Himself, having divinity and essence from no other, which can be seen clearly by examining Calvin's texts.

However, Calvin and all our theologians unanimously teach and acknowledge that the unproduced and uncreated essence exists differently in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Father has it unbegottenly, i.e., not received or communicated from another; the Son has the same essence communicated from the Father through eternal generation; and finally, the Holy

Spirit received it from the Father and the Son through an ineffable procession. Thus, the Father not only has an essence that is from Himself but also has it from no one; the Son and the Holy Spirit, while having an essence that is from themselves and not produced by another, have received this essence—the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.

Regarding the expressions criticized in Calvin, he used them not only without error but also without danger, as it is immediately apparent to any reader what his aim is. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the expression that the Son has divinity and essence from Himself and does not borrow essence from another is inconvenient and less proper and should not be used simply and without caution. For although the Son of God has an essence and divinity that are from Himself and not produced by another, He does not have that essence from Himself. It is true that the essence of the Son is neither begotten nor produced, but it is equally true that the person of the Son is both begotten and produced. When it is said simply and absolutely that the Son of God is from Himself and has essence and divinity from Himself, these words taken strictly and properly seem to imply that the very person of the Son is from no one and has received His essence from no one, which is false and contrary to the opinion of all Orthodox believers. Therefore, it is safer and more appropriate to say that the divine essence in the Son is not from another, but the Son Himself is not from Himself but has received essence and divinity from another, namely, from the Father, since according to the Nicene Creed, He is "God from God and Light from Light."

Chapter II.

On the Union of the Two Natures in Christ, and the Resulting Communication of Properties

On this matter, most of those who profess to follow Luther's doctrine differ from the Roman Church. However, there is no controversy between us and the Roman Church on this chapter. But to make clear what is being debated, it should be known that all Lutherans agree with the Roman Church, and therefore with us, that in the one and indivisible person of our Lord Jesus Christ there are two distinct natures: the divine nature which is eternal, and the human nature which was assumed in time into the unity of the person of the Son of God. They confess that these two natures are united not only inseparably and indivisibly, but also without confusion and immutably, so that neither of these natures is changed into the other or confused with the other.

Furthermore, they teach and acknowledge that as each nature remains unconfused in its nature and essence, and is never abolished, so also each retains its natural, essential properties, and does not lay them aside for all eternity, and that the essential properties of one nature never become the essential properties of the other nature.

On the other hand, all doctors, both ours and those of the Roman Church, by common consent with the Lutherans, confess and acknowledge that the two natures in Christ are not simply united in the way that two boards are glued together, but they truly and really have

communion with each other, and from this follows in Christ a true and real communication of the properties of both.

But there is some disagreement in explaining the nature of both that personal union in Christ and the communication of properties of both natures. And indeed our theologians, agreeing with the Roman School in this, consider that the reason and form of that hypostatic union consists in the fact that Christ's human nature does not have its own subsistence, but is hypostatically sustained by the Son of God, and is assumed by him, so that it is part of his person which subsists in him, not outside him, and thus does not constitute a person by itself, but is considered only a part of another person, namely the Divine Word, which is therefore said to have become flesh.

Furthermore, from this follows such a communion of the divine and human nature in Christ, that he truly is and can be called God-man, and man-God, and also separately God and man. And so, looking at Christ, we can now say God is man, and man is God, which statements are not merely verbal and only certain modes of speaking which have no foundation in reality, for most truly and really the eternal Son of God is man born of the Virgin Mary, and no less truly and really that man whom the Blessed Virgin conceived by the Holy Spirit is God blessed above all forever, although in Christ Divinity and Humanity remain unmixed, and neither is Deity man, nor is humanity God.

Moreover, from this Union of the two natures in Christ, it follows that the properties of the divine and human nature are so communicated to the person of Christ that by whatever name it is called, whether of God or of man, they can be truly said and predicated of it. Therefore we rightly and truly say God was born of the Blessed Virgin Mary, God shed his blood for us, and the Jews crucified the Lord of Glory; and in the same way it is rightly and truly said Jesus of

Nazareth is omnipotent and everywhere, and he himself who in the beginning created Heaven and earth.

This communication of properties, in the opinion of our theologians, is not merely verbal, for that person who is God, since he is also man, truly and really has all the properties of human nature; and that man, namely Christ, since he is God blessed above all, truly and really has all the properties of divine nature. But if our theologians sometimes call that communication verbal, they only mean this: that each nature of Christ perpetually preserves its own properties, and does not receive the properties of the other nature, so that this communication is real with respect to the person, to whom both divine and human properties really belong, and can be truly said of it, by whichever nature the person is denominated. Therefore truly and really God shed his blood for us, and suffered for us, and truly and really that Jesus, who ascended into Heaven, rules his Church present today; but it is called verbal with respect to the natures, because, although God truly suffered for us, Divinity nevertheless did not suffer for us, and although the man Christ is present on earth today, his humanity is not on earth: because indeed the divine person suffered for us, but not according to his divinity, and the human person is simultaneously in Heaven and on earth, but not according to his humanity, and therefore in the concrete it is indeed rightly said the man Christ is omnipotent, the man Christ is everywhere, but in the abstract it can neither

truly nor rightly be said that Christ's humanity is omnipotent and everywhere, just as indeed God truly suffered and died, although Divinity could neither die nor suffer.

But although the human nature of our Lord Jesus Christ did not in itself receive the properties of the divine nature, yet from its personal union with the eternal Son of God it obtained the greatest gifts that a creature can receive, such as most excellent grace, greatest wisdom, clearly singular power, and other things of this kind, which gifts, although great and excellent above what we can say and comprehend, are nevertheless not infinite, since a creature, being finite, is not capable of infinite gifts. And this is briefly the opinion of our theologians.

But as for those who are called Lutherans, they seem to diverge into various opinions on this chapter. For not all explain the hypostatic union in the same way, for Brentius and Smidelinus define that hypostatic union by that communication of properties which they imagine for themselves, so that the Word assuming flesh is not formally anything else in their mind than the eternal Son of God really communicating all the properties of his divine nature to that human nature.

But most others distinguish the hypostatic union from that communication of properties, which they want to be its effect and consequence, but the personal union, as we also seem to place it chiefly in this, that Christ's human nature not having its own subsistence, does not subsist except in the Word, and through the very subsistence of the Word. Indeed, some of them explain the communication of properties, which takes place in Christ's person, no differently than our Doctors, and with whom there is no controversy on this matter, among which number are both Philip Melanchthon and Nicolaus Hemmingius, Professor at Copenhagen in Denmark in the previous century.

But commonly today it does not seem sufficient to Lutherans in Germany that reciprocal communication of properties of both natures in the person of Christ, which has been explained by us, nor even that outpouring of the greatest and ineffable gifts, which nevertheless are created and finite, into the human nature of Christ, which our Theologians admit follows from the hypostatic union: but moreover they want through that union, the properties of the divine nature to have been really communicated to Christ's human nature, and thus Christ's human nature to have received gifts not only created and finite, but uncreated and infinite.

But what the mode of this communication is, they themselves can scarcely explain, yet the Book of Concord, which is of the highest authority among Lutherans, attempts to declare the matter thus. And first indeed that book denies that communication was made in the way that the Father from eternity communicated to the only-begotten Son with the divine nature all the properties of the divine nature, whence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father, for they do not want the human nature to be made equal to the divine through that communication of divine properties.

Furthermore, it denies that communication to be physical or natural, and to have been made through some outpouring, or transfusion of divine properties into human nature, as if Christ's humanity had them by itself and in itself and separated from the divine essence. For they do not want, for example, there to be a double omnipotence and omniscience in Christ, one

indeed which is the same as Christ's divine nature, and another which is poured out into Christ's human nature, and of which that human nature is the subject, but they acknowledge there to be only one omnipotence and omniscience in Christ, namely that which is the same as his divine nature.

But when they call that communication real, they say they oppose it to the verbal communication that others teach, and they want to say that that communication was truly and really made, and does not consist only in phrases and modes of speaking.

Finally, they try to explain this communication by the similarity of ignited and glowing iron, for, they say, as in ignited iron there is not a double power of burning and shining, as if fire had a peculiar power of burning and shining and iron also had a peculiar power of burning and shining, and also that power of burning and shining is a property of fire, not a property of iron, but only because fire is united with iron, therefore it exerts the power and virtue of burning and shining in and with the iron and through that glowing iron, so that ignited iron from this union has the power of burning and shining, and yet there is no transmutation of the nature of fire and iron, or any transfusion of the natural properties of both iron and fire, each of which retains its natural properties: So in Christ the God-man there is not a double glory, virtue and divine majesty.

And also the glory, virtue and divine majesty which is in Christ, is not a property of human nature, but of the Word which assumed flesh, and both the Word and human nature preserve their natural properties, nor are the properties of one transfused into the other, so that they are in it as in a subject, and yet the divine Word so shines with all its majesty, virtue and glory in the assumed flesh, and in it, with it, and through it exerts and exercises all its virtue, majesty and efficacy, that Christ's human nature can be said to have divine majesty, virtue and glory; and thus to be able to know and do all things. Which recent Lutherans today explain in these words, namely that divine attributes are communicated to human nature, not through participation so that they inhere in it subjectively, but through union with the divine.

But whatever the mode of this communication may be, it follows according to the Lutherans' mind that the properties of divine nature are rightly and truly predicated not only of the person of Christ from either nature, whether divine or human denominated in the concrete, but also of human nature in the abstract, so that it is not only true to say, that man namely Christ is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, which we also willingly concede, but also Christ's humanity is omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent.

Moreover, some of them approve and defend this phrase as good: human nature is God, Christ according to human nature is God. And also some among them want there to be such a communion between human and divine nature, that it can be rightly said, not only God is dead, but divine nature has suffered and died, as Wendelinus reports in Christian Theology Book 1. chap.6.

But whether all properties of divine nature are so communicated to Christ's human nature, that they can be directly predicated of it in the abstract, in the way already explained, is not agreed among Lutherans. Many of them thus distinguish divine properties which are

operative, that is, through which God operates, such as omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, from those properties which are not operative, such as eternity, simplicity, infinity: they say the former are communicated because divine nature operates through human nature: the latter not, because divine nature does not operate through them, and therefore although they maintain Christ's human nature to be omniscient and omnipotent, yet they do not want it to be rightly called most simple, eternal and infinite.

However, in this part the Swabians contradict other Lutherans, and contend that through the communication of properties Christ's human nature has also been made eternal, immense, and of the same substance with God the Father, and that Christ's body is infinite, as the same Wendelinus reports in the place cited above. But these are few compared to the rest.

Therefore the main dispute is about divine omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence, whether they are so communicated to human nature in Christ, that Christ's humanity is truly omnipotent and omnipresent: concerning which omnipresence of Christ's human nature, however, not all think and speak in the same way yet. For there are some who speak timidly about that omnipresence, and do not openly assert Christ's body to be everywhere, but are content to say Christ's flesh is where he wills, and can be everywhere if he wills, as Chemnitz in the book on the two natures of Christ, and thus all things are not full of Christ's body, which some condemn, others reject.

And moreover, on that ubiquity of Christ's body a certain new controversy has arisen in this century among Lutheran Theologians, namely whether Christ's body from the very moment of conception, before the resurrection and in the state of exinanition was always everywhere: or whether that omnipresence of Christ's body should be restricted to the state of exaltation alone, so that Christ's body is indeed everywhere now from the day of resurrection, but before was not, but only in a certain place: Lutheran Theologians from Prussia and Swabia maintain the former, affirming that Christ's body from the first moment of incarnation was always everywhere according to human nature as long as he lived among men on earth, and in a weak and mortal body. On which matter frequent volumes have been published by Theologians of both parties.

Furthermore, from this explanation, both of the Lutheran and our opinion, it appears that they unjustly criticize our Theologians, as if they taught that Christ's natures have no communication between themselves really or truly. Nor do they deny that divine attributes, such as divine omnipotence, omniscience and immensity, which are altogether the same as Christ's divine nature, are truly and really in his human nature, namely through personal indwelling, of which the Apostle says, to the Colossians chap.1. That in Christ all the fullness of the Godhead dwells bodily. For they communicate with each other as really according to our opinion as body and soul communicate in man, from which man's person is constituted, since human nature is so really and closely united to the Word, that from it arises a single person namely Christ the God man, and therefore we do not want these Propositions, God suffered and God died, also That man, namely Christ our Lord can do all things, and rules his Church present on earth, to be verbal as the Lutherans cavil, as if they were mere forms of speaking which had no foundation in reality. For we confess that truly and really God both suffered and died, not indeed human nature

alone, although divine nature is not rightly said to have died, and that the Son of man Christ is truly and really omnipotent God, although his humanity is neither God, nor omnipotent.

On the other hand, we must beware lest we deal with the Lutherans as if they taught that those things which are proper to divinity are transfused into Christ's humanity, and inhere in it subjectively, which they perpetually deny, as has been shown before.

Therefore this controversy alone remains, whether the properties of divine nature in Christ were so communicated to human nature, that it is permitted to say in the abstract, Christ's humanity is everywhere and omnipotent. In which controversy there is perhaps more logomachy and obstinacy, than real difference, for in some sense we can concede that a real communication of the properties of divine nature was made to Christ's human nature insofar as, as has been said, Divinity with all its properties really and personally indwells in that human nature, just as fire is really in ignited iron; but just as from that union of fire with iron we can indeed rightly say, this iron burns, this iron glows, yet it is not rightly said ironness burns, ironness shines, because fire in iron, not however the nature of iron itself, so acts. So also we can rightly and truly say, this man can do all things, this man is everywhere, but not Christ's humanity is everywhere and omnipotent, about which perhaps only a form of speaking can be a question with many Lutherans.

Chapter III.

On the Knowledge of Christ's Soul, and His Grace and Blessedness

All who acknowledge that the Son of God assumed human nature into the unity of his person teach not only that Christ the man has dwelling in him, through the grace of that hypostatic union, the fullness of all divinity, and is thus true God to whom they attribute all the attributes of power, wisdom, goodness and happiness that can truly be ascribed to God himself. But they also maintain that from that union there followed in Christ's human nature the most excellent and eminent grace and glory, and gifts that are indeed created, but as great as can befall a creature. For it was not fitting that the nature which the Son of God, equal to the eternal Father and of one substance with him, assumed into unity with himself, should lack any gifts and ornaments that a creature could receive, nor does it seem possible that a nature could be so closely united to God without him pouring out upon it all the treasures of his goodness and grace, which Holy Scripture also sufficiently teaches when it asserts that Christ was full of grace and truth, and that God did not give the Spirit to him by measure, and thus we all draw from his fullness.

All who put faith in the Gospel of Christ also acknowledge that Christ's human nature was not immediately and in one moment raised to that height of perfection and glory which it has now attained in heaven, for Christ reached the natural perfection of his body through various stages of growth, and did not have before the resurrection those qualities of a glorified body with which he now shines; and in order to complete the work of our redemption, he willingly submitted himself to many hardships in body and soul even unto death, and for a certain time

took on various defects and infirmities of our nature. And concerning these things there is no controversy between our theologians and the doctors of the German Church, but regarding the grace, gifts and blessedness of Christ's soul, certain questions are raised on which not all our theologians are in complete agreement with the doctors of the Roman Church. But in order that the difference between the two may be more distinctly understood, the opinion of the Roman School must be briefly set forth, then it must be noted what our theologians approve in it, and what less so.

The Scholastic Doctors commonly teach, therefore, that the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ, from the first moment of its creation and simultaneous union with the divine word, saw the divine essence itself, in which they teach the substance of that highest blessedness which we expect in Heaven consists: Yet since Christ, as long as he dwelt on earth, lacked the glory of the body, and also by a certain singular dispensation, was subject to many passions according to the soul, such as sadness, pain, fear, which cannot coexist with blessedness that is perfect in every respect, it follows from their opinion that Christ, as long as he was on earth, was already blessed in such a way that nevertheless in some respect he could be said to be striving towards blessedness, which the Scholastic Doctors understand when they say that Christ was simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender. Furthermore, since the Apostle opposes faith to sight, 2 Cor. 5, and teaches that faith is of things not seen, Heb. 11, and thus faith is incompatible with the state of the blessed who see God face to face, it is also a consequence of this opinion that Christ never had faith properly so called, but in place of faith a certain knowledge of a higher kind.

Moreover, since this opinion supposes that Christ always enjoyed God as the highest good through that beatific vision, it also follows that our Lord Christ did not have hope properly so called, whose object is God under the aspect of an absent good, and which one has not yet attained, for hoping and enjoying are opposed; but as the same Apostle teaches, Rom. 8, "Hope that is seen is not hope, for why would one hope for what he sees?" However, since a twofold object of hope can be assigned, one primary namely God, in the way already mentioned; the other secondary, to which pertains whatever divine aid and whatever good promised by God. With respect to this secondary object of hope and trust, all theologians acknowledge that there was a kind of hope in Christ, which no one can deny hoped for deliverance from the evils to which he subjected himself for us, and the resurrection and glory of his body.

Furthermore, since Scripture teaches in many places that Christ received the fullness of grace from God, and that God gave him the Spirit not by measure, the Roman School holds that this abundance and fullness of all grace was poured out upon Christ's soul at the very first moment of his conception, simultaneously and at once, so that there was afterwards no room for increase, nor did he receive the gifts of the Spirit gradually and by degrees with the progress of age, but whatever he ever had of such gifts, he always had from his very conception. By that grace, moreover, they understand the supernatural habits of charity, wisdom, fortitude, fear, and the like, which they maintain were infused into his soul in the highest degree at once in the first instant of the conception of our Lord Jesus Christ, according to that of Isaiah, chap. 11: "And the

Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord, and shall make him of quick understanding in the fear of the Lord."

Furthermore, although from this opinion our Lord Jesus Christ could never make any progress in these gracious habits, but always had them in the same way and degree, nevertheless the Scholastic Doctors do not deny that Christ made progress in grace according to acts, since although the habits of grace infused into his soul from the beginning received no increase, nevertheless greater works proceeded from time to time from those habits with the accession of age, and to this they refer what is said in chap. 2 of the Gospel according to Luke, that Jesus increased in wisdom and age, and in favor with God and men.

But the main difficulty here is concerning Christ's knowledge. Therefore it should be known that besides that uncreated and infinite knowledge which is in Christ insofar as he is God, the Scholastic Doctors posit a threefold knowledge in Christ's soul.

For firstly, since they hold that the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ was blessed and saw God from the very first instant of its creation, it follows that Christ in the very womb of his mother had that knowledge which they call the knowledge of the blessed. Moreover, through that knowledge they teach that Christ's soul beheld the very essence of God, and knew it far more clearly and perfectly than it is given to any other creature to know and behold it, and this because of the singular and most perfect union of Christ's soul with the word. Yet they do not think that Christ's soul comprehends the divine essence, since Christ's soul is finite and God's essence is infinite, and the infinite cannot be comprehended by the finite. But since they maintain that all things can be seen in God or in the divine word as in a mirror (or at least according to Thomas Aquinas they hold that each blessed person knows in the word all things that pertain to himself, and all things pertain in some way to Christ and to his dignity, since all things are subject to him, and he is appointed judge of all; see Eustace part 2, page 171), from this they conclude that the soul of

Jesus Christ always knew and saw in God all things past and future, whether said, or done, or thought, and thus also those things which, although they neither are nor will be, are in the power of the creature and can be done by it.

They do not want it said, however, that Christ through this knowledge knew all things simply and is omniscient, since through this knowledge he does not comprehend the divine essence, as said, and thus he indeed knows whatever a creature can do, but not all things that are in the power of God, that is, which not a creature, but God himself can do; for if he had known these, he would comprehend the infinity of divine power, which would be to comprehend the divine essence itself.

But besides that knowledge which they call the knowledge of the blessed, the Scholastic Theologians maintain that Christ's soul received another knowledge from God at its very creation, which they call congenital or infused knowledge. This, namely, is their view that Christ not only saw and knew all other things in God, but moreover that intelligible species of all things were impressed upon Christ's human mind in the very conjunction of his soul with the Logos, by

means of which he could know all things; which they teach were also given to the Angels in their creation by God.

Thus through this knowledge they also think Christ knew all things from his very first conception, with the sole exception of the divine essence, which the Scholastics teach cannot be known through such species, but only through the light of glory, by which they maintain it is seen immediately by the blessed.

Finally, to this twofold knowledge, which from the mind of the Scholastic Doctors Christ had from the beginning of his conception, those Doctors join yet a third, which Christ and other men living on earth drew from the senses themselves and the natural light and use of intellect and reason, and this they therefore call acquired or experimental knowledge, since, namely, Christ was not endowed with it like the two preceding from the very first moment of his conception, but gradually acquired it through the exercise of the senses and the reasoning of the mind, and thus since from the Scholastics' view those former kinds of knowledge, both beatific and infused, could not be increased and grow in Christ, this experimental knowledge had its increases in him, and in respect to it some progress can be attributed to Christ. Which, however, is not to be taken as if they thought Christ learned by means of the senses and experience and under the guidance of reason some things which he previously did not know. For it is supposed that from the first moment of conception he saw all things in God's essence, and moreover knew the same things in yet another way, namely through species immediately impressed on his mind by God, but he is said to have made progress in respect to that experimental knowledge, since what he already knew before through beatific and infused knowledge, he perceived and learned in a new way, namely through knowledge received from the senses. For these three kinds of Knowledge do not properly differ in their objects: For whatever Christ learned through the senses and experience, he is thought to have already known through infused knowledge and congenital species, and since he had that infused Knowledge, he is posited to have seen it in the word united to himself as in a mirror. And these three kinds of knowledge are so compared among themselves, that the superior eminently includes the inferior, namely beatific knowledge includes infused, and infused includes acquired or experimental, although conversely Christ's acquired knowledge does not extend as widely as his infused, nor his infused as his beatific, since Christ did not perceive with his senses all things of which he has infused knowledge from God, nor does he know the divine essence through infused knowledge, which he is held to see through beatific knowledge. Therefore they are rather three modes of knowing than three different kinds of knowledge, for the same things Christ as man is thought both to see in the word united to himself, and to know through species impressed upon and innate to him, and finally also to have grasped with the senses, and perceived by the natural light of reason.

To which it must be added, that the mind of the Scholastics may be rightly perceived, that that infused knowledge and acquired knowledge are to be conceived after the manner of habits inhering in Christ's intellect, by which it is not necessary that Christ always actually knew, and had present to his mind all things of which he is said to have had such knowledge, not only as habits, but also as acts, see Eustace tract. 1 on the Incarnate Word disput. 7. quest. 2. where he

says that knowledge is habitual and actual in different respects. But as for beatific knowledge, it is to be conceived after the manner of an act by which they think Christ perpetually and incessantly contemplated the divine essence, and in it all other things, which he perpetually saw, and had present as in a mirror.

From these things, moreover, according to the opinion of the Roman School, it follows that although Christ as man is not properly speaking omniscient, since he does not comprehend the divine essence, nor does he know all things possible to God, it can nevertheless be said that he never ignored anything, and that no ignorance should be ascribed to him according to any time, so that in a suitable sense it can be said that in this respect he always knew all things, and learned nothing that he did not know before: for he is posited to have had all knowledge and science that it is possible for a human soul to have. Ignorance, however, signifies the absence of knowledge of something in an intellect which is capable of that knowledge, and therefore just as a stone is not rightly said to be ignorant, because it knows nothing, so a man is not rightly said to be ignorant because he does not have knowledge of that which he is in no way capable of knowing.

It should be noted, however, that this doctrine concerning the blessedness of Christ's soul from the very beginning of his incarnation, and its consequences which have now been set forth, although commonly held in the Roman School, has not been defined by the Roman church, and thus is not held as a matter of faith even among the Pontificals themselves.

As for our theologians, however, there are various opinions among them on these matters. Jerome Zanchi in Book 2 on the Incarnation of the Son, Thesis 2, which book is found in volume 8 of his works, on these matters either does not differ at all, or very little from the Scholastic Theologians. For he teaches with them that the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ was blessed and saw God from the first moment of its union with the Word, and thus Christ never had faith or hope properly so called. Moreover, he asserts that Christ's human nature was filled with the holy spirit and all his gifts already from conception. And he also acknowledges a threefold knowledge in Christ's soul besides the uncreated knowledge of the Logos. And firstly indeed that knowledge of the blessed through which Christ's soul from its creation, not only saw the divine essence, but in it also all things that are, were, and will be, since every blessed intellect sees in God all things that pertain to itself and its blessedness, and all things pertain to Christ as King, Lord and Judge of all, so that in this respect only the comprehension of the divine essence and its infinite power is excluded from his knowledge.

Then he also attributes to Christ's soul from its very origin that infused knowledge through which he knew all things that Angels and men can know in this life. Finally, he does not deny that to this beatific and infused knowledge was added, with the progress of time, acquired and experimental knowledge, through which Christ the Lord perceived many things by use and experience itself and knew and investigated far more things by the natural light of reason than is given to any man to know.

Having proposed the question, however, whether the gifts of spirit and grace which Christ received in his very conception had some true increase with age, or whether the progress

which is attributed to Christ in the Gospels is to be understood not of the gifts and habits themselves, but only of the acts and effects of the gifts and habits, he leaves it free to think this or that, and does not dare to pronounce anything for certain, although he does not deny that it seems to him simpler and more consistent with God's word if we say that those gifts conferred on Christ's human nature were not initially consummated in all respects, and received true increase with age, which is against the common sense of the Roman School; to which, however, he seems to accede afterwards, when he expressly teaches and often repeats that Christ's infused knowledge received at first birth was never increased as to habit, but Christ only made progress in it as to acts.

Moreover, Zanchi has this singular view, and differing from the Roman School, that he exempts from that infused knowledge of Christ the knowledge of the day and hour of the last Judgment, which he maintains Christ did not know, by acquired knowledge, nor even by infused knowledge, but only through the knowledge which they call beatific and of vision, since, namely, that knowledge is remote from angelic and human intellect in this life.

Tilenus follows Zanchi in disputation 2 on the effects of the hypostatic union, where he also posits a threefold knowledge in Christ's soul, namely beatific, infused and acquired, and consequently teaches that faith or hope properly so called could not have place in Christ. In this, however, he differs from Zanchi, in that he maintains that Christ grew and made progress in that infused knowledge, not only as to acts, but also as to habits. Robert Baronius in his exercise on faith, and Junius in his notes on Bellarmine, where he touches on this question, agree with Zanchi and Tilenus.

But other of our theologians are of a different opinion. For Chamier in Panstratia volume 2, Book 4, Chapter 2, denies that Christ's soul from its very origin enjoyed that highest blessedness which it now enjoys in Heaven, for these are his words in paragraph 3 of that chapter: "Therefore we cannot approve those who, relying on their own temerity, dare to assert that already from the beginning that soul personally united to the Deity was perfectly blessed in itself, that is, actually enjoying that state which is very far removed from present misery"; which opinion he opposes to the common consensus of the Roman School. In Chapter 7, moreover, he simply asserts that there was hope in Christ, when he was here in the form of a servant. The question having been proposed, however, whether Christ had faith, he teaches that faith is taken in three ways, first for the assent which one gives to doctrine revealed by God. Secondly for the certain trust by which we promise ourselves all things that can be expected from him for our utility. Thirdly for the means by which we are justified before God through Christ our Mediator, and embrace the remission of sins in his blood. He concedes that faith taken in this third way was never in Christ, but asserts that faith in the first and second signification was in Christ, and thus contends that it cannot be denied without blasphemy that there was simply and absolutely faith in Christ. Nor yet by this does he mean that Christ had only an obscure knowledge of God and divine things: for to this argument (he who has faith does not see perfectly the divine essence, Christ always saw perfectly the divine essence. Therefore he never had faith) he responds, distinguishing faith, if it is taken in the third way it is conceded, if in the first and

second it is denied. Where he seems to acknowledge that Christ's soul always saw the divine essence, although he denies that it was always perfectly blessed. See Chamier volume 20. Book 5. Chapter 20. paragraph 40. and following where he distinguishes a twofold vision of God, and denies that Christ saw God by that beatific vision.

Calvin does not raise this question, nor does he dispute about it, but nevertheless in many places he speaks of Christ as having had faith, especially in the harmony explaining the passages of the Evangelists where they deal with Christ's anguish and passion; for he says that faith always stood firm in Christ's heart, by which he beheld God present, and that he retained God by faith as propitious to him, and in this dire torment his faith was unharmed, so that deploring that he was forsaken, he nevertheless trusted in the near help of God: where by faith he seems to understand nothing other than trust in divine help.

Louis Cappel, Professor at Saumur, in disputation 2 on the incarnation of our Lord Jesus Christ, Thesis 43, judges it rash to assert that Christ always saw the divine essence, indeed he does not even dare to assert that the blessed see the divine essence, and that their knowledge consists in this. Then he indicates sufficiently that the opinion of the scholastics does not please him, who maintain that Christ was simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender, since these two states seem to him not to be able to consist in the same subject. In Thesis 40, moreover, he affirms that in the first moment of Christ's conception all the gifts of mind which he afterwards had were not poured out upon him at once, but that he received them in order and time, and that his human wisdom and grace was altogether less when he was born than when he grew up.

But especially most of our theologians do not think that Christ always knew all things of which he afterwards acquired knowledge, nor do they fear to say that he sometimes was ignorant of some things which he now knows and understands. For since Christ willed to be made like us in all things, except sin, it does not seem unworthy of him if as a boy and infant he did not know things which it is only for an adult man to know and understand.

Furthermore, from what has been said it is gathered that concerning these questions there is not properly a controversy between the Roman Church and the Reformed Churches: For just as the Roman Church has not yet pronounced anything about these things in its Councils, so also the Reformed Churches have not yet established anything in common about these matters, but they are mere Scholastic questions, about which in either communion it is permitted to think either this way or that without danger to faith, but although by the judgment of the Pontificals themselves one who thought otherwise about these proposed questions than the common opinion of the School holds is not immediately to be considered a heretic and deviant from the faith, he would nevertheless be rash, and would be judged to err, and would not escape some censure and mark. But opinions are freer among us, and it is permitted to our theologians, with the good grace of their fellow ministers and colleagues, to think about this whole matter either in this or that direction.

However, it is not agreed between the Scholastic Doctors and at least some of our theologians, as is evident from what has been said, whether the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ, while he was still on earth, before death already enjoyed that highest blessedness which it now

enjoys in Heaven; and thus whether Christ could then be said to be simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender (which the Roman School teaches by common consent). But some of our theologians deny this, while others affirm it, most being silent and saying or establishing nothing about it.

Furthermore, from that matter another dispute arises, whether Christ had faith and hope properly so called, which the Roman School denies, as has been shown before. But those of our theologians who deny that Christ's soul was always perfectly blessed affirm it. Concerning faith, however, there seems to be a *λογομαχία* [logomachy, or dispute about words]; For the Scholastic Theologians contend that Christ did not have faith properly so called, because faith in its nature includes some inevidence and obscurity, which they think should be removed from Christ's knowledge: Our Doctors, however, although they attribute faith to Christ, nevertheless by this do not wish to diminish, or accuse of obscurity the knowledge which he had of God and divine things, but either by the name of faith they understand trust, or simple assent given to doctrine revealed by God, as is evident from what has been adduced before.

Moreover, from what has been said it appears that our theologians, either all or most, differ from the Roman School in this, that they think that all fullness of grace was not poured out upon Christ's soul at once and simultaneously as soon as he was conceived in the Virgin's womb, but that Christ made progress in grace with time, not only as to acts, but also as to habits; whereas on the contrary the Roman School holds that the gifts of the Spirit were conferred upon Christ in such abundance in his very first conception, that afterwards there was no place at all for increase, but whatever gifts and grace Christ now possesses in his soul, he always had even in his mother's womb in the same measure and degree.

But the principal dispute is about the knowledge of Christ's soul, which indeed all agree now knows all things in heaven of which knowledge can fall to any creature, but they do not agree whether he always knew all things and never learned anything which he truly did not know before. And the Pontificals indeed by common consent hold that the soul of our Lord Jesus Christ was so filled with knowledge from its very creation, that it afterwards learned nothing which it did not know before, and that Christ never labored under any privative and properly so called ignorance, but through some created knowledge always knew all things which he now knows, and which it is possible for a creature to know. On the contrary, however, most of our theologians assert that it can be truly and properly said that Christ, insofar as he is man, was sometimes ignorant of something, and that his knowledge began to have various increases with age, and thus that he knows some things in heaven which he did not know when he was not yet glorified.

However, it is imputed to us by calumny that we say Christ labored under a crass ignorance of many things, or that we attribute to Christ all our ignorance which can be without sin; for not only do we remove from Christ all culpable ignorance, but we do not even dare to determine what he knew or was ignorant of at any time, but we simply adhere to the Gospel text, where we read that Christ increased in wisdom with God and men, and that he did not know the day and hour of the last judgment as long as he was here on earth in the form of a servant.

CHAPTER IV.

Did Christ Ever Do Anything That Required Correction?

Here, there is no controversy, but merely a calumny from the Catholic doctors attempting to burden our theologians. The occasion for this calumny is taken from Calvin's words in Matthew 26, found in his Harmony of the Gospels. There, Calvin, writing about Christ's prayer, "My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me; yet not as I will, but as you will," includes these words among others: "He was struck with fear and constricted by anxiety, so that it was necessary for him to vacillate, as it were, with alternating prayers amidst the violent waves of temptations. This is the reason why, having prayed for the cup to pass, he immediately reins himself in, and submitting his prayer to the Father's command, he chastises and recalls the request that had just slipped out. And there, he says, 'This was not a deliberate prayer of Christ, but the force and sudden impulse of grief extorted the words, to which correction was immediately added; the same vehemence also took away the immediate memory of the heavenly decree.'"

From this, Bellarmine infers that, according to Calvin, Christ did something that needed to be corrected, which, he says, even if Calvin does not dare to call it a sin, it nevertheless was truly a sin if it needed to be corrected. But how far Calvin was from attributing anything to Christ that deviated even minimally from perfect purity and integrity is evident from the words that immediately precede those cited by Bellarmine: "Indeed, it must be held that Christ's emotions were not turbulent, such as ours, which might expel pure moderation from his mind; but, as far as possible, he, with a sound and unblemished human nature, was struck with fear," etc.

Therefore, it should be known that in speech, one often corrects what one says, not because it is bad and reprehensible, but through a figure of speech and manner of speaking, which rhetoricians call "epanorthosis," that is, correction. And in this sense, and no other, Calvin means that the Lord corrected and recalled the prayer, "Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass from me," which correction is not an amendment but an explanation and modification of what was said. For neither Calvin nor any other Reformed theologian has ever said or thought that our Lord Christ either did or said anything deserving of reprimand and needing correction; rather, they all unanimously proclaim that he was always free from any stain or blemish of sin.

CHAPTER V.

In which the Sentiment of the Roman Church on the Descent of Christ into Hell is Explained, and the Questions Arising from it

Doctors of the Roman Church here understand "hell" to mean hidden receptacles where souls that have not attained heavenly bliss are detained. They distinguish four such receptacles. The first is that most terrible prison where the souls of the wicked, along with demons, are tormented by perpetual fire, commonly and strictly called hell. The second is purgatory, where the souls of the pious who die with some guilt are tormented for a definite time to be purified, so they may enter heaven. The third is that place called the Limbo of the children, where the souls of children who die with original sin are confined, who, although deprived of the beatific vision of God forever, are not afflicted with any sensible punishment. Finally, the fourth type of receptacle is where the souls of the saints who had nothing to atone for in purgatory were received before the advent of our Lord Jesus Christ; this place is commonly called the Limbo of the Fathers in the schools, also called Abraham's bosom, a term taken from Luke 16.

Scholastic Doctors understand these four receptacles by the common name of "hell," and although the Roman Church has not yet defined their location in its councils or decrees of its popes, the Scholastics, by common consent, place them in a certain order around the center of the earth, and establish hell as underground places. The lowest, they teach, is destined for the torments of the damned; the next is for the purification of the souls of the pious before they can enter heaven. The third is assigned to receiving the souls of children who die in original sin. Finally, the highest and last is assigned to the spirits of the saints until the resurrection of Christ.

Although they teach that the Fathers of the Old Testament received the remission of all sins, including original sin, by virtue of Christ's future passion through faith, they do not believe they were released from the punishment due to original sin, which is physical death and exclusion from heavenly glory until the price of human redemption was actually paid. Similarly today, although the faithful are freed from all sins and the guilt of original sin through baptism, they remain obligated to the penalty of original sin, namely the necessity of physical death. Therefore, they believe that the Fathers of the Old Testament, although departing from this life in whatever perfection, were not admitted to the vision of God and heavenly glory, but were received in the place called the Limbo of the Fathers, where the souls departing from purgatory were also admitted after paying the due penalties.

Although, according to their view, the souls of the ancient faithful enclosed in this Limbo did not enjoy the beatific vision of God, they nevertheless had a peaceful habitation there and lived without any sense of pain, except that which the delay of promised glory and beatitude might bring, which, however, they sustained with certain hope. Nevertheless, they consider these holy souls as captives there and in some way under the power of the demons by whom they were confined and restricted.

When it is said that Christ descended into hell, they understand it as a real and true descent by which Christ penetrated those lowest places. They establish that our Lord Jesus Christ's soul, at the moment of its separation from the body by death, sought these subterranean abodes and remained there throughout the entire three days of death. Indeed, some believe that Christ's soul visited each part of hell, and according to real presence, was also in that prison where the wicked are tormented with demons, which is properly called hell. Bellarmine supports

this opinion in his *On Christ*, Book 4, Chapter 16, although he later retracted it in his reviews of his works. However, the opinion of Thomas Aquinas, which the majority of the school follows, is that Christ descended in real presence of his soul only to the Limbo of the Fathers, and to the other places of hell only by certain effects. They believe that in the strict sense of hell, by the manifestation of his glory, he terrified the demons, and convicted the damned of their unbelief, compelling both to kneel and acknowledge him as Lord. Regarding purgatory, some Scholastics believe that all souls tormented there when Christ descended to hell were then delivered by a certain full indulgence of Christ, an opinion held by Dominic Soto and Ambrose Catharinus, as reported by Estius in the third Sentences, Distinction 22, Paragraph 4, who also inclines to this opinion. However, most others consider it more probable that Christ did not free all souls detained in purgatory at that time but only those who had completed their period of purification or had deserved by some special devotion to Christ's passion to be liberated by him descending into hell. They believe Christ brought some relief to the others by raising them to the hope of future life.

Regarding the souls detained in the Limbo of the Fathers, Christ, according to his soul, really descending there, according to the Roman Church's opinion, conferred two greatest goods upon them. First, he granted them essential beatitude by admitting them to the beatific vision of God. Secondly, he led them out of that prison and took them to heaven, which he accomplished not long after. They believe that Christ's soul, returning to the body on the third day, brought out all the souls of the Fathers, who, after forty days, were carried up to heaven with Christ ascending.

Scholastics dispute whether the descent into hell should be counted among the penalties that Christ suffered on our behalf. Thomas indeed believes so in his *Summa Theologica*, Part 3, Question 52, Articles 1 and 3, and Cardinal Cajetan in Acts 2. But Bellarmine and others think differently, believing that while Christ was in hell, he was indeed in a place of punishment but without suffering; he descended there not as a prisoner to be detained but as a king and liberator to free the captives there, and that it is not a punishment if a king visits prisons to free some from there; rather, this should be called condescension and humility.

As for our theologians, they acknowledge indeed that the term "hell" or "infernus" in the Vulgate Latin edition of Scripture is variably interpreted and does not simply signify the same thing, but when it is taken for a specific place of souls, they never understand by "hell" anything other than the place of the damned. Indeed, they establish only two places for souls after death, one where the souls of the saints and the pious are gathered after death and enjoy blessed rest, which place is in heaven and is called Paradise in Scripture; the other where the souls of the wicked are thrust down and tormented with dire and eternal punishments, which they only comprehend by the name of hell.

Where is that place? They do not think it necessary to inquire curiously, nor do they dare to define it. However, many, such as Tilenus in his *Disputation on the Last Judgment* and Ramburtus in his *Theses on the True Penalties of Sin*, do not find it probable that it is in the center of the earth, because they believe that this earth will eventually be annihilated, whereas

hell is a place that is eternal and will never end. Others, such as Beza and Bucanus on the descent of Christ into hell, Bullinger, and Keckermann in his Theological System, who do not believe that this world will be annihilated on the last day but only changed, do not find it improbable that hell is an underground place. But, whatever the case, few or none of our theologians precisely define the location of hell.

Furthermore, since our theologians generally assert that there are only two places destined for receiving the souls of the dead, namely Paradise and the abode of the damned, it follows that the souls of the pious who died in faith under the Old Testament were immediately admitted to heavenly Paradise, as they should not be thrust into Tartarus, nor did they have any guilt by which they could be excluded from heaven. They believe that the faithful before Christ, no less than we, received full remission of all sins, including original sin, by virtue of the future passion of Christ. This is the common opinion of our theologians, as they do not think the souls of the fathers were thrust into any hellish places but were transferred to the very place of the blessed upon departing from the body.

However, this opinion is not universally accepted by all our theologians, as some dissent or at least suspend their judgment. For instance, Peter Martyr in his commentaries on 2 Kings 2, where he discusses the rapture of Elijah and Enoch, clearly teaches that the souls of the ancient fathers before Christ's ascension were not yet admitted to the highest heaven where the saints now reign with Christ. He writes, "Now you may ask to what place Enoch and Elijah were translated. I simply say that I do not know, for it is not taught by the divine Scriptures. However, if a probable reasoning is to be followed, I would say they were brought to the place of the fathers or Abraham's bosom, where, waiting for Christ's resurrection, they lived with the blessed fathers, and after his resurrection, they were lifted above the heavens." A little later, he distinguishes the supreme seat of the blessed, which Christ first reached after his resurrection, from Abraham's bosom, where the souls of the pious fathers were gathered. Speaking about Elijah's descent, he says, "It is not a question of that ascent above all the heavens, where Christ first entered, but of being taken to Abraham's bosom." He concedes that no one reached that sublime ascent before Christ. Enoch and Elijah went to the fathers and waited there with them for Christ, and when he came, they accompanied him to heaven along with others. Finally, he poses this objection: "In sacred history, it is expressly stated that Elijah was taken up to heaven by a whirlwind, so he does not seem to have gone to Abraham's bosom." To which he replies, "Perhaps by heaven is meant the air through which it is certain he passed, or Scripture speaks not of the initial journey to the fathers but of the later one when he ascended with Christ above all heavens." This latter interpretation is more probable. Hence, Peter Martyr concluded that the souls of the ancient fathers were not received into the heavenly and glorious seat where pious and holy men now reign with Christ after leaving this life but were placed in a peculiar location distinct from heaven, where he believed they rested free from the torments of the damned, well off and rejoicing.

Calvin, however, denies that the question of the location of souls is necessary both before and after Christ and permits everyone to have their own opinion on it. These are his words:

"There are other controversies among the churches that do not disrupt the unity of faith. Why should churches be at odds if one, without a desire for contention or obstinacy, thinks that souls departing from bodies fly to heaven, while the other dares not define the place but certainly holds that they live with the Lord?" (Institutes, Book 4, Chapter 1, Paragraph 11).

Jerome Zanchius, in explaining the article of the Creed on Christ's descent into hell, offers many and varied interpretations and specifically that "He descended into hell," meaning into the subterranean place called Limbo, where, as in a prison, the fathers of the Old Testament were held captive. Christ descended to liberate them. After not rejecting any of the proposed interpretations outright, he concludes with these words, "But let the pious and Christian mind judge which of these interpretations fits best." This is found in his *Compendium of the Principal Chapters of Christian Doctrine*, in section 80, which is included in the 8th volume of Zanchius's works.

But whatever the opinions of some of our doctors may be, the vast majority do not believe that the souls of the fathers under the Old Testament were received into a different place than the faithful are today under the New Testament. However, all agree that although the souls of the pious who died before Christ enjoyed some degree of beatitude and heavenly glory, they had not yet reached the level of beatitude and glory they attained after our Lord Jesus Christ's resurrection and ascension into heaven, and which all faithful souls now departing from this life obtain. Our theologians teach that the knowledge of those holy souls was greatly increased through Christ's coming and his glorious presence in heaven, revealing many new things to angelic and human spirits, thus also increasing their joy and happiness. And none of our doctors have ever denied that Christ's soul, at his death, went to where the souls of the fathers were before him and remained with them until the resurrection.

Furthermore, from what has been explained, it is clear that our theologians, like the Romanists, teach that there are certain hells distinct from the graves and that by this name is not only designated the state and torments of the conscience of the damned but also a specific place intended for receiving the souls of the dead, namely those who depart from this life outside the grace of God. There is no controversy about this.

Our doctors also, as it appears, concede to the Romanists that the souls of the fathers who preceded Christ, wherever they were, did not attain that level of beatitude before Christ's coming which they now enjoy in heaven with Christ and awaited Christ's coming and presence with some anxious desire. All theologians, both ours and the Romanists, as is evident, agree that our Lord Jesus Christ's soul immediately after it was separated from his body went to the place where the souls of the fathers were and stayed with them for the entire three days of death, bringing them great joy and an increase in happiness.

On the other hand, the doctors of the Roman Church do not deny that the souls of the ancient fathers, although not yet admitted to the vision of God, were nevertheless free from pain, enjoyed great peace, and even experienced considerable joy from the certain hope of glory, which they awaited according to God's promise.

The question is whether hell is an underground place, which the doctors of the Roman Church affirm, while most of our theologians doubt and find improbable. Secondly, whether besides the place of the damned and heaven, which is the seat of the blessed souls, there are other specific receptacles for souls included under the name of hell, which the doctors of the Roman Church affirm, but our theologians generally deny.

Thirdly, it is questioned whether the souls of the saints who died before Christ were held by some guilt until his death, by which they were excluded from heavenly beatitude and glory, and whether they were in some way still under the power of the devil. Or were they, being free from all guilt, immediately after death, able to begin to enjoy the very substance of heavenly beatitude? The former is affirmed by the doctors of the Roman Church, while the latter is affirmed by our Church.

Fourthly, whether the soul of Christ after his death truly descended to certain subterranean places, and whether this is what is meant by the article of the Creed about Christ's descent into hell. This is affirmed by the Scholastic doctors, but our theologians deny it.

CHAPTER VI.

In which various opinions of our theologians concerning Christ's descent into hell are reported.

Robert Bellarmine, in Book 4 on Christ, which is about Christ's soul, Chapter 7, claims this to be the opinion of Brentius and Calvin: that to descend into hell is to be utterly destroyed and extinguished. To this end he cites certain passages from their works, but this is entirely slanderous. For none of the Protestants or Reformed ever thought this, and the calumny can be refuted from the very passages Bellarmine cites.

Among those Protestants called Lutherans, there were many debates in Germany over this article. But the Book of Concord, which attempts to settle disputes arising among Lutherans, and in which most Lutherans agreed, wants this article to be believed simply as containing doctrine distinct from the article on Christ's burial. However, it says the manner in which Christ our Lord descended into hell should not be investigated and defined, but distinct knowledge of this matter should be reserved for the next age. For that book states thus in the epitome of articles about which controversies arose among theologians of the Augsburg Confession, Article 9:

"It should be enough for us to know that Christ descended into hell, destroyed hell for all believers, and delivered us through himself from the power of death and Satan, from eternal damnation, and even from the jaws of hell. But we do not curiously inquire in what way these things were accomplished, but reserve knowledge of this matter for another age, where not only this mystery, but also many other things simply believed by us in this life will be revealed which exceed the grasp of our blind reason."

From our theologians also, Zanchius, in that passage we cited in the previous chapter, after presenting several explanations of this article, does not dare to define anything for certain,

but leaves the matter undecided and wants each person to be free to choose whatever opinion he wishes.

But other theologians from our side have quite varied opinions on this article and do not explain it in the same way. To a few, a certain opinion far differing from others seems probable. William Bucanus reports it and does not entirely reject it in his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Section 25, Section 6. Where after he said the ancients contend that at the very moment of the earthquake and resurrection, Christ showed himself alive to those in hell and declared, not so much in words as in reality, that he was the victor over death and the Prince of darkness, and that Satan no longer has any power over the elect, and that the name was given to him, so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow in heaven, on earth and under the earth, he adds:

"I do not dare to condemn this opinion, since it does not conflict with Sacred Scripture and contains nothing absurd. Indeed, this opinion seems able to be probably inferred from the words of the Apostle, Ephesians 4:9: 'Now that he ascended, what is it but that he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth?' For there is a clear antithesis between 'above all heavens' and 'the lower parts of the earth'. And since the former is taken literally, the latter also seems it should be understood literally. But no part of the earth is lower than hell, which is the place of the damned."

This opinion holds that Christ descended into hell in body and soul, and not during the three days of death, but in the very resurrection in which Christ stood and showed himself alive to the devils and damned in hell by his real presence. But I do not think any of our theologians today approve this opinion.

The opinion of the Zurich theologians is also unique. Their Catechism explains this article thus:

"I believe that Christ after his bodily death not only went with his soul to the souls of the departed, but also that by his death he was salutary to all the holy Fathers who died from the beginning of the world; indeed that Christ by his death has broken eternal death and hell for all of us who believe in him, and has freed us from all the horror of Tartarus."

Moreover, some understand Christ's descent into hell as nothing other than his burial, and consider this article to be merely a repetition of the preceding article in other words and another formula, just as in Sacred Scripture one and the same thing is often expressed by two formulas. This is because the Hebrew word which the Greeks translate as "Hades", and which corresponds to the word "inferorum" in the Latin Vulgate edition, is often taken to mean "grave" in Scripture. Rufinus seems to have held this opinion formerly, who, discussing this article, says, "The force of the word seems to be the same in that he is said to be buried." And indeed some of our theologians have followed Rufinus, but today there is scarcely any theologian who does not reject this opinion.

However, another opinion which is very close to this one is widely held among our theologians. Since Sacred Scripture very often designates by "Hades" and "Infernum" in general the condition and state of the dead and those who have been removed from sight by death, and as it were cut off from the earth, hence it happens that according to the style of Sacred Scripture, to

descend into hell simply means to undergo the condition of those whom death has taken from the company of the living, and to be pressed and held by the power of death. And according to this sense, many of our theologians want it to be said in the Creed that Christ our Lord descended into hell, because not only did he die and was buried, but he lay in the grave for three days, and there was held as if captive by death, so that for some time he seemed to have completely perished and to have been utterly cut off from the land of the living like all others whom death takes away forever from the sight of men living on earth. And so Christ's descent into hell signifies the last and lowest degree of humiliation by which Christ remained for a time under the power and dominion of death, with enemies insulting and triumphing as if over one completely oppressed and cut off.

Nevertheless, an opinion far different from this appealed to most of our theologians formerly, and is still held by many today. They believe that by Christ's descent into hell is signified those most grievous pains and anguishes which Christ endured in soul for our sake, and which the Evangelists mention when they record that Christ, before he was crucified, was in agony and also in great distress, and that his soul was sorrowful, completely sorrowful even unto death, so much so that due to anguish of mind and most grievous torment, a bloody sweat flowed from Christ, and on the cross he was forced to cry out due to the bitterness of pain, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?"

So that this whole matter may be understood more distinctly, it should be known that our theologians teach by common consent that Christ's passion, by whose power and merit we have been redeemed, is not to be restricted to the bodily death alone which he endured hanging on the cross, and to which he was condemned by the mouth of an earthly judge, with divine providence directing. For just as we were endowed with body and soul, and unless God's supreme goodness had come to our aid, we would have been punished one day in hell with the highest torments in both, so it was necessary that Christ our surety and sponsor, who had taken upon himself the guilt of our sins, should bear the punishments due to us, both in body and in soul, so that we might be freed from them.

CHAPTER VII.

Whether Christ Merited Anything for Himself

Both our theologians and those of the Roman Church unanimously teach that Christ merited grace and glory for us. However, the Scholastic Doctors also inquire whether Christ merited anything for himself. First of all, since they teach that Christ's soul from the moment of conception saw God and was blessed, and besides, received all the fullness of grace, so that there was no room for increase afterward, it follows that they also teach that these things were not acquired by his merits since he received them before any merit. This is also the common opinion of the Scholastics, with perhaps a few exceptions.

However, although according to their understanding, Christ never lacked supreme beatitude in his soul, as long as he lived on earth, by a singular dispensation, he had a soul subject to many sorrowful passions, and besides, a mortal and infirm body, and he struggled with the gravest pains, sufferings, and utmost ignominy up to and including a shameful death. Therefore, many things were lacking to him, both bodily and spiritual goods: namely, the impassibility of the soul, the immortality of the body, and other qualities of a glorified body, as well as the glory and exaltation of his name, and everything else he received through the resurrection, ascension into heaven, and sitting at the right hand of the Almighty Father. They believe that Christ merited all these things for himself and received them from the Father as a reward for his obedience, although these things could and should also flow from the personal union of the human nature with the divine nature.

This is the doctrine of the Roman School, with no known dissent. As for our theologians, Calvin in his Institutes (Book 2, Chapter 17) judges that it is curious and foolish to inquire whether Christ merited anything for himself and presumptuous to affirm it. He also attempts to prove with several arguments that Christ did not acquire anything for himself through his merits.

However, Jerome Zanchius was of the opposite opinion, and in this question followed the doctrine of the Scholastics. When he included these words in Chapter 11, aphorism 15 of his published confession of faith: "We believe that Christ by his perfect obedience merited not only eternal life for himself but also for us," he was advised by some theologians following Calvin to remove those words, "not only for himself." But he refused to comply with their admonition. To defend his position, in the preface to later editions of his confession, he brought forth many testimonies from the Fathers, attempting to show that the doctrine of the ancient Church agreed entirely with his own in this matter.

Although some of our theologians lean more towards Zanchius's view and others towards Calvin's, they all agree that this question is not necessary, and that theologians may hold either view with the goodwill of their brothers, without disturbing the peace of the Church or creating discord among souls.

End of Book TWO

Elucidation of the Status of Controversies Regarding the Governance of the Church and the Roman Pontiff

Chapter I The Nature of the Governance Instituted by Christ in the Church

Christ, calling people to faith and salvation through the preaching of the Gospel, did not intend to remove them from the authority of the political magistrate or to change the external form of the state. However, the faithful, considered as such, are not a confused multitude that, apart from that political subjection, lacks its own governance and order. Rather, by Christ's institution, they constitute among themselves a holy society and commonwealth, which He desires to be governed in a specific way that harmonizes perfectly with civil authority and does not prejudice it, as all theologians, both Catholic and Protestant, agree. They also agree that Christ alone is the supreme and absolute Lord of the Church and that no authority is given to anyone over the faithful, except that which can be ascribed to ministers and stewards.

The question arises as to what form of governance Christ has committed to people in the Church. To understand this, it should be noted that philosophers observe three primary ways and forms by which a multitude of people can be well and legitimately governed. The first is monarchy, where supreme authority is vested in one individual whom all others obey. The second is aristocracy, where the governing power is neither vested in all nor in one alone but in certain individuals who stand out in the community by nobility or wealth. The third is democracy, where the supreme power is vested in the whole multitude, whose votes elect magistrates and administer all things. These are the simple forms of governance, which can be mixed in various ways, giving rise to other forms of mixed governance. For instance, some republics have a monarchy tempered with aristocracy, some have a place for both aristocracy and democracy along with monarchy, and some republics can be conceived that incorporate elements of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.

If we speak of the simple governance and state of the Church, all our theologians with common consent teach that it is purely monarchical insofar as Christ, who died for us, rose, and ascended into heaven, is appointed by God as the supreme Lord of the Church, governing the faithful here on earth, whom He redeemed with His blood, in a unique way: internally through the Spirit, invisible influx of grace, and hidden providence; externally through ministers established in the Church, by whose work the faithful are fed and governed in Christ's name.

But if the discourse is about that ministerial governance which Christ committed to humans in the Church, we deny that it is monarchical. Christ did not appoint one minister in His Church who alone, by office, should govern the entire Church and to whom all others, both the faithful and pastors, should be subject and follow his lead. Christ governed the nascent Church through the twelve apostles, who each governed the entire Church and had authority not only over the faithful but over all other ministers of the Church. However, they were equal in authority among themselves, and although there could have been some order among them, as

indeed in any rightly instituted college, none of them had their colleagues as subjects or exercised jurisdiction over them. After the apostles, whose office was extraordinary, were taken from the earth, pastors and teachers, and if there are other ordinary ministers, remained in the Church, each governing the part of the Lord's flock committed to them and jointly the whole Church. But by Christ's institution, none of them ought to preside over all the others and have them as subjects. Each should indeed acknowledge some superior authority in the Church, but this authority does not reside in any singular person; rather, it resides in the assembly and community of their colleagues and brothers, to whom each is bound to submit.

Although Christ committed the care of governing the Church to certain persons, namely pastors and ministers whom He saw fit to appoint, it should not be thought that the people have no part in ecclesiastical governance. At least, it pertains to the Christian people to elect their ministers or to accept or reject those elected and presented to them. Thus, according to our doctors, the governance of the Church is aristocratic, though it has a democratic element mixed in.

Our theologians indeed do not all agree on every detail regarding the mode and form of ecclesiastical governance, and there are those who grant more or less to the people in this part, yet none, as far as I know, believe ecclesiastical governance to be a democracy rather than an aristocracy, contrary to what Bellarmine attributes to some theologians of the Augustan Confession. But this seems to be unjustified.

From the above, it appears that when we say a form of aristocracy, which is the governance of the best, has a place in the Christian Church by Christ's institution, we understand by these best, the ministers instituted by Christ, not the secular rulers that Bellarmine attributes to Brentz. There were some princes who embraced the Reformed religion and called themselves heads of their churches, nor do our doctors deny princes any right over the ministers of the Church. For we indeed hold that the ministers of the Church are subject to the political prince as they are to his state. Moreover, we assert that a Christian magistrate is the guardian and protector of divine law and religion, whose duty it is to ensure that subjects worship the true religion and are instructed in it, and that there are faithful and competent pastors and ministers in his dominion who rightly administer sacred things. He should not only support and protect them but also stir up the indolent, correct those acting contrary to their duty, punish them as deserved, and ensure the external order in the Church and assemblies of pastors.

This does not confuse civil and ecclesiastical power, for the magistrate and political prince should not themselves undertake the functions of ministry or exercise spiritual and ecclesiastical jurisdiction but should leave that to ministers appointed by Christ. If he is pious and religious, he should voluntarily submit to ecclesiastical discipline exercised rightly and lawfully by pastors, as one who is among Christ's sheep, which are entrusted to His ministers to be fed. He has the power to ensure that there are competent ministers and to compel them to perform their duty, to preach the word purely, administer the sacraments rightly, and exercise discipline, but he cannot and should not, as such, perform ministry or exercise discipline.

This is our view of ecclesiastical governance. However, the Catholics unanimously teach that the state of the militant Church is instituted by Christ as monarchical, so that not only is He the true monarch of the Church, but also among pastors and ministers of the Church, there should always be one who is superior to all others, who, by a special prerogative, takes care of the entire Church spread throughout the world, to whom all pastors and particular churches must absolutely submit and obey his commands. But when it comes to explaining what and how great the power of this head of the Church is, the doctors of the Roman Church diverge into different opinions.

Many who flatter the Pope, including Bellarmine, teach that our Lord Christ has given the supreme power to this head of the Church, so that not only is he superior to individual pastors and churches and has the right to govern all churches and to care for those things that concern the whole Church, but also he has the entire Church, even collectively taken, subject to him, while he himself is subject to no ecclesiastical authority, not even if the entire Church should come together in its pastors, whose assembly has the right to command, while the head has no authority over the assembly. From this, it follows that apart from Christ, the Church on earth has a properly called monarch, and its governance is monarchical and a monarchical government.

Bellarmino, however, notes that this monarchical government is tempered by aristocracy and democracy. It is aristocratic because the bishops, through whom the Christian commonwealth is governed and administered under the authority of the head of the Church, are not his vicars, but they too are princes in the Christian commonwealth appointed by Christ, who govern the part of the Lord's flock entrusted to them, not only by the commission of this visible monarch but by the office entrusted to them by Christ. It is democratic because ecclesiastical dignities are not hereditary nor fixed to certain families, but anyone from the people can be chosen for them if they are found suitable for such offices.

Others, although they acknowledge a visible head in the Church to whom all other pastors should be subject as Christ willed, do not believe that the supreme power in the Church resides solely in that one, so that he should recognize no superior authority on earth. For while they subject individual pastors and particular churches to this head, they believe that the entire Church, collectively taken, and the prelates of the Church gathered in council have authority over this visible head, to whom he should be subject. They teach that the Pope is not above a universal council of the whole Church, but rather the council is above the Pope, which can call him to account if he fails in his duty, and if necessary, even depose him, as was the view of the Council of Constance at the beginning of the fifteenth century after Christ, and later also of the Council of Basel; these two councils exercised such authority over Roman Pontiffs, passing judgment on several Popes and deposing them from office, replacing them with others.

Richierus, Doctor of the Sorbonne, and several other theologians in France, who uphold what they call the liberty and immunity of the Gallican Church, explain their view on this matter as follows. They distinguish the state of the Church from its governance or administration. Regarding the state of the Church, they teach that it is monarchical because Christ instituted one who would be the ministerial head of the Church and have authority over individual pastors and particular churches dispersed throughout the world, whose duty is to ensure that ecclesiastical

canons and laws are observed everywhere and to mandate those things that concern the good of the entire Church.

However, they state that the administration of the Church is aristocratic because the power of this head is neither free nor absolute, but constrained and limited by laws and canons established by the common counsel of the Church. They do not believe that the power to issue laws and canons that bind the Church resides with this visible monarch but with the Church assembled in council, which the head does not have the authority to command at will, nor to alter laws established by its own authority. His role is solely to execute ecclesiastical laws and, when the occasion arises, to interpret them. Thus, while the execution of the canons pertains to him throughout the entire Church, the institution of those canons belongs to and occurs within the council of the Church's best, which is the doctrine of Richier in his booklet on political and ecclesiastical power.

Amyraldus, in his first disputation, states that the Church is a Democracy governed by an Aristocracy. Hoornbek, in his tenth book on the Brownists, asserts that the governing power lies not with the entire congregation but with the ministers of the Church, contrary to the views of the Brownists. From these points, it is easy to deduce the nature of the controversy regarding Church governance.

First, with the Roman Pontiff and those who are more loyal to him, the question is whether Christ instituted a Monarch to whom the entire Church militant on earth, both collectively and individually, must be subject, so that it is necessary to obey the laws he establishes, while he himself is not subject to any earthly power by right and should not be judged by anyone. Then, with the entire Roman Church and all its doctors, the question is whether Christ appointed one minister over the Church militant here on earth who would be superior to all other pastors and believers and have some authority and jurisdiction over each of them—in other words, whether the state of the Church is Monarchical and its governance properly Monarchic. Alternatively, whether the state of the Church is Monarchical, which they affirm and we deny, believing instead that the polity and administration of the Church established by Christ is Aristocratic, yet with some elements of Democracy mixed in.

CHAPTER II

On the Primacy of Peter

Our theologians, as stated earlier, believe that Christ entrusted the care of His Church to the Apostles in such a way that each of them would govern the entire Church and have singular and extraordinary authority over all believers and other ministers of Christ. However, they maintain that the Apostles were entirely equal in authority among themselves, so that none of them had power or jurisdiction over their colleagues. Nevertheless, they do not deny that there was a certain order among them, and that one of them held a primary position and was the president and spokesperson of the Apostolic College, just as in synods and assemblies of Church

pastors, someone from among us is chosen to preside over and moderate the assembly, even if he has no authority or power over his colleagues and holds the same office and authority. Similarly, in all assemblies of judges, there is a president who precedes the others, proposes matters to be managed, collects the votes of others, and pronounces the sentence based on the consensus of the majority. They readily concede that this honor was granted to the Apostle Peter, either because of his age or because he was the first to be called to the apostleship by Christ, or because of his unique zeal and eloquence. This is referenced in Matthew 10, where in the listing of the twelve Apostles, Peter is not only placed first but is explicitly called the first by the Evangelist. We also explicitly see in the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles that when the Apostles were together, Peter spoke first and made statements before the others. They observe other privileges or prerogatives of his, such as being the first to solemnly preach the Gospel after Christ's resurrection, both to the Jews on the day of Pentecost after the miraculous outpouring of the Holy Spirit and to the Gentiles in the house of Cornelius after being divinely warned in a vision about the calling of the Gentiles. This makes it evident that Peter was the one who laid the first foundations of the Christian Church, composed of Gentiles and Jews. Thus, our theologians do not deny Peter any primacy but grant him a primacy of order and dignity among the Apostles, though not of power and jurisdiction, as is especially seen in the works of Chamier (vol. 2, book 11, chapter 10) and Cameron (lecture on the passage "You are Peter"), and in the theses of Ramburtius, where Peter is given primacy of honor and authority.

The doctors of the Roman Church, however, teach that not only Peter but all the Apostles were given supreme ecclesiastical power by Christ, so that each of them governed the entire Church and had care over all Christ's faithful, and could be called pastors and rulers of the whole Church. Yet, they note two main differences between Peter and the other Apostles: they assert that this supreme power was given to Peter as an ordinary pastor, with successors, while to the others it was given as delegates, without successors. They also believe that the other Apostles were appointed by Christ over the universal Church but were in some way subject to Peter and dependent on him, so that, with respect to Peter, they were sheep, and Peter was their pastor. Hence, they conclude that Peter alone had preeminence over all in the Church of Christ without exception, while the other Apostles governed the entire Church but had no power over their colleagues, and least of all over Peter. This is the opinion of Bellarmine in his work on the Roman Pontiff (book 1, chapters 9, 11, and 12) and Costerius in his Enchiridion (chapter 3 on the Supreme Pontiff), where he observes that there are two kinds of offices: those which cease with the person to whom they were entrusted, such as those of a legate, commissioner, or nuncio, and those which, when the first holder dies, require a successor, such as those of a king, pastor, or bishop. Based on this, he teaches that the other Apostles besides Peter did indeed hold some ordinary office, for they were pastors and bishops of the places to which they were divinely sent and ended their lives, where they also found men to succeed them in their places, namely archbishops and bishops. But apart from this ordinary office, he teaches that they had a delegated office, which was not to be succeeded, and by which they were properly called Apostles or legates, in that they were sent by Christ to govern the entire world with the same supreme

authority and power as the blessed Apostle Peter, except that they did not preside over their fellow Apostles and were not bishops or pastors of the world but Apostles, that is, legates whose power over the entire world was not ordinary but delegated and lacking a successor. However, Peter, he says, was both the prince of the Apostles and the ordinary pastor of the whole Church.

From these points, it is easy to deduce the nature of this controversy. Namely, the question is not whether Peter held some primacy, for our theologians do not deny this; they readily concede that Peter was first in order among the Apostles and held a certain singular dignity, like the president in an assembly of judges. The question is whether Peter had any power or jurisdiction over the other co-Apostles, by which they were, by Christ's institution, truly subject to him, which the doctors of the Roman Church affirm, while our theologians unanimously deny.

CHAPTER III

On the Succession of the Pope in Place of Peter

From what has been said in Chapters 1 and 2, it is clear that the doctors of the Roman Church, with unanimous consent, teach that the state of the Christian Church was instituted as a monarchy by Christ. They believe that Christ intended for there to always be someone who would preside over the whole Church and have authority and power over all other pastors and ministers of Christ. This responsibility was first entrusted to Peter, with the intention that after his death, someone else would succeed him with the same authority. Hence, they conclude that it is necessary for the Church of Christ to have a successor to Peter, who will be the head of the Church and the visible monarch of the Christian commonwealth.

They identify this successor of Peter as the Bishop of Rome, because, after residing for several years in Antioch, Peter established his seat in Rome and never moved it elsewhere. He not only held the Roman episcopate there but also exercised supreme power over the entire Church until he was martyred. They consider it absolutely certain and indubitable that Peter not only lived and preached in Rome but also took up the bishopric of the city and held it for many years until he was crucified upside down in the same city by the order of Nero. They adhere to the old tradition which asserts that Peter sat for seven years in Antioch and twenty-five years in Rome, where he was crucified head downwards. Therefore, they claim that the bishops of Rome are the true successors of Peter, inheriting both his role as the bishop of Rome and the supreme authority over all Christ's churches, a power and authority always recognized in the bishops of Rome and exercised by them, since no one else in the Christian world has claimed it.

However, Roman doctors raise various questions among themselves, such as whether the succession of the Bishop of Rome to Peter's place and his supreme pontificate is of divine right, or whether it is established by a specific and explicit command of Christ. They distinguish between the succession itself and the manner of succession. They unanimously assert that the succession of the Roman Pontiff to Peter's pontificate is from Christ's institution, because the supreme power over the whole Church conferred by Christ upon Peter was not an extraordinary

office pertaining solely to Peter, but an ordinary power and dignity intended by Christ to endure perpetually in the Church and to be passed on from Peter to others in continuous succession. However, regarding the manner of succession, that is, why the Bishop of Rome rather than the Bishop of Antioch or any other should succeed Peter, they do not all teach and think the same.

Many of them, especially those more devoted to the Pope, believe that Christ not only willed and ordained that there should always be a successor to Peter in the ecclesiastical monarchy but also determined that this successor should be the Bishop of Rome, so that by Christ's institution, the Roman Pontificate was forever attributed to the Bishop of Rome. This is the opinion of Gregory of Valencia in his "Analysis of Faith" (Book 7, Chapter 12), who considers the contrary opinion unsafe, although he does not speak of his own as if it were absolutely certain and indubitable but simply says that tradition seems to indicate this.

Bellarmino, in his work "On the Supreme Pontiff" (Book 2, Chapter 12), considers it not improbable that Christ openly commanded that Peter should establish his seat in Rome so that the Roman Bishop would succeed him absolutely, and no other. Thus, not only is the succession of the Roman Bishops to Peter's pontificate by Christ's institution, but also the manner of succession. However, Bellarmine does not hold this as certain and admits as more probable that the manner of succession by which the Roman Pontiff rather than the Antiochian or any other succeeds Peter to the leadership of the Church did not originate from any divine institution but from the fact that Peter voluntarily chose Rome as his seat and ended his ministry there. For, he says, Peter could have chosen no particular seat and then, upon Peter's death, neither the Roman nor the Antiochian bishop would have succeeded him, but rather whoever the Church elected. Likewise, Peter could have remained in Antioch, and then the Bishop of Antioch would have succeeded without a doubt. But because Peter chose and held Rome as his seat until his death, the Roman Pontiff succeeded him in the leadership of the whole Church.

However, many other doctors of the Roman Church affirm and confidently assert that the succession of the Bishop of Rome to Peter's position is not by divine right but by ecclesiastical right, and that the particular bishopric of the city of Rome is united with the supreme pontificate only accidentally and not by any explicit command of God or Christ. Thus, by divine right, the Church could transfer the supreme pontificate from the Bishop of Rome to another and elect as head of the Church a bishop of another diocese or one without a specific diocese. In this case, there would be one universal pastor of the Church and another Bishop of Rome, and the Roman Church would be only a particular church that could err and fall, a view held by Dominic Soto, Cajetan, and Bannes (in 2.2. q. 1. art. 10).

Furthermore, the Roman doctors inquire whether, even if it is not by divine right that the Bishop of Rome succeeds Peter in the leadership of the whole Church because he is the Bishop of Rome (or what is the same, that the leadership of the Church is not by divine right tied to the Roman episcopate), it is still a matter of faith. Melchior Canus answers this question cautiously and perplexingly in his work "On Locations of Theological Topics" (Book 6, last chapter), where he tries in many ways to show that it pertains to the doctrine of faith. But Bellarmine, in his work "On the Supreme Pontiff" (Book 2, Chapter 12), addresses the matter more boldly and

succinctly: "It should be noted," he says, "that even if it is not by divine right for the Roman Pontiff, as the Roman Pontiff, to succeed Peter, it still pertains to the Catholic faith; for it is not the same to be a matter of faith and to be of divine right. It was not by divine right that Paul had a cloak, yet it is a matter of faith that Paul had a cloak. And although the succession of the Roman Pontiff to Peter is not explicitly found in Scriptures, yet that someone succeeds Peter is evidently deduced from Scriptures; and that it is the Roman Pontiff is based on Apostolic tradition from Peter, which tradition has been declared by general councils, papal decrees, and the consensus of the Fathers."

Finally, the Roman doctors observe that the Bishop of Rome is the successor of Peter in the leadership of the whole Church in such a way that the particular office of the Bishop of Rome and the universal leadership are not actually distinct offices but only potentially. For they say, Peter, instituted by Christ as the Pontiff of the whole Church, did not add to himself the bishopric of the city of Rome as a bishop of a place might add another bishopric or abbacy, but rather raised the bishopric of the city of Rome to the supreme pontificate of the whole earth, just as when a simple bishopric is elevated to an archbishopric or patriarchate, as seen in Bellarmine (*loc. cit.*).

Regarding our theologians, some simply deny that Peter ever was in Rome, believing they can prove this with various arguments derived from Scripture, such as the Lutheran Velenus in his special treatise on this matter and a certain Baleus in his preface to the Acts of the Roman Pontiffs. However, most others do not think it should simply be denied that Peter was in Rome and died there, due to the consensus and testimony of the ancients on this matter, although if one investigates the principle of this tradition, they ultimately reach authors of uncertain faith who have transmitted many other fabulous stories. Hence, our doctors do not consider the story of Peter's arrival in Rome and his death there as certain and well-established as the Roman doctors do. But even though they generally do not deny that Peter went to Rome and was crowned with martyrdom there, they consider it false and contrary to sacred and canonical history that Peter established his seat in Rome and was the bishop of that city for 25 years. For if Peter ever was in Rome, it is necessary that he did not come there so soon and that he stayed there for a much shorter time, as can be shown from the Acts of the Apostles and Paul's Epistles.

Moreover, our theologians do not admit that Peter was, strictly speaking, the Bishop of the city of Rome. For although the Apostles founded and governed the churches in which they resided as long as they were there, they did not do this as bishops of those places, but by virtue of an extraordinary power. For as their ministry commissioned by Christ encompassed all the churches everywhere in the world, and their proper function was to found churches everywhere, they did not bind themselves to any particular church as pastors and bishops today are assigned the care of churches. Just as we see men with special authority being sent by kings through provinces to establish judicial orders and often new tribunals, and while they are there, they administer justice in the name of the king, but are not considered judges of those places, but are distinguished from ordinary judges. Thus, the Apostle Peter, when he was in Rome, could, by virtue of his apostleship, govern and shepherd the Roman Church by preaching the word of God

and providing and ordering various matters for the good of that church, but he was not properly the Roman Bishop.

When our theologians, along with ecclesiastical writers, say that the bishops of these or those places succeeded the Apostles, they mean only that this or that church was first immediately founded and administered by the Apostles, and shortly after the Apostles, the care of such a church was entrusted to this or that bishop. However, they do not wish to include the Apostles in the rank and order of bishops; just as in a new tribunal established by a king, the first ordinary judges succeed those who, delegated by the king with extraordinary power, established those tribunals and first administered justice there, though they are not considered ordinary judges nor should be counted among them.

In this sense, we concede that the Roman bishops succeeded the Apostles Peter and Paul, which is why in antiquity they were held in singular honor. For among Christians, churches founded immediately by the Apostles, administered by them, and where they resided, were always celebrated and esteemed, and were therefore called Apostolic in a special sense. But particularly, the honor accrued to the Bishop of Rome from the dignity and greatness of the city. Since it was the foremost city of the entire Roman Empire, by ecclesiastical and ancient custom, which the canons of the councils sanctioned, its bishop was regarded as first in honor and order among the bishops of the entire Roman world, although in the better times of the Church, he did not have power and jurisdiction over other bishops outside his diocese. For when the ecclesiastical polity was first constituted, it followed the order of the civil polity; thus, according to the dignity and order of each city in civil polity, bishops would precede others and have certain special rights.

Therefore, according to our opinion, the Bishop of Rome succeeded Peter no differently than the bishops of other cities where the Apostles preached and resided can be considered their successors. That is, neither Peter nor the other Apostles' supreme authority over the whole Church, which Christ entrusted to them, passed to the pastors who were subsequently appointed to the churches they founded and administered. And just as the Bishops of Jerusalem would have arrogated to themselves the authority and prerogatives of James, who is said to have first ruled that church, and the Bishops of Ephesus the authority of John because he is said to have died at Ephesus, so the Bishop of Rome undeservedly attributes to himself the same power as Peter because ecclesiastical history testifies that the Roman Church was first administered by Peter. Nor did the Roman bishops arrogate such authority to themselves in the first centuries after Christ. But over time, and on various occasions, their pride grew, and they attributed much to themselves beyond what was right, until they finally usurped the empire and monarchical power over the universal Church. For this reason, we consider that they have forfeited those prerogatives by which, according to the decrees of the ancient councils, they stood out above the common lot of bishops in the ancient Church. And since Christian doctrine and discipline have been corrupted among them in various ways, we believe they should no more glory in the fact that they sit and teach where Peter first taught than those bishops who occupy other sees once

called apostolic, but are nevertheless condemned as heretical by the Roman Church, have the right to boast that they succeeded other apostles.

Furthermore, it can be gathered from what has been said that the question between us and the Pontificians is not properly whether Peter was in Rome and suffered martyrdom there, which most of our theologians do not deny, nor even whether the first bishops of Rome can be said to have succeeded Peter and be his successors, which we concede in a good sense. But the primary question is whether Peter, properly speaking, was the bishop of Rome and held that episcopate for many continuous years, namely 25, until his death. Then, and most importantly, whether he transmitted the governance of the whole Church, which Christ entrusted to him, to certain successors, and whether the current bishops of Rome should be considered the true and legitimate successors of Peter and honored and obeyed as such. All these things are affirmed by Pontifical doctors, but we deny them.

CHAPTER IV

On the Infallibility of the Pope in Judging Controversies of Faith and Morals

After the doctors of the Roman Church once established that Christ instituted a single visible head in His Church to govern the entire Church, and that this dignity was first given to Peter and later transmitted to the successors of the Bishop of Rome, who formerly shared the common title of bishop but made it their own, they then inquire, dispute, and decree various matters about the power of the Pope—what it is, what its nature is, and how great it is.

Bellarmino, whose footsteps we follow here, attributes a dual power to the Pope or Roman Pontiff: one spiritual and the other temporal, proposing to address both separately.

Regarding the former, four main questions arise:

1. The Pope's power in judging controversies of faith and morals.
2. The certainty and infallibility of the Papal judgment.
3. The Pope's power in making laws.
4. The jurisdiction of all other Church prelates—whether it is conferred by the Pope or received directly from God.

As for the first, the doctors of the Roman Church question among themselves whether the supreme power to judge controversies of faith and morals rests with the Roman Pontiff. The Pontifical doctors agree that the Roman Pontiff, deciding in council and from the judgment of the universal council, can pronounce the supreme judgment in matters of faith and religion, to which all Christians are bound to submit and acquiesce. However, they question where this power chiefly and properly resides—whether with the Pontiff or the council itself. On this matter, the Pontifical doctors do not teach and think the same. There are those who believe that the supreme power to judge matters of faith and religion lies chiefly with the universal council of the Church, with no appeal possible, and that the council can issue decrees binding the faith and conscience of Christians even without the Pontiff. The judgment of the Roman Pontiff alone is not entirely supreme, and it is permissible to appeal to the council, which can alter and correct the Pope's

judgment. This is the opinion of many theologians in France and commonly held in the Roman Church about two centuries ago, such that a thousand prelates in the Council of Constance agreed on this point. To provide an example of this power, they deposed three Popes before electing a new one and issued a decree of faith, namely that it was permissible to administer the Eucharist under one species only, contrary to the example of Christ and the custom of the early Church. This decree still holds in the Roman Church to this day.

However, the opposing view seems now to prevail in the Roman Church, which holds that the supreme power to judge controversies of faith and morals properly and chiefly resides with the Roman Pontiff. Thus, the Pope can pronounce a judgment on matters of faith even without a council, to which all are simply bound to submit, and which no earthly authority can nullify or alter. The judgment of even universal councils on matters of faith and religion is not valid and firm without the confirmation of the Roman Pontiff, which today, as I said, is the opinion of the majority of doctors of the Roman Church.

CHAPTER V

On the Certainty of Papal Judgment or the Infallibility of the Pope

On this question, the doctors of the Roman Church do not all teach and think the same. To understand the extent to which they agree among themselves and the diversity of their opinions on this matter, it must first be noted that they distinguish between questions of law and questions of fact.

A question of fact arises when it is asked whether this or that person committed this or that deed and is therefore worthy of a particular punishment, or whether this or that person is worthy to be promoted to a particular office, and other similar matters whose truth the judge cannot know except from the testimony and faithful narration of those who either saw or heard the events in question.

A question of law, however, is when it is not about some singular matter that concerns a particular person but when it is asked in general what is to be believed or what is to be done. For questions of law, as far as this matter is concerned, are either about faith, such as when it is asked whether this or that must be believed and accepted by the Christian people, or about morals, such as when it is asked what a Christian person ought to do and how they ought to conduct themselves, whether privately or in public office.

This distinction is closely related to the one Bellarmine presents in *De Pontifice*, Book 4, Chapter 2, where he notes that the sentences and decrees of the Pontiffs sometimes pertain to universal matters proposed to the whole Church, such as decrees on faith and general moral precepts, and other times to particular matters, such as almost all controversies of fact—whether someone should be promoted to the episcopate, whether they were lawfully promoted, or whether they should be deposed.

Furthermore, it should be known that the doctors of the Roman Church distinguish here between simple error, when someone, even in universal matters pertaining to Christian doctrine,

errs out of ignorance and persuades themselves of a falsehood, which often happens to learned, pious, and good people, and heresy, where someone pertinaciously believes something contrary to the faith.

Similarly, the general precepts of morals are about things necessary for salvation, and things that are inherently good or evil, or they are about things that are by nature indifferent, which can neither promote nor impede salvation on their own. Therefore, errors in these precepts can occur in two ways: either when something harmful to salvation is commanded, or something necessary is prohibited, or at least when something is commanded or forbidden without any cause or reason, thus rendering the law useless and superfluous.

Furthermore, Doctors of the Roman Church observe that the Supreme Pontiff can be considered in four ways: 1. As a particular person or private doctor. 2. As Pontiff, but alone. 3. As Pontiff, but with the usual council of advisors. 4. Finally, as Pontiff, but together with a general council.

Given this, there are certain things on which all Doctors of the Roman Church agree. Firstly, regarding matters of fact and decrees about particular matters, there is no Pontiff who does not acknowledge that the Pope can err in these matters, however he is considered, whether he judges alone, with his ordinary advisors, or even with the council of the whole Church. For in their view, he can, in all these ways, pass an unjust sentence, either deceived by false testimonies, negligently managing the matter, or led astray by some wrongful affection.

Moreover, all Doctors of the Roman Church agree that the Roman Pontiff, as a private doctor, can err, and can even be ignorant in questions of law and universal matters, both of faith and morals, as sometimes happens to other doctors. The Roman Pontiff is considered a private doctor when he teaches something orally or even in writing, but not with the intention that it be held by all the faithful as solemn doctrine of the Church, which no one may depart from, but simply as a private opinion, explaining and teaching what seems to him more consonant with truth and reason, without thereby absolutely condemning and considering heretical and lost those who hold a different opinion.

No Pontiff, as far as I know, denies that the Roman Pontiff, even as Pontiff, is liable to error in decrees concerning the morals of the Church, at least to the extent that he can establish a superfluous or less discreet law, for instance by commanding something useless or trivial under too grave a penalty, as Bellarmine acknowledges in "De Rom. Pont." book 4, chapter 5.

These are the points on which the Doctors of the Roman Church agree among themselves. However, there is great diversity of opinion among them on other matters. Firstly, some teach that the Pontiff, no matter what he does and how he is considered, is liable to error, and even can be heretical and teach heresy if he defines something without a general council, and that this has indeed sometimes happened. They acknowledge that the Roman Pontiff, when defining something together with a universal council, cannot err or propose any error to be believed by the Church, but they maintain that this infallibility resides not in the Pontiff but in the council, so that the Pontiff without the council can both deceive and be deceived, but the council even without the Pontiff cannot. This was the opinion of the Councils of Constance and

Basel, and commonly prevailed in the Roman Church about two hundred years ago, particularly upheld by the University of Paris, as evident from the writings of Gerson and Almain, who were distinguished Doctors of the Sorbonne. In the last century, this was also the opinion of Adrian VI, Pope in the question of Confirmation, and Alfonso de Castro, a Spanish theologian, as Bellarmine himself reports in "De Rom. Pont." book 4, chapter 2. Today, many, especially in France, still hold and defend this opinion, as among others Richer did four years ago in a book he published on political and ecclesiastical power.

A different opinion, which is far removed from the former, states that the Pontiff, not only as Pontiff but also as a private doctor, cannot be heretical or teach heresy. The Pontiff teaches as Pontiff when, by the supreme authority he arrogates to himself, he defines something to be believed by the whole Church and commands that it be accepted and held by all in faith: but as a private doctor, he simply opens his mind either in writing or orally, without thereby making a law for the Church that commands everyone to think the same as he does, as we have previously stated. Therefore, those who hold this opinion believe not only that the Pontiff cannot propose anything heretical to be believed by the whole Church from his authority, but also that it is impossible for the Pontiff privately to teach or believe anything contrary to faith, and that he is so guided and illuminated by the Spirit that he not only publicly and outwardly teaches the truth but is also inwardly persuaded of it. This opinion is defended by Albert Pighius in "Hierarch. Eccl." book 4, chapter 8, and Bellarmine in "De Rom. Pont." book 4, chapter 6, where his fourth proposition states: "It is possible, and it can be piously believed, that the Supreme Pontiff, not only as Pontiff but also as a private person, cannot be heretical or pertinaciously believe anything false against the faith."

However, between these opinions, there is a middle way which does not deny that the Pontiff, as a private person, can fall into heresy and assert something heretical: but it maintains that it is in no way possible for him to define something heretical as to be believed by the whole Church. It also teaches that it can never happen that the Roman Pontiff, from the authority he is believed to have, commands all Christians to believe something contrary to true and orthodox faith, whether he defines it with the common suffrages of a general Synod, or only with the usual council of advisors, or even pronounces the sentence alone. Their opinion is that the Pontiff can indeed hold a very poor opinion of faith privately; but when consulted by Christians in doubtful matters to decide some controversy as part of his office, God so directs his voice and pen that he can never respond falsely or against divine will, but must bear witness to the truth even against his own mind. This opinion is proposed and explained by Coster the Jesuit in his "Enchir." chapter 3, about the Supreme Pontiff. They admit that it is possible for the successor of Peter to worship idols, have incorrect opinions on faith, and even collaborate with diabolic arts, but they firmly deny that the vicars of Christ and successors of Peter, the Roman Pontiffs, can teach heresy to others or propose error.

However, when these scholars deny that Pontiffs can propose error, they do not mean that in the public and authentic writings of the Pontiffs (such as solemn responses, decretal letters, and the like) nothing can be found where they have erred and deviated from the truth. For even

those who are most devoted to the Pope do not hesitate to criticize certain things in such writings. But they distinguish in Pontifical documents between what the Pontiff chiefly intends to declare and define and what he inserts and asserts incidentally to illustrate or prove his point, and they restrict the absolute infallibility of the Pontiff to the former, while conceding that in matters of lesser importance, he can humanly err and go astray.

Bellarmino notes that those who attribute such infallibility to the Pontiff, even if he defines something without a general council, seem to differ among themselves. Some say the Pontiff cannot err if he proceeds maturely and consults the council of other pastors; others say the Pontiff cannot err in any way even alone. Bellarmine tries to reconcile these views, noting that the latter do not deny that the Pontiff must proceed maturely and consult knowledgeable men, but only intend to say that the infallibility is not in the council of advisors or in the council of bishops, but solely in the Pontiff. Conversely, the former do not want to place infallibility in the advisors, but solely in the Pontiff: they merely explain that the Pontiff must do what he can by consulting knowledgeable and skilled men about the matter at hand. If anyone were to ask whether the Pontiff could err if he defined something rashly, without a doubt the aforementioned authors would all respond that it is impossible for the Pontiff to define anything rashly; for He who permits the end undoubtedly also permits the means necessary to attain that end. However, it would be of little benefit to know that the Pontiff will not err when he does not define rashly unless we also knew that Divine Providence would not permit him to define rashly.

But whatever may be said on this matter, if one compares these three opinions, it is certain that the second one, which asserts that the Pontiff, even as a private person, cannot be heretical or have erroneous beliefs about the faith, is held by very few, who flatter the Pope more than others. As for the first opinion, which denies infallibility to the Pontiff and attributes it to the general council, it not long ago, as we noted earlier, prevailed in the Roman Church and was openly approved by the majority; but today, the situation seems different. For although freer and more candid minds still hold it, they propose it timidly out of fear of the Roman Pontiff, and are harshly and rigidly confronted by the opposition, as if it were entirely erroneous and close to heresy. Therefore, in the Pontifical Kingdom, the opinion that generally prevails and is most commonly held, and which many adhere to, is the third one, which teaches that the Pontiff can err and be heretical as a private doctor. However, as Pontiff, and by virtue of his office, whether teaching or commanding, even without a council, he is infallible and immune from error, specifically in matters of faith and those moral precepts that are necessary for salvation.

Chapter VI

On the Infallibility of the Particular Roman Church

Bellarmino, in Book 4 of "De Rom. Pontif.", presents the proposition that not only can the Roman Pontiff not err in matters of faith, but neither can the particular Roman Church. To clarify his point, he first notes that the firmness of the Roman Church in faith and the faith of the Pontiff can be understood in different ways. According to him, the Pontiff is an infallible judge

of faith and therefore is said to be unable to err in faith; however, such judgment does not pertain to the Roman Church as distinct from the Pontiff, but the Church is said to be unable to err in faith only because, in his opinion, it is impossible for there to be no faithful adherents to the Pontiff within the Roman Church, thus preventing the entire Roman Church from becoming apostate, even though individual members of the Roman Church may not be immune from error.

Secondly, he observes that the statement that the Roman Church cannot err can be understood in two ways: one, based on the hypothesis that the Pontifical See remains there; otherwise, if the see is removed, and two, that it cannot err or fail because the Apostolic See can never be transferred from Rome to another place. In the first sense, that the Roman Church cannot err while the Pontifical See stands there, Bellarmine holds this proposition to be most true and certain. But in the latter sense, namely, that the Church of the City of Rome cannot fail because the Pontifical See cannot be separated and removed from it, Bellarmine's opinion seems pious and most probable, but not so certain that the contrary could be called heretical or manifestly erroneous. For Bellarmine acknowledges that neither Sacred Scripture nor tradition clearly teaches that the Pontifical See is so fixed in Rome that it cannot be removed. However, he attempts to make this probable by many arguments, in which he also finds support from Gregory de Valencia in "Analysis fid." Book 7, Chapter 12. But Dominicus a Soto and many others disagree, who do not want the Pontifical See to be so fixed in Rome that it cannot be removed by the authority of the Church. According to the opinion of these latter ones, it follows that the particular Roman Church can simply err and fail, since it can be reduced to the condition of other particular churches.

Furthermore, there are many in the Roman Church who, even while the Pontifical See stands in Rome, do not concede that the particular Roman Church cannot err in faith. All those, namely, who do not consider the Pope to be infallible in matters of faith without a general synod and want the infallibility in faith to reside solely in the universal Church and the council that represents it. For if they do not believe that the Roman Pontiff himself is immune from error, they will much less attribute this to the Church of the City of Rome, whose immunity from error is considered entirely dependent on the Pontiff's infallibility.

Chapter VII

Whether the Roman Pontiff and all Church Prelates Have Truly Coercive Jurisdiction, So They Can Enact Laws That Bind in Conscience, and Judge and Punish Transgressors

To properly understand this question from the perspective of Pontifical theologians, it is first necessary to distinguish between two types of power or authority: one that is merely directive, and another that is also coercive. Directive authority belongs to those who, by their office, teach and prescribe what should be done, even though they cannot compel obedience through punishments, nor does one necessarily commit a sin simply by not following their prescriptions. Such authority, for example, belongs to a doctor advising a king, prescribing a diet or lifestyle according to medical principles to prevent or cure illnesses. Similarly, this authority

belongs to experts in any field, even those publicly called to teach and promote Christian piety and proper living. Their teachings and precepts, insofar as they proceed simply from themselves, do not bind consciences in such a way that disobedience is necessarily sinful, unless they are derived from divine law.

Coercive authority, however, is found in those who have the power not only to prescribe what should be done but to command it in such a way that disobedience is sinful, and who have the right to enforce their commands with penalties. This coercive authority and power is properly called jurisdiction, which is not rightly attributed to the directive authority.

Moreover, it must be noted that there are two types of jurisdiction: spiritual and temporal. Temporal jurisdiction belongs to political rulers or magistrates who have the right to command their subjects in matters pertaining to the public and external peace of the state and to impose the necessity of obedience, using physical or monetary punishments against those who refuse to obey.

Spiritual jurisdiction, on the other hand, belongs to those who, according to divine institution, govern the Church and can issue commands and mandates concerning the worship of God and the eternal salvation of souls, which bind the consciences of men to obedience. They possess this authority from divine mandate and have the right to punish transgressors with spiritual penalties, such as excommunication or suspension.

This question does not yet concern any temporal jurisdiction—whether it exists and belongs to the Roman Pontiff and the bishops under him, which will be addressed later—but only the spiritual jurisdiction described above. Thus, the question is not whether the Roman Pontiff and other church prelates can enact political laws and use temporal power against those who do not observe them, or whether they can vindicate ecclesiastical laws with civil penalties. The question is whether bishops, especially the Roman Pontiff, by virtue of their office given by Christ, can enact certain spiritual laws for the common good of the Church and the salvation of souls, and whether such laws bind the faithful in conscience and constitute transgressors those who act against them. It is also questioned whether bishops can legitimately punish transgressors with spiritual penalties, such as those mentioned earlier.

All these points are taught by the doctors of the Roman Church. After they seem to have proven that the Roman bishop is established by Christ as the prince of the entire Christian Church, they infer that he has true jurisdiction over all the faithful in spiritual matters, just as kings have in temporal matters. Just as kings can enact various laws concerning earthly and civil matters that bind their subjects so that they cannot avoid observing them without violating their conscience, the Roman Pontiff can likewise enact laws concerning the worship of God and the discipline of the Church, which bind all the faithful in conscience. Furthermore, just as earthly princes can enforce their laws with various temporal penalties, the Roman Pontiff has the right to use certain ecclesiastical penalties against those who transgress his laws, such as interdict, excommunication, suspension, or deposition from holy orders, and so on.

What they say about the Roman Pontiff concerning the universal Church, they also proportionally teach about other bishops concerning the particular churches they govern. They believe that these bishops are ecclesiastical princes under the supreme pontiff who can enact laws that truly bind the consciences of their subjects and legitimately punish transgressors according to judicial form.

However, they clarify that this applies only to just laws. For a law to be just, they require four conditions: 1. It must be directed to the common good and not to the private benefit of the lawgiver. 2. The lawgiver must have authority over those whom he wishes to impose the law. 3. The law must not be contrary to divine law, such as prohibiting virtue and commanding vice. 4. The law must be constituted and promulgated in due manner and order, maintaining a fair and suitable proportion in imposing burdens and penalties and distributing honors. Even though they acknowledge that an unjust law is not properly a law and therefore does not bind the conscience by its own force, they distinguish between unjust laws. Those that are unjust in their matter, meaning contrary to divine law, they teach should not be followed. Those unjust due to some defect in condition should be followed if not following them would cause scandal. They want the Roman Pontiff and individual bishops in their dioceses to be endowed with such authority that any just laws they enact will bind the consciences of their subjects, so that they can judge and punish violators like other judges.

Therefore, they want the laws of the Roman Pontiff and other church prelates to bind the consciences of the faithful, making otherwise indifferent acts necessary and inherently good. It is not permitted to disobey these laws, even without contempt and scandal, as seen in Bellarmine "De Rom. Pontif." Book 4, Chapters 15 and 16. Thus, the violation of such laws makes a person liable to God's judgment and eternal damnation.

They also distinguish between ecclesiastical statutes, not considering all as properly laws. Besides absolute laws, which according to them bind all Christians (such as laws on observing solemn feasts and fasts, annual confession, and Easter communion), there are many rites and pious institutions which are not properly laws and those who do not observe them are not necessarily guilty of sin. For example, Bellarmine says that those who do not recite the Angelic Salutation, take the Palm Branch on Palm Sunday, or strike their breast during the sacrifice are not sinning, as stated in "De Rom. Pontif." Book 4, Chapter 18.

Ecclesiastical laws, properly speaking, are not meant to bind the faithful in conscience and make transgressors guilty of eternal death, any differently than the political laws of princes, which are taught to bind the conscience of subjects, rendering an indifferent act necessary and inherently good. According to Bellarmine in his often-cited book, chapter 16, this is to be understood in light of the principle found in Romans 13. Our theologians, however, do not seek to strip the Roman Pontiff of all authority, as it is already clear from what has been said, nor is this the place to discuss the extent of episcopal authority over presbyters. Instead, we will explain the power and authority of those who govern the Church, whoever they may be, in enacting and enforcing statutes and laws, and what controversies might exist between us and the Doctors of the Roman Church on this matter.

First, our theologians agree that not everything pertaining to the celebration of divine worship and the order of ecclesiastical discipline down to the smallest details is prescribed and dictated in the Word of God. What is substantial and necessary in these matters is abundantly set forth in sacred scripture, needing no supplementation from elsewhere. However, regarding the various circumstances of these matters, they are left to the discretion and prudence of the Church, under the general rule and caution that all things be done decently and in order in the Church of God. God commanded that His Word be publicly read, proposed, and explained, and that the sacraments He instituted be duly celebrated. He declared that He desires to be worshipped privately and publicly through prayers, psalms, hymns, and songs, and that fasting, by which men demonstrate their humility before Him and attempt to subdue the flesh, is pleasing to Him. Nevertheless, He did not specify in detail the place, time, attire, gestures, and rituals for these practices, nor prescribe a fixed form for public liturgy. Therefore, church leaders are able and obliged to declare these things, considering the circumstances of times and places, and establish how and with what rites each should be performed.

The same applies to the use of the keys and the power of binding and loosing, which Christ granted to them. Christ commanded, and the apostles decreed, that sinners and those living scandalously should be admonished and censured by the church pastors and, if necessary, expelled from the fellowship and communion of the faithful. However, they did not specify the way, method, and order for dealing with such sinners, nor the steps, moderation, and precautions to be observed in these corrections and censures, nor which crimes deserve which marks and penalties. Therefore, it was necessary for those whom Christ appointed to govern the Church to establish various canons regarding the exercise of this discipline instituted by the apostles and Christ, to prevent confusion and disorder.

Thus, theologians universally acknowledge that it was not only permissible but absolutely necessary for church leaders to issue various disciplinary canons and establish a fixed form for divine worship and the administration of the sacraments, so that, according to the apostolic precept, all things might be done decently and in order in the Church of God. They also believe that the leaders do nothing contrary to their office when they proclaim public fasts or dedicate and consecrate certain days for solemn thanksgiving to God for serious reasons. Furthermore, they teach that the faithful should willingly subject themselves to such canons and constitutions, to obey the divine and apostolic command to obey their leaders who watch over their souls. They do not believe that anyone can neglect and despise what has been rightly established by the pastors and leaders of the Church without sinning and harming their conscience. They affirm that those who refuse to conform their lives and actions to the rules of ecclesiastical discipline, even in matters not expressly prescribed in the Word of God, are guilty of serious contumacy and rebellion.

Moreover, they do not leave the punishment of such negligence and rebellion to God alone but teach and confirm by their practice that those who willingly and knowingly neglect the wise institutions established by church pastors and leaders, and violate ecclesiastical discipline, should not only be admonished and corrected but also summoned before the council of church

pastors and elders and, depending on the gravity and nature of the offense, be marked and punished with various ecclesiastical censures and penalties, such as suspension, excommunication, and deposition from sacred ministry, all of which are practiced among us.

However, not all our theologians speak in the same way about these ecclesiastical sanctions. Some, like Calvin and Tilenus, do not call them laws but rather good ordinances and constitutions, decrees, canons, and rules. Others, however, do call them laws without scruple. Nonetheless, they all agree that these sanctions are not strictly and properly called laws, but only in a broader sense. For a law to be properly called so, it requires the highest and absolute authority of its issuer, which in the Church belongs to God alone. Church leaders have only an economic and ministerial authority. Furthermore, every proper law requires coercive power, but according to our theologians, ecclesiastical sanctions only have directive power. They do not deny that ecclesiastical sanctions oblige obedience and that those who refuse to obey them sin. Indeed, pastors and elders have the right to compel the faithful to observe these sanctions with ecclesiastical censures and penalties. However, they claim that these sanctions lack coercive power in two ways. Firstly, because those who are rebellious and not only ignore but also condemn ecclesiastical constitutions and censures cannot be compelled to obedience by external force, unlike political rulers who compel their subjects to obedience. Secondly, because ecclesiastical sanctions do not bind the conscience by their own force, as the commands of God do, who alone can command the conscience by right. Church constitutions must indeed be observed by the faithful, and they cannot violate and neglect them without some harm to their conscience. However, this is not because church leaders dominate their conscience, but because violating church laws transgresses the general command to obey those who have the care of our souls. Moreover, what is established by church decrees and canons does not become intrinsically good and pleasing to God in itself, like trusting and invoking God, but remains indifferent by nature. It is good and pleasing to God to observe such statutes not because they impart intrinsic goodness to any act but because they contribute to order and decorum in the Church, and because God is pleased when we subject ourselves to the authorities He has ordained, just as servants and children do something pleasing to God when they obey their fathers and masters, even if the actions commanded are not intrinsically pleasing to God.

Consequently, transgressing ecclesiastical laws is not sinful simply because of the inherent evil of the act itself, like lying or adultery, but for other reasons, mainly three: if it proceeds from contempt of legitimate authority, neglect of fraternal edification, or personal impiety and profane license and intemperance.

Therefore, these laws do not bind as strictly as divine precepts, nor can they make an act that is naturally free and indifferent simply necessary and no longer freely observant, as they are changeable by human authority and various situations may arise where necessity or exigency dispenses people from observing them. However, our theologians do not deny that such laws and constitutions impose some necessity of observance and bind consciences in a certain way, because they cannot be neglected without disturbing the peace and order of the Church and

contemning divinely established authority. In this respect, they acknowledge and affirm that these laws bind the consciences of men.

Moreover, the Roman Pontiffs assert that ecclesiastical laws make an otherwise lawful and indifferent matter intrinsically good by commanding it or intrinsically evil by prohibiting it. Our theologians deny this; however, the Roman Pontiffs do not mean by this anything other than that it is inherently good to do what our superiors command and inherently evil to do what they prohibit, even if they command or prohibit matters that are otherwise indifferent. For instance, when a father commands his son or a master commands his servant to go here or there, or forbids them from leaving the house, the son and servant, by obeying, do a good deed and fulfill their duty; by disobeying, they commit a sin and are guilty. This, however, our theologians deny, but they only mean that indifferent matters do not acquire any intrinsic goodness or evil from being commanded or prohibited by some higher authority, whether political or ecclesiastical, just as it is intrinsically good to love and trust God and intrinsically evil to blaspheme and live intemperately. But if you remove the respect for that command of a superior and the divine precept that grants authority to it, the matter remains simply lawful and indifferent by its nature, which the Roman Pontiffs readily admit.

Similarly, the Roman Pontiffs say that by the force of a law, whether political or ecclesiastical, an act that is otherwise free becomes necessary. Our theologians deny this. However, the Roman Pontiffs do not mean that a human and positive law can make something necessary in an absolute and simple sense, like the necessity to love and believe in God, but only that it is not free but necessary to obey our superiors when they command right and lawful things. Our theologians do not deny this but only insist that their precepts and constitutions do not make anything necessary in the same way that divine law itself commands.

Finally, our theologians frequently teach and emphasize that human and ecclesiastical laws do not obligate outside of contempt and scandal; the Roman Pontiffs, however, affirm the contrary. But even here, there seems to be no other disagreement than over words. For, as was shown before, our theologians do not mean that someone can safely neglect what the Church's rulers legitimately establish and command, provided no one is present who might be scandalized, or the person does not do so explicitly and deliberately in contempt of ecclesiastical authority. For instance, if someone eats during a public fast without anyone knowing and for no other reason than to satisfy their desire to eat and drink. For by contempt, they understand not only expressed contempt but also what the schools call interpretative contempt, and they consider someone to despise the Church's constitutions who does not observe them without necessity or any just cause, which alone can allow the faithful to neglect them with a clear conscience. The Roman Pontiffs, however much they attribute to ecclesiastical laws, do not deny that sometimes necessity and reasonable cause can dispense with their observance; for example, they consider illness, age, and the duties of public office sufficient to exempt the faithful from the obligation of observing fasts established by the law of the Roman Church. Therefore, when we say that ecclesiastical laws can be disregarded provided contempt is absent, we take contempt broadly, meaning not only expressed contempt but also interpretative contempt. When the Roman

Pontiffs say that those laws obligate even without contempt, they take contempt strictly, meaning only expressed contempt.

This can also be related to our theologians' refusal to establish divine worship in these human institutions. The Roman Pontiffs, however, teach that God is not only worshipped through what is prescribed in His Word but also through those acts that the Church institutes for worshipping God. Our theologians teach that ecclesiastical constitutions relate to worship and somewhat pertain to it, serving as its appendages. They do not intend to deny anything other than that God is worshipped in and of Himself through such constitutions, as they say, *ex opere operato*, and as He is worshipped through acts of faith, hope, and charity, as seen in *Bucanus*, locus 43, quaest. 2.1. The Roman Pontiffs, in turn, acknowledge that what the Church leaders establish for worship is only external and incidental and relates to internal acts of religion as a shadow to a body, and should not be compared with them in excellence, dignity, and necessity. So if there is any difference here, it is either very slight or merely verbal.

However, although in theory, and when considered in general and abstract terms, there seems to be no great controversy about the power to enact laws in the Church between us and the Doctors of the Roman Church, when it comes to specific practices of the Roman Church, our theologians find much to criticize, while the Roman Pontiffs defend them as well-founded.

Firstly, our theologians complain about the number of these constitutions in the Roman Church, considering them too many and burdensome for the Christian people, and believe that their multitude and variety significantly prejudice Christian liberty. Secondly, they note that many of these constitutions are futile, absurd, and frivolous, and even dangerous and full of superstition, and directly contrary to the Word of God.

Furthermore, they complain that the leaders of the Roman Church commend, urge, and enforce human constitutions, such as laws about fixed fasts and distinctions of food, more intensely and strictly than the obedience due to divine precepts themselves.

Lastly, they accuse the leaders of the Roman Church of excessively extending their supreme power. Not content with declaring only those things that contribute to the proper and convenient performance of worship already prescribed by God in His Word and the exercise of discipline instituted by Christ, they establish certain things that are entirely new in substance and ascribe some form of religion and worship to new types of actions. For example, the use of holy water, wax lambs, and many similar things. Our theologians do not want church laws and constitutions to deal with anything other than the mere declaration of various circumstances of discipline and worship already prescribed by God, not with instituting entirely new acts.

Chapter VIII

Whether Christ Conferred Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction Directly to the Roman Pontiff Alone, from Whom it Derives to Other Bishops?

Doctors of the Roman Church distinguish two types of power in bishops. One is called the power of order, and the other is called the power of jurisdiction. By the power of order, they mean the power to perform certain acts they consider proper to the episcopal rank and dignity, dependent on the character they believe is imprinted when someone receives that order, such as the ability to consecrate and administer the sacrament of orders and confirmation, which they do not consider to pertain to anyone other than a bishop.

The power of jurisdiction, on the other hand, is further distinguished by them into the power of internal jurisdiction and the power of external jurisdiction. By the power of internal jurisdiction, they mean the authority by which the Christian people are governed in the internal forum of conscience, that is, before God, where one is either absolved from sins or sins are retained, which they believe happens in the administration of the sacrament of penance.

By external jurisdiction, they mean the power to establish and oversee matters pertaining to the external order of the Church, including the power to excommunicate and impose other ecclesiastical penalties and to absolve from those penalties when necessary.

Moreover, all doctors of the Roman Church, by common consent, teach that the power of order is conferred on bishops directly by God when they are ordained, not mediately through the Roman Pontiff. Additionally, there is little disagreement among them regarding internal jurisdiction, and most agree that it is also granted directly by God.

However, they debate extensively about the external jurisdiction that bishops possess in their churches, specifically whether they have it directly from God or if it is derived from the Roman Pontiff. It is important to note that it is one thing to question whether this external jurisdiction of bishops is of divine right, and another to question whether they have it directly from God. For no Pontiff, as far as I know, denies that it is of divine right; they all commonly agree that it is of divine right that the Christian Church be governed by bishops who rule particular churches and oversee their external order, such that it is not permissible for the Roman Pontiff to change this order or mode of governance and establish another. But the entire question is whether God willed that bishops receive their jurisdiction directly from Him, as the Roman Pontiff is considered to receive his jurisdiction directly, or mediately through the Roman Pontiff, who alone receives ecclesiastical jurisdiction directly from God and confers it to other bishops according to divine institution.

There are three different opinions on this matter within the Roman Church. The first is held by the most ardent supporters of the Pope, who claim that Christ conferred ecclesiastical jurisdiction on the supreme Pontiff in such a way that there is no jurisdiction in the Christian Church that does not derive from him. They believe that even the apostles did not receive their jurisdiction directly from Christ but from Peter, whom they consider the first Pope. Therefore, bishops today receive their jurisdiction not directly from Christ but immediately from the Pope. This view is taught by John of Turrecremata in Book 2, Chapter 54 of "*Summæ de Ecclesiâ*" and a certain Dominic Jacobaticus in Book 10, Article 7 of "*De concil.*", as cited by Bellarmine in "*De Pontif. Rom.*" Book 4, Chapter 22.

The second opinion is held by Bellarmine himself, as cited in the aforementioned passage, and many others he lists. They admit that the apostles received all their authority and jurisdiction directly from Christ, not from Peter, but they believe that bishops receive their authority and jurisdiction not directly from Christ but from the supreme Pontiff.

However, there are others who teach that all bishops receive their entire jurisdiction, both external and internal, directly from Christ, not from the Roman Pontiff. Just as the apostles received all their jurisdiction directly from Christ, in the same way, in a kingdom, all royal judges, not only the supreme ones but also the subordinate ones, receive their jurisdiction directly from the king, not from higher judges, although they exercise their jurisdiction dependently on them, just as bishops exercise theirs with a certain dependency on the Roman bishop. This is taught by Francisco de Vitoria in the second lecture on the power of the Church, Question 2, and Alfonso de Castro in Book 2, Chapter 24 of "*De justa hereticorum punitione*." Also, Richerius in his booklet on political and ecclesiastical power, and all those who defend the liberty of the Gallican Church and submit the Pope to a general council, share this view.

Our theologians, however, resolve the matter briefly. Since they recognize no head and monarch in the Church other than Christ, they commonly teach that all pastors and ministers of the Church receive all the power they have directly from Christ, although the process of human involvement, by which they are elected and ordained according to Christ's institution, ordinarily concurs.

Chapter IX

On the Temporal Power of the Pope and Other Church Leaders

There are two main questions regarding this power. First, whether the Pope, by virtue of his papacy, has any temporal power. Second, whether the Pope and other church leaders can exercise temporal jurisdiction and wield the temporal sword, even under a different title, that is, whether it is fitting and not contrary to divine institution for one person to be both a political prince and a pastor of the Church.

Regarding the first question, there are various opinions within the Roman Church. First, the canon lawyers, or the doctors and interpreters of canon law, teach that the Roman Pope has the fullest power by divine right over the entire world in both political and ecclesiastical matters. Therefore, they believe the Pope is the temporal lord and monarch of the whole world, having the authority to grant, remove, and transfer kingdoms and principalities directly and absolutely. Among others, Doctor Martha in "*De Jurisdictione*," part 1, chapter 18, number 1, as reported by John Barclay in "*Vindiciæ pro Regibus*," against Bellarmine, chapter 5, paragraph 2, says, "Notwithstanding the previous reasons to the contrary, it is decided in this text that the supreme Pontiff has supreme power in temporal matters, not only with respect to spiritual matters but also

to temporal matters naturally and temporally." And in chapter 20, number 32, "From this follows the intended conclusion: The Emperor has temporal dominion temporally and directly over the whole world, whose quantitative parts are kingdoms and states. But the Emperor receives the exercise of this temporal dominion from the Pope, therefore the Pope has temporal dominion temporally and directly over the whole world." Hostensis, as cited by Bellarmine in "De Pontif." book 5, chapter 1, teaches that with the advent of Christ, all dominion of infidel princes was transferred to the Church and resides in the supreme Pontiff as the vicar of the supreme and true King Christ. Hence, the Pope can rightfully bestow the kingdoms of infidels to whomever he wishes among the faithful. Many Pontifical theologians follow these canonists, notably Augustine Triumphus of Ancona, who in question 22 of "De Potestate Ecclesiæ," as reported by the same John Barclay in the prologue against Bellarmine, asserts that all positive law depends on the Pope, so much so that he can abolish all civil laws in the whole world or in part. He also believes that the whole world is but one principality, the prince being Christ and His vicar, the Pope. Therefore, the Emperor is to the Pope as the procurator to the proconsul, or the proconsul to the Emperor, that is, as the vicar to the one whose vicar he is. In question seven of "De Potestate Papæ," he says that no law or statute of any Emperor, King, or other authority has any force unless confirmed and approved by the Pope's authority. Similarly, Alvarus Pelagius, Bishop of Silves in Spain, who was a penitentiary of John XXII, in "De Planctu Ecclesiæ," chapter 13, teaches the same. Among more recent writers in Rome in this century, Alexander Pesantius, in his book on ecclesiastical immunity and the power of the Roman Pontiff, which he dedicated to Paul V, writes on page 45 of the Roman edition, as reported by Tilenus in his remarks on Bellarmine: "I say that the supreme Pontiff by divine right has the fullest power over the entire world in both ecclesiastical and political matters," and in the margin, it is written, "The Pope by divine right is directly the lord of the world." Bozius also published a book titled "On the Temporal Monarchy of the Church and its Jurisdiction," where he explicitly writes in book 1, chapter 1, that the supreme temporal monarchy of the Church and temporal power are contained eminently, indeed formally and absolutely, within ecclesiastical or spiritual power over all other temporal powers. In book 2, chapter 16, he deduces from the words of Leo IX that the Pontiff has distinctly received the terrestrial kingdom, and absolutely not incidentally, but simply within the spiritual power. See John Barclay against Bellarmine, chapter 5, paragraph 2. The Jesuit Azorius, in "Institutiones Morales," part 2, book 4, chapter 19, similarly concludes: "We conclude that it is indeed the opinion of the interpreters of canon law that the Roman Pontiff has both spiritual and temporal power." Later he says, "I do not agree with the way Victoria and Soto speak (whom Bellarmine follows) because they seem to imply that the Pope has only spiritual power, not temporal, for in canon law it is absolutely and simply said that the Pope has both swords, spiritual and temporal; indeed, by right and possession, although not in use and act except in certain cases."

However, there are also many among the Pontificals who, although they extend the Pope's power to temporal matters, do not approve of the first opinion as too harsh and try to soften its rigor with some distinctions. These first refuse to call the Pope the lord of the entire

world because Christ only entrusted His sheep to Peter, and infidels are not Christ's sheep, nor can church leaders judge infidels, according to the Apostle in 1 Corinthians 5: "What have I to do with judging those outside?" They also believe that infidel princes are true and supreme rulers of their regions, whom the Apostle commands us to obey for conscience's sake, in Romans 13.

They also teach that the Christian world has not desired the Pope to be its temporal lord, but that temporal dominion belongs to Christian princes and kings. They assert that the Pope, as such, does not have any temporal jurisdiction by divine right, at least not directly and per se. Nevertheless, they state that the Pope has temporal power, indeed supreme temporal power, indirectly and consequentially. They argue that for the sake of spiritual good, the Pope has supreme power over the affairs of all Christians. Although pontifical power is in itself primarily spiritual and thus directly concerns spiritual matters as its primary object, it necessarily concerns temporal matters as a secondary object to which this spiritual power applies only in certain cases. To illustrate this, they say that the Pope's spiritual power is to temporal power as the art of riding is to the art of bridle-making. Just as these two arts are distinct, but because the end of one is ordered to the end of the other, one governs and prescribes laws to the other—riding to bridle-making—so although political and ecclesiastical powers seem to be distinct powers, one is subordinate to the other, and political power receives laws from ecclesiastical power, since the end of one is referred to the end of the other. Others use the analogy of the body and soul, saying that just as flesh and spirit have distinct faculties and actions, and can exist separately, as seen in animals and angels, yet when these two are united, as in humans, they are subordinated to each other, with the flesh subject to the spirit. Although the spirit does not meddle in the actions of the flesh but allows it to perform all its actions as in animals, nevertheless, when they hinder the spirit's end, the spirit commands the flesh and punishes it, and, if necessary, imposes fasts and other afflictions, and if the flesh's action is necessary for the spirit's end, even death, the spirit can command the flesh to expose itself. Similarly, political and ecclesiastical powers have different objects and functions and can exist separately, as in the time of the apostles. But when they are united, as now, the inferior is subject to and subordinate to the superior. Thus, spiritual power does not meddle in temporal affairs but allows everything to proceed as before their union, provided they do not hinder the spiritual end or are not necessary for achieving it. If such a case occurs, spiritual power can and must control temporal power by any means necessary.

To better understand the extent and breadth of this indirect papal power over temporal matters, they distinguish between the persons, laws, and judgments of political princes. As for their persons, they teach that the Pope, as Pope, cannot ordinarily depose temporal princes even for a just cause in the same way he deposes bishops, as their ordinary judge. However, he can transfer kingdoms, take them from one and give them to another as the supreme spiritual prince if necessary for the salvation of souls. They believe a prince can harm the salvation of souls if he causes any harm to the Church or violently violates its immunities and rights, or if he falls into heresy or schism, or neglects to eradicate heretics or schismatics, or even if he remains Catholic but abuses his power, is simply unfit to rule, or acts tyrannically against the faithful, endangering

their safety. In such cases, they believe the Pope can depose a king or prince and substitute another, and whether a prince sins and harms the salvation of the faithful is judged by the Roman Pope as the spiritual head of the Church.

Regarding the laws of princes, they say that the Pope, as Pope, cannot ordinarily enact civil laws, or confirm or invalidate the laws of princes, because he is not the political ruler of the Church. However, he can do all these things if a civil law is necessary for the salvation of souls and the kings do not wish to enact it, or if another law is harmful to the salvation of souls and the kings do not wish to repeal it. Whether a law is harmful to salvation or necessary is judged by the Pope, who judges that those laws of princes that seem to violate ecclesiastical rights and immunities in any way harm the salvation of souls.

Finally, regarding judgments, they say the Pope, as Pope, cannot ordinarily judge temporal matters. Nevertheless, in cases where it is necessary for the salvation of souls, the Pope can also assume temporal judgments, especially when there is no one else who can judge, such as when two supreme kings contend, or when those who can and should judge refuse to pass judgment. This is the doctrine of Bellarmine in "De Rom. Pontif." chapter 6 and in his book against Barclay. Many Pontificals follow Bellarmine in this regard.

It should be noted that the indirect power of the Pope over temporal matters, to which they subject princes, also extends, according to their view, to lower magistrates and private persons, who they believe can be deprived of their dignities and fortunes by the Pope, at least indirectly and consequently.

There is disagreement among those who assert this indirect papal power over how far it extends to infidel princes. Martin Becanus, a Jesuit, denies that infidel princes can be deposed by the Pope. His words in "Torfur. torti" paradox seven are: "We admit that Christian kings can be deposed by the Pope if they sin, but not infidels."

Bellarmino, however, in "De Pontif. Rom." book 5, chapter 7, believes that infidel princes can and should be deposed by the Pope and deprived of their dominion if they attempt to turn the faithful subjects away from the faith; but if they do not attempt such things and are not troublesome to the faithful, then they cannot be deprived. In his later writings, he retracts this opinion and extends the Pope's right further: "I do not approve what I said, that infidel princes cannot be deprived by the Church of the dominion they have over the faithful, unless they try to turn the faithful subjects away from the faith." And shortly after, "Therefore, if such princes do not try to turn the faithful away from the faith, they can indeed be deprived of dominion by the Church, but the Church does not always do this."

But in the Roman Church, there is still a third opinion, held by those who deny that the Pope, as such, has any power over temporal matters, whether directly or indirectly. They believe that all the power Christ conferred on the Church is so spiritual that it only concerns spiritual matters, and by that power, church leaders cannot judge temporal matters or impose temporal penalties for any reason. They concede that kings and princes, as far as they are faithful and have pledged to Christ, are subject to the Pope in spiritual matters and things concerning the salvation of the soul, and are bound to observe his decrees in matters of faith, rites, and sacraments. If they sin in these and violate the evangelical law and divine rights, they admit the Pope can rebuke and even punish them, but only with spiritual penalties, such as barring them from the sacraments. But as far as they are kings and princes, they in no way consider them to be under ecclesiastical authority and do not think the Pope has the right to depose them from their principality and kingdom or to interfere in their temporal affairs as if by authority and right. If the Pope attempts such actions, they believe he can be resisted as someone tyrannically invading others' rights, and no obedience is due to him in this matter.

This opinion is defended by William Barclay, a Scot, in a booklet published at the beginning of this century on the power of the Pope, which Robert Bellarmine tried to refute in a singular book titled "*De potestate summi Pontificis in rebus temporalibus*." John Barclay, William's son, defended his father's views in a book he titled "*John Barclay's Devotion or Public and Private Vindication for Kings and Princes and for William his Father against Robert Bellarmine*." The same opinion is briefly explained and defended by Richer, a doctor of the Sorbonne, in the often-cited booklet "*De Potestate Politica & Ecclesiastica*."

The first of these opinions is that of the Popes themselves, who arrogate a certain temporal monarchy to themselves in their rescripts and bulls, which are included in canon law, especially Gregory VII and Boniface VIII, whose authority the canonists and doctors and interpreters of pontifical law rely on to attribute temporal dominion over the whole world to the Pope. Alexander VI used this fictitious right when he divided the New World between the kings of Castile and Portugal by solemn decree, and therefore this opinion is taught in Rome and under the Pope's eyes with great applause.

The second opinion, which denies the Pope's direct power over temporal matters but attributes indirect power to him, is asserted by the majority of Pontifical writers and seems most common in the Roman school. However, it is not free from some envy in Rome, as Bellarmine is said to have been burdened by this in the name of Pope Sixtus V, if we believe John Barclay. Indeed, Alexander Carrerius, a staunch defender of the first opinion, dares to anathematize Bellarmine on this account and include him among impious politicians in "*De Potestate Papæ*" book 2, as reported by Ames in "*Bellarm. enervatus*," where he treats the present question.

The third opinion is held by kings and their senates, judges, and parliaments, especially in France, where Bellarmine's book "*De potestate summi Pontificis in temporalibus*" was

condemned by public judgment of the Parliament and burned by the hand of the executioner. Many theologians, both old and recent, also hold this view, although those who defend the first and second opinions sharply attack the latter and brand it as heretical, calling it the opinion of politicians, as seen in Bellarmine's "De Pontif." book 5, chapter 1, and Baronius in the year 1073, paragraph 13, as reported by Chamier in volume 2, book 15, chapter 1.

Regarding our theologians, they unanimously teach that Christ did not grant any power over temporal matters to His Church, nor can church leaders, by virtue of their office given by Christ, compel people to duty with temporal penalties, or judge and dispose of their temporal affairs in any way. They can only admonish, warn, and act against sinners with ecclesiastical penalties to compel and recall them to duty. All the faithful, of whatever rank and dignity, must willingly submit to this order and discipline. If they are contumacious and refuse to obey church leaders, there is nothing left but to leave them to divine judgment and to procure their conversion as much as possible with prayers to God and persuasions and exhortations to men.

Regarding the second question, whether it is permissible for church pastors and leaders to exercise temporal rule and hold civil office, so that the spiritual and temporal swords are committed to one and the same person, all Pontificals agree that it is entirely lawful and can be done rightly and reasonably for one man to be both the bishop of a city or province and its temporal prince and ruler. Therefore, they believe bishops can, without violating their office and conscience, accept cities and domains from princes or peoples, of which they are the temporal lords and administer not only spiritual matters but also civil rights. They do not consider it blameworthy for the Roman Pontiff to exercise royal and territorial rule over many provinces donated to the Church by kings and emperors, like other temporal princes. Although many Pontificals teach that ecclesiastical and political powers are so distinct that an ecclesiastical leader, as such, by virtue of his office, has no direct or indirect power over temporal matters except by advising, persuading, and teaching what is just and proper, they see no contradiction in both powers being vested in one and the same man and legitimately exercised by him. None of them, as far as I know, holds a different opinion on this matter.

However, not all Reformers speak and think the same on this matter. In many places where the Reformation has taken hold, many temporal domains remain with ecclesiastical persons, and the titles of bishop or archbishop are still joined with some temporal principality or domain, as they were before, such as in Germany and England, where bishops still without scruple take on various civil offices and administrations.

Some of our theologians believe that by divine law, it is not permissible for both the spiritual and temporal swords to be committed to one and the same person. They also consider it inappropriate for Church pastors to hold any earthly principality under any name or title. Therefore, they condemn the Roman Pontiff and the bishops subordinate to him for exercising dominion over many places like secular princes while claiming to be pastors of the Church. This

is the opinion of Calvin in "Institutes," Book 4, Chapter 11, Paragraphs 8, 9, and following: "If we seek Christ's authority on this matter, there is no doubt that He wanted to keep His ministers away from civil domination and earthly rule, as He said, 'The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them, but you are not to be like that.' He means not only that the pastor's office is distinct from the office of the prince, but that they are so separate that they cannot be united in one person." Peter Martyr in his commentary on Romans 13, Ames in "Bellarm. enervatus," and most of our theologians in France, as well as those called Puritans in England, have always taken this view, finding it intolerable for ecclesiastical ministry to be joined with any temporal dominion.

However, some of our theologians use a certain distinction here. Tilenus, in his notes on Bellarmine's "De Pont." Book 5, Chapter 9, distinguishes between two types of principality. He observes that sometimes by "prince" is meant one who acknowledges no superior except God and who is, as he puts it, the direct lord of the territories and peoples he rules. Then, there are those called princes who have authority over others, though not supreme, and hold their power as a benefit or fief from an emperor or king. He also suggests distinguishing between present times, i.e., those of the New Testament, and those before Christ's advent. Whatever may have been the case under the old law, he denies that the prior principality could now, under the New Testament, be united with ecclesiastical ministry in one and the same person, because any church minister must be subject to laws and canons and can appeal to a synod. However, the latter principality, which is not entirely supreme, he contends does not conflict with ecclesiastical ministry. In his notes on the same book, he teaches that it is permissible for bishops and church ministers to possess feudal estates and have some public authority, at least under a pious and Christ-embracing magistrate, provided that the distinctions made by nature itself are maintained and that those who have devoted themselves entirely to Christ are not distracted from divine worship and public ministry by worldly affairs. He adds that a pastor and bishop whose prudence is recognized and proven can be summoned to council by a political prince and can also be granted lands and towns as gifts, which the pastor and bishop can accept from the prince without any prohibition, and he endeavors to confirm his opinion with many arguments.

Franciscus Junius, in his notes on the same Bellarmine text, similarly distinguishes between the times of the ceremonies preceding Christ and those following His coming in the flesh, suggesting that the situation was different under the Law and the Gospel. He then notes that when someone is called a prince, it can be understood either according to dominion or according to administration. An ecclesiastical person can indeed be a prince in terms of dominion, if the dominion belongs directly to him by birth, donation, or similar means, just as someone who is a prince by dominion can become ecclesiastical by God's gift and calling. But he denies that an ecclesiastical person should become a prince by administration, and vice versa, that someone who is a prince by administration and obligated to it should become ecclesiastical unless he renounces political administration. Finally, he states that both political and ecclesiastical administrations should not be united in one person, though he somewhat tempers this opinion by adding, "I do not seek to change what has long been joined by public order: this

is a matter for another place, but I simply contemplate the question and state that these two administrations should not be united in the person who is free to choose either." Christ so established it in Matthew 20, and the Apostle teaches it in 2 Corinthians 2. Who is sufficient for these things? God is a jealous God, and if a minister accepts political principality, he does not understand either the gravity of his ministry or the force of divine jealousy.

Furthermore, the discipline of the French Churches clearly decides this question. In Chapter 1, Article 17, it explicitly forbids church pastors and ministers of the divine word from practicing medicine or law, i.e., from serving as judges, advocates, or doctors, which has often been prohibited in their synods.

Chapter X

On the Antichrist

In Scripture, the name Antichrist is sometimes taken generally for any opponents of Christ and those who corrupt and overthrow Christian doctrine, as when in John's first epistle, chapter 2, it is said, "Even now many antichrists have come." And in the second epistle, "Many deceivers have gone out into the world, who do not confess Jesus Christ as coming in the flesh. This is the deceiver and the antichrist."

Otherwise, the name Antichrist is singularly understood to mean a certain notable adversary of Christ, whom Scripture predicts will come and who, in a particular sense, is given the name Antichrist, above all others who oppose Christ. These words of John in the second chapter of the first epistle should be understood in this way: "You have heard that the Antichrist is coming," and Paul's prediction of this Antichrist's coming in the second chapter of the second epistle to the Thessalonians, where the Apostle calls him "the man of lawlessness," "the son of perdition," and therefore many prophecies about him are found in John's Revelation, where he is described under the name of the Beast.

Regarding this eminent Antichrist, there is a great controversy and a wide divergence of opinions between us and the Doctors of the Roman Church. The Romanists believe that this Antichrist and the Beast mentioned in Scripture refer to a specific and singular man, not a series of men succeeding one another in the same tyranny. They think this man will be a Jew by birth, possibly from the tribe of Dan, who will first entice the Jews by deceit and fraud and then invade their kingdom, establishing his seat in Jerusalem. From there, after conquering several kings through Egypt, Ethiopia, and Africa, he will extend his empire widely over the whole world, forcing the remaining kings to submit to him. They believe this man will be called the Antichrist because he will not indirectly and secretly oppose Christ but will directly and openly set himself against the true Christ, claiming to be the true Christ and the Messiah promised to the Jews. Therefore, he will seek to abolish Christ's doctrine and revive Jewish rites such as circumcision and Sabbath observance, and eventually he will claim to be the sole and supreme God,

demanding to be worshiped as such, especially in the Temple in Jerusalem. Consequently, he will prohibit the worship of the true God and all idols, making his own worship the only one.

To accomplish these heinous acts, he will use the power of the Devil, performing many miracles by his virtue, like making fire come down from heaven, and will thus lead people into astonishment and error. But he will not only use deceit and fraud but also open violence against the true Church of Christ, raising the most savage and severe persecution ever seen and gathering an innumerable army to destroy all the faithful from all nations. However, his army will ultimately be defeated, and he himself will be killed, with God providing help from heaven. They also teach that this immense tyranny of the Antichrist will last no longer than three and a half years, followed immediately by Christ's second and final advent and the consummation of the world. From the death of the Antichrist to Christ's final judgment, they believe there will be only forty-five days, as deduced from Daniel chapter 12. Some, like the Jesuit Ribera who wrote on Revelation, extend this period to seven years. This, in brief, is the picture of the Antichrist as described by the Roman Doctors. However, these are not decreed and defined by the Roman Church but are mostly drawn from the writings of the ancient Church Fathers, who conveyed similar teachings about the Antichrist when interpreting various prophecies about him found in both the Old and New Testaments.

But our theologians and all those called Protestants unanimously teach and affirm that the eminent Antichrist, called the man of sin and the son of perdition by Paul and depicted by John in Revelation under the image of a monstrous beast and the great harlot, does not refer to a single individual but to a series of tyrants oppressing the Church, about whom Scripture speaks in singular number because each one in his time would be a singular tyrant, all claiming the same power in succession and attacking Christ and His Church in the same manner. They infer this from the Apostle's teaching in 2 Thessalonians 2, which not obscurely teaches that this son of perdition will finally be destroyed at Christ's ultimate advent, even though the foundation of his tyranny over the Church was already being laid. "For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work," says the Apostle, and immediately adds, "whom the Lord will consume with the breath of His mouth and destroy with the brightness of His coming." Furthermore, this tyrant is presented in Scripture as one who, at least in name and appearance, will be a Christian, thus not an open enemy of Christ but a hidden one, who will secretly and deceitfully oppose Christ's doctrine and glory while professing to be His disciple and servant. His machinations against Christ and His Church are called a mystery, and in Revelation, the harlot is said to have the word "mystery" written on her forehead, indicating not open force but something hidden and deceitful. The second beast described by John in Revelation 13 is said to have two horns like a lamb but speak like a dragon. It is also deduced from Scripture that this tyrant will usurp authority over the faithful and, as much as possible, subject the Church to himself, for it is foretold that he will sit in the temple of God. The word "sitting" in Scripture usage denotes authority, and by the temple of God, nothing else can be understood but the Church, which is often called the temple and

house of God in the New Testament, under which we recognize no material temple of God as the one in Jerusalem.

Moreover, this son of perdition will not simply oppress the Christian Church with some tyranny but will arrogate to himself God's own rights and will arrogantly claim for himself what belongs to God alone, as the Apostle indicates in 2 Thessalonians 2, saying that he will sit in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God. And this tyrant will not only exercise spiritual tyranny over the Church, according to sacred Scripture, but will also claim temporal power and the right of both swords. For in Revelation 13, the second beast is said to exercise all the power of the first beast, that is, the Roman Empire, and this is what the two horns given to it signify, representing twofold power. Thus, the beast will attack the faithful in two ways, waging war against them both with earthly weapons, as it is said in Revelation 17 that she will be drunk with the blood of the saints, and with spiritual weapons, that is, with false doctrine and seduction, for she is said to deceive the inhabitants of the earth with her false doctrines and false miracles, which are called the signs of falsehood in 2 Thessalonians 2.

Regarding the seat and location of this tyrant, our Doctors argue that it will not be Jerusalem but Rome, based on Revelation 17. For the harlot and woman described there is said to sit upon seven hills; and at the end of the chapter, it is added, "The woman you saw is the great city that rules over the kings of the earth," which can only be interpreted as Rome.

This is, in sum, the idea of the Antichrist that our Doctors derive from Scripture. Furthermore, they claim that everything Scripture teaches about the Antichrist applies to the Roman Pontiff. For he sits in the city of Rome, arrogates to himself dominion over the entire Church, and strives to subject it to himself. He boasts of having the right to both swords and claims supreme authority both in spiritual matters and in temporal ones over the whole world, so much so that he can change and transfer kingdoms. He also professes to be the vicar of Christ and to follow His doctrine, yet in deeds and actions, he opposes Christ by corrupting His doctrine in various ways, nullifying His precepts, and adulterating the true worship of God with various superstitions and idolatrous rites. He usurps divine rights and even exalts himself above God by proclaiming himself the head and spouse of the Church, demanding that his responses be considered as oracles binding the Christian faith. He claims the right to institute new forms of worship and even dispenses men from the divine law and the bond of vows and oaths. Moreover, he tries to confirm his false doctrine with many deceptive signs and performs many lying miracles to deceive the simple people. He adds to these a fierce and savage persecution against the servants of God who oppose his tyranny and the various corruptions of sacred doctrine. He allows himself to be called God by his flatterers and even to be worshiped. Additionally, he revives the image of the former Roman Empire, imitating its pomp and pride in various ways, as foretold in Revelation 13.

From all these things, they conclude that the Roman Pontiff is the notable Antichrist and the son of perdition predicted by John and Paul, a conclusion solemnly defined by all the Reformed Churches of France in 1603 at the Synod of Gap in Dauphiné, which added this article to their confession of faith immediately after the thirtieth article. The article states: "As the Roman Bishop, having erected for himself a monarchy in the Christian world, arrogates to himself dominion over all Churches and Pastors, and is so inflated that he calls himself God and desires to be worshiped, claiming all power in heaven and on earth, disposing of ecclesiastical matters at his will, establishing articles of faith, subjecting the authority of Scripture to his own, interpreting it as he pleases, engaging in the traffic of souls, releasing from vows and oaths, instituting new forms of worship, and trampling upon the lawful authority of magistrates, giving and taking away kingdoms: We believe and assert that he is the true and genuine Antichrist, the son of perdition predicted in the Word of God, the scarlet woman sitting on seven hills, reigning over the kings of the earth. We await the day when God, as promised and already begun, will finally destroy him by the brightness of His coming."

Moreover, it should be noted that when our theologians say the Roman Bishop is the notable Antichrist predicted in Scripture, they do not mean the first bishops of that city, who for several centuries persisted in the true doctrine of Christ, many of whom were very holy men and even martyrs and confessors of Christ. Instead, they refer to the bishops of later centuries, from the time when the Roman See degenerated into open tyranny and fostered many pernicious corruptions in both the doctrine of faith and the discipline and worship of the Church. Indeed, that mystery of iniquity began to work immediately as various abuses gradually crept in, laying the foundations and seeds of future tyranny as some pastors of the Church exalted themselves above others and gradually assumed greater and greater power, especially the Roman bishops. However, it was only after many centuries that this mystery was consummated and the son of perdition revealed, as Paul had predicted. As for the time to which this first revelation of the Antichrist should be referred, there is some disagreement among our Doctors, though most believe it should be referred to the times of the Roman Emperor Phocas, from whom, at the beginning of the seventh century, that is, after the year 600 AD, Boniface III, the Roman bishop, obtained the title of universal bishop and was declared the head of all churches. From that time, they believe the title and reality of Antichrist have been applicable to the Roman bishop. In that revelation of the son of perdition, they note various stages. For his pride and tyrannical power only reached its apex after the middle of the eleventh century during the time of Hildebrand or Gregory VII, who was the first to wield the temporal sword against emperors and involved the Christian world in the most cruel wars by passing a sentence of deposition against Emperor Henry IV. Therefore, they refer a second and more manifest revelation of the Antichrist to the time of this pontiff. However, there is some variety among our theologians regarding these times, which need not be pursued further here.

Moreover, a few years ago, a singular and entirely new interpretation of the Scriptural passages that both our theologians and the Romanists apply to the Antichrist emerged. This

interpretation was proposed by the very learned and famous Dutchman Hugo Grotius, who died as an ambassador of the Queen of Sweden at the court of the King of France. He published an anonymous pamphlet on this subject shortly before 1640. He believed that the man of sin and the son of perdition who opposes and exalts himself above all that is called God or worshiped, so that he sits as God in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God, mentioned by the Apostle in 2 Thessalonians 2:3-4, referred to the Roman Emperor Caligula, who was supremely and openly impious against all deities, both true and false. Caligula wanted to be called a god and attempted to place his statues in the Jerusalem temple, giving orders about this to the governor of Syria, Vitellius, although he could not complete this due to his death. Grotius also believed that the "lawless one," mentioned in the same chapter, verse 6, who will be revealed and whom the Lord will consume with the breath of His mouth and destroy with the brightness of His coming, referred to Simon Magus, who, after associating himself with Christians for a while, later openly revealed his impiety and opposed Christian doctrine with magical tricks and impostures. Regarding Revelation 13, where two beasts are mentioned, the first described as having seven heads and ten horns, and the second with two horns like a lamb and speaking like a dragon, our theologians understand the first to represent the Roman Empire and the second the papal tyranny. However, Grotius thought the first represented Roman idolatry under the pagan emperors, while the second referred to magic, particularly that followed and made famous by Apollonius of Tyana, who is said to have horns like a lamb because Apollonius and others like him professed abstinence in diet and chastity, boasting of these virtues.

Chapter XI

On Elijah and Enoch

In the eleventh chapter of Revelation, there is mention of two witnesses whom God will send against the beast (Antichrist) and who will prophesy for 1260 days, ultimately being killed by the beast but then resurrected and taken up to heaven after three and a half days. The sacred text states in verse 3: "I will give power to my two witnesses, and they will prophesy for 1260 days, clothed in sackcloth." In verse 7, it says, "When they have finished their testimony, the beast that comes up from the Abyss will make war on them, conquer them, and kill them. Their bodies will lie in the street of the great city which spiritually is called Sodom and Egypt, where also their Lord was crucified." And later, "After three and a half days, the breath of life from God entered them, and they stood on their feet, and great fear fell on those who saw them. Then they heard a loud voice from heaven saying to them, 'Come up here.' And they went up to heaven in a cloud."

The question arises as to who these two witnesses are that God will send in the time of the beast, that is, the Antichrist. Most Doctors of the Roman Church believe that these two witnesses are Elijah and Enoch, who were miraculously taken from death and are still preserved alive by God, to oppose the coming Antichrist, to strengthen the elect in their faith in Christ, and finally to convert the Jews. They believe that these two will be killed by the Antichrist, but will rise again after three and a half days by a miracle. They think that Elijah and Enoch are not in the heaven of the blessed, but in some unknown place, which many suspect to be the earthly paradise, where they live a mortal and sensitive life so that they can die in due time. They base this belief on the tradition of many ancient Church doctors and support it with certain scriptural testimonies.

Regarding Elijah, they refer to the passage in Malachi 4: "Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the great and dreadful day of the Lord comes," and to what the author of Ecclesiasticus says in chapter 48: "Who was taken up by a whirlwind of fire... who is written in the judgments of times to appease the wrath of the Lord, to reconcile the heart of the father to the son, and to restore the tribes of Jacob." Their conjecture about Enoch is based on Ecclesiasticus chapter 44 where the Vulgate version reads, "Enoch pleased God and was translated into paradise that he may bring repentance to the nations."

Some of the Romanists, however, do not pair Enoch with Elijah but rather Moses, as Maldonatus the Jesuit writes in his commentary on Matthew 17, a view also held by Gagneus of the Sorbonne, as noted by Diego in his commentary on Revelation 11. They base this on Revelation 11:6 where it is said of the witnesses that they "have the power to shut the sky so that it will not rain during the days of their prophesying, and they have the power to turn the waters into blood and to strike the earth with every kind of plague as often as they desire." These words seem to refer to Elijah, who shut the sky for three and a half years by his prayer, and to Moses, who turned the waters of Egypt into blood and struck the land with many and various plagues.

Our theologians commonly believe that Elijah and Enoch were translated to the heaven of the blessed, where they now enjoy blessed immortality in soul and body, and thus find it absurd to bring them down to be killed by the Antichrist. Therefore, they interpret the two witnesses in Revelation either as the Old and New Testaments, which bear testimony to divine truth, or as the faithful servants of Christ who are raised up and continue to testify against the Antichrist, asserting the truth of the Gospel against his errors and corruptions. Many of these witnesses were killed by the Antichrist, but they seem to rise again in those whom God sends to bear similar testimony. They interpret Malachi's prophecy about Elijah's coming before the great and dreadful day of the Lord as referring to John the Baptist, who came in the spirit of Elijah to prepare the way for the Lord, according to Christ's own interpretation in Matthew 17.

**ELUCIDATION on the State
Of the Controversies ON COUNCILS
BOOK IV.**

**CHAPTER I.
On the Origin, Necessity, and Use of Councils.**

By councils, we mean assemblies of ecclesiastical men who come together to manage ecclesiastical affairs and, having considered various opinions, decide what seems good concerning some controversy that has arisen about religion. These councils are usually distinguished into four kinds: some are General, some National, some Provincial, and some Diocesan.

General councils consist of ecclesiastical men gathered from the entire Christian world. National councils are where delegates from one kingdom or nation meet. Provincial councils are where only the delegates of one province gather. Finally, Diocesan councils are where ecclesiastical men from only one diocese or district meet.

Further, various questions are raised about councils: 1. Where their institution comes from, their use, and necessity. 2. Who should be called to councils and of what kind of people they should consist. 3. Who has the authority in councils. 4. By whom and by what authority councils should be convened. Finally, what is their utility and how great is it. Regarding the origin and institution of councils, the Doctors of the Roman Church do not agree among themselves. For Albert Pighius, in Book 6 of Hierarchy, chapter 1, contends that the institution of councils is entirely human and devised by natural reason, as Bellarmine relates in Book 6 of Councils, chapter 3. But Bellarmine himself, in the cited place, judges more probably that ecclesiastical councils are of divine institution or at least Apostolic since the first council of the Christian Church was held by the Apostles themselves, who with the elders of the Apostolic Church gathered in Jerusalem concerning the question raised about the observation of legal matters, as related in Acts 15.

As for the necessity and use of councils, Bellarmine thus states in Book 1 of Councils, chapter 10. And indeed, as far as general councils are concerned, he considers such convocations very useful and in a certain way necessary, though not simply and absolutely, for just as the Church remained safe without general councils for the first three hundred years after Christ, so it could have remained in subsequent centuries.

However, he believes some councils, whether general or particular, are absolutely necessary for the good governance of the Church: he proves this from the practice of the Apostles and the perpetual custom of the Christian Church. It should be noted that those among the Pontiffs who attribute more to the Pope and wish to place infallibility especially in him, not in the assembly of Church prelates, diminish as much as they can the necessity and use of general synods. But other doctors of the Roman Church, who do not want this infallibility to

reside in the Pope but in the general council of the entire Church, attribute greater necessity to them.

This led to the Council of Constance, which raised the council above the Pope and arrogated infallibility in judgment to the council, not to the Pope, deciding that a general council of the entire Church should be held every ten years.

As for our theologians, they commonly teach that the use of councils descended from the practice of the Apostles and was also indicated by Christ in Matthew 18: "If two of you agree on earth about anything they ask, it will be done for them by my Father in heaven. For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I among them." They also believe that synods of the pastors of the Church are necessary for the preservation and right governance of the Church, especially this necessity is urged and proven with many arguments by the most illustrious Moses Amyraldus in his book written in French about Church governance. However, this is mainly understood about provincial and national synods. Although they teach that a certain general synod of all true Churches of Christ is greatly to be wished for, that illustrious man in chapter 11 of the book just cited intends to prove that a universal assembly of Christian Churches is very necessary and much to be desired, which he shows with many and quite strong reasons. Yet, our theologians seem to believe that particular synods are far more necessary than universal ones since particular synods are more easily held and without them the Church cannot be rightly governed, whereas a general synod can hardly be held and the Church stood safe for many centuries without any such synod, so far they hardly differ from Bellarmine on the necessity of councils.

Further, as Amyraldus contends in his booklet that the use of councils is absolutely necessary for the Church, the famous English theologian Whitaker speaks more leniently about this necessity in Controversy 3 of Councils, question 1, chapter 3. For speaking indefinitely about councils, he indeed teaches that councils are very useful for the Church and contribute much to it, and with Augustine he asserts that their authority in the Church of God is most salutary: yet he denies that they are simply and absolutely necessary, since the faith and the Church can and have remained safe for a long time without them. At the end, he concedes this to Bellarmine and urges with many arguments about universal councils. They are necessary, he says, that is, greatly useful, but we do not think they are simply necessary, for if they had been simply necessary, Christ would have commanded them to be held somewhere, or at least His Apostles would have, which we do not read they did anywhere.

It should be noted that among those who profess the Reformed religion, there are not a few who, as far as the sum of doctrine is concerned, agree with us and approve our confession of faith, yet differ from us concerning Church rites, order, and discipline; especially in England, among these are those called Independents, but they prefer to be called Congregationalists. These men believe that every particular assembly rightly instituted and ordered, as they speak, is a complete and perfect Church composed of its own parts immediately and independently regarding other Churches under Christ alone. Namely, their view is that each assembly of believers is as many republics: each of which has absolute and supreme authority in its own governance under Christ,

so that there is no ecclesiastical authority on earth that can legitimately usurp authority over them. Therefore, they do not want the Church to be governed by Classes and Synods, to which they attribute no right over particular Churches but want each assembly to be an absolute and independent democracy, in which ecclesiastical matters are indeed managed by pastors and elders; but in the presence and oversight of the congregation, which itself has the right to choose, appoint, and ordain pastors and elders as it pleases, without needing to seek help from any synod. However, they do not reject all use of synods, but when disturbances and scandals arise in a particular assembly that it cannot settle and remove, and which rightly offend other Churches, they teach that then, by the law common among Christians of avoiding scandal and not sharing in others' sins, such an assembly is bound to submit to the full and apt examination of neighboring Churches; as I said, by the law of charity and a certain voluntary submission, not because other Churches have any authority and power over that assembly that caused the offense. Therefore, they approve in such a case a convention of pastors and elders from neighboring Churches, who examine and judge the matter at hand and even use censure against the Church that offended others. Indeed, if the matter requires, they pronounce a sentence of non-communication against it and notify other Churches to abstain from communion with it until due repentance is evidenced. They call this a sentence of non-communication rather than excommunication because the latter implies a power they deny can be constituted or given over a particular Church or congregation. The controversy hinges on this: but non-communication is pronounced by equals, those who are equally interested in maintaining or not maintaining communion. Therefore, they admit some synods, but not fixed and regular ones, but occasional and arbitrary according to the nature of the cause, for they believe that fixed and regular synods cannot be admitted without imposing, as they judge, a certain servitude on each Church and establishing some superior power over them. Yet, they warn that no particular Church should arrogate to itself exemption from rendering an account or from the censure of others, whether magistrates above it or neighboring Churches beside it. What they condemn and profess to abhor is the dependence and combination of Churches in synods and the authority of synods over individual Churches, because they believe that each particular Church or congregation is entirely self-governing and has in itself all supreme ecclesiastical power, not subject to another Church, Churches, or their deputies or synods. Therefore, when a synod is convened, it has no proper and direct power over any Church, but can only help the Church with counsel and assistance, and also proceed against the offending Church with censure, not by any superior power, but by collateral and equal judgment.

It should be noted that when our theologians seem to attribute some power to synods over the Churches included under them, they do not mean any commanding power like that of lords and princes over their subjects, but a certain delegated and auxiliary or ministerial power, which they possess by the free and common consent of the Churches, voluntarily subjecting themselves to synods for the necessity of order and edification. Just as in public affairs, by the common counsel of equals, a college is established to which common causes are referred to be handled and decided, which has no power over them except by their choice and mutual consent. Nor do

they believe that Churches have only some precarious power derived from synods, or that they relinquish their power when they convene in a synod and hand it over to it, but each Church retains a certain power immediately received from Christ, by which it can judge matters concerning itself and its members, so that there is no significant contention with us on this point.

However, to make it clearer how and to what extent those called Independents or Congregationalists differ from our theologians on ecclesiastical governance, this difference was expressed in the London Synod of 1647 in three propositions, which ours affirmed, but they denied. 1. The first proposition was that several particular congregations could be under one Presbyterian governance. 2. That it is lawful and consistent with the word of God for there to be a subordination of assemblies: congregational, classical, provincial, and national for the governance of the Church. 3. That it is absolutely required that a singular congregation, which can aptly associate with others, should not arrogate to itself all the power of ordination, which is more extensively detailed in John Hoornbeek's "Summa Controversiarum Religionis," book 10, on the Brownists.

Furthermore, it should be noted that although the use of synods is approved by all our theologians, the use of synods is not the same in all Reformed Churches; for most are governed through synods, as, for example, the French, Dutch, and Scottish Churches, in which synods are regular and ordinary. However, some, such as the German Churches, rarely and infrequently use synods, since the ordinary governance and supreme ecclesiastical power of those churches are not vested in the pastors of the province or district, but in an ecclesiastical senate consisting of a few pastors and the counselors of princes.

CHAPTER II.

Who are to be Called to Councils, and of What Kind of People They Should Consist.

To explain his opinion on this matter, Bellarmine first notes two things to be observed; one is that the entire Church is comprised of four types of people, for, he says, some are clerics, some laypeople, and among the clerics, some are prelates, others non-prelates, likewise among the laity, some are princes, others private individuals. The other is that, for various reasons, some can participate in councils, some as judges who are said to have a decisive vote, others as those who examine difficulties by disputing and are said to have a consultative vote, and others as ministers, such as notaries, custodians, etc. And others to defend the council and ensure that everything inside and outside is peaceful.

Having noted this, he teaches that from the four aforementioned types of people, some can and should be called to the council, but for different purposes and functions. He says that some private laypeople are called, but only for some ministry of the council to which they are necessary or useful, while princes are called to defend the council and later to punish transgressors and the contumacious with corporal penalties as witnesses and connoisseurs of the council's decrees. From the presbyters and other lower clerics, he says some learned men are called to help in disputing or other ministries, and therefore, they can have a vote which he called

consultative. But he contends that only major prelates, that is, bishops, have the right to a decisive vote in both general and provincial councils by ordinary law, although by privilege and custom, this right is also extended to cardinals, abbots, and generals of orders, even if they are not bishops.

Regarding diocesan synods, it is evident from the aforementioned that they consist, according to the opinion and understanding of the Pontiffs, of the presbyters of one bishopric, presided over by a single bishop, but, as stated before, such synods are hardly considered councils.

Furthermore, Bellarmine's opinion is sanctioned and confirmed by the current practice of the Roman Church, especially by the example of the Council of Trent, and most of its doctors adhere to it. However, in the Roman Church itself two centuries ago, a different opinion seemed to prevail among many. For in the Council of Basel, which began in the year 1431, presbyters were admitted to a decisive vote, as Bellarmine himself acknowledges in book 1 of Councils, chapter 15, section 3. Cardinal Louis of Arles, president of the Basel Council, in a certain speech given at that council, as reported by Aeneas Sylvius in book 1 of the Deeds of the Council of Basel, proves with many arguments that not only bishops but also presbyters have, by right, a voice in councils, not only consultative but also decisive and terminating: and he testifies that those presbyters exercised their right in the Council of Constance and previous ones; "the recent memory of the Council of Constance exists where many of us were present, and I too, who was not yet a cardinal nor a bishop but only a doctor, participated and saw without difficulty the lower ones admitted with the bishops to the decision of difficult matters, and it should not shame us to imitate that most grand and holy synod, which both the Council of Pisa and that most extensive Lateran Council followed, in which it is undeniable that presbyters judged with the bishops." He particularly urges the example of the council of Jerusalem in which presbyters or elders convened with the apostles.

As for our theologians, it should be observed that Bellarmine undeservedly attributes to them the teaching that the Church's council consists only of the truly pious and elect. He deduces this from the fact that our theologians hold that only the holy and elect belong to the Church: however, a council of the Church cannot consist only of members of the Church. This is a fallacy based on the ambiguity of the term Church, for the Church is sometimes taken to mean the invisible Church, to which only the holy and elect belong, and sometimes the visible Church, in which many impious and hypocrites are mixed with the saints. Now, the council consists of members of the visible Church, not the invisible, and represents the visible Church, not the invisible.

Therefore, the true opinion of our theologians is that all those who are sent and chosen for that purpose have a decisive vote in councils, for they do not think it right for anyone to intrude into councils without a specific calling for it. They also believe that churches can delegate not only bishops, in the sense the word is taken today, but also any pastors; nor do they want this to be a privilege of pastors, for in our churches, those we call elders, that is, men chosen from the congregation who govern the churches in common counsel with the pastors, are

usually added to the pastors sent to synods, and these are also granted the right to vote in our synods. Furthermore, our theologians believe that churches should be free to send and delegate to councils even private individuals, provided they are pious, learned, and knowledgeable in ecclesiastical matters, and these, in such a case, can give their vote on proposed matters in common with the pastors and elders. This is also taught and believed by Whitaker in *Controversy 3 of Councils*, question 3, the illustrious Moses Amyraut in his *Theses on Councils*, part 2, Wendelin in *Christian Theology*, book 1, chapter 28, thesis 31, Bucanus in place 43, number 23, and Tilenus in *Disputations on Councils*, 1, and many others. Hence, it is evident what the status of this controversy with the modern Pontiffs is, namely, whether only bishops have a decisive vote in councils, which the Pontiffs affirm, or whether the same right belongs to any delegates of the churches, whether they are pastors or from other governors of the Church, or even otherwise private individuals, which our theologians teach.

CHAPTER III

Who Should Preside Over Councils.

According to the opinion of the Pontiffs, diocesan councils are rightfully presided over by the bishop of that diocese; provincial councils by the archbishop or metropolitan of that province; national councils by the primate or patriarch of the nation or kingdom. However, they believe that the right to preside over ecumenical or general councils belongs to the Roman bishop, whether he exercises that function personally or through legates appointed by him. Furthermore, in councils held in the Roman Church during the time when there were multiple antipopes causing turmoil in the Roman Church and thus without their authority, the right to preside was given to the one elected to this function by the unanimous vote of the council.

Regarding our theologians, it should be noted that church governance is not the same everywhere among the Reformed. In some places, bishops distinct from presbyters remained, as in England. Elsewhere, the office of all pastors is considered equal, but for the sake of order, some are placed above others with some authority and are called superintendents, as in Germany and Poland. However, in most of our churches, such as in France and the Netherlands, complete equality is maintained among pastors. Now, where the name and somewhat of the dignity of bishops have remained, there is no doubt that bishops claim for themselves the right to preside over councils above ordinary pastors; and I also think that among those who have substituted superintendents for bishops, something peculiar is also attributed to them in this respect; and in most of our churches where the use of synods is frequent and the aforementioned equality of pastors is maintained, the one who presides over synods is elected to this function by the silent vote of the delegates. The same should undoubtedly obtain in a general synod, if one could be held, as the illustrious Moses Amyraut teaches and proves in his *Theses on Councils*, part 2.

However, some seem to grant this right to the emperor or kings so that they can preside over councils either personally or through delegates appointed by them, if it seems good to them: these are the words of Whitaker in "*On Councils*," question 4, chapter 1. Our opinion, he says, is

that the whole matter of who should preside over the council is placed at the discretion of the emperor and kings or the council itself. If the emperor is present, we contend that he is supreme, and therefore he can preside either personally or delegate this to another, placing someone else in his place, whether a bishop or a man of consular rank, or finally committing the whole matter to the council and leaving it to their discretion to choose a moderator. Bucanus agrees in book 43, part 23, where he expressly teaches that the chief magistrate should preside over synods either personally or through others whom he pleases to appoint, provided he is a Christian or a tolerator of the Christian religion.

Some, however, speak more distinctly and, in my opinion, more appropriately on this matter, distinguishing between a political president and an ecclesiastical president. The former is either the political prince himself or someone appointed by him for this purpose; the latter is chosen from among the ministers of the church who are elected to this by the votes of their brethren. Thus, Tilenus in "On Councils," disputation 1, thesis 10 and 11, says it is wrong to seek any other supreme president of the council than Christ. The ministerial president is twofold, ecclesiastical and political. The former, elected by the votes of his brethren, submits questions to the council, moderates the discussion and debate, asks for opinions, records the decrees through notaries, and takes care of anything else of that sort. The political president's duties are to call and convene the council, protect it when convened, prevent both external and internal violence and disorder, ratify the legitimate decrees confirmed by the subscriptions of the delegates, and establish them with his own authority in the domain he governs.

Therefore, the question between us and the Pontiffs regarding councils, especially universal ones, is whether the Roman Pontiff should preside over them in ecclesiastical matters, or rather the one who is designated and elected by the council itself. The Pontiffs affirm the former, while our theologians affirm the latter.

CHAPTER IV. Who Should Convene Councils?

According to the Pontiffs, diocesan councils should be convened by the bishop of that diocese, provincial councils by the archbishop or metropolitan of that province, and national councils by the primate or patriarch of the nation or kingdom. However, they hold that the duty of convening general councils belongs to the Roman Pontiff, though another may also call a council with the Pope's consent. Moreover, it is sufficient if the Pope later ratifies and confirms the convocation; and if neither the Pope calls the council nor anyone else by his mandate or consent, nor does he at least approve the convocation, then the doctors of the Roman Church, or most of them, consider it not a council but a conciliabulum, as can be seen in Bellarmine's book 1 on councils, chapter 12.

Regarding the convocation and convening of councils, our theologians do not all speak in the same way; some seem to refer the entire authority of convening and calling councils to temporal princes, at least if they are Christians. Thus, Whitaker, in his book on councils, question

2, chapter 1, says, "We say that councils should not be convened by the Pope, but by the emperor and other Christian princes, and this authority should be attributed to them." Similarly, Tilenus in the thesis cited in the previous chapter, where he asserts that the political president's role is to call and convene the council.

Similarly, Wendelin in his "Christian Theology," book 1, chapter 28, thesis 31, article 4, responding to the question of who has the power and authority to call councils, especially universal or ecumenical ones, says, "We say this power belongs to the Christian political magistrate, that is, the emperor, kings, princes, etc." But Bucanus, in book 43, part 23, responding to the question of who should convene or call synods, says, "By the supreme magistrate, if he is faithful or a tolerator of the Christian faith, who should preside over the synod either personally or through others whom he pleases to appoint; but if the magistrate is unfaithful," he explains what should be done in this case with these words, "then it is the duty of the pastors, as much as lies in them, to see that the Christian Church suffers no harm, and to mutually encourage each other to convene in a common council, without the preeminence of seats, those who are known to excel in doctrine, integrity of life, and other gifts of the Holy Spirit, not excluding even laypeople."

The most excellent and most reasonable explanation of this matter, however, seems to be given by the illustrious Moses Amyraut in his often-cited theses on councils, part 2, thesis 22, to the end. Therefore, in thesis 23, he teaches that particular churches, which are united as if by a confederation, have the right to convene their own assemblies, define the regular times for their meetings, and choose from among themselves those who have the right to call a common council. This office can either be assigned to a particular church or rotate among all the churches of the district, as is the practice in the French churches; just as in particular churches it is their right to establish their own senate and council, determine the fixed times for its meetings, and grant the authority to convene it to those who comprise it, whether one person always has this power or it is shared among several in turns. He adds that what is thus used in diocesan or provincial synods should also apply to national councils because the relationship of a provincial assembly to individual churches is the same as that of a national council to individual provinces or dioceses, which are similarly united by a common bond.

As for a universal synod, he not only refutes those who assign the right of calling it to the Roman Pontiff but also those who assign it to the emperor or any political power, if the matter is considered in itself and strictly. For, he says in thesis 28, lesser magistrates do not usually arrogate to themselves the power to order the consistory of particular churches or to convene diocesan or provincial synods, but leave this power to the churches themselves, as if it properly pertains to them; similarly, emperors should not claim for themselves the right to convene universal councils by their command. Just as a religious society does not assume the power to call councils or assemblies in democracies or senates in aristocratic republics, or sometimes estates and orders in monarchies, but allows it to be done by those to whom the political authority has granted this power, so political power should not assume for itself the right to convene councils but should permit it to the religious society.

To explain this matter more distinctly, he says the Church, which is a religious society, can be considered either separately or as having something in common and connected with a political society. In the former way, the Church must be considered when it is hidden or dispersed or simply tolerated in a republic or kingdom that is alien to it. In the latter way, when the political magistrate is faithful and Christian, so that the Church and the republic consist of the same persons considered in different ways. And indeed, if the Church is considered separately and by itself, he teaches, as already explained, that not only does each particular church have the right to convene its own senate, that is, council, but also several churches can lawfully convene in provincial or national synods or even all in universal councils through ecclesiastical men delegated by the churches or individual provinces or nations, although this can hardly be done without the knowledge and consent of the political power.

If, however, the Church is considered not precisely in itself but as having something in common with and connected to a political society, this illustrious man makes another distinction. For, according to his opinion, if the Church properly performs its duty and holds its assemblies and councils in the orderly manner instituted and as required and demanded by the common good, then the political power should do nothing to interrupt this common and legitimate way of providing for edification, nor should it interfere in ecclesiastical matters whose administration God has entrusted to the Church itself. But if the rulers of the Church allow the doctrine and discipline of the Church to collapse and be corrupted, and neglect to convene councils that would repress and dispel evils that have crept into the Church, then the political magistrate, whoever he may be, has the power and right not only to exhort and impel the ministers of the Church to their duty but also to do himself what he cannot persuade others to do by his exhortations. Thus, he can not only convene councils in his domain but also solicit other high magistrates and princes by letters and legations to lend a hand to the edification of the Church from all places if possible. In this respect, he says, he does not intrude into the office of the pastors; for after the council is convened, he does not take over its governance to rule by command or intrude into the harvest of another, but only ensures that they perform their duty and serves the common good.

Furthermore, it is evident from what has been said what the state of controversy between us and the Pontiffs is regarding the convocation and convening of councils. For the Pontiffs attribute the power of convening a general council properly and by ordinary right to the Pope, while particular councils are attributed to bishops, archbishops, primates, and patriarchs. Some of our doctors, however, attribute this right rather to the political magistrate, while others attribute it to the churches themselves or to the rulers of the churches in common, although where things can be done peacefully and in order, nothing should be done in this matter without the consent and permission of the magistrate.

Incidentally, note that Bellarmine is mistaken when he affirms in book 1 of councils, chapter 22, that it is agreed between us and the adversaries that diocesan councils should be convened by the bishop, provincial councils by the archbishop, and national councils by the patriarch or primate, citing Calvin as a witness in Institutes book 4, chapter 7, section 8. For Calvin in that place merely recounts what was formerly done in this matter, not what should be

done; and since Calvin himself and the vast majority of our theologians have considered that hierarchical order of bishops, archbishops, primates, and patriarchs should be eliminated from the Church as tyrannical, it is clear that they are far from the opinion attributed to them by Bellarmine.

Moreover, it should be noted that the doctors of the Roman Church agree, as already stated, that properly and by ordinary right, the Roman Pontiff has the power to convene and call a general council. However, they question among themselves whether it is permissible for a council to be convened by someone other than the Pope when it is necessary for the Church, and yet the Pope either does not want to call it or should not; should not because he is a heretic or schismatic, or cannot due to death, captivity, insanity, or resignation. Turrecremata, as reported and approved by Bellarmine in book 1 of councils, chapter 14, responds that it is scarcely possible for a council to be necessary and yet the Pope unwilling to call it; but if this happens, the Pope can then be considered suspect of heresy, and the matter can be handled as if the Pope were a heretic.

If, however, the Pope is a schismatic or heretic, or due to death, insanity, or another case, cannot call a council, Bellarmine responds that a true and perfect council, which has the authority to define questions of faith, cannot be convened at that time because the Church would then be without a head in whom that authority chiefly resides. However, an imperfect council, sufficient to provide for the Church regarding its head, can be convened. Such an imperfect council can be convened by the College of Cardinals, and bishops can also convene in one place by themselves without the convocation and command of the Cardinals.

However, those Pontiffs who place the council above the Pope would say that the Church can then convene itself and even constitute a perfect council, which would have the power to define anything. This power was exercised by the Council of Constance, which deposed three pontiffs before electing a new one, and in this manner, to demonstrate its power, decreed that communion should be administered under one kind only.

CHAPTER V.

On the Authority of Councils, What It Is and How Great.

The Pontiffs note that the authority of councils can be considered in two ways:

1. Absolutely and in itself.
2. Comparatively to the authority of Sacred Scripture and the authority of the Roman Pontiff.

Therefore, they first inquire what and how great the authority of councils is in itself; then whether that authority is greater or lesser than the authority of Scripture and the authority of the Roman Pontiff.

Regarding the first, the question is whether the authority is such that councils are entirely immune from error and necessarily bind the faith of Christians. Here the Pontiffs distinguish:

1. Between particular councils, whether provincial or national, and general or ecumenical councils.

2. Between councils confirmed by the Roman Pontiff and those not yet confirmed.

And indeed, all Pontiffs agree that ecumenical councils confirmed by the Roman Pontiff cannot err at all, either in faith or morals, and this is held by them as a dogma of Catholic faith, which no one can deny without falling into heresy. However, they do not all agree whether particular councils confirmed by the Roman Pontiff can err in matters of faith and morals. For those who contend that the Roman Pontiff is not free from error in judging matters of faith and morals also teach that a particular council, no matter how much it is confirmed by the Roman Pontiff, can be subject to error, since such a council is not infallible by itself, nor can the Roman Pontiff confer infallibility on it which he himself does not have. However, all those who believe that the Roman Pontiff cannot err when teaching the Church publicly in matters of faith and morals also believe that any council confirmed by him cannot err in these matters; for if the Pontiff cannot err, certainly neither can a council, however small, approved by him.

The latter opinion is more accepted in the Roman Church today, and Bellarmine follows it, who does not dare to consider heretical those who teach that particular councils confirmed by the Roman Pontiff can err, but he asserts that such a teaching is rash, erroneous, and close to heresy.

It should be noted that the question, whether a council confirmed by the Roman Pontiff can err, if the words are taken literally, is not free from absurdity. For since a council is not confirmed by the Pope until it has been held and completed, and thus no longer exists, to ask whether a council confirmed by the Pope can err is the same as asking whether a council that does not exist and decides on nothing can err. Therefore, when they ask whether it is certain that a council confirmed by the Pope has not erred and whether its decrees must necessarily be believed, the question should rather be posed as, whether the Pope can err in judging whether any council has erred or not. For the question is not so much about the councils, but rather about the infallibility of the Pope.

To understand properly how much the Pontiffs attribute to councils, we must consider them in two ways:

Before they are confirmed by the Roman Pontiff, that is, while they still stand and are not dissolved and can judge and decide on proposed matters. And indeed, all doctors of the Roman Church unanimously concede that any particular council, whether national or provincial, which is not general and ecumenical, before the confirmation of the Pontiff, can be subject to error even in matters of faith, and cannot make anything certainly to be believed. However, they hold such councils to be of great authority, so that it is rash to contradict them, and private individuals are bound to acquiesce to their judgment until the Apostolic See or a universal council judges otherwise, as can be seen in Bellarmine's book 2, chapter 10 on councils.

But whether universal councils can err before the confirmation of the Pontiff is a matter of controversy among the doctors of the Roman Church. For many of those who place the council above the Pope, and do not want the Pope's judgment to be entirely infallible, attribute this infallibility to councils, and teach that legitimate general councils cannot err even before the confirmation of the Pontiff. This opinion was formerly that of the theologians of Paris, and many of them still hold it today, and two hundred years ago, at the time of the Councils of Constance and Basel, it was commonly held in the Roman Church.

On the other hand, others teach that councils, no matter how general and legitimate, can still err in defining matters before the confirmation of the Pope. This was the opinion of Cardinal Cajetan and Cardinal Turrecremata, as reported by Bellarmine in book 2 of councils, chapter 11, and it is held by most of those who flatter the Pope and elevate his authority above the council, and is thus almost the common opinion of the monks. Bellarmine, however, explains his opinion more distinctly and notes that it can happen in four ways that a general council's definition is made:

1. That the Fathers agree and decide with the legates of the Roman Pontiff dissenting.
2. That they decide with the legates agreeing, but acting against the instructions of the Pontiff.
3. That all agree, including the legates, but they did not have certain and particular instructions.
4. That all agree, including the legates, who follow the particular instructions they have from the Pope.

If the council decides in the first and second ways, Bellarmine boldly affirms that such a council can err and condemns the contrary opinion. About the third way, he says the matter is subject to opinion, that is, it is permissible to opine either way, and he himself thinks the council can err, and its judgment is not infallible before the Pope's confirmation. But in the fourth way, namely, if the council defines something not only with the legates agreeing but also following the particular instructions they have from the Pope, Bellarmine says there is hardly any doubt that such a council is free from error, and it seems certain to him that such a council cannot err, which words sufficiently imply that some of his own disagree, and it is not considered an established truth in the Roman Church.

From these it can be inferred that a great part of the doctors of the Roman Church indeed transfer all infallibility from the council to the Roman Pontiff, since, in their opinion, it is not absolutely certain and to be held as an article of faith what is defined by a council, however general, before the confirmation of the Roman Pontiff; but it must be accepted with all obedience of faith what any particular council has defined, provided it is confirmed by the Roman Pontiff.

But there are today some doctors of the Roman Church who neither want the Pope to be infallible in himself if he defines something without a general council, nor do they want a universal council to make anything certainly to be believed before the Pope's consent and confirmation, but then only something in the Church is certain and to be held as an article of faith, when the Pope and the council agree on it; for they do not place infallibility in the head of

the Church nor in the body separately, but in both, that is, in the head and the body joined and taken together.

It should be noted that when the Pontiff doctors attribute infallibility to councils, however considered, and assert that they cannot err, they do not mean absolute infallibility, as if nothing false or deviating from the truth could be in such councils, and their judgment could never depart from what is right and just.

For they distinguish between matters of fact and particular matters and matters of law and common to the whole Church. In particular matters and matters of fact, they all willingly concede that no councils can be free from error and fallibility; whatever infallibility there is in them, they restrict to dogmas of faith and laws or decrees on morals, which are necessary for salvation.

They distinguish between the acts of councils taken generally and the decrees or canons of councils. For in the acts of councils there are many disputes and various things are brought up for the illustration and proof of the dogmas discussed in them. They do not think that all these things oblige the faith of Christians, and they admit that some error can be found in them, but they assert that only the canons formally sanctioned in councils and their bare decrees are free from error.

Moreover, even among the decrees of councils, they distinguish, for they teach that some councils sometimes define not as absolutely certain and necessarily to be held, but only as probable, in which case, evidently, their decrees do not bind faith, and falsehood can be present in the defined matters. Sometimes, however, councils declare and define those things which pertain to faith, and which one cannot reject without sinning against the Christian and Catholic faith: and in this, they particularly hold that councils cannot err. If someone asks how it can be discerned whether a decree of a council is proposed as a matter of faith or not, they respond that this is known from the words of the council. For then, they say, councils always declare that they are explaining the Catholic faith, or that those who think otherwise are to be considered heretics, or most importantly, they pronounce that those who hold and think otherwise are to be excluded from the Church, and they say Anathema to them. But when nothing of this sort is observed in the decrees of councils, according to the doctors of the Roman Church, it is not certain that it is a matter of faith. Moreover, even when councils decree and define something as a matter of faith, the Pontiffs note that in their decrees, not the words but only the meaning pertains to faith. For, they say, it is not heretical to say that some word in the canons of councils is superfluous or not rightly placed, unless perhaps a decree has been formed about that very word, as when it was decreed in the Council of Nicaea that the word *ὁμοούσιον* (homoousion, consubstantial) should be accepted, and in the First Council of Ephesus, *Θεοτόκον* (Theotokos, Mother of God).

Thus indeed do the doctors of the Roman Church think about the authority of councils considered absolutely; but if councils are compared with Sacred Scripture, then a new question arises, namely, how great is their authority in this respect, whether it is greater or lesser than the authority of Scripture.

Many of the Pontiffs do not hesitate to say that Sacred Scripture depends on the authority of the Church or council for us, and thus the authority of the Church and councils is greater, at least for us, than the authority of Scripture. There is a serious controversy about this between our theologians and the doctors of the Roman Church, especially Thomas Stapleton, who has dealt extensively and accurately with this question in all his works. Bellarmine, however, raises no dispute with our theologians on this point, and he seems to have felt that there is no special controversy on this matter; indeed, he does not obscurely disapprove, at least of the mode of speaking, of not a few of his own, such as Eckius' statement that "Scripture is not authentic except by the authority of the Church," and that of Peter Charron in the third truth, chapter 2, "It is the Church which acknowledges, authorizes, and governs Scripture." Likewise, "Scripture has no authority, weight, or force over us and our belief, except insofar as the Church has said and declared it." For in book 2 of Councils, chapter 12, he says, "Catholics do not subject Sacred Scripture to councils, but place it before them, and there is no controversy on this point; if sometimes some Catholics say that Scripture depends on the Church or council, they do not mean in terms of authority and in itself, but in terms of explanation and for us." And later he observes that there are many differences between Sacred Scripture and the decrees of councils, from which it is understood that Scripture is placed before councils. With these words, he clearly teaches that he acknowledges the authority of Scripture to be greater than the authority of councils.

Furthermore, between Scripture and the decrees of councils, he notes five differences, which, when considered, make it easier and clearer to understand what and how much the Pontiffs attribute to councils, and what they think about their authority compared to the authority of Sacred Scripture.

First, it is clear that Scripture is the word of God immediately revealed and written in a way dictated by God. Indeed, to the sacred authors either new and previously unknown things were revealed by God, or at least God directly inspired them, moved them to write what they saw or heard, and guided them so they would not err in any way. But councils neither have nor write immediate revelations or words of God; they only declare what is written or handed down word of God, and how it should be understood, and additionally deduce conclusions from it by reasoning.

Second, from this first distinction arises the second, which is that the sacred writers did not have to labor much in publishing their books. Their work seemed to consist in writing or dictating what the spirit suggested; if they published prophecies, they brought forth new mysteries, or at most recalled to memory what they had seen and heard, and thought about the words with which to write these things, if they wrote histories, letters, or something similar. But the fathers in councils must seek the matter itself, that is, investigate conclusions by disputing, reading, and thinking.

Third, there can be no error in Scripture, whether it concerns faith or morals: whether something general and common to the whole Church is affirmed, or something particular and pertaining to one individual only: but it is otherwise with councils, as has been observed before.

Fourth, in Scripture not only the sentences but also all the individual words pertain to faith, for we believe that no word in Scripture is placed in vain or incorrectly; but, as stated before, the pontiffs acknowledge that the matter is far different in councils.

Fifth, Scripture does not need the Pope's approval to be authentic; but only Bellarmine, to make its authority known; but even general and legitimate councils are not ratified unless confirmed by the Pope; and thus he compares the authority of Scripture with the authority of a council, and seems to attribute greater authority to Scripture than to a council, contrary to what other Doctors of the Roman Church do.

But among them, there is a much greater controversy about the comparison of the power of councils with the power of the Roman pontiff, for some exalt the Pope above the council, while others maintain that greater power resides in the council than in the Pope, and hence argue that the Pope must be subject to the general council and receive laws from it.

Therefore, many in the Roman Church profess that the Roman Pontiff is indeed the head of the Church instituted by Christ, but only a ministerial head, which is superior to individual Christians and individual Churches if taken separately but not to the whole Church taken together and gathered. For they believe that Christ immediately granted to the Church itself all the spiritual power by which the Church is governed, so that this power perpetually remains in the Church and can never be taken away from it; but because the Church cannot always remain congregated and exercise this power by itself, Christ instituted the supreme Pontiff as a general instrument for all the actions of the Church, and to exercise this supreme ecclesiastical power over individual believers and individual Churches on behalf of the whole Church; hence it follows that this power is principally and more immediately in the Church than in the supreme Pontiff, so that if the Pontiff is deposed, or dies, or refuses to fulfill his office and care for the Church, the Church lacks no power and can perform by itself and without the Pontiff whatever it ordinarily performs through or with the Pontiff. Finally, they believe the Pope in the Church is what the Doge is in the Venetian Republic, or the general master in some monastic order. For it is clear that the Doge is above individual magistrates, senators, and Venetian cities, but not above the whole Senate collectively; and when the Doge dies, it is certain that all ducal authority is in the Senate. Similarly, the general master is above individual monks of his order, even priors and provincials, but not above the general congregation to which he must obey, not command. Moreover, since an ecumenical council represents the universal Church, and whatever rights and powers the Church has are considered to be in the council gathered from the whole, they believe the supreme power of ecclesiastical governance to be in the council in a more eminent way than in the supreme Pontiff, who is, as it were, an instrument of the council, procuring the execution and observance of what has been decreed and ordained in councils by the universal Church. Hence, they conclude that the Pope is bound by the decrees of councils, and that the laws established by a council bind the Pope, and that the Pope cannot by his own authority alter the laws established by councils, although as the general master of the Church he can dispense in them; but so that if he acts less rightly in this, he must give an account to the council.

If the Pope neglects his office and is carried away by some effect and refuses to fulfill his part in a general council, they think the council can still do all that it could with the Pope present and presiding, namely to define what pertains to faith, to establish laws and decrees concerning morals, to grant indulgences, and such things. Therefore, they attribute jurisdiction over the Pope to the general council, so that it can summon the Pope to trial, and if there is a just cause, depose him from the Papacy, and punish him according to his merits. This opinion was commonly held in the Roman Church two centuries ago and was very famous, as is evident from the most famous writers of that time, whom Bellarmine attests were in this view in his work "On Councils" Book 2, Chapter 14, where he attributes this opinion to Cardinal Cameracensis, Cardinal Cusanus, Cardinal Florentinus, Tostatus, Abulensis Bishop, also Panormitanus, Gerson, and Almainus. The theologians of Paris especially defended and were steadfast in this opinion, and many of them still hold it today, and certainly it should carry the greatest weight among the Pontiffs. Two of their councils solemnly defined this supremacy of councils over the Pope, namely the Council of Constance, which Pope Martin V confirmed, and later the Council of Basel.

However, still today, there are two other opinions in the Roman Church on this matter. Some interpreters of canon law, the authors of the gloss added to canon law, according to Bellarmine, believe indeed that the Pope is above the council and cannot be judged by anyone against his will. However, they think that he can subject himself to the council and give it power over himself, and if this happens, he must submit to the council's judgment, even if it concerns his deposition.

But Bellarmine and many others, who are more devoted to the Pope, teach and believe that the supreme power of ecclesiastical governance was not given by Christ to the Church itself but immediately to the supreme Pontiff, whom Christ constituted as the head and shepherd of his Church in such a way that he is not only superior to individual Christian Churches but also to the entire universal Church, or council that represents the Church. Therefore, outside the Pope, there is no supreme and spiritual power by which matters of faith can be defined without danger of error, and laws binding the whole Church can be established. They say that the supreme Pontiff is simply and absolutely above the whole Church and general council, so that he recognizes no judge above himself on earth, and that the council has no right to judge the Pope, to depose him, or to punish him in any way, no matter how much he neglects his office. They also say that the Pope is so superior to the council that even in a general council, which the Pope presides over either in person or through legates, nothing can be defined without his consent. They do not want the authority of the council to be greater, even intensively, than that of the Pope alone; or they want the Pope alone to have equal authority with the council he presides over; hence they say that the Pope cannot be judged or condemned by such a council, nor can its decrees bind him coercively but only directive, and he can dispense with and alter them, except for decrees of faith which are immutable, because an equal does not have power over an equal, as can be seen in Bellarmine, "On Councils," Book 2, Chapter 13 and following.

Bellarmino considers this opinion almost a matter of faith, because of the definition of the last Lateran Council under Leo X, which established that the Roman Pontiff has authority over all councils. It should be noted that those who exalt the Pope so much above the council that they deny the Pope can be judged by the council, do not deny that when the Pope is accused of heresy or infidelity, the council can examine the Pope's case and declare him outside the Church, and thus condemn him if he is indeed found to be a heretic or infidel. But Bellarmine and others argue that this is not properly judging and punishing the Pope because he who is a heretic and infidel, even if he is considered Pope, is not really Pope; he is outside the Church and therefore cannot be its head. Thus, before any judgment of the Church, the Pope who becomes a heretic, according to their view, ceases to be Pope: nor does the council that declares him a heretic depose him from the Papacy; it only declares that he has fallen from the Papacy, as can be seen in Bellarmine, "On the Roman Pontiff," Book 2, Chapter 30.

Then, they distinguish between true and certain Popes and doubtful Popes, such as during a schism when multiple people at the same time claim to be the supreme Pontiff and act as such. They say that a doubtful Pope is considered as not a Pope, and thus a council can depose the Pontiff during a schism and provide the Church with someone who is a true and certain Pope.

Finally, if a Pope harms the Church by his example and scandal, and attempts things that lead to the Church's destruction, they say that such a Pope cannot be judged and deposed, but he can be resisted with force and arms. Bellarmine says it is permissible to resist the Pope with force and arms if he seeks to destroy the Church: for resisting and repelling force with force does not require any authority (Book 2, "On Councils," Chapter 19, paragraph "Refpondeo non mirum," etc.).

Regarding our theologians, they unanimously teach that since there are no longer men like the apostles in the Church, each pastor of the Church, without exception, including even the Roman bishop, is subject to the assembly or council of pastors, not only of the whole world but also of their own province and the churches to which they belong and of which they are members. Therefore, they consider the authority of a council to be greater than the authority of any pastor among those who belong to the council, or the churches from which the council is composed.

Moreover, our theologians also agree that the authority of no council can be equated with the authority of Scripture, nor does the authority of Scripture, either in itself or concerning us, depend on the authority of any council; indeed, it can be known without any council's declaration, and therefore the authority of Scripture is not only greater in itself but also more certain and known to the faithful than the authority of any council.

Furthermore, our theologians recognize that legitimate Church councils not only have the right to establish things concerning Church discipline and order and various circumstances of divine worship, but also to declare and teach with particular authority the things that pertain to the doctrine of faith, just as the Doctors of the Roman Church also attribute great authority to particular councils in this matter, although they do not believe they are free from the risk of error.

Indeed, they acknowledge that those councils which are truly gathered in the name of Christ, that is, which seriously and diligently fulfill the condition included in those words, "gathered in the name of Christ," while putting aside human affections and solely and earnestly seeking the truth in the word of God handed down through the Prophets and Apostles, and invoking the help of the divine spirit with prayers and ardent supplications, they acknowledge, I say, that those councils have Christ so present that they cannot fall into any pernicious error. But just as we can safely and certainly judge no visible assembly of pastors whether it has truly fulfilled the condition Christ requires of those who wish to be gathered in his name, so they also think that there is no council, however general and numerous, of which we can state and say that it cannot err and necessarily bind the faith of Christians, and therefore what is concluded and defined in one council can be subjected to examination in another council.

In the meantime, however, they believe much deference should be given to the authority and definition of a council until it is otherwise decided by a subsequent council. On this matter, our most famous and venerable colleague Peter Molina in his book written in French "On the Judge of Controversies," Chapter 11, where these are his words: "What is decided in one council can be reviewed and examined by another. However, until it is otherwise ordained, pastors of the churches are bound to teach accordingly."

This is the very authority we have previously reported to be attributed to particular councils by the Doctors of the Roman Church.

But this is more distinctly explained and taught by other of our theologians. They distinguish between those things which are necessary for salvation and pertain to the foundations of faith, and are clearly and openly placed in the Scriptures, and those things about which Christian theologians dispute among themselves, and which sacred Scripture does not present as clearly and evidently as the former, and therefore are such that if someone does not think rightly about them, they do not thereby overthrow the foundation of faith, nor are they excluded from the hope of salvation on that account. In the former, if a council errs, our Doctors openly state that it must be opposed, and no regard should be had for it.

But regarding the latter matters, if it happens that a Synod errs in them, the consciences of the faithful are not bound by it, so that they can retain the true opinion among themselves and defend it by appropriate means; but they must proceed cautiously and prudently in this and beware of stirring up disturbances in the Church; and while we want to defend the opinion which appears truer to us, we must not destroy all the authority of councils and create some scandal, and therefore there is a need for much modesty and patience until a remedy can be applied by another council.

Similar teachings are found in the illustrious man Moses Amyraldus in his Theses on the Authority of Councils, where he not only teaches how much we should defer to councils but also how much they should arrogate to themselves; namely, they should commend and urge those things necessary for salvation and clearly taught in Scriptures and which agree with spiritual ministry, to those who recognize their authority; but they should be careful not to rashly define those things which can safely be left in doubt, nor impose as certain those things which are

obscure and uncertain; indeed, they should not urge even true but less necessary things untimely and too imperiously, and never try to overwhelm dissenters with their own authority, but rather convince them with evident truth and reasons derived from the word of God.

Moreover, when the Pontiffs say that the decision of a national or provincial council should be accepted until otherwise defined by that council or the Roman Pontiff, I think they will easily admit a similar distinction between well-explored articles of faith and those things that are doubtful among the Christian people, and explain their opinion in such a way that a council should be accepted to the extent that it does not define anything contrary to the well-explored articles of faith, but leaves a doubtful and uncertain matter in doubt.

So here the only proper question is about the authority of a general council, whether it is so great that it cannot err and necessarily obliges the faithful to believe, which all our theologians simply deny; but the Pontiffs all affirm, if such a council has been confirmed by the Pope, and many even without such confirmation.

**ELUCIDATION OF THE STATUS Of Controversies
ABOUT THE CHURCH MILITANT,
BOOK V**

**CHAPTER I
On the Nature and Definition of the Church**

The term "Church" originates from the Greek word ἐκκλησία, meaning "to call out." Among the most perfect writers, it signifies generally any assembly, that is, a gathering of people convened in any manner. Even in the Acts of the Apostles, it is used to describe a confused multitude of Ephesian people who, recklessly responding to the seditious cries of a certain Demetrius, came together tumultuously, as seen in the same book, chapter 19, where the sacred historian, speaking of the Ephesians tumultuously shouting, "Great is Artemis of the Ephesians," says that the assembly was confused, and later, the town clerk dismissed the assembly.

However, with the exception of this one instance, the writers of the New Testament use the term "Church" only in a sacred sense, and by the "Church of God," simply put, they mean a certain religious society peculiarly consecrated to God and Christ, which God Himself calls to eternal salvation and happiness. There is frequent and notable mention of this in Scripture, and various accolades are attributed to it, such as when it is called the house of God, the bride of the Lamb, the body of Christ, and even the pillar and foundation of truth. It also has many great promises, such as the perpetual guidance of the Holy Spirit and God's singular favor and protection, as when Christ promises that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. This is the Church we profess to believe in when we say in the creed, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church."

But here the question arises, what should be understood by this Church? Who belongs to it? And who are to be excluded from it? The Doctors of the Roman Church want nothing else to be understood by the Church we profess to believe in the creed, to which the Holy Spirit in Scripture attributes and promises such magnificent things, than the visible assembly of those who profess the true doctrine of Christ and communicate in His sacraments under the governance of legitimate pastors. For this is how Bellarmine defines the Church, with the agreement of most of the doctors of the Roman Church: "The Church is the assembly of men bound together by the profession of the same Christian faith and the communion of the same sacraments, under the governance of legitimate pastors, and especially of the one Vicar of Christ on earth, the Roman Pontiff." And they want this to be the proper, primary, and chief meaning of the Church.

Moreover, from this definition, it is clear that the Pontiffs do not require any internal virtue to constitute someone in the Church, which Bellarmine expressly teaches and admits in "On the Church and Council," Book 3, Chapter 2: "This is the difference," he says, "between our opinion and all others, that all others require internal virtues to constitute someone in the Church, and therefore make the true Church invisible. But we, although we believe that all virtues, hope, faith, charity, and others are found in the Church, yet to be able to say that some are part of the

true Church, about which Scripture speaks, we do not think any internal virtue is required, but only the external profession of faith and the communion of the sacraments, which is perceived by the senses."

Thus, they include in the true Church and want to be considered as its parts not only the elect but also the reprobate; not only the good but also the wicked, and even the infamous and great sinners, provided that otherwise, they profess the faith and subject themselves to the Church's pastors: indeed, they do not exclude from the Church even secret infidels, that is, those who internally ridicule the doctrine of Christ but externally, for some temporal advantage, profess the Christian faith and mix with the true faithful in the communion of saints. Bellarmine and many other Pontifical doctors teach that these are parts and members of the Church, as can be seen in Bellarmine "On the Church," Book 3, Chapter 10. Where he acknowledges, however, that some of those whom he considers Catholics, and notably Cardinal John de Turrecremata, teach and believe that those who lack internal faith in no way belong to the Church.

Moreover, to make the mind of the Doctors of the Roman Church clearer, it should be known that they distinguish various ways by which someone can be in the Church; they observe that some are in the Church by number and calling only, of which kind are the impious and hypocrites, who externally profess the faith; others by number, merit, and election, who not only retain piety and faith for a time but persevere in good to the end. Therefore, they want all those who profess the faith to be in the Church in some way, but they teach that the truly pious are in it in a more perfect way, and those elected by God who persevere in good to the end and finally attain eternal salvation are in it in the most perfect way.

To this pertains also what they note, that in the Church, which is the Mystical Body of Christ, there are, as it were, three kinds of members: some simply joined to Christ, others more closely joined, others most closely joined. The simply joined are those who adhere to Christ by faith, or at least by the sacrament of baptism, which is a sacrament of faith, and have in some way put on Christ; the more closely joined are those who are coupled to Christ not only by faith and the use of the sacraments but also by charity; the most closely joined are those who remain connected to Christ by persevering faith and charity to the end, and are never separated from Him, which is proper to the elect, as can be seen in Stapleton's "Controversies," Book 1, on the Church in itself, Question 2, Article 1.

Bellarmino, however, in the book "On the Church," Chapter 2, notes from Augustine that the Church is a living body, in which there is a soul and a body; and he says that the soul is the internal gifts of the Holy Spirit, faith, hope, charity, etc. The body, however, is the external profession of faith and the communion of the saints; from which it follows, he says, that some are of the soul and body of the Church, and therefore united to Christ the Head internally and externally: again, some are of the soul and not of the body, such as those who have faith and charity but have not yet been admitted to the external communion of the Church, or have been ejected from it by the sentence of the Church's leaders. Finally, some are of the body and not of the soul, such as those who have no internal virtue and yet, out of hope or fear of some temporal advantage, profess the faith and participate in the sacraments under the governance of pastors.

The first, he says, are most perfectly of the Church and in it as living members in a body, and yet among them, he says, some participate more, some less in life, and some even only have the beginning of life, namely faith without charity. Hence it is clear that he, in a way, includes among the living members of the Church those who only have dead faith and the rest who are impious and wicked. While elsewhere he says that the wicked and great sinners are members of the Church and the body of Christ not as living, but as dead members, in "On the Church," Book 3, Chapter 9, response to the first argument. The last, however, he says, are in the Church as nails, or hair, or even bad humors are in the human body.

Moreover, from these things, it appears that the Pontifical doctors indeed want that in the Church and belonging to the society of the Church are not only the truly pious and faithful but also many impious and wicked people who externally profess the faith, but in a very different and disparate way; for according to their mind, infidels and impious people hiding under an external profession of faith belong to the body and society of the Church, but not principally: just as those who are imbued with true faith and piety belong only to the external communion, but also to the internal one. These are the living members of the Church, but those are only dry and dead. These belong to the Church in number and merit, but those only in number, and thus in a much more imperfect and ignoble manner.

While in a living body, a dead and dry member is not properly and equivocally called a member, the Pontifical doctors are accustomed to ask among themselves whether hypocrites and impious people, who are truly mixed with the pious and good in the Church, are true members of the Church and can simply and properly be called such, or only improperly and equivocally: and many indeed among the Pontificals admit that the wicked and great sinners living in the Church are not true members nor simply of the Body of the Church, but only in a certain respect and equivocally; this is the opinion (as Bellarmine testifies in "On the Church," Book 3, Chapter 1, response to the first argument) of Cardinal John de Turrecremata in the book "On the Church." This opinion follows many ancient scholastics, such as Thomas, Hugh, and Alexander of Hales, with whom many recent theologians agree, such as Melchior Cano, Peter of Soto, and others, who all say that the wicked are not true members of the Church, although they assert that they are truly in the Church, just as hair and bad humors are truly in the human body, although they are not true members of the body.

However, most of the Pontifical Doctors today hold a different opinion; they teach that the impious and hypocrites who are in the external communion of the Church are true members of the Church and can be called such simply and unequivocally, not merely in a certain respect and equivocally. This is the doctrine of Thomas Stapleton in *Controversies* 1. On the Church in Itself, Question 2, Article 1, where he says that the property of a thing must be distinguished from its perfection; the impious are not members of the Church perfectly and primarily, but they are true members and can be called such truly and properly.

Bellarmino, however, in the previously cited place, uses some distinction. He notes that the members of a body can be considered in two ways: one way according to their essence and substance, another way as they are operative instruments. Based on this, he says that the wicked

who are in the Church, such as a bad teacher or a bad bishop, are indeed dead members and therefore not true members of the body of Christ, insofar as the member is considered as a part of the living body: yet they are very true members as instruments, that is, bishops, however wicked and impious, are true heads, and teachers, however bad, are the true eyes or the true tongue of the Church. For although in a natural body a dead member cannot be a true instrument of operation, the matter is different in the mystical body, whose soul is the Holy Spirit, who does not need the goodness of the instrument for his operations. Whatever the definition of the Church given by the Pontifical Doctors, it is clear from them that the true Church consists not only of the elect but also of the reprobate, not only of the good but also of the wicked, and not only of those who have faith in their hearts but also those who lack internal faith but simulate faith by external profession.

Furthermore, from the same definition, it can be inferred who they exclude from the Church; since, for someone to be considered in the Church, they expressly require these three things: an external profession of faith, the use of the sacraments, and subjection to legitimate prelates. Hence, it appears according to them that the following are not in the Church: all infidels and heretics who do not profess the true faith of Christ; and therefore, the elect themselves before their calling and the public and external profession of faith, such as many among infidels and heretics who are to be converted to Christ's faith and brought to salvation by the eternal decree of God. Regarding heretics and apostates who neither have nor profess the true faith of Christ, there is some question and disagreement among the Pontiffs as to whether they belong to the Church. For Alphonsus a Castro, a renowned Spanish doctor, in Book 2, On the Just Punishment of Heretics, Chapter 24, as reported by Bellarmine, teaches that heretics and apostates who have been baptized are members and parts of the Church, even if they openly profess false doctrine. But other Doctors of the Roman Church generally hold that heretics and apostates are not in the Church nor should be considered parts of it, because they do not profess the true faith. Bellarmine teaches this in Book 3, On the Church, Chapter 4, where he notes that heretics, although they are not of the Church, somehow belong to the Church, like sheep belong to the fold from which they have strayed; therefore, the Church, which otherwise does not judge those who are outside, can judge and punish heretics because, although they are outside, they ought to be inside and have the mark of the Church through baptism, as it were, impressed upon them; hence, the Church has the same right over them that a shepherd has over a wandering sheep outside the fold, and the Emperor over a deserter from the army. Similar teachings are found in Stapleton in Controversies 1. On the Church in Itself, Question 2, Article 3, where he says that a heretic is not a member of the Church simply, but in a certain respect, and because of the character of baptism which he retains, and by whose power it is that one who deserts the faith, like a deserter, can be justly punished, but if he returns to the faith, he does not need to be initiated anew, like infidels, by baptism, but as one already a Christian, by the laying on of hands, is reintegrated into the body of the Church.

Next, the Pontiffs exclude from the Church, nor do they want to consider as its parts, all those who do not communicate in the sacraments of the Church, such as those who have not yet

been initiated by baptism, and those who, once admitted to the sacraments, are later deprived of their communion by the sentence of ecclesiastical judges. Therefore, from their viewpoint, there are no catechumens in the Church, by which they mean those among infidels who are instructed in the Christian religion and are to embrace Christ. Although the mind might be piously affected towards the doctrine of Christ and desire to join the faithful, indeed, although they may already have living faith internally and profess it externally, if they have not yet been initiated by Christian baptism, they do not want them to be properly in the Church or to make them part of it but place them outside the Church: and the same they also think of the excommunicated, that is, those who, whether justly or unjustly, are prohibited from the use of the sacraments by a certain judgment of the Church's prelates. They exclude all such persons from the Church and do not want them to be considered in it, even though it is possible that in that state they retain faith and have charity towards God and neighbor. This is the doctrine of Bellarmine in Book 3, On the Church, Chapters 3 and 6, and of Thomas Stapleton in Controversies 1. On the Church in Itself, Question 2, Article 2. Yet Bellarmine, in Book 3, On the Church, Chapter 2, concedes that catechumens and excommunicated persons, if they have charity and faith, are of the soul of the Church, although they are not of its body, and nonetheless wants them to be simply outside the Church and not to belong to the Church in actuality, but only potentially, since he simply wants the wicked and infamous and even secret infidels who profess the faith externally to be actual parts of the Church and to be considered as such. This is indeed astonishing and clearly contrary to reason, since the soul with the body and internal communion is far superior to external communion, and the denomination ought to be and usually is taken from the more excellent and noble part. Others, however, say that catechumens and excommunicated persons who have faith and charity are of the Church not in number but in merit, as John of Turrecremata in Summa de Ecclesia, Book 1, Article 10, as reported by Thomas Stapleton in the previously cited place, where he observes that this can be true if the Church signifies the Mystical Body of Christ; but it is not true if the Church signifies the great house and the gathered multitude of the called, which he wants to be the proper meaning of the word Church; although the Pontifical doctors do not want any catechumens and excommunicated persons to be of the Church, they do not exclude all of them from the hope of salvation.

If someone objects to the axiom they insist on so much, namely, that no one can be saved outside the Church, Bellarmine responds that this should be understood of those who are neither in the Church in reality nor in desire. But catechumens and excommunicated persons, if not in reality, are at least in desire in the Church, and therefore can be saved: others say they are in the Church not in number but in merit.

Finally, by the third condition required by the Pontifical doctors for someone to be considered in the Church, namely subjection to legitimate prelates, they exclude from the communion of the Church and do not want to consider as members of the Church all schismatics and those who refuse to submit to the Roman Pontiff, no matter how much they otherwise preserve the true faith and the use of the sacraments. Nor do they simply teach that they are outside the Church, as they do with catechumens, but they wholly exclude them from the hope of

salvation: and they understand this not only of the authors of schism but also of their followers, as can be seen in Stapleton in Controversies 1. On the Church in Itself, Question 2, Article 4, and Bellarmine in Book 3, On the Church, Chapter 5, where he notes that some Catholics doubt whether schismatics are not of the Church, indeed Alphonsus a Castro in the previously cited place affirms that they are of the Church.

Furthermore, from what has been previously stated, it is quite clear what the Pontifical Doctors mean by the Church which we profess to believe in the Creed, whose authority is commended in the Scriptures and to which the perpetual guidance of the Holy Spirit and the perpetual assistance of God are promised, namely the visible assembly of those who profess the true doctrine of Christ, use the sacraments instituted by Him, and render due obedience to legitimate pastors. And they want this meaning of the word Church, as stated before, to be proper and principal. However, whether the name Church in the Scriptures is sometimes restricted to only the truly pious and holy and used for them alone is not entirely agreed upon among the Pontiffs. Some, following Jerome and Augustine, do not deny that the Church is sometimes taken in this sense, as in Ephesians 5, where the Apostle says that Christ gave Himself up for the Church to present her to Himself as a glorious Church, without spot or wrinkle or any such thing: and in many other places, Melchior Cano acknowledges this in On Theological Places, Book 4, on the authority of the Catholic Church, Chapters 2 and 5, where after arguing that the Church to which the Spirit of truth, the support of faith, and other gifts of the Holy Spirit are promised and given, is the one consisting of wheat and tares, of good and bad fish, he adds that all these things said by him should be understood in such a way as to acknowledge that there is a multitude and assembly of the good on earth which is called the Church and the bride and friend of God in the Sacred Scriptures. Therefore, Bellarmine, in On The Church Militant, Book 3, Chapter 9, queries whether some of his Catholics are fabricating two Churches, one that includes both the good and the bad, and another that consists solely of the good and pious.

But Bellarmine and most other recent Doctors of the Roman Church, such as Thomas Stapleton and Cardinal Perronius, deny that the term Church is ever used in the New Testament to refer only to the pious and holy. As for the places where attributes are ascribed to the Church that seem to belong only to the pious and holy, such as when it is called the body, bride, and fullness of Christ, and His dove, as well as a garden enclosed and a fountain sealed, they respond that these are said of the Church in which the wicked are indeed mixed with the good, but with respect only to the good who are found in it. For often things are said of a whole entity with respect only to a certain part of it, as when a particular Church is praised for the piety and holiness of some, while at other times, the whole Church is criticized for the vices and disorderly lives of others.

Furthermore, it is clear from what has been said that the Pontiffs, when they define the Church and inquire into its nature, deal solely with that part of the Church that is on earth, which we call the Church Militant, although they otherwise teach that the Church Militant and the Church Triumphant, which consists of the saints received into heaven, constitute one and the same Church.

But these remarks on the Pontiffs' opinion should suffice. It now follows that we briefly explain our theologians' opinion on the nature of the Church. Omitting the various acceptations of the Church, which they diligently note, it will be sufficient to observe, according to our doctors, that there are mainly two acceptations of the Church that are frequent in Sacred Scripture. Firstly, the Church is taken for those who are truly of Christ and truly belong to Him. Secondly, for those who call themselves of Christ and profess the name of Christ on earth. In the former sense, the Church is commonly called by our theologians the invisible Church, and in the latter sense, the visible Church. And they consider the former acceptation of the Church to be primary, proper, and principal, while the latter is considered improper and less principal. Therefore, when our doctors speak of the Church simply and absolutely, they use it in the former sense for those who truly belong to Christ.

Whether the Church is taken in the first or second sense, it is not defined and described in the same way by our doctors. The invisible Church is simply described by many as the assembly of the elect and is thought to include all the elect, those who have been, are, and will be. This is the opinion of the confession issued in the name of the Anglican Church by the order of the English Parliament. This confession states in Chapter 25, Article 5, on the Church: "The Catholic or universal Church, which is invisible, comprises the whole number of the elect who have been, are, or will be gathered into one body under Christ the head." Similarly, Philip of Mornay, Lord of Plessis, in his book on the Church, Chapter 1, says, "If we want to speak subtly, we call the Church the society of those whom God has chosen for eternal life in all times and places, which is invisible to man." Wendelinus agrees in Christian Theology, Book 1, Chapter 28, Thesis 16. Our celebrated and venerable colleague Peter Molina also agrees, distinguishing the invisible Church into three parts: the first includes the elect received into heaven, which is called the Church Triumphant; the second includes the elect still living on earth and mixed with the wicked, which is called the Church Militant; the third includes the elect not yet born or not yet converted, which can be called the Church to come. This can be seen in his little catechism and Chapter 2 of his book against Cardinal Perronius. Other of our theologians define the Church properly so-called as the society of men effectively called by God according to His good pleasure to the communion of grace and glory in Christ, or, to use the words of John Cameron, united to one head, Christ, through the ministry of the word, and in Him sharing in grace in this life and in glory in the life to come. This definition includes both the elect who already reign in heaven and those who fight against the devil and sin on earth, but not those who are not yet born and called to communion with Christ through the word.

However, most of our theologians define the Church in such a way that their definition does not apply to the elect who have already been taken from the earth, nor to those who are not yet born and called, but only to those who are already partakers of grace on earth and are awaiting future glory in heaven. Such is the definition of the Helvetic Confession, Article 17, where it states that the Church is the assembly of faithful men called out from the world, namely those who truly know and rightly worship the true God in Christ the Savior through the Word and the sanctification of the Spirit, and finally, who participate by faith in all the goods freely

offered. For faith only pertains to the elect who are on earth and walk by faith, not by sight; and a similar definition is also given by the French Confession, Article 27, and the Augsburg Confession, Article 7, where these words are found: "The Church of Christ is properly the congregation of members of Christ, that is, the elect who truly believe and obey Christ." And in this sense, although each one uses their own words, the Church is defined by Musculus in Theological Places, on the Church, Section 3; by Bucanus in Loc. 41. on the Church, Question 3; and by the illustrious Amyraldus in his Theses on the Name and Definition of the Church. For among other things, he says that the Church is the assembly of men united by faith and the participation of the Holy Spirit, so that they may finally attain eternal life.

The Church, which is commonly and for the sake of distinction called visible by some, is generally defined as the assembly of those who in any way throughout the whole world profess the Gospel of Christ, whether they hold sound doctrine or one corrupted by heresies and false teachings. Therefore, the parts of this Church include both orthodox churches and any schismatic and heretical ones. This is taught by Philip Mornay in On the Church, Chapter 2, who is followed in this matter by the illustrious Peter Molinaeus in Book 2, Against Cardinal Perronius.

However, most others describe the visible Church as the assembly of those who profess the true and salutary doctrine of Christ and legitimately use the sacraments instituted by Him, and also observe the lawful order of discipline. Some others more briefly say it is the assembly of those who profess the true religion, along with their children. Thus, the Anglican Confession, Chapter 25, Article 30. Therefore, they do not want any heretical churches to constitute part of the visible Church, but exclude from it those who are properly called heretics; nor do they place outside it all who err in matters of faith and sin in the administration of the sacraments and the exercise of discipline; but only those who deny and subvert the fundamental teachings concerning faith, discipline, and the sacraments. Therefore, among the many particular churches that are contained within the communion of the true Church, they note various degrees of purity and perfection; nor do they immediately deny a church to be a true Church of Christ if it is not in all respects pure in doctrine or in the rest of worship, rites, and the sanctity of discipline, and if it has some errors in saving faith, some abuses in the use of sacraments, some superstitions in divine worship, and some allowance of scandals in the sanctity of discipline, provided that in the meantime it retains the fundamental and saving doctrine and practice of faith and worship. These are the words of the confession or declaration of the Polish Churches, publicly read at the Thorunien assembly in 1645, and printed and published the following year. And this is the common opinion of our theologians, as can be seen in John Calvin, Institutes, Book 4, Chapter 1, Section 12 and following, and in the illustrious Mestrezat in his French treatise on the Church, Book 2, Chapter 4.

Here, however, the question arises whether the visible Church and the invisible Church are two distinct Churches, or whether there is only one and the same Church considered in different ways. Some of our theologians, among them our illustrious and venerable colleague Peter Molinaeus, think that the invisible Church is different from the visible Church, as can be seen in Response to Cardinal Perronius, which is called Papist Novelty, Book 1, Chapter 2,

where he expressly teaches and admits that the invisible Church and the visible Church are different kinds or species of the Church, which differ in nature.

But most of our other theologians deny that the invisible Church and the visible Church are two Churches, but one and the same Church considered under different respects. For they note that in the Church two things can be considered, namely its internal state, which consists in faith, charity, piety, and internal purity; and its external state, which consists in the external profession of faith, the ministry of the Word, and the sacraments. And indeed, if the Church is considered under the former aspect, it can be called invisible because internal faith, piety, and charity do not fall under external senses, nor are there any external signs by which truly pious and faithful men can certainly and distinctly be recognized from hypocrites. But if the Church is considered in respect to its external profession and ministry, then it can be called visible because the external profession of faith and the external ministry are things that fall under the senses. Thus teaches the illustrious John Mestrezat in *On the Church*, Book 1, Chapter 3: "When we distinguish," he says, "the Church into visible and invisible, or into the Church of the elect and saints, and that which consists of those whom external profession and calling unite into one, this is not a distinction of two Churches that exist separately, but of one and the same Church considered according to its internal state of faith, piety, purity, and charity, which is inward in the conscience, and according to its external ministry, namely, of the Word and sacraments." And this is also taught by John Cameron, Bucanus, and others in their treatises on the Church.

Therefore, the Polish Churches in their aforementioned declaration do not separately define the visible Church and the invisible Church, but they provide only one definition of the Church which includes both aspects, namely, those things which are internal and hidden in the Church and those which are externally manifest. This is the definition of the true Church: "The true Church is nothing other than the assembly of the faithful under one head, Christ, who by the same Spirit of grace are called out from the power of darkness to the kingdom of God through the Word of the Gospel, and are united in the internal communion of the same faith, charity, and hope, as well as in the external communion of the same sacraments, all divine worship, and holy discipline," as can be seen in the last chapter of their declaration, which is about the Church.

And hence it can also be that most of our other confessions, such as the Augsburg, Helvetic, and French, also propose only one definition of the Church, although they seem to define the Church only from those things that are internal and pertain to its internal communion, which is the reason why they speak of it as if they intended to define only the invisible Church.

Moreover, if it is permitted to interpose our judgment here, since those controversies about the Church that are currently debated between us and the Pontiffs do not concern that part of the Church which reigns with Christ in heaven, but that which militates on earth, those seem to act most wisely who, when they present the definition of the Church, principally consider this aspect, and describe the Church in such a way that their description applies properly to the Church Militant.

Furthermore, since our theologians, with one or two exceptions, acknowledge that the visible Church and the invisible Church are not two distinct Churches, but one and the same

Church considered in different ways, namely, either according to those things that pertain to its internal state or according to those things that pertain to its external state, it is not quite accurate to say that the term Church is taken in two ways, namely, sometimes for the visible Church and sometimes for the invisible Church, but it should rather be said that the Church is sometimes considered according to those things that are internally hidden and invisible, and sometimes according to those things that are externally manifest and visible.

Moreover, it was not necessary to separately provide two definitions of the Church, one that would apply to the visible Church and another to the invisible Church; for this suggests that we conceive of two Churches, which we do not intend, but it would be more prudent to include in one and the same definition of the Church both those things that pertain to its external state and are visible, and those things that pertain to its internal state and are invisible, as the Polish confession has done. For later, when needed, the various respects in the same Church can easily be distinguished. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, I would define the militant and Christian Church discussed here as "the multitude of those who are effectively called by God through the word of the Gospel to the participation of salvation in Christ, and are associated in themselves by both the internal communion of the same faith, hope, and charity, and the external profession of the salutary doctrine, the legitimate use of the sacraments, and the observation of the discipline and order instituted by Christ, to which, however, many hypocrites and impious people are mixed in regard to that external communion."

Furthermore, having understood our theologians' opinion, it is not difficult to judge who, according to their view, belongs to the Church and who does not, and how to respond to the various questions that the Pontifical Doctors raise on this matter.

Firstly, concerning the elect unto life, two questions arise: whether all of them belong to the Church, and secondly, whether the Church consists solely of them.

To the first question, some of our theologians respond that all the predestined and elect unto life belong to the Church and are part of it, even before they are converted and called; this is the view of Philip Mornay, Wendelin, and others previously cited. Add to this Lucas Treletius in his *Theological Institutes*, Book 2, on the Church, where he says that Paul was part of the Catholic Church before his calling, and that all the faithful are eternally members of the Catholic Church, even if none are members of the visible Church before their external and temporal calling. However, many others teach that the predestined are not actually and in reality part of the Church before their calling, but only by divine designation and destination, because by God's certain decree they are to be introduced into the Church at some point, if they do not already belong to it. Thus, the illustrious Amyraldus in his *Theses on the Parts of the Church*, Polanus in his *Syntagma*, and many others. Therefore, according to these, if someone asks whether the elect belong to the Church before their calling, the simple answer is no, because what exists only potentially and by destination is not to be said to exist simply. However, when asked whether the Church consists solely of the elect, without any reprobates among them, our theologians respond with a distinction: the Church, insofar as it is invisible, consists only of the elect and is therefore

described as the assembly of the elect; but in the visible Church, reprobates are mixed with the elect.

Since the visible and invisible Church are not different churches but one and the same Church considered either according to what is external and visible or according to what is internal and unseen, I would rather say to the first question that the elect, before their conversion, are not part of the Church, but they will all eventually be introduced into the Church, ordinarily both in internal and external communion; however, not necessarily and simply in external communion, but only in internal communion. To the second question, I would say that the Church consists only of the elect concerning its internal communion, but in its external communion, many reprobates are mixed in.

Furthermore, there is the question of whether the Church consists solely of the baptized, or whether some non-baptized also belong to it. The non-baptized are either infants or adults; and infants are either those of the faithful or the infidels. No one contends that the unbaptized infants of infidels belong to the Church, but our theologians teach that the infants of the faithful are part of the visible Church, i.e., they at least somewhat belong to the external communion of the Church and are not entirely alien to it, as they follow the condition of their parents according to the Apostle's words, "Your children are holy." Unbaptized adults are either strangers to the faith, about whom there is no question, or they are being instructed in the doctrine of Christ, have already accepted the faith, and wish to join the Church; all our theologians teach that these are members of the invisible Church, even if they have not yet been introduced to the visible Church's communion and are not considered part of any particular church. I would say that they belong to the internal communion of the Church, and to the external communion only imperfectly and in part, namely by the fact of their external profession. Since the internal communion of the Church far surpasses the external, they are simply to be considered as part of the Church.

A similar reasoning applies to the excommunicated. For excommunication does not, in itself, exclude people from the internal communion of the Church, but only from the external communion. Thus, if someone is unjustly excommunicated or justly excommunicated and later repents and has faith and penitence in their heart, according to our theologians, such a person is excluded from the visible Church but nevertheless belongs to the invisible Church and is therefore to be simply considered as part of the Church.

It is also asked whether the impious, hypocrites, and secret infidels who profess the faith externally belong to the Church. Similarly, it is responded that they are not members of the invisible Church but are nevertheless in the visible Church. I would say, as before, that they are in the external communion of the Church but do not belong to the internal communion. However, speaking simply, our theologians do not want to say that the impious are true members of the Church, properly and absolutely part of the Church, because they prefer to use the term Church more properly for the invisible Church than for the visible, and because the impious are dead, not living, members of the Church, and are therefore only equivocally and improperly such. They do not, however, deny that the impious truly belong to the external communion of the

Church and that there can be true pastors and teachers among them to whom we should listen and obey, as these things pertain to the external order of the Church.

There is little difficulty concerning heretics; all our theologians agree that heretics are not part of the invisible Church, as they lack faith and other virtues. Whether they belong to the visible Church is a matter of some debate: a few, very few, think that they form some part of the visible Church, which they define so broadly as to include all who in any way profess the doctrine of Christ, as previously noted. However, the vast majority exclude heretics, who overthrow the foundations of religion, from both the invisible and visible Church. I would say they belong neither to the internal nor the external communion of the Church. It cannot be denied that heretics participate in some aspects of the Church, such as the profession of the Christian name, agreement in many points of doctrine, and the use of sacraments (since their baptism is not repeated and is considered legitimate). Therefore, some of our theologians argue that there is indeed a true Church among them, although corrupted and where only death and destruction can occur, just as a mortally sick man is still a true man, as Polanus explains in his *Syntagma*. However, most believe that among heretics there is only a false Church, so called equivocally.

As for schismatics, that is, those who separate themselves from true Christian churches for some slight cause, whether in doctrine or discipline, our theologians distinguish between the authors of the schism and the people deceived by them. As for the authors of the schism, since they break the bond of charity, they acknowledge that they cannot belong to the invisible Church, whose bond and communion consist in faith, hope, and charity. But concerning the deceived people or those born in schism, they are less rigid and believe that there can be good men among them, not alien to the body of Christ but joined to it by true faith and charity; nor do they entirely exclude schismatic churches from the visible Church if they retain the foundations of doctrine and discipline, since they reserve this honor only for those who deny and overthrow the fundamentals of faith and discipline.

Our theologians also inquire whether angels are part of the Church. Tilenus, Polanus, and others who want the Church to be taken broadly enough to include even the angels affirm this. However, the illustrious Amyraldus, in his *Theses on the Parts of the Church*, denies it along with many others. I think briefly that there is great communion between angels and pious and faithful men, and that Christ's death reconciled angels to men and closely united them, making angels protectors and guardians of the faithful and promoting their salvation. But pious men form a certain society among themselves to which angels do not belong. The name Church in Scripture is only attributed to the society of men and never includes angels.

Furthermore, here the question arises: what is that Church which we profess to believe in the Creed and which is called Catholic there? Most of our theologians say that the Creed refers not to the visible Church but to the invisible Church, which is placed among the objects of our faith. However, Calvin, in his *Institutes*, Book 4, Chapter 1, contends that the article of the Creed pertains to both the visible and invisible Church. Thus, in Paragraph 2, he states, "In the Creed, where we profess to believe in the Church, it refers not only to the visible Church, which we are now discussing, but also to all of God's elect, including those who have died." Paragraph 3

begins with these words, "The article of the Creed pertains also to the external Church to some extent, so that each of us may remain in fraternal consent with all of God's children, grant the Church the authority it deserves, and conduct ourselves as sheep of the flock." I also agree with this view, but I would express it in other words: since the visible and invisible Church, as often repeated, are not two churches but one and the same Church considered under different respects, there is no need to ask whether the Creed speaks of the visible or invisible Church; for it cannot speak of one without speaking of both, since they are not two but one. Therefore, the question should be posed under which respect the Creed considers the Church, whether according to what is external and visible, or according to what is internal and hidden and not seen by the eyes. To this, I think it should be answered that the Creed proposes the Church under both respects and as an object of our faith, for we must believe not only in what pertains to the internal communion of the Church but also in what pertains to the external state and order instituted by Christ in the Church. And what we profess to believe in the Creed is that Christ our Lord established a certain holy Republic or society on earth, to which He prescribed a certain form of discipline and government, and to which all pious individuals are obliged to join, recognize as their mother, and maintain communion with.

As for the name Catholic, most of our theologians say that it is common to both the visible and invisible Church, but the invisible Church is absolutely and simply to be called Catholic, that is, universal, because it encompasses all the elect from the beginning of the world. However, the visible Church is to be considered Catholic in a certain respect, as it encompasses all those who together profess the true and saving religion on earth and includes all particular churches scattered in various parts of the world. In my opinion, the name Catholic is a title of that part of the Church which now militates on earth under Christ, and this name is given to it, 1. Because it is spread throughout the whole world, not restricted to one nation as the Jewish Church was in ancient times. 2. Because it embraces the entire doctrine of the Apostles, not admitting part and rejecting part like heretical sects. Finally, because it has persevered the same in all times, namely, through succession and continuation.

Regarding the Scriptural passages where the Church is mentioned, our theologians explain them variously, sometimes referring to the visible Church, sometimes to the invisible; but commonly those passages where the Church is called the body and spouse of Christ, and where it is promised perpetual God's favor and protection, and continuous assistance of the Holy Spirit, are referred to the invisible Church as they properly pertain to it.

But it is clear from what has been said that, if we wish to speak properly and accurately, it should not be said that Scripture in this or that place should be explained concerning the visible Church and not the invisible, and vice versa, since there are not multiple churches but one, which is both invisible and visible under different respects. Therefore, all the praises and promises made to the Church in Scripture should be understood concerning one and the same Church, which is both visible and invisible. The only question can be under which respect this or that is said of the Church, whether of things pertaining only to the external communion, or also to the internal, or of all things that are in the external communion of the Church.

I add that the sacred Scripture seems to restrict the name of the Church to the part of the Church which we call militant and cannot provide any place where it is necessary to extend the term Church more broadly and interpret it otherwise than concerning the Church that Christ constituted on earth and in which He instituted the ministry of the word and sacraments.

Now, to briefly compare the Roman Church's view with ours and conclude what is being debated here, it is evident from what has been said that the doctors of the Roman Church agree with us in acknowledging that the Church is a living body, in which there is a soul and a body, and therefore, a double communion can be had with the Church: one as to the soul, which is internal and consists in the participation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the other as to the body, which is external and consists in the profession of faith and use of the sacraments, and that one should subject themselves to the order that Christ instituted in the Church. Moreover, they also place beyond doubt that the internal communion is far more excellent and necessary than the external communion.

In turn, although our theologians distinguish the Church into visible and invisible and propose a double definition or description of the Church, they do not intend, except for one or two, to define two separate and divided churches but to present one and the same Church under different respects, in which there are certain internal things that cannot be seen and also certain external things that are visible. Consequently, they concede to the Roman doctors that the various things said about the Church in Scriptures are to be expounded concerning one and the same Church, considered differently.

However, the disagreement lies in that, according to the Romanists, the notion of the Church properly regards those things that are external and visible in the Church. Hence, they define the Church from these, omitting mention of the internal things of the Church. On the contrary, our theologians contend that the essence and principal consideration of the Church consist properly in the internal and saving gifts of the Holy Spirit, and therefore, they derive the definition of the Church from these, neglecting the external things of the Church. Therefore, the question is whether, when asked simply and absolutely what the true Church is, it should be defined according to the Romanists from external things, namely, "the assembly of those who are united among themselves by the true profession of faith, the use of the sacraments, and subjection to legitimate pastors," or according to the majority of our theologians, from internal things, "the assembly of those whom God has effectually called to the participation of grace and glory in Christ the Savior," or at least, according to others with whom I agree, from both internal and external things, "the assembly of those whom God has called to salvation in Christ, who are united and joined together both in the internal communion of the same faith and charity and in the external profession of divine worship, order, and sacraments instituted by Jesus Christ our Lord, among whom, concerning that external profession, many hypocrites are mixed in."

The Romanists base their argument on the fact that Scripture presents the Church to us as a body distinguished by various organs, in which there is a great diversity of degrees and offices, and which is essentially and inherently distinguished into pastors and teachers and the people who are fed and governed by them. Moreover, many duties are prescribed to us concerning the

Church, namely, that we do not cause it scandal, that we join it, and continually remain in its communion, that we defer to its authority, and listen to it, and perform many works of charity, both spiritual and corporal, toward its members, all of which indicate and suppose that the Church is an external society that can be certainly recognized by us and whose members we can see and distinguish from others.

Now the question here is: what is that Church which we profess to believe in the Creed and which is called Catholic there? Most of our theologians say that the Creed refers not to the visible Church but to the invisible Church, which is placed among the objects of our faith. However, Calvin, in his Institutes, Book 4, Chapter 1, contends that the article of the Creed pertains to both the visible and invisible Church. Thus, in Paragraph 2, he states, "In the Creed, where we profess to believe in the Church, it refers not only to the visible Church, which we are now discussing, but also to all of God's elect, including those who have died." Paragraph 3 begins with these words, "The article of the Creed pertains also to the external Church to some extent, so that each of us may remain in fraternal consent with all of God's children, grant the Church the authority it deserves, and conduct ourselves as sheep of the flock." I also agree with this view, but I would express it in other words: since the visible and invisible Church, as often repeated, are not two churches but one and the same Church considered under different respects, there is no need to ask whether the Creed speaks of the visible or invisible Church; for it cannot speak of one without speaking of both, since they are not two but one. Therefore, the question should be posed under which respect the Creed considers the Church, whether according to what is external and visible, or according to what is internal and hidden and not seen by the eyes. To this, I think it should be answered that the Creed proposes the Church under both respects and as an object of our faith, for we must believe not only in what pertains to the internal communion of the Church but also in what pertains to the external state and order instituted by Christ in the Church. And what we profess to believe in the Creed is that Christ our Lord established a certain holy Republic or society on earth, to which He prescribed a certain form of discipline and government, and to which all pious individuals are obliged to join, recognize as their mother, and maintain communion with.

As for the name Catholic, most of our theologians say that it is common to both the visible and invisible Church, but the invisible Church is absolutely and simply to be called Catholic, that is, universal, because it encompasses all the elect from the beginning of the world. However, the visible Church is to be considered Catholic in a certain respect, as it encompasses all those who together profess the true and saving religion on earth and includes all particular churches scattered in various parts of the world. In my opinion, the name Catholic is a title of that part of the Church which now militates on earth under Christ, and this name is given to it, 1. Because it is spread throughout the whole world, not restricted to one nation as the Jewish Church was in ancient times. 2. Because it embraces the entire doctrine of the Apostles, not admitting part and rejecting part like heretical sects. Finally, because it has persevered the same in all times, namely, through succession and continuation.

Regarding the Scriptural passages where the Church is mentioned, our theologians explain them variously, sometimes referring to the visible Church, sometimes to the invisible; but commonly those passages where the Church is called the body and spouse of Christ, and where it is promised perpetual God's favor and protection, and continuous assistance of the Holy Spirit, are referred to the invisible Church as they properly pertain to it.

But it is clear from what has been said that, if we wish to speak properly and accurately, it should not be said that Scripture in this or that place should be explained concerning the visible Church and not the invisible, and vice versa, since there are not multiple churches but one, which is both invisible and visible under different respects. Therefore, all the praises and promises made to the Church in Scripture should be understood concerning one and the same Church, which is both visible and invisible. The only question can be under which respect this or that is said of the Church, whether of things pertaining only to the external communion, or also to the internal, or of all things that are in the external communion of the Church.

I add that the sacred Scripture seems to restrict the name of the Church to the part of the Church which we call militant and cannot provide any place where it is necessary to extend the term Church more broadly and interpret it otherwise than concerning the Church that Christ constituted on earth and in which He instituted the ministry of the word and sacraments.

Now, to briefly compare the Roman Church's view with ours and conclude what is being debated here, it is evident from what has been said that the doctors of the Roman Church agree with us in acknowledging that the Church is a living body, in which there is a soul and a body, and therefore, a double communion can be had with the Church: one as to the soul, which is internal and consists in the participation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the other as to the body, which is external and consists in the profession of faith and use of the sacraments, and that one should subject themselves to the order that Christ instituted in the Church. Moreover, they also place beyond doubt that the internal communion is far more excellent and necessary than the external communion.

In turn, although our theologians distinguish the Church into visible and invisible and propose a double definition or description of the Church, they do not intend, except for one or two, to define two separate and divided churches but to present one and the same Church under different respects, in which there are certain internal things that cannot be seen and also certain external things that are visible. Consequently, they concede to the Roman doctors that the various things said about the Church in Scriptures are to be expounded concerning one and the same Church, considered differently.

However, the disagreement lies in that, according to the Romanists, the notion of the Church properly regards those things that are external and visible in the Church. Hence, they define the Church from these, omitting mention of the internal things of the Church. On the contrary, our theologians contend that the essence and principal consideration of the Church consist properly in the internal and saving gifts of the Holy Spirit, and therefore, they derive the definition of the Church from these, neglecting the external things of the Church. Therefore, the question is whether, when asked simply and absolutely what the true Church is, it should be

defined according to the Romanists from external things, namely, "the assembly of those who are united among themselves by the true profession of faith, the use of the sacraments, and subjection to legitimate pastors," or according to the majority of our theologians, from internal things, "the assembly of those whom God has effectually called to the participation of grace and glory in Christ the Savior," or at least, according to others with whom I agree, from both internal and external things, "the assembly of those whom God has called to salvation in Christ, who are united and joined together both in the internal communion of the same faith and charity and in the external profession of divine worship, order, and sacraments instituted by Jesus Christ our Lord, among whom, concerning that external profession, many hypocrites are mixed in."

The Romanists base their argument on the fact that Scripture presents the Church to us as a body distinguished by various organs, in which there is a great diversity of degrees and offices, and which is essentially and inherently distinguished into pastors and teachers and the people who are fed and governed by them. Moreover, many duties are prescribed to us concerning the Church, namely, that we do not cause it scandal, that we join it, and continually remain in its communion, that we defer to its authority, and listen to it, and perform many works of charity, both spiritual and corporal, toward its members, all of which indicate and suppose that the Church is an external society that can be certainly recognized by us and whose members we can see and distinguish from others.

However, when our theologians define the Church from those things which are internal only, they refer to various places where the Church is called the body and spouse of Christ, which He loved, and for which He procured salvation with His blood, and which He will one day present to His Father as glorious, without any spot or wrinkle; all of which apply only to those who are the living members of Christ, grafted into Him by faith and charity.

But the third opinion, which is ours, is based on both foundations; for since Scripture attributes to the Church both things that denote an external and visible society, as well as things that can only be referred to an internal communion, whose bond is internal and hidden in the heart, the Church cannot be sufficiently described and defined by these or those alone, but both must enter into the definition of the Church so that we may have a full and perfect notion of the Church.

Furthermore, since it is conceded on both sides that there is only one Church, and therefore the promises made to the Church in Scripture pertain to one and the same Church, which has in itself some things visible and some things invisible, the only disagreement between the Romanists and our theologians is that the Romanists contend that those promises, especially the one about the perpetual guidance and continuous assistance of the Holy Spirit promised by God to the Church, pertain to the Church as an external and visible society, and therefore are fulfilled not only in the internal and true members of the Church but also in those who are only dead and external members of the Church. Our theologians, however, refer those promises to those only who are in the internal communion of the Church, not to those who are only in the external communion, in whom the fulfillment of those promises is sought in vain.

Since the Romanists define the Church by external and visible elements, while our theologians primarily define it by internal elements that cannot be perceived by the senses, they pronounce and feel differently about who should be considered part of the Church or outside it. The Romanists simply say that all who are in the external communion of the Church, even if they are not in the internal communion, are part of the Church. Conversely, all who are not in the external communion of the Church, even if they belong to the internal communion, are simply said to be outside the Church. On the other hand, our theologians assert that all who are in the internal communion of the Church, even if they are not in the external communion, are simply part of the Church. Conversely, those who are not in the internal communion of the Church, even if they are in the external communion, are simply said not to be part of the Church, and they only pertain to it in a certain respect.

Therefore, if someone asks about impious hypocrites and hidden infidels who externally profess faith and submit to the external order of the Church, whether they are part of the Church and true members of it, the Romanists simply affirm this, while our theologians simply deny it. In this matter, it seems to be merely a dispute over words. For the Romanists concede to our theologians that such hypocrites indeed pertain to the body of the Church, but not to its soul, and that they are members of the Church, not living but dead, and that they are in the Church in the way that excrements and bad humors are in the human body. Conversely, our theologians acknowledge that such people pertain to the visible society of the Church and are indeed in the external communion of the Church and are true external parts of it. Thus, not only can the Church exercise authority and discipline over them, which it cannot do to those who are entirely outside, but more importantly, they can be true leaders of the Church and hold true authority over its members, to which the faithful are obliged to submit. For none of us deny that the office of a true and legitimate pastor can fall to an impious and hypocritical person.

On the other hand, if someone asks about adults who foster and profess faith but are not yet baptized, who are called catechumens, and also about those who have been excommunicated from the Church but still retain faith and charity in their hearts, whether they are part of the Church and should be considered true members of it, the Romanist doctors simply deny it, while our theologians affirm it. However, there seems to be agreement in reality; for such individuals, according to the Romanists, pertain, as they say, to the soul of the Church and the mystical body of Christ to be granted salvation by Him. Our theologians concede that such individuals are not, at least absolutely and perfectly, part of the visible Church, that is, they do not pertain to the external society of the Church, nor are they aggregated to any particular Church, which does not prejudice their salvation according to both sides. See Whitaker on the Church against Bellarmine.

Regarding the unbaptized children of the faithful, there is a real controversy about whether they pertain to the Church. For such infants, according to the Romanists, do not pertain to the Church in any way, while our theologians contend that they follow the condition of their parents and are in God's covenant and constitute part of the visible Church, at least pertaining to

the external communion of the Church, as is particularly evident in the Anglican confession, chapter 25, and in Bucanus' work on the Church, in the definition of the Church.

Concerning heretics, some Romanists, as we have previously noted, contend that they are part of the Church, and the same opinion is held by some of our theologians, who consider them part of the visible Church. But the majority of our theologians and even the doctors of the Roman Church exclude heretics absolutely and simply.

Regarding schismatics, our theologians distinguish between the authors of schism and the followers of schism. They unanimously exclude the authors of schism along with the Romanists. But they have a milder view of the followers and consider that they can pertain to both the internal and external communion of the Church, which some Romanists also agree with. However, the majority of them oppose this view, excluding schismatics entirely and simply from the Church and condemning them to eternal damnation.

Both sides agree that the elect for life belong to the Church in an eminent and special way and are its most noble members. However, whether they belong to the Church in actuality before conversion is affirmed by some of our theologians but denied by the majority along with all the Romanists.

Whether the Church consists of the elect only is a major and more difficult controversy. The Romanists teach that reprobates can have a place not only in the external but also in the internal communion of the Church, believing that true faith and charity can temporarily fall upon a reprobate person. Our theologians acknowledge that reprobates are indeed mixed with the elect in the visible Church, that is, both pertain to the external communion of the Church, but they deny that any reprobate is ever an internal member of the Church because they unanimously hold that true and living faith is a gift unique and peculiar to the elect, of which no reprobate can be a partaker.

CHAPTER III.

On the Visibility and Invisibility of the Church

Visible here refers to what can be certainly perceived by external senses and can be pointed out, like a terrestrial kingdom, about which we can judge with certainty and distinction from external things that fall into our senses what belongs to it and what does not. In this sense, the Church is taught to be visible by the Pontificians, namely, they claim it can be pointed out as though with an extended finger, no less than any civil republic, and that the true members of the Church can be recognized and distinguished by sensible signs without any doubt or danger of error. For, as it was explained in the previous chapter, they argue that the Church is a society bound by certain external ties, such as the profession of the same faith, the use of sacraments, and subjection to legitimate pastors, from which they judge that the Church should be defined, and in which, according to them, the true nature of the Church properly consists. Therefore, in their view, it is visible and has properties that are proper and inseparable from it, so that it is necessarily and essentially an external society.

However, they do not deny that there are many invisible elements within the Church, such as faith, hope, charity, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, which they admit are indeed necessary for the Church and are found only within it. But they do not concede that these are required in each of its members to the extent that someone can be considered a true part of the Church without these. Nor does this prevent the Church from being visible, as can be seen in Bellarmine's work "On the Church Militant" (Book 3, Chapter 15, Response to the First Argument). For, he says, the body of any animal is visible and yet has many things inside it that are not seen, such as the heart, liver, vital spirits, and similar things. Thus, the visible Church has many invisible elements, like hope, faith, charity, etc., and although these invisible gifts are necessary in the Church and are found only in the Church, they are not found in all its parts, just as sensation is necessarily in an animal and only in an animal, and yet it is not in all its parts.

Some even argue that the Church is an external and visible assembly, but that recognizing that assembly as the true Church of God is something that is perceived not by sense but by faith. For these are Bellarmine's words in the same chapter, Response to the Sixth Argument: I say that something in the Church is seen, and something is believed; for we see the assembly of people which is the Church. But that this assembly is the true Church of Christ, we do not see but believe. And in the last part, he says, Finally, that thing, or as we speak logically, that incomposite, of which the nature and definition of the Church is predicated, is a visible thing, but the connection of the predicate with the subject is held by faith alone. He illustrates this with examples, adding, the apostles saw the man who is Christ the Son of God, and yet they did not see that he was Christ the Son of God but believed it. And in the Creed, we say, I believe in one baptism, although we see and feel the baptism, that is, the sprinkling of water and the pronouncement of words; for we do not see but believe that sprinkling of water and pronouncement of words to be the baptism of Christ, that is, a certain sacrament.

But although the Pontificians think that some internal and invisible things are proper to the Church and are found only in it, they nonetheless define it only from external things, nor do they want any internal things to be precisely and directly included in the notion of the Church, and therefore they want the Church to be called simply visible, not invisible. Thus, in the Church, as far as it is visible and consists of those members that can be distinguished and perceived by external senses without error, they think the promises made to the Church about the continuous guidance of the Holy Spirit and his perpetual assistance are fulfilled.

As for our theologians, it is clear from what was explained in the previous chapter that they distinguish a twofold state in the Church, or, as others prefer to speak, a twofold form, namely, one internal and the other external. They teach that the internal form or internal state of the Church consists in faith, hope, and charity, and other virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit; the external state or form, in the ministry of the word, the use of sacraments, and the exercise of sacred discipline. Hence, they take the opportunity to distinguish the Church into invisible and visible, by which distinction they do not intend to designate a twin and double Church, but only two different respects of one and the same Church, which is invisible in respect of that internal form, which consists in things that are hidden and removed from the senses, but visible in respect

of the external form, which consists in things that fall into the senses. Hence it is clear that our doctors do not simply deny that the Church is visible, nor affirm that it is absolutely and in every part invisible; but acknowledge that the Church is in some respect visible, in some respect invisible.

However, because, as was also said above, they think that the true nature and essence of the Church are chiefly and principally placed in those things that are internal, nor do they want to simply and absolutely say of the Church and consider as its true members and parts those who only participate in the external communion of the Church, as many hypocrites do, therefore they prefer to say simply and absolutely that the Church is invisible rather than visible, and deny that the true members of the Church can be discerned and distinguished by the senses.

To better understand this matter, it should be noted that our theologians acknowledge that the living, true members of the Church are not in every way and entirely invisible, but they make some distinctions here; for they distinguish between confused and distinct knowledge or vision, and also between absolute and infallible certainty and moral or conjectural certainty. They indeed deny that the true and internal members of the Church can be distinctly known from things that fall into the senses, and with a certain infallible certainty, since there is nothing external that a hypocrite cannot simulate. But they still concede that they can be seen, at least confusedly and indistinctly. For since the word of God is never preached in vain; wherever the ministry of the word is instituted, and the public profession of faith takes place, we can be certain that some truly pious and faithful persons are found there, and thus internal and true members of the Church, although we cannot point them out individually and distinguish them from hypocrites without any danger of error.

Nevertheless, we do not entirely lack some distinct knowledge of them. For from the fruits of righteousness, repentance, charity, and works of piety, we can not only confusedly but also distinctly discern the true members of the Church and judge that this or that person should be considered as such, although that distinct knowledge will indeed be conjectural rather than certain and infallible. Moreover, by the judgment of charity, we should consider all those who retain the profession of faith and the use of the sacraments as true members of the Church, as long as we have no other evidence to the contrary. This knowledge and judgment of charity are sufficient for us to cultivate communion with them and perform those duties which we are commanded to render to those who are true members of the Church. But if we consider that external form which our theologians acknowledge in the Church, and ask whether this or that person belongs to the external communion of the Church, then they admit that it is something about which we can judge distinctly and certainly from external things and those that fall into sense, and to that extent they teach that the Church is properly visible. But because, according to them, what properly constitutes the Church does not consist in those external things, but in those that are internal and hidden, and because someone being in the external communion of the Church does not make him a true and proper member of the Church, and simply to be called such, but only equivocally and in a certain respect. Therefore, from the fact that the Church is in a certain respect visible and is called such, they deny that it follows that the visible members are

true members of the Church, in whom the promises of Christ are fulfilled, especially that of the anointing which teaches all things and the Spirit who leads into all truth.

To understand more clearly what our position is in this matter, we acknowledge that Christ has established an external and visible ministry of the word and a certain order of discipline in his Church, according to which pastors should govern the people, and the faithful people should obey the pastors. But at the same time, we teach and observe that Divine Providence permits that this external state and order of the Church may often be obscured in various ways, and sometimes almost entirely disappear from sight, which sometimes happens due to the cruelty of tyrants and persecutors of the Church, so that the pastors of the Church are scattered and exiled, and the faithful are deprived of the freedom to hold ecclesiastical assemblies, hence the external form of the Church no longer appears.

Furthermore, a similar problem arises in the Church from errors and superstitions that gradually increase within it, gradually obscuring and deforming its external appearance until heresies and idolatrous worships finally take over. Thus, true believers are forced to hide among the wicked and idolaters, as happened in the ten tribes during the time of Elijah, and even in the Jewish Church at times when certain impious kings introduced idols into the very temple of God, supported by priests and those who oversaw sacred matters among the Jewish people, promoting impiety.

They argue that a similar disaster has befallen the Christian Church. In the early centuries after Christ, the Church experienced flourishing times in which the order of discipline thrived, the purity of divine worship was maintained, and the ecclesiastical ministry was very illustrious due to the piety and exceptional doctrine of those who led the Church at that time. But gradually, various errors, abuses, and superstitions crept into the Church, until eventually the doctrine of Christ, in many parts, was so corrupted, and divine worship so contaminated with idolatry and superstition that true believers were oppressed and hidden among the wicked. After long seeking the reformation of the entire Church in vain, they were compelled to secede from those who preferred to defend pernicious errors and blatant and intolerable superstition rather than yield to the truth and correct those entrenched abuses confirmed by ancient custom.

Moreover, from this, it appears that the Pontificians acknowledge that there are certain invisible aspects within the Church, which can only be perceived by faith alone. Conversely, our doctors do not deny that there is something visible and external in the Church that falls under the senses. Hence, it is concluded that both agree that the Church is not visible in such a way that it is in no respect invisible, nor is it so invisible that it is not in some respect visible.

Furthermore, both parties agree that the Church is not distinctly and certainly visible in its living and more perfect members, but such members can only be recognized confusedly; or if distinctly, not with complete certainty, but only with what they call the judgment of charity. Regarding external parts, they agree that it is both certainly and distinctly visible.

The disagreement, however, lies in the fact that the Pontifician doctors, measuring and defining the Church primarily by externals, want to say absolutely and simply that the Church is visible, not invisible, even though there are some invisible elements within it. Our theologians,

on the other hand, defining the Church primarily by internal aspects, prefer to say simply and absolutely that the Church is invisible rather than visible.

Furthermore, the major question is whether those promises in which Christ promises his Spirit to the Church, who will teach it all truth, are fulfilled in the invisible Church, or also in the visible Church. That is, whether these promises are fulfilled only in those who are in the internal, thus invisible, communion of the Church, or also in those who are in the external and visible communion of the Church. The former is affirmed by our theologians, and the latter by the doctors of the Roman Church.

Additionally, it is highly controversial whether that external form of the Church, which consists of the ministry of the word and sacraments, and the governance of ecclesiastical overseers, which renders the Church visible, remains in the Church not only simply but also prominently, so that the Church can be easily and at all times visible and pointed out, as it were, with the finger. Thus, there should have been solemn and celebrated assemblies in all ages where the pure doctrine of Christ was publicly proclaimed and the true and sincere worship of God was administered openly before all eyes. And even now, places and seats of such assemblies should be able to be designated and noted by historians. This is affirmed by the doctors of the Roman Church, but our theologians deny it, asserting that it is not necessary for the Church to be visible in this way at all times, but the external state of the Church can be obscured and disturbed in various ways, as has already been explained. Specifically, they contend that this visible prominence is not inseparable from the Christian Church, but that it was to be taken away from it for a time, as can be gathered from predictions contained in Sacred Scripture, such as what is foretold in 2 Thessalonians 2 about a singular and great defection in the Church, and that the son of perdition and man of sin would sit in the temple of God, that is, usurp tyranny in the Church. And in Revelation, it is implied that God's people would be held captive in Babylon until they hear the voice, "Come out of her, my people," and similar things.

But to make it clearer in what the essence and significance of this controversy about the visibility of the Church consists, it must be observed that it originates from when, at the beginning of the Reformation, our doctors argued against various corruptions by which the doctrine and discipline, and even the worship of the Roman Church had been depraved. Their adversaries appealed to the judgment of the Church, that is, of councils representing the Church. For since the Church is to be led into all truth necessary for salvation by its spouse Christ through the Holy Spirit, according to the promises made to it in the divine word, they claimed we could safely acquiesce to its judgment. To which our doctors responded that the true Church, which is led by the Spirit of Christ, cannot be certainly and distinctly perceived by the eyes so that we can approach it whenever we want and hear its judgment and sentence. For it does not consist in some external and visible assembly of pastors and overseers of the Church, but in truly pious and God-fearing individuals who adhere to their head Christ with living faith and unfeigned charity and often lie hidden among a much greater multitude of the wicked and hypocrites.

Hence, it is clear that the question is whether the true Church, which is led by the Spirit of Christ into all truth, is so visible that we can certainly and distinctly discern it with our eyes and hear it speaking whenever we want in some external and visible assembly representing it. This is affirmed by the Pontificians, but we deny it.

Finally, after the cruelty and obstinacy of their adversaries forced our doctors to secede from the Roman Church and leave its communion to hold their assemblies separately, the Pontificians thought they could evidently prove that the true Church was not with our people, since they could neither point out nor show where, before the Reformation and in all past ages, there were assemblies similar to ours, where the same doctrine and order and manner of worshiping God were observed. They assumed that the external and visible form of the Church, which consists in the pure preaching of the word and the use of sacraments, and the legitimate order of discipline, could never be separated from the Church; but that these should always flourish and be prominent within it, so that at all times it should be possible to point out where the Church held its solemn assemblies and had its pastors, purely and sincerely teaching the true doctrine. Our theologians, on the other hand, contend that the external state of the Church is often obscured and disturbed in various ways, both by rampant persecutions and by various errors and abuses arising within it and gradually increasing. Consequently, the Church is sometimes forced to flee into the desert to hide in corners, as it were. Sometimes, however, it needs to be reformed in doctrine, worship, and discipline, and thus many things must be changed in its external form. Therefore, the question is whether the Church is so visible that it can never be forced to hide when oppressed by enemies, and whether the pure preaching of the word and the legitimate administration of discipline and sacraments should always be prominent and conspicuous within it. This is affirmed by the doctors of the Roman Church, but our theologians deny it.

Chapter III.

Can the Church Fail, or On the Perennial Duration of the Church

Is the duration of the Church on earth perpetual and eternal, by the ordinance of God revealed and manifested in His Word? According to the Doctors of the Roman Church, from the beginning of mankind, God has always had a Church on earth, and will continue to have one until the end of the world, without any interruption. They define the Church as a society of those united by the profession of the same faith, the use of the same sacraments, and submission to legitimate pastors. By stating that the Church perpetually remains on earth, they also assert that it is perpetually visible. Their view is that there has always been and will continue to be a public and visible society on earth worshipping the true God, professing pure doctrine, and having its pastors and teachers who purely teach the Word of God and administer the sacraments sincerely, visible to all.

Our theologians, with equal consensus and constancy, teach that the Church's duration on earth is perpetual, and there has never been a time without a true Church of God on earth, and as

long as the world stands, there will always be a Church. However, they primarily define the Church by internal qualities, not by what is visible, and consider the true and proper form of the Church to consist of faith, charity, and piety of heart. Thus, they believe there has never been a time when there were no truly pious and faithful people worshiping God with a pure heart and destined for eternal salvation. Whether they will always construct an external form of the Church among themselves, and therefore whether there will always be a visible Church, is a matter on which they do not all speak in the same manner. Some seem to admit that the Church indeed remains perpetually on earth, but deny that it is perpetually visible. The distinguished Amyraldus, in the Salmurian Theses on the visibility and invisibility of the Church, Theses 17 and 21, teaches that there are times when the external appearance of the universal Church is so obscured that it is visible to no one, and other times when some parts of it are visible and others invisible. On the contrary, Tilenus in his dissertation on the Church, Theses 35 and following, asserts that no particular Church can lose its external and visible form, but no matter what happens, there will always be some visible Church on earth, even if there is no place where its seat is fixed, and from where it cannot be moved. After saying in Thesis 3 that there will never be a time when no assembly of the faithful remains, he adds in Thesis 4 that we understand this statement not only of the internal form of the Church which is invisible but also of the external which is visible. Thus, the duration of the Church is not only perpetual but also visible.

The learned Camero, in his treatise on the perpetual and uninterrupted duration of the Church, seems to make a distinction between the Church of the Old and the New Testament. He believes that the Church of the Old Testament sometimes ceased to be visible. For he says that in the times of the Old Testament, sometimes by the authority and counsel of those in charge of sacred matters, the worship of God was entirely hidden, and the Jewish Church was sometimes in such gross darkness that it could appear completely extinct. But he thinks otherwise of the Church of the New Testament, believing it has never ceased to be visible. For he says, unlike in the Old, in the New Testament we do not deny the visibility of the Church, as we recognize that in the Old Testament, sometimes the marks of the Church entirely disappeared, whereas in the New Testament we affirm that although the marks have sometimes disappeared, they have not completely vanished.

Nevertheless, regarding the matter itself, our theologians do not seem to disagree, at least with respect to the Church of the New Testament. Those who maintain, like Tilenus, that the Church is perpetually visible, acknowledge that the Church is obscured in various ways and does not always expose its external and visible form to the eyes of enemies to avoid their snares and attacks. Thus, Tilenus speaks of the militant Church in his second dissertation, Thesis 6. The Church has certain cycles, like the moon receiving more or less light from the sun, not fixed in place, but subject to various changes, eclipses, and vicissitudes, especially when it is obscured by the clouds of persecutions or the vapors and clouds of heresies. And in Thesis 7, he says, it is one thing for the Church to entirely strip off and lay down its form, another thing to not expose it to the eyes of its enemies, that is, dogs and swine. We deny the former, but affirm the latter.

Conversely, those who say that the Church sometimes becomes invisible and inconspicuous do not believe that no external and visible form remains at all in the Church, but only that it is so obscured that it can hardly be recognized, and thus they teach that the Church sometimes becomes inconspicuous and invisible not simply and absolutely but comparatively and in some respect. Camero explains this in his treatise on the perpetual duration of the Church. He says, the Church is said to be obscured in this controversy not only when there is no Church, but when it hides, and not even this alone, but when it is so hidden that it is not apparent to the eyes of men as it was or could have been. But after a few interjections, he says, we say the Church has not failed absolutely but comparatively, that is, the Church of the New Testament has not been equally clear and conspicuous at all times, for it was very bright in the beginning, followed by a decrease in brightness, then it was obscured but not completely, and finally, after being obscured, it shone again.

To better understand this, we must remember what makes the Church visible is the ministry of the Word and sacraments and the external order of governance instituted by Christ. It can happen that the violence and snares of persecutors and enemies of the Church disturb its order so much that pastors are forced to either leave or hide, and the faithful can rarely, with difficulty, and very secretly hold their meetings to hear the Word of God preached and receive the sacraments, in which case the Church escapes the sight of its enemies, although it does not cease to be visible to some within and belonging to it.

Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, various abuses, errors, and superstitions may gradually arise and emerge in the Church, obscuring divine truth and polluting the worship of God, and weakening Church discipline, which with time may so prevail that the doctrine of salvation is almost buried by human inventions and can hardly be discerned by the faithful, so that ultimately there is a need for the Church to be reformed in discipline and doctrine, and to endure great struggles to secure the salvation of the elect. Our theologians assert that this has indeed happened in the Christian Church. When this occurs, the order of governance instituted by Christ in the Church is not entirely abolished but only degenerates and becomes tyrannical. Some preaching of the Word remains, but the doctrine of salvation is so involved in errors that the faithful must beware of the leaven of their pastors, just as the pious did in the time of the Pharisees, accepting their teaching but guarding against their leaven. Finally, the use of the sacraments is not entirely removed, and their substance remains in the Church, but various corruptions are mixed in, so the external form of the Church, which makes it visible, is not entirely removed and does not vanish, but it is greatly obscured.

Therefore, our theologians acknowledge that the Church, even regarding its external and visible state, perpetually remains; but they also admit that it undergoes various changes and becomes so obscure that it can hardly be recognized, and thus they compare the Church in this respect to a man who is initially healthy, but gradually becomes sick and languishes until the disease becomes severe and eventually lethal, and who finally begins to recover and regain his original health. For they say, such a man, from birth to old age, in which he is assumed to have recovered from the disease, perpetually subsists, but not in the same way.

Firstly, he was healthy and strong, then he became languid and weak, then gravely and lethally ill, and finally restored to his former health. Similarly, the church never failed, but perpetually remained, though not in the same state. At first, it was indeed pure, but gradually errors and superstitions crept in, making it impure. This evil grew over time until it reached an extreme, until God preserved His church from total defection and destruction through the Restoration and Reformation which He provided in recent times, as can be seen especially in the learned Mestrezat's book on the church, book 2, chapter 16, where he discusses this doctrine in detail.

But although all our theologians agree that the church perpetually remains, they strictly maintain that the church is not tied to any specific place or seat, and no particular church can legitimately and without presumption promise itself perpetual duration.

Furthermore, from what has been said, it is clear that both the Pontificians and our theologians unanimously teach that the church's duration on earth is perpetual, and that God has always had, and will have until the end of the world, some church on earth.

Nor is the question properly about whether the Christian church at least has always had, and will continue to have, some external and visible form, and whether by God's ordinance there should always be some external society on earth that can be called the church of Christ, in which eternal salvation can also be obtained. For this, our theologians do not deny.

But first, the question is whether there is any particular church fixed in a specific place that can promise itself perpetual duration. This, our theologians unanimously deny, though many of the Pontificians attribute this glory to the church of the city of Rome; for they assert that the Roman particular church can never fail, and that the seat of Peter and the Pontifical seat will perpetually remain in Rome, which they contend is the foundation of the church and the center of ecclesiastical communion; such is the opinion of Robert Bellarmine in "De Summo Pontifice" book 4, chapter 4, although others are unwilling to assert that the true church and the supreme Pontificate, without which they believe the church cannot stand, are so attached to certain parts of the earth that they cannot be transferred elsewhere.

However, the main question is whether by God's decree there must perpetually be on earth not just some church that is in some way visible, but one in which the pure and uncorrupted profession and preaching of heavenly doctrine and faith always shines forth and stands out, with legitimate pastoral governance, and which is exposed to the eyes of all and can be easily recognized and distinguished by anyone. This the Doctors of the Roman Church affirm, but our theologians deny, asserting that the church is sometimes greatly obscured, and its external and visible order disturbed, as has often been explained.

Chapter IV

Can the Church Err, or About the Constancy of the Church in Retaining the Faith

The Pontificians observe that the name "church" designates not only the entire multitude and assembly of the faithful, which is the church properly and simply so-called, but also the whole body of bishops and church leaders, which is the representative church. Whether taken in the former or latter sense, they commonly teach that the church cannot err, neither in matters absolutely necessary nor in other matters proposed as to be believed and done. Hence, when they say the church cannot err, they mean that whatever all the faithful hold as a matter of faith must necessarily be true and of faith, and likewise, whatever all bishops teach as pertaining to the faith must necessarily be true and of faith.

Furthermore, they note that when it is said that the church cannot err, this is true not only of the ancient church, which could not err in faith, but also of the church as it now is and will be until the end of the world; for it is never possible for the church to believe or propose anything false to be believed.

However, it must be known that there are some doctors of the Roman church who admit that the church's faith cannot fail, and that God is perpetually present with the church, so that true faith and charity never cease in it. Nevertheless, they teach that the church can receive and propose as true a thing that is false and not revealed by God. For example, suppose it is not revealed by God that the Virgin Mary was immune from original sin. They say that even if the church believed that the holy Virgin was conceived without sin and defined it to be believed by all, it would not be considered a loss of faith; for although it would be in error, a probable and blameless error does not exclude the church's faith. Melchior Canus attributes this opinion to some of his own in "De Locis Theologicis" book 4, chapter 4, conclusion 2, and says that this opinion is seen in Thomas Cardinal de Turrecremata, Alphonsus à Castro, and the interlinear gloss on the phrase "the gates of hell shall not prevail against it"; but today the Roman school, by common consensus, opposes this and holds that the church can in no way err in believing. And when it is said that the church cannot err in faith, the faithful should understand this to mean that whatever the church holds as a doctrine of faith is true, and nothing that the church believes or teaches should be considered false.

Moreover, when the Pontifical doctors assert that the church cannot err in moral precepts and doctrines of faith, by "church," they mean the universal church, for otherwise they admit that particular churches are liable to error and can reject something that is not contrary to faith as though it were, and accept something as a doctrine of faith that is not actually part of the faith. Similarly, when they teach that bishops and pastors of the church, whom they call the representative church, cannot err, they mean bishops universally and collectively considered and agreeing in the same opinion; for otherwise, they acknowledge that individual bishops, and even many of them together, can fall into error and be mistaken in the doctrine of faith.

Nevertheless, there are some who maintain that not only the universal church is free from all error but also attribute the same privilege to the particular Roman church. Among them is Bellarmine in "De Summo Pontifice" book 4, chapter 4, where his second proposition is, "Not only can the Roman Pontiff not err in faith, but neither can the particular Roman church."

Now if one were to ask whether any church erring in some matter, especially in morals, thereby ceases to be a true church and becomes unworthy of the name "church," the Pontifical doctors seem to affirm this. For Cardinal Perronius in his work against the King of Great Britain contends that if the church has erred in any of the controversies, both ancient and modern, it has thereby fallen from the title of the true church. Especially in book 1, chapter 60, page 483, he asserts that it is essential and necessary for the church to be pure and undefiled in faith, and that the communion of the Greeks, Armenians, and Ethiopians is thereby proven not to be the true church, for none of them are free from some error, and their doctrine of faith is corrupted in some way. And certainly, if the true church cannot believe anything false in the doctrine of faith, it follows that any communion that believes and maintains something false is not the true church. However, according to the doctrine of the Roman church, this distinction must be made: not every error in faith immediately separates one from the body of the church and places them outside the church. If a doctor or private person can err in some question of faith and yet remain in communion with the church, it follows that even if some particular church errs in a similar manner, it can still be considered part of the universal church and thus a true particular church. Thus, the African church in the time of Cyprian held that the baptism of heretics was invalid and that those baptized by heretics should be baptized again, which was some error in faith, yet the Pontifical doctors do not consider the African church to have been cut off from the body of the universal church. Therefore, they assert that the church cannot err, meaning it is impossible for all the faithful collectively and all the doctors of the church to fall into any error; but they do not thereby exclude all faithful and all doctors who have fallen into some error. Instead, they distinguish various degrees and types of error. For the error that denies something properly and strictly of faith, according to them, places all who hold it outside the communion of the church and prevents any society implicated in such error from constituting part of the church. This is what they call heresy. However, they speak of faith properly, not as anything that God has revealed in His Word and handed down to the church through the prophets and apostles, but only what the church has sanctioned and defined as such. Therefore, many things were not considered articles of faith centuries ago because they had not yet been defined by councils, but now they must be regarded as articles of faith after being confirmed by the authority of councils. Thus, they could have been denied in former times by those who were nonetheless acknowledged as members of the church; but today, those who deny them are considered heretics and alien to the church. For example, it was not considered a heresy in the past, nor a pernicious error, to believe that heretics should be rebaptized, or that Easter should be celebrated on the 14th day of the moon and not on the following Sunday, or that the books of the Maccabees were not canonical and of equal authority with the prophetic books. But after the definitions of the Nicene and recently celebrated Tridentine councils, these are now considered heresies, and anyone who holds these views is deemed alien to the church.

Therefore, to sum up briefly, this is the opinion of the doctors of the Roman church on the proposed question: First, that multitude which, in common doctrine, holds some error as a matter of faith, which is not really of faith, or rejects something that truly pertains to faith, cannot

constitute the body of the universal and visible church. Secondly, any particular assembly that denies and rejects even a single article of faith, that is, something which the church has once approved and sanctioned by common consent to be believed and accepted by the faithful, is outside the communion of the church and cannot be numbered among its parts. Thirdly, they admit that there are some errors regarding matters of faith and divine worship which do not constitute either a private person or any assembly outside the communion of the universal church, and which may exist in a congregation that is part of the true church.

Moreover, it must always be remembered that the Pontificians understand by the name "church" not anything other than a certain external and visible society of those who profess the doctrine of Christ and are subject to the pastors instituted by Him, or the very assembly of pastors who govern the church. Hence, this is the church to which they attribute the privilege of not erring, and to which they claim the promises of the perpetual assistance of the Holy Spirit apply, who will guide it into all truth. Thus, they believe that there should perpetually be on earth a certain assembly that is exposed to the eyes of all and to which all can consult on doubts arising about faith, and whose judgment they ought to accept.

As for our theologians, when asked whether the church on earth, which is the sole subject of this question, can err in matters of faith and religion, they neither simply deny nor simply affirm it; instead, they apply various distinctions. First, they distinguish between errors that overthrow the foundation of religion and cannot coexist with true faith and piety, and other errors that indeed err in the doctrine of faith and religion, but whose fault does not overthrow the foundation of religion, and with which it is not impossible for someone to retain sincere piety and saving faith in their heart.

Furthermore, they use their usual distinction of the church into visible and invisible. By these different appellations, they do not mean, as has often been observed before, two different churches, but one and the same church considered either in terms of only internal communion and as consisting of those who have been given to Christ according to the purpose of eternal election and are united to Him by true faith and charity, in which respect it is called the invisible church; or in terms of its external and visible state, consisting of those who are externally connected by the profession of true faith in Christ and the use of the same sacraments, and are subject to the pastors instituted by Christ, in which respect it is called the visible church. This visible church is further distinguished here into the universal church, which is considered to consist of all those assemblies that embrace the saving doctrine of Christ and use the sacraments instituted by Him; and into particular churches, by which are meant either individual assemblies of those who meet in Christ's name in a certain place to worship God according to His Word; or the society of many such assemblies bound together by certain laws and using a particular form of governance, such as when we speak of the Church of England or the Church of the Netherlands.

With these premises, to the question of whether the church can err in the doctrine of faith and religion, our theologians respond that the invisible church, properly so-called, consisting of those who are truly united to Christ by faith according to the purpose of eternal election, cannot

fall into pernicious error or depart from the foundations of faith. This is the church said to have an anointing from the Holy One and to which Christ has promised His Spirit, who will guide it into all saving truth; and this follows from the common doctrine of our theologians, who, as shown in the previous chapter, acknowledge that the duration of the true church on earth is perpetual and uninterrupted. For if that entire church were to fall into pernicious error, it would thereby cease to be the true church, and the duration of the church on earth would be interrupted. Indeed, to say that the entire church, properly so-called, cannot fall into pernicious error is, according to our theologians, the same as saying that there will always be some faithful adherents of the saving doctrine of Christ on earth.

However, our theologians do not deny that even the church, properly so-called, can fall into some error, provided it is not a pernicious error that overthrows the foundations of piety. For the Holy Spirit does not so enlighten the minds of the faithful on earth as to leave no remaining weakness and ignorance in them, as the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 13: "We know in part and we prophesy in part," and thus it is possible for even the truly pious and faithful to be held in some error concerning matters of faith and religion, provided that error is not pernicious and destructive.

As for the so-called visible church, that is, the assemblies of those who externally profess the faith and discipline of Christ, our theologians unanimously assert that there is no particular church, that is, no external assembly of Christians distinct and identifiable from others, about which we should believe it can never err in faith or depart from the true doctrine of faith. For no such particular assembly has ever been divinely promised this. However, they do not wish to immediately deny the character of a church to any assembly that falls into some error in the doctrine of faith, nor do they wish it to cease being considered a member of the true church, unless that error is such that it overthrows the very foundation of faith.

Indeed, whether the universal visible Church is subject to errors in faith, that is, whether all assemblies of Christians who outwardly profess the saving faith of Christ, taken together and collectively, can fall into such errors—on this matter our doctors believe that nothing prevents all these assemblies from being held in some common error regarding matters of faith and religion, admitting as true what is contrary to the Word of God and rejecting as false what is agreeable to the Word of God. There is no disagreement on this matter if the error in question does not overthrow the foundation, but can coexist with true faith and charity.

However, if the question is about a pernicious error that overturns the foundations of piety, there does not seem to be a single opinion or at least not the same manner of speaking. Those who say that the visibility of the Church is not necessarily perpetual, and that it can sometimes happen that the Church becomes invisible to the eyes of men, do not need to maintain that the universal Church, constituted by individual visible Christian assemblies, cannot fall into fundamental and harmful errors. Therefore, the distinguished Amyraldus, who previously asserted this, as noted earlier, also denies this infallibility to the universal visible Church. And from the fact that each particular church, of which the universal church is a certain aggregate, is liable to any grave errors, he necessarily concludes that the whole composed of them can also

lose its integrity, as can be seen in his third volume, Salmurian Theses, disputation on the Church's infallibility, Thesis 33.

Others, however, who say that not only is the duration of the Church perpetual, but that there is always a visible Church on earth, must also say that the entire visible Church cannot simultaneously fall into pernicious error, for by this very fact it would cease to be the true visible Church. However, they admit, like all others, that the majority of those assemblies which constitute the visible Church can simultaneously fall into deadly errors, indeed completely depart from the faith, and that no particular visible assembly can be designated about which we can be certain that it will never fall from the faith. Although they assert that there is always a visible Church on earth, they do not attach it to any specific place, but acknowledge that God can and often does transfer His lampstand from one place to another, permitting unbelief to reign where the Word was previously purely preached, while elsewhere gathering other assemblies through the proclamation of the Word, who profess true faith in Him. Therefore, all our doctors agree that no assembly or church on earth can be designated whose judgment we can safely rely on as being entirely free from the danger of pernicious error.

From this, it is easy to conclude the state of this question, as the Pontificians concede to our theologians that particular churches are not immune from error, except perhaps the Roman Church as a particular church, as some of them like.

Our theologians, in turn, do not deny that the Church in some sense cannot err, at least in fundamentals. But the question is first whether the Church that militates on earth, in whatever sense it is taken, is so free from error that it cannot believe anything as true that is not true and conformable to the Word of God, nor reject anything that is not false and contrary to the Word of God, which the Pontificians affirm; our theologians, however, deny this. And the Pontifician doctors do not merely affirm this indiscriminately of the Church, but they state it as true of the entire visible Church, which alone they want to be properly called the Church. They deny that all those assemblies that profess the saving doctrine of Christ can ever agree in some common error, which our doctors admit. But since they consider those assemblies that adhere to the Roman Pontiff as the universal Church, our question with them comes to this: whether that Church which is subject to the Roman Pontiff as its head is entirely immune from error in matters of faith and morals, so that we can safely consult it on any question and controversy and be bound to acquiesce to its judgment. This they affirm as the first and chief principle of their faith, but we utterly deny, nor do we believe that any Church can be designated and pointed out as immune from error, whose consensus and judgment we must hold as the rule of faith, which they strictly maintain.

Chapter Five

On the Marks of the Church According to the Pontificians

Here, above all, the Doctors of the Roman Church assert that the true Church is like a certain sun, which spreads its rays everywhere and makes itself easily seen and known by all.

This is equivalent to saying that the Church possesses a light within itself by which it can be distinguished and recognized from other sects and communions that attempt to claim the name and title of the Church for themselves. Moreover, this light consists of certain signs and testimonies that distinguish the Church from all false religions of the pagans, Jews, and heretics, and although these do not make it evident that it is the true Church of God, they make it evidently credible. For there is a difference between being evidently true and being evidently credible. Evidently true is that which is known and exposed of itself, whether to the senses or to the intellect, or at least that which is necessarily and evidently deduced from principles known of themselves, just as, for example, geometric conclusions from their principles. Evidently credible, however, is that which, although not known of itself, nor falling under logical or mathematical demonstration, nevertheless has so many and such weighty testimonies and such illustrious signs and indications of its truth that any wise man ought rightly to believe it; and thus that which is evidently true in another sense, which others call logically or mathematically evident, or even having internal evidence of itself. Evidently credible is what others call morally evident or having only external evidence.

Furthermore, those signs and testimonies, by which it is rendered evidently credible or morally evident that this is the true Church, are what the Pontificians call the marks of the Church. These marks, as already mentioned, do not make this truth simply and absolutely evident according to the Pontificians, but, given the truth of Scripture and Church history, they want to prove the true Church evidently by these marks, and thus produce evidence of the truth, not just evidence of credibility, among those who admit both.

Moreover, the Doctors of the Roman Church variously enumerate and assign these marks, with some proposing more, others fewer. Bellarmine, whose footsteps we follow here, and whom many follow, lists fifteen marks of the Church. The first mark is the very name of the Catholic Church and Christians. Their meaning is that the true Church is called Catholic not only by its own members but also by its enemies and outsiders, and that this title is attributed to it by common usage and consent of men. Similarly, when they say that the name Christian is a mark of the Church, they understand those to constitute the true Church who are not merely called Christians but are distinguished from others by not being named after any particular man or having a specific dependence on him, unlike the Arians who indeed called themselves Christians but were named Arians after Arius, distinguishing them from other Christians.

The second mark of the Church, according to Bellarmine, is antiquity. His meaning is that among the Christian sects that dispute the title of the Church, those cannot rightfully claim this title whose founder after Christ can be designated, who first introduced new doctrines, the place where they began to preach, and who their first followers and opponents were. However, the true Church's beginning cannot be found or noted unless we go back to Christ and the Apostles (each of which he claims can be shown of all sects opposing the Roman Church) and that it does not adopt new doctrines about which it can be judged who, where, and when they began to be preached, or who first believed or opposed them, all of which he contends the

Roman Church rightfully attributes to itself, but which do not apply to our communion or any other Christian sect apart from the Roman one.

The third mark of the Church, according to him, is long and uninterrupted duration; namely, that heresies and erroneous sects last only a short time and are extinguished within a few years, whereas the true Church must have had perpetual duration from Christ until now, and it can be shown where and among whom it existed in each century since Christ.

The fourth mark for him is the extent or multitude and variety of believers. Not that he believes the number of those who at any time constitute the true Church necessarily always exceeds the number of any other then-existing sect; he admits that it could happen that only one province retains the true faith. However, his meaning is that the true Church of Christ must be propagated successively throughout the world, known and flourishing among various nations and provinces at different times, and since in these latter ages the Church has aged and the last times are approaching, it must necessarily be or have been in the greater part of the world, which he believes to be true of the Roman Church but not of the sects opposing it.

The fifth mark that Bellarmine assigns is the continuous succession of bishops and pastors from the Apostles to us. He asserts that the true Church cannot exist without true pastors and bishops, and that they are not true bishops who have not succeeded the Apostles or Apostolic men and have not been ordained by them. Moreover, he boasts that this succession of bishops from the Apostles to us is found in the Roman Church, especially in the Roman bishops, whose continuous series from the Apostle Peter to our times is traced; while, he argues, among us there are no pastors and bishops who have succeeded the Apostles and have been ordained by Apostolic men. He observes that the first of those who attempted to reform the Church conducted themselves as pastors and bishops without legitimate ordination, and even in places where there were already other legitimately ordained bishops, thus where there was a place for succession. Bellarmine observes that this mark, or the argument derived from this mark, is primarily used to prove that there is no Church where there is no succession, but it does not necessarily follow that there is a Church where there is succession.

The sixth mark for the Pontificians is the agreement in doctrine with the ancient Church. They suppose that the ancient Church, in the first four or five centuries after Christ, was and remained the true Church by everyone's confession, and therefore that Church which today teaches and hands down what was held by that ancient Church is the true Church, and that communion which holds as articles of faith those things that were formerly considered heresies cannot be such. They boast that the former applies to them even from the testimony of their adversaries, while they accuse our Church of the latter.

The seventh mark of the Church, according to them, is the unity of its members among themselves and with the head; that is, with the Bishop of Rome. Firstly, they strive to prove from several ancient testimonies that union with the Bishop of Rome was simply considered a mark of the true Church. Secondly, they argue that concord is a sign of the Kingdom of God, and that those who are discordant among themselves cannot constitute the Kingdom of God. Thus, they conclude that various assemblies that do not communicate with each other cannot simultaneously

be members of the true Church and form the Church. From this, they conclude that the Church cannot be with us since we disagree among ourselves, nor do we agree with the Lutherans, Anabaptists, Arminians, and other such sects into which we are daily divided and subdivided. In the Roman Church, however, they claim there is great concord and consensus about doctrines, and all who belong to it cultivate communion among themselves; hence, they argue that it should be recognized as the true Church and the Kingdom of Christ.

The eighth mark, according to Bellarmine, is the holiness of doctrine. They claim that the Church is called holy because its profession is holy, containing nothing false in terms of the doctrine of faith, and nothing unjust in terms of moral teaching. Hence, they argue that there is no true Church except the Roman one, since no other sect is free from manifest errors contrary to right reason, while the Roman Church alone teaches nothing of the kind.

The ninth mark is the efficacy of doctrine. Bellarmine uses this mark to argue that the Roman Church is the true Church because, throughout all centuries, it has converted many Gentiles and infidels to the faith of Christ and united them to itself, which no other Christian sect or any sect of philosophers has ever accomplished. As for the widespread acceptance of Islam, they claim it was achieved through terror and force of arms, not the efficacy of doctrine.

The tenth mark is the holiness of the life of the founders and early teachers of the religion. Bellarmine argues from this that the true Church is none other than the Roman Church, because the founders of religious orders and the teachers who defended the faith of the Roman Church and fought against various heresies were all, he says, so holy, chaste, pious, and sober that their adversaries have nothing to reproach them for except excessive holiness. In contrast, he claims that the authors of heresies and all other Christian sects were proud men, motivated by ambition, hatred, and envy to invent new doctrines.

The eleventh mark is the glory of miracles. To prove from this that the true Church is among them and not among their adversaries, they assume two foundations: one is that miracles are necessary to persuade new faith or extraordinary mission; the other is that they are effective and sufficient. From the former, they argue that the true Church is not with us, because those who undertook to reform the Church preached a new doctrine, or at least one different from what the ordinary pastors proposed, and were not sent by the ordinary pastors and leaders of the Church. Therefore, they should have confirmed both their doctrine and mission with miracles, which they did not do. From the latter, they argue that they are the true Church because true miracles have been performed and are still performed in the Roman Church in all ages.

The twelfth mark is the light of prophecy. They argue that the gift of prophecy was promised to the Church based on the words of Joel, chapter 2, which are referred to and explained by Peter the Apostle in Acts 2. From this, they argue that we are not the true Church because there have been no true prophets among us who foretold future events, whereas in the Roman Church they prove the presence of true prophets with examples of Bernard and Francis, who were founders of religious orders among them and predicted certain future events.

The thirteenth mark is the confession of adversaries. They say that the power of truth is such that it compels even adversaries to sometimes bear testimony to it. Now, they claim,

Catholics are never found to praise or approve the doctrine or life of any pagans or heretics, whereas pagans, Jews, Turks, and heretics have often given honorable testimony to Roman Catholics. To prove this concerning those they consider heretics, they cite testimonies from Calvin and Philip Melanchthon, who occasionally called Bernard, Francis, and Dominic pious and holy.

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The final mark is temporal prosperity, divinely bestowed upon those who defended the Church. Here they particularly emphasize the victories won by their adherents over the enemies of the Roman Church in recent times.

Moreover, our theologians think of these marks as follows: Regarding the first mark, which is the name of Christians and the Catholic Church, they say that it is wrong to judge things based on names, for the same name often remains while things change significantly, and conversely, the same thing is often designated by different names over time and circumstances. They argue that although the name "Catholic Church" remained in the Roman Church, it has greatly degenerated from the Church to which it succeeded in the name "Catholic." Our theologians rarely or no longer use the name "Catholics" because its meaning has changed, and it now designates those who adhere to the corruptions and abuses that gradually crept into the Church. As for being called Lutherans or Calvinists derogatorily, instead of simply Christians, they say this is done out of slander and insult, for they do not swear by the words of Calvin or any other man, nor do they accept their doctrine without examination, only as far as it is found conformable to the Word of God.

Regarding the second mark, which is antiquity, our theologians concede that the true Church cannot be one that is not ancient and does not have Christ as its author, but another after Christ. They assert, however, that the Roman Church, as it exists today, although it appears ancient, is actually new, while our Church, though it seems new, is actually ancient. For the Roman Church has departed far from the doctrine of Christ, and in it, a form of worship prevails that is very different from what Christ instituted. The fact that the time, author, and circumstances of the change in the Roman Church cannot be easily designated is because the change was not made all at once, but gradually and imperceptibly, as old age tends to creep upon the unwary, and the customs and languages of peoples gradually change. Now, our Church appears new because it has rejected and repudiated various abuses and errors that had long crept into the Church and has embraced and stood by the original and most ancient form of divine worship and doctrine delivered by Christ. Therefore, the Reformation instituted in our Church was indeed new, but it was made to the most ancient form of the Church, as if, after a very long

illness that gradually infected and occupied a man's body, health should return again. Our theologians, however, do not think that antiquity should be correctly considered as a mark of the Church unless its examination is conducted solely through the oldest and primary monument of Christian religion, namely the Holy Scripture. They argue that knowledge of inferior antiquity is very obscure and difficult to obtain, and that anything departing from that principle is new.

As for the third mark, which is long and uninterrupted duration, our theologians acknowledge that the true Church perpetually endures on earth and never completely fails and perishes; but they also recognize that it is subject to various changes and does not need to remain perpetually unchanged, whether regarding doctrine, worship, or discipline. For over time, various errors and abuses have gradually crept into and flourished in the Church, making it necessary to be reformed from time to time and assume a somewhat new form. New, I say, not in relation to the first and most ancient, but in relation to the corruption that has gradually crept in and prevailed. Therefore, it is not correctly concluded that it is not the true Church if some part similar to it in all aspects of doctrine and worship cannot be shown in every century since Christ. As for the Roman Church, our theologians deny that its duration from Christ to us has been so perpetual that there has always been a church holding the same doctrine and celebrating divine worship with the same rites as the modern Roman Church; for its appearance in the first centuries after Christ was very different from what it is in these latter times. Whatever the case, since the long and uninterrupted duration of any Church cannot be certainly known except through immense reading and accurate knowledge of ancient history, they argue that it is wrongly proposed as a mark of the Church, which should be obvious and easy to understand.

Regarding the fourth mark: amplitude or multitude our theologians say that this mark is proposed without reason as a mark of the Church, since the Church is called a "little flock" and is opposed to the world and universality, as Christ's faithful are said to be hated by all. Moreover, the Church is indeed said to be propagated among all nations, but this is fulfilled in a few elect from all the Gentiles. We do not deny that these are the last times, and that the true Church must have reached and become known to most nations. We say this has been fulfilled, even though the names of Luther or Calvin may not be known there. For neither Calvin nor Luther founded a new Church, nor are they the authors of our religion, but they only purged the Church of the Pontifical leaven. Therefore, our Church is present wherever true Christianity has been preached and accepted, not corrupted by fatal additions.

Regarding the fifth mark: succession of bishops our theologians say that the Roman Church vainly boasts of the succession of its bishops. They argue that Roman bishops and others in agreement with them have succeeded the ancient bishops no differently than darkness succeeds light. They indeed occupy the chairs of the ancient bishops, but preach a very different doctrine and engage in very different functions. Our pastors, however, we assert to have truly succeeded the Apostles in as much as they preach the true Apostolic doctrine, and are not without legitimate vocation, most of them having been called from the Roman Church itself to preach the Word of God and to take care of souls. Furthermore, we deny that the Church necessarily has a continuous succession of pastors teaching the Word of God purely and

uncorruptedly; for it often happens that the Church's pastors abuse their ministry and mix their inventions with God's Word, corrupting it with their leaven, as happened in the Jewish Church.

Regarding the sixth mark: agreement in doctrine with the ancient Church our theologians think that if by the ancient Church is meant the primitive and Apostolic Church, this is rightly and deservedly proposed as a mark of the Church. This is what they emphasize when they say the true Church's mark is conformity in doctrine, worship, and discipline with the Prophetic and Apostolic Scriptures, from which alone the appearance of the most ancient and primitive Church can be known. However, if by the ancient Church is meant the Church that flourished in the three or four centuries after the Apostles, they say that the true Church today must agree with it in the chief and fundamental points of doctrine since that old Church was also the true Church of Christ. Yet, they acknowledge that it had its blemishes, and therefore it is not necessary to require complete conformity with it. Nevertheless, they argue that agreement in doctrine and discipline with the Church of those earlier centuries is poorly proposed by the Pontificians as a mark of the Church, since the truth of this mark can only be known by those well-versed in the writings of the ancient Church fathers and highly learned in Greek and Latin literature, which very few people are. Therefore, they believe the true Church should be easier to recognize than by that agreement, which is improperly proposed as a mark of the Church as something unknown. Moreover, they argue that the Pontificians falsely boast of their Church's agreement in doctrine with the Church of the first four centuries, having departed far from it in many ways, as could be made manifest with numerous examples.

The seventh mark was the unity of the members among themselves and with the head, by which head they mean the Bishop of Rome, whom they claim to be the visible head of the Church. Our theologians, however, recognize no head of the Church except Christ, and therefore they simply deny that union with the head is a mark of the Church. If by the head of the Church is meant Christ Himself, union with Him indeed belongs to the Church and is something without which the Church cannot exist; but it cannot be called a mark of the Church, because it is something hidden and not perceived by the senses. If, however, by the head is meant some visible person, that is, a bishop who presides over all others, union with such a head cannot be a mark of the Church, as they acknowledge no such head in the Church. As for the union of the Church's members among themselves, they observe that it is either internal, whose bond is internal charity and faith; or external, which consists in external association and mutual communication. They say that neither should be assigned as a mark of the Church: not the former, because it is something hidden and invisible; nor the latter, because external communion is not always possible for various reasons, such as the distance of places, the diversity and dissension of public affairs or kingdoms in which the Church is gathered, and also because of schisms, which often arise in the Church due to human weakness, as in the time of Paul in the Church of the Corinthians. Though these blemish the Church, they do not abolish it or cause it to cease being the Church.

The eighth mark, which is the holiness of doctrine, is accepted by our theologians as good and legitimate. They believe judgment should be made about the Church from the truth and

holiness of its doctrine. However, they observe that the Pontificians contradict themselves on this point, since elsewhere they argue that judgment about doctrine should be made by the Church, not that the Church should be sought and judged by examining its doctrine. Therefore, they assert that from this mark it becomes manifest that the true Church is not among the Pontificians, since their doctrine is openly contrary to right reason and good morals in many respects, which they demonstrate and confirm with numerous examples.

Regarding the ninth mark: efficacy of doctrine our theologians admit that the efficacy of the Gospel doctrine is indeed an argument that it is divine and from God, because it surpasses human understanding and is highly abhorrent to human sense and affection, yet faith in it has been held in the world and propagated widely without any human support, and has been opposed by all kinds of adversaries in various ways. However, they observe that the efficacy of sacred doctrine is not always equally evident and conspicuous; sometimes many, sometimes few, obey the Gospel as it pleases God to accompany the preaching of the Gospel with greater or lesser efficacy of the Spirit. Moreover, Christ, when He comes to judge the world, will scarcely find faith on earth. Additionally, from the efficacy and success of any doctrine—that is, from the simple fact that it is accepted by many—it is not rightly argued to confirm its divinity and truth. This may be because it has something that flatters the flesh and human sense, and otherwise, God often, in His just judgment, grants efficacy to falsehood and error. Therefore, they conclude that the efficacy of doctrine is not rightly proposed as a mark of the Church.

Regarding the tenth mark: holiness of life of the founders and first leaders of the Religion our theologians acknowledge that the holiness of Christ, the Prophets, and the Apostles is the best argument for confirming the truth of the Christian religion. However, since there is great controversy among those who profess to venerate Christ and His Apostles about the true Church, and they distrust each other greatly, from the holiness of Christ and His Apostles considered in itself, it cannot sufficiently and immediately be concluded which is the true Church and which Christian sect or communion can rightfully claim that title. If, however, the Pontificians include in the founders and first leaders of the religion those doctors who defended and promoted their own doctrines, and whom they can claim for themselves without controversy, we say that their holiness is no less uncertain, ambiguous, and controversial than anything else we dispute about.

Regarding the eleventh mark: the glory of miracles our theologians acknowledge that true miracles are a suitable testimony for confirming divine truth. Therefore, from the miracles performed by Christ and the Apostles, and those who immediately succeeded the Apostles, an excellent argument is drawn for the confirmation of the Christian Religion. Nor do they deny that miracles can appear necessary where something previously unheard of and newly revealed by God is proposed to be believed under the penalty of eternal death. Therefore, it was necessary that the Evangelical Doctrine, when it began to be preached, be confirmed by many wonders and signs, as was done by God. However, they assert that where the doctrine of faith has once been confirmed by miracles, there is no longer any need for miracles in the Church. Therefore, the gift of miracles in the Church was temporary and extraordinary, and no miracles have been promised to the Church in these recent times. Rather, the faithful are warned to beware of those who would

show and boast of miracles, which Antichrist and the son of perdition would primarily do. Hence, they conclude that miracles are wrongly assumed as a perpetual mark of the Church, and the display and boasting of miracles in this age of the Church are rather a sign of deception and false doctrine, something proper to the Synagogue of Antichrist. Furthermore, our theologians should not be required to perform miracles, as they have not preached any new doctrine but the very doctrine that was confirmed by the miracles of Christ and received from His mouth. All that in which they differ from the Roman Church consists in rejecting new doctrines and human traditions added to the Word of God, which would rather need to be confirmed by miracles if anyone wished to compel their acceptance. Additionally, our theologians' vocation is not extraordinary, as they have never claimed to be immediately sent or inspired by God. Most of the miracles said to have been performed in the Roman Church for many centuries, and even now claimed to be performed, are mostly entirely fictitious, some being monkish tricks, juggleries, and perhaps some impostures and illusions of demons. It is also possible that some true miracles were performed in the Roman Church to confirm the Christian Religion among pagans and infidels, since its foundations remained among them. However, these should not be taken as confirmation of the errors and abuses by which the Christian doctrine in that Church is infected.

Regarding the twelfth mark: the light of prophecy our theologians make the same judgment about the twelfth mark, which is the light of prophecy, claimed by the Pontificians as a mark of the Church. They acknowledge that from the prophecies and predictions of both the Old and New Testament prophets, a valid argument can be drawn to confirm the Christian Doctrine and show its divinity. However, they also teach that the gift of prophecy is extraordinary in the Church, and God has not promised that the Church will never lack true prophets. Therefore, proposing the light of prophecy as a perpetual mark of the Church, by which the true Christian Church can always be distinguished from heretics and false Christians, is unreasonable. The prophecies attributed by the Pontificians to Francis and others are uncertain and of dubious credibility, relying on the faith of legends, in which even the Pontificians themselves do not put much trust. Furthermore, in Deuteronomy 13, God warns us not to believe a prophet who entices us to worship other gods, even if what he predicts comes to pass.

Regarding the thirteenth mark: the testimony of adversaries our theologians consider the thirteenth mark, which is the testimony of adversaries, proposed by the Pontificians, to be a very weak argument for proving that their Church is the true one and believe it frivolous to count this among the marks of the Church. For good men, acting candidly, often praise what is good in their adversaries, while bad men, deceived by error or carried away by some affection, can praise something not good in an adversary. If the Pontificians boast that our people also give honorable testimony to theirs, we can likewise cite many praises and testimonies given by their adversaries to ours. Specifically, Calvin calls Bernard a pious writer because he recognized many pious things in his writings, not because he approved of everything Bernard wrote. Nor do we hold Bernard in the same regard as the defenders of Roman superstition today. As for some who in recent centuries have been included in the number of saints by the Pontiff, we sometimes call

them saints, not because we truly consider them saints, but simply because we follow the usual manner of speaking.

Regarding the fourteenth mark: the unfortunate end of those who oppose the Church our theologians say that the fourteenth mark, which is the unfortunate end of those who oppose the Church, is very false. The death of the pious, who die in the grace and faith of Christ, is always happy, while the death of the impious cannot be anything but unhappy, as it casts them into eternal perdition. However, if judged by human standards and from what falls under the senses, the end of the impious often seems not bitter, while the death of the pious seems very hard and bitter, as the Prophet complains in Psalm 73. The stories the Pontificians tell of the unfortunate end of Calvin and others among us are mere nonsense and slander, to which we could oppose the manifestly and truly unfortunate deaths of many who, within the memory of our fathers, persecuted and attacked our Churches.

Regarding the fifteenth mark: temporal happiness bestowed by God on those who defend the Church our theologians judge the same way regarding the fifteenth mark, which is the temporal happiness divinely bestowed on those who defend the Church, and say that the contrary is rather a mark of the Church, namely, the cross and sufferings. For it is foretold in the Word of God that the pious will suffer persecution in this world, not that they will be superior to their adversaries in arms.

Chapter Six:

On the Marks of the Church According to the Opinion of Our Doctors

John Cameron, in his treatise on the Church, in the chapter on the true marks of the Church, advises that the Church in this life cannot be certainly and distinctly known by us, and that it is in this way known only to God. Therefore, it is futile to seek such marks of the Church that lead to certain and distinct knowledge of it. The marks that can be presented of the Church can only generate in us a moral and conjectural certainty about the Church, which is also sufficient for us to maintain communion with the Church as we are commanded. He enumerates three such marks of the Church:

1. The profession of true faith.
2. Concord with the brethren.
3. Good works or the holiness of life.

Others, however, profess to seek and provide certain and undoubted marks of the Church. These marks are commonly numbered as three by our theologians:

1. The profession of true faith.
2. The sincere administration of the Sacraments and the purity of divine worship.
3. Legitimate governance.

These opinions, although they seem to differ in appearance, can nevertheless be well reconciled. Those who deny that the Church has entirely certain marks consider the Church in terms of its internal form, in which respect the Church is called invisible. Those who say that the

true Church has such marks, which certainly and distinctly identify it, consider the Church in respect to its external form, through which it is made visible. Both agree that the proposed marks primarily and distinctly designate the visible Church, and secondarily and confusedly and by accident, the invisible Church.

Moreover, our theologians note that these marks are not always equally illustrious in the Church, nor are they equally conspicuous in all parts of the Church, as various degrees of purity and sincerity can be noted in particular churches. The name of the Church should not be denied to any assembly where there is no pernicious error in doctrine, no idolatry in worship, and where there is a tolerable form of governance, even if various corruptions can be noted in all these aspects.

Furthermore, the doctors of the Roman Church deny that these are legitimate marks of the Church, first because, in their judgment, the Church itself is better known than these marks. They believe we cannot certainly know what true faith and doctrine are, and what the legitimate use of the Sacraments and the order of discipline is, except through the judgment and testimony of the Church. Secondly, they believe that these marks can be found in a false Church, namely in a Church that is purely schismatic but not heretical. Additionally, they argue that any Church can arrogate these marks to itself, whether rightly or wrongly.

ON THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITANT CHURCH

Chapter One

On the Designation of Clergy and Laity

Pontifical authors establish three orders of people in the militant Church: the first is that of the Clergy, the second is the Laity, and the third is those taken from both the Clergy and the Laity, distinguished by certain symbols and functions, called Monks or Regulars.

The name "Laity" is derived from the Greek word λαός, which signifies the people or the common folk. Thus, the Laity are so called as the plebeians or commoners who belong to the Church's people, that is, those to whom no part of the Church's function is entrusted, and who hold no ministry in the Church.

The Clergy, on the other hand, are those who, as they say, are consecrated to divine worship and have taken upon themselves, by God's command, the responsibility and care for religion and sacred matters. In one word, they call all those Clergy who are called and consecrated to some ecclesiastical office or ministry. Moreover, under the name Clergy, they also include some who do not exercise any ecclesiastical office but are as it were consecrated by bishops with the first tonsure, which in their view is a certain preparation for ecclesiastical orders, although it has no office attached to it. The name Clergy is derived from the Greek word κληρος, which first means a lot and then also inheritance, which is usually divided by lot. Therefore, they say Clergy are so called because in a peculiar way the Lord is their lot and inheritance, and they in turn are the Lord's inheritance and lot. They uphold and retain this appellation of the Church's ministers, not only as approved by ecclesiastical usage but also as derived from the Holy Scriptures. For they refer to certain words of Jeremiah, chapter 12, verse 13, where the Septuagint version reads, "Their lot shall not profit them," which some Fathers, namely Origen, Epiphanius, and Jerome, seem to interpret of the Clergy of the Christian Church, in the sense that for many Clergy, the honor and rank of their clergyhood do not profit them for salvation. However, these Fathers twist the words of the Prophet only by a certain allusion and accommodation, not as if they thought that their proper meaning. The Hebrew text and the Vulgate interpreter render it, "They have sown wheat, but shall reap thorns; they have inherited, but it shall not profit them." By these words, the Prophet simply signifies that it will profit the Jews nothing to possess the inheritance they have received from God, because of their sins by which they have angered God. The words of the Greek interpreters, who by κληρος mean nothing else than what the Hebrew word חלק signifies, that is, the part of the inheritance, which usually falls to each heir by lot, also pertain to this.

Moreover, the doctors of the Roman Church claim that the appellation of Clergy is taken from the first epistle of Peter, chapter 5, verse 3, where Peter admonishes the elders of the Church, "Neither as being lords over God's heritage," as the Vulgate version reads. Bellarmine and others think it very probable that the term Clergy is not referred to the whole Church but to those who are properly called Clergy. They believe Peter alludes to the Levites of the Jews, who

are said in Numbers 18 and Deuteronomy 18 to be of the Lord's lot and inheritance because He had given them in a certain way His part, that is, the tithes and offerings of the children of Israel. Under the New Testament, they believe the Levites correspond not to all Christians but only to the priests and their ministers who are in the Christian Church what the Levites were in the Jewish people.

However, Peter by κληρος means the flocks of the faithful and the particular churches committed to the care of the elders and ministers of the Church since he distinguishes them from the elders and ministers whom he forbids to dominate them. In the same passage, those called κληρος are later called the flock, "Neither as being lords over God's heritage, but being examples to the flock." Indeed, some Pontificians acknowledge that Peter in that place, while exhorting the elders, calls the flocks under their governance "lots" that fell to them, as can be seen among their more candid scripture interpreters, like Cajetan and William Estius on that passage of Peter.

Moreover, our theologians do not deny but openly teach that the Christian people are rightly distinguished into those who preside and minister publicly and the simple laity who hold no office. They also acknowledge that the name Clergy for designating the Church's ministers in the Christian Church is ancient and very common. They do not simply deny that ecclesiastical men under the New Testament can be called by a peculiar respect and singular reason the "lot" or "inheritance" of the Lord, which otherwise is common to the entire community of the faithful. Therefore, they do not condemn or reject the appellation of Clergy among the Church's ministers as inherently bad or absurd, but concede that it can be borne in a certain sense and respect. They deny, however, that it can be shown to have been used by the Apostles or in their time, for it does not appear in the Apostolic writings but is only twisted from certain Scripture passages by force and error to prove it. Hence, they deny it possesses true antiquity since whatever began in the Christian Church after the time of the Apostles can in a way be called new. They argue that the Roman clergy have abused this appellation to pride and arrogance, which is why we willingly abstain from it and eliminate it from most of our churches, just as we reject not the ancient office but the name and appellation of presbyters and bishops among our ecclesiastical men because of the abuses of those offices in the Pontifical Church, lest the same abuse invade our churches with the name. However, just as in England, the name and distinction of bishops and presbyters have remained in the churches, so too the appellation of Clergy and Laity has been retained and commonly used there.

Our doctors believe that the appellation of Clergy to designate ecclesiastical persons arose because in the beginning of the Christian Church, people were first chosen by lot and appointed to ecclesiastical offices: namely, the Christian people in each church were accustomed to elect by vote from among themselves suitable men for ecclesiastical offices, from whom a selection was afterward also made by lot, following the example of the Apostles, who after Christ's resurrection, when deliberating on someone to replace Judas, first selected by the consensus and approval of the faithful two men, Barnabas and Matthias. However, casting lots, Matthias was chosen into the number of the Apostles, as the learned Louis Cappel conjectures in his thesis on the distinction and appellation of Clergy and Laity found in volume 3 of the Saumur

Theses, as well as the distinguished Tilenus in his second dispute on ordinary ministers, thesis 24. The more learned among the Pontificians also do not think it should be opposed if someone contends that the Clergy were so called because the duties of offices among the Church's ministers used to be assigned by lots, especially in the time of the Old Testament, as evidenced by the example of Zacharias reported by Luke in his Gospel, chapter 1. Or rather, it is from the fact that by divine designation and election, as if by lot, each one was called to sacred ministry, according to what is said of Judas in Acts 1, "He obtained part of this ministry," as seen in Estius on the fourth book of Sentences, distinction 24, part 4.

Chapter Two

On the Ranks and Distinction of the Ministers of the Church

Pontifical theologians commonly teach that there are seven orders of ministers in the Church. The first and lowest is that of the Doorkeepers (Ostiarii), the second of the Readers (Lectores), the third of the Exorcists (Exorcistae), the fourth of the Acolytes (Acoluthi), the fifth of the Subdeacons (Subdiaconi), the sixth of the Deacons (Diaconi), and the seventh and highest of the Priests (Presbyteri).

Among these, the first four orders are commonly called minor orders, while the remaining orders are major or sacred orders. For by sacred orders, they primarily mean the priesthood (Presbyterate), the diaconship (Diaconate), and the subdeaconship (Subdiaconate), and they usually do not include the other orders under this designation.

They describe the duties of these orders as follows: the office of the Doorkeepers is to hold the keys of the temple, to open, close, and guard the doors, and to prevent the entry of infidels, excommunicated persons, and mockers of the Sacraments of Christ. In one word, they discern between those who wish to enter the Church, admitting the worthy and excluding the unworthy. They also add that it was formerly their duty to guard what is stored in the temple and used for sacred purposes, and additionally, to ring the bell to call the people to divine services.

The duty of the Readers, they say, was formerly to read clearly and distinctly the books of the Old and New Testament, especially those read during nocturnal psalmody, particularly those that the bishop was to expound to the people. The Roman Catechism adds that it was also the office of the Readers to teach catechumens the basic principles of faith.

The Exorcists' duty is said to be to recite the exorcisms of the Church over the possessed (Energumens), that is, those vexed by unclean spirits, and to lay hands on them to free them from demonic vexation. It should be noted, however, that there are two types of exorcisms in the Roman Church: one used on the possessed and another used on all those to be baptized. The former is said to belong specifically to the Exorcist as such, while the latter pertains to the priest, although Peter Lombard seems to think differently in Book 4, Distinction 24.

The duty of the Acolytes, or rather Acoluthi, according to Roman Church doctors, is to light, carry, and hold the Church's candles during Mass. Hence, they are also called Cereferarii in Latin. They are thought to be called Acoluthi, that is, attendants, because those in this office

are to assist the major ministers, that is, the deacons and subdeacons, in the ministry of the altar. As a sign of this, when they are created, empty vessels are placed in their hands, in which water and wine are usually administered for the Eucharist.

As for the Subdeacons, their functions, according to the Roman Church, are to assist the deacons at the altar with sacred linens, vessels, and vestments, especially preparing the bread and wine for the sacrifice of the Mass. They also believe it is the duty of the Subdeacons to recite the Apostolic Epistle or its part or prophetic lesson during Mass. They add that it was once the duty of the Subdeacon to teach the rudiments of faith to catechumens.

The Deacons, who hold the rank immediately below priests, are assigned many duties. They acknowledge that the Apostles appointed them to collect the offerings of the faithful, administer the Church's resources, and especially distribute them for the use of the poor. Besides, they believe the Deacons have multiple functions in public liturgy, such as assisting the celebrating priest, bringing the offerings of the faithful to the altar, placing them on the altar, and reciting the Gospel during Mass. They also note that it was once the duty of the Deacons to distribute the Eucharistic symbols to the faithful and not only to assist and serve bishops and priests in baptizing and preaching but also sometimes to baptize and preach themselves. They add that their duty was to observe the morals and actions of the people and report the sinners to the bishop so that he could rebuke and correct them as the matter required. However, today Deacons in the Roman Church do not perform most of these duties, especially the administration of the common goods contributed by the faithful, to which they were primarily appointed by the Apostles.

The principal duty of priests and presbyters, who hold the highest rank among sacred orders in the Roman Church, is to offer the body and blood of Christ daily in a true and proper sacrifice (as they believe) and to administer the sacraments to the Christian people, especially the one they call penance, in which they believe the priest remits the sins of the penitent by a certain judicial power. However, they do not consider the duty of preaching the word necessarily connected with this order, as many who are regarded as priests and presbyters do not have this office.

Although the opinion of the sevenfold number of ecclesiastical orders generally prevails in the Pontifical School, it is not so certain and accepted that some do not deviate from it but add other orders to these seven. For instance, some few, whose opinion, especially after the Council of Trent, is considered improbable, consider clerical tonsure an order and even a sacrament truly and properly so-called, by which grace is conferred on the tonsured by the very act performed (*ex opere operato*), as reported by William Estius in 4 Sentences, Distinction 24, Chapter 4. But as stated before, the common opinion of the Roman School considers this clerical tonsure, which they call the first tonsure, not an order but only a preparation and admission to orders. For among the Pontificians, it is stipulated by ecclesiastical law that before anyone is admitted to orders, they receive the distinctive clerical tonsure, by which they are enrolled in the number of the clergy, which, however, according to their opinion, is not an order but a degree and preparation for receiving orders. For, they say, just as people are usually prepared for baptism by exorcisms

and for marriage by betrothals, so with the tonsure, they are dedicated to God as an entrance to the sacrament of order.

Some Pontifical theologians also think that the episcopate is a distinct order from the presbyterate and that it is no less properly and truly a sacrament than the presbyterate itself, and this opinion seems probable in the Roman School. Estius supports it in 4 Sentences, Distinction 24, Paragraph 28, where he testifies that this is the opinion of Eck, Cajetan, Navarre, and Peter Soto, and even John Duns Scotus himself.

Bellarmino, in *De Clericis*, Book 1, Chapter 11, at the end, testifies that canonists, that is, the doctors and interpreters of Pontifical law, number nine orders. They not only add the bishop to the commonly numbered seven orders but also the cantor and the psalmist.

However, the doctors of the Pontifical school attempt to reconcile this disagreement concerning the number of ecclesiastical orders with certain distinctions. Firstly, Bellarmine notes in the cited chapter that ecclesiastical order is commonly understood in two ways by authors: one way properly and the other way commonly. In his view, proper orders are those that are conferred with a certain sacred and solemn rite by a bishop and are referred to a certain ministry of offering divine sacrifice. In this sense, he wants there to be only seven orders, namely those enumerated above. For, he says, although the bishop and the priest are distinguished, yet as far as the sacrifice is concerned, they exhibit exactly the same mystery, hence they constitute one order, not two, just as the lector and cantor or psalmist. However, commonly, he says orders are those who are dedicated to divine service in any way, even if not referred to sacrifice, in which way many more than seven orders can be numbered. At the end of the chapter, he adds that theologians only consider orders as they relate to the sacrifice, in which way bishops and priests, lectors and cantors are not distinguished. Canonists, however, consider orders as they constitute the hierarchy, and therefore rightly distinguish the bishop from the priest. Estius, in 4 Sentences, Distinction 24, Paragraph 28, in establishing that the episcopate is a singular order distinct from the presbyterate, notes correctly that the seven orders are commonly numbered because only seven are directly destined for the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the true body of Christ. The episcopate, however, is for governing the mystical body of Christ and for creating other soldiers of the Church and ministers of the sacraments.

To illustrate this, Pontifical theologians observe that there are two types of power in the Church: one is called the power of order, and the other is called the power of jurisdiction. The power of order, they say, refers to the true body of Christ, while the power of jurisdiction is occupied with the mystical body of Christ, which is the Church. Indeed, as far as the power of order is concerned, its primary and most perfect function is to offer the sacrifice of the Body and Blood of the Lord, which is the function of the priestly order, and therefore it is considered the first and highest among properly and strictly called orders, to which six other lower ministerial orders serve.

There is a great controversy in the Roman School as to whether all those seven orders commonly enumerated are of divine institution or if some of them were instituted solely by the Church. Firstly, everyone agrees that the order of priests and deacons is of divine institution, but

those who are more candid in the Roman Church acknowledge that the remaining five orders, particularly the four below the subdiaconate, known as minor orders, were not instituted by Christ or the apostles, but only by the Church, which existed in the times of the apostles. Therefore, they deny that these lower orders are truly and properly sacraments, but only, as they say, certain sacramentals. This opinion is deemed probable by Estius in Sentences, distinction 24, part 8, and is supported, as he reports, by Dominic of Soto, Navarrus, and Francis of Victoria, among others listed there. However, the common opinion of the Scholastics is that all seven orders, without exception, were instituted by Christ himself. For they teach that they are properly and truly sacraments, since it is necessary, according to them, that every sacrament be immediately instituted by Christ. And this is the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Paludanus, and others who are regarded as the pillars and lights of the Roman Church; and therefore the Catechism, called the Roman Catechism, which was composed by the order and authority of the Council of Trent, openly teaches this opinion as being consistent with the definition of that Council.

However, it should be noted that in the Roman Church, scarcely anything remains of these lower orders beyond their names and certain rites of consecration, with the actual substance having almost entirely fallen into disuse. For those who are to be ordained priests and sacramental ministers are indeed consecrated by the bishop through certain rites and formulas as porters, lectors, exorcists, acolytes, subdeacons, and deacons; but this is done in a continuous series, and it is only very rarely, and almost extraordinarily, that one finds among the clergy those who are satisfied with the title and office of porters, lectors, exorcists, and acolytes, and who perform the duties designated by these names. However, the functions of these orders are often administered by those called laypeople, not by any of the clergy: as Estius notes in Sentences, distinction 24, part 8, the functions of at least the minor orders can be transferred from the clergy to the laity; and indeed, they seem to have been transferred: for laypeople, even boys, serve as janitors of churches, assist in masses, and light the lamps; and in some places, laypeople are allowed to chant the epistle.

Moreover, it should be known that in the Roman Church, besides these seven orders of ministers, there are many names of dignities and offices, which, however, are not commonly considered as proper and strict orders, nor are they usually counted among the ecclesiastical orders. Firstly, there are the orders called powers, who, by virtue of their office and ordination, have the power to perform certain spiritual acts which exceed the power of priests. The first act which they wish to be proper to the episcopal grade is the ordination of priests and other ministers of the Church: for they hold that this is so proper to the bishops of the Church that if priests attempt anything in this matter, it is completely null and void. The second proper act of the episcopal grade is the confirmation of the baptized; and the third is the consecration of temples and altars: for among the Roman clergy, only bishops can confer what they call confirmation, a sacrament, and consecrate altars and temples, at least as a regular ministry. Whether simple priests can also perform confirmations outside the usual order is debated among the Roman clergy. But besides this, they wish the bishops to be superior to the priests, with

jurisdiction in every diocese subjecting the priests and other ministers of the Church to the bishops, so that they establish that bishops have the same power over them as kings and princes have over their counselors. The common opinion of the Roman Church today is that this distinction between bishops and priests is of divine law, and that Christ instituted different and subordinate offices for the episcopate and the presbyterate, and I do not know if anyone now dares to oppose this. Before the Council of Trent, however, not a few doctors of the Roman Church thought otherwise, holding that bishops and priests are essentially the same by divine law, and that the distinction now existing between them is of human and ecclesiastical law. This opinion was held and approved by Cardinal Louis of Arles at the Council of Basel, with many supporting him, as Æneas Sylvius reports in his first book on the Council of Basel. The same opinion was held by Cajetan, Panormitanus, Isidore Clarius, Enchiridion, Coloniensis, and many others, whose names are listed by the illustrious David Blondel in the preface to his *Apology for Jerome's Opinion*, page 61. But the Council of Trent seems to have defined the opposite opinion, namely that bishops are by divine law superior to priests; for it speaks thus in session 23, chapter 4: "Therefore, the holy synod declares that besides the other ecclesiastical grades, bishops, who have succeeded the apostles, belong especially to this hierarchical order, and are appointed, as the apostle says, by the Holy Spirit to rule the Church of God, and that they are superior to priests," etc. And in canon 6, "If anyone says that there is not in the Catholic Church a hierarchy established by divine ordination, consisting of bishops, priests, and ministers, let him be anathema." And in canon 7, "If anyone says that bishops are not superior to priests," etc., let him be anathema. However, there are many indications and conjectures from the history of the Council of Trent itself, as can be seen in the same Blondel in the aforementioned preface, pages 62 and 63, that something ambiguous is in these decrees, and that the council did not intend simply to define that the episcopate is a ministry completely and by divine law distinct from the presbyterate.

Moreover, in the Roman Church, not only are bishops superior to priests, and distinguished from them as holding a different office, but among the bishops themselves, there is a variety of dignities and titles; for some are simply called bishops, others archbishops or metropolitans, to whom several bishops are subject. Some are called primates, who preside over several archbishops; and some even patriarchs, who are above the primates. However, the Roman clergy admit that this entire distinction of the episcopal order is of human and ecclesiastical law, although they agree that it was rightly introduced and should be entirely maintained. Moreover, those who are called cardinals of the Roman Church possess authority and dignity above all bishops in the Roman Church. Cardinals today are some bishops, priests, and deacons chosen by the Roman pontiff to be principal members of the Roman clergy, and, as it were, princes of the Roman Church. They are usually designated by the title of certain churches in the city of Rome, and are called, for example, Cardinal Bishop of the title of Saint Balbina, Cardinal Priest of the title of Saints Nereus and Achilleus, Cardinal Deacon of the title of Saint Peter in Chains, or something similar. Their office is to continually assist the Roman pontiff and to help him in the governance of the Church with counsel and work, and thus they are

judges, senators, and principal ministers of the entire Roman Church, who judge even the bishops with the pontiff, and create or depose them when necessary; but their principal privilege is considered to be that the election of the Roman pontiff belongs to them by custom, and he is usually chosen from among them. This is the main reason why cardinals, even those who are not bishops, are preferred to all bishops in the Roman Church and are considered to have greater dignity.

Moreover, although the pontifical cardinals defend their office and dignity as they are today as something very useful to the Christian Church, they readily acknowledge that it is not very ancient and only came into existence in later centuries; for they observe that already in the time of Gregory the Great, there were priests and deacons called cardinals; not only in Rome but also in some other places, such as Ravenna and Milan. However, they differed greatly in office and dignity from today's cardinals; for, as the Roman clergy admit, it was not specifically their responsibility to elect the Roman Pontiff, nor did they constitute a sort of senate, nor were those cardinal priests or deacons preferred over the bishops, but in each church, they were subordinate to their bishops. Learned men inquire into why those priests or deacons were called cardinals and what distinguished them from others, and they arrive at various opinions. It is certain that in any matter, the term cardinal is metaphorically applied to what is principal in the church and on which other things depend; thus cardinal virtue means principal virtue, just as certain virtues and even winds are called cardinal, and certain points of the heavens are called cardinal points. Thus a cardinal priest is the same as a principal and chief priest. Some think that those priests or deacons who presided over other priests or deacons of the same church and who were, as it were, presidents in the college of deacons or priests were called cardinals, which is the opinion of Onuphrius in his book on the titles of cardinals. Bellarmine, however, thinks that certain principal churches, which enjoyed special privileges, were called by the title of cardinal, hence the priests who governed those churches and the deacons who served in them were called cardinals, as can be seen in his work on the clergy, book 1, chapter 16.

Chapter Three

On the Grades and Distinction of Ministers of the Church According to Our Theologians.

All Reformed theologians unanimously disagree with the Doctrine of the Roman Catholics concerning sacred orders presented in the previous chapter. They consider the enumeration of seven orders by the Roman School to be baseless and without foundation. If we take into account the orders instituted by Christ and His Apostles, they argue that there are fewer than seven; and that the five orders below the deacon—namely, subdeacon, acolyte, exorcist, lector, and porter—were not instituted by Christ or the Apostles. If someone claims to include in their number not only those orders originating from Apostolic institution but also those established by the Church in later centuries, they first deem it absurd to equate the offices instituted by Christ and the Apostles, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, with those that are purely ecclesiastical and dependent on human authority; and secondly, they assert that the

number and offices which are of positive and ecclesiastical law are certain and should neither be fixed nor unchangeable. Since the matter is self-evident, the Church can abolish offices established in ancient times and substitute new ones that are more suitable and conducive to the present conditions.

Therefore, they do not deny that the names of these lower orders were used and known in the early Church, and that certain offices and duties were designated to them, introduced into the Church with reason and contributing something to the Church as it then existed. But they assert that with the changed face and external discipline of the Church, most of these duties have no longer any use in the Church, such as the office of exorcist, which was legitimate and useful only as long as those possessed by evil spirits came to Christian churches, and as long as the miraculous and extraordinary power of expelling demons remained in the Church.

Furthermore, they complain that today certain functions are attributed to these seven orders, which are alien to ancient institution and contrary to the intent of the early Church and the truth of the Gospel. They assert that these offices are related to the fictitious sacrifice of the Mass and various ministries associated with it. Even if the number of sacred orders were to be determined in relation to this fictitious sacrifice, it is absurd that precisely seven are established; for it is not clear how the office of porter and exorcist directly relates to the sacrifice of the Mass, any more than the grade of bishops, who alone consecrate and ordain those considered priests in the Roman Church.

However, as to which and how many orders of ecclesiastical ministers, whether instituted by Christ the Lord or by the Apostles, our theologians do not entirely agree. For many, such as Bucanus, Tilenus, and others following Calvin in this matter, divide those who hold ecclesiastical functions into two main categories. They say that some are teachers, and others are ministers. As far as ordinary ministry is concerned, for this discussion is not about extraordinary ministry, they believe that there are two kinds of teachers proposed to us by Scripture: the first are those called pastors and bishops, whose duty it is to preach the word of God to the people, apply it to the various needs of the faithful, administer the sacraments, engage in solemn prayers, and oversee the morals of the flock, as well as preside over the exercise of sacred discipline. But besides pastors and bishops, they believe that those who are specifically called doctors also have the office of teaching in the Church, whose duty is to focus solely on the simple interpretation of Scripture and to preside over the governance of the ecclesiastical school, so that sound and pure doctrine is maintained in the Church, and who are not responsible for administering the sacraments or exercising ecclesiastical discipline. They believe that the Apostle refers to these in Ephesians 4:11, where it is said that Christ gave to his Church some apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and doctors; here they think doctors are distinguished from pastors, having a different ministry assigned by Christ. Similarly, they believe the same Apostle in Romans 12:7, when he says, "If it is teaching, let him teach; if it is encouraging, let him encourage," distinguishes the function of these doctors from that of pastors, which he there calls exhortation.

Regarding ministers, they also consider there to be two orders proposed in the word of God: one is that of presbyters, strictly and narrowly defined, and the other is that of deacons. They observe in Scripture that two kinds of presbyters are mentioned: some are those who devote themselves to the word and doctrine, while others are those who, by their proper office, should focus only on governance. The former are the same as pastors, while the latter are peculiarly called presbyters. And they believe this distinction is indicated in 1 Timothy 5:17: "The elders who direct the affairs of the church well are worthy of double honor, especially those whose work is preaching and teaching." These presbyters, that is, those particularly called elders and distinct from pastors who preach the word of God and administer the sacraments, are men of proven piety selected from among the faithful to assist the pastors in the governance of the Church and the discipline of morals. Their duty is to diligently observe the morals of the flock entrusted to them, and if they notice any offense in the life or doctrine of individuals, to either privately admonish them or, if necessary, report them to the presbytery to undergo appropriate discipline. They believe these elders are understood by the Apostle in Romans 12:8 by the term "he who leads," and that they are distinguished from pastors and doctors. After the cited words, he adds, "if it is leadership, let him govern diligently," and they also think they are referred to by the term "governments" in 1 Corinthians 12:28, where, among various grades and orders of the faithful in the Church, which is the body of Christ, he mentions "those with gifts of administration and those with gifts of helping."

As for deacons, who constitute the other order of ministers according to our theologians, their primary and principal duty is to oversee the ecclesiastical treasury, receive and dispense the sacred collections and alms of the faithful according to the judgment of the entire presbytery, for various uses of the Church, especially for the relief of the poor and needy; and in addition, they acknowledge that it pertains to them to assist pastors in the administration of the sacraments, wherever their help may be needed. However, they do not believe that these deacons, by their proper office, have the authority to preach and administer the sacraments.

Therefore, according to most of our doctors, four orders of ordinary ministers instituted by Christ and mentioned in Scripture are found in the New Testament: pastors, doctors, elders, and deacons.

However, there are some who teach that only two orders of ministers were instituted by Christ and the Apostles to ordinarily govern and administer the Church. The first is those who are called pastors and doctors, presbyters and bishops, which names they consider completely synonymous, and the second is deacons. For they do not believe that any doctors were instituted by Christ who did not have the authority to administer the sacraments, and thus they think Scripture regards pastors and doctors as the same, not distinguishing them, but designating different aspects of the same office by the names of pastors, doctors, and overseers, referring to various functions of the same office.

Moreover, they think that no presbyters were ordained by the Apostles who only presided over the governance of the Church, without having the authority to administer the sacraments and preach the word of God: thus, they consider those elders, who are assistants to the pastors in

the governance and discipline of the Church and are elected from among the laity, to be a human institution, and therefore recent, not existing in the Church until the last centuries, after the establishment of the Reformation of the Church. And this is the opinion of many esteemed doctors among us; for instance, those in England who defend the Church being governed by bishops teach this doctrine, especially the professors of Saumur in their thesis on the various government of the Church.

It should be noted, however, among those of our theologians who affirm that these elders distinct from pastors and deacons are of human institution, that some simply condemn their use as illegitimate and abusive, as do those English who favor Episcopal governance; while others, however, mostly concede that their institution is not to be disapproved, and could have been legitimately done by our Churches without blame, given the power the Church has received from Christ concerning the various circumstances of its governance according to the times and places, as is seen in the aforementioned disputation on the various government of the Church.

As for the distinction between presbyter and bishop, since the Church of England is governed by bishops, the common opinion of the English is that the episcopate and presbyterate are distinct offices with different powers instituted by Christ, and therefore, by divine law, bishops are superior to presbyters and the ordination of ministers particularly pertains to them by the same law; and many still persist in this opinion in England today. However, most of the other Reformed theologians, and even those of the Augsburg Confession, generally agree that there is no distinction by divine law between bishop and presbyter, but that those names are synonymous in Scripture and are used interchangeably. They thus believe the matter is exactly the same; but that the eminence of bishops over presbyters, which has prevailed in the Christian Church for many centuries, is only of positive and ecclesiastical law, gradually introduced over time, namely that already in the time of the Apostles, a certain primacy of honor and order was granted to the one who, among the presbyters governing the same Church, was ahead of his colleagues either by age or by the time of ordination; so that although he was considered of the same office and did not have power and jurisdiction over his colleagues, he was nevertheless, as it were, the president and moderator of the presbytery or college of pastors, as they say today, and thus always performed those duties that are temporarily performed by those who are elected as presidents or moderators for a time in our synods or presbyteries. In the second century, however, it happened that such primacy was no longer conferred by age or order of reception, but a custom was introduced that one of the presbyters was chosen by the suffrages of the whole college to preside over the pastors' college permanently in the same manner. These presidents gradually made the name of bishop their own, and over time, drew more and more prerogatives to themselves and subjected their colleagues to them until it resulted in the tyranny that still prevails in the Roman Church.

Moreover, although all our theologians, perhaps with the exception of the English, condemn the tyrannical supreme power that bishops in the Roman Church usurp over presbyters; indeed, they consider that there is no distinction by divine law between bishop and presbyter. However, there is some disagreement among them as to whether it is expedient by positive and

ecclesiastical law to establish certain grades among the pastors of the Church, as ministers of the word, whereby some are preferred over others and have authority over them, provided moderation is used to prevent it from becoming tyrannical. The Churches of France and Belgium, and many in England, consider this dangerous and not sufficiently consistent with the precepts of Christ. Therefore, they desire to maintain complete equality among their pastors, without elevating any above the rest or placing them in a higher grade with any authority and power over their colleagues. But the contrary opinion and practice prevail in the Churches of Germany and Poland. They have certain bishops, whom they call superintendents, who preside over other pastors in a certain district with some authority and power, although far less than that arrogated by bishops in the Roman Church. Indeed, they establish three grades or orders of ministers of the word: the first are those bishops or superintendents, the second are those particularly called elders or presbyters, and the third are those called deacons, who are, as it were, auxiliary pastors, supplying the place of others when necessary, and assisting them in the administration of the sacraments.

The Churches of Poland confirmed this opinion regarding the superiority of some pastors over others a few years ago in the Confession of Toruń, chapter on the Church, article 9. They state: "We consider the external governance of particular churches on earth to be aristocratic by the institution of Christ, but we do not deny some priority of order and governance to bishops or superintendents or inspectors over other presbyters.

Chapter Four

On the Institution or Creation of Ministers of the Church.

Under the term creation or institution of Ministers of the Church, the Roman Catholic Doctors observe three components: election, ordination, and vocation or mission. They say that election is the designation of a specific person to an ecclesiastical office, while ordination is the sacred ceremony by which a future minister is consecrated with a certain rite. Vocation, according to them, is the sending of someone to exercise the office to which they have been consecrated, through which a person is constituted as a pastor of a church in reality, and acquires some power and jurisdiction, or the right to exercise their function in that church.

Regarding the ordination of Ministers of the Church, the Roman Catholics teach that it pertains solely to bishops, that is, neither to the laity nor to any other ministers of the Church. They deny that presbyters or any others who are not bishops can ordain either a bishop, presbyter, or any other inferior minister. They assert that in no case can someone who has not been consecrated and ordained by a bishop lawfully act as a pastor and minister of the Church, nor be regarded as such, and that it is never lawful for the Christian laity to ordain and constitute a pastor for themselves without the intervention and assistance of a bishop who performs that ordination.

Similarly, they teach that vocation or mission does not pertain to the Christian people, but solely to the bishops, and most importantly to the Roman bishop. Their opinion is that the

people, whether of a larger church governed by bishops or of a smaller one called a parish governed by simple presbyters, do not have the authority by their own power to call and appoint someone as their pastor, even if the person is already marked with an episcopal or sacerdotal character. Instead, the authority of sending and appointing bishops belongs to the Roman bishop; and presbyters should be sent to individual parishes either by the bishop or by another who has received this right from the Roman Pontiff.

Finally, concerning the election or designation of specific persons to ecclesiastical offices, Bellarmine and other Roman Catholics with him concede that in the ancient Church, at least in many places, this right belonged to the Christian people, so that future bishops and pastors were elected by the common suffrage of the people. But first, they contend that the right of electing pastors does not pertain to the people by divine law, nor did Christ ordain and establish that the Christian laity should elect their bishops and pastors by suffrage. They also deny that this custom descended from the example or ordinance of the Apostles, but claim that it was gradually introduced into the Church. They say that initially, that is, in Apostolic times, pastors were elected without the knowledge of the people; then the people began to be consulted to give testimony about the life and morals of the elect; then, to ensure that the people would love their bishops more, only those whom the people had requested were ordained. Finally, in some places, the custom obtained that the people even usurped the right of suffrage; but they claim that whatever power the people had in this matter was entirely derived from the connivance or concession of the Roman Pontiffs, to whom it properly belongs by divine law to either elect the pastors of the Church themselves or at least prescribe the manner of election. Therefore, they argue that not only the people but neither the kings or princes nor even the clergy themselves have the right of suffrage in electing bishops, except as much as the Roman Pontiff has conceded, though in this matter, I do not think all Roman Catholics will agree with Bellarmine, but only those who are more devoted to the Pope.

Moreover, they consider that the custom of electing pastors by the suffrage of the people is extremely inconvenient, as it is subject to tumult and sedition, and often results in the promotion of unworthy individuals, and therefore has been rightly abolished and should not be revived. However, Bellarmine introduces some distinction, saying that concerning the election of pastors, two things can be granted to the people: first, to cast a vote as a judge, and second, to simply give testimony about the life and morals of those to be ordained as pastors, so that by their testimony, they can either be elected or not elected, according to whether they are found worthy or unworthy by that testimony. He contends that it is not advisable to grant the former to the people, but the latter can be rightly and suitably granted, and is still preserved in the Roman Church; for, he says, even now bishops and presbyters are ordained in the presence of the people, and the bishop who is to confer the orders addresses the people through a deacon and asks if anyone has anything against those to be ordained, let them come forward and speak. However, I think this is a mere rite and ceremony with no serious or real use, especially since in such solemn ordinations, everything is conducted in a foreign language, unknown to the people, namely Latin. Besides, as for the current practice of the Roman Church, bishops are in many places elected by

the Pope, in some places by those who are principal in the clergy, called canons, and elsewhere by kings and political princes.

Furthermore, the doctrine of Bellarmine, which we have just recounted, generally prevails in the Roman Church today; however, I believe that some Roman Catholics will dissent from it, since they rely on fundamentally different premises than those assumed by Bellarmine in this controversy, namely not, as he claims, that ecclesiastical jurisdiction resides in the Roman Pontiff as the source and is derived from him to the bishops and others, but that the entire power and jurisdiction are originally and inherently in the body and community of the Church. They believe that prelates derive their jurisdiction and power from the Church electing them, which is the opinion of Richer, a doctor of the Sorbonne, in his treatise on political and ecclesiastical power; and also of Tostatus, Bishop of Avila, a very learned and celebrated scholar, in his commentary on Numbers, chapter 18, question 49. He says: "The Church and prelates both have the keys, but the Church has them according to origin and power, while prelates have them according to use. The Church is said to have the keys according to power, which it can confer on a prelate through election; it is also said to have them by origin, for the power of prelates does not originate from themselves, but from the power of the Church through election. The Church, which elects the prelate, grants him that jurisdiction, and the Church has received it from no one else after once receiving it from Christ." In the previous question, he illustrates this with an example taken from civil society: "This same principle applies to communities; if there is any community or college, there will be jurisdiction as to those who are in the community; and that jurisdiction, which cannot be administered by the entire community, is administered by one of the community, but it is not in him in such a way that it is not in the community, but rather it is more in the community, because before he is constituted as a judge or ruler, he has no jurisdiction, but when the community has elected or appointed him, he has jurisdiction."

However, regarding our theologians, they all agree that no one should publicly teach or exercise an ecclesiastical ministry in the Church who is not lawfully called and elected to that office. But to explain this opinion more distinctly, they observe first that two kinds of times and places must be distinguished, namely, those where no faithful are ever found, nor any constituted Church, such as in cities where there are no Christians, but only Muslims, Jews, or pagans, and also in those places where there are those who call and profess themselves Christians but are so contaminated with idolatry and errors mixed with the doctrine that they subvert the foundations of Christianity. When such places and times occur, they say that whoever feels himself endowed with sufficient gifts and reasonably judges that he will gather some fruit of his labor, can, without a special calling, teach the erring there out of the general office of charity, and privately and publicly, by whatever means he can, lead them to the true knowledge of Christ, not waiting for any other mission than that which arises from divine providence, which offers him such an opportunity to procure the glory of God and the salvation of his neighbors. But where a form of the Church is already constituted, or at least a certain multitude of people converted to the true faith and believing and professing the doctrine necessary for salvation is found, they assert that

this general calling is not sufficient, but a certain special mission is required, which is done in a certain rite and order.

Moreover, regarding this special vocation, some distinguish election, ordination, and mission just as the Roman Catholics do. They hold that the first and last belong generally to the Christian people. They assert that the right of electing and sending pastors and ministers of the Church resides in each particular church and body of the faithful, in the same way that in popular republics the right of electing magistrates and admitting them to the body of the people pertains to the republic as a whole. They believe that in each church, the entire Christian people have the right to designate who should be ordained as pastors, to admit the ordained, and to grant them the faculty and permission to exercise their ministry among them. Moreover, they argue that this right is grounded in nature, because by natural and civil law, every assembly is allowed to procure what is necessary for its preservation. Thus, when needed, they may choose a leader and rector, just as a free people elects a king, travelers choose a guide and leader, and those who navigate a ship appoint a captain. Furthermore, they teach that this power granted to the Christian people is confirmed by many examples in Scripture and by the practice and custom not only of the early Christian Church but also of the very Primitive and Apostolic Church.

When the Christian people have magistrates and supreme authority who profess the Christian religion, they do not deny that these authorities should be given significant consideration in this matter and that they have substantial power in this respect, which is not borrowed from elsewhere but is founded on a right divinely granted to them.

As for the ordination of new pastors and ministers of the Church, our theologians acknowledge that it pertains to other pastors and should not be permitted to any others, except the English who favor Episcopal governance. They deny that there is any divine prerogative of bishops over other pastors, which would make the ordination of pastors and church ministers a function peculiar to bishops alone, invalidating any attempt by lower-ranking pastors in this matter. They further assert that when pastors ordain, they do so in the name of the whole Church; therefore, although the act of ordination by ordinary law belongs only to pastors and cannot be exercised by the common multitude, pastors nevertheless perform this act by the authority derived and delegated from the entire body of the Church.

Indeed, they state that the act of ordination does not so exclusively pertain to pastors by law that, in certain cases, the multitude of the faithful may not only elect and designate future pastors from among themselves but also ordain and consecrate them without other pastors, choosing from among their own members those who will solemnly perform the rite of ordination and consecration. This can happen when there is a group of faithful people, either newly converted from heresy or infidelity to the true Church of Christ through private efforts, without any pastors, or deprived of pastors due to severe persecution and unable to call pastors to themselves from elsewhere due to distance or other impediments. This is especially illustrated and taught by the reverend and learned men Lud. Cappellus in his third part of the thesis on the vocation of Evangelical Ministers and Joan. Mestrezatius in his treatise on the Church, book 2, chapters 13 and 14. At the beginning of the latter chapter, he asserts his opinion with these

words: "I say that the right of mission and ordination pertains to the body of the Church as a society of the faithful, who are in one place, whether there are among them ministers of the Gospel or not. And that wherever a multitude is found gathered in the name of Christ, and whenever God raises it up, the power of election and ordination of their own pastors resides in it, just as in elective kingdoms the power of electing and creating kings resides in the body of the state, and in democracies the power of creating magistrates, by whom it is governed, resides in the body of the people who constitute the republic; but the rite of inauguration of the elected person is performed in the name of the people by someone whom the people designate."

Furthermore, our theologians carefully observe that those indeed sin and are rightly reproved who deviate from the example of the Apostles and the custom of the early and purer Church in the institution of pastors; but nevertheless, if anything is amiss in this matter, and some defect arises in the election and ordination of pastors, this does not prevent there from being a true Church there, nor does it prevent such pastors from leading people to eternal salvation through their ministry, provided they preach the true doctrine of Christ and administer the sacraments according to His precepts. For the efficacy of the sacraments and the Word does not depend on the dignity and legitimate election of the minister.

Moreover, from this, it can be concluded that both our theologians and the Roman Catholics agree that no one should engage in sacred ministry in the Church or claim the office of pastor without being legitimately called and elected to it.

However, regarding the election of pastors, the question is whether by natural and somewhat divine law, confirmed by examples drawn from the Word of God, it pertains to the Christian people in each church, or whether the Christian laity have no right in this matter except by concession from the Roman Pontiff. Yet, our theologians do not hold that the vocation of pastors depends so much on the election of the people in each church that if some superior authority takes away and usurps that right of election from the people, the vocation of those pastors would be entirely invalid, which the Roman Catholics seem to attribute to us.

Regarding the ordination of pastors, our theologians concede to the Roman Catholics that it should ordinarily be performed only by pastors. But the question is whether by divine law it pertains solely to bishops, which the Roman Catholics affirm today, or whether the right belongs to all pastors, which is the opinion of our theologians. Furthermore, the question arises whether pastors, when ordaining, do so in the name of the whole Christian people and by the authority derived from them, so that in a case of necessity, the people themselves can create and ordain new pastors through others than pastors, which our theologians affirm and the Roman Catholics deny.

Finally, concerning the mission of pastors, the question is whether the right resides in the individual assemblies of the Christian people, and whether no mission is legitimate except that which someone has from pastors who can show that they succeed the Apostles by a personal, perpetual, and uninterrupted succession. Thus, whether the right of sending pastors resides solely in the Roman Pontiff and the bishops subject to him, which the Roman Catholics affirm, and our theologians deny.

Chapter Five:

On the Celibacy and Bigamy of Ministers of the Church

Papists here distinguish between minor orders and major or sacred orders, and they acknowledge that those in the four minor orders are not bound by the law of celibacy. However, they assert that celibacy is rightfully annexed to the sacred or major orders in the Roman Church, which include the presbyterate, diaconate, and subdiaconate. They believe it is neither expedient nor proper to allow those who have received these orders to marry or to use their marriage rights.

It is noteworthy that Roman Church doctors make a significant distinction between marriage contracted before receiving orders and marriage contracted afterward. They consider it entirely illicit and never permissible for someone to marry after receiving orders, but they admit married individuals to the reception of sacred orders provided they vow and promise to abstain from their spouses in the future.

Indeed, although in these regions the Roman Church does not allow major clerics to use their spouses if they are married, it is known to be more lenient with the Greeks and Orientals. For among the Greeks and other Eastern Christians, it is forbidden for those in sacred orders to marry afterward, but they are permitted to use their spouses whom they married before receiving orders. If any of them wish to join the Roman Church and unite with it, the Roman Church tolerates this practice and does not compel their priests to celibacy.

However, on what grounds this law of celibacy for ecclesiastical men rests, Roman Catholic doctors do not agree. Some believe that the ministers of the New Testament are divinely prohibited from the use of marriage. Thus, John Major in 4 Sent. dist. 24. q. 2., as reported by Bellarmine in *De Clericis*, book 1, chapter 18. Others, like Cajetan and Bellarmine himself, teach that the decree by which the vow of celibacy or continence is annexed to sacred orders is not properly divine and thus indispensable, but is apostolic and descends from apostolic tradition, having been long observed throughout the Church from the time of the Apostles.

Finally, many admit that the entire law of celibacy is purely ecclesiastical, not instituted by Christ or the Apostles. This was the opinion of Thomas, as seen in 2. 2. q. 88. art. 11., and of Claude Espence, a celebrated doctor of the Sorbonne, in his books on the continence of sacred men, among many others. The Council of Trent itself seems to lean towards this opinion, as it calls the law of celibacy for church ministers ecclesiastical, not divine or apostolic, in session 24, canon 9.

However, some use a distinction here, stating that it is of divine law that one who has been initiated into sacred orders cannot marry and that no dispensation can be granted in this regard. At the same time, they teach that the rule which states that those who are married today cannot be initiated into sacred orders unless they intend to abstain thereafter is a precept of the Church first issued by Pope Siricius, and it was never accepted by the Eastern Church. Therefore, it was allowed throughout the Church for priests to use their wives, whom they married before ordination, until the time of Siricius; and in the Eastern Church, it is still allowed and has always been allowed, which is the doctrine of Jodocus Clitonius in his book on the Celibacy of Priests.

Moreover, some distinguish deacons and subdeacons from priests or presbyters, stating that marriage is prohibited to deacons and subdeacons by positive and ecclesiastical law only, but to priests by divine law.

End of Book VI

Theological Theses:

In which it is inquired whether divine worship should be celebrated publicly and privately in the vernacular language understood by the people.

Thesis One.

The doctors of the Roman Church deny that it is expedient for divine worship to be celebrated publicly in the vernacular language. Therefore, the Roman Church everywhere uses the Latin language in its sacred rites, even though it is no longer the vernacular and commonly understood by the people anywhere. This practice was sanctioned by the decree of the Council of Trent. For in Session 22, Chapter 8, these words are found: "Although the Mass contains great instruction for the faithful people, it did not seem expedient to the Fathers that it be celebrated everywhere in the vernacular language." And in Canon 9 of the same Session, it is declared anathema to say that the Mass should only be celebrated in the vernacular language.

II. Nevertheless, they do not consider it entirely illicit to celebrate the Mass, that is, the public liturgy, in a language other than Latin. But they extend this privilege to the Greek and Hebrew languages as well. However, they only permit the use of these three languages—Hebrew, Greek, and Latin—in public and solemn worship, and completely prohibit the use of any other languages. Nor do they think it is permissible for any nation to read Scripture in public assemblies, or to compose prayers and thanksgivings to God in their own vernacular language, but only in one of those three languages, which they call learned languages. This can be seen in Bellarmine's work, book 2 on the Word of God, chapter 15.

III. It should be noted, however, that when they say it is not lawful to celebrate public worship except in those three languages, they do not mean that this pertains to any divine law, but only to positive and ecclesiastical law, from which the Roman Pontiffs can dispense. It is said that they have sometimes allowed the Slavs to celebrate Christian worship in their own language.

IV. On the other hand, Protestants, by common consent, assert that it is not only permissible but divinely necessary that Scriptures be read publicly and that all divine worship be celebrated in a language that can be understood by the people present and listening.

V. They confirm this opinion with many strong arguments. First, by the precept and authority of the Apostles in the 14th chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians. There the Apostle forbids anyone to speak in the church and the assembly of the faithful in an unknown language, which cannot be understood by those present. He shows with many reasons that it is

absurd and improper to do so. Above all, because he who speaks in a foreign and unknown language brings no benefit to the listeners, whereas in the church nothing should be said that does not refer to the use and edification of those who hear. "If," he says, "I come to you speaking in tongues, what will I profit you?"

VI. He then illustrates this with various comparisons. "If even lifeless instruments, such as the flute or the harp, do not give distinct notes, how will anyone know what is played on the flute or the harp? And if the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who will prepare for battle? So with yourselves, if you in a tongue utter speech that is not intelligible, how will anyone know what is said? For you will be speaking into the air."

VII. He also emphasizes that it is absurd to speak in a gathering in such a way that those present cannot understand the speaker's words. This would make people appear as barbarians to each other. "If I do not know the meaning of the sound," he says, "I shall be a foreigner to the speaker, and the speaker a foreigner to me." Properly speaking, one language is not more barbarous than another, but a barbarian is anyone who speaks in a foreign and unknown idiom, according to Ovid's saying in *Tristia*, book 5, elegy 10: "Here I am a barbarian because no one understands me; the ignorant laugh at my Latin words."

VIII. The Apostle also teaches that in the church, one should pray in such a way that not only the one who prays is edified, but also that some benefit returns to those who hear. This cannot happen when one prays in an unknown language. "For if I pray in a tongue," he says, "my spirit prays, but my mind is unfruitful. What then? I will pray with the spirit, but I will pray with the mind also; I will sing praise with the spirit, but I will sing praise with the mind also." The term "spirit" is taken in various ways by interpreters. Some understand it as the extraordinary inspiration of the Spirit; others as the reason and intellect of the one praying; others as the spirit or habit of the mouth by which words are uttered; others, like most of the modern Roman Catholic doctors, as the affective part of the soul as opposed to the mind. But however "spirit" is taken, it is certain that the mind or intellect, which the Apostle here contrasts with the spirit, does not simply refer to the one who prays and sings but to those who hear the one praying and singing. For, as is evident from the entire context of this chapter, the Apostle's purpose is not to teach that the one who prays in the assembly of the faithful should understand only himself, but that he should speak in such a way that he is understood by others. Therefore, according to the Apostle's intent, one prays with the mind not simply when he understands his own prayer, but when others can understand him praying. This is clearly evident from what the Apostle subsequently adds: "In the church, I would rather speak five words with my mind, to instruct others also, than ten thousand words in a tongue." For it cannot be doubted that speaking with the mind here means speaking in such a way that others understand. Since the Apostle says that the one who speaks with the mind instructs others, it requires not only that the speaker understands himself, but that he is also understood by the listeners.

IX. Furthermore, the Apostle proves that it is absurd to compose prayers and thanksgivings in the assembly of the faithful in a language unknown to the listeners, because when this is done, the faithful people cannot follow the prayer with their minds and testify their

assent with the solemn voice of "Amen," which is proper to do. "If you bless with the spirit," he says, "how can one who occupies the place of the unlearned say the 'Amen' to your thanksgiving, since he does not know what you are saying? For you may give thanks well enough, but the other is not edified."

X. Here it should be noted that by the one who occupies the place of the unlearned, the Apostle means the unlearned person himself. The Apostle calls any private person in the church who holds no office an unlearned person. For in the church, as in the republic, the unlearned or private individuals are opposed to magistrates and those who conduct public business. Therefore, according to the Apostle, the unlearned are those who were later called laity, in opposition to the clergy, by which name ecclesiastical writers designate the ministers of the church. But it is questioned why the Apostle, wishing to designate the unlearned person, uses this circumlocution, "one who occupies the place of the unlearned," instead of simply saying "the unlearned"? I answer that the reason for this locution is to be sought from the custom that was observed in the church from the beginning. For the ministers of the church did not sit promiscuously with the people, but had separate seats where the faithful used to gather, while the people sat separately. Hence, the Apostle, wishing to refer to the unlearned, says "one who occupies the place of the unlearned," that is, who occupies the place of the unlearned and sits among the unlearned, not among the ministers of the church. And thus this phrase is explained by the Greek interpreters, namely, Chrysostom, Oecumenius, and Theophylact, who knew the force of the Greek phrase best.

XI. But the Latin interpreter, apparently not fully grasping it, translated it as "one who fills the place of the unlearned." Most Roman Church interpreters explain this as someone who then represented the people and responded on their behalf to the minister praying and blessing, and said "Amen," as is commonly done today in the Roman Church. However, this custom is more recent. Formerly, the whole people used to acclaim the minister praying on their behalf, as is evident from many testimonies of the ancients and from those ancient liturgies that bear the names of Basil and Chrysostom. This is especially clearly testified by Justin Martyr in his second Apology, where, describing the form of public worship used in his time, after mentioning those prayers and thanksgivings made by the bishop over the Eucharistic bread and wine, he adds that the people acclaim by saying "Amen." This is echoed by Cyprian in his discourse on the Lord's Prayer. "When," he says, "the minister says, 'Lift up your hearts,' the whole people respond, 'We have them with the Lord.'" Hence, Jerome, in the prologue to the second book of his Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, speaking of the Roman Church, says, "Where does the thunder-like Amen resound in likeness to the heavenly thunder?" This itself is proof that in those times the people understood the public prayers, as they were accustomed to acclaim and respond to them.

XII. But to return to the text of the Apostle, from what has been said it is quite clear that he does not simply forbid anyone from speaking in the church in an unknown language, but he proves and persuades this with many arguments, concluding with the words quoted earlier: "In the church, I would rather speak five words with my understanding, to instruct others also, than

ten thousand words in a tongue," that is, an unknown tongue. These words are certainly so clear and so openly condemn the use of a language unknown to the people in public assemblies of the faithful, that there are even some notable men in the Roman school who acknowledge that it would be better if public prayers were held in a language understood by the people. Chief among them is the confession of Cardinal Cajetan in his commentaries on this passage. He says, "From this teaching of Paul, it is held that it is better for the edification of the church that public prayers, which are said in the presence of the people, be said in a language common to both clergy and people, rather than in Latin."

XIII. Nevertheless, the doctors of the Roman Church seek various escapes, so that despite such clear teaching of the Apostle, they seem to use a language not understood by the people in divine worship with reason. First, they say that these precepts of the Apostle were temporary and referred to the state and condition of the primitive church, which is very different from the current state of the church. This seems to have been the opinion of Thomas Aquinas in his commentaries on this chapter. He raises this question in his third lecture towards the end: "But why are blessings not given in the vernacular, so that the people may understand them and conform themselves to them more?" He responds, "It must be said that this may have been in the primitive church, but after the faithful have been instructed and know what they hear in the common office, blessings are given in Latin."

XIV. Thomas Harding, in his book against Jewel, the Bishop of Salisbury, after twisting himself in various ways and seeking many things to obscure the Apostle's teaching, finally settles on this response as the safest and easiest of all. He says in Article 3, Section 30: "But what divine Paul seems to disapprove of, namely, the custom of praying in the church in a language unknown and fruitless for edification, and preferring five intelligible and perceived words or sentences from which the rest of the people may be instructed, to ten thousand words spoken in a foreign and unknown tongue, all these must be referred to the condition of those times, which is very different from the state of the church today." Then, explaining the reason for this difference, he adds, "Instruction was necessary for them: we are not ignorant of the principal parts of religion. They needed to be instructed in every detail: we do not primarily come to church to be instructed and taught when prayers are celebrated, but to pray and attend homilies. Their prayers, because faith was lacking, were useless, and therefore they had to be done in the vernacular language so that their faith might be increased: our faith will benefit us more if we devote ourselves to religious prayers. Since they were devoid of faith, they needed interpretation both in prayers and in homilies and all other spiritual exercises: we, having been sufficiently taught the necessary rudiments of faith, should rather devote ourselves to diligent and fervent prayers to God for a just, pious, and holy life, than spend much time listening to increase our knowledge."

XV. I have wanted to quote these words verbatim so that it may appear what straits the doctors of the Roman Church are driven to by their obstinate determination to defend the abuses and errors received in it by any means, right or wrong, and how absurd they are compelled to devise and utter to evade the force of truth and reason here. For what is more absurd than to say that the first faithful were devoid of faith, and therefore needed to pray in the vernacular

language so that their faith might be increased? And besides, by what right are vernacular prayers opposed to religious prayers, as if one could not pray religiously in the vernacular, which even the most obstinate of adversaries would not admit outside the heat of dispute and the desire to contend?

XVI. But lest we seem to wrangle, let us set aside those absurd evasions and discuss that difference which is supposed to exist between the primitive church and the present-day church. It seems that Harding, following Thomas Aquinas, places it in two points. First, that the first Christians, who constituted the church in the time of the Apostles, were endowed with very little faith (for it is charitable to interpret that which is not said without contradiction, that the first faithful were devoid of faith and their prayers were without faith), whereas the Christians of today have much greater faith. Secondly, that the first Christians were ignorant and poorly instructed in faith; therefore, they needed instruction: but the faithful of today are clearly well-instructed and not ignorant of the principal parts of religion.

XVII. But certainly, if any difference is to be noted between the primitive and apostolic church and the present Roman church, it should rather consist in the fact that the first Christians were endowed with remarkable faith and great knowledge of sacred things compared to today's Christians, among whom faith languishes and supreme ignorance of divine matters reigns, especially if they are compared with those ancient believers. For will we think that they were devoid of faith or at least inferior in faith to us, whose faith the Apostle so highly commends? As is evident from the letters written by the Apostle to various churches he had founded, such as the Romans, Ephesians, Philippians, and Thessalonians, where he gives great thanks to God and Christ for the true and sincere faith with which they had eagerly received the word of God preached by him. Particularly, writing to the Corinthians, to whom he prescribes laws and precepts in this very chapter which is now under discussion, he thanks God that they were enriched in everything, in all speech and all knowledge, so that they were not lacking in any gift while awaiting the revelation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

XVIII. Here I appeal to the conscience of the theologians of the Roman Church and implore them to dare to prefer their congregations in faith and knowledge to those whom the Apostle testifies were enriched in all speech and all knowledge, so that they were not lacking in any gift. And indeed, who could bring themselves to believe that the first faithful, who shone with miracles and upon whom the Lord, according to the prophecy of Joel, poured out His Spirit so abundantly that even children, servants, and women prophesied, were inferior in faith and knowledge of sacred mysteries to the faithful of this time? Certainly, Christ and the Apostles did not predict that faith would increase more and more with time, but rather that it would be diminished by the perversity of men, so much so that Christ would hardly find faith on earth in the last days.

XIX. It is clear, therefore, that it is contrary to the truth and the testimony of Scripture for the doctors of the Roman Church to assume that the faithful of today surpass the first Christians in faith and knowledge of sacred doctrine. For if they affirm this sincerely, they must think very poorly of those first Christians instructed by the voice of the Apostles. For what greater

ignorance of divine matters can be imagined than what has been seen in recent centuries and is still seen among the people adhering to the Roman Pontiff, who for the most part hardly know even the first rudiments of the Christian faith; they neither understand what is said in public liturgy nor their private prayers, often not even thinking about what is contained in them? Therefore, if anyone ever needed instruction and to be informed about all things pertaining to the Christian religion, they must be counted among those who make up the Roman congregation. Therefore, if the Apostle once commanded that among the first faithful in the church nothing should be said in a language they did not understand, but all parts of the liturgy should be celebrated in a language known and understood by them, so that they could be daily more and more instructed in matters of faith and religion, it is clear that this same precept obliges the present church even more to celebrate its liturgy in a known language, since the Christian people labor under no less ignorance than the first faithful, and indeed need more instruction than they did.

XX. Then from the given response, it follows that at least among new Christians, whose faith is weak and knowledge small, it is expedient for divine worship to be celebrated in the vernacular language. Yet, they do not observe this among the barbarous peoples of both the East and West Indies, whom they boast of having converted to the Christian faith. For although, by their own admission, little faith and even less knowledge is found among them, they do not cease to celebrate and administer divine worship and everything pertaining to the public liturgy in the Latin language, as they do here.

XXI. Finally, by this response, they acknowledge that if the sacred liturgy, prayers, and solemn thanksgivings are celebrated in the vernacular language, it contributes to the instruction of the people and the increase of their faith. Therefore, let them explain why they deny this benefit to the Christian people today. For even if it were true that greater faith and broader instruction are found among Christians now than in the past, we should never rest content in the measure of faith and knowledge we have but always strive to go further and make progress, going from faith to faith, and according to the example and exhortation of the Apostle, pressing on toward perfection, forgetting what lies behind and straining forward to what lies ahead. It is the duty of those who govern the church to keep this in view and to promote as much as they can the progress of those committed to their care, not knowingly and willingly omitting anything that contributes to the increase of the people's faith and the cultivation of piety.

XXII. Therefore, other doctors of the Roman Church, not considering it safe to concede this much to us, try to escape by another route. They say that the Apostle in that whole chapter is dealing with a miraculous gift of tongues, which once existed in the Apostolic Church. For many of the faithful were so affected by the Holy Spirit that they suddenly spoke in foreign languages they had never learned before, with great admiration from those present and listening. Among the Corinthians, there were those who ambitiously used this gift and, in the public assemblies of the faithful, gathered for prayer and hearing the Word of God, sought to speak in a foreign language to draw admiration, thereby disturbing the church with an inappropriate noise. This abuse is what the Apostle rebukes and wants to correct in the chapter in question. Although these

things are very true and we willingly concede them, those doctors conclude from them that the precepts given in that chapter do not apply to us now. For that gift of tongues no longer exists, so there is no longer any abuse of it. Therefore, according to the Apostle, speaking in a tongue does not simply mean speaking in a language not understood by those present, but rather uttering divine mysteries through inspiration in a foreign language, which the speaker has never learned. From this, they conclude that a priest reciting the liturgy in Latin or Greek, even among unlearned people, is not speaking in tongues or in a tongue, according to Paul's meaning, and therefore does not violate the Apostle's precept, which forbids speaking in tongues in the church unless there is an interpreter. For such a priest does not speak through inspiration, but simply reads and repeats what has been dictated and designated to him according to the order of the church.

XXIII. But although what they assume is true, it does not diminish, but rather strengthens the force of our argument. For we admit that the Apostle is dealing with the extraordinary gift of tongues and rebuking its abuse among the Corinthians. But if the Apostle did not want anything to be uttered in the church in an unknown language without an interpreter, even though that language was a miraculous gift of the Holy Spirit, by which the doctrine of the Gospel was divinely confirmed, how much less would he have approved of ordinary worship being perpetually celebrated in a language not understood by the people, which, unlike those foreign tongues, has nothing divine or extraordinary to prepare unbelievers for faith or to strengthen believers in faith?

XXIV. Furthermore, the Apostle does not prohibit the use of those foreign tongues in the church on the grounds that they were miraculous and extraordinary, but because the speaker could not be understood by the congregation present, and thus spoke in vain, as if into the air, and was a barbarian to those who were present, who did not know what he was saying and therefore could not be edified or say "Amen" to his prayer or blessing. These reasons show that the use of any foreign language in the church should be abolished, whether it is ordinary or extraordinary, whether it was infused by the Holy Spirit or learned through study and practice.

XXV. But those we are now dealing with say that in these Western provinces, the Latin language should not be considered foreign, like Arabic, Persian, or Ethiopian. For it has become familiar through long use and is understood at least by the learned. But even this escape cannot diminish the force of the Apostle's arguments. For those learned people who understand Latin are very few compared to those who only know their vernacular. Indeed, in many churches, no learned people are found, and only the unlearned and ignorant are present. But the Apostle does not want the church to consider only a few learned individuals, but also those who sit among the unlearned. And however much it may be claimed that even the common people and private individuals are familiar with the Latin language because they often hear the priest speaking or singing in Latin and read and recite certain Latin prayers themselves, they still do not understand the Latin language any more than they do Hebrew, Turkish, or Persian. Nor can they derive any edification from what is said in Latin, which the Apostle declares to be necessary. And the one

who speaks in Latin is still, in their regard, speaking as if into the air and is a barbarian to them, not knowing what he says, so they cannot say "Amen" to his blessings and prayers.

XXVI. Other theologians of the Roman school respond that the Apostle in that chapter is not dealing with the public and ordinary reading of Scripture and solemn sacred rites, but with certain spiritual exercises and conferences, by which the ancient Christians used to comfort and edify one another after the sermon and the celebration of the mysteries. Sometimes they would encourage each other with holy exhortations, sometimes they would explain and expound certain passages of Scripture, and sometimes they would engage in prayers, celebrating God with hymns and spiritual songs. And indeed, we do not deny that this custom once existed, especially when extraordinary gifts of the Spirit flourished in the primitive church. The Apostle undoubtedly refers to this at the end of the chapter when he says, "When you come together, each one has a hymn, a lesson, a revelation, a tongue, or an interpretation. Let all things be done for edification. If anyone speaks in a tongue, let there be only two or at most three, and each in turn, and let someone interpret. But if there is no one to interpret, let each of them keep silent in church and speak to himself and to God. Let two or three prophets speak, and let the others weigh what is said. If a revelation is made to another sitting by, let the first be silent. For you can all prophesy one by one, so that all may learn and all be encouraged." And besides, it is possible that in these spiritual exercises, the Corinthians abused and flaunted the gift of tongues. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this abuse also took place even in the ordinary worship. It is highly credible that some would ostentatiously utter the common prayers and blessings in a foreign tongue. For the Apostle seems to refer to this when he says, "If you bless with the spirit, how can anyone in the position of an outsider say 'Amen' to your thanksgiving when he does not know what you are saying? For you may give thanks well enough, but the other person is not edified." Here the Apostle, using the word "bless" and the term "thanksgiving," seems to allude to the prayers and thanksgivings used in the very celebration of the Eucharist.

XXVII. But those with whom we are contending say that it is beyond doubt that Scripture was read in Greek in Greece, and divine offices were celebrated in the same language; hence, Protestants believe that an argument can be made against the practice of the Roman Church, which does not allow divine offices to be celebrated in the vernacular language of each province. Therefore, what the Apostle says about a foreign tongue, which some among the Corinthians used or rather abused in public assemblies, cannot be referred to the ordinary worship but only to certain extraordinary exercises. I respond that it is indeed true that the Apostle established that in the churches of Greece, Scriptures should be read in Greek, and public prayers and services should be conducted in Greek. But this does not prevent the Corinthians and others from sometimes, contrary to the Apostle's intent and institution, conducting those prayers in some foreign language, which they had learned divinely and miraculously, for which the Apostle rebukes them in this chapter.

XXVIII. But suppose the abuse of the gift of tongues was confined to those extraordinary exercises and that the Corinthians only used a foreign language in them, and this alone is rebuked by the Apostle. This still does not diminish the force of our argument, which we derive

from his words against the current abuse. For the Apostle, on the occasion of what was improperly done among the Corinthians, speaks generally and gives certain general precepts, namely, that in the church, the edification of the people should always be considered, and nothing recited in an unknown language should contribute to the edification of the people; therefore, it is better for five words to be spoken in the church with understanding than ten thousand words in a language not understood. This certainly conflicts no less with the use of an unknown language in ordinary worship than in extraordinary exercises.

XXIX. The same is evident in what the Apostle argues throughout that chapter against the abuse among the Corinthians: that the one who used an unknown tongue was a barbarian to the listeners, spoke into the air, and others could not say "Amen" to what was uttered. These arguments condemn the use of a foreign language in ordinary prayers and hymns as much as in extraordinary ones. Whatever may be uttered in a foreign tongue, the speaker remains a barbarian to the listeners, who do not understand what is said. Should it be permitted for church ministers to be barbarians and speak into the air in ordinary worship rather than in some extraordinary exercises? And is it any less necessary for the people to say "Amen" to the stated and solemn prayers than to those that might occur outside the regular order?

XXX. However, those we argue with make an exception, claiming a distinction between ordinary worship and those extraordinary exercises. They say that during the time of the primitive Church, new and previously unheard prayers and supplications were offered by those endowed with the gift of tongues; therefore, those present could not say "Amen" and approve them until the words were explained to them. Otherwise, they would blindly approve of something they did not understand, whether it was good or bad. But regarding the current prayers of the Church, although they are said in a language unknown to the people, the people know that these prayers are good since they are received and used by the Church. Therefore, they can safely say "Amen" even without understanding them. This is the exception made by Estius, a doctor from Douai, in his commentary on this passage.

XXXI. However, this escape is as vain as the others. For it is not sufficient for the people to say "Amen" to prayers said in the Church just because they know generally that the prayers are good; they must distinctly understand what those prayers contain. Otherwise, the early Christians could have said "Amen" to prayers and thanksgivings spoken in a foreign tongue through the gift of tongues, just as the people of the Roman Church today can say "Amen" to prayers authorized by the Church and recited in an unknown language. For the early faithful could not doubt that what was uttered in the foreign language by those endowed with the gift of tongues was good, knowing that they had received the Holy Spirit through the laying on of the Apostles' hands and were adorned with miraculous gifts. Since it was evident that they were speaking in foreign tongues by the inspiration of the Spirit of God and through a great miracle, it was also certain that they were uttering nothing but good things. And yet Paul affirms that the people could not say "Amen" to what was spoken until they understood the speakers. Thus, by the same reasoning, it is clear that the Christian people cannot say "Amen" to what is recited

before them in an unknown language, even if it is assumed that whatever is said is good and holy.

XXXII. However, Bellarmine invented another distinction between those prayers and blessings that the Apostle forbids to be done in an unknown language and those contained in the ordinary liturgy. He says that the primary purpose of the prayers and songs that the Apostle speaks of was the instruction and consolation of the people, which the people could not receive unless they were spoken in a known language or at least immediately followed by an interpretation. But the principal purpose of the divine offices is not the instruction and consolation of the people, but the worship of God. However, in making this distinction, Bellarmine makes a false assumption and a poor inference. First, it is false to claim that those prayers, praises, and blessings uttered by the early Christians in public assemblies under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit did not have the worship of God as their primary purpose. No one can legitimately pray to or praise God without primarily intending to worship God. Since the primary purpose for which people solemnly gather is to render due worship and honor to God, it is clear that in the public assemblies of the Church, nothing can legitimately be done that is not primarily referred to divine worship.

XXXIII. Secondly, it is also false to say that the divine offices, as Bellarmine calls them, that is, the prayers and blessings, and other parts of the public and ordinary liturgy, do not have the instruction and consolation of the people as a purpose. Although their primary purpose is divine worship, a secondary purpose, necessarily connected with the primary one, is the edification of the Church, to which the Apostle commands everything in the assemblies of the faithful to be referred, as can be seen in this very chapter. And indeed, who could believe that the edification and instruction of the Christian people should be less regarded in the ordinary liturgy than in some extraordinary exercises? Therefore, the divine offices must be celebrated in such a way that not only is God worshiped, but the people are also edified. Bellarmine himself does not dare to deny that the public liturgy also has the instruction and consolation of the people as its purpose. For he does not say that the worship of God is its only purpose, but only its primary purpose. By these words, he seems to admit that the edification of the Church is also a purpose of it, although not the primary one. Hence, it follows that even this secondary purpose must also be considered. However, this secondary purpose is not considered at all as long as those offices are celebrated in an unknown language. For, according to the Apostle, the people cannot be edified or receive consolation and instruction from them unless they know what is being said.

XXXIV. Therefore, it is clear that whatever the leaders and officials of the Roman Church may devise, they are still bound by the Apostle's precept, and they cannot escape the guilt of violating it as long as they continue to celebrate divine worship in a language unknown to the Christian people. The extent of their sin in this matter can also be demonstrated by other arguments. Firstly, the sacred liturgy largely consists of the reading of Scripture. Now, in Scripture, God speaks to humans. And indeed, He speaks with the purpose that they may hear and understand and learn their duty and His will. Therefore, those who read the sacred Scripture in an unknown language to the Christian people frustrate God's purpose, as far as they are

concerned, and render Him a barbarian to them, implicating themselves in the curse by which God threatens to punish the hypocrisy of the people of Judah in Isaiah 29:13-14, "Therefore, behold, I will again do a marvelous work among this people, a marvelous work and a wonder; for the wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent men shall be hidden." Paul applies this to the same matter in 1 Corinthians 14:21.

XXXV. However, to avoid the force of this argument, the doctors of the Roman school, against all reason, deny that the purpose of the public reading of Scripture is the instruction and edification of the people, but rather the worship of God by the Church. But although God is also worshipped by attentively and reverently reading and hearing His word, it is certain that the purpose of this reading is also the instruction and edification of the people. This is clearly evident from Deuteronomy 31, where God commands that His law be solemnly read before all Israel so that every person, men, women, children, and strangers, may learn to fear the Lord and keep His commandments. "When all Israel comes to appear before the Lord your God in the place which He chooses, you shall read this law before all Israel in their hearing. Gather the people together, men, women, and little ones, and the stranger who is within your gates, that they may hear and that they may learn to fear the Lord your God and carefully observe all the words of this law." These words are certainly so clear and evident that it cannot be doubted that, at least under the Old Testament, the public reading of the divine law was intended for the instruction of the listening people. Who could believe that the Christian people are less capable of hearing the divine law or that less regard should be had for their instruction?

XXXVI. Indeed, although some circumstances of that Deuteronomic precept, specific to the place and time, were peculiar to the ancient people, the purpose and substance of the precept are no less relevant to Christians today than they were to the Jews then. For we are no less obliged to hear and learn the law of Christ, recorded in the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists, than they were to hear and learn the law given to Moses in writing. Therefore, if God once wanted His law to be read to His people so that through that reading it might become familiar to them, and even the women and children might learn His will, who doubts that the Christian people should be similarly instructed through such readings, so that they too may learn the will of God and make progress in the knowledge and fear of God?

XXXVII. Indeed, the leaders of the Roman Church are convicted by their own words that the purpose of public readings of Holy Scripture is the instruction and edification of the people. When a bishop ordains a lector, he uses these very words: "Strive to read the word of God, that is, the sacred lessons distinctly and plainly, for the understanding and edification of the faithful, without any falsehood or deceit... so that you may be able to teach your listeners by word and example." This can be seen in the Roman Pontifical in the chapter on the ordination of lectors. These ancient words of ordination clearly accuse the present abuse. It is evident that public readings of Holy Scripture were originally instituted with the purpose that the people might understand, be taught, and be edified by them. But today, the Roman Church involves its lectors in perjury by binding them with a solemn oath to read Scripture for the understanding and

edification of the faithful, while simultaneously commanding them to chant it in an unknown language, so that the present people understand and perceive nothing.

XXXVIII. Furthermore, in the sacred liturgy, not only is Scripture read, in which God speaks to humans, but the public minister also often addresses the present people. This can be seen in the Mass itself, where the priest often says to the people, "Let us pray," "Pray for me, brothers and sisters," and also exhorts the faithful to lift up their hearts. He even confesses his own sins to them, saying, "I confess to Almighty God, to Blessed Mary ever-Virgin, to Blessed John the Baptist, to the holy Apostles Peter and Paul, to all the saints, and to you, brothers and sisters, that I have greatly sinned in thought, word, and deed." Now, what could be more absurd than addressing someone in such a way that they cannot understand, exhorting those present to do this or that in an unknown and foreign language? Certainly, this is completely contrary to the nature of speech, which is given to humans to make their thoughts known. This is rather to mock than to exhort, commanding that something be done in such a way that the hearer does not know what you mean or what you desire to be done.

XXXIX. From these arguments, it is evident that sacred acts performed in a foreign language are condemned by the authority of Scripture and clear reason, and therefore should always and everywhere be celebrated in a language that those present can understand. This practice is evident in the ancient Church of both the Old and New Testaments. There is no doubt that in the Israelite community, sacred acts instituted by Moses and the prophets were conducted in the Hebrew language, which was vulgar and vernacular to that people. For God gave the law to be read to His people in Hebrew; all the solemn prayers and blessings found in the Old Testament were originally given and read in Hebrew as long as the Hebrew church and state existed. For example, the priestly blessing found in Numbers 6, which we still use today when dismissing our assemblies, and the two brief prayers, one said when the ark was set out, and the other when it was placed in its resting place, as seen in Numbers 10. Additionally, the blessing formula used in the offering of the first fruits and in the offering of the triennial tithes, as seen in Deuteronomy 26. Later, David dictated the Psalms in Hebrew, to be sung with musical instruments in the Temple of God.

XL. The same was true in the early Christian Church. Everywhere the apostles and their disciples established divine worship in a language that the people could understand. This is evident even from the admissions of our adversaries. We have already referred to the words of Thomas Aquinas, who plainly concedes that in the primitive Church, blessings were given in the vernacular. Nicholas of Lyra also acknowledges this in his notes on the 14th chapter of the first epistle to the Corinthians. He says, "Therefore Paul says if you, a priest, bless with the spirit, and the people do not understand, what does the simple and unlearned people gain? Therefore, in the primitive Church, blessings and all other things were done in the vernacular." Even more recent theologians of the Roman school do not deny this. Harding, an Englishman who wrote extensively on this subject against Jewel, then Bishop of Salisbury, after raising this objection from the Protestants, responds, "Indeed, in the primitive Church this was necessary when the first rudiments of faith were being delivered. For this reason, prayers were then made in the common

and usual language of the people so that they might be better instructed, having been recently converted to the faith and made Christians from pagans, and therefore needed thorough instruction." (Article 3, Section 28).

XLI. The ancient doctors of the Church clearly and openly testified that things were indeed so, as Cassiodorus, writing around the year 330 AD, explicitly mentions. Explaining Psalm 44 (which in the Hebrew text is Psalm 45), he writes: "Let us examine why the Church of God is praised for its variety of languages, even though the whole of it is simple and one. But here variety signifies the multiplicity of languages, because all nations sing in the Church according to their homeland, showing the most beautiful diversity to the author of virtues." This is also supported by what is read in Origen, book 8 against Celsus: "Christians do not even use common names of God in sacred Scripture while praying; but Greeks pray in Greek, Romans in Latin, and each one prays in their own language and praises God according to their ability; and the Lord of all languages hears those who pray in all tongues."

XLII. Indeed, this is evident by induction. It is beyond controversy that in Greece, the liturgy was established in Greek, while in Italy and adjacent provinces where Latin was commonly understood, it was celebrated in Latin. For the Armenians of Syria, Ethiopians, Indians, and Persians, it is entirely reasonable to believe the same. For Chrysostom and Theodoret testify that the sacred books of Scripture were translated long ago into the languages of those and many other nations. Theodoret writes in his book on the healing of Greek maladies: "The Hebrew books have not only been translated into Greek but also into Roman, Egyptian, Persian, Indian, Armenian, and Scythian languages, and indeed into every language used by nations to this day." Similarly, Chrysostom, in his first homily on John, speaking of John's writings and comparing them to those of the pagan philosophers, says: "But the doctrine of these unlearned and illiterate men has not vanished. Instead, the Syrians, Egyptians, Indians, Persians, Ethiopians, and countless other nations, translating the doctrines introduced by this man into their own language, have learned to philosophize."

XLIII. Contemporary experience shows that Ethiopians celebrate their sacred rites in the Ethiopian language, Armenians in Armenian, Muscovites in Muscovite, Syrians in Syriac, and Egyptians in Arabic, since the Saracens invaded Egypt and made Arabic the common language there. This is acknowledged and recorded by the doctors of the Roman Church themselves. Francis Alvares, in his Ethiopian history, cited by Cassander in his liturgical writings, chapter 11, attests that Ethiopians consecrate the sacrament of the Eucharist in their own language. And in chapter 15, he mentions from Sigismund, that the entire sacred rite or mass is customarily performed in the vernacular language among the Muscovites. The Sigismund referred to is the same one who is otherwise called Sigismund, Baron of Herberstein. Bellarmine and Harding also concede that Armenians, Muscovites, Ethiopians, and others celebrate their sacred rites in the vernacular language (Bellarmine, Book 2, last chapter of "On the Word of God"; Harding, Article 3, Section 38, against Jewel).

XLIV. Bellarmine claims that all these people who today use their vernacular language in sacred rites are either heretics or schismatics, a claim also made by Harding, but they state that

their ancestors did not act in this manner, nor did they celebrate their sacred rites in the vernacular languages. However, Bellarmine affirms this without any evidence and against all plausibility. Since we have learned from Theodoret and Chrysostom that they translated the sacred Scripture into their own languages long ago, is it not entirely credible that these translations were made for use in their sacred rites? Indeed, it is clear that the Syrians celebrated their liturgy in the Syriac language, as they sang the Psalms in Syriac at funerals, as Jerome attests in his epitaph on Paula. Describing the funeral pomp and ceremony, he says: "The entire crowd of Palestinian cities gathered for her funeral. Psalms were sung in order in Hebrew, Greek, Latin, and Syriac."

XLV. Furthermore, Ephrem, a deacon of the Edessene Church around the third century, renowned in his time for his learning and sanctity, wrote many things in Syriac, including some hymns and psalms, as Theodoret records. These were recited publicly after the reading of Scriptures and were sung in the Syriac churches, a clear indication that the liturgy was then celebrated in Syriac, as it is today. The same Theodoret attests that Ephrem, though a deacon and public minister in the Church, was entirely ignorant of the Greek language. If the divine worship had been administered in Greek, as our adversaries claim, surely such a holy and learned man, responsible for that administration, would not have been ignorant of Greek.

XLVI. But what most strongly proves that divine worship was once celebrated in a language understood by the people is the fact that public sacred acts were not administered by one person or with only a few ministers, as is done today in the Roman Church, but by the joint efforts of the priests and the whole Church, as the ancient doctors of the Church testify with one voice and in agreement. Thus, Clement of Alexandria, in *Stromata*, book 7, speaking of the assembly of the faithful, says: "In prayers, they have one common voice and one mind." Chrysostom, in Homily 18 on 2 Corinthians, says: "Not only does the priest give thanks to God, but the whole people." Basil, in his letter to the Neocaesareans, recounts how the faithful, during nocturnal vigils, would divide into two groups and sing alternately. This custom, where the people took part in public prayers and psalmody, still prevailed in Isidore's time. He writes in the book "On Ecclesiastical Offices," chapter 10: "It is fitting that when the Psalms are sung, they should be sung by all; and when prayer is made, it should be made by all; and when a lesson is read, it should be equally listened to by all in silence." To give an example of these dialogues between the priest and the people, after the priest said "Lift up your hearts," the people responded, "We have lifted them up to the Lord," as observed from Cyprian. When the priest said "The Lord be with you," the people responded, "And with your spirit." At the end of each prayer of the priest, the whole congregation loudly exclaimed "Amen." These things could certainly not be properly and conveniently done unless the people understood the priest speaking.

XLVII. Next, let us address the arguments of our adversaries, who believe it is not expedient for divine worship to be celebrated in the vernacular languages but only in the three so-called learned languages: Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. First, they argue for the prerogative of these languages, which the Lord, as they say, honored with the title on the cross, as seen in John 19, where the Evangelist records that the inscription on the cross of Christ was in Hebrew,

Greek, and Latin: "Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews." I respond that the fact that this title was inscribed in three languages on Christ's cross was not done by Christ but by Pilate, who ordered this inscription. Who would consider Pilate's actions as a rule for divine worship in the Church? We do not deny that this happened by divine counsel and providence. But the purpose of divine providence was not to consecrate those three languages particularly but to make known to all in Jerusalem and those who could see Christ hanging on the cross that Christ was indeed the King given to God's people, and to spread the fame of His death everywhere. If there had been more languages in use in Jerusalem at the time, Pilate, directed by God, would certainly have used them in that inscription as well. Thus, the argument rather suggests that the mysteries of the Christian religion should be celebrated in all the languages of all peoples, so that the death and reign of Christ might be more widely known. Furthermore, if those languages are to be considered sanctified because the title on Christ's cross was written in them, then all other languages of the world were sanctified much more when they were miraculously infused into the apostles and their disciples, so that they might announce the wonderful works of God in all of them.

XLVIII. Furthermore, the doctors of the Roman Church argue that it is not expedient to celebrate public worship in the vernacular because the majesty of divine offices seems to require a more grave and venerable language than those commonly used. I respond that one language is not inherently more venerable than another. The reverence of a language comes from the things conveyed in that language, not from the language itself. Moreover, if languages have sufficient gravity and veneration to proclaim divine mysteries, why should they not also have enough to celebrate divine offices? I do not see what greater majesty can be imagined in the sacred liturgy than in the doctrine of the Gospel and its most profound mysteries. And yet it is permissible to preach the word of God and expound the sacred mysteries of the Gospel in all languages, even the vernacular. Furthermore, let those we debate with explain how the gravity and reverence of the Latin or Greek language surpass that of the vernacular languages. Bellarmine responds that those languages are graver and more venerable precisely because they are not in common use. But if a language is more grave and venerable the less commonly it is used, then the Tartaric or Turkish language would be graver and more venerable than the Latin or Greek language. For in the Roman Church, the Tartaric or Turkish language is far less common than Greek or Latin. Furthermore, the Greek and Latin languages, which are no longer common, once were, and indeed were when divine worship was instituted in them. Thus, if we follow Bellarmine's judgment, the Apostles and their disciples, who established the liturgy to be celebrated in Greek in Greece and in Latin in Italy, did not sufficiently consider the majesty of divine offices, nor did they choose a language sufficiently grave for their celebration.

XLIX. The theologians of the Roman School reason thus: If there were any reason why the sacred Scriptures should be read in the vernacular language in the assembly of the faithful, and other parts of the liturgy should also be administered in the same language, the chief reason would certainly be that everyone might understand. But the people would not understand the Prophets and Psalms and other things read in the churches, even if they were read in the mother

tongue. For those who know Latin do not necessarily understand the Scriptures unless they read or hear expositors. How then would unlearned people understand them, especially since the Scriptures become more obscure the more they are translated into foreign languages? I respond that it is true that the Scriptures are read in the assembly of the faithful so that they may be understood by the people present. This is taught by the very formula of the ordination of readers in the Roman Pontifical, where they are commanded to proclaim the words of God, that is, the sacred readings, clearly and distinctly for the understanding and edification of the faithful. To the objection that even if the Scriptures are read in the vernacular, they are not therefore understood by the people, I respond that indeed in the Scriptures there are difficult passages which, although read in the vernacular, are not immediately understood by the people. But there are also many clear passages which anyone can easily grasp, and from which the people can be greatly edified. Is it fair and reasonable that because of certain things the people do not understand, those things they can understand should be hidden from them? And since they cannot achieve knowledge of everything, should they be kept in ignorance of everything? Moreover, the obscure passages in the sacred Scriptures gradually become clearer through frequent reading and hearing of the word of God, and the people, constantly hearing them read in a familiar and vernacular language, gradually become accustomed to the phrases of Scripture and daily grow in their knowledge of it. Indeed, it is evident that from the reading of Scripture, provided it is done in the vernacular, the faithful people can learn their duty and the fear of God, as it was for this very reason that God commanded His law to be publicly and solemnly read, so that everyone from the people of God might hear and learn, fear the Lord, and keep His commandments, as seen in Deuteronomy 31, previously cited. For it is not credible that God intends an end that cannot be achieved. Finally, even in the homilies and sermons given in the vernacular among the people, the people do not understand everything. Should they therefore be delivered in a non-vernacular, foreign, and unfamiliar language?

L. The doctors of the Roman Church also argue against us in this way. They say that it is absolutely necessary for the unity of the Church to be preserved that the public use of the Scriptures be in some common language. For if the public use of the Scriptures is not in a common language, communication between churches will be lost. No one, neither learned nor unlearned, will frequent churches except in their own country, and moreover, no general councils will be able to be held. For not all the fathers who come to councils have the gift of tongues. Thus, Bellarmine argues on this matter in book 2, chapter 15, of "On the Word of God." I respond that this public use of the Scriptures can be understood in two ways. Either it refers to the public use of the Scriptures in schools among the learned and in the gatherings of pastors and church leaders. In this sense, we indeed admit that to foster the union of churches and make their communication easier, it is expedient to have some common language in which learned men of various nations can discuss sacred matters and hold councils when necessary. Therefore, in these western provinces, we have retained the use of the Latin language. Our doctors use this language in schools, and those who dedicate themselves to the sacred ministry are required to learn it. But if by the public use of the Scriptures is meant the reading of Scripture in the assemblies of the

faithful and among the Christian people, then there is no need to use a language common to the learned, since this reading is not primarily for the learned but for the common faithful, the majority of whom are unlearned and often consist only of the unlearned.

LI. But if this is so, says Bellarmine, no one will frequent churches outside their own country. I wish Bellarmine would provide a reason for this consequence. I can divine none other than because no one would understand the sacred liturgy outside their own country. But according to Bellarmine, understanding the sacred liturgy is not necessary for those present, and without understanding it, they can still beneficially participate in its celebration. Therefore, lest some foreigners fail to understand the sacred liturgy when celebrated in the vernacular, Bellarmine thinks it expedient that it be celebrated in a language that neither foreigners nor natives can understand. But certainly, the majority of foreigners who are either in France, for example, or in other provinces, understand Latin less than the language of the region where they reside for commerce or other reasons. Therefore, if we consider their situation, the use of the vernacular in the sacred liturgy will be more convenient than Latin. But there is a much more convenient way to provide for foreigners. Since they do not live in villages and small towns but in large cities, if those who care for the commonwealth and the Church wish to favor them, a place should be assigned where sacred services are administered in a language they know and speak, as we do in London, England, where there are French and Dutch churches, in which French and Dutch people gather for worship. Indeed, Pope Innocent III ordained this very thing in the Lateran Council in the 13th century: "Since in many parts within the same city and diocese there are people of different languages, having under one faith different rites and customs, we strictly command that the bishops of such cities or dioceses provide suitable men who can celebrate divine offices for them according to the diversity of rites and languages, and administer the ecclesiastical sacraments, instructing them by word and example." Finally, by the same reasoning, one might conclude that sermons should be given in Latin or Greek, not in the vernacular, because, supposedly, when they are given in the vernacular, foreigners cannot benefit from them; which is obviously absurd.

LX. Regarding the New Testament Church, Bellarmine claims that the true and orthodox Christian Church used only three languages for the public reading of sacred Scripture: Greek, Hebrew, and Latin. He says this is demonstrated by two points. Firstly, he cites Blessed Augustine in Book 2 of "On Christian Doctrine," chapter 11, stating that the knowledge of only three languages—Hebrew, Greek, and Latin—is necessary for understanding the Scriptures, as they were read in these languages. However, Bellarmine does not accurately convey Augustine's point. Augustine's words are: "Latin-speaking people, whom we now undertake to instruct, need the knowledge of Hebrew and Greek for understanding the Scriptures, so that they may refer to the earlier examples if any doubt arises due to the infinite variety of Latin translators." But who, other than Bellarmine, would conclude from this that Scripture was read nowhere else in the world except in Hebrew, Greek, or Latin? Augustine is not talking about the public reading of Scripture but simply stating that Latin speakers need to know Hebrew and Greek to have an accurate understanding of Scripture, so they can refer to the original sources. Therefore,

Bellarmino attributes a false meaning to Augustine. Augustine does not say that the knowledge of only three languages is necessary for understanding Scripture, as the word "only" is not present in Augustine's text. Nor does he say that the knowledge of these three languages is universally necessary, but only for Latin speakers. Greeks, for example, did not need to know Latin to understand Scripture. Finally, Bellarmine misattributes the reasoning to Augustine, as if Augustine argued for the necessity of these three languages because Scripture was read in them alone, whereas Augustine's actual reason is different: to use the Greek and Hebrew languages to refer to the original texts.

LXI. Bellarmine's second argument lacks credibility and strength. He says that no ancient author mentions any Scripture edition other than Hebrew, Latin, and Greek, even though there were undoubtedly many other vernacular languages at the time. Therefore, he concludes, in the first four hundred years, when the Church flourished the most, Scripture was not read in the vernacular. But it is indeed surprising to see either such ignorance or such impudence in Bellarmine. What learned man could deny or be unaware that the sacred Scripture was already translated into various languages of the nations, even barbarian ones, as asserted by ancient and reliable authors? Do not Chrysostom and Theodoret belong to this number? Yet both, in the passages previously cited, clearly state that the books of sacred Scripture were translated not only into Greek and Latin but also into the Indian, Armenian, Persian, Scythian, and Sauromatian languages, among others. Socrates also attests that Ulphilas translated Scripture into the Gothic language in the fourth century.

LXII. Nevertheless, the Roman Church's doctors insist that it can be effectively and clearly demonstrated that in the first four centuries after Christ, divine worship was administered, and Scripture was publicly read in Greek and Latin in many places, where these languages were not vernacular. Firstly, they argue this based on the authority of Jerome, who indicates that in his time, the Greek version of the Septuagint was in public use throughout the East, according to the triple recension by Origen, Lucian, and Hesychius. Jerome, in his preface to the books of Chronicles addressed to Chromatius, explains that from Constantinople to Antioch, the Greek version of the Septuagint corrected by Lucian was in public use; from Antioch to Egypt, the Origenian codices were used; and in Alexandria and the rest of Egypt, the texts corrected by Hesychius were used. For these are Jerome's words: "Alexandria and Egypt praise Hesychius as the author of their Septuagint copies. Constantinople up to Antioch approves the copies of Lucian the martyr. The middle provinces read the Palestinian codices which were worked on by Origen, published by Eusebius and Pamphilus." Now they say it is evident that the Greek language was not vernacular and commonly used by the people in all these provinces.

LXIII. And indeed, concerning Egypt, it is certain that the Egyptians had a peculiar language, entirely different from Greek. That this language was still in use around the third century, in the time of Anthony, is evident from the fact that Anthony wrote several letters in Egyptian, as Jerome attests in his work "On Illustrious Men," in the section on Anthony. Additionally, he debated with some Greek philosophers through an interpreter, as is written in his life attributed to Athanasius. From this, it is inferred that he did not speak Greek. Similarly,

in Syria, whose metropolis was Antioch, it cannot be doubted that there was a peculiar language called Syriac, akin to Hebrew, but significantly different from Greek. An evident argument for this, if nothing else were available, is that Bardesanes, Ephrem, and others wrote many works in Syriac, their vernacular language, and did not understand Greek, as proven by Theodoret's testimony mentioned earlier.

LXIV. As for Asia Minor and the various regions between Constantinople and Antioch, it is equally evident that Greek was not the vernacular everywhere, but almost every province had its own language different from the others. For instance, the Galatians, who were not far from Constantinople, had their own language entirely different from Greek, closely resembling the language of the Treveri, as Jerome attests in the preface to the second book of his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians. Moreover, Pontus, Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, which are part of that region, had distinct languages differing from each other, as is evident from Acts 2, where Pontus, Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia are listed as provinces with various languages. In the same book, chapter 14, there is mention of the Lycaonian language, distinct from Greek, which the Lycaonians used. When Paul and Barnabas addressed the Lystrans, they are said to have exclaimed in the Lycaonian language that Barnabas and Paul were gods who had come down to them in human form.

LXV. Finally, this fact can be verified by the geographer Strabo, who was from Asia Minor and thoroughly explored and accurately described each of its provinces around the time of our Lord Christ. In his "Geography," book 14, he testifies that there were sixteen nations within the peninsula commonly called Asia Minor, now known as Anatolia. However, of these sixteen nations, only three were Greek, while the others were barbarian. Among them were the Carians, whom he also testifies had their own peculiar language, significantly different from Greek. Since the Egyptians, Syrians, and many other various peoples who once inhabited Asia Minor had their own languages different from each other, and since Greek was not the vernacular language for all of them, it seems evident that the Scripture was read to them in a foreign and unknown language if the churches of those provinces read the Scriptures publicly from the version of the Septuagint, as we have just heard Jerome testify.

LXVI. I respond first that what the doctors we are now debating with say—that throughout the East in Jerome's time, the Scripture was read from the version of the Septuagint, and hence divine worship was conducted in Greek—must be taken with some qualification. For it cannot be understood that all the regions of the East are included, especially those outside the Roman Empire. For in India, Persia, and Arabia, the version of the Septuagint was never used. But as we learn from Theodoret, the Scriptures were translated into the native languages of these nations, and the Christians living in those places used these translations. Indeed, even in Syria, which was part of the Roman Empire, we have already proven that in many of its places, and specifically in Edessa in Mesopotamia, the liturgy was conducted in Syriac. It is entirely reasonable to think the same of the more remote parts of Egypt, namely that the divine Scripture was read there and the entire divine worship was conducted not in Greek but in Egyptian. For Theodoret, in the often-cited passage, testifies that the Scripture was translated into the Egyptian

language, which seems to have been done for no other purpose than for it to be read in the churches that understood only Egyptian and not Greek.

LXVII. Nor does Jerome mean anything different in the previously cited passage. For when he says that Alexandria and Egypt used the version of the Septuagint corrected by Hesychius, this must be taken indefinitely, not of all Egypt, but of those parts where the Greek language was common. Similarly, when he says the middle regions between Antioch and Alexandria read the Palestinian codices revised by Origen, it must be referred to those parts of Syria and Palestine where Greek was also commonly understood.

LXVIII. It should be known that the Greeks propagated their language in various ways throughout much of the East. Firstly, even before the time of Alexander the Great, they established many colonies in different places, especially in Asia Minor, where there were many Greek cities. Additionally, since the Greeks primarily cultivated sciences and arts, not only passing them down orally but also embellishing them with their writings, many of the barbarian nations made the Greek language familiar to themselves so they could listen to and read Greek philosophers and thus learn sciences and arts. But what spread the language the most was the Greek Empire. After Alexander's conquests throughout the East, Greek leaders who followed him divided the provinces he had subdued among themselves after his death. Hence, many Greek kingdoms were established in Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor. Therefore, since the court language was Greek, and because laws were issued, trade conducted, and sciences taught in Greek, and because there were many Greek colonies and numerous Greeks mingled with the indigenous people everywhere, the Greek language became so familiar that there were hardly any who did not understand Greek, at least in the more populous places and not so far from major cities and seats of power. Just as today we see the Spaniards and Portuguese propagating and making their language commonly known in the parts of both Indies that they have subjugated.

LXIX. Nevertheless, in those provinces of the East where the Greek language was thus propagated, the native and vernacular languages of the indigenous people were not entirely abolished. Instead, two languages were commonly in use: the native language of each region, spoken by the common people, and Greek, which was understood by everyone. Similar to how in our Brittany, formerly called Armorica, there is a language entirely different from French spoken by the common people, yet almost everyone, or at least most, understand French, even if they do not speak it. The same can be seen in Gascony and Occitania, where the common people speak a dialect so different from pure French that it cannot be understood by us, yet the peasants and women there understand French, even if they cannot speak it. Thus, in Asia Minor and in many parts of Syria and Egypt, as I said, two languages were in common use: the native language of each region spoken by the common people, and Greek, which was commonly understood and spoken by most except for the lowest classes of society.

LXX. Therefore, it is futile for those we argue with to try to prove with various arguments that the Galatians, Phrygians, Pamphylians, Cappadocians, Carians, Cilicians, and other peoples of Asia Minor, and much more the Syrians and Egyptians, had peculiar languages. Protestants do not deny this. However, they assert that these peoples, besides their native tongue,

also spoke or at least understood Greek. Jerome explicitly states this in the very place cited by the Roman Church doctors to prove that the Galatians had a language entirely different from Greek. He says that the Galatians, besides the Greek language spoken by the entire East, also had a language similar to that of the Treveri. He clearly asserts that the entire East, i.e., much of the part subject to the Romans, spoke Greek and that the Galatians used two languages: Greek, common to many peoples, and their own language, akin to that of the Treveri in Gaul. Likewise, as shown in Acts 14, the Lycaonians had their own dialect, yet they understood Paul speaking in Greek. If that people spoke only one language, namely Lycaonian, Luke would not have noted that the Lystrans shouted in the Lycaonian language. No one would note that the Parisians spoke French. But it is clear that Luke, when noting that the crowds shouted in Lycaonian, opposed the Lycaonian language to Greek, which Paul spoke.

LXXI. Therefore, since Greek was commonly understood in much of the East, it is not surprising if public worship was administered in Greek there and the Scriptures read in Greek, as civil affairs, speeches, and public acts were also conducted in the same language. Just as today in those provinces of the French kingdom which have their own dialect, such as Gascony, Occitania, and Béarn, divine worship is administered in French, and justice is delivered in French.

LXXII. But what removes all difficulty and most strongly supports our position is the fact that in those provinces of the East where it is clear that Scripture was read in Greek and divine worship conducted in Greek, it is also evident that public addresses and homilies to the people by the Fathers were given in Greek. Thus, Athanasius, Cyril, and Theophilus, patriarchs of Alexandria, preached and taught the people in Greek in Alexandria, Egypt; Cyril of Jerusalem did so in Jerusalem; Eusebius, bishop of Caesarea in Palestine, did so in Caesarea; Chrysostom did so in Antioch, the metropolis of Syria, with many of his homilies to the Antiochian people still extant; Basil did so in Caesarea in Cappadocia; Gregory of Nyssa in Caria; and Gregory of Nazianzus in Pontus. They delivered their homilies and catecheses in Greek and committed them to writing. Many of their Greek homilies are still extant today. If, however, in some remote corners and outlying places of these provinces, the people did not understand Greek and homilies were not given in Greek, there is no evidence to prove that divine worship was conducted there in Greek.

LXXIII. What the Roman School doctors emphasize most strongly is that the Western Church has always celebrated its sacred rites in Latin and that the divine worship was established in Latin by the earliest founders of the Christian faith there, even though in most of its provinces, Latin was never the vernacular language. This is well known and evident from Augustine and Cyprian, who show that the African Church, to which they ministered, used Latin in its liturgy and in the reading of Scriptures. Yet they believe they can easily prove that in many parts of Christian Africa, Latin was not the vernacular language. Augustine himself attests in many places that during his time, the Punic language was still in use among the Africans. It is undisputed that the Punic language differed greatly from Latin and was akin to Hebrew.

LXXIV. I respond that from Cyprian, Optatus, Augustine, and others, it is clear that divine worship was administered in Latin in Africa. It is also evident from the same sources that the Latin language was commonly understood in Africa. The Punic language indeed had not entirely disappeared, but its use was rarer than that of Latin, and more people knew Latin than Punic. Augustine attests to this in his 26th sermon on the words of the Apostle, where he addresses the people of Hippo: "A known Punic proverb, which I will say in Latin because not all of you know Punic." Therefore, in Book 2, chapter 10 of "On Christian Doctrine," he calls the inhabitants of Africa Latin-speaking people: "When we say 'bos,' we mean cattle, which all of us Latin-speaking people call by this name." In Psalm 50, he says: "We all know that in Latin it is not called 'sanguines,' nor 'sanguina,' but 'sanguinem.'"

LXXV. That even the lowest classes of people understood Latin is evident from Augustine's first book of "Retractations," chapter 20, where he says he composed a certain Psalm in Latin letters against the Donatists so that it would reach the understanding of the very lowest common people: "Desiring that the cause of the Donatists might reach the knowledge of the very lowest of the common people and those entirely unlearned and ignorant, and to the extent possible by us remain in their memory, I made a Psalm in Latin letters to be sung by them."

LXXVI. Not only was the use of Latin common in Carthage and some other large cities and coastal towns, but also in the more remote and less frequented places of Africa, such as Thagaste in Numidia, where Augustine was born, as he attests in Book 4, chapter 7 of "Confessions." Yet in Book 1 of "Confessions," he says: "I learned Latin without any fear or suffering, among the caresses of nurses, the jokes of those who laughed, and the joys of those who played."

LXXVII. What made the Latin language so commonly understood in Africa was the Roman effort to propagate their language wherever their empire extended. Additionally, the frequent colonies, camps, and legions of the Romans; the fact that Roman laws were written and justice administered in that language; and that in each city, the "Curiales" (those who managed public affairs) spoke Latin and were Latin people. This made the whole population gradually accustomed to the Latin language, while the Punic language gradually fell out of use. Therefore, not only the sacred liturgy but also sermons were given to the people in Latin. Optatus of Milevis and Augustine, bishop of Hippo in Africa, preached in Latin, as is evident from Augustine's homilies to the people, which are still extant.

LXXVIII. But Bellarmine insists that it cannot be denied that some rustic Africans did not know Latin. This is inferred from what Augustine reports in his unfinished exposition on the Epistle to the Romans. I respond that from that passage, it indeed appears that some rustic people did not speak Latin. But it is also evident that they were very few. Since in that province far more people understood Punic than Latin, it was entirely reasonable that the sacred rites were conducted in Latin rather than Punic. Furthermore, if there was any corner of Christian Africa where Latin was not understood, Bellarmine does not provide any proof that the sacred rites were conducted in Latin rather than Punic.

LXXIX. Since the Latin language was so widely used in Africa that it was understood even by the uneducated and ignorant, as we have just heard Augustine state, how much more common must it have been in Spain, Gaul, and other provinces closer to Italy? Therefore, the efforts of the Roman School doctors to prove that the sacred rites were originally instituted in Latin and have continued to this day are in vain. We indeed admit this, but we also contend, and can easily prove, that the Latin language was understood in those provinces not only when they first embraced the Christian faith but also for many centuries thereafter. No learned men deny this about Spain. Except for Cantabria and some other rugged areas of Spain, the Latin language was not only understood by the Spaniards but also became their common speech, as Strabo attests in his Geographies. Thus, Quintilian, Seneca, and Martial, all eminent Latin authors, were from Spain. Martial's father was named Fronto, and his mother Flacilla, which, as it appears, are Latin names.

LXXX. Moreover, after the Goths subjugated Spain around the year 417 AD and separated it from the Roman Empire, the use of the Latin language did not cease among the Spaniards. Although the Goths had their peculiar language, they adapted to the Latin language. Therefore, under the Gothic kings, the laws remained in Latin, and their councils, both political and ecclesiastical, were conducted in Latin. Although the Latin language in Spain was corrupted as a result, this corruption happened gradually, not all at once. For many years, the Latin language was still somewhat understood. This can be inferred from Isidore of Seville, who wrote around the year 630 AD. He says in his book on Ecclesiastical Offices, in the passage previously cited: "When psalms are sung, they should be sung by all, and when prayers are offered, they should be offered by all, and when a reading is given, it should be heard by all in respectful silence. Where what is read is not understood, listening and attention seem unnecessary. Nor would it seem that the whole people could pray and sing psalms together if the prayers were conceived in an unknown language."

LXXXI. Regarding Gaul, Bellarmine also exerts much effort to prove that the Gauls, even when they were subject to the Roman Empire, had a peculiar language. No one disputes this with him, and it seems to have been the case. Not only Caesar but also Suetonius mention some Gallic words, such as "beccus" and "alanda." Jerome also mentions the language of the Treveri, who belonged to Gaul, in the cited passage. But whatever the case may be, it is certain that in Gaul, as in Africa, the Latin language was understood and eventually became the common language, with the old Gallic gradually becoming obsolete. Hence, after the Franks invaded Gaul, the Gallic language was called Roman to distinguish it from the Teutonic language, which the Franks initially spoke. This is why books written in the common vernacular were said to be in "Roman French." This name remains today for those fictional books with which idle youth are entertained.

LXXXII. That the Latin language eventually became common among the Gauls can be inferred from the fact that Pacatus, a Gaul, excused himself by this name before Emperor Theodosius in his panegyric: "Then, due to the inherent and hereditary difficulty in speaking, it is not surprising if this rough and unpolished speech of the Transalpine language is not well

received." However, even when the Latin language was gradually transformed into another vulgar language corrupted from Latin, the use of the Latin language remained in the forum and public acts for a long time. Less than four hundred years ago, public judgments, royal edicts, and even contracts between private individuals were conducted in Latin. At least in the fifth century, the Latin language was still understood by the common people, as Sulpicius teaches in the life of Martin. When a certain man named Defensor tried to obstruct Martin's election as bishop, it happened that, in the absence of a reader, someone from the people picked up a psalter and read Psalm 8. When he reached the words "to destroy the enemy and the avenger," Sulpicius notes that the people shouted against Defensor as if marked by divine judgment, which led to Martin's election being confirmed.

LXXXIII. Therefore, even then, sermons in Gaul were delivered in Latin, as Prosper of Aquitaine, who wrote around 450 AD, teaches in his first book on the Contemplative Life. He wants the preacher's speech to be simple and clear, even if less refined, yet disciplined and serious. Around that time, Sidonius Apollinaris, Bishop of Clermont in Auvergne, wrote some Latin sermons addressed to the people of Bourges. In his second book, letter 10, he laments the corruption of the Latin language among the common people: "Unless you reclaim the pure propriety of the Latin language from the rust of vulgar barbarisms, we will soon lament its complete obliteration."

LXXXIV. From all this, we can conclude that it is entirely expedient and necessary for the edification of the Church that public worship be conducted in a language commonly understood by the present people, and the arguments usually made by the Roman School doctors against this have no force. As for private prayers, which each faithful person is obliged to offer to God daily, the doctors of the Roman Church admit that it is permissible to conceive them in the vernacular language, and there seems to be no public law in the Roman Church prohibiting this. Indeed, their theologians admit that one who prays in this way derives more benefit from their prayers than if done otherwise. Nevertheless, they defend as licit and good even prayers conceived in a language unknown to the one praying. Indeed, throughout the Roman Church, the people are taught to pronounce their ordinary prayers in Latin, and few recite the Lord's Prayer or other solemn prayers in the vernacular and common language.

LXXXV. However, Protestants hold that one who prays should pray in a language they understand. Therefore, they condemn prayers conceived in a language unknown to the one praying as useless, superstitious, and not pleasing or acceptable to God. They consider it a grave abuse for the Christian people to be instructed to pray to God in a language they do not understand, not knowing what they are asking from God, and thereby apply to them what Christ reproached two of His disciples for, "You do not know what you are asking" (Matthew 20:22).

LXXXVI. Indeed, all the Apostle's reasons previously cited, which discourage the faithful from using and praying in an unknown language in public Church assemblies, conclude all the more strongly that no one should conceive their prayers in a language unknown to them. For if the Apostle does not want someone to pray in an unknown language before the Church because it would make them a barbarian to those present, and they could not say "Amen" to their

prayer and blessing, would he approve of someone becoming a barbarian to themselves and uttering words before God to which they themselves could not reasonably say "Amen"? And can one edify themselves more than others by murmuring words they do not understand? Or would the Apostle allow us to consider our own edification less than that of others in our prayers and blessings? It is clear that he condemns prayers and thanksgivings recited in an unknown language in the assemblies of the faithful because others cannot be edified by them.

LXXXVII. Moreover, it is certain that for our prayer to be pleasing to God, the one praying must attend to the things they ask from God. Among the conditions of legitimate prayer that is pleasing to God, all theologians require that the one praying must be attentive and not let their mind wander. But how can anyone attend to what they pronounce in an unknown language? It is possible for someone reciting memorized foreign words to attend to the sounds of the words, but it is impossible for them to attend to the things signified by those words if they completely ignore their meaning.

LXXXVIII. Additionally, not only attention is required in prayer but also zeal and ardor, which must necessarily be lacking in one who prays in a foreign language they do not understand. Even when conceiving their prayers in intelligible words, the mind can hardly be kept within bounds without wandering; gradually, the heart grows faint, ardor cools, and hands become slack. How much more will this happen if foreign and barbarous words are mouthed and swiftly uttered? The spirit burns while attending to the words and matters emanating from their own heart and mouth, and it soars aloft on those wings. Deprived of such aids, it necessarily falls to the ground, pouring out words and voices without attention or fervor.

XXXIX. Furthermore, it is well known that various affections and movements of the heart are required depending on the nature of the things being asked of God. Requests pertaining to the glory of God should be made with more intensity than those concerning personal benefit; those necessary for eternal salvation should be prayed for more earnestly than those related to present comforts. There are also scattered parts in prayers where a pious and faithful person must urgently press upon God, designed to aid the heart in its elevation. But if all these are conceived in a foreign language not understood by the one praying, how can they accommodate the various movements of the heart and mind to the different parts of the prayer? It may happen that they petition more intensely for things that should be asked with less fervor, and they will be more relaxed where the greatest fervor is required, and more intense where perhaps more relaxation would be appropriate.

XC. Finally, it is hardly conceivable how prayer can be made with faith when it is in a foreign language not understood by the one praying. Indeed, the practice of praying in a barbarous tongue is in direct contradiction to all the conditions of prayer. For faith clearly presupposes understanding, and we can have no confidence in being heard unless we clearly know whether the things we ask for are good, pious, useful, permissible, and pleasing to God. But what faith, what understanding can there be in someone who mutters barbarous words whose meaning they do not know? And even if they know them with the help of an interpretation and translation into the vernacular, they can have no certainty, relying only on the testimony and

faith of others. Moreover, who does not know that the slightest change and inflection of words can change the meaning? Such inflection is easy for someone pronouncing words they do not understand; hence it can happen that they unknowingly ask for something entirely different from what they intend in their mind when praying to God. Additionally, prayer is primarily instituted to obtain from God what we need according to various circumstances of time, age, state, sickness, health, and condition, whether prosperous or adverse. But how can this be done successfully by someone who, through long practice, has learned to repeat the Angelic Salutation, "Hail Mary," etc., and the Apostles' Creed, "I believe in God," etc., hundreds or thousands of times with mind and tongue, indeed even with fingers? From all this, we can conclude that all prayers, both public and private, should be conceived in the vernacular language, known and well understood by those who are praying.

**Prayer on the Divine Origin of Holy Scripture;
Delivered at Sedan in the Theological Auditorium on the 16th day of February in the year
1660, before the promotion of the Most Illustrious and Learned Man, JACOB ALPEI, to
the degree of Doctorate, and his inauguration into the profession of Theology.**

Prayer Delivered Before the Oration

Heavenly Father, author of every good gift, we humbly ask you to graciously forgive our sins for the merit and obedience of your beloved Son, and to daily bestow upon us more of your Holy Spirit, who may increasingly cleanse and sanctify us from all impurity and defilement of body and soul, and also guide and direct us throughout the course of our lives, so that we may never stray from the path of salvation and truth. Especially now, most merciful Father, we ask that you be present with us through your power, directing our minds and tongues, so that whatever we are about to say and do may be pleasing and acceptable to you, and with your effective blessing, may serve to the glory of your name, the edification of the Church, and the common good, honor, and benefit of this Academy, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

Most Noble Councilor, Most Distinguished and Honorable Presiding Officers, Most Wise and Learned Members of the Academy, and Most Distinguished Curators of the Senate, Magnificent Supreme Rector, Reverend Pastors and Learned Professors, and the entire learned and courteous assembly of listeners.

All theology relies and rests upon principles handed down and revealed by God and contained in divinely inspired Scripture. The duty and office of a theologian is to examine and investigate the divine oracles once recorded in the writings of the Prophets and Apostles, and to extract from them the hidden treasures of heavenly wisdom, applying and using them for various purposes: whether to confirm saving truth, to refute error, to establish moral conduct, or to instruct human consciences in the discernment of good and evil. Moreover, a theologian ought to propose nothing that does not precisely align with Scripture, and whatever opposes or contradicts Scripture, even in the slightest degree, must be utterly eliminated from theology. Therefore, as

we are about to solemnly inaugurate a Doctor and Professor of Theology today, with God's blessing, we have deemed it most appropriate and fitting to discuss with you the divine origin of Sacred Scripture and its excellence, dignity, and authority, which far surpass all human writings. To this end, we have selected the testimony of Scripture itself, spoken by the Apostle Paul, one of the most eminent of the sacred and divine writers, uttered and written by him under the movement and guidance of the Holy Spirit, by which holy men of God once spoke and wrote. For, commending the reading of Sacred Scripture to his disciple Timothy, he says, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God." To gain a fuller understanding of this testimony, we will briefly, with God's favor, consider what that Scripture is which is so excellently called. Then, in what sense and in what manner it is said to be inspired by God. Finally, we will inquire and examine the marks and arguments by which its divine nature can be proved and distinguished from all human writings.

But do not expect from us an oration adorned and arranged according to the precepts of rhetoricians, with a meticulous selection of words and an anxious adjustment of periods to certain rhythms, and a grand and splendid array of figures. These seem necessary only where deception is intended, and the minds of the common people and the uneducated need to be stirred. Those things which require the embellishments and various ornaments of orators are inherently weak, and there is a risk that if they were seen in their nakedness, they would be held in contempt. Truly great and excellent matters need no other recommendation than to be presented openly and plainly, and the coverings of grand and swollen words and the manifold colors of figures rather obscure and diminish their native grace and beauty than enhance them. Just as in women, natural and genuine beauty, in a way neglected, pleases and affects more, while makeup and excessive and meticulous adornment are designed only to deceive the eyes and to cover the flaws and defects of nature. Thus, here we intend to use not an oratorical but a simple and scholastic style of speaking. Our only concern will be to briefly, clearly, and plainly set forth whatever is to be said on so grave a subject.

Now, therefore, to address the matter itself, in order to properly grasp what that Scripture is which the Apostle testifies to be inspired by God, it seems necessary to trace things back a little further. It must be known, then, that it seemed good to God, most excellent and greatest, to declare His goodness toward the human race in every possible way. Therefore, not content with having endowed man with natural gifts, He willed to treat him more kindly by calling him to heavenly life and happiness. Hence, it was not enough for God to teach man inwardly through the infused light of reason and outwardly through the works of nature set before him, but He also willed to make him more certain of His will and of the love with which He embraced him in a manner surpassing nature. Therefore, He deigned to speak with man Himself and to instruct him with His word, both about the duty he ought to render to God and about the reward he could rightly expect from God for persevering in duty, as well as about the punishments he ought rightly to fear if he refused to obey divine commands and admonitions. Thus, before man fell and sin darkened his mind, God had already revealed Himself to man and had expressly instructed him about many things that were in his interest to know, as attested by the first chapters of

Genesis, in which Moses recounts many conversations of God with the first man. After man had fallen into sin and thereby had darkness cast upon his mind, it was much more necessary for God to illuminate him with His Word, to give him hope of forgiveness through His promises, to declare a Redeemer, and to rouse him from his stupor and darkness to his duty more vigorously, and to instruct him more fully and clearly about what to do and what to avoid. This God did in ancient times through the Patriarchs and Prophets who succeeded one another until Christ came and fulfilled the promises made to the fathers, and imparted heavenly wisdom to men much more abundantly, clearly, and distinctly than had been done in any previous ages.

Indeed, God did not communicate His Word and the heavenly doctrine which He willed to reveal to man in one single way: but πολυμερῶς, in many parts and in many ways, as the Apostle teaches in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. First, I say, in many parts. God did not reveal the whole doctrine of salvation all at once, but initially set forth only certain rudiments of it, which He then progressively augmented with new revelations, until the Son of God, manifested in the flesh, brought the fullness of saving doctrine and announced to us the whole counsel of God concerning our salvation. Thus, at first, there shone forth as it were a certain dawn, and gradually the benign light of that heavenly day gained new increments and shone more and more, until finally the Sun of Righteousness arose, who today surrounds us with His light.

However, God did not communicate His word and heavenly doctrine to men only gradually and in parts, but He also did so in various ways. Sometimes through dreams, sometimes through visions, sometimes through the appearance and speech of angels, sometimes through voices from heaven, and finally through prophetic inspirations, God revealed His will and what pertained to His worship to men. But, what is most noteworthy and particularly relevant to the present matter, is that the word of God was preserved and propagated among men for a while without any Scripture. Later, however, God willed that His word, that is, the saving and sacred doctrine, be committed to writing.

Indeed, from the beginning of the world until Moses, for more than two thousand years, no saving doctrine was contained in any writings by God's command. But men drew it from the mouth of the Patriarchs. These Patriarchs, who were then ministers and messengers of God among men, instructed others by word of mouth and familiar teaching without any assistance of letters. And it was not difficult at that time to preserve the sacred doctrine uncorrupted in that manner. For it was contained in a few heads, and most of the mysteries which God later revealed were still quite hidden and unspoken. Moreover, the worship of God was simpler and freer, not bound by as many ceremonies and rites as it was later. Add that most of the Patriarchs were then prophets, immediately taught and inspired by God, so that if there was any doubt or controversy about the sacred doctrine and worship of God, it was easy to refer to their authority. And those who deviated and strayed from the truth could be recalled to a sound mind and the right path by them.

But the situation was different in subsequent ages. For God chose the descendants of Jacob for Himself from all nations as a peculiar people. To them, He gave greater and clearer

promises about Christ the Redeemer than before, and He willed that the natural law, which the increasing corruption of men and the long lapse of ages had almost entirely obliterated from the hearts and minds of men, be renewed and solemnly promulgated. Moreover, God added to this law the ceremonial law, by which the external worship of God, which He willed to be very elaborate and burdened with many mystical rites, was defined in detail. And He also added political laws which determined the form of judgments and the method of administering that Republic. But these many and great matters could not be safely entrusted to the memory of men alone. There was a great danger that they might be exposed to the frauds and corruptions of men if their preservation had been entrusted only to tradition and the living voice of fathers teaching their sons. Especially since the long-lived Patriarchs, whose doctrine and authority could keep others in the truth and duty, were absent. Therefore, by God's command, all these things were committed to writing, so that they might not be forgotten through the carelessness and negligence of men, or corrupted and adulterated by their frauds and malice.

In this matter, God first used the work of Moses, who, at God's command, committed to writing the moral, ceremonial, and judicial law of God. Also, the prophecies and promises about Christ the Redeemer, together with the history of the Creation of the World and the Church from the beginning of the world until the time of Moses. And God Himself wanted to set an example first when He inscribed the summary of His law on stone tablets with His own finger.

In the same way, God willed to preserve and propagate the heavenly truth in subsequent ages in the Jewish Church, when He granted it a new light of fuller revelation through the Prophets sent by Him. For what they first taught and handed down by the oracle of the living voice, they later summarized and committed to writing, inspired by the Spirit of God.

And the same was done under the New Testament in the Christian Church, as had been done under the Old Testament in the Jewish Church before. For after Christ, who is the eternal wisdom of the heavenly Father, manifested and brought to light the mysteries of the Gospel doctrine, which had been silent and hidden for eternal ages, and handed them down to men first by Himself, then through the Apostles sent by Him, He also willed that they be committed to writing, using the ministry of the Apostles and Evangelists in this part. And these are what we have diligently inculcated in the four Gospels, the Epistles of Paul, and the other books of the New Testament.

Furthermore, the books given to the Jewish people by Moses and the Prophets, at God's command, along with those left by Christ's disciples, Apostles, and Evangelists, from the mandate and inspiration of their Master, to the Churches they founded, constitute that Scripture which we call sacred and divine: which the sacred authors themselves frequently call Scripture absolutely and by way of excellence, as the Apostle does in this place. For it is customary and very usual to assign the name of the genus simply to all things that excel in that kind. Thus, when we say the Apostle, we usually mean Paul, because he wrote and labored more than the other Apostles. Thus, very often in the New Testament, the doctrine of the Gospel is designated and understood by the name of the Word simply, because there is no word that approaches the excellence of that Word. And so those volumes by which the body of Scripture is constituted are

called Books in Greek, by antonomasia. And even when we speak Latin, we call the Codex of sacred books the Bible, because no books can be compared with them. Hence also the Jews, whom we call Scripture with them, also call it Mikri, a reading, because the reading of that divine Scripture ought to be most solemn and usual in the Church of God. To which the Apostle alludes when he says to Timothy, "Attend to the reading of sacred Scripture," recommending its assiduous reading to him.

Therefore, rightly and deservedly, we call the prophetic and apostolic writings Scripture with the Apostle, by synecdoche and in a certain eminent sense, because they surpass all other writings, just as divine things surpass human, and heavenly things earthly. For indeed those writings were not elaborated by human art, but inspired by God, as the Apostle testifies in this place when he says to Timothy, "All Scripture is divinely inspired." For those books which we venerate as divine and sacred were indeed written by men like us, but they did not do so of their own motion and counsel, and from a certain choice of their own mind, but by divine instinct and impulse, namely, the Holy Spirit moving and impelling them in an extraordinary way to write. For as Peter testifies in his second Epistle, "Prophecy never came by the will of man, but holy men of God spoke as they were moved by the Holy Spirit." Where it is evident from the whole context that he is speaking of the prophecy of Scripture.

Moreover, the books contain, for the most part, dogmas and certain mysteries which the human mind did not discover and invent, but which became known to the sacred writers in a supernatural way, namely, by God revealing and illuminating them inwardly, or even by teaching them in a marvelous outward manner. Thus, the Son of God Himself taught His disciples the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven. And Paul, added to the Apostles after Christ's resurrection, testifies in the first chapter of his Epistle to the Galatians that he did not receive his Gospel from man, nor was he taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. And the Prophets likewise first received those things which they committed to writing by the assistance of God's Spirit or from the angels of God.

As for the various histories found in sacred Scripture, the same Spirit of God made the selection of them and directed the mind and pen of the sacred authors to write down those which He judged most suitable for the consolation and instruction of the Church. Indeed, the phrases and words of Scripture themselves should not be attributed to men but to the Holy Spirit, who not only suggested the things themselves to the sacred writers but also the appropriate words by which they should express them, and who therefore wrote with the hands of the Prophets and Apostles just as He spoke through their mouths, according to what Christ says in Matthew when addressing His disciples. "Do not think about what or how you should speak, for it will be given to you in that hour what you should speak. For it is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father who speaks in you." Hence also Paul, speaking of the mysteries of the Gospel in 1 Corinthians 2, says that he speaks them not in words taught by human wisdom, but in those taught by the Holy Spirit.

From this, it can be inferred how great is the dignity and preeminence of this sacred Scripture above all other writings, of whatever kind they may be. For most other books that are

in the hands of men contain nothing but human inventions and reasonings, such as those that convey philosophical sciences and the so-called liberal arts. But, as has already been said, sacred books contain divine mysteries and those things which the human mind could not conceive but had to be revealed by God. Indeed, there are many other writings that also deal with divine mysteries and those things that pertain to the religion which God Himself taught by His word, such as the many learned and pious books that the pastors and doctors of the Church have written and continue to write. But in such writings, the material is indeed divine, as it is drawn and derived from the source of Scripture. However, in them, the style, order, and method cannot be attributed to the Holy Spirit as the immediate author, but to human labor, care, and industry. And therefore, the matters treated in them are divine but are delivered in a human manner. But as for that Scripture which the Apostle preaches as the Lord's, it not only treats of divine things, but it also treats them in a completely divine manner, namely, with words chosen not by man but dictated by the Spirit of God Himself, and with an order that is not devised by the human mind but must be referred to God Himself as the author. And therefore, in all other writings, however pious and holy they may be, there is always something human, and their authors are rightly considered and called men. But in this Scripture, there is nothing but the Divine, and it has no other author than God. For as regards the Prophets, Apostles, and Evangelists, whose hand and pen God used in delivering it to the Church, they were not properly its authors but merely its writers. And hardly anything more should be attributed to them in this matter than to an amanuensis or scribe to whom a learned man dictates a work he has composed, and whose sole author he is recognized, even though it is brought to light by another's pen or style.

Hence it follows that the books which constitute the canon of Scripture excel in authority over all other writings, whatever they may be. For in other writings, it is not inconceivable that something erroneous and false may be found since they have human authors, the best and wisest of whom err and falter in many things. And therefore, their simple testimony is not sufficient to establish the truth: but what they say should only be accepted insofar as it is found to be consistent with Scripture itself and right reason. But sacred books are entirely free from all error and deserve and demand faith on their own account. And therefore, it is sufficient for them to affirm something for it to be received with full assent of faith. And their simple testimony is firmer than any reasoning or demonstration. And this is because they are the work of God Himself and entirely proceed from that spirit of truth who can neither deceive nor be deceived. And they were given to the Church for this purpose, that they might be a rule of faith, and that whatever is read and written in them may be firmly held as divine truth, without any doubt or hesitation of mind; however lacking reasons and arguments may be to prove and confirm it from elsewhere. Hence it is that those books are called Canonical because they are the Canon, that is, the rule by which all things in the Church must be proved and examined; so that nothing should be believed and received that is not consistent with those books; and whatever contradicts them and cannot agree with them should be rejected as false.

Furthermore, that sacred Scripture has proceeded in a singular manner from God, and that such great authority belongs to it, neither Paul asserts without reason nor do Christians believe

without reason. Nor does our faith in this matter rest on the simple and bare testimony of Scripture itself, which it affirms to be divinely inspired: but there are abundant reasons and arguments by which pious and faithful men prudently persuade themselves of this, and by which the authority and divine origin of Scripture can be proved and defended against profane and contemptuous people. It is indeed certain that no one can receive Scripture as divine with true and saving faith unless the Spirit of God has touched his heart and illuminated the eyes of his mind. Hence it is that faith is called the gift of God, Ephesians 2. And truly, if, according to the Apostle's testimony, 1 Corinthians 12, no one can say that Jesus is the Lord except by the Holy Spirit, how could anyone embrace that Scripture as divinely inspired, whose chief subject is that Jesus Christ died, suffered, and was assumed into glory for our salvation, without the work of that Holy Spirit?

But although the divine truth of Scripture cannot be rightly and savingly persuaded to us except by the internal operation and illumination of the Divine Spirit; yet no enthusiasm or any private and immediate revelation of the Spirit is to be imagined here, as if the Holy Spirit whispered in the ear of each believer and declared by a private and express testimony, "This Scripture is divine." But the Spirit of God does this by inwardly affecting our minds so that, freed from prejudices and depraved affections, which usually pervert the right judgment of reason, we duly attend and consider those things by which we can and ought to be induced to believe with certainty that Scripture is divine and to be firmly persuaded of its heavenly origin.

These things are various and many. But due to the constraint of time, we will select only a few from among many. And first, indeed, the doctrine and Scripture handed down by the Apostles and Prophets are proved to be true and divine, and to be referred to God as the author, by the great and many miracles that were once performed for their confirmation. For as the sacred doctrine and Scripture consist of two principal parts, the Law and the Gospel: the Law was confirmed by those marvelous things that happened in the wilderness, such as the voice of God speaking and pronouncing His law clearly from the midst of the fire; the daily falling of a certain manna for forty years in the wilderness, except precisely on the seventh day of each week, and that in such abundance as to suffice to feed the entire people; the sudden torrents of water bursting from the hardest rock in dry places and abundantly supplying drink to the great multitude; the earth swallowing up alive Korah, Dathan, and Abiram who rebelled against Moses, and many such things. The Gospel was testified by the almost infinite miracles of Christ, who frequently restored sight to the blind, raised the dead, calmed storms by His word, and fed many thousands of people with a few loaves of bread; and also by the visible and utterly astonishing gifts of the Holy Spirit, which our Lord Christ, as He had promised, poured out upon the first believers; so that they suddenly spoke in various and foreign languages which they had never learned, healed all kinds of diseases, cast out serpents and even demons, were not harmed by poisons, and performed many other wonderful things. For since such things are beyond the powers of nature, it is necessary that God exerted His power in them. And it is blasphemy to think that God would use His omnipotence to attest to a doctrine and Scripture that was falsely and unjustly ascribed to Him, as if He had conspired with men to lie.

But here someone may object that those miracles are indeed said to have been performed, but how can we know that they really happened? And is it not equally uncertain whether those miracles were real, as it is whether that Scripture, in whose confirmation they are said to have been performed, is divine? I answer that it can be effectively proved from our Scriptures themselves that those things indeed happened. For our writers recorded them in such a manner that it is impossible they could have lied in this matter. This is not difficult for an attentive person to notice. For anyone who denies or doubts the truth of the miracles narrated by our writers, Moses and Paul for example, I will ask if he is willing to doubt that there was a Moses who gave laws to the Israelite people and wrote certain volumes: and likewise that there was a Paul who preached the doctrine of Christ and wrote certain letters that bear his name? No one has ever doubted this; not even the atheists have wanted or dared to deny or dispute it. And indeed, this is attested by a reputation so constant, so enduring, and so universally accepted, even by adversaries, that to doubt it would be sheer madness. For Moses and his writings are frequently mentioned among the heathen. And the Jews and the fiercest enemies of Christians, the Muslims, do not deny or doubt that our Apostles existed and wrote. If anyone persistently wished to call this into doubt, he would be forced to provide a reason for his doubt and give some rationale why he does not believe the unanimous testimony of the whole world. And why he believes that Herodotus and Titus Livius existed and wrote, rather than Moses and Paul. Indeed, we labor in vain to prove this, for it is an acknowledged fact. For those who reject the word of God do not deny that those authors, whom we hold as sacred, existed and wrote, but they blaspheme by claiming that they did not write the truth.

Let us, therefore, see whether it is possible that the things narrated by Moses and Paul about these miracles are not true. Certainly, if they are not true, either they were deceived in writing, thinking that things had happened which in fact had not, or they wrote with the intention to deceive and tried to present falsehoods as truths. The former cannot be said. For they do not report these things as received from elsewhere, but testify to them as witnessed by themselves. Therefore, they must have intended to deceive, Moses the Israelites, and Paul the Corinthians, Galatians, and others. And this is how profane men think, who accuse Moses and Paul of imposture. It must be seen, then, whether they were impostors who tried to persuade those to whom they were writing and into whose hands they delivered their writings that these miracles and prodigies had happened when, in fact, none of them had happened.

Certainly, impostors and those who intend to deceive usually craft their lies in such a way that they cannot easily be accused of lying by those they intend to deceive. Thus, Numa, who established many of the rites of Roman superstition, claimed to have nocturnal conversations with the nymph Egeria, but only alone and where no one could be a witness. Likewise, in the Koran of Muhammad, certain portents are narrated, but not as things done before the eyes of men, but whose credibility depends on him alone. If someone were to narrate portents and dreams and yet appeal to the senses of those he addresses for their truth, as someone who now recounts that Moses parted the waters and made it rain blood before our eyes and wanted to persuade us of this, this would not be imposture but a certain kind of madness, completely

unusual and incredible; nor can this be attributed to one who is not utterly insane and driven by black bile. Now, those marvelous things narrated by Moses, such as the sea being split so that the Israelites passed through it on dry land, the terrifying voice of God heard from Mount Sinai, the manna and quail raining in the desert, the streams of water frequently drawn from the rock, and the Israelites who were bitten by fiery serpents being healed by the sight of the bronze serpent, and many others of the same kind; Moses does not narrate these as things that happened in other times or distant places, but as having happened at that very time and place where he was writing. Indeed, he writes to the whole people of Israel, in whose presence he was writing and to whom he was commending his writings as divine. And he appeals to the eyes and ears of the Israelites for the truth of these miracles, repeatedly reminding them of how God struck Egypt with miraculous plagues for their sake, made a path through the sea for them, and buried Pharaoh with his whole army before their eyes in the waters; how they heard the voice of God from the midst of the fire and saw the pillar of fire by night and the cloud by day leading them in the desert; how they were fed with manna and drank water flowing from the rock, for which he frequently and severely rebukes them for their ingratitude towards God.

Similarly, the Apostle Paul, when he had among the Corinthians certain rivals and envious ones who tried to call his apostleship into doubt and make it suspect, appeals to the miracles and signs that were done among them for the truth of his apostleship. "The signs of an apostle were performed among you with utmost patience, with signs and wonders and mighty works," he says in 2 Corinthians 12:12. And in the first Epistle, he discusses at length the miraculous gifts of the Holy Spirit, the gift of healing, the working of miracles, the gift of prophecy, and the gift of speaking and interpreting foreign languages suddenly by the inspiration of the Spirit, as things known and usual among them; and he admonishes them not to envy each other for such gifts and also rebukes them for sometimes using these gifts ambitiously, prescribing the proper use of these gifts. To the Galatians, rebuking them for departing from the true doctrine of faith to follow the works of the old law, he recalls to their memory the visible gifts of the Holy Spirit which they also had received after believing his preaching, and the miracles, that is, the miraculous works which God had worked among them. "Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law, or by hearing with faith?" he asks in Galatians 3. And later, "He who supplies the Spirit to you and works miracles among you, does he do so by works of the law, or by hearing with faith?" meaning, through the preaching and acceptance of faith.

Therefore, if all these things are lies and fabrications, certainly Moses and Paul were not, as the profane accuse them, cunning deceivers with the intention of deceiving people and mocking the world. No one can be deceived about things to which his ears, eyes, and experience are appealed. But it must be said, far be it from blasphemy, that they were utterly insane. Yet their writings, judged even by atheists, sufficiently prove them to have been of sound mind. For they speak coherently and show much prudence and wisdom.

Moreover, let us imagine that they were insane men who, with utmost madness or imprudence, wrote and presented those lies as truths about which they could be publicly and universally accused; how then did it come about that the Israelites revered Moses, and the

Corinthians, Galatians, Romans, and others revered Paul as divine and holy men and accepted their teaching with such reverence, although it is in many ways distasteful and burdensome to the flesh and contrary to human affections, and although no benefit accrued to those who thus wished to deceive them, if the matter is judged by human sense? Certainly, no miracle or portent is more incredible than this, that the doctrine of insane men and their gross and vile lies, without any divine or human assistance, obtained such great credibility among those who could not fail to recognize and notice their madness and lies.

Since, therefore, the things narrated by Moses and Paul about the miracles done in confirmation of the Law and the Gospel were written in such a manner that those to whom they were writing and with whom they lived and interacted could immediately recognize whether they were speaking truth or falsehood, as they are matters appealed to their experience and senses, and yet their writings were given such credence by those who first received them, and thereafter down to this day; it is clearly necessary that they wrote the truth, and that the miracles they narrate are true, and therefore that the Scripture and doctrine in whose confirmation God willed these miracles to be done are true.

And certainly, if the matter is considered in itself, and judgment is to be made in a human manner, and we do not consider a certain divine and extraordinary power, everything seems to have stood in the way of men believing in and giving assent to sacred Scripture and Christian doctrine, of which it is the sum and foundation. For it proposes many mysteries to be believed which the human sense judges to be folly, and it commands and requires things that are most contrary to human affections, namely, that we bear the cross of Christ, deny ourselves, and be ready to give up wealth and pleasures and lay down our lives for Christ crucified. Moreover, those who announced this doctrine to men and first recommended the Scripture as divine to various nations and peoples did not use art and eloquence by which the minds of men are usually swayed. Nor did they have authority among men, whether by reputation for wisdom and learning. Nor were they powerful men who could terrify and compel acceptance of their doctrine by threats and arms. But most were unlearned and ignorant men, making a living by mechanical trades: from the Jewish people despised and hated by all others: considered by those who were then esteemed as learned and wise to be barbarians and unlearned. Add that they were dealing with men nurtured in diverse religions and occupied with many and great prejudices. For the superstition from which they were turning away had been received from their ancestors, seemed to be confirmed by the consensus of peoples, the endorsement of the wise, and the authority of the powerful. Nor can it be said how many and how fierce and powerful enemies the doctrine contained in the Scriptures had. For the philosophers of the nations and even the Jewish teachers vehemently opposed it in its main points. The latter opposed it with their authority, which was very great among their own people. The former exerted all their intellectual acumen and eloquence against it. Moreover, the magistrates and princes of the age most cruelly persecuted those who embraced it and raged against them with all kinds of punishments. And yet a few years after the Gospel began to be preached, the doctrine of Christ had spread almost throughout the entire world, and the sacred Scripture, which is its book, was received everywhere as divine

and found innumerable followers who venerated it as having come from God and brought their understanding into obedience to it. Since, therefore, nothing helped the sacred doctrine and Scripture from the side of men, but everything was contrary to it, it is necessary that the faith that was given to it must be attributed to the power of God alone; nor could it have proceeded except from a certain divine power which accompanied that sacred doctrine, inscribed it deeply in the hearts of men, and confirmed it outwardly by various prodigies and signs.

Indeed, if any other sect spread widely and found many followers, it happened by human means. For example, Islam, which quickly spread through many provinces. But this happened by arms and open force; moreover, that doctrine in many ways flatters the flesh.

But that divine power shines forth especially in the constancy, number, and condition of the martyrs who sealed the scripture with their own blood, whence the strongest argument for the divine origin of scripture is derived. Since, by nature, nothing is dearer to man than life, how did it happen that so many people willingly faced death in defense of the scripture and the doctrine it conveys, if not by a singular divine power that deeply imbued their minds? Indeed, sometimes heretics and superstitious people have been persecuted, and perhaps a few examples can be found of those who, out of a certain ferocity and obstinacy of mind, chose to die rather than be turned away from an error they had once embraced. But no error, no superstition, and no human doctrine has ever had followers so obstinate that, although they could escape safe and sound by renouncing their impiety, they nevertheless refused to avoid punishment and torment. However, when the apostolic and prophetic scripture and doctrine first began to spread throughout the world and could not yet be considered established by tradition and custom, which are the main roots by which human institutions usually adhere to the minds of men, not a few but countless thousands of people of all ages, sexes, and conditions were found who endured the most severe kinds of death rather than renounce the doctrine of scripture: although by renouncing it alone they could not only save their lives but also enjoy their goods and honors with their fellow citizens. Nor can they be considered to have rushed into certain death out of ferocity, stupidity, or a certain mental illness; for they often extorted testimony from their very enemies of a well-composed mind and blameless life, and in death itself, they showed the greatest modesty, humanity, and presence of mind. In this, certainly, unless someone deliberately closes their eyes, the finger of God can easily be noted.

Nor is the consensus of nations, indeed of various sects, in acknowledging the divinity of scripture a matter of small importance. For today there are three principal sects, later subdivided into many others, namely Jewish, Christian, and Muslim, which now occupy the greatest part of the world. Jews, Christians, and Muslims all acknowledge the authority of the Old Testament: the New Testament, although proven from the Old, is rejected by the Jews; but the Muslims hold it in esteem with us and venerate Christ at least as the greatest prophet of God. But what could compel so many peoples, otherwise differing in customs and opinions and pursuing each other with the bitterest hatreds, to approve these books as sacred and divine, if not the force of truth itself and a certain divine efficacy?

But besides these things, the antiquity of the scripture and God's care in preserving it contribute not a little to its authority and veneration. Indeed, the books of Moses are by far the oldest of all that exist. Indeed, there are no profane writings that equal the antiquity of David or Solomon. And yet the whole world has long waged war against the scripture and tried to abolish it, as Antiochus Epiphanes did in the times of the Jews; and in the memory of Christians, the Roman emperors, whose power was so great and their empire so vast. However much the world strove to abolish it, God's providence watched over it so that it has remained safe and whole to this day.

But especially, the divine origin of scripture is proven and established by the prophecies of the prophets. For it is only God's to know for certain and distinctly future contingencies and events that will happen many ages later. And therefore, no one can predict such things except by the inspiration of the divine spirit. But the prophets predicted many things for which there were no apparent causes in nature and which were fulfilled long after their death. Thus, Isaiah named Cyrus and predicted his empire and remarkable prosperity one hundred and fifty years before Cyrus was born. Similarly, the prophet Jeremiah precisely numbered the seventy years of Babylonian captivity before the Jews were taken to Babylon. Finally, Daniel clearly prophesied about the Persian and Greek monarchies, about the successors of Alexander the Great, and especially about Antiochus Epiphanes, who profaned the temple of God.

But most notably, what the Gospel teaches us about the birth, life, passion, death, burial, resurrection, and ascension into heaven of Jesus Christ, and the fruits of His death and passion, the calling of the Gentiles, the desolation of the Jewish nation, and the abolition of ceremonial worship, with nearly all the circumstances of these events, are clearly and openly predicted in the prophets. Among other notable passages, Isaiah 53 stands out, where he speaks so distinctly and clearly about the death and passion of our Redeemer Christ and His offering for the sins of the world, even about the manner of His death and burial, that he seems to narrate an event rather than predict a future one. And Daniel 9, where he expressly designates the time when Christ was to come and be cut off and bring an end to sacrifices: namely, after seventy weeks of years, followed by the dreadful destruction of the entire Jewish nation. Thus, comparing the oracles of Moses and the prophets about the Messiah with the Gospel history of Christ, a marvelous and utterly astonishing harmony immediately appears. Hence, it is manifestly proven that the books of the prophets are divine, as they contain predictions of things that happened so long after, and that the Gospel history is true and divine, as God bore witness to it through the prophets so many ages before.

Furthermore, the Jews, the fiercest enemies of Christians, testify that these prophecies were not fabricated by Christians, yet they are the strongest defenders and upholders of the prophetic books. And moreover, the great hatred of the Christian religion could not compel them to erase those prophecies from their books, even though they are so strongly opposed to it. This alone, I say, absolves them of the charge that some pagans have tried to bring against them, that they inserted those prophecies about Cyrus and Alexander the Great into their books to curry favor with those kings. For if they thought they had such license, they would not have left

untouched those prophecies with which Christians so strongly press them, especially that of Daniel about the time of Christ's coming and His being cut off. Nor will anyone who knows how religiously, not to say superstitiously, the Jews regard their sacred books ever suspect such a thing about them: so much so that they count the letters and points of individual books and proclaim a public fast if by chance a copy of scripture falls to the ground through negligence.

Moreover, anyone who attentively reads and considers the books of the prophets Daniel and Isaiah will easily recognize that everything in them coheres and is woven together with the same thread and spirit, and nothing is found that could reasonably be suspected of being added or inserted contrary to the mind and sense of the author, and which could be removed without the ruin and gap of the entire work.

In particular, to establish faith in the Evangelical scripture and doctrine, and consequently in the writings of the Old Testament, it is very beneficial to consider what the essence of this doctrine is, and who and what kind of people were the first to proclaim it throughout the world and commit it to writing. The essence of that doctrine is that Jesus of Nazareth is the Son of God and the promised Messiah, who, after teaching on earth for a while and performing miracles, voluntarily subjected Himself to an ignominious death for the sins of men; on the third day He rose again, and for several weeks frequently showed Himself alive to His disciples and proved it to them, holding many conversations with them about divine mysteries until He was finally taken up into heaven before their eyes. All this was testified to not only by one or two but by many disciples of Christ, especially the twelve prominent ones called Apostles. They all, with one accord, affirmed and publicly testified to everyone that they had seen Jesus, with whom they had been familiar and intimate while He lived, alive again after His death, had touched the scars and marks of His wounds with their hands, had even eaten and drunk with Him, and had received various commands from Him, had seen Him performing miracles with their own eyes as He had been accustomed to before His death, and finally, after blessing them, had seen Him ascend into heaven while they watched and gazed upon Him departing.

Moreover, these were simple and uneducated men, who, before becoming disciples of Christ, had mostly been engaged in collecting taxes, fishing, or other manual trades. And yet, being such men, they left their homes and families and undertook to preach Christ's doctrine in all places and establish a new form of worship of God. And having divided various provinces among themselves, they traveled throughout the world to bear witness to all nations and peoples that Jesus, the Son of Mary, whom they had seen with their own eyes performing many miracles, but especially His glorious resurrection from the dead and ascension into heaven, was the Son of God and the Savior of the world, appointed by God as the Lord and Judge of all, and therefore ought to be worshiped and adored by all, and His doctrine ought to be received with the highest faith and obedience.

Yet, although Jesus, who had died and risen again and whom they proposed to be worshiped, was foolishness to the Gentiles and a stumbling block to the Jews, and dangers threatened them from all sides, and their endeavors and marvelous actions, by which they sought to abolish the rites and customs of religion everywhere and bring all men to the faith and

obedience of Christ crucified, faced every opposition and new obstacles emerged daily, nothing could ever deter them from their purpose. Neither the insults and reproaches with which they were everywhere met, nor the violent impulses and seditious tumults of the crowd, nor the threats of the magistrates, nor prisons, nor scourges, nor wounds, nor hunger, thirst, and nakedness, nor the immense labors and cares of travel and every kind of hardship, until finally, having spread Christ's doctrine through countless nations and founded many churches in His name, they cheerfully faced death for their Master and confirmed their testimony of Christ's passion and glory with the shedding of their own blood.

If they did not testify the truth, since they claimed to have often seen and heard these things with their own eyes and ears, they must have knowingly fabricated them. But what could compel them to invent such things? Certainly not an excessive affection for their teacher. For if Christ did not truly rise again and ascend into heaven but remained perpetually buried by a bloody and ignominious death, they could not have been ignorant that they were falsely declaring Him to be the Messiah and the Savior of the world, and that they had been disgracefully deceived and deluded by Him. Who, knowing for certain and perceiving that they had been deceived by someone else, would not detest and hate him, and would not choose anything rather than to devote their entire life to His glory, proposing Him to all as God and Lord to be worshiped and invoked?

Moreover, if, feeling themselves deceived by Christ, they nevertheless wanted to lie so prodigiously and boldly in His favor, what end and purpose did this serve? Indeed, those who intend to deceive and impose upon men aim either at gaining profit, or some pleasure, or hope of obtaining some glory and dignity. But such a motive cannot be attributed to Christ's disciples without great impudence and against all semblance of truth. For if Christ did not rise again, but still lies buried in death, what could they hope for or fear from a dead man, whom they could not be unaware had been a notable liar and impostor, even if they had most wanted to believe otherwise?

From the part of the men to whom they announced Christ and bore witness to His resurrection, what benefit or glory could they expect by lying against their own conscience that a certain crucified man, regarded as a criminal by his own people, had risen again, and that he had suffered the most just punishment? And how could so many people of blameless and innocent life, against whom no crime could be objected, agree together in such a portentous and useless lie? Certainly, if we judge by human sense, they were all most miserable and in a wretched and contemptible condition. Nor did they gain any wealth or anything else that men usually desire and covet by their preaching, so much so that the most famous among them made his living by the labor of his own hands throughout his life, spending the time not devoted to preaching in making and selling tents. Indeed, the testimony they bore to Christ, both by word and writing, aroused the hatred of their fellow citizens and strangers against them and exposed them to infinite injuries and insults, and even put their lives in jeopardy, so that most of them, as we have already said, sealed their writings with their own blood. Nor can it be said that they fell into such

miseries inadvertently. For they undertook their mission foreseeing these calamities and voluntarily delivered themselves to be exercised and tormented by so many evils.

Therefore, if the testimony of Christ's disciples and Apostles was false, they could not expect any reward for their lies and absurd work either from the crucified Jesus, whose glory they so earnestly promoted, giving everything to Him and nothing to themselves, or from those to whom they preached Christ's resurrection and exaltation to the right hand of God, whether they were Greeks or Jews, since among both the name of Christ was despised and hated. Nothing could move and compel them to endure such labors for Christ and, despising all kinds of dangers and obstacles, bear witness to His glorious resurrection and ascension into heaven throughout the whole world, to the last breath of their lives, except the force of truth itself, and the divine commands and promises, with which their conscience was convicted, and their mind confirmed against all human power.

Besides these arguments and many similar ones by which the divinity of scripture can be asserted against those who deny it, the scripture itself has very illustrious marks and indications of truth and divinity, by which it proves and commends itself to a well-disposed mind whose eye is not blinded by prejudices and perverse affections, although these cannot be taken as arguments for disputing or at least not as valid and effective.

For just as a remarkable work of art, such as a Virgilian poem, or a painting, or a statue by a famous painter or sculptor, has certain qualities that reveal its author and claim him, and these are clearly and certainly recognized by experts, although a layperson may not notice them and may not easily draw arguments from them against someone who denies it, so the sacred scripture bears deeply impressed traces of the divine Spirit and marks of its heavenly origin, which are seen by those whose minds are not darkened and who are skilled in divine matters, and from this they become certain of its divinity, even if the ignorant and profane make light of them or do not notice them at all. Indeed, those who are learned in the humanities, when they read a human book, easily notice in it a certain spirit and character by which they are led to the knowledge of its author. Critics thus attribute genuine writings to their authors, for example, Aristotle or Cicero, and expunge spurious and counterfeit writings, although often what critics notice and recognize can hardly be explained and demonstrated to another who is not versed in these matters. Therefore, shall we doubt that the prophetic and apostolic writings exude the divine spirit and contain something that a pious and learned man perceives, by which he distinguishes them from human and counterfeit writings, even though this cannot be demonstrated against a disputant and opponent?

Moreover, these marks of divinity which we say are present in scripture can be noticed both in the matters and in the words. First of all, in the words, a certain divine character shines forth throughout the scripture. For when it narrates historical events, it does so candidly, simply, and plainly, without embellishment or rhetorical flourishes. Human writers, when they recount great events, usually show signs of a worried and doubtful mind, fearing that they may not be believed; they subtly try to avoid what might be more offensive and to make the matter as credible as possible. But when they have to say something about themselves, they either boast

and display their own deeds or are timid and fearful; they use certain excuses and prefaces: this certainly arises from a certain weakness and reveals a mind that lacks confidence and is not sufficiently secure.

As for the sacred writers, although they deal with the greatest and most astonishing matters, often performed through their own ministry, in their narratives everything is straightforward and simple, and there is nothing that smacks of a worried and anxious mind fearing disbelief. Rather, they speak everywhere as if assured of human judgments, relying on the dignity and truth of the matter: which indicates a certain magnanimity and majesty worthy of God.

In the precepts, corrections, and exhortations of scripture, a certain divine majesty can easily be observed. For it addresses kings and commoners, the highest and the lowest, magistrates and private individuals with equal authority. It flatters or spares no one, and its author shows himself to be entirely free from favoritism and hatred, hope and fear, accepting no one's person, but being the same towards all, regardless of their status and condition. When it teaches, it uses a certain plainness that accommodates itself to the understanding of the simple. It does not seek to embellish what it teaches with art and eloquence, but commends it by its own weight and usefulness. The masters of human arts and sciences usually coin specific terms for each art and cover what they teach with grand words to give their art dignity and add something of a mystery to it, so that the common people may admire and revere it. But scripture explains divine matters in human words and phrases taken from the common speech. When it wants to illustrate something, it does not seek its examples far away, but uses familiar and commonplace examples. Nor are its arguments such that only the learned can perceive them; rather, they are often of such a nature that any rustic and simple person can recognize their force.

Indeed, sometimes the words and phrases of scripture contain something foreign and contrary to common usage. But this should be attributed to the nature of the Hebrew language to which our ears are not accustomed. For the sacred writers either wrote in Hebrew, as Moses and the prophets did, or used phrases and idioms of the Hebrew language even if they wrote in Greek, as the writers of the New Testament did.

Finally, scripture always acts candidly and honestly. While men, when blaming or praising, threatening or promising, usually inflate and elevate trivial and humble matters with grand words and lofty metaphors, scripture, on the contrary, expresses the greatest matters in a simple and ordinary style and with words that fall short of the magnitude of the matter. And when it threatens and promises, its promises are indeed magnificent, and its threats are terrifying; yet, the importance and gravity of the matter far exceed the sound and emphasis of the words.

Now, if we attend to the matters of scripture, the marks of divinity will appear even more illustrious and clear.

All that is contained in scripture is either histories and narratives of past events, or prophecies and predictions of future events, or dogmas and precepts that do not note any difference of time. Concerning prophecies, it has already been said. But the sacred history claims

eminently for itself truth and weight. Firstly, the sacred history has many and great marks of truth.

For either reason and the very nature of things support it, as in the history of the creation of the world, which is proven by the strongest arguments to have been made from nothing and in time. Or the monuments of ancient and foreign historians bear witness to its truth, for example, in the history of the universal flood, the building of the tower of Babel, the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, which are mentioned by reputable and ancient historians whose fragments are preserved in Eusebius, Josephus, and others, and some of which are still in the hands of men. Then also, the sincerity and candor of the sacred historians give credibility to their accounts, which is so great that they do not conceal their own faults and often bring many marks of disgrace upon themselves and their people. Add to this that the sacred history in many ways proves itself by its candor and likelihood, and has those marks of truth which reputable historians possess, as can be seen in the books of Kings and Chronicles, as well as in the historical writings of the New Testament. And those things which seem to exceed belief and are marvelous and astonishing are written in such a way that it is impossible for the writer to have lied, since he appeals to countless witnesses who could have refuted him, but who nevertheless received his writings as divine and commended them to posterity as such: as has been shown above about the miracles narrated by Moses and mentioned by the Apostle Paul, and can also be shown about those marvelous things recounted by Luke in the Acts of the Apostles.

Moreover, if one considers the weight and significance of sacred history, what matters of greater weight or significance can there be or be imagined than those which pertain not only to a nation or a republic but to the whole Church that God has chosen for Himself from the world, indeed to the entire world, to the angels, inhabitants of heaven, and to God Himself, who is the first cause of all things? These are the matters with which the sacred history of scripture is concerned. For scripture recounts to us what were the beginnings and cradles of this universe and how God formerly created and ordered all things. How the human race was born and propagated, how it spread throughout the world, and what were the initial divisions of nations and languages. It narrates the appearances of angelic spirits and their frequent conversations with men, and the wonderful deeds of God Himself in governing and protecting the Church and procuring the salvation of the human race. If one were to compare the histories of the Greeks or Romans with these, he would find nothing that could in any way compare to them.

But especially in the precepts and dogmas of scripture, the greatest light of divinity shines forth. To make this clearer, it should be noted that these are of two kinds. For scripture teaches and commands many things that men know by nature, but very confusedly and uncertainly. It is as if one were to read ancient inscriptions on old coins, whose characters have begun to fade. But scripture makes these things clearer and teaches them fully and accurately so that reason, taught by it, sees distinctly and clearly what it previously saw only vaguely and obscurely. It is like a skilled person reading those inscriptions to the unskilled, who then can read and recognize them by themselves and declare that they ought to be read in this way and no

other. Such are the teachings of scripture about the nature and attributes of God, namely about God's eternal, immense, and immutable essence, and His infinite power, wisdom, goodness, and justice; about the creation of the world and all things in it, and the providence by which He preserves, governs, and administers everything; likewise about the duties of man towards God and neighbor, such as that God should be loved above all, everything should be referred to His glory, He should be diligently worshiped and invoked, trusted in, and relied upon. Likewise, the neighbor should be loved, everyone should be benefited, injuries should be borne, one should think humbly of oneself, internal thoughts and affections should be kept pure, and in a word, all the precepts of the Christian life, which should be pure and sincere in every part, and from which all impurity and lust should be absent.

These and similar things are approved by the sense of conscience and confirmed by reason, and their rudiments are seen in the books of the pagans. Indeed, they teach not contemptible things about God, piety, and human duty, but they do so obscurely, sparingly, coldly, doubtfully, and with a mixture of many errors. But scripture places these things in a clear light and teaches them fully and openly. So that after the light of scripture has shone upon us, we marvel that matters so certain and indubitable were only faintly, doubtfully, and obscurely recognized and handed down by the most excellent minds. But since those most excellent minds handed down these matters, whose truth we now see by the benefit of scripture, so meagerly and obscurely, and scripture does so fully and clearly; and yet the sacred writers did not surpass other men in learning or natural gifts, but rather were mostly unlearned and simple in human sciences, it is necessary that they were led by some other light than that of nature and were taught and inspired by God.

But besides those things of which men have a slight and fleeting knowledge by nature, sacred scripture teaches many things that surpass reason, and the human mind cannot grasp them nor has certain arguments for them. However, they so well harmonize with the things that the sense of conscience approves, and about which right reason is convinced, and they are so consistent with those earlier truths and so fittingly and appropriately built upon them, that it clearly appears they are not human fabrications but mysteries of divine wisdom. Such, for example, is the doctrine of the atonement of our sins through the death and offering of Christ, both God and man, made on the cross, which is seen to be most congruent with God's justice and mercy. In this way, God's justice is satisfied since our sins are punished in Christ, and mercy is shown since they are forgiven to us. And with this doctrine coheres that sublime and lofty dogma of three divine persons in one essence. For if the Son of God were not God and equal to the Father, His sacrifice would not have been of infinite value, which was required to atone for our sins, since they deserved infinite punishment. And such also is the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. It seems reasonable that the man who has acted well or badly in the body should also receive just reward or punishment in the body: since this does not happen in this life, it is fitting to God's justice that our bodies, which death has reduced to dust, should be reunited with their souls so that the entire person may be rewarded or punished according to his deeds.

Finally, in the precepts and doctrines of scripture, whatever their kind, nothing is found except what is sublime, pious, and holy. All things are referred to the honor of God and the good and benefit of man; thus, giving glory to God in all things, the fruit and benefit return to man. It expresses to us the idea of a life wholly perfect and paves the way to happiness, beyond which nothing can be wished for or conceived. Furthermore, it reveals the beauty and grace of piety and virtue, and it exposes the foulness and turpitude of vice so that it deeply strikes and affects the soul with love and desire for the former and horror and aversion for the latter. Thus, it distinguishes and separates the true and solid goods, by which the soul is cultivated and prepared for the enjoyment of God Himself, from the apparent and false ones, which the depraved appetites of men crave, so that the mind, convinced of the vanity of the latter and the excellence of the former, cannot but despise these and ardently pursue those. It deters man from evil and stimulates him to duty and good with motives and incentives that touch and move the whole man, compared to which the ethical concepts invented by philosophers are cold and feeble. If we seek comfort in adverse situations and in the distresses of the mind, it suggests such consolations that support the soul with firm hope and incredible sweetness, not like human wisdom, which deceives and deludes for a time. Against the depraved and turbulent affections of men, it supplies remedies that uproot evil from its deepest roots and, in those who do not refuse to use them and seriously desire to be freed, rightly compose all the movements of the soul and establish a certain peace and quiet that is above all desires.

Therefore, there is no book, nor any product of human wisdom, that in any part matches the power and efficacy of this divine scripture and doctrine, which acts so powerfully and effectively on man, whether by affecting him with a sense of sin and awakening his slumbering conscience, or by uplifting a contrite spirit and consoling an afflicted conscience, or by so changing the whole man that he hates sin and sincerely pursues true righteousness and holiness. In this efficacy, nothing is more potent in confirming believers, although it cannot compel assent from those who have not yet felt this efficacy and have hardened themselves against the Word of God. Yet, even the most profane man, although he has not felt the efficacy of the Word of God, if he attentively considers it, can easily recognize that this Word is such that it generates the highest tranquility and joy in those who firmly believe in it and compels them to every good work and every virtue.

The Inauguration of the Most Learned James Alpeus.

But the beauty of the argument and its inexhaustible fecundity has carried us farther than we intended: The time now elapsed warns us to draw to a close and address the matter for which you are assembled here today. Therefore, you know how nearly two years ago God transferred to a better life the venerable old man, the most learned and celebrated Mr. Peter Moulin, who presided over this Church for many years and, also with the highest praise and everlasting honor, served as Professor of Theology and was a singular ornament to our Academy. Consequently, someone was immediately sought who could fill the role of such an eminent man both in the

Church and in the School. After much deliberation, the Academic Senate, with the unanimous vote of the elders of this Church, finally fixed their eyes on the most renowned and learned James Alpeus of Saint Maurice, who was then serving the sacred ministry with great praise in one of the churches of our neighboring Champagne. He was therefore chosen and sought with the consent of all votes and mature judgment to take up the role of Pastor and Professor of Theology in place of the illustrious Moulin, of blessed memory, as soon as possible. What compelled this choice was his already well-known learning, eloquence, readiness for all tasks, besides his disciplined life and pleasant manners, and also his prudence, tempered by vigor and skill in handling affairs. But due to certain obstacles delaying his vocation, the matter was postponed to the recent Synod of Ayace, from which he finally obtained an honorable discharge, after being assigned the role of Secretary in that Synod with no small mark of honor. Thus, having been called here last summer, he not only taught from the pulpit in the Church and performed all the duties of a good and faithful pastor with the highest vigilance and care, but also, as directed by the Academic Senate, began teaching theology students privately without delay, both to promote their studies and to further his own progress in theological knowledge by teaching others, and by this sort of training to approach the public profession more practiced and ready. Finally, he was commanded to publicly display the proofs of his genius and doctrine, both by teaching and disputing, so that he might be duly and solemnly inaugurated as Doctor and Professor of Theology. How much applause and praise he earned in this, you yourselves are witnesses and conscious of, and there is no need to recount. Therefore, he has been pronounced most worthy by the judgment of all pastors and professors to be promoted to the degree of Doctor and to be enrolled in the theological profession.

Let the academic scribe now rise and read to you, James Alpeus, the received formula of the oath, which you will swear to in set words, with raised hand, so that you may know the duties you are henceforth bound to and the responsibilities of your profession.

After the formula was read and the oath taken, the Promoter thus addressed the most learned man.

Now therefore, Most Learned and Distinguished Man, about to be numbered among the Professors of this Most Holy Faculty, ascend this platform to receive the title and dignity of Doctor and Professor of Theology, which is due to your learning.

After the one to be inaugurated had ascended from the lower chair to the higher platform, the Promoter addressed him with these words:

First and foremost, most learned man, let Christ our Lord always be before your mind, who gave pastors and teachers to His Church, so that you may faithfully and purely teach, illustrate, and defend the heavenly doctrine which He ensured was recorded in the writings of the Prophets and Apostles.

Therefore, do not think beyond the Word of God. But whatever you propose to your listeners, whether in writing or by spoken word, let it be drawn and gathered from the Word of

God and strictly conform and agree with what is contained in the Canonical books of the Old and New Testaments.

Also, remember that you are appointed by God as a teacher of the truth which is according to godliness. Thus, strive to ensure that all your teaching breathes godliness and is directed to the glory and worship of God. Therefore, avoid vain and useless questions. Adhering to necessary and solid matters, refrain from idle speculations that do nothing but provide material for fruitless disputes and contentions.

Furthermore, diligently impress upon your mind that truth is to be pursued with charity, according to the Apostle's command. Hence, be careful not to break the bond of charity with your brethren under the pretext of pursuing truth, or to stir up disturbances in the Christian school. Therefore, do not be eager for novelty. Nor rashly or too harshly condemn anything others propose that does not entirely agree with your preconceived opinions. Do not think your understanding is the measure of others, nor that the judgments of all should be subject to your judgment. Rather, firmly holding to the foundations of pure religion, do not be contentious in matters that do not subvert sound doctrine and are not clearly and plainly set forth in the Word of God, and do not assume a censorious attitude towards your colleagues and peers, but always be ready to learn from others and bear with differing opinions in non-essential matters calmly and modestly.

As much as possible, strive to be clear and concise in teaching. Avoid circumlocution, vain subtleties, and untimely displays of learning and varied reading. Rather, focus on imbuing your students with sound doctrine according to their capacity and understanding, rather than making yourself appear learned to others.

To be more fit to teach others, endeavor to become more learned yourself daily and to progress in the grace and true doctrine of Christ. Therefore, if possible, waste no time uselessly but diligently attend to reading, and gather resources from all sides so that you may daily become more equipped to teach others.

Especially, be careful not to spend the hours dedicated to the instruction of your students in idleness or other business without necessity. Do not be content to teach only from the pulpit, but when necessary, listen to your students in turn, always ready to answer those who consult you and patiently and kindly resolve the knots and difficulties that trouble their minds.

Do not only strive to lead your students in doctrine and word but also by example. Let your conduct be blameless. Your whole manner of life should be composed and dignified, and your daily and domestic conversations should be seasoned with salt and grace. Let nothing in your words, dress, or behavior suggest vanity, levity, or a spirit that is not sufficiently pious. Yet, while maintaining a decent gravity everywhere, temper it as much as you can with kindness and courtesy so that your students may not only respect you but also love you and more willingly learn from you and listen to your admonitions and reproofs.

These things, Most Distinguished Man, I do not mention as if I thought you ignorant or forgetful of them. Nor do I say anything to you that I would not also consider said to myself. But our common frailty and the excellence and magnitude of the office to be imposed on you, for

which an account must be given to God, make it necessary that these things be impressed upon us too often.

Formula of Inauguration:

Therefore, may it be prosperous and auspicious. I declare, create, and announce you, Jacobus Alpeus, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, as a Doctor of Theology. With the academic senate presiding and the whole assembly of the most learned professors and reverend pastors consenting, I admit you into the body and college of Theology Professors, so that you may publicly teach sacred scriptures from this platform and henceforth enjoy the privileges and immunities granted to this sacred order.

I place this open book of Sacred Scripture before your eyes, in which the living oracles of God and the saving Doctrine are contained, so that you may know that your teaching must be drawn from it and that your eyes must be continually turned to it, and nothing divergent from it should be proposed to your students. I offer you this book again closed, as a reminder that you should be so versed and skilled in Sacred Scripture that even without books you can resolve proposed doubts and respond to questions extemporaneously. I extend my right hand to you as a symbol and pledge of collegiality and friendship. And I embrace you with this fraternal hug as a most dear brother in Christ.

Therefore, with God's favor, who is the Father of lights and the author of every good gift, with the blessing of Christ our Lord who gave pastors and teachers to His Church, and with the inspiration of that Holy Spirit from whom all wisdom flows into us, undertake the province assigned to you with alacrity. May the same Almighty and Most High God, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit, clothe you with divine life, endow you with His gifts, guide you with His leadership, and may His grace be continually with you so that the duty imposed upon you may lead to your honor, the benefit of the students, the adornment of the Academy, and the defense of the truth, to the glory of God's name and the edification of the Church, through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

Prayer of Thanksgiving:

O Most High and Excellent God, source of eternal light and wisdom, we solemnly give thanks to You for so many great benefits with which You daily fill us, although we are unworthy and undeserving. Do not interrupt the course of Your beneficence towards us because of our daily sins, but continue to pour out Your sacred and heavenly blessings upon us, and favor our labors with Your grace so that, faithfully and diligently fulfilling the duties to which You have called us, we may reap some fruit of our work and usefully serve the edification of the Church and the glory of Your name. Save our most merciful King and adorn him more and more with royal virtues so that we may long enjoy that peace under his shadow and protection, which he has brought to his kingdom by his arms and victories, relying and aided by Your help. Also, may You keep our illustrious Prefect safe, and more and more endow him with all the good things of body and soul, and be present with Your grace and spirit to those who manage public affairs

under his auspices; so that we may live peacefully and tranquilly in this place, unanimously worshiping You in true righteousness and holiness in this earthly and mortal life, until we reach eternal life. Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

FINIS